The Crisis of the Humanities and Social Sciences in the Age of “Innovation”:
Philosophy as a Critical Facilitator toward a “Civic Turn” of the University

KATO Yasushi
Professor, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: The concept of “innovation” dominates and commands all over the world. This confronts us with a deep crisis, in that faculties for the Humanities and Social Sciences are being curtailed steadily in universities. Japan is no exception. In the case of Japan, both the “notice of June 8th” and the “Science and Technology Basic Plans” constituting the background of this notice propose to reduce these faculties in Japanese national universities radically. I am afraid that the death of philosophy would start from this curtailment of the philosophy faculty. By making a historical detour to Kant’s philosophy, especially his arguments on the university in The Conflict of the Faculties (1798), I argue for the claim that both philosophy and the philosophy faculty should transgress established disciplinary boundaries, and that in this way philosophy as a “critical facilitator” could mediate between academic expertise and common sense of civil society. That is what I mean by a “civic turn” of the university. I hope that we could find in “applied ethics” and “applied philosophy” methodologies that could help philosophy assume this role in Japan.

The concept of “innovation” dominates and commands modern society. Japanese society is no exception. In Japan, the “Science and Technology Basic Law”, with the goal of “building a nation that is creative in science-based technology”, plays a leading role in “innovating” society technologically. The 3rd “Science and Technology Basic Plan” (as ratified by the Japanese Cabinet in March 2006 for the...
The Crisis of the Humanities and Social Sciences in the Age of “Innovation”

period 2006-2010), which was drawn up according to that Law, defines “innovation” as “renewal that creates new social and economic values by fusing and developing scientific discoveries and technological inventions” (STBP III, 4). From the third through the fourth (2011-2015) and the current fifth period (2016-2020) of the “Science and Technology Basic Plan”, “innovation” has been its core concept. More, on the basis of the definition quoted above, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) further stresses “models of innovation with impact on the market and technology” and “models of innovation, which relate to the creation of economic values.”

This readily shows how closely the concept is linked to the problem of the “market”.

In the following I will first give an overview of how “innovation through science-based technology”, the key concept within these Science and Technology Basic Plans, subjects both the university and the humanities and social sciences (HSS) to market principles and compromises their original functions. Second, I will consider how the university and the HSS can overcome this crisis. Finally, I will discuss what kind of contribution philosophy might make, by focusing on its critical and reflexive, as well as its boundary-transgressing and interdisciplinary function. This also means the possibility of transgressing the boundary between “HSS (Geisteswissenschaften)” and “natural sciences”, which presupposes the ontological distinction between “spirit” and “nature”. E. Cassirer’s idea of “Cultural Sciences (Kulturwissenschaften)” is a good precedent for such a philosophical project, since one may certainly discover here evidence of philosophy’s transgressing established disciplinary boundaries. In my understanding, however, we could find in “applied ethics” and “applied philosophy” methodologies that could help philosophy assume this role, especially in Japan now. Through these “applied” methodology philosophy may transgress disciplinary boundaries to form new fields, such as that of “bioethics” that cooperates closely with the medical sciences, for example. By “applying” itself

Science and Technology Basic Plan will be used: STBP, which will be followed by the period and page number from this web site.


Henceforth I refer to this conference report as HfSSH.
and thereby “transgressing” supposedly given boundaries philosophy may thus provide a foundation for interdisciplinary research.

1. The HSS under the regime of “innovation”

In June 2015 MEXT issued the so-called “notice of June 8th”, which was reported not only in Japan but all over the world as having proclaimed that faculties for the HSS would be radically reduced in Japanese national universities. The real background for this “notice” can be discerned in the notion of “innovation” in the STBPs. The ideas of the 3rd Basic Plan about “innovation” are revealed quite clearly in the following quote:

“It takes years before the accumulation of intellectual capital is concretized as value. Whether the strengths in science-based technologies, which have increased due to the investments in the period of the 1st and 2nd STBP, can be realized through innovations in various economic and social fields, contribute to the solution of social issues by strengthening industrial competitiveness, security, health, etc., and thus secure the prosperity of the Japanese economy and population, will depend on further efforts. (STBP III, 4)

“Innovation” thus is to mean “innovation through science-based technology”. This is the basic strategic concept that is supposed to aid the Japanese economy to survive in the market and thereby solve social problems. With this concept as one’s criterion, the HSS inevitably appear to be of limited value. And within frameworks such as “cooperation between science and industry” or “cooperation between science, public administration and industry”, “university-originated ventures” are emphasized. Through the concept of “innovation” the university is thus incorporated into the market. However, the concept does not determine the 3rd STBP completely. In fact, there are several aspects to it, which may well be assessed positively. (1) The plan shows some understanding toward autonomous and diverse basic research carried out by the universities. For example, it states that “it is important to ensure that the university’s function of training excellent researchers is supported, and that the level of basic research is raised, and it is advisable not to one-sidedly emphasize certain areas of research, but to maintain a wide range of subjects and promote
emerging fields in order to preserve the diversity of fundamental research” (STBP III, 25). It thus refrains from the full-scale marketization of all functions of the university. (2) With respect to “basic research which produces diverse knowledge and innovations”, the plan states that “basic research, which creates human wisdom and is the source of knowledge, is the most uncertain among all research and development activities” (STBP III, 11). It thus shows some concern toward fundamental research precisely because of its “uncertainty”. With respect to basic research, its assessments are mostly correct. (3) “Basic research includes research within the humanities and social sciences which is based on the free thoughts of researchers, and research which is based on policies and aimed at future applications. Both should be supported” (ibid.). With this position the plan backs up diverse basic research in the humanities and social sciences while it also encourages interdisciplinary research involving both natural sciences and humanities/social sciences and aiming at solving social problems. Further, when it states that (4) “An integrative approach to promote specialized and segmented knowledge, including the humanities and social sciences, is necessary” (STBP III, 14) and defines basic research as (5) “generating human wisdom”, it distinguishes different levels to which science and technology can make contributions, i.e. “contributions to the world”, “to society”, and “to the nation”. With “contributions to the world” it posits a dimension beyond the scope of the nation state.

The 3rd Basic Plan clearly aims to combine universities or research in universities with “innovation” and to subject them to market principles. But on the other hand, it still leaves room for disciplines which cannot or need not be part of marketization, in other words “short-term economically useless” disciplines or “reine Wissenschaft”, as opposed to “Brotwissenschaft”. Regarding this point and the position of the humanities and social sciences, the 3rd STBP thus is ambivalent.

The following 4th Science and Technology Basic Plan, which was adopted after the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011, propagates a concept which is difficult to translate in any foreign language: “innovation through science-based technology”, which supposedly “comprehends scientific and technological measures and innovative strategies as one unit” (STBP IV, 3). It is defined as “intellectual and cultural creation, based on new knowledge derived from scientific discoveries and inventions, and innovations which develop such knowledge and connect with the creation of economic, social, and public values” (STBP IV, 7). With this concept, the marketization line has become even more manifest. The 4th STBP also stresses that “the fundamental strengthening of basic research rich in creativity and diversity,
which may create new concepts and generate knowledge for mankind, is necessary” (STBP IV, 4), but the aim of this is to “construct the foundations to develop the sciences and technology of our country” (ibid.). This reduces the issue to the scientific and technological context, and thus also inserts the humanities and social sciences into this diminished context. This is reflected in an extreme way in the statement that “science and technology are to be maintained as culture” (STBP IV, 6). While the position taken is rather regressive compared to the 3rd STBP, the 4th STBP still points to the need for interdisciplinary research and grants that basic research should be based on free, diverse and original ideas of researchers.

By contrast, the 5th STBP defines the present as an “era of drastic change” (STBP V, 4), and affirms that in future Japan will become a “super smart society” and Japanese universities in such a society will be positioned as follows:

To maximize the potential accumulated from investments to date, universities must be reformed with the recognition that they contribute to society through their education and research, and partnerships between industry, academia, and government must be expanded. (STBP V, 1)

Through this simplification the universities and the HSS are much more deeply embedded within the “innovation through science-based technology” framework and thereby directed toward marketization.

The points that attract attention here are (1) the altered status of basic research, (2) the substantial withdrawal or rather loss of the prospects of “human wisdom” or “knowledge for all mankind”. Regarding (1), in the 5th STBP basic research has been redefined as “academic research”. Moreover, “results” are particularly emphasized, when it mentions “academic research that produces a variety of creative and high-quality results grounded in researchers’ intrinsic motivations” (STBP V, 37). In this context, the wording “basic research driven by policy strategy and demand” (ibid.) is also introduced, which shows how the importance of basic research has changed. While a balance between intrinsic motivation and social exigencies is considered, “academic research” is required to “respond to the public mandate” (STBP V, 38). And the long-term perspective, i.e. the contribution to “human wisdom” which was included in the previous STBPs, has nearly disappeared. Consequently, “basic research” is reduced to “academic research” and to “short-term solution-finding research”. In connection with this, there is, moreover, a focus on a drastic reform of the university. It is suggested that
universities become “core executioners” of “innovation through science-based technology” (compare STBP V, 46ff.). The so-called “notice of June 8th” by MEXT in 2015, which demanded a substantial reform including the removal of faculties for the humanities and social science in Japanese national universities, was nothing but a preliminary announcement of these aims. In any case, the 5th STBP announces the “drastic change” toward a “super smart society”, “Society 5.0” accomplished by “innovation through science-based technology” and engineering. If the HSS still have a role to play, it is but a subordinate one. Because, according to the 5th STBP, social problems are solved by science-based technologies, and the “drastic change” of Japanese society can also be accomplished through science-based technology, the HSS do not really find their place within its structure. They are essentially excluded from it. The first step in this respect is their retreat from Japanese national universities. The effect is that “innovation through science-based technology” turns out to mean that social change is equivalent to the progress of science-based technology.

That the universities and academic research in the HSS and natural sciences are exposed to marketization by way of the concept of “innovation”, and that the HSS are in such a sorry state, is, however, not a uniquely Japanese phenomenon. These are symptoms that appear worldwide. The 5th STBP in Japan, in fact, corresponds to “Horizon 2020” (2014-2020), adopted by the EU in January 2014. According to the analysis of the Japan Science and Technology Agency, the aim of “Horizon 2020” is “to connect the results of research with innovation, economic growth and employment.” And the baseline of its international strategy is supposed to be “raising the economic and industrial competitive strength of European research” and “dealing with social problems affecting the whole world”. This “dealing with social problems” then “may contain different programs ranging from basic research to innovation, to social science research.” Here I simply want to point out the harsh fact that just as the 5th STBP in Japan clearly neglects the HSS, so does “Horizon 2020”. Yet, to oppose this form of neglect, in 2013 representatives of the HSS in the EU gathered at Mykolas Romeris University in Lithuania. They convened at the “Vilnius Conference” and discussed countermeasures. In the following section I will look at the main points raised during this conference.

---

7 Ibid.
2. Strategies for survival of the HSS in the EU

“Horizon 2020” is an EU programme to establish research frameworks, running for 7 years from 2014 onwards. According to the executive committee of the “Vilnius Conference” the characteristics of “Horizon 2020” may be seen in two aspects. On the one hand, one of the priorities of “Horizon 2020” is to address the so-called “social challenges” within the EU, on the other hand, an “integrative approach” is meant to promote interdisciplinary research across established disciplines. Both aspects correspond with the Japanese 5th STBP. Within the framework of “Horizon 2020”, the first one involves a model of “short-term solutions”. If the interdisciplinary research of the “integrative approach” is linked with this, the HSS must content themselves with subordinate functions within this approach. In the worst case, they are simply excluded. It was out of concern that particular research fields within the HSS were to be reduced that the “Vilnius Conference” was organized. This is certainly a concern we share. In this sense, the crisis of the HSS is prevalent in the “East” just as in the “West”.

The aim of the “Vilnius Conference” as designed by the executive committee was to alter “Horizon 2020” as far as it gave reason to worry that the HSS would lose ground, but also to find out how the HSS may be actively promoted under the conditions of the program. For this reason, “policy-makers” and “administrators” were invited to the conference to discuss these issues with experts from the HSS. Departing from the humanities and social sciences scholars’ standard assumptions about their research, they made suggestions how a concrete and active contribution within the “integrative approach” of “Horizon 2020” might be possible. Concretely, the following issues were discussed: “what are the potential contributions which the SSH [social sciences and humanities] can bring to solving/enlightening the specific societal challenge? And what are specific conditions that need to be met for the SSH in order to be able to make this contribution?”

The conference summarized its result in the “Vilnius Declaration”. This Declaration lists the conditions under which HSS might be integrated into “Horizon 2020” with “benefits” for these disciplines.

How does the Declaration comprehend the “benefits” of this integration? What kind of particularities of the HSS does it consider? According to the “Vilnius Declaration”, the distinguishing features of the European humanities and social sciences are to be found in the fact that they can consider social diversity

8 HiSSH, p.17.
pluralistically, and in the fact that they are intellectual resources for social change. In so far as these sciences are integrated into “Horizon 2020”, it becomes possible to grasp “innovation” not simply as progress of science-based technology, but as a matter of social change. If “innovation” is understood properly, and is assigned an appropriate place in society, it may help in tackling social problems more effectively. Originally the HSS are fundamental tools to connect society and science-based technology. What is important is that through the mediation of the HSS the self-serving teleology of “innovation” is avoided, that the domination of the social by science-based technology can be prevented, and that it is thereby possible to raise the “reflective capacity of society.” This “reflective capacity” itself is essential to ensure that society can continue to be a democratic and pluralistic one. Thus the HSS can contribute to slowing the homogenization and simplification of society by “innovation through science-based technology” and to maintaining social diversity.

In this way, the HSS might become intellectual resources that help to sustain or enhance a pluralistic and democratic society, and at the same time they can help -- through their mediation between science-based technology and society -- to design a system that integrates “innovation” appropriately within society. That is the main import of the “Vilnius Declaration”. This could lead us to a new concept of “innovation” mediated by the HSS, which I call “social human innovation”. The first requirement of “social human innovation” is interdisciplinary research through the mediation of the HSS that makes it possible to connect research evaluation and social values. That is, in the framework of this new “innovation” the HSS come to play a double role, i.e. they mediate between science-based technology and society as well as between research in general and society. Such a mediating role of the HSS is in a sense identical with the procedural method of “translation”. Only through the mediation of the HSS is it possible that both technology and research in general conceive and communicate the diversity of society and vice versa.

Concerning these points D. Weidner has also provided several interesting arguments on the ways that “Cultural Sciences (Kulturwissenschaften)” produce hybrid knowledge as follows:

It [Kulturwissenschaften] aims to transport a knowledge that is no longer disciplinary but not yet systematic. While transgressing disciplinary boundaries, it does not omit them; instead it is constituted by the various transfers of specific concepts of one discipline and discourse into another.9

9 Weidner (2013), p.50 on HfSSH.
That means that he sees the particularity of the HSS in the method of “translation”, especially “the diversity of translation in which various discourses relate to each other productively through mutual exchange.” With recourse to Cassirer he engages the concept of “Cultural Sciences (Kulturwissenschaften)” as one good example that originates from the same “translation” type of methodology.

According to him, through this kind of methodological approach the HSS within themselves produce hybrid knowledge and open up new areas of research, and in this sense, the “translation” is original and creative. Weidner proposes to transport this method beyond the HSS, that is, to make use of it in interdisciplinary research engaging the humanities, social sciences, natural sciences, and engineering. By using the method of “translation”, joint research of the HSS with natural sciences and engineering may thus create new hybrid knowledge. That is, disciplinary boundaries are transgressed by way of “translation”. At the same time it will be possible to institutionalize “innovation” adequately in society. Viewing the process from the point of the HSS, it is through the process of “translation” that the HSS may eventually integrate “innovation” within society, i.e. may convert “innovation through science-based technology” into “social human innovation” meaningfully.

Weidner’s thesis is an interesting proposition, which takes the particular character of the HSS as its point of departure in order to relate them to “Horizon 2020”. The problem is, however, that he does not address how his interesting observations may be related to the university’s own functions.

But reconsidering the issue, one may come up with another idea: wasn’t philosophy just the discipline that transgressed established disciplinary boundaries, in other words, the discipline that played a “translation” role originally? The real situation of philosophy now is harsh, though. For example, departments of philosophy at Japanese universities have already been downsized. I am afraid that philosophy may face an existential crisis all over the world (perhaps except for China). In the next section, I want to make a historical detour that hopefully allows a fresh look at the situation philosophy is facing in the present from another point of view. The detour leads to a field in which I work: Kant’s philosophy and the situation in philosophy at the end of the 18th century, especially in Germany. I make this detour because Kant thinks the boundary-transgressing potentialities immanent to philosophy together with the university’s own functions, and because I think that Kant’s ideas point to possibilities for the survival of philosophy as a discipline.

---

10 Weidner (2013), p.52 on HfSSH.
3. On the public use of philosophy in the university – Toward a “civic turn” of the university

The cooperation or partnership of industry, government and university is not a new idea at all. In the 18th century J. D. Michaelis already defined the essential function of the German universities in terms of “utility (Nützlichkeit)”, stating that the “the state should profit from the university.”\(^{11}\) In this context, it was Kant who in *The Conflict of the Faculties* (1798)\(^{12}\) proposed a new social function and role for the university. Kant’s discourse eventually became the theoretical foundation of the University of Berlin, which constitutes the starting point of the modern university.

Kant initially follows the tradition in distinguishing the higher faculties, the “theological”, “legal”, and “medical”, from the lower faculty, the “philosophy”. Departing from this distinction, he notes that it was made by the government, and moreover that the government’s interest focused on the higher faculties, not the “philosophy” faculty. That is, the reason why the higher faculties are supposed to be “higher” is but the government. Just as the medical faculty is occupied with health and longevity, which the people in general desires on the basis of their natural instincts, so the other higher faculties react to social needs in order to realize the general happiness of the people. More, the government is actually interested in controlling the population through the higher faculties. In this sense, the university, which is dominated by the higher faculties, is nothing more than one of the “instruments of the government” (Streit, VII, 18), a “space for utility”, which the government makes a large profit from. In this way, the higher faculties are part of a chain for the fulfillment of happiness mediating between the government and the


\(^{12}\) The abbreviations used for Kant’s work are as follows, and are followed by the volume and page number from the German academy edition: *Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften*, edited by the “Königlich Preussiche Akademie der Wissenschaften” (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1902ff.). The English translations of Kant’s works are based on the Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel Kant:

*Aufklärung* Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? (What is Enlightenment?)

*Briefe* Briefe (Letters)

*KrV* Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason)

*MS* Die Metaphysik der Sitten (The Metaphysics of Morals)

*Streit* Der Streit der Fakultäten (The Conflict of the Faculties)
people. J. D. Michaelis’ argument mentioned above is just one classic discourse justifying such a passive and utilitarian concept of the university.

By contrast, the philosophy faculty as the lower is not under the control of the government, but under that of reason. “So the philosophy faculty, because it must answer for the truth of the teachings it is to adopt or even allow, must be conceived as free and subject only to laws given by reason, not by the government” (Streit, VII, 27). If the division of the faculties is analyzed from the perspective of “reason”, there is yet another difference hiding in the background. This is certainly, as E. Cassirer puts it, the difference between the “conventions and power” of the government and “scientific reason”, but I understand it yet more precisely as that between the “private” and the “public” use of “reason” in the scientific field. Kant defines the difference between these two uses of “reason” in his What is Enlightenment? as follows:

For this enlightenment, however, nothing is required but freedom, and indeed the least harmful of anything that could even be called freedom: namely, freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters … The public use of one’s reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among human beings; the private use of one’s reason may, however, often be very narrowly restricted without this particularly hindering the progress of enlightenment. But by the public use of one’s own reason I understand that use which someone makes of it as a scholar before the entire public of the world of readers. What I call the private use of reason is that which one may make of it in a certain civil post or office with which he is entrusted. Now, for many affairs conducted in the interest of a commonwealth a certain mechanism is necessary, by means of which some members of the commonwealth must behave merely passively, so as to be directed by the government, through an artful unanimity, to public ends (or at least prevented from destroying such ends). Here it is, certainly, impermissible to argue; instead, one must obey. But insofar as this part of the machine also regards himself as a member of a whole commonwealth, even of the society of citizens of the world, and so in his capacity of a scholar who by his writings addresses a public in the proper sense of the world, he can certainly argue … (Aufklärung, VIII, 37f.)

---

According to Kant’s argument quoted above, the “private” use of reason means that which is merely under the control of the government and must behave passively according to its directions. By contrast, the “public” use is that which is entirely free from this control: it is purely based on “reason” and can address the citizens as members of the whole commonwealth and of world society. Here, the meaning of “private” and “public” is rather different from and even contradictory the usual meaning in ordinary language. In my understanding, the distinction between “private” and “public” corresponds to the distinction between the role of the philosophy faculty and that of other “higher faculties” in the university in respect to their use of “reason”, in so far as Kant stresses that “—Now the power to judge autonomously – that is, freely (according to principles of thought in general) – is called reason. So the philosophy faculty, because it must answer for the truth of the teachings it is to adopt or even allow, must be conceived as free and subject only to laws given by reason, not by the government” (Streit, VII, 27); while the philosophy faculty is free from the control of the government and purely based on “reason” and therefore can use it in public (öffentlich), the “higher faculties” depend on the “conventions and power” of the government and are always subjected to the constraints and limitations set by it. So to guarantee academic freedom, the philosophy faculty is required to always be free, especially free from the government.

Consequently, Kant concludes that “… a university must have a faculty of philosophy. Its function in relation to the three higher faculties is to control them and, in this way, be useful to them, since truth [Wahrheit] (the essential and first condition of learning in general) is the main thing, whereas the utility [Nützlichkeit] the higher faculties promise the government is of secondary importance … /The philosophy faculty can, therefore, lay claim to any teaching, in order to test its truth. The government cannot forbid it to do this without acting against its own proper and essential purpose; and the higher faculties must put up with the objections and doubts it brings forward in public [öffentlich], though they may well find this irksome...“(Streit, VII, 28). This conclusion means the following: (1) The philosophy faculty goes beyond the individual specialized disciplines; using “reason” in public, it critically questions the established boundaries and conditions of academic disciplines; it thereby subjects the higher faculties to the “critique of reason”; (2) as the higher faculties are thus exposed to the “critique of reason”, they are removed from government control and can then practice self-reflection and self-criticism in regard to their dependence on the government. To put it bluntly, it is the “free rational discourse (die freie Vernünftelei)” of the philosophy faculty, i.e. of
philosophy, which questions and breaks up the “magic power” (Streit, VII, 31) of the higher faculties. This “magic power” drives from the government, which employs the three higher faculties to respond to the people’s needs and thereby controls the people; the “magic power”, therefore, is but the power of “utility”. Further, through this questioning the university can be rationalized from within. It opens up the possibility that reason itself becomes institutionalized. By including philosophy, the university gains the capacity to reflect and criticize itself. That means that the “freedom” of “free rational discourse” within the philosophy faculty is nothing more than the “freedom” from “utility” and also the freedom from “government control”; “The philosophy faculty can, therefore, lay claim to any teaching, in order to test its truth. The government cannot forbid it to do this“ (Streit, VII, 28). Moreover, the philosophy faculty “is independent of the government’s command with regard to its teachings”; “having no commands to give”, this faculty “is free to evaluate everything” (Streit, VII, 19). Finally, philosophy is the most adequate discipline to take on this task. As “boundary-transgressing scholarship”, philosophy includes other disciplines from other faculties, questions their scientific foundations critically, and thus changes the function of the university itself; throughout this process the fundamental function of the university can be demystified and stripped of the “magic power” of the government. Thus, through the critical function of philosophy as “scholarship that transgresses disciplinary boundaries”, in other words through the public use of philosophy, the university is transformed from a “space for utility” into a “space for truth”. When the philosophy faculty occupies the center of the university as the higher faculty, the question what kind of purpose the university has will be answered with “truth”.

How is Kant’s “interest in truth” as the university’s guiding principle to be understood? “Truth” in whose interest and for what kind of purpose? R. Brandt’s interpretation that “the purpose of the university (...) is to grasp truth for truth’s sake, to consequently blend out human interests and benefits”\(^{14}\) seems to be mistaken. For Kant an “external touchstone for truth” (cf. KrV, B 848) is required, and thus according to him, “truth” has to be open to the public sphere.\(^{15}\) It is closely related to “publicity” or “sociality” of “truth” and not a hermetic “truth for truth’s sake”. That the university is first and foremost a “space for truth” and not a “space for utility” therefore means that the university is not directly linked to the government, but

---

\(^{14}\) Reinhard Brandt, “Zum »Streit der Fakultäten«”, in: Kant-Forschungen, vol. 1, p.34.

addresses the citizens in a different manner, other than in terms of “utility”. Kant calls this “an agreement [Eintracht] of the learned and civil community” (Seit, VII, 35). As a “learned community” the university cooperates primarily not with the government but with the citizens. The new relationship that it forms in this “cooperation” consists in the university’s assuming the role of the self-reflection of civil society. “Utility” is of course thereby not completely abandoned by the university. As long as there is a medical faculty within it, the health and longevity of the people remain the goal of its knowledge-producing endeavor. If this is the case, what does it mean to say that the university in “agreement with the civil community” functions as self-reflection of civil society?

When the university develops its self-reflective function, the form of civil society itself becomes a topic of discussion, and problems, such as whether a particular institution is to be reformed or not, or whether society as a whole is sufficiently democratic and pluralistic etc., are discussed. This can be easily understood. What is more important is that when the philosophy faculty becomes a higher faculty and the university adopts the function of such self-reflection of civil society, philosophy takes on a new role based on its own public use, too. For example, it will transgress established disciplinary boundaries and then intervene in the medical faculty, and critically examine medical issues. In this case, the “utility” of the medical faculty will be questioned, and the validity of advanced medical technologies will be scrutinized. From the position of the traditional university, the government should provide citizens with advanced medical technologies; the ethical validity of medical technologies and treatment methods is perceived as self-evident and not problematized. Citizens receive medical care and treatment only passively. By contrast, in the university according to Kant, through its examination of the ethical validity of the advanced medical technologies and treatment methods, philosophy will link medical experts and citizens, medical expertise and common sense of civil society. With philosophy working as such a “critical facilitator” to back up the citizens’ human dignity, human rights and demands, an “agreement [Eintracht] of the learned and civil community” is instituted within the university and embodied as a new interdisciplinary field of scholarship of “bioethics” on the boundary between philosophy and the medical sciences. In this way, both the advanced medical technologies and the advanced scientific technologies are also critically institutionalized and adequately implemented in civil society.

In *The Metaphysics of Morals* Kant himself has mentioned the aporia of “vaccination”, which represented an advance in medical treatment at the time:
“Anyone who decides to be vaccinated against smallpox puts his life in danger, even though he does it in order to preserve his life; (...) Is small inoculation, then, permitted?” (MS, VI, 424). In the context of this aporia, Kant confronts the actual suffering of citizens (cf. Letters, XIII, 283-284, Letters, XV, 972). His academic attitude toward citizens represents just the reflexive function in society which philosophy may assume. Out of this aporia Kant himself has not actually developed “bioethics” as a new interdisciplinary field of scholarship. But when philosophy functions as a “critical facilitator” within the university, the university will free itself from the control of the government and create such new forms and fields of scholarship, which will mediate between academic expertise and common sense of civil society, as “bioethics”, “environmental ethics” and “engineering ethics” etc. As a form of scholarship that transgresses disciplinary boundaries, philosophy should include in itself as its own principle for interdisciplinary research that of “application”, which lies at the basis of “applied ethics” and “applied philosophy”. When this principle is properly employed and philosophy plays its role as “public” discipline within the university, experts within the natural sciences and members of society can conceive and communicate issues like the “quality of life (QOL)” of “bioethics”, “intrinsic value of nature” of “environmental ethics” and “corporate social responsibility (CSR)” of “business ethics” etc. The process of “translation” is already incorporated in this principle: When philosophy transgresses boundaries to other academic disciplines, it opens up new fields, such as “applied ethics”, on the boundary between philosophy and these disciplines. Their expertise is examined by means of philosophical concepts and approaches and crucial problems inherent to it may be pointed out. Philosophy then “translates” these forms of expertise into a common language that might be understood by ordinary citizens. This is one kind of labor philosophy may carry out according to the principle of “application”. At the same time fundamental philosophical concepts and approaches, which are discussed within “pure philosophy”, are also to be reexamined and reinterpreted from the vantage point of “applied ethics” and “applied philosophy”. Examples may include the concepts of the “person”, of “dignity”, or of “value” etc. Both “applied ethics” and “applied philosophy” are also a form of self-reflection of “pure philosophy”. The reflective moment within the principle of “application”, again, is important for philosophy’s transgression of disciplinary boundaries. It will serve to reflect and reform the university and civil society, and eventually philosophy itself, not least in Japan.
When it comes to the question of how to make use of the potential inherent in Kant’s theory of the university, I suggest one may speak of a “civic turn” of the university guided by the public use of philosophy as a critical facilitator. Only through this turn can we radically transform the “innovation through science-based technology” into a “social human innovation” (i.e. what Kant calls “Enlightenment”) in civil society. This would free us from the extreme regime of present-day “innovation”. It is thus necessary that the Philosophical Association of Japan follows this “civic turn” and establishes roots within our society.