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Philosophical Activities in Japan
Translations of Aristotle in Modern Japan

It was in the mid-nineteenth century that Western ideas and translations flooded the newly opened Japan and spread over East Asia. The earliest scholars of enlightenment, particularly Nishi Amane 西周 (1829–1897), clearly recognized the fundamental significance of Greek philosophy for the full understanding of Western Civilisation, and he translated a number of philosophical and other technical terms into Japanese — often by tracing back to their Greek or Latin origins — above all, tetsugaku 哲学 (philosophy).1 Thus, Ancient Greek Philosophy has played a crucial role in Modern Japan. However, it was not until Rafael von Koeber (1848–1923, born in Russia, studied in Germany) came to Japan to teach Western philosophy at Tokyo Imperial University 東京帝国大学 (1893–1914) that Japanese scholars translated the original Greek texts. While teaching German philosophy, he encouraged students to learn classical philosophy and literature in the original Greek and Latin languages. Kubo Masaru 久保勉 and Abe Jirō 阿部次郎, two loyal pupils of Koeber, translated Plato’s Apology of Socrates and Crito for the first time from the original Greek texts in 1921. However, during this period, most people still learned Greek philosophy through modern European translations.

Although Plato’s works were all translated by Kimura Takatarō 木村鷹太郎 from Benjamin Jowett’s English translation in five volumes in 1903–1911, Aristotle started to be translated a little later. After Aoki Iwao 青木巌 translated the Politics from Greek into the title of Kokka-gaku 国家学 (Daiichi-Shobō 第一書房, 1937), the translation series of Aristotle’s works was planned and partly published from Kawade-shobō 河出書房. Shinrigaku: Seishin-ron 心理学:精神論 (De anima) was translated by Takahashi Chōtarō 高橋長太郎 in 1937, Nicomachean Ethics by Takada Saburō 高田三郎 in 1938, Shinrigaku, Shōronshū 心理学:小論集 (Parva naturalia) by Soejima Tamio 副島民雄 in 1939, Keizai-gaku 経済学 and Athenian Constitutions by Murakawa Kentarō 村川堅太郎 in 1939, and Topics by Yamauchi Tokuryū 山内得立 and Taga Zuishin 多賀瑞心 in 1944.

It was in 1968–73 that the first Complete Works of Aristotle アリストテレス全集 were edited by Ide Takashi 出隆 and Yamamoto Mitsuo 岩本光雄 and published in 17 volumes from Iwanami-shoten 岩波書店. They are now being replaced by The New Complete Works of Aristotle in 20 volumes, edited by

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1 For an introduction to the word tetsugaku, see Kanayama Yasuhira’s article “The Birth of Philosophy as 哲學 (Tetsugaku) in Japan”, in Tetsugaku Vol. 1 (2017), 169–183.
Besides the two *Complete Works*, several works of Aristotle were translated in different forms. For example, the *Nicomachean Ethics* has five editions: Takada Saburō (revised in Iwanami Bunko 岩波文庫 in 1971) and Katō Shinrō 加藤信朗 in the *Complete Works* in 1973, Park Il-Gong 朴一功 in *Western Classics Series* 西洋古典叢書 of Kyoto University Press in 2002, Kanzaki Shigeru in the *New Complete Works*, and Watanabe Kunio 渡辺邦夫 and Tachibana Kōji 立花幸司 in Kōbunsha Koten-shinyaku-bunko 光文社古典新訳文庫 in 2015–2016.

The following articles are written by the leading scholars of Aristotelian studies in Japan. They discuss the philosophical problems in translating Aristotle for the *New Complete Works of Aristotle*.

NOTOMI Noburu
Can We Translate Thinking? On the Translated Word “Koufuku”

KANZAKI Shigeru† 神崎繁
(Translated by NOTOMI Noburu 納富信留)


Kanzaki Shigeru was born on 29 November 1952 in Himeji, and he died on 20 October 2016. He studied ancient philosophy at Tohoku University 東北大学 (under the supervision of Iwata Yasuo 岩田靖夫, 1932–2015), and the Graduate School of the University of Tokyo 東京大学 (MA and PhD courses under the supervision of Saitō Ninzui 斎藤忍随). He taught at the Faculty of Humanities at Ibaraki University 茨城大学 (Lecturer, 1982–1985), the Faculty of Education at Tohoku University (Lecturer, Associate Professor, 1985–1987), the Faculty of Humanities at Tokyo Metropolitan University 東京都立大学／首都大学東京 (Associate Professor, Professor, 1987–2007) and at Senshu University 専修大学 (Professor, 2007–2016).

Kanzaki published five books (including a posthumous one) on Plato, Nietzsche, Foucault and Aristotle; he edited several books including the New Complete Works of Aristotle (2013–). He published some forty academic papers, but all were written in Japanese. I chose this article as one of the representative works of his academic discussion and translated it with his family’s permission.

In this paper, Kanzaki translated various ancient texts (from Homer to St. Augustine) into beautiful Japanese to show how such a translation is possible (including his own Nicomachean Ethics translation). I dare not present my own translations; instead, I use the standard translations in Britain and America. My

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1 This paper is based on a presentation given at the International Research Center for Philosophy, at Toyo University 東洋大学国際哲学研究センター, held on 28 February 2015. While preparing for it, I heard of the death of Prof. Iwata Yasuo. I hope that this paper commemorates my teacher.

Tetsugaku, Vol.2, 2018
translation is often free (i.e., iyaku 意訳) wherever the original Japanese is highly nuanced.

1. The relatively new appearance of the word “koufuku”

Because we are now discussing the philosophical methods and significance of translation, I would like to examine the Greek word eudaimoniā in light of my own experience of translating Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.\(^2\) By focusing on this word, I will question whether any framework of thinking can be translated into another. First, we should know that the word *koufuku* 幸福 is a relatively new addition to the Japanese vocabulary. It seems to have been introduced around the last phase of the Edo Period and the Enlightenment of the Meiji Period, because *Nihon-kokugo-dai-jiten* 日本国語大事典 (Large Dictionary of Japanese Language, 2nd ed., 2001) cites Ueda Akinari 上田秋成’s *Tandai-shoushin-roku* 胆大小心録 (1808)\(^3\) and then the early English dictionary, *Angeriagorin-taisei* 諳厄利亜語林大成 (1814),\(^4\) for its early examples.

However, Ueda Akinari used other words — like *mei-fuku* 冥福, *mei-roku* 命禄 and *ten-roku* 天禄 — as well. *Mei-fuku* refers to the Buddhist concept of the good effects in this world that originate from good deeds performed in a previous life and thus without a person’s current awareness (although this word is now customarily used in funerals to refer to the sense of happiness in the afterlife). *Mei-roku*\(^5\) and *ten-roku* refer to the order of Heaven 天命 in Confucianism. Therefore, whether one pronounces the Chinese word 幸福 “*kau-fuku* かうふく” or “*sai-hahi* さいはひ”, Akinari may have used it as a new word unrelated to

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\(^3\) Cf. §155, etc. His masterpiece, *Ugetsu Monogatari* 雨月物語, written earlier in 1776, has examples of the word 幸福 (Books 1 and 5), but the *Large Dictionary of Japanese Language* does not include them. Is this because it was pronounced sai-hahi?

\(^4\) It has entries for “happiness” and “happy”, with the translations 幸福 and 幸, 幸福. But it is not clear whether these should be read as kou-fuku, sachi or saiwai.

\(^5\) Ueda is thought to have taken this word from Ōjū 王充’s *Ronkō* 論衡 (in the Later Han period), chapter 3, Meiroku 命禄. Having suffered much misfortune in his late middle age (e.g., the loss of his house in a fire, the loss of his wife, the failure of the family business, and loss of sight in his right eye), Akinari wrote stories about the suffering of good people in *Shun-u Monogatari* 春雨物語 and *Tandai-shoushin-roku*. This is the background of his use of the words meiroku and guu-fuguu 遇不遇 (cf. *Ronkō*, chapter 1).
Can We Translate Thinking?

Buddhist or Confucian doctrines, since he belonged to the Koku-gaku (Japanese Studies) school of Kamo-no Mabuchi 賀茂真淵. In any case, it was only during the Meiji Period that the word koufuku came to be widely used in ordinary situations.

In Nakamura Masanao 中村正直's Saigoku-risshi-hen 西国立志編 (the translation of Samuel Smiles Self-Help, 1859) in 1871, we see the word koufuku, along with ordinary words of morality, such as doutoku 道徳, jiyuu 自由 and kairaku 快楽. But here again, the translation of happiness is not fixed; Nakamura also used other words, like fukushi 福祉, fukushou 福祥, fuku-un 福運 and fukubun 福分. However, in the Meiroku Journal 明六雑誌 published later (whose contributors included Nakamura Masanao, Mori Arinori 森有礼, Nishi Amane 西田英登, Tsuda Mamichi 津田真道 and Katō Hiroyuki 加藤弘之), the word koufuku was fixed as the translation of “happiness”.

On the other hand, the Raponichi-jiten 羅葡日辞典 (Dictionarium Latino-Lustanicum ac Japonicum) — published three hundred before in 1595 at the Jesuit School of Amakusa 天草 — contained the following description in the entries or beatitudo and felicitas:


We can read here kahou 果報, goshou-no-katoku 後生の果得 and kahou 果報, eiyou 栄耀, eiga 栄華 from the old-style transcription in Latin alphabets. This shows that the word koufuku did not exist or at least was not used much at that time. The translations kahou and eiga, used in sixteenth century Christian writings, came from the Greek eudaimoniā via the Latin felicitas or beatitudo. We may think

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6 Neither meifuku in Buddhism, nor meiroku, nor tenroku in Confucianism guarantees good deeds in this world, since in Buddhist thought, such goodness was predestined by events in one’s previous life, and in Confucian thought, these matters are fully determined by Heaven’s order.

7 However, the Shintei Dai-genkai 新訂・大言海, edited by Ōtsuki Fumihiko 大槻文彦 and published in 1932, contains “shiawase” but no entry of “koufuku”. The enlarged edition of Philosophy Wordbook (Zouho Tetsugaku-jii 増補・哲学字彙), edited by Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎 and Ariga Nagao 有賀長雄 in 1884, has no entry for “happiness” or its translation.

8 In these articles, the genitive form follows an entry. Lus.=Portuguese; Iap.=Japanese.
that these translations are better than “koufuku”, since several scholars in the Anglophone world have recently insisted that “flourishing” or “well-being” is a better translation than “happiness”, which originally comes from the word “happen”.

We can conclude that the word koufuku is a relatively new word, which spread as the translation of “happiness”. Before that, the words kahou and eiga were used, at least in the Kyushu Area. These were probably used until quite recently. In Ishimure Michiko’s *Kukai-jōdo* 苦海浄土 (1968), the word eiga 栄華, uttered by an old fisherman on the Shiranui Sea, echoes this old meaning. He says: “Fish are given by Heaven. I live each day by what is given from Heaven for free; thinking this is what I need. Is there any more eiga than this wherever I may go?” (Ch.4, Fish of Heaven). In this passage, in which we see a clear contrast between the disastrous situation of Minamata-disease 水俣病 (caused by water pollution in the 1960s) and the fertility of the Shiranui Sea before the calamity, the author describes the felicitous and self-sufficient life enjoyed in nature, in dreadful contrast with a miserable, wasted life.

If the Japanese Christians had not been suppressed in the subsequent few centuries (17–19C), the translation eiga for beatitudo or felicitas might have survived. But even though eiga fits “flourishing” better than “happiness” and may correspond to recent translation trends in the Anglophone world, I did not adopt this word for eudaimoniā in my new translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Obviously, modern people no longer have a cultural background for using this term. Moreover, if we think of the changing ideas about happiness over two thousand years (from the fourth century BC to the sixteenth century), we see that adopting a word influenced by thinkers of some particular period is inadequate as a translation or that it even constitutes a mistranslation in the wider perspective of the history of philosophy.

In this sense, koufuku can be an adequate translation because it is free from religious and ideological background, i.e., it is not affected by the Buddhist idea of causation (like kahou) or the Confucian idea of Heaven’s order (like meiroku and tenroku). Although any translation should reflect correctly what it represents, we

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9 *Kahou* is the appearance of the good cause (or bad cause) of the previous life as the good effect (or bad effect) in the present life. *Kahou* 花報, as the effect of the cause in this same life, is sometimes distinguished from *kahou 果報=Quafō*. However, the *Raponichi-jiten* does not include 花報=Caфō. It is not certain whether there was any association between 花 (flower) and 華 in *eiga 栄華*.

10 It is interesting that *kahou 果報* has a good connotation (like koufuku), whereas *inga 因果* has a bad connotation (like fuko 不幸). See Satake Akihiro 佐竹昭弘, *Minwa-no-shishō 民話の思想*, Chūkō-bunko.
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should, in some cases, choose expressions whose meanings are not narrowly defined. In particular, this can be true for words whose original definitions have gone through several shifts or changes in meaning, as we will see below.

2. Changing meanings of eudaimoniā

The early Greek words for koufuku in Homer appear as follows:

Ah, happy (makar) son of Atreus, child of fortune (moirēgenes), blest of heaven (olbodaimon); now see I that youths of the Achaeans full many are made subject unto thee (Iliad III. 182–183, trans. A. T. Murray).

Here, the words makar (makarios) and olbos (with its related word olbodaimōn) are used. However, later eudaimōn and its noun, eudaimoniā, became the most popular terms.

The word eudaimōn originally meant “having a good daimōn”, but it is not clear how much of the etymology people were conscious of in using the term.11 However, people agreed that it refers to “beauty, or strength, or wealth, or glory, or anything of the sort” (Xenophon, Memorabilia IV.2.34). It was against this common view of happiness that Socrates expressed his own view, that body and money can be called good only if they are based on virtue, since he encouraged people to care for the soul, instead of caring for the body or money (Plato, Apology 30b). Xenophon also argues against the vulgar view of happiness by reference to those who ruined themselves because of beauty, ability, wealth, fame or power. He attributed an anti-vulgar position similar to that of his contemporaries, Antisthenes and the Cynics, to Socrates.

On the other hand, Plato saw in Socrates the original thought that not only separates happiness from popular ideas but also brings a fundamental change to the concept of happiness. In the Gorgias, the Macedonian tyrant Archelaus provides the antithesis to the Socratic thought that unjust people are unhappy, and Plato develops this idea in a more systematic way in the so-called “Glaucon’s Challenge” in Book

11 In philosophical writings, Plato’s Republic VII. 540c1–2 etymologically associates a happy person (eudaimōn) with daimōn, and Xenocrates, a pupil of Plato, used this etymology to show that a virtuous person is happy (cf. Arist. Top. 112a36–38).
Two of the Republic. To examine the power of justice in itself, he presents a thought-experiment in which just people suffer unhappy situations.

A tyrant who has usurped political power without legal authority possesses a great power to monopolise wealth and power, and for that purpose he confiscates the property of others or banishes or executes them. The wealth and power acquired in this unjust way are regarded as happiness in the vulgar view, but Socrates insists that such a person is athlios. This Greek word is the antonym of happiness, and it is sometimes translated as “miserable”, which represents the subjective condition or emotion of the observer. However, it can be translated as “collapse” or “failure”, words that describe the objective situation of the agent.

Concerning this point, Cicero gave in the Tusculan Disputations a translation of the Gorgias passage. Because this is of interest given our translation theme, let us consider it an example of Cicero’s Latin translation of Plato’s Greek. Let us focus on the following text: when Socrates asks Polus whether the tyrant Archelaus is happy or miserable, he says, “I say that the admirable and good person, man or woman, is happy but that the one who’s unjust and wicked is miserable” (Gorgias 470e9–11, trans. Donald J. Zeyl). Cicero translated this sentence: “good people are happy, unjust people are miserable (bonos beatos, improbos miserros)” (Tusc. Disp. V.35). One may wonder whether this is a translation sensu stricto or not; however, it is clear from the context that Cicero intended to translate, not to summarise or paraphrase, Plato’s Greek into Latin.

Cicero translates the phrase kalos kai agathos into a single word: bonus. We can suppose that he took these words as a set (kalokagathia) but did not omit or simplify them. However, in the next phrase, in which Socrates deliberately states “man or woman”, Cicero expresses it in the masculine only. Although this can be explained as changing the singular into the plural (to include both sexes), it ignores something important in the emphasised phrase.12

A more important point is the shift in meaning caused by translating the Greek athlios into the Latin miser. As stated above, athlios is the word that signifies the objective, disastrous situation of the agent. Although the Latin miser originally had a similar connotation, Cicero argues in the previous passages of Book 5 of the Tusculan Disputations (which contains the translation of the Gorgias) that being driven by insensible passion, the excitement and disturbance of the upset mind, and

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12 Here we should remember that Socrates points out in Meno 73b that there is no difference between virtue in men and virtue in women. Since Cicero mentions the Meno’s argument in Tusculan Disputations I.57, he must have known that passage. It would not be unfair to see here a kind of gender bias among Romans.
anger prevents happiness, and that fear of death, pain, poverty, disgrace, infamy, weakness, blindness and slavery leads people into the situation of miser (Tusc. Disp. V.15). Based on this consideration, Cicero concludes that happiness is “a quiet and peaceful state of the soul (animi quietus et placatus status)”, escaping from the disturbance (perturbatio) of such irrational fears. He compares happiness to the “tranquillity of the sea (maris tranquillitas)” 13 (ibid. V.16), and regards “disturbance of the mind (perturbatio animi)” as emotions which mislead us into wrong judgements. The last phrase is Cicero’s translation of the Greek word pathos (III.7). Here we can see a mixture of two theories, namely, the Stoic theory of emotion (that the sage is in the state of apatheia without ever being affected by such emotions) on the one hand and the Epicurean theory of peacefulness of mind (ataraxiā) — which can be attained by purging ungrounded fears from our mind using correct understanding of the world — on the other. The reference to the Gorgias passage was given in order to buttress the idea of the Stoic Zeno with the authority of Plato.

In short, during Cicero’s time, the word miser changed in meaning from a hard situation to the mental attitude toward such a situation. Correspondingly, the notion of happiness shifted its meaning from the objective situation to the mental attitude of the people concerned with the situation. 14

In fact, in the three main trends of Hellenistic philosophy after Aristotle — namely, Epicurean, Stoic and Sceptic — the notion of eudaimoniā or beatitudo came to mean ataraxiā or tranquillitas (Epicurean and Sceptic), apatheia or good flow of life (euroia biou) (Stoic), all of which are subjective. This change can be characterised as a shift from action to mental state or from activity to tranquillity.

3. From happiness as activity to happiness as a mental state

13 In this context, the Latin tranquillitas is used as the translation of the Greek galēnē. Aristotle says in Topics 108b25 that “the sameness of a calm (galēnē) at sea, and windlessness (nēnemiā) in the air (each being a form of rest (hēsychiā))”.

14 We should remember that in the medieval Japanese language, tanoshi 楽し means richness, and kanashi 悲し poverty (bingu 貧窮 or bokushou 乏少). Also, the word saki-hahi represented the flourishing state of flowers, and sachi originally signified arrowhead, being a symbol for fertility in the sea and mountains. The former belongs to the fertility of the Flora type, while the latter to that of the Fauna type. Both are the roots of our view of happiness.
We had this in mind when we said in the first section that “we should, in some cases, choose expressions whose meanings are not narrowly defined”. According to the Greek traditional view of happiness, the possession of wealth, fame, power, family, health and beauty is necessary for happiness. However, not everyone can obtain these things; acquiring these fortunes is a matter of good or bad luck. On the contrary, the possession of such things may cause unhappiness, and thence the unworldly or anti-profane view appeared, suggesting that not possessing them is happiness. To Xenophon and Antisthenes, Socrates seemed to take this position.

However, Plato pushed this position further, putting forward the following view: because only virtue is unconditionally good, the good person can never be harmed (Ap. 41d1–3, cf. 30c9–d1), even if his property is confiscated, or his family is harmed, or he himself is banished or killed, his virtue (as the goodness of his soul) is never damaged. Plato saw in Socrates, who took this view, a revolutionary figure in changing the views of happiness. He insisted that those who commit unjust acts without being punished are unhappy (Gorgias 472d). Since death does not destroy the virtue of good men, but can be an opportunity for improvement of one’s soul, the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is not only cosmological but also an ethical theoretical postulate. Moreover, in the Republic, Plato insists that happiness is not brought about by good luck. Instead, it should be achieved through our own actions. Therefore, Plato referred to eudaimoniā as “good deed” (eupragiā, or its verbal form eu prattein). In this sense, it is symbolic that the Republic ends with the words “we shall do well = be happy (eu prattomen)” (621d2–3).

Aristotle doubtless faced these radical changes in the traditional view of happiness introduced by Socrates and Plato, but he did not reject traditional elements of happiness, such as wealth, fame, political power, health, family, beauty and good luck. Instead, he put important limitations on these conditions (i.e., that happiness can be realised by the actuality of virtue). In this respect, Aristotle, being a Macedonian metoikos, was more conservative. He defined the essence of happiness...

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16 For the former, see the Apology, 30d, 35a–b; for the latter, see Laws 854d–855a, 881a.
17 Cf. Charmides 172a3, 173d4, 174b12–c1, Euthydemus 278e, Protagoras 344e–345a, Gorgias 507c, Republic 353e5, 621d2–3.
18 Aristotle, in Rhetoric I.5, regards this vulgar happiness as a part of happiness, and enumerates good birth, plenty of friends, good friends, wealth, good children, plenty of children, a happy old age, health, beauty, strength, large stature, athletic powers, fame, honour, good luck and finally virtue.
as “complete activity through complete virtue” via the location of external goods or fortunes (i.e., property or family and friends) within the conditions of happiness. (This is why the word *praxis* is changed to *energeia*; the latter includes *theoría* as well as *praxis*). Aristotle then added the framework of complete life into the *Nicomachean Ethics*.\(^\text{19}\) This was a search for the possibility of wholeness and unity of life within the limited human lifespan, against his own background following Socrates and Plato, who assumed the everlasting existence of the soul after death.\(^\text{20}\)

However, the divergence of views lay not only between the general population and intellectuals, but also between philosophers’ views; the general understanding that happiness is doing well was already crumbling among philosophers, when Aristotle argued in the following way:

Pretty well most people are agreed about what to call it: both ordinary people and people of quality say “happiness (*eudaimoniā*)”, and suppose that living well (*eu zēn*) and doing well (*eu prattein*) are the same thing as being happy (*eudaimoneuein*). But they are in dispute about what happiness actually is, and ordinary people do not give the same answer as intellectuals (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* I.4, 1095a17–22, trans. Sarah Broadie and Christopher Rowe).

The precursor of this view was Democritus, who forwarded contrary philosophical opinions in many fields. He may have called happiness *euestō* (well-being), and in the bibliographical list of Diogenes Laertius, the title “On cheerfulness (*euthymiā*)” is included (IX.7.46). To this, Diogenes added a note that we found no title of “well-being”.\(^\text{21}\) In fact, the term *euthymiā* became common after Democritus.\(^\text{22}\) In this sense as well, Democritus shared the objectivist view of happiness up to the fourth century BC by using the word *euestō*, but we may say that,

\(^\text{19}\) Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* I.10, 1101a15–17, and *Eudemian Ethics* II.1, 1219a39. Later the Doxography of Arius Didymus defined happiness as the prior use of complete virtue in complete life, or the complete activity of life according to virtue (Stobaeus, *Eclogues* II.7.16). Although it is uncertain whether Cicero read Aristotle’s *Corpus*, his expression “the exercise of virtue with well-being lasting throughout a complete life-time (*virtus usum cum vitae perfectae prosperitate*)” (Fin. II.19) probably came from such doxographical reports.


\(^\text{22}\) Arius Didymus reported in the first century BC. that Democritus had called *eudaimoniā* by various names, including *euthymiā*, *euestō*, *harmoniā*, *symmetriā* and *ataraxiā* (Stobaeus, *Eclogues* II. p.52).
at the same time, he started a new subjectivist view of happiness by using the word *euthymiā*. This feature is well observed in the following fragment:

For men achieve cheerfulness (*euthymiā*) by moderation in pleasure and by proportion in their life; excess and deficiency are apt to fluctuate and cause great changes (disturbances) in the soul. And souls which change over great intervals are neither stable nor cheerful. So one should set one’s mind on what is possible and be content with what one has, taking little account of those who are admired and envied, and not dwelling on them in thought, but one should consider the lives of those who are in distress, thinking of their grievous sufferings, so that what one has and possesses will seem great and enviable, and one will cease to suffer in one’s soul through the desire for more (Democritus, B191 DK, trans. C. C. W. Taylor).

The influence of Democritus’ view of happiness can be seen in Pyrrho, the founder of scepticism, and this fact provides good evidence of a transitional process from the objectivist to the subjectivist view of happiness. Pyrrho explained three necessary factors or three stages for becoming happy: “First, what things really are, second, how we can behave ourselves towards things, and finally, what result is brought about to such a person” (Eusebius, *Praep. Ev.*, XIV.18, 2–4). The first point involves indifference (*adiaphora*) in the world, the second is the epistemological attitude of *epokē*, and the third is what accompanies this attitude, namely, peacefulness of mind (*ataraxiā*). In other words, happiness is shifted through these stages, from the objective situation of the world, through our judgement (or suspension of judgement) towards it, and eventually to our mental state or the mental art. In this way, happiness is shifted from an individual’s being to their subjective feelings.

It is no coincidence that Epicurus — who studied under Nausiphanes, a pupil of Pyrrho’s — posited *ataraxiā* as the goal of life, just like Pyrrho. However, although they had the same goal, they pursued it via different routes. Whereas Pyrrho suspended judgements because real things are all indifferent, Epicurus believed that the firm recognition of things can remove irrational fears and therefore allow one to attain *ataraxiā* (i.e., happiness). Vergil, who was familiar with

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24 Pyrrho was said to have learned from Anaxarchus, a pupil of Metrodorus, who was a pupil of Democritus (Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* VII.87–88).
25 For the teacher-pupil relationship between them, see Diogenes Laertius, IX.11.64.
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Epicureanism from his youth, simply stated: “Happy, who had the skill to understand / Nature’s hid causes, and beneath his feet / All terrors cast, and death’s relentless doom, / And the loud roar of greedy Acheron” (*Georgica* II.490–492, trans. J. B. Greenough). For Epicurus, unlike the sceptics, believed that a clear understanding of the world can resolve our fears and anxieties, and he believed that such diverse fears could be ultimately reduced to the fear of death.

Lucretius, whose influence we can assume in Virgil’s poem above, stated in *De Rerum Natura*:

> Fear of death induces one man to violate honour, another to break the bonds of friendship, and in a word to overthrow all natural feeling . . . For as children tremble and fear everything in the blind darkness, so we in the light sometimes fear what is no more to be feared than the things that children in the dark hold in terror and imagine will come true. This terror, therefore, and darkness of the mind must be dispersed, not by rays of the sun nor the bright shafts of daylight, but by the aspect and law of nature (Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura* III.83–98, trans. Martin F. Smith).

Lucretius, a scholar poet contemporary of Cicero, who reconstructed the entire philosophy of Epicurus in Latin verse, argues particularly in Book 3 that our desires, accumulation of property, and quest for honour are all based on the fear of death. One wants to beget children out of fear of one’s own corruption or perishing. The desire to keep as large a property as possible for future stability has the same origin. However, Epicurus’ materialistic philosophy shows that “death is nothing for us”. The fear of death is irrational because we cannot experience death; therefore, rational understanding can resolve fear of death. When the fear of death is removed in this way, we can get rid of additional things, such as desires for property and for honour. This way of thinking eventually allows one to reach *ataraxiā*. Thus, Pyrrhonian scepticism and Epicurean hedonism, both influenced by Democritus, converge on the same goal (i.e., *ataraxiā*) through different routes.

In this way, the view of happiness has drastically changed in the Hellenistic period, when the history of philosophy marked a new stage after Aristotle. This change did not occur at once. As we have seen, it emerged through some stages, in particular when Cicero translated the passage of Plato’s *Gorgias*, which we examined as a definite stage of this transition. In the Hellenistic period, of the three main schools — the Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics — the last two discussed
happiness in terms of *ataraxiā* (the negation of *tarachē*, i.e., trouble) in Greek and *tranquillitas* in Latin,\(^{26}\) and the first school considered happiness in terms of *apatheia* or *euroia biou* (good flow of life).\(^{27}\) In both cases, it is obvious that they departed from the traditional view of happiness held by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, all of whom believed that happiness came from good actions or activity.

In this regard, one passage in Plato’s *Republic* may seem to be foreseeing the new view:

> Taking all this into calculations, he will keep quiet (*hēsychiā*), and mind his own business, like someone taking shelter behind a wall when he is caught by a storm of driving dust and rain. He sees everyone else brim-full of lawlessness, and counts himself lucky if he himself can somehow live his life here pure, free from injustice and unholy actions, and depart with high hopes, with a spirit of kindness and goodwill, on his release from it (Plato, *Republic* VI.496d5–e2, trans. Tom Griffith).

If we take this description as that of a self-sufficient life on a farm (*kēpos*), it represents the Epicurean way of life, in which people detach themselves from political activities. And if we consider a situation in which one stands on the inner fortress (*acropolis*)\(^{28}\) so as not to have his or her mind disturbed by various emotions, it represents the mental state of the Stoic sage, led by the controlling part (*hēgemonikon*) of the soul. Of course, it is only in our hindsight that Plato foresaw the future situation. If “high hopes” means the soul’s release from the body, just as in the *Phaedo* (67b7–c3), his view is fundamentally different from that of the Epicureans and Stoics, who believed that each individual perishes when the body dies.

Despite these differences, we must appreciate Plato’s sharp sense of direction about the subsequent trends of thought: Plato demonstrates a view that treats happiness not in terms of action or activity but as a state of the soul, whether it is tranquillity or *apatheia*. This seems to be closely connected with the changing frameworks surrounding thinking on human life and time. Let us finally get some hints concerning this point.


\(^{27}\) Cf. *SVF*. III.35.12; cf. ibid. III.16.

\(^{28}\) For this metaphor, see Marcus Aurelius, *Meditationes* VIII.48.
4. Happiness and Time

When we read the *Phaedo*, we notice that it uses the word *elpis* (hope) several times in the first part. It may be assumed that this dialogue deals with the previous life because it discusses the theory of recollection (*anamnēsis*); however, the word *elpis* rather points to the eternity of life after death and the prospect of the next life. The Socratic belief that anyone who commits crimes and unjust deeds without receiving punishment is unhappy, and that good persons will never be unhappy even if they are persecuted, influenced the Cynics and Stoics later, but at least the figure of Socrates depicted in Plato’s dialogues expresses the immortality of the soul and the eternity of life as inseparable conditions, whether they came from Pythagoreanism or not. In this way, happiness (and its opposite) inevitably involved the existence of the soul after death.

Although the Epicureans are hedonistic in so far as they appreciate pleasures, they may be dubbed ascetic in that they try to avoid excessive pleasures. Nevertheless, with respect to the eternity of life, they believed that the prolongation of time in life does not increase happiness, since they deny the subsistence of the soul after death.

We must not go beyond the bounds, but keep within the boundary and measure that applies to such things, and must reckon that the person who is afraid of abstinence from animate creatures, even if it is for pleasure that he takes to abstinence-eating, is afraid of death. For he immediately connects with deprivation of meat the presence of some terror without limit, and from this presence comes death. From causes like these, and from analogous causes, there arises an insatiable desire for life, wealth, money and fame, because people think that with these they will, given a longer time, increase their sum of good, and because they fear the terror of death as something without limit (Porphyry, *On Abstinence from Killing Animals* 1.54.2–3, trans. Gillian Clark).

Here Porphyry presented the Epicurean view that excessive and superfluous desires, without necessary bodily conditions in accordance with nature, are caused by the fear of death. In this view, Epicurus criticised the wrong assumption that the

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prolongation of life can advance the good, the object of desires, and can thus postpone death. This sense of eternity of life did not guarantee happiness for the Epicureans. In other words, they believed that it does not matter whether a life is long or short. This is consistent with their belief that happiness lies in peacefulness of mind.

Lucretius, for example, expressed this view in the following poem:

Nor do we, or can we, by prolonging life subtract anything from the time of death, so as perhaps to shorten our period extinction! Hence you may live to see out as many centuries as you like: no less will that everlasting death await you. No shorter will be the period of non-existence for one who has ended his life from today than for one who perished many months or years ago (Lucretius, De Rerum Natura III.1087–94, trans. A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley, 24G).

This is no direct reference to happiness, but this quote is interesting because it expresses the notion of time in Epicureanism. This notion of time can also be seen in Cicero’s testimony on the Epicurean’s main interest, pleasure, that “no greater pleasure could be derived from a life of infinite duration than is actually afforded by this existence which we know to be finite” (De Finibus, I. 19–63, trans. H. Rackham).

A similar thought can be seen in the Stoics, being materialists like Epicureans, who assumed the limit of life:

A good is not augmented by addition of time; but, if one be prudent even for a moment, one will not be at all inferior in happiness to him who exercises virtue for ever and blissfully lives out his life in it (Plutarch, On Common Conceptions 1061F–1062A, trans. Harold Cherniss).

Because of their differing definitions of the good, the Stoics focused on happiness based on virtue, and the Epicureans focused on pleasure. However, both agreed that length of life cannot be a decisive factor for happiness. Moreover, in so far as the Stoics based their view of happiness on apatheia or good flow of life, their conception of happiness corresponds to the ataraxiā of the Epicureans.
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Whoever had the idea that permanence increases the good, it may not be difficult to attribute it also to Plato. Aristotle, in criticising the Form of the Good, says that it is not the case that “what is white and long-lasting is whiter than what is white and short-lived”. This criticism implies that time permanence does not increase quality and value for those who possess it. This does not mean that Aristotle had ideas similar to those of the Epicureans or Stoics. However, in this respect, one passage of Epicurus reminds us of Aristotle:

Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures by reason the limits of pleasure. The flesh perceives the limits of pleasure as unlimited and unlimited time is required to supply it. But the mind, having attained a reasoned understanding of the ultimate good of the flesh and its limits and having dissipated the fears concerning the time to come, supplies us with the complete life (pantelēs bios), and we have no further need of infinite time: but neither does the mind shun pleasure, nor when circumstances begin to bring about the departure from life, does it approach its end as though it fell short in any way of the best life (Epicurus, Cyriai Doxai ix–xx = DL. X.145, trans. Cyril Bailey).

Here “the complete life” or “the best life” reminds us of the following passage and others (e.g., 1100a4–5) of the Nicomachean Ethics, despite the fact that Aristotle’s thought is not compatible with that of Epicurus and Lucretius (in the above citation), who maintained that momentary happiness is in essence no different from everlasting happiness:

The human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue (and if there are more virtues than one, in accordance with the best and the most complete). But furthermore it will be this in a complete life (teleios bios). For a single swallow does not make spring; in the same way, neither does a single day, or a short time, make a man blessed and happy (Aristotle,

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30 The point of Hatano Seiichi 波多野精一, in Time and Eternity 時と永遠 (Iwanami-shoten, 1943, pp. 98–99), that unlimitedness of time is not eternity but the ultimate form of incompleteness, can be true for a vulgar form of Platonism, if not for Plato himself.
32 For this passage, see J. Annas, The Morality of Happiness, pp. 345–347.
This passage shows that human happiness needs a certain length of time and maturity in time so that activity can realize happiness, as long as it depends on exercising both intellectual and ethical virtues. This indicates a different message from that of the Epicureans, who insisted that, if a life gains true pleasures, it is a complete life, however short it is.

The difference between these views is explained by Arius Didymus, a doxographer of the first century BC, from his comparison of doctrines. “The Epicurean philosophers do not accept the view that happiness lies in activity, since they regard the supreme good as something passive, i.e. pleasure, but not something practical”. Didymus must have had Aristotle in mind when he discussed the view that happiness lies in activity.

Based on the idea of a complete life, Aristotle refrains from admitting that children can attain happiness. He bases this view on the following points: (A) happiness is concerned with reason (logos) because it requires activity based on virtue, and (B) for that reason a certain length of time is necessary for one to obtain happiness, so that happiness is not fully judged until the end of one’s life. Aristotle thus believed (based on point A) that happiness cannot be applied to animals and (based on points A and B) that it cannot be applied to children.

This may sound harsh to modern people, who naturally associate innocence and simple-minded happiness with children, but it is a natural conclusion for Aristotle, who defines happiness as activity based on virtue. Yet, since he might have regretted this view as an overstatement in accordance with his contemporary common views, he added that “those children that are said to be happy are being called blessed because of their hope (elpis) for the future. This is because, as we

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34 Plotinus, Enn. I.4.1: “Suppose we assume the good life and well-being to be one and the same; shall we then have to allow a share in them to other living things as well as ourselves? If they can live the way natural to them without impediment, what prevents us from saying that they too are in a good state of life? For whether one considers the good life as consisting in satisfactory experience or accomplishing one’s proper works, in either case it will belong to the other living things as well as us” (trans. A. H. Armstrong). Like Didymus, Plotinus, distinguishing between active and passive aspects of happiness, attributed happiness in a wider sense to all animals, since he made no distinction between points A and B.
have said, happiness requires both complete virtue and a complete life” (Nicomachean Ethics I.9, 1100a3–5, trans. Broadie and Rowe, slightly modified).

Noticeably, the word “hope” is used here. Of course, it is the hope for a future in this world, but not hope for the next life, as expressed in Plato’s Phaedo and Republic. We do not know whether Aristotle intended this or not, but this passage implies a sort of Aristotelian real-worldism, namely, the emphasis on the complete life in this world, in contrast to the commitment to the world after death. It is the complete life attainable within finite time. Like Plato, Aristotle talks of “becoming like a god as much as possible”, but he does not believe that men can hope for everlasting life, or that such a life is realisable. Instead, man’s goal must be integrity of life rather than eternity of life.

5. Concluding remarks

We started our discussion by showing that the Aristotelian concept of happiness may have been introduced into Japan through the Christian writings of the Jesuits in the latter half of the sixteenth century. In this consideration, we have examined several stages of change concerning the concept of happiness. We now recognise clearly that we cannot state that this translation was completed when eudaimoniā was replaced by beatitudo or felicitas, or when it was replaced by kahou or eiga, or now koufuku. This is not to introduce the indeterminacy of translation or interpretation. Instead, I intend to show that translation requires us to engage in archaeological work to carefully peel away the layers of word meanings to observe their changes, by presenting some examples on koufuku or happiness.

In this sense, when I state that the Aristotelian concept of happiness may have been introduced into Japan through Christian writings, this is far from exact, although not entirely untrue. Whether the appropriate translation is beatitudo or felicitas, it no longer refers to Aristotle’s “happiness as activity”. We should also consider the connection with happiness as a mental attitude, like ataraxiā or apatheia, in recalling that the New Testament was edited during the Hellenistic period, when these ideas were predominant. A more complicating factor is that Christian writings introduced into early modern Japan were a part of the Jesuit

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35 In addition to the famous passage of Plato, Theaetetus 176a–177a (esp. 176b1–2), see also Symposium 207c–209e, Timaeus 90b–d, and Laws 721b–c; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics X.3, 1177b33.
activities based on Scholasticism, which was in turn based on the theology of Thomas Aquinas. Of course, Aquinas established his theology via examination of Aristotle’s philosophy.

It is important to consider the difference between the traditional Greek and the Christian views of happiness: the former was happiness for the strong, since they based it on virtue, whereas the latter was considered happiness for the weak, as we see in the Gospels of Matthew (5.3–12) and of Luke (6.20–26). Moreover, the concept of virtue also underwent a Christian transformation. This is clearly shown in the following passage in Augustine:

For if our virtues are genuine — and genuine virtues can exist only in those who are endowed with true piety — they do not lay claim to such powers as to say that men in whom they reside will suffer no miseries (for true virtues are not so fraudulent in their claims); but they do say that our human life, though it is compelled by all the great evils of this age to be wretched, is happy in the expectation of a future life in so far as it enjoys the expectation of salvation too. For how can a life be happy, if it has no salvation yet? So the apostle Paul, speaking not of men who lacked prudence, patience, temperance and justice, but of men who lived in accordance with true piety, and whose virtues were therefore genuine, says: “Now we are saved by hope. But hope that is seen is not hope. For how should a man hope for what he sees? But if we hope for that which we do not see, then we look forward with endurance” (Romans 8.24–25) (Augustinus, De Civitate Dei XIX.4, trans. W. C. Greene).

Here, Augustine rejects not only wealth, power and honour from happiness but also the view of Socrates and the Cynics that the good person cannot be harmed. He instead insists that the weak are blessed. Accordingly, he presents “hope” as a virtue, instead of “prudence, patience, temperance and justice”. For Augustine, the theological virtues are hope plus faith and charity.

In the Dochirina Kirishitan (Doctrina Christiana, Jesuit texts published in Japan in the end of the sixteenth century) the passage from the Gospel of Matthew (5.4) was translated into “Naku-mono wa yorokobase-raru-beki niyotte kahou nari
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(weeping person is kahou because he will be pleased)\(^{36}\); i.e., a sufferer is happy. In this sentence, “beki” signifies not duty but a definite future. In other words, it does not mean to have a present hope for future salvation, but to be happy now in anticipation of an already secured future reward.

Here the word “hope” is used again, this time to describe the virtue of the weak, but it differs from the hope of Socrates and Plato based on the immortality of the soul. Whereas the latter is the hope for the release of the soul from the body at death, the former is hope for the salvation of the soul through the resurrection of the body.\(^{37}\) In the latter, the coming world does not exist yet, whereas the former assumes the eternal place to which the soul belongs.

Although it is often emphasised how much Neoplatonism, especially Plotinus, influenced Augustine and Christianity, we should not ignore Plotinus’ differing views concerning the special role of body and time in Christian thinking on happiness. The difference is suggested in the following passage in the Enneads:

So, if well-being is a matter of good life, obviously the life concerned must be that of real being; for this is the best. So it must not be counted by time but by eternity; and this is neither more nor less nor of any extension, but is a “this here”, unextended and timeless. So one must not join being to non-being or time or everlastingness of time to eternity nor must one extend the unextended; one must take it as a whole if one takes it at all, and apprehend, not the undividedness of time but the life of eternity, which is not made up of many times, but is all together from the whole of time (Plotinus, Ennead I.5, 7.20–30, trans. A. H. Armstrong).

In this passage, a new view of happiness is indicated, which is different from the happiness realised in activity or from the happiness as mental attitude, though this view is modelled on Plato.

When we observe the final trend of the Greek views of happiness, a new Christian view of happiness, modelled on views of Aristotle, emerges in contrast with the Greek views. This new perspective on happiness integrates the realisation

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36 Of the four editions, the Vatican edition of 1591 and the Roman edition of 1592 have “喜ばせられるべきによって”，while the other two editions corrected them into “宥め喜ばせるるによって”.

37 For the different views of hope, see P. T. Geach, The Virtues, Cambridge University Press, 1977, pp. 61–62.
of happiness through action and through mental attitude, since it offers us hope for future resurrection and enables us to bear present sufferings as precursors to happiness. I believe that this new aspect can properly locate the significance of the introduction of Aristotle into Japan through Christian writings in the sixteenth century.
From *Ousia* to *Jittai*: A Problematic Translation

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esse Graeci οὐσίαν vel ὑπόστασιν dicunt, nos uno nomine Latine substantiam dicimus, et οὐσίαν Graeci pauci et raro, ὑπόστασιν omnes. (Marius Victorinus, *Adversus Arium* PL VIII 1138C)

I

§1. Introduction

In the Meiji period, Nishi Amane (西周 1829–1897), a philosopher who was extremely influential in the introduction of Western philosophy into Japan, adopted *jittai* (実体) as a translation of the English word “substance”, and in doing so provided this long-established Japanese expression with a new philosophical meaning. Subsequently, Japanese scholars translated οὐσία, a fundamental concept of Aristotelian philosophy, as *jittai*, simply because this Greek word has traditionally been translated as “substance” or its equivalents (“Substanz”, “sostanza”, etc.) in the West. Thus, ordinary Japanese readers have always been compelled to understand Aristotle’s concept of οὐσία in indirect translation.

In 2013, the project of a new Japanese translation of the complete works of Aristotle (with Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店 as publisher) was launched. As one of the three editors, I proposed to put an end to the use of *jittai* in this project in the belief that Aristotelian scholars had long been aware of many problems created by

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1 This article is the partial English translation of my article “Transplanting, Grafting, and Crossbreeding — a Journey into the Labyrinth of *Jittai*”, which is based on a presentation given at the International Research Center for Philosophy, at Toyo University 東洋大学国際哲学研究センター, held on 28 February 2015. A draft of this translation was prepared by Atsushi Hayase. I am grateful to him for his sensitive and meticulous work. I have written up the final version on my own, and so I am solely responsible for any errors contained.
translating οὐσία as “substance”. I thought that the commissioned translators would readily accept my proposal (though I was convinced that this would astonish many Japanese scholars specialising in modern or contemporary Western philosophy). However, my expectation was betrayed: some of the translators expressed strong disapproval at my proposal. When I exchanged opinions with them, I came to realise that what lay at the bottom of our disagreement was not just problems involved in the interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy, but also those involved in the long history of the translation and interpretation of οὐσία via the Latin word substantia.

In this article I would like to analyse and clarify some conceptual complications that have caused the transformation of οὐσία into jittai in the history of philosophy.

§2. The Japanese word jittai (実体)

Since I believe the Japanese word jittai is unfamiliar to most readers, I would like to start by clarifying our common understanding of the term. Many Japanese dictionaries I consulted list the following two basic meanings under the entry of jittai:

1. true form or character; content or essence (jisshitsu 実質), and
2. the self-identical entity that underlies a constantly changing thing; concrete particulars in Aristotle’s philosophy, etc.

The first is the original, time-honoured meaning of jittai, while the second is derived from Nishi’s translation of the English word “substance”.

Why did Nishi adopt jittai as the translation of substance? I suggest that he understood the English word “substance” to designate the body or a thing that has or contains other attributes, and he thought that jittai could refer to such a thing. On various occasions (e.g. Nishi 1870–1873) he paraphrased jittai as “true body” (masashiki tai 正シキ体), “true thing” (masashiki mono 正シキ物), or “the true thing that has a shape or form” (masashiki nari aru mono 正シキ形アル物), and distinguished it from “the things that are added or attributed to it” (tsukitaru mono 附キタルモノ) or “the things that are contained in it” (sono uchi ni fukumitaru mono ソノウチニフクミタルモノ).
This concept of *jittai* as body or thing is not Nishi’s pure invention. Firstly, a certain usage from Chinese classical literature may collaborate with him. Just like numerous other Japanese expressions, *jittai* has its origin in Chinese classical literature. Some dictionaries of Chinese expressions provide “true concrete thing” as the first meaning for 実体, quoting an example from Lu Ji’s (陸机 261–303) *Fuyun Fu* (『浮雲賦』):

有輕虛之艱象，無實體之貞形
I find the beautiful shape of superficial and empty things, but not the real form of true concrete things. (*My translation*)

Second, *jittai* was connected with the Latin *substantia* via the Portuguese *substancia* long before Nishi proposed his translation. The Jesuit missionaries compiled a Japanese to Portuguese dictionary (*Nippo Jisho*『日葡辞書』) and published it in 1603, which has the following entries:

- **Jittai**: Macotono tai. Verdadera substancia
- **Tai**: Substancia
- **Taiyō**: Substancia & accidente

Set against these historical backgrounds (I am not certain if Nishi knew about them), it seems fairly natural for the Japanese scholar who understood “substance” as true body or thing to translate it as *jittai*. Moreover, there is one more merit of this translation that is worth mentioning: it has successfully transferred the non-technical meaning of the English “substance” into Japanese (see (1) above).

It was not the case, however, that scholars in the Meiji period accepted Nishi’s translation without further ado. Inoue Tetsujiro 井上哲次郎 (1855–1944), another influential Japanese philosopher, for instance, translated several words including substance as *jittai* in his *Dictionary of Philosophy* (*Tetsugaku Jii*『哲学字彙』).² It may be of particular interest to note the fact that he used *jittai* as a translation of “substratum”, the word that has traditionally been used by Western scholars to translate another of Aristotle’s philosophical jargon, ὑποκείμενον. In Japan, ὑποκείμενον is usually translated as *kitai* (基体).

² According to Hida’s general index for Inoue’s *Dictionary of Philosophy* (Hida 2005), Inoue proposed *jittai* as translations for “thing in itself”, “Ding an sich”, “entity”, “Noumenon”, “reality”, and “substratum” as well as “substance”.

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Thus, having clarified the concept of *jittai* sufficiently for my purpose, I would like to turn to the examination of its philosophical sense ((2) above). In spite of the fact that this sense was invented in order to translate a concept that originally came from Aristotle’s philosophy, I shall point out that serious problems have been created by understanding and translating Aristotle’s *οὐσία* as *jittai*. These are not the sort of problems, I submit, that are avoidable if we choose a different translation, for the concept of substance or *substantia* has been and still plays an important role in the history of thought. Indeed, it may not be an exaggeration to say that these problems will affect the currently accepted framework of philosophical thinking in general.

II

§3. Background to Aristotle’s concept of *οὐσία*

The Greek *οὐσία* is a substantive that is formed on the feminine participle (*οὐσα*) of the verb *εἶναι*, which means “to be”. Both in the early history of this term and in Aristotle’s thoughts, *οὐσία* never lost its close connection with the original verbal form. Thus, for instance, Aristotle claims that the inquiry “which investigates being (*τὸ ὄν*) as being (*ἧ ὄν*)” comes down to the attempt to answer the question as to “What is *οὐσία*?”, for the concept of *οὐσία* can be detected at the heart of “being”, which has many meanings (see *Metaph.* Γ.2 1003a33–b19). It is then necessary to look at the basic meanings of the Greek verb “to be” (*εἶναι*) or its participle form “being” (*ὄν*) before working on Aristotle’s concept of *οὐσία*.

A still prevalent way to analyse the meanings of “to be” or its equivalents in modern languages (“sein”, “être”, etc.) is to adopt the copula-existence dichotomy. J. S. Mill firmly stated that we should adopt this dichotomy, claiming that the failure to understand it was the main source of confusions about the equivalent Greek and Latin concepts (*όν*, *οὐσία*, ens, entias, essentia) (Mill 1843: bk. 1. ch. 4, sect. 1). Of course, the credit of the discovery of this dichotomy does not belong to him. Mill himself attributed it to his own father’s, i.e. James Mill’s, work (Mill 1829). Even though researchers in various branches of language sciences occasionally expressed their criticisms against this dichotomy or its variations, e.g. the existence-predication-identity trichotomy, this kind of analysis has been widely accepted as useful ways for understanding the concept of “to be”.
It is Charles Kahn who levelled fierce and trenchant criticisms against reading this dichotomy into Greek literature. He has been working on this Greek verb for more than 40 years, and published several books and many articles on this issue (see especially Kahn 1973 and 2009). His contentions have changed in nuance and scope throughout his career, but I think I can summarise his main achievements in the following point. He has shown that, contrary to the common belief, the existential use was not fundamental to the verb εἶναι for both ordinary people and philosophers in Antiquity. By pointing out the significance of the veridical use, he has demonstrated that the copula-existence dichotomy does not constitute a suitable framework for understanding this verb. In my view, Kahn has provided ample textual evidence against the prevalent view that analyses the meanings of εἶναι in terms of the copula-existence dichotomy. It is true that Martin West had a different opinion. He examined the uses of the verb “to be”, reconstructed as h₁es-, in the Indo-European language family, and claimed that it is not the veridical or predicative uses, but the adessive use (“be there, be available” or “vorhanden sein, sich befinden”) that is the primary sense of εἶναι. However, it is sufficient for my purpose if it is admitted that the oldest or the most basic sense of εἶναι is not existence. I am not going to enter into the discussions held by these eminent scholars. At any rate, I am of the opinion that, when we discuss Greek philosophers’ ideas about the concept of οὐσία, we must always take into consideration its historical linguistic circumstances. And this is especially true in the case of Aristotle’s concept of οὐσία which can be detected at the heart of the common and ordinary use of εἶναι. And this brief review of the basic uses of εἶναι shows that we do not have to presuppose the copula-existence dichotomy when we attempt to specify the meaning of οὐσία.

What then was the linguistic environment of οὐσία, the substantive form of εἶναι, like? First, let us consider its ordinary usages. This term first made its appearance in the 5th century BCE; we cannot ascertain a single instance in Homer or Hesiod. According to Motte and Somville 2008, among the extant works written before Plato’s time, we find 201 instances provided by 12 different authors. Virtually all of these instances have an economic sense: this term means “property”, “wealth”, “heritage”, and the like. There are a couple of exceptions, but it is simply

3 I am grateful to Francesco Ademollo for making me notice this article, and for giving me a warning that I am too much dependent on Kahn’s studies. In this connection I should also note that many Greeks preferred to use the verb ὑπάρχειν when they mean “to be there” or “exist”. Cf. Glucker 1994.
not easy to determine the meaning of οὐσία for these cases, and some scholars even suspect corruptions in the text (e.g. Diggle 1981 on Euripides *Ion* 1288). Second, if we look for technical usages in philosophy and medicine, we may obtain some interesting results. There is not a single instance of this term in the fragments, or extant direct quotations, of the so-called Pre-Socratic philosophers. (Note that what was once regarded as Philolaus’ fragment (B11DK) is now generally agreed, mostly under the influence of Burkert 1962, to have been written much later than his time.) However, in medicine we find some noteworthy instances. The anonymous *De arte* (probably written from the late 5th to the early 4th century BCE) in the *Corpus Hippocraticum* contains four non-economic instances of οὐσία that show a fairly clear connection with the verb ἐἶναι (2.3; 5.8; 6.13, 15). This usage seems to be a device for turning the sentence “x is in reality F” into the noun form, and it is possible to translate these instances as “real nature” as opposed to mere “name”.

§4. Οὐσία in Plato

A crucial turning point for the usage of οὐσία came with Plato’s works. It is not the case that Plato provided a new, special meaning with this term. On the contrary, he always used this term in a more or less natural sense in which its connection with the verb ἐἶναι was clearly observable. Here I shall concisely survey some important usages of this term found in Plato’s works (for a comprehensive, though in my view not quite impeccable, survey, see Motte & Somville 2008).

[1] In the early dialogues there are two important meanings of οὐσία:

(i) a specific nature or property (see *Chrm*.168d, where οὐσία means the nature of something as compared with the nature of another thing, e.g. the nature of “less” as opposed to that of “more”, and *Prt*.349b, where it means the nature that underlies the names of the five virtues, “wisdom”, “self-control”, “courage”, “justice”, and “piety”), and

(ii) a thing about which Socrates asks his “What is F-ness?” question (see *Euthphr*.11a8 and *Men*.72b1). (This second meaning is derived from what Kahn calls the predicative use of ἐῖναι.)

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4 *Euthphr*. 11a6-1b1: τὸ δ’ ὅτι ἐστὶν οἶνον φιλεῖσθαι, διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖται. καὶ κινδυνεύεις, ὁ Ἔυθύφρων, ἐρωτώμενος τὸ ὅσιον ὅτι ποτ’ ἐστίν, τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν μοι ἀυτὸν οὐ βούλεσθαι δηλώσαι, πάθος δὲ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν, ὅτι πέπονθε τοῦτο τὸ ὅσιον, φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ πάντων θεῶν· ὅτι δὲ ὅν, οὐποὶ εἶπες.
In the middle dialogues, Plato puts forward the fully fledged theory of Forms, and allocates an important role in this theory to the concept of οὐσία. Examining the Phaedo from this respect, we obtain the following three meanings:

(iv) the real or essential nature of F-ness (76d9, 77a2),
(v) the very thing that is F or what F-ness is (65d13, 92d9), and
(vi) a thing about which Socrates and his interlocutors ask questions or give answers (78d1).

It may be possible to draw a single thread from (iv), (v), and (vi): when Socrates asks “What is F-ness?”, he wants to know the real or essential nature of F-ness or to find the very thing that is F or what F-ness is. These meanings of οὐσία are all consistent with the veridical use and the predicative use (which includes the identity use). However, it is (v) that makes up the hinge: (v) is expressed in the manner that clearly shows its correspondence to Socrates’ “What is F-ness?” question (see footnotes 4–6), and so it is reasonable to take this usage to provide clear direction for the correct understanding of Plato’s concept of οὐσία throughout his dialogues. Additionally, (vi) seems to endorse this interpretation; it shows that οὐσία can designate the objects of Socrates’ question even in the middle dialogues. Socrates’ “What is F-ness?” question is then a principal source for Plato’s concept of οὐσία, and we can find instances of this kind even in his latest works.\footnote{Men. 72a8-b3: ἀτάρ, ὃ Μένον, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν περὶ τὰ σμήνη, εἰ μοι ἐρωμένου μελλίτης περὶ οὐσίας ὅτι ποτ’ ἐστίν, πολλάκις καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἔλεγες αὐτὰς εἴναι, τι ἀν ἀπεκρίνοι μοι, εἰ σε ἡρόμην.}

In the late dialogues we find instances of οὐσία that seem to designate beings more generally than the ones discussed above, and are not restricted to the objects of Socrates’ questions (see Tht.179d, 185c, 186a–e; Sph.246a–c, 251d–252b; Phlb.26d, 27b et al.). I suggest that even these instances, which include οὐσία as contrasted with “becoming” (γένεσις), belong to the usage that is derived from the predicative use of εἶναι.\footnote{Phd. 65d11-e1: Ἀλλ’ ἄλλῳ τινὶ αἰσθήσει τὸν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐρήμου αὐτῶν; λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους πέρι, ὑγείας, ἰσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνι λόγῳ ἀπάντων τῆς οὐσίας ὃ τογγάνει ἔκκεστον δὲ. Among the middle and late dialogues the connection of the concept of οὐσία with the “What is F-ness?” question is fairly obvious in the following places: Phd. 78d1; Phdr. 237c3, 245e4, 270e3; Rep. VII 534b3–4; Tht. 202b6, 207c1, 3; Lg. II 668c6, X 891e9, 895d4. Cf. also Epist. VII 342b. It is likely that most of the Platonists might not express substantial disagreement over this issue. However, I think if we pay more attention to this point, new light will be shed on, for example, the reasons why Plato found our sensible world defective. At present, two opposing interpretations are particularly influential among scholars, i.e. the traditional...}
One might object here that the battle of gods and giants over οὐσία described in the *Sophist* (245a5sqq.) is in fact the battle over *existence*, because the question addressed in this passage is the existential one: which of the two kinds of things, i.e. bodies or Forms, should we consider really to exist? The giants claim that bodies are οὐσία while gods claim that incorporeal Forms are.

However, I think that even in this passage the predicative use of εἶναι is recognised at the core of the οὐσία in question, though I do not mean to claim that we should rule out existence altogether as the meaning of this οὐσία. To see this, it is important to pay close attention to the Eleatic stranger’s proposal that identifies οὐσία with the “capacity” or “power” (δύναμις). Having made the giants admit that there are incorporeal οὐσίαι, he proposes the definition or mark (ὁρος) of οὐσία as the capacity of acting and being acted upon.

T1 Eleatic Visitor: I’m saying that a thing really is if it has any capacity at all, either by nature to do something to something else or to have even the smallest thing done to it by even the most trivial thing, even if it only happens once. I’ll take it as a definition that *those which are* amount to nothing other than *capacity*.

Theaetetus: They accept that, since they don’t have anything better to say right now (*Sophist* 247d–e, tr. N. White in Cooper and Hutchinson 1997).

As Cornford (1935: 234–236) noted, in Plato’s time a methodical procedure of examining the capacity of acting and being acted upon was regularly employed by medical practitioners. In the *Phaedrus* (270c–d), Socrates suggests that Hippocrates employed such a procedure in order to examine the nature of body and soul. He is in my view alluding to the fact that Hippocrates and his followers administered drugs or applied other medical treatments to a patient and then checked his or her body’s reactions. Plato thought that the function or power of things can only be determined by such a procedure, since it does not have colour or shape or other perceptible properties (see *Rep* V 477d). When the οὐσία of a certain thing is identified through such a procedure, it is impossible to distinguish the question as to

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“constant change” interpretation and the recently proposed “compresence of opposites” interpretation. I think I can say something about the process of becoming (γένεσις, γίγνεσθαι) in the sensible world from a different point of view. For the usages of δύναμις in Hippocrates and Plato, see Souilhé 1919.
whether or not the thing in question exists from the question of what it is like. This is true even for the other instances of οὐσία in Plato’s dialogues that are customarily translated as existence (e.g. ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας used for the status of the Form of the Good in Rep. VII 509b8–9). I do not think it is right to understand these instances independently of the concept of “what F-ness is”.

III

§5. The senses of οὐσία in Aristotle

With this historical background in mind, let us consider what Aristotle meant by the word οὐσία. Notice that I am not going to consider (1) what οὐσία is for Aristotle, but (2) in what sense he used the word οὐσία. The first question asks what he takes οὐσία to refer to. To answer this adequately, one must examine the whole works of Aristotle, with particular focus on the Metaphysics. It is this question that Aristotelian scholars have been trying to answer since Antiquity. The question I am going to address in this article is not so ambitious. That well-known distinction between sense and reference in the case of definite descriptions would help us see the difference between these two questions. For example, “the oldest person in this room” always has the same sense, but refers to a different person depending on the time and location in which it is used. Thus, this description will refer to one person if it is used in this symposium I am attending, and another if it is used in a different conference tomorrow in Kyoto. The referent of a definite description is determined only in relation to the world, whether real or merely assumed, in which it is used. In the case of philosophical concepts, we can also observe a corresponding distinction, though it will be merely relative and not as clear as we have observed in the case of definite descriptions. Still, when we reflect on the history of the understanding of the word οὐσία, this distinction is important. On the one hand, it is clear that Plato’s and Aristotle’s οὐσία referred to different things, for Plato made it refer to Forms while Aristotle denied the existence of such entities. On the other hand, it does not follow from this that these two philosophers endowed it with different senses. It is possible

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10 Later on Stoics referred to and attached profound importance to this definition of οὐσία. However, Stoics understood this definition in their own ways: when they claim in reference to this definition that all beings are bodies, they have in mind their existence rather than “what they are”. Perhaps we should admit that such a view is implied in the claim of the materialistic giants in the Sophist (but not in the Eleatic visitor’s proposal).
that they understood οὐσία in more or less the same way, but made it refer to
different things on account of their different understandings of the external world or
the cognitive abilities of human beings (just as the referent of “the oldest person in
this room” varies depending on the occupants of the room in question). When we
ask which aspect of οὐσία Aristotle inherited from Plato and what he added to it or
what he changed, we have to take note of the difference between questions (1) and
(2). Obviously it is question (2) that is relevant for our translation of the word
οὐσία.

Now according to a predominant interpretation, Aristotle uses οὐσία in two
different senses: (A) “particular thing” and (B) “essence”. In published translations,
when understood in sense (A), οὐσία is usually translated as “substance” in English
and jittai (実体) in Japanese, but when understood in sense (B), it is usually
translated as “essence” in English and honshitsu (本質) in Japanese (though
admittedly some translators choose to translate οὐσία in both these senses
consistently as “substance” or its equivalents as long as it does not sound too
unnatural). As a matter of fact, many scholars believe that this distinction is implied
in Aristotle’s own words. In chapter 8 of Book Δ of the Metaphysics he first
enumerates several examples of οὐσία and then summarises them in two senses. In
W. D. Ross’ standard translation this summary runs as follows:

T2  It follows, then, that substance has two senses, (a) the ultimate
substratum, which is no longer predicated of anything else, and (b) that
which is a ‘this’ (τόδε τι) and separable — and of this nature is the shape or
form of each thing. (Metaph. Δ.8. 1017b23–26. trans. by Ross in Barnes
1984)

Among the examples offered immediately before T2, the simple bodies and the
bodies or animals that are made up of the simple bodies are examples of sense (a),
while the internal causes of these bodies (e.g. soul), the immanent elements which
limit and mark these bodies as “some this” (τόδε τι, for this expression see my
argument below, pp.40–41), and “what it is by nature” or essence, are all examples
of sense (b). When compared with that distinction between senses (A) and (B) above,
it will obviously turn out that (a) and (b) respectively correspond to (A) and (B).
Thus, Aristotle seems to endorse the translators’ distinction. In addition to this,
scholars suggest that sense (B) or (b) comes from Plato’s concept of οὐσία, while
sense (A) or (a) is Aristotle’s own, as it was probably developed from his criticisms
against Plato. According to these scholars, it is oûσία in sense (A) or (a) that should be identified with the oûσία as distinguished from quantity or quality in the Aristotelian categories.

However, I do not think this line of interpretation is correct. To begin with, this interpretation will make it difficult to see the unity of the concept of oûσία. With those two distinct senses of oûσία in mind, a famous Japanese scholar once asserted that “there are two kinds of oûσία: one is the particular, existential oûσία, and the other the universal, ideal oûσία” (Imamichi 1980). Yet, such an assertion would imply that oûσία is practically homonymous, comprising a deep conceptual chasm within it. Is it really true that the concept to which Aristotle attached special importance both in his use and in his analysis is just a hotchpotch of such heterogeneous elements? To say that Aristotle’s concept has (not ambiguous but) rich connotations seems to me merely a smoke screen for hiding real problems involved in this interpretation. Next and more importantly, I have several reasons for thinking that the basic sense of the oûσία of the categories, which scholars have regularly translated as “substance” or jittai, is not “individual” or “thing”, and so it is not “substance” either. In the rest of this article I would like to explain some of these reasons, as long as space permits, by selectively discussing important points. For now I shall postpone a thorough and detailed examination of the relevant texts of Aristotle and many interpretations previously proposed by scholars.

First, it should be noted that the oûσία of the categories is used interchangeably with “what x is” (τί ἔστι). Oehler’s exhaustive survey of the locations which enumerate one or more categories (Oehler 1984: 289–292) indicates that Aristotle mentions the first category as oûσία in 28 places maximum, as “what x is” (τί ἔστι or τί) in 21 places (out of which three places might be better read as “something” (τί) instead), and as “some this” (τόδε τι or τόδε) in about 18 places. It is plausible, I think, to consider oûσία and “what x is” to be almost synonymous; it is unlikely that they just happen to refer to the same thing. A comparison with other categories seems to confirm this. Throughout the locations enumerated by Oehler, the expressions for quantity and quality are almost invariant. Consistency, then, seems to require that the first category is invariant not just in reference but also in sense. If one objects that only when Aristotle focuses on the formal aspect of oûσία does he use “what x is” instead of oûσία (and so these two concepts are not synonymous), I shall answer that he uses these two concepts interchangeably even in the so-called Organon in which the notions of form and matter do not appear (in fact, he uses the expression “what x is” in four out of six places which enumerate several
categories: *APo.* 83a21, 85b20; *Top.* 103b22; *SE* 178a7). This clearly shows that Aristotle’s occasional use of “what x is” is not directly related to his distinction between the formal and material aspects of οὐσία.

Second, let us examine the meaning of τόδε τι which is regularly used by Aristotle interchangeably with the οὐσία of the categories, and which, as we have observed, is also used in T2 above. Greek grammar teaches us that τόδε is a demonstrative pronoun and τι is an indefinite pronoun, each being used both substantively and adjectively. Accordingly, setting aside the exceptional view that takes this phrase as the juxtaposition of two substantives, we have the following two options: either (1) that we take it as “a/some this” (where τόδε is substantive and τι is adjective), or (2) that we take it as “this something” (where τόδε is adjective and τι is substantive). Note, however, that our decision for the grammatical construction will not settle the issue, we still have to face the question of the sense of this expression.

Many scholars, including W. D. Ross who was very influential on Aristotelian studies in Japan, have understood that the sense of τόδε is “individuality” or “singularity” on the grounds that it is the demonstrative pronoun that points to a thing located in the close vicinity of the speaker. If this view was correct, then the sense of τόδε τι would be “any individual, singular entity that can be pointed to by ‘this’”, or to put it more concisely, “a specific individual or particular thing”. Indeed, many Japanese scholars following this line of interpretation, translated the οὐσία of categories as “this individual” (korenaru kobutsuこれなる個物) or “the individual referred to by ‘this’” (kore to shijisareru kobutsuこれと指示される個物) even when it is juxtaposed with the expression “what x is” (τί ἐστιτι or τι), as at for example, *Metaph.* Z.1. 1028a11–12.11

However, Aristotle’s usages of τόδε τι seem to show, at least in the context in which οὐσία is at issue, that the sense of τόδε τι is not “individuality” or “singularity”, but “a thing that is defined in a certain specific way”. Aristotle’s juxtaposition of τόδε τι with “what x is”, as at for example, *Metaph.* Z.1. 1028a11–12, is the sign of a close conceptual connection between them. Also, Aristotle’s argument in chapter three of Book Z of the *Metaphysics* offers further evidence. In this argument he rules out matter as οὐσία because he thinks that matter is not defined either as “something” (τι) or as “of certain quantity” (ποσὸν) or in any other way, while οὐσία must be τόδε τι and separate (1029a20–30). The obvious

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11 Ross’s translation in Barnes (1984) has: “for in one sense it means what a thing is or a ‘this’”.

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implication is that, in contrast to matter, οὐσία is defined in a specific way. This is in accordance with T2 (b), where τόδε τι is grouped together with shape or form. On the basis of these observations, I suggest that τόδε is not used as a demonstrative pronoun for individual things, but as a variable substitute for any specific nominal expression that answers the question as to “What is x?”.

The relation between “What?” (τί) and “this” (τόδε) in these cases is parallel with the one between “What ... like?” (ποῖον) and “such and such” (τοῖονδε) in the cases in which τοῖονδε is used as a variable substitute for any specific quality that answers the question as to “What is x like?” (see Phy. III.1. 200b27, III.2. 201b26; Metaph. K.9. 1066a16, N.2. 1089a14).

Third, it is wrong to suppose that the referents of οὐσία are just individuals or things. In the Categories (1b4–5), they are put forward (if literally translated) as “the some human” (ὁ τίς ἄνθρωπος) or “the some horse” (ὁ τίς ἵππος). It is true that they refer to what we think of individuals or things, but Aristotle does not say that they can be replaced with proper names, such as Socrates, or Plato, or with “individuals” (καθ’ ἔκαστα). The fact is that he purposefully and artificially created this kind of expression by combining a definite article, an adjectival indefinite pronoun, and a noun in order plainly to show how we should understand οὐσία. When logically analysed, it will turn out that this expression is created by individualising a certain species or sort. I think it is plausible that the article indicates that the thing under consideration is a specific single thing, and that the indefinite pronoun indicates that it can be any one of the members of the species mentioned. Thus, this expression refers to any specific single thing that belongs to a certain species. It is not the expression that simply refers to individuals or particulars.

Finally, the relation between οὐσία and ὑποκείμενον needs reconsideration. In spite of all the problems discussed above, scholars might nevertheless insist on translating οὐσία as substance or jittai, believing that one of the two senses of οὐσία is identical with ὑποκείμενον, the self-identical entity that underlies a constantly changing thing, the entity that can rightly be called “thing” or “individual”. However, I think they have jumped to the conclusion too hastily. Certainly, Aristotle uses the concept of ὑποκείμενον in order to distinguish οὐσία from the other categories in the Categories, and uses it as one of the criteria for settling the question as to what is qualified as οὐσία in the Metaphysics (e.g. at T2 above). However, this does not support their identification of the οὐσία of the categories with ὑποκείμενον, for

Aristotle uses the former to classify predicates and beings, but he does not use the latter for this purpose. I would like to elaborate on this a little more, starting again with a quick review of the linguistic environment of ὑποκείμενον.

[1] The Greek word ὑποκείμενον is a present participle form of the verb ὑποκεῖσθαι. This verb consists of the preposition ὑπὸ (“under”) and the verb κεῖσθαι, which is used as a passive form of τίθεναι (“to place, put”). Thus, the literal meaning of ὑποκεῖσθαι is “to be put under” or “to lie under”. It is a commonplace word, and used, for example, by Homer for the firewood under a kettle (Il. 21.364, used as separable verb) and by Thucydides for the foundation of a building (Th.1.93). In addition to these literal or physical senses of the verb, we can also ascertain various metaphorical senses in its earliest usages. For example, it means “to be appointed” in Pindar’s Olympian Odes (1.85) and “to be set as principles” in Herodotus’ Histories (2.123). These are just a few examples of the metaphorical use of the verb, in which both of the components, i.e. ὑπὸ and κεῖσθαι, have senses far wider than their literal or physical senses.

[2] Aristotle’s technical term ὑποκείμενον should be understood in close connection with these metaphorical senses of ὑποκεῖσθαι, for he derives this term from his own use of the verb in question. Consider, for example, his most basic analysis of change in chapter seven of Book 1 of the Physics. In this argument, Aristotle first mentions the verbal form ὑποκεῖσθαι at 190a15 and thereafter uses both the verbal form (at 190b3) and the participle form (at 190a35, b10). He says that there must be some single thing “that lies as a foundation” (ὦ ὑπόκειται 190b3) in the process of change. I suggest, then, that so long as this term is understood in close connection with the verbal form, as “lying as a foundation”, it has a meaning only in relation to the context in which it appears. Only when it appears in the context in which we speak or think of the process of change, does ὑποκείμενον refer to the thing that lies as a foundation for our locution and understanding of “x comes into being” or “x becomes y”. It is not the case, then, that the word ὑποκείμενον itself refers to some kind of entity that provides the foundation for the process of change, as many scholars usually suppose, nor should this word be translated as “substratum” or kitai (基体).

[3] We can find further evidence for this characteristic nature of ὑποκείμενον in the Categories. Aristotle employs the concept of ὑποκείμενον to set up the two criteria for his classification of beings in the following way (Cat. 2.1a20–1b9).
Here the word ὑποκείμενον — which has a special sense in this specific context — is correlated to “things that are spoken of it” and “things inherent in it”. Thus, for example, a particular human being, a primary οὐσία, is a ὑποκείμενον for the human being, a secondary οὐσία, and so the latter is spoken of the former (Cat. 5.2a21–22). The animal is related to the human being as a genus to its species, and so the former “lies as a foundation” for the latter (Cat. 5. 2b19–20). I therefore suggest that when Aristotle says “x is spoken of some underlying thing” or “x is inherent in some underlying thing”, he means that only in relation to y, something different from x, is it possible for x to exist or to be spoken of.

If I am right, then the ὑποκείμενον does not refer to a specific kind of entity, as the οὐσία or quality or quantity of the categories do. Indeed, we should regard the categories as ontological concepts, and the ὑποκείμενον as a meta-ontological concept for distinguishing and organizing the categories. One would, then, be making a disastrous “category mistake” if one were to identify the ὑποκείμενον with the οὐσία of the categories. It is wrong to translate this οὐσία as substance or jittai on the grounds that it is identical with the ὑποκείμενον understood as a thing or individual thing.

These are my reasons, admittedly presented far more concisely than the issue deserves, for thinking that the basic sense of the οὐσία of the categories is not “substance” or jittai. What is it then? I think my discussion points to an interpretation that is considerably different from the dominant one: the basic sense of the οὐσία of the categories is “what x is” as corresponding to the question “What is x?”, and Aristotle inherited this sense from Plato. His manner of introducing the οὐσία in the Categories supports this interpretation. When he introduces the οὐσία of the categories and explains it through examples, he does not mention “a particular human being” nor “the particular horse”, but “human being” and “horse” (ἀνθρώπος, Ἰππός) (1b28). He mentions the former only later when he sets out to analyse it with the concept of ὑποκείμενον. The οὐσία of the categories is initially posited as something corresponding to the question “What?”, just as the other categories are
posed as things corresponding to the questions “How much?” or “What . . . like?” Being a particular thing is not a requirement for something to be a οὐσία at this stage. I therefore suggest that Plato and Aristotle made the word οὐσία refer to different things not because Aristotle changed the sense of this word, but because they had different understandings about the external world and the cognitive abilities of human beings.

Why then does Aristotle’s concept of οὐσία have the two usages (τρόποι 1017b23) observed in T2: (A) particular things or living beings and (B) their essence or form? I answer this question very briefly, first by saying that (A) comes into focus when the following two conditions are satisfied. First, an inquirer has in mind the question “What x is?” as contrasted with the other kinds of questions such as “What x is like?” (quality) and “How much x is there?” (quantity). The second condition is that he thinks of ὑποκείμενα, something that underlies the object of investigation, when he is trying to answer the question “What x is?” Primary οὐσίαι, particular things or living beings, can be such ὑποκείμενα, and these things come under consideration in the investigation as to “What x is?” as contrasted with “What x is like?” or “How much x is there?” Next, I suggest that (B) comes into focus when this investigation has been completed. In answer to the question “What x is?” about particular things or living beings, the inquirer shows “what x is”, i.e. essence or form.

Aristotle’s discussion in chapter nine of Book 1 of the Topica, in which he minutely analyses the procedure or strategy for dialectical argumentation, clearly shows that the concept of οὐσία has its origin in the context of question and answer. There he puts forward “what x is” instead of the word οὐσία he used in the Categories, making use of the expression that manifestly corresponds to the question “What x is?”, just as the quantity corresponds to “How much x is there?” and the quality to “What x is like?” One can observe here that Aristotle also inherits the dialectical background of Plato’s concept of οὐσία.

Notice, however, that I am not saying that we should rule out “existence” as the meaning of οὐσία. So far, I have discussed that the sense of οὐσία should be understood in close connection with the verb εἶναι, and οὐσία basically means “what x is” even in the case of the οὐσία of the categories, and it does not mean their “existence” as separated from their “what x is”. I am not denying that οὐσία is a basic existent or that which exists as an underlying thing for other phenomena in this world (e.g. a particular colour or size or movement), because Aristotle clearly admits such a status to the referents of the word οὐσία.
Thus, I think translating οὐσία as “substance” or jittai is misleading. It conceals the close relation between οὐσία and εἶναι, or “what x is”, from readers who read Aristotle only in translations, and the Japanese word jittai will lead them to work out a meaning that Aristotle did not intend to convey, as we have seen in section one. This is not just a problem of translation, but actually a problem of our philosophical thinking. I am deeply concerned that the traditional translation has almost led us to forget about the history of thoughts over being, though of course I am here not talking about Heidegger’s Seinsvergessenheit!

References


Is Act Utilitarianism Self-Effacing?
The Rising Need of Utilitarian Awareness in Indirect Strategies

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Abstract: Ethical theories can be “self-effacing”: as we are less successful in achieving their point when we hold and apply them, they enjoin us to stop doing so. It has been argued that self-effacing theories are problematic. Act consequentialism, for example, act utilitarianism, remains the most prominent target for this charge. Because act utilitarianism is the most familiar version of act consequentialism, this paper focuses on that view, even though the ensuing arguments apply mutatis mutandis to consequentialism in general.

Act utilitarianism might well be self-effacing when the ways of holding and applying the principles are restricted in a certain manner (say, to deduction), but act utilitarianism itself does not involve such restrictions. Act utilitarianism can be held and applied with smart thinking devices, and through the finding and improvement of these devices, it has become less prone to self-effacement.

One might suspect that it is not necessary for everyone to accept and hold the principles of act utilitarianism in order to find out and improve thinking devices that achieve the act utilitarian purpose. After all, intellectual elites can do that for other people. So act utilitarianism might still endorse partial self-effacement. Such a worry about partial self-effacement will be addressed in view of various contrivances that purport to direct people’s decision making and conduct.

As science and education have progressed and spread, act utilitarianism has increasingly ceased to be self-effacing. However, it could be self-effacing in the past. As the verdicts of utilitarianism rely on input from the real world, perhaps this world-dependent result on its self-effacement should be expected. However, this type of historical consideration is rarely found in the literature. The question of self-effacement awaits more thorough scientific investigation, particularly into the trajectory of actual human history.
to stop doing so. Many people have argued that self-effacing theories are problematic: they fail to properly guide action, violate the publicity condition,\(^1\) disrupt agents’ mental harmony or integrity, and/or require agents to have conflicting moral judgments (Smith 2001). While other ethical theories, for instance virtue ethical theories, are also allegedly self-effacing (Keller 2007), act consequentialism, for example, act utilitarianism (AU), remains the most prominent target for this charge. Though there are various characterizations of self-effacement (Cox 2012, 290), act consequentialism is often supposed to fit all of them.

Like many philosophical debates, arguments about the self-effacement of ethical theories tend to focus on what implications the phenomenon would have, and whether they would be problematic (see, e.g. Parfit 1984, Smith 2001, Cox 2012, and Akiba 2016). However, these questions are preceded by another genuine issue, i.e. whether theories in question are really self-effacing. This paper concerns the latter question for act consequentialism. Because AU is the most familiar version of act consequentialism, this paper will focus on that view, though the ensuing arguments apply mutatis mutandis\(^2\) to consequentialism generally.

It is probably true that, when applied to human beings in the actual world, AU enjoins us to have motives and decision-making procedures other than trying to do what the principle tells us, i.e., to maximize the happiness of those concerned. Utilitarians have long since acknowledged this point (e.g. Mill 1861, Chapter 2). However, for AU to be self-effacing, it must enjoin more, i.e. ensure the removal of ‘itself’ in the agent’s mind. Therefore, we have to ask: is AU really self-effacing?

1. The Terms of the Debate

Though there are various definitions of self-effacing moral theories, I essentially follow Parfit’s (1984) classic characterizations:

A theory is completely self-effacing iff it tells everyone to believe some other theory.
A theory is partially self-effacing iff it tells some people to believe some other theory.

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\(^1\) According to the publicity condition, a moral theory must be such that everyone should accept and acknowledge it to each other (Rawls 1971, 133 and 182).

\(^2\) That is, by replacing reference to welfarism with another value theory.
A theory is self-effacing for a person P iff it tells P to believe some other theory.

As I understand AU, it dictates that an agent ought to maximize the sum (or average) of well-being. In talking about the maximization of well-being, I mean what actually makes the world go best in terms of well-being. I am not going to talk about a theory that dictates that an agent must maximize the expected well-being or utility, i.e. the weighted average of all possible well-being resulting from the action, with the weights being assigned by the expectation degree (i.e. subjective probability) that any particular event will occur. Such a subjective theory is usually not taken to be self-effacing to the extent that its objective counterpart is. The threat of self-effacement looms when an agent might not do what a theory recommends if s/he believes and tries to follow it. It seems that, given that the agent’s beliefs determine which options have the best expected utilities, s/he has a good chance of doing what a theory recommends, i.e., taking the option that has the best expected utilities, if s/he believed and tried to follow it. Of course, the subjects might tend to miscalculate the expected utility or spend too much time calculating it. It is still apparent that the epistemic problem is still larger for the objective variant; if even the objective version has resources to address the problem of self-effacement, the subjective variant has better resources. This paper regards objective AU as the main focus of this debate. From now on, when I say “act utilitarianism” (AU), I refer to the objective version.

Whether a theory is self-effacing depends not only on the content of the theory but also on the empirical facts about the agents and their natural and societal environment. If an agent were omniscient, s/he could figure out and perform what maximizes well-being. Therefore, for him or her, AU would not be self-effacing. If everyone found themselves in the world where Descartes’ evil demon (Descartes 1641, Meditation 1) dominates, AU, along with many other moral theories, would be completely self-effacing, telling everyone to, say, ignore the principle and do what s/he believes to be harmful. However, these far-fetched possibilities are not the focus of this debate. I assume that agents and environments are actual human beings and actual human conditions.

2. Conditions on Application?
AU might well be self-effacing when the ways of holding and applying the principle is restricted in a certain manner. For example, if it is required that the application of ethical principles like AU be consciously deductive, then, given our favoritism and limited knowledge, we would often have mistaken factual premises and end up producing suboptimal outcomes. For example, suppose a student has a choice between going to see his academic advisor at the time he promised to do so, or not going to see her and instead study for his exam. If he held AU and applied it deductively, he might well reason as follows:

I should take an option iff it would maximally promote the well-being of those concerned.
Skipping the appointment and studying for my exam would maximally promote the well-being of those concerned.
Therefore, I should take the option, i.e., skipping the appointment and studying for the exam.

As a result, the student would skip the appointment and study for the exam. However, it might well turn out that this decision would have suboptimal outcomes. For example, the student would miss the opportunity to get important information on the exam and the defense of his thesis in a timely fashion, the relationship between the student and the advisor would be damaged, and so forth. If he had believed some deontological view that one should always keep a promise no matter what, or the non-welfarist (and hence non-utilitarian) view that keeping a promise is intrinsically important, he might well fulfill the goal of AU better.

For another example, if it is presupposed that the ways of applying AU are those the agents would choose ‘naturally’, i.e., if they held the principle and were given no instruction on how to apply it, then again, the agents would often produce suboptimal outcomes. Consider, for example, a notorious case where you walk near a shallow pond where a child is drowning. In the ‘natural’ application of AU, you consider which option would maximally promote the well-being of those concerned. You consider which option exits. It might take some time to conclude that there are three options: leaving the place without doing anything, calling the police, and entering the pond and saving the child. You try to calculate which option has which outcomes with what probabilities, and manage to figure out that you should enter the pond. When you finally entered the pond to save the child, the child has drowned. If you believed a deontological view that you should save a person when you can no
matter what, or a non-welfarist view that a human life is intrinsically and non-comparatively important, you might well have saved the child and achieved the goal of AU better. The time and opportunities that utility calculus costs are often very expensive.

If AU must be held and applied in the above ways, it will often have suboptimal outcomes. AU might support believing another theory and applying it if these cases are frequent and the alternative theory would have a better record.

Perhaps there must remain a few people who hold AU because, if all of us ceased to believe AU, people’s beliefs in moral theories would be without an act utilitarian check and they might start acting in a very anti-utilitarian way. This reasoning given by Parfit (1984, Section 17) is convincing, but partial self-effacement is still a real possibility if the way of holding and applying AU is restricted in the above ways.

The question is whether these restrictions must be accepted. You cannot deduce from conceptual analysis that AU must be applied either consciously deductively or ‘naturally’. AU is the standard of permissibility, and it does not by itself determine how it should be used in guiding thought and action. Of course, as you will see in the next section, given that believing and applying a theory is itself an action, AU would recommend whatever way of believing and applying the theory, which would maximize the well-being of those concerned. However, the concrete way is determined not conceptually, but by the world we live in. For example, it is not guaranteed that utility calculus is part of the recommended way of applying act utilitarianism.

Some might suppose that the recommended or canonical way of believing and applying a moral theory must be deductive or ‘natural’. These people have a particular conception of what it must be like to be guided by a moral theory, for example, that moral principles must be held and applied in the same manner as laws, or that its application must take the form of justification. Such a conception is controversial and not part of AU itself, and its advocates must present some positive argument that AU must satisfy this conception.

3. Believing AU and Applying it with Smart Thinking Devices

Another idea of application is that an application of a theory must be such that an agent cannot fail to achieve the standard or aim set by the theory. I think that in this sense of application, human beings cannot apply not only AU but also its main rivals, deontological theories and virtue theories included.
Is Act Utilitarianism Self-Effacing?

I have argued that AU can be self-effacing when the ways of holding and applying the principle are restricted in a certain manner. However, often self-effacement will not be optimal provided that we have the options of holding and applying AU with the aid of various decision guides, for example, with well-made secondary rules, simplified decision trees, or computers running utility enhancing programs. These thinking devices can be established through the after-the-fact investigation of tendencies, rather than the prospective utility calculus about each particular action. The former is obviously easier than the latter.

As an example of well-made secondary rules, I present three major rules of safety engineering: inherent safety, safety factors, and multiple barriers (e.g. Hansson 2014, Section 4). These rules are the rules of thumb regarding serious risks. Inherent safety dictates that you eliminate a hazard itself rather than trying to reduce risks associated with that hazard. Safety factors dictate that the strength of designed constructions exceed certain numerical factors in order to ensure that they are stronger than the bare minimum expected requirement for their functions. Multiple barriers dictate that each barrier to the relevant risk be independent of its predecessors so that if the first barrier fails, the second is still intact, etcetera. These rules are not introduced as utilitarian second rules, but they can be adopted as such provided that they would increase the well-being — or in this case, reducing its loss — better than any other known alternative guides, including utilitarian calculus. The above set of three rules, or something like it, might well satisfy this condition at this point in time; satisfying them prevents numerous risks from being actualized, and the cases of not satisfying them, for example, that of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, faced severe outcomes.

As an example of simplified decision trees, I present one from Gigerenzer’s book (2007, 174: see Figure 1). This is the tree used for deciding in a timely fashion whether a patient with severe heart pain, which may be a symptom of a heart attack, 

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4 Note that I am not arguing for rule utilitarianism (RU). RU holds that an action is permissible iff it complies with the system of rules the application of which would promote well-being more than the application of any other systems of rules. The position in the text does not assert that rules, or any other thinking devices, determine which action is permissible. It still embraces AU, which holds that the standard of permissibility is whether the action itself maximally promotes well-being. Even if an agent uses the thinking devices, they occasionally act sub-optimally, which is not permissible according to AU.

5 The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant put all the electronic sources along the coast side, which is a violation of multiple barriers. A tsunami destroyed all of them, and this is the direct cause of the meltdown.
should be sent to a coronary care unit or to an ordinary nursing bed with an electrocardiographic telemetry (ibid. 168). This “fast and frugal tree” succeeds better than not only specialized doctors’ unaided intuitions, but also complex statistical methods, in correctly sending heart attack patients to coronary care units while not sending so many non-heart attack patients there (ibid. 175; see Figure 2). The tree helps to make quick life-and-death decisions.\(^6\)

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\(^6\) As Gigerenzer notes (2007, 176), a full decision tree has so many branches that it is computationally intractable and unsuitable for timely practical decision. What he calls “first and frugal” trees consist of three blocks; first, looking up for factors in order of importance; second, stopping a search if a factor allows it; and third, classifying the object according to this factor (ibid. 175).
As for a utility enhancing computer-run program, I do not know any that is actually used for this very aim. However, it will resemble the one that is used in determining who receives a particular organ that is provided by a brain dead donor in Japan (Japan Organ Transplant Network 2015, especially 10). Because of the lack of organs, the problem of distribution is severe in Japan. A computer-run program is set up to select the recipients that satisfy certain necessary conditions of compatibility and that maximally satisfy certain additional criteria. By the necessary conditions of compatibility, I mean the conditions that must be satisfied in order for the organ to do any good to the recipient. For example, if the donor has B-type blood, the recipients must have either B-type or O-type blood, because otherwise the transplanted organ would not function in the recipient’s body. Given these inputs, the computer will select the recipients. Because the additional conditions reflect not only considerations about efficiency but also those about medical immediacy, order on the waiting list and so forth, this might not exactly fit the description of the utility enhancing computer-run program. However, by modifying the content and priority of the conditions, we can construct a program for implementing AU in so far as our current conditions of knowledge allow. If human beings have to determine who will
receive an organ or who will not, it would be not only too time-consuming to transplant it timely, but also a stressful process because it is potentially a decision of life and death. Additionally, the computer-run program can avoid the influence of doctors’ favoritism for their own patients. Using such a computer-run program can be a good guide in the application of AU in such a domain.

All of these thinking devices have appropriate domains of application. If act utilitarians make use of them, they will employ different devices in different domains.

The point is that one can adopt the above decision guides while holding that AU is true and that these guides are devices to achieve the aim of AU. Because these guides are not flawless, they might end up producing suboptimal outcomes in certain cases. Thus, the agents who deploy them do not believe that using them would maximize well-being on every occasion. I still take it that this mode, i.e., holding AU and using the thinking devices to achieve its aim, is a way of applying, or of trying to follow, AU. Given our limited knowledge, these methods have better chances of achieving the aim of AU than any other known alternatives, including the use of utility calculus.

Furthermore, AU would not enjoin us to forget itself and take these thinking devices as the ultimate criteria. Doing so would eliminate the chances to improve these devices on the bases of new data and their analysis. Through the observations of “experiments in living” (Mill 1859, Chapter 3) and real controlled experiments, i.e. on the basis of scientific investigation, we can improve these thinking devices; they are first discovered on the basis of experience, so in principle they can be improved upon thorough further empirical investigation. However, in order to judge that they are improved from the act utilitarian viewpoint and to adopt them for this reason, we need to keep our belief in AU. Because we do not naturally have the maximization of well-being as the object of our primary desires, believing in AU as the guiding principle is crucial for our adopting and revising devices-cum-actions from the act utilitarian standpoint.

4. The Possibility of Partial Self-Effacement

At this point you might argue that everyone’s holding of AU is not necessary for finding out and improving upon thinking devices to achieve the act utilitarian purpose. Intellectual elites can do that for other people. Therefore, AU might still
endorse partial self-effacement: only these elites should hold AU. This conclusion amounts to a variation of the position that Sidgwick (1907, 489) warily argued for and Williams (1985, 108–109) made famous in his critique under the name of “Government House Utilitarianism”.

Sidgwick (1907, 490) argued that in certain situations, people should not know utilitarianism, since the calculation of utility is so difficult that their actions lead to bad results. However, this paper has argued that AU recommends people to use smart thinking devices over utility calculus as the means to achieve the utilitarian end. As far as such devices are available, people generally do not need to make calculations, and their holding of AU does not produce the bad results Sidgwick is concerned about. The above paragraph, however, points out the possibility that as far as smart thinking devices are available, ordinary people do not need to keep AU in mind. Only intellectual elites hold AU and create these devices, and ordinary people merely use them.

There are four reasons why AU would not support such an intellectual division of labor in the actual world. First, if the creation and revision is up to elites, their self-or group-interests might well distort the thinking devices so that their use will promote their interests but have suboptimal outcomes in terms of general welfare. In order to check this bias, ideally every competent agent should hold AU to make sure that the thinking devices tend to promote the well-being of everyone concerned.

Of course, we might not need AU to recognize direct disadvantages against ourselves and our families because we are naturally sensitive to such effects. However, some relevant effects of using a thinking device might be easily overlooked, such as those involving long-term consequences, and outcomes to strangers and those who cannot voice their complaints (including non-human animals). By holding AU, people recognize them as theoretically important and pay attention to these effects from time to time.

Second, there are so many differences in people’s abilities and social situations and what makes them better-off, that what works for some people (e.g. intellectual elites) might not work for other people. From the act utilitarian viewpoint, this means that even if a thinking device is usable by some group and tends to promote general welfare in their situations, it might not be usable by us or tend to be rather suboptimal in our situations. Even if technology-dependent thinking devices, which involve computers, the internet, and so forth, are available,

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7 Section six examines what happens where this assumption does not obtain.
some people might do better in their own preferred way; the use of paper maps might work better for you than the most recent computer navigation system. To create feasible and workable thinking devices for diverse populations in different circumstances, their users and those potentially affected by the uses should be able to voice their relevant experiences and expectations. What counts as relevant experiences and expectations depend on the guiding principle, AU. By helping people recognize the principle and through using it to guide public discussion, people will pay attention to things that are relevant to general welfare and provide information that may be more useful in improving upon thinking devices. Thus, in developing the thinking devices for AU, people are generally advised by AU to hold it as the standard.

Third, in the use of thinking devices, we need to take AU as setting the point of use. This need comes from three facts. First, usually, thinking devices can be employed in more than one way. This tendency is strengthened when we try to develop general thinking devices for various people and situations. Often, without recognizing the point of employment which is given by AU, one cannot choose the proper use. Second, because the users are human, there are risks of error in employing the devices. Realizing the point of use will help people to avoid rather obvious versions of these errors, for example, misreading or misinterpreting the instructions for use. If they realize that their way of employment will lead to suboptimal results and this will violate the point set by AU, they might well suspect that something is wrong and come to correct their mistake. Third, even if the thinking devices determine the one definite way of application and we avoid human error, thinking devices will sometimes lead to suboptimal results. This is unavoidable. These devices are made to promote general welfare most efficiently in the long run, and not in each and every occasion. To expect more than this is beyond us, the beings whose prediction abilities are severely limited. This condition is aggravated as these devices are always under development to deal with new circumstances and to become more user friendly, more efficient, and open to wider application. The holding of AU will help people recognize rather obvious cases of suboptimal outcomes and, in those cases, to find quick fixes for application procedures.

Fourth, in order for smart thinking devices to be known and used, education is necessary and some justification is required to put them on the lists of things to be taught. Otherwise, people will not keep them in mind and voluntarily use them. If people are taught AU first, we can provide them with a unified and straightforward
rationale that explains why using such diverse thinking devices are important, which might well be more persuasive than piecemeal and disconnected explanations.

For these four reasons, ordinary people need to keep AU in mind when using thinking devices. AU does not support the intellectual division of labor where only intellectual elites hold AU and develop these devices and ordinary people merely use them.

5. **Externalization and Partial Self-effacement**

However, you might suspect that we do not need education, or at least a rationale for education, to propagate and run thinking devices. We can externalize the thinking devices, e.g. by putting well-made secondary rules into laws or professional codes of ethics, or simplified trees into official guidelines for practitioners. Bentham and his fellow reformers attempted to do this in 19th century Britain. While they tried to institutionalize secondary rules with punishment, economists often attempt to do so with positive as well as negative incentives. For example, some of them recommend that the government provide insurance premium deduction, which makes it a rule that people take out certain insurance.

As Lessig (1999) points out, physical or technical constraints on activities (e.g. locks on doors or firewalls on the Internet) can constrain us as these regulations can. Such “architectures” can also be regarded as externalized directive. A recent, subtle implementation is a nudge, which “is any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates. Putting fruit at eye level counts as a nudge. Banning junk food does not” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, 6). In certain domains, by nudging people in certain ways they will promote general welfare more efficiently than coercing them in those directions or leaving them to act as they wish. If these attempts of externalization succeed, people can achieve the aim of AU by following externalized thinking devices. Even the illiterate can be expected to act in the act utilitarian way.

There are differences in the transparency of these contrivances. Laws and official professional codes of ethics are relatively transparent to the intended addressees; they know these public rules and they recognize that they are supposed to follow them. However, incentive structures and architectures, including the
setting of a nudge, often work more covertly. The intended addressees might not recognize what direction these environmental conditions lead them to, or even that they are ways of courting their decision making in a certain direction. They often do not use these devices consciously.

Now let us go back to the issue at hand. The suggestion is that we might not need education, or at least a rationale for education, to propagate and run thinking devices because we can externalize them. People do not have to know the reasons for the legalization and codification of secondary rules and simplified decision trees, because these laws and guidelines come with their own punitive structures. Putting an incentive structure and nudging in place might not require education at all, as people’s decision making is not affected by the recognition of their hidden direction. Since knowing the doctrine does not affect people’s decision making and action, AU does not require people to hold AU, or so argued.

However, we need to keep AU in order to develop or check externalizing thinking devices in the proper way. Here “we” not only include those in charge of externalization, but also the people who use the externalized devices and who are affected by their use. In the previous section I mentioned that losing sight of the standard has four disadvantages: there will be a greater risk of the devices’ being created only for the sake of the developers of the device; it will be difficult to develop the device to accommodate the diversities and complexities of people and environments; as people will not recognize the point of running the devices, the results might severely violate the end of AU in certain cases; and lastly, education on thinking devices might well become less convincing. The argument in the above paragraph concerns only the last disadvantage. The first three cautionary remarks apply to the externalization of these devices as well.

Let us think, for example, about incentive structure and nudging. These interventions are often so subtle that they have a considerable risk of being used for special interests and of having their invisible and often long-term effects overlooked. Keeping AU in mind, people will have a greater chance of looking into these points in view of general welfare. And because incentive structures and nudges do not work in the proper way in certain situations, it will be beneficial from an act utilitarian view that people can check whether it promotes general welfare in the particular situations they encounter. Though some might think a priori that an incentive for an action always tends to induce that action, this is not true, and we need to examine it on a case-by-case basis. For example, Thaler and Sunstein (2008, 232) suggest a program for reducing second pregnancies of teenage girls: city
governments pay girls who have already had a baby a dollar for each day they are not pregnant. As Gigerenzer performed a literature study, he found only one randomized trial by Stevens-Simons et al. (1997), which reported that giving a dollar a day did not change the rate of second pregnancies. As this example illustrates, humans and their societies are so complex that it is hard to know how a particular incentive or nudge will work out for the intended group in the intended situation. Sometimes incentives even hamper the intended action by crowding out people’s social preferences (see Bowles 2016, especially Chapter 3 and references therein). From the act utilitarian standpoint, it will be beneficial if people hold the doctrine and can examine whether the incentive or nudge actually promotes general welfare. Such an examination will involve subtle consequences, including people’s motive structure (ibid. Chapter 6).

Note also that externalizing a thinking device has its own cost. For example, enforcing a criminal law requires police, a justice system, jails, and the money to support them, not to mention the decrease in welfare from the restriction of freedom. Given these costs, AU will expect people to pay attention to and check whether these externalizations will really promote general welfare most effectively. In order to do so, an act utilitarian viewpoint is necessary.

6. Individual and Social Conditions, and the Prospective Effacement of Self-Effacement

If my argument is on the right track, the resulting style of application is not to recognize AU and then use it with empirical premises to deduce what one should do. Nor is it to be unaware of AU and use a thinking device instead. Rather, it is to be aware of AU and implement a thinking device or its externalization as the best feasible way to achieve its end. The direct awareness of the principle, and its indirect application through such a device will be the strategy for success in view of AU. AU is not even partially self-effacing.

Or is it? Until now I have supposed two things: the availability of such thinking devices as explained in section three, and the abilities that are sufficient for using and checking thinking devices or their externalizations to achieve the end of AU. We need to admit that these conditions are not universally satisfied.

Nudging allows choice and costs little in terms of personnel and money, but often leaves people uninformed (Gigerenzer et al. 2009).
The availability of such devices or their externalizations is not universal. Because well-made secondary rules are “general conclusions from the experience of human life” (Mill 1861, Chapter 2), they could not be established without empirical investigations. Even after they are established, they might not reach the general population. For example, many people do not know the three maxims of safety engineering. Furthermore, technology-dependent thinking devices, which involve language, paper, printing, computers, the Internet, and so forth, are simply unavailable if these technologies are absent, unaffordable, or presented without instructions and interfaces that are understandable to them. In the past, these devices were not found at all. Then, trying to apply AU might have involved a ‘natural’ application which would have included utility calculus. The result might have been suboptimal and even worse than believing some other theory.

As for the abilities to use thinking devices to achieve the end of AU, these devices are often made for normal human beings. If some people do not have the capacities of normal adult human beings, their use of these devices might have suboptimal results. For example, if some people cannot enter inputs into the relevant computer properly, the computer-run program will not return the desired results. For this task at this point, literacy and the ability to understand certain basic instructions are necessary. Perhaps future technological development will make these devices less demanding, but currently some people cannot use these devices to bring about desirable outcomes.

Thus, perhaps AU has been self-effacing for the ill-informed and the illiterate, and even for many normal adults who applied it in the past. Certain restrictions on its application, which is discussed in section two, is forced by their personal or social conditions; and, in believing and trying to follow AU, they might end up facing results worse than believing another ethical view available to them at that time.  

However, given the development of natural and social sciences as well as the improvement of linguistic and other literacies, it might well cease to be so, as human beings gain more accurate information and have access to better decision guides in applying the principle of AU. Moreover, if the thinking devices for AU are successfully externalized, more people can hold and apply AU successfully with the help of these externalized devices. Informing people of the principle has become

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9 This partly depends on what other moral views have been available. Note that if these theories are unavailable to an agent at that time, holding them will not be his or her option, so it will not be recommended by AU.
generally conducive to the aim of AU in rendering thinking devices and their externalization more efficient. AU recommends that we work on science and education that have generally improved the conditions of human welfare. Therefore, act utilitarians will seek a world that is increasingly developed in terms of science and education, which includes smarter thinking devices and possibly their externalizations through which people who hold the principle, can implement its end.

The broad conclusions are as follows. AU might well be self-effacing when the ways of holding and applying the principle are restricted in a certain manner (say, to deduction), but AU itself does not involve such constraints. But because our world might have so constrained us, it might have been partially or wholly self-effacing. However, it has increasingly ceased to be so, as science and education have progressed and spread.¹⁰ As the verdicts of utilitarianism depend on inputs from the real world, perhaps this world-dependent result on its self-effacement should be expected. However, this type of historical consideration is rarely found in the literature. The problem of self-effacement awaits more detailed scientific investigations, specifically into the trajectory of actual human history.

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¹⁰ Future researches need to investigate the role of freedom and democracy here.
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An Interpersonal-Epistemic Account of Intellectual Autonomy: Questioning, Responsibility, and Vulnerability

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Abstract: The nature and value of autonomy has long been debated in diverse philosophical traditions, including moral and political philosophy. Although the notion dates back to ancient Greek philosophy, it was during the Age of Enlightenment that autonomy drew much attention. Thus, as may be known, moral philosophers tended to emphasize self-regulation, particularly one’s own will to abide by universal moral laws, as the term “autonomy” originates from the Greek words “self” (auto) and “rule” (nomos).

In parallel, modern epistemologists supposedly espoused the idea of intellectual autonomy as self-reliance. In this classical view, an intellectually autonomous explorer of knowledge must not depend on a belief that is obtained from another’s testimony, until one can justify it to oneself. However, accompanying the growing focus on the importance of social dimensions of acquiring knowledge and understanding, recent epistemologists have doubted the classical view and have since reconsidered intellectual autonomy from distinct approaches such as social and virtue epistemology.

This paper propounds an interpersonal-epistemic approach to intellectual autonomy. First, it is argued that thinking through questioning both individually and with other epistemic peers is an interpersonal-epistemic practice. Second, it is demonstrated that with particular cognitive features inherent within us, an intellectually autonomous person must think through questioning in necessary situations. This interpersonal account of intellectual autonomy can conceptually enrich intellectual autonomy by considering its relationship with not only responsibility but also with vulnerability. Specifically, regarding responsibility, an intellectually autonomous person must be responsible for his or her own actions throughout questioning processes. Regarding vulnerability, our intellectual autonomy lies in retaining autonomy with vulnerability in the plastic control of the questioning processes.

This distinct notion of intellectual autonomy may be characterized as “interpersonal-responsibilist”. In this view, intellectual autonomy is praiseworthy in
fulfilling the responsibility to think through questioning as an interpersonal-epistemic practice in pursuit for an epistemic good. This opens up scope for further research to examine interpersonal and diachronic dimensions of our epistemic practices pertinent to intellectual autonomy.

1. Introduction

The nature and value of autonomy has long been debated in diverse philosophical traditions, including moral and political philosophy. Although the notion dates back to ancient Greek philosophy, it was during the Age of Enlightenment that autonomy drew much attention. Thus, as may be known, moral philosophers tended to emphasize self-regulation, particularly one’s own will to abide by universal moral laws, as the term “autonomy” originates from the Greek words “self” (auto) and “rule” (nomos). In parallel, modern epistemologists supposedly espoused the idea of intellectual autonomy as self-reliance. In this classical view, an intellectually autonomous explorer of knowledge must not depend on a belief that is obtained from another’s testimony,¹ until one can justify it to oneself.

However, accompanying the growing focus on the importance of social dimensions of acquiring knowledge and understanding, recent epistemologists have doubted the classical view of intellectual autonomy. For example, is it really the case that all the beliefs obtained from others’ testimony are unreliable? Or, is it really true that all the beliefs that we justify on our own are free from implicit cognitive biases? The notion of intellectual autonomy has since been examined from distinct epistemic approaches, such as social and virtue epistemology.

Even so, the idea that thinking for oneself is exclusively an individual’s mental activity remains unquestioned. It often involves, either partly or entirely, shaping one’s standpoint through questioning: students may encounter an intriguing question while reading a historic book, such as Theaetetus, and start to consider it for themselves with their parents. Researchers may become inclined to articulate their views by eliciting elaborate responses from their peers and critics. Even when

¹ The term “testimony” in epistemology refers to reports that are obtained from what other people tell us. We often rely on the reports of others for our beliefs about the food we eat, medicine we ingest, products we buy, discoveries in science, historical events, and so on. For example, I have a belief that eating excessive snacks can be harmful to health based on what I have watched on television, as well as a belief that Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration in 1945 based on my reading a history textbook.
one deliberates on a particular matter for oneself, one may engage in questioning in conformity with the principles of one’s epistemic communities, such as a particular scientific community. As the above illustrates, we think through questioning individually and with interlocutors in a disciplined manner.

This paper propounds an interpersonal-epistemic approach to intellectual autonomy. First, it is argued that thinking through questioning both individually and with other epistemic peers is an interpersonal-epistemic practice. Second, it is demonstrated that with particular cognitive features inherent within us, an intellectually autonomous person must think through questioning in necessary situations. This interpersonal account of intellectual autonomy can conceptually enrich intellectual autonomy by considering its relationship with not only responsibility but also with vulnerability. Specifically, regarding responsibility, an intellectually autonomous person must be responsible for his or her own actions throughout questioning processes. Regarding vulnerability, our intellectual autonomy lies in retaining autonomy with vulnerability in the plastic control of the questioning processes. In this view, an intellectually autonomous person is praiseworthy in pursing an epistemic good while fulfilling the responsibility to think through questioning as an interpersonal-epistemic practice.

The argument will proceed in five parts. Section 2 examines the literature on intellectual autonomy. Section 3 elaborates on thinking through questioning as an interpersonal-epistemic practice. Section 4 illuminates the internal connection between intellectual autonomy and responsibility. Section 5 explores the relationship between intellectual autonomy and vulnerability. Section 6 concludes by summarizing my distinctive approach.

2. A brief overview of the contemporary debate

To understand the backdrop of the literature on intellectual autonomy, let us first clarify the classical view of intellectual autonomy as self-reliance. This view is illustrated by René Descartes’ episodes in Discourse on Method. As a boy, Descartes, once aspiring to gain clear and certain knowledge of everything useful in life, found himself bewildered by innumerable uncertain claims and errors in academic books. Descartes considered it impossible to become closer to the truth by learning from books that are assembled from mere pieces of others’ testimony. In
Scenarios such as this, it appears that Descartes was sensible to eventually put aside what he had acquired through others’ testimony to retain intellectual autonomy.

Social epistemologists have eschewed the individualistic assumption underlying this classical view of intellectual autonomy and examined the relationship between epistemic dependence on others’ testimony and thinking for oneself (e.g., Coady 2002; Fricker 2006). Fricker (2006)’s social-epistemic approach is distinctive in exploring intellectual autonomy in light of humans’ limited sensory and perceptual faculties and their fallible cognitive capacities. Admittedly, others’ testimony sometimes contains false beliefs, whether intentionally or otherwise, which can render the recipients of the testimony epistemically insecure. Still, it is fair to bear in mind that beliefs that are justified on our own are not always guaranteed to be true. People may be epistemically insecure when they memorize all the phone numbers of their colleagues at the office for themselves. Similarly, people may not trust themselves epistemically when they conduct complicated calculations even after reflectively ascertaining the consequence. Conversely, some people can be better equipped to obtain a particular truth than other people are. For instance, one may possess excellent cognitive competences, such as good memory and outstanding reasoning skills, and reliable expertise regarding particular subjects.

In my understanding, Fricker’s consideration is illuminating in highlighting intellectual autonomy that is unique to humans with particular cognitive features. This insight should not be regarded as relative to the epistemic environment of a particular society. Rather, the point is that intellectual autonomy that fits us must hold in its relationship to our social-epistemic interactions. To put it differently, the following holds true:

(1) With cognitive limitations, an intellectually autonomous person must appropriately engage in social-epistemic practices.

Take the case of testimonial exchange. It seems reasonable to think that with intrinsic cognitive limitations, an intellectually autonomous person must discreetly depend on others’ testimony vis-à-vis the epistemic environments (Fricker 2006, 239). For example, as a recipient of information, an intellectually autonomous person must be capable of sensibly identifying reliable epistemic authorities in a particular field, such as a trustworthy doctor.

Conversely, a criticism of Fricker is that her argument draws exclusively on the transmission of knowledge through testimony from informants to recipients.
However, there is another distinctive social-epistemic activity we often confront: questioning. In essence, “questioning” refers to the dynamic process of asking questions and answering them in combination with prepared arguments. For example, in receiving others’ testimony, one may unwittingly make biased judgments on the credibility of informants due to their political views. This is known as “testimonial injustice” (Fricker 2007, chap. 2). Although no one may be free from such risks in testimonial exchanges, such as the news in mass media, questioning may help us recognize our own implicitly unfair judgment on a belief by opposing informants. As this suggests, the focus on questioning will likely expand the range of epistemic approaches to intellectual autonomy. I examine questioning more closely in the next section.

Now, concerning virtue epistemology, Linda Zagzebski has focused on the relationship between pre-reflective trust and reflective thinking. In the view of intellectual autonomy as self-reliance, self-reflection helps one obtain an epistemic good, whilst the unreflective intake of perceptual and memory beliefs is believed to make one epistemically insecure. However, a point that recent epistemologists arguably agrees on is that it can be rational by default for a person to pre-reflectively trust the functioning of our sensory faculties and cognitive competences (Zagzebski 2012, chap. 2). By a default condition, I refer to the case in which people obtain perceptual and memorial beliefs by exercising their faculties and competences as usual under normal circumstances. To illustrate, eyesight functions as a reliable source of perceptual beliefs under normal circumstances, and, thereby, a person can trust the functioning of his or her eyesight to gain beliefs reliably. For instance, an angler may tell if today’s fish is fresh or not at first sight, which shows that his or her eyesight is a pre-reflective yet reliable source of the angler’s belief.

Thus, it is necessary for an intellectually autonomous person to exercise “epistemic conscientiousness”. Concerning this notion, Zagzebski gives a concise account:

I call the quality of using our faculties to the best of our ability in order to get the truth epistemic conscientiousness. I think of this quality as the self-reflective version of the natural desire for truth. . . . Once a person becomes reflective, she thinks that her trustworthiness is greater if she summons her powers in a fully conscious and careful way, and exercises them to the best of her ability. What I am calling conscientiousness is the state or disposition to do that (Zagzebski 2012, 48).
Conscientiousness is defined as the disposition to reflect on a conflict in one’s mental state, called “dissonance”, when one recognizes it by obtaining a new, and alternative, belief. In this understanding, an intellectually autonomous person pursues the ideal by reconciling pre-reflective trust in sensory and perceptual faculties and conscientiousness in the best way. Suppose that Tom had to pay the fare for a trip that was planned for the New Year’s holiday and that it was due today. Remembering that a sufficient amount of money was left in his bank account, he tried to withdraw the money but found that his available funds were inadequate. He wondered what was going on, relying on his memory (not merely wishful thinking) and his belief that enough money was left in his bank account. If Tom had a normal memory, his action of relying on his memory might be reasonable. Here, if Tom were intellectually autonomous, he would not neglect the dissonance caused by the recognition of the discrepancy between the fact and his earlier memorial belief. He would reflect on the matter to resolve the apparent inconsistency.\textsuperscript{2}

Zagzebski’s virtue-based approach to intellectual autonomy seems insightful, in that it can reconcile the requirement of a reflection process, as has been emphasized in moral and political autonomy, and the unreflective yet reliable functioning of one’s perceptual and cognitive faculties. Also, on the basis of her critique of intellectual autonomy as self-reliance, her approach can give credence to trust in other’s wisdom, such as in testimony delivered by experts.

However, Zagzebski’s view of intellectual autonomy still seems to be individualistic, as it assumes that conflicts in beliefs get noticed by a conscientious person and dispose him or her to reflect on them. Conversely, because of our cognitive limitations, as in (1), even a reflective thinker, or a conscientious thinker, may implicitly have particular stereotypes and fail to recognize inconsistencies in the web of their beliefs. To identify such inconsistencies, one often needs other peers as interlocutors who are in an equally good or better position in regards to the discussed matter. This suggests that although our intellectual autonomy requires reflective thinking on our part, it also has a lot to do with the questioning conducted with other peers. I pursue this line of argument in more detail in the next section.

3. Thinking through questioning as an interpersonal-epistemic practice

\textsuperscript{2} Zagzebski (2012, 2013) referred to intellectual autonomy understood this way as self-governance.
Although some research has examined the relationship between questioning and some character traits, such as inquisitiveness (Watson 2015), none has focused on the relationship between intellectual autonomy and questioning. Given this omission, this section focuses on this relationship and demonstrates that an intellectually autonomous person must think through questioning, which is understood as an interpersonal-epistemic practice, in necessary situations. So, let us begin by articulating several relevant concepts, such as “questioning”, “epistemic peers”, and “a chain of arguments”.

Questioning is an epistemic practice seen in everyday intellectual lives as well as in argumentative dialogues in law, science, politics, medicine, and education. With regard to the notion of practice, I draw on Roberts and Wood (2007)’s clear account:

Intellectual practices aim intrinsically at such goods as understanding (of texts, of natural processes, of historical events, of historical human actions, of human nature and its conditions of flourishing and conditions of dysfunction, etc.), acquaintance, and confirmation of beliefs (evidence, insight about coherence with well-established beliefs). Intellectual practices aim at the justification and warrant of beliefs (Roberts and Wood 2007, 117).

Their account of intellectual practice seems reasonable because any type of epistemic practices involves people’s different actions to obtain epistemic goods, such as knowledge and understanding. For example, doctors may see their patients and consider the best treatment for them, and citizens may debate the political policy regarding how they can accommodate immigrants and satisfy their needs. In this light, questioning is an epistemic practice that has the purpose of attaining epistemic goods. Suppose, for example, a child, say Ben, is keen to ask why the sky looks blue in sunlight, while the outer layer of the Earth in the picture of the universe looks dark. His science teacher may assist his questioning by helping him expound on his question and attain targeted understanding about the color of the sky.

Questioning reflects bi-directional relationships among epistemic peers. “Epistemic peers” refer to people in an equally good or better position on a topic of
questioning. Suppose that Ben found an intriguing question about the sky’s color while reading an illustrated reference book on science. He became curious about the question in the book and considered it based on the testimony and advice of the book’s authors. Similarly, consider a scenario in which Mary is a medical scientist who has been developing a medicine to avert an epidemic and discovers the risk of a side effect caused by the medicine. This fact may urge her to discuss the problem of what specifically causes the side effect with her collaborators and other reliable experts. Accordingly, Mary engages in questioning with her peers to attain her research goal.

Furthermore, questioning is structured to represent the relationship between arguments, that is, a chain of arguments, in the form of asking and answering. Suppose that a scientific study reports that an increasing number of Japanese people of working age are diagnosed with obesity, which is more likely to lead to serious diseases. Suppose also that, asked about the measure to curb the increase, a physician advises people over 40 to have a detailed medical checkup every two years for free. The physician also illustrates the point by claiming that, as cars in Japan must be inspected every two years, or three years after the registration of a new car, analogically, it is advisable that people over a certain age undergo regular medical checkups. In this instance, the physician’s answer assumes the validity of the scientific study’s result and is based on the analogical linkage between the cases of people over 40 and used cars. In this way, this answer is embedded in the particular chain of arguments and will be evaluated accordingly.

Based on the clarifications on questioning, let us consider thinking for oneself. As the term “thinking” is used widely and differently depending on the contexts, I shall confine the following argument to thinking in the form of asking and answering questions in the pursuit of epistemic goods. I simply call this type of thinking “thinking through questioning”.

Thinking through questioning can be done both individually and with epistemic peers. In both cases, it must be deemed as an interpersonal-epistemic practice with some qualifications.

First, consider individual thinking through questioning. An individual’s thinking through questioning is an interpersonal-epistemic practice only if the

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3 As one can be an imaginary interlocutor who is in an equally good position in one’s mind, one’s epistemic peers include oneself. This individual thinking is discussed in more detail below.

4 See Hintikka (2007) for a more detailed analysis of how questioning behaves logically in argumentative terms.
thinking, consisting of a chain of arguments, conforms to certain principles and frameworks, such as reasoning, accepted by an intellectual community. For example, suppose a pupil, say Emily, is keen on how a parachute works when it descends at the same speed from a certain height. If she considers it herself, her consideration is based on valid reasoning and presuppositions based in Newtonian physics, such as Newton’s first law of motion, her thinking through questioning may be deemed as an epistemic practice in physics. Likewise, suppose that Mary, the aforementioned medical scientist, addresses the problem of how to produce a safe and effective medicine without consulting her colleagues and supervisors. In this case, Mary is deliberating on her question, presumably with an imagined interlocutor in her mind, and her conduct of questioning constitutes a chain of arguments in conformity with the principles of the scientific community to which she belongs. Roberts and Wood (2007) observe that “even solo epistemic practices have a social dimension: the laboratory scientist will belong to a tradition of experimentation; Descartes’s thoughts are responses to a historical intellectual and political situation” (114). Sole reflective thinking, as a chain of arguments in accordance with a particular standard, is regarded as an interpersonal-epistemic practice.

Second, thinking through questioning with epistemic peers may likely bring one closer to one’s own epistemic good. To explain this, let us consider the difference between moral laws as moral goods and truth as an epistemic good. A morally autonomous person might individually recognize moral laws, such as that one must keep a promise, and could bind himself or herself to them. That person would neither need other people to recognize moral laws nor to obey them. By contrast, an intellectually autonomous person needs epistemic peers to recognize truth as an epistemic good. To illustrate, questions from epistemic peers can help one recognize hitherto one’s own doubtful stereotypical beliefs. Stereotypical beliefs are often implicitly held and go unnoticed by ourselves. For example, contemporary epistemologists have posed a question about the value of knowledge, which was supposedly implicitly assumed. This question has gained momentum to explore the values of different epistemic notions, such as understanding, in so-called “value-driven epistemology” (Riggs 2008).

Moreover, questioning with epistemic peers helps one to guide questioning in a better direction. Suppose, for example, that a child, say Cindy, asks how she can know she is awake. By asking this question, Cindy may want to know the difference

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5 See also Pritchard, Millar, and Haddock (2010, part 1) for an exposition of the value problem.
in how our brain functions between the time the brain is active and the time when we are asleep. Alternatively, Cindy may be curious about the philosophical question of how it is possible to know we are awake and not in a dream. Her teachers may help Cindy to develop an initial question, so her inquiry can be directed toward the goal that she wants to achieve.

Considering this, epistemic peers’ questions can work as epistemic promoters in terms of *prima facie* obtaining epistemic goods.\(^6\) Admittedly, they can also function as epistemic defeaters empowered to cancel or downgrade the degree of the power of one’s justification. A defeater either renders a part of the arguments unjustified or the whole chain of arguments unjustified. To illustrate a local unjustified state, suppose that a leap in a scientific theory is found during a review process. The theory will be incomplete, but a scientist and a reviewer can identify a previously unjustified part in the theory in their dialogue.

However, questions that appear to defeat the justification at first can turn into promoters. Consider the aforementioned case in which a leap in a theory a scientist proposes is found during a review process. This does not ruin the scientist’s whole theory, but it can maintain a degree of certainty. Although the reviewer pointed out an unquestioned yet doubtful assumption in the theory, it may have facilitated the necessary questioning to solve the problem and make the entire theory compelling. In this example, the question defeats the part of the scientist’s original argument, while it simultaneously promotes good questioning between the scientist and the reviewer in the sense that they will be able to come closer to the research goal collaboratively.

Hence, with some qualifications, thinking through questioning both individually and with other epistemic peers must be regarded as an interpersonal-epistemic practice.

Let us articulate the relationship between thinking through questioning and intellectual autonomy. It is granted that our intellectual autonomy requires thinking through questioning on our part. The present focus is on thinking through questioning with epistemic peers or individual reflective thinking, comprising a chain of arguments in accordance with certain standards within an intellectual community. These forms of thinking are regarded as interpersonal-epistemic practices. Suppose that “S” represents a person. Given the above,

\(^6\) The *prima facie* condition is necessary because questioning is essentially open to further questions. See also Hookway (2008) for a different consideration about the role of questions.
(2) S is intellectually autonomous only if S thinks through questioning, as an interpersonal-epistemic practice, in necessary situations.

I will refer to this understanding of intellectual autonomy as an interpersonal account of intellectual autonomy. Note here that the justificatory state regarding any claim in questioning as a chain of arguments is not necessary for intellectual autonomy. As detailed above, there are many cases in which a claim is locally unjustified, but an unjustified part can later be justified once identified and examined. A person can be seen as intellectually autonomous if that person thinks reflectively and responds to a defeater at a later time.

The interpersonal account of intellectual autonomy with our cognitive limitations can offer the perspective to relate intellectual autonomy to the notions of responsibility and vulnerability. I consider this in the following two sections.

4. Intellectual autonomy and responsibility

The first significant point of the interpersonal account of intellectual autonomy is that it makes it possible to conceptually connect intellectual autonomy and responsibility. It was implicitly assumed that epistemic responsibility concerns one’s own belief, while moral responsibility involves one’s own action. In this understanding, unlike the case of moral responsibility for their actions, people do not have voluntary control over their beliefs (cf. Kornblith 2014, chap. 2). Perceptual beliefs, such as beliefs gained through eyesight, come to people involuntarily, and thus they occur spontaneously.

However, Lorraine Code, a founder of virtue responsibilism, presents a different perspective to consider in regard to epistemic responsibility:

I call mine a “responsibilist” position in contradistinction to Sosa’s proposed “reliabilism”, at least where it is human knowledge that is under discussion. This is because the concept “responsibility” can allow emphasis upon the active nature of the knower/believer that the concept “reliability” cannot . . . . We would speak of a “reliable” computer, but not of a “responsible” one. A person can be judged responsible or irresponsible only if s/he is clearly to be regarded as an agent (in this case a cognitive agent) in the circumstances in
question. It is because of its active, creative nature that human knowledge-seeking endeavor requires evaluation in terms of responsibility (Code 1984, 39–40, emphasis original).

Inspired by Sosa’s view, Code proposed a distinct responsibilist virtue epistemology. I leave the question of the relationship between two versions of virtue epistemology here. I want to call attention to Code’s suggestion that epistemic responsibility is borne not by perceptual beliefs but rather by epistemic practice, in which people aim for epistemic goods.

As observed in section 3, people engage in various intellectual practices and can choose actions, through which they arrive at true beliefs. To exemplify, people can be circumspect about how to receive testimonial beliefs. For example, one can be cautious to stay away from the information on unreliable websites. In the same vein, through the process of questioning, one can choose actions, such as giving an elaborate response to their epistemic peers. If people choose actions on their own will in questioning, they can responsibly maintain the resulting beliefs.

Here, the above responsibilists’ insight can lend support to the view that people can engage in questioning responsibly. What, then, is the relationship between intellectual autonomy and responsibility?

An intellectually autonomous person must be responsible for actions in questioning. Remember that an intellectually autonomous person is required to think through questioning as an interpersonal-epistemic practice. That person must then be responsible for handling questions as either defeaters or promoters. To illustrate, an intellectually autonomous person takes the responsibility to respond to a question as a defeater in a chain of arguments by removing an unnecessary assumption from a set of premises. Otherwise, that person is not deemed as intellectually autonomous because he or she waives reflective thinking. Alternatively, an intellectually autonomous person may have the duty to forestall possible questions that may arise in the prepared arguments. This can prevent the occurrence of a defeater to that person’s answer. Conversely, an intellectually autonomous person does not have to respond to irrelevant questions. In this case, that person is not irresponsible but is merely not responsible for responding to such questions.

Hence, with regard to the relationship between intellectual autonomy and responsibility,
(3) An intellectually autonomous person must hold responsibility for his or her actions in the questioning processes.

As explained earlier, this does not require an intellectually autonomous person to have voluntary control over his or her belief. Instead, as that person can choose actions in questioning, one must have responsibility for one’s performance and, consequently, must hold the resulting beliefs. This is what it means for an intellectually autonomous person to “believe responsibly”.

There are several notes regarding a questioner’s responsibility. First, an intellectually autonomous person does not need to convince his or her interlocutor. Suppose that a person is prima facie justified in responding to a question before a peer. This response acts to defeat a defeater but does not ensure that the opponent is necessarily persuaded. The person may be obstinate in his or her own view due to forming an unfair judgment. In addition, a person can persuade peers regardless of how compelling his or her response is. Suppose that a politician has a charismatic eloquence that can allure listeners. The listeners might be persuaded by the politician’s claim, even when it is not based on good responses. As persuasion often involves evaluations other than epistemic ones, a person does not have to persuade to be intellectually autonomous.

Second, an intellectually autonomous person can reasonably depend on what epistemic authorities say, including an encyclopedia, as Fricker suggested. It can function to either defeat justification or promote questioning. An illustrated reference book based on a trustworthy expert’s testimony may help an intellectually autonomous person to accomplish an epistemic goal. Conversely, if the source of a testimony is considered unreliable, an intellectually autonomous person must think critically and believe the resulting belief responsibly. In addition, an intellectually autonomous person can pre-reflectively trust his or her cognitive faculties under normal circumstances, as Zagzebski observed. What is required for intellectual autonomy is to fulfill the responsibility to think through questioning after noticing questions in some way or other.

5. Intellectual autonomy, vulnerability, and plastic control

Another significant point of the interpersonal account of intellectual autonomy is that it enables us to consider intellectual autonomy and vulnerability in the control of
questioning processes. This section demonstrates that with cognitive limitations as explained in stipulation (1), people are epistemically vulnerable to questions from epistemic peers. Then, it argues that despite our vulnerability, intellectual autonomy must sustain interest in a topic of questioning with a plastic plan for fulfilling an epistemic goal.

As a starting point, let us consider the relationship between moral autonomy and a life plan as broadly understood in the political and moral spheres. Traditionally, alongside the requirement of reflective thinking, moral autonomy supposedly requires us to decide and control our life courses and to fulfill the objectives of our lives accordingly (cf. Slote 2013). To exemplify this, suppose that Susan is a Japanese anime fanatic and wants to work at a Japanese company in the future. If she is morally autonomous, she might make a plan to learn Japanese at a language center, act on her own will to specialize in Japanese at a university, and might see a professor whose study pertains to Japanese culture. In this way, Susan would be willing to control her life to accomplish her goal, and would not be manipulated by external forces, such as being at her parents’ disposal. As this example shows, in the classical view of autonomy, a morally autonomous person may ideally be someone who designs his or her life course and never becomes frustrated in pursuing the life plan’s objective.

Assuming that the classical view of moral autonomy is the case, an intellectually autonomous person would be required to control a questioning process according to his or her initial plan. If so, that person’s failure to control the process would render him or her intellectually heteronomous. However, in the process of questioning, one frequently faces epistemically challenging situations, such as being exposed to unforeseen questions that are not easily dealt with. Even a conscientious researcher might become stuck on a crucial question. Thus, the requirement of being able to control the questioning processes as initially planned seems too strong for a person to retain intellectual autonomy.

What, then, is wrong with the classical view? It fails to consider the cognitive limitations inherent within us, as stipulated in (1). As people can only anticipate future events from their own present perspectives, they are susceptible to unforeseen yet relevant questions. People may struggle to handle the questions and even become frustrated by such questions.

We may call “epistemic challenges” questions that are pertinent to an epistemic goal yet difficult to answer. They may hinder, delay, and spoil the initial planning to achieve an epistemic goal. Here, it might be wondered if one can
disregard questions as epistemic challenges. Unlike in the case of practical challenges, epistemic ones do not involve physical or financial issues and can seemingly be disregarded. However, as explained in (3), during the process of questioning, an intellectually autonomous person must hold responsibility to respond to questions as defeaters and promoters.

Thus, an intellectually autonomous person is vulnerable to such epistemic challenges. However, this vulnerability differs from heteronomy. First, vulnerability concerns epistemic challenges that arise as a result of active engagement in questioning. Presumably, as one becomes aware of more relevant and distinct details of knowledge and understanding in a particular field, it enables one to be more sensitive to the relevant questions, although the range of such questions may be smaller (Sato 2016). Thus, an intellectually autonomous person may be vulnerable to questions, yet its vulnerability results from good questioning in the pursuit for an epistemic good. By contrast, intellectual heteronomy may render people merely obedient to what their peers request.

Second, vulnerability allows one to possess the willingness to address epistemic challenges, while intellectual heteronomy makes one frustrated by them. If the aforementioned medical researcher, Mary, who is struggling to deal with the unexpected side effect of the medicine, is vulnerable yet not heteronomous, she may be willing to assess how difficult it is to identify the cause. She may also contemplate whether she should change the initial research method. As this illustrates, by granting vulnerability, she can be responsive to epistemic challenges and also retain intellectual autonomy.

Hence, our intellectual autonomy lies in retaining autonomy with vulnerability. Being vulnerable is not an embarrassing fact for intellectual autonomy, as vulnerability arises from people’s active engagement in questioning. Grounded in a questioning-based notion of thinking, there is a gradation in the extent of intellectual autonomy and vulnerability.\(^7\)

How then can intellectual autonomy with vulnerability withstand the control of the questioning process? It is necessary for an intellectually autonomous person to not only prepare an initial plan for a whole questioning process but also redesign it accordingly with changing epistemic situations. This can be referred to as the ability to plastically control questioning. Take the aforementioned case in which a scientist

\(^7\) In accordance therewith, intellectual autonomy can be considered as developed. On one hand, expert inquirers may welcome critical questions and be more acquainted with their vulnerability. On the other hand, children may be in need of care from adults in questioning at school and at home, as children are generally novice questioners.
identifies a leap in his proposed theory during a review process. The scientist may need longer time to complete his theory than initially planned. However, the scientist can maintain his research by altering his earlier plan to consider the best way to cope with the epistemic challenges. Considering this, it can be granted that

(4) An intellectually autonomous person must plasticly control his or her questioning process.

Certainly, in confronting epistemic challenges, even a person who is strongly motivated to solve them at first could lose the willingness to think through questioning. However, while plasticly regulating a questioning process, an intellectually autonomous person must sustain interest in an explored topic to be able to come closer to an epistemic good.

6. Concluding remarks

I have thus far expounded on an interpersonal-epistemic approach to intellectual autonomy by critically examining the idea of thinking through questioning. By evaluating the literature on intellectual autonomy, Section 2 argued that with particular cognitive limitations, an intellectually autonomous person must appropriately engage in social-epistemic practices. Section 3 proved that with some qualifications, thinking through questioning both individually and with other epistemic peers must be regarded as an interpersonal-epistemic practice. Based on this, this section also argued that an intellectually autonomous person must think through questioning. Section 4 demonstrated that an intellectually autonomous person must be responsible for his or her own actions throughout the questioning process. Section 5 argued that granting vulnerability, an intellectually autonomous person can be vulnerable to questioning to different degrees.

We may characterize this distinct notion of intellectual autonomy as “interpersonal-responsibilist”. In this view, intellectual autonomy is praiseworthy in fulfilling the responsibility to think through questioning as an interpersonal-epistemic practice in pursuit for an epistemic good. This opens up scope for further research to examine interpersonal and diachronic dimensions of our epistemic practices pertinent to intellectual autonomy.
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References


Thinking and Transcendence: Arendt’s Critical Dialogue with Heidegger

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Abstract: In the introduction to The Life of the Mind: Thinking (1977), Hannah Arendt explains that it was her observation of Adolf Eichmann’s “thoughtlessness” — his inability to think — at his trial in Jerusalem that led her to reexamine the human faculty of thinking, particularly in respect to its relation to moral judgment. Yet, it is not an easy task for her readers to follow how Arendt actually constructs her arguments on this topic in this text. The purpose of this paper is to delineate Arendt’s criticisms of Heidegger in order to articulate the characteristics of her own account of thinking in relation to morality. The paper first suggests the parallelism between Heidegger’s “wonder” and Arendt’s “love” as the beginning of philosophizing, i.e., thinking, and point out a peculiar circularity in Heidegger’s account of thinking. Secondly, the paper traces Arendt’s criticism of Heidegger’s account of thinking in §18 of the LM 1. Thirdly, the paper discusses why Arendt thinks Heidegger’s account of thinking is problematic by examining Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929). Finally, based on the above analyses and discussions, the paper explores the nature of Arendt’s account of thinking to show how her conception of thinking provides a basis for moral judgment.

In the introduction to The Life of the Mind: Thinking (1977), Hannah Arendt explains that it was her observation of Adolf Eichmann’s “thoughtlessness” — his inability to think — at his trial in Jerusalem that led her to reexamine the human faculty of thinking, particularly in respect to its relation to moral judgment. Yet, it is not an easy task for her readers to follow how Arendt actually constructs her arguments on this topic in this text. The purpose of this paper is to delineate Arendt’s criticisms of Heidegger in order to articulate the characteristics of her own account of thinking in relation to morality. The paper first suggests the parallelism between Heidegger’s “wonder” and Arendt’s “love” as the beginning of philosophizing, i.e., thinking, and point out a peculiar circularity in Heidegger’s account of thinking. Secondly, the paper traces Arendt’s criticism of Heidegger’s account of thinking in §18 of the LM 1. Thirdly, the paper discusses why Arendt thinks Heidegger’s account of thinking is problematic by examining Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929). Finally, based on the above analyses and discussions, the paper explores the nature of Arendt’s account of thinking to show how her conception of thinking provides a basis for moral judgment.
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1. What makes us think: Wonder

Though Heidegger’s name is suggested sporadically through the *Life of the Mind* (hereafter abbreviated as *LM*) 1, at first glance it does not seem that Arendt is engaging in a series of critical dialogues with Heidegger in her text. With closer attention, though, a large portion of Arendt’s discussion in the text, if not most of it, is revealed to be her critical reading of Heidegger. If we read very carefully, the theme of the relation between thinking and transcendence underlies quietly yet consistently through chapters 3 and 4 of *LM* 1. The first clear indication is found in Chapter 3, §15 of *LM* 1, where Arendt proposes “love” as the beginning of *philosophizing* (i.e., thinking), contra Heidegger’s similar claim of “wonder”. It is in the contrast between the two that we uncover our first clue as to how Arendt sets the link between transcendence and thinking as the center of her inquiry into the relation between thinking and morality. In section 15, Arendt takes up the shift in the understanding of the concept of “wonder” that occurred in modern philosophy, the shift from Plato’s “admiring” wonder (*thaumaizein*) to Heidegger’s “nothingness”, mentioned with his 1929 text “What is Metaphysics?” Platonic admiring “wonder” as the beginning of thinking is to admire “something familiar and yet normally invisible”, an “invisible imperceptible whole implicitly manifest in all that appears”, viz., Being.¹ But when wonder is revived in modern times, the nature of “wonder” is fundamentally changed. Instead of admiring the whole — the harmonious relation between Being and being as Greek philosophers did — modern philosophers, especially after Kant, no longer believe that such a harmony exists. Instead, they are left with the shock that there is no way to comprehend the particular *qua* particular, i.e., existence.² In other words, Being becomes such that it is thinkable only through

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² Arendt wrote on this point in her 1946 essay, “What is Existential Philosophy?” the following: “[T]he unity of thought and Being presupposed the pre-established coincidence
the sheer fact that nothing is unthinkable. In that shift from Being to nothing in modern philosophy, though, Heidegger’s position is closer to Plato’s admiring wonder; still, that shift from Being to nothing in modern philosophy inherits the same predicament as well. It is Heidegger’s peculiar way of seeking a solution in Dasein, in whom essence and existence coincide, that Arendt finds problems and thus challenges. That is, Heidegger’s solution to see thinking as the primal, or, authentic way of the Being of Dasein.

In §15 of LM 1, after mentioning Heidegger’s “wonder” Arendt suggests that “love” (eros) is the beginning of philosophizing found in Socrates. Arendt presents “love” (eros) as a “not”. “Love” is a need, and it “desires what it has not”. “Men love wisdom and therefore begin to philosophize because they are not wise, and they love beauty, and do beauty, as it were — philokaloumen, as Pericles called it in the Funeral Oration — because they are not beautiful”. Instead of “wonder”, Arendt proclaims that philosophical thinking, or philosophizing, begins with “love”, for we are not wise and beautiful. If we turn to the latter part of §18 of the same text, we find an echoing statement showing what is at issue for Arendt when she refers to Heidegger’s “wonder is his account of transcendence and its relation to his account of human existence:

This term [“boundary situations”] coined by Jaspers for the general, unchanging human condition — “that I cannot live without struggling and suffering; that I cannot avoid guilt; that I must die” — to indicate an experience of “something immanent which already points to transcendence” and which, if we respond to it, will result in our “becoming the Existenz we potentially are.” In Jaspers, the term gets its suggestive plausibility less from specific experiences than from the simple fact that life itself, limited by birth of essential and existential; that is, everything thinkable also existed, and everything extant, because it was knowable, also had to be rational. Kant, who is the real, though secret, as it were, founder of modern philosophy and who has also remained its secret king until this very day, shattered that unity”. (Hannah Arendt, Essays in Understanding, 1930–1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism, 1st edition [New York: Schocken, 2005], 168, hereafter referred to as EU in the text.)

3 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 1, 149.
5 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 1, 178, emphasis added.
6 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 1, ibid., emphasis added.
and death, is a boundary affair in that my worldly existence always forces me
to take account of a past when I was not yet and a future when I shall be no
more. Here the point is that whenever I transcend the limits of my own
lifespan and begin to reflect on this past, judging it, and this future, forming
projects of the will, thinking ceases to be a politically marginal activity.
And such reflections will inevitably arise in political emergencies.7

We can sketch out Arendt’s account of transcendence with its characteristics
from the above section, though we will need to provide a more detailed discussion
later in this paper. Similar to Heidegger, Arendt sees the moment of transcendence
in human finitude. We did not create ourselves. We are born and our lives will come
to end. We are not omnipotent or infinite, or fully present, i.e., we are temporal,
finite being whose Being is characterized as “possible”. For her, the “not” is a
reminder of our finite and worldly existence, which points out that the meaning of
transcendence is to “take into account” the past when the human person was not in
the world and the future when s/he is no longer in the world. Putting it differently,
the “not” signifies “love” of the world, which enables me to transcend my lifespan
and to think beyond my finitude, i.e., to think of others who are part of this world not
only now but also those who are already gone and those who have not yet arrived.8
Keeping this remark in mind, let us turn our attention to Heidegger’s account of
“wonder” and transcendence as found in his 1929 essay.

Heidegger explores the nature of the nothing through anxiety, which was
introduced in Being and Time.9 Unlike fear, which arises “in the face of something”
and thus is always experienced in a particular situation, anxiety, in contrast, occurs
without a particular object.10 As a peculiar mood of Dasein, in “anxiety” everything
— including ourselves — sinks into indifference.11 In anxiety, beings as a whole are
experienced as superfluous, and thus anxiety reveals the nothing, i.e., nihilation. It
annihilates all the pre-established meanings of beings with which we are familiar in
our everyday life. Annihilation “discloses these beings in their full but heretofore

7 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 1, 192, emphases added.
8 For Arendt, we are not just in-the world but of-the world. See, LM 1, 20.
9 See, Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, H.182, 191, 251.
10 Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings: Ten Key Essays, plus the Introduction to Being and
Time, ed. David Farrell Krell, Revised and Expanded edition (San Francisco, Calif.:
11 Heidegger, Basic Writings, 101.
concealed strangeness as what is radically other — with respect to the nothing”.\textsuperscript{12} For Heidegger, our being anxious is the very mark of our finitude. But in our daily life, we are busy engaging in this or that business within the already established network of meaning in factual life. In such situations, we are always already understanding something within a given context. However, in anxiety, the pre-established meanings recede into the background, and nothing but our Being as primarily understanding is revealed; we “are held out into the nothing”.\textsuperscript{13} As being-there, Dasein is transcendence. That which is Dasein is holding itself out into the nothing, going beyond a being toward the Being of that being. In other words, the strangeness of beings experienced in the nothing inspires us to wonder what it means to be: “Why are there beings at all, and why not rather nothing?”\textsuperscript{14} Thus, wonder is the beginning of philosophizing, or metaphysics, which is the “basic occurrence of Dasein”.\textsuperscript{15} Dasein is the existence whose Being in its essence is transcendence.

We can see a parallelism between Heidegger’s “wonder” and Arendt’s “love”. Both philosophers see the moment of the beginning of thinking (philosophizing) as the occurrence of transcendence. Both “wonder” and “love” as transcendence that establish a relationship or unity. Yet, while Arendt pays attention to the person’s relation to others in transcendence, Heidegger’s account seems to be quite different. There is a peculiar circularity which characterizes his discussion, a circular relationship between the question of the meaning of Being and the questioner, i.e., Dasein. It is in the nothing that wonder arises, which leads Dasein to the question of Being. That question refers back to the questioner, since the very questioning itself is a mode of Being of Dasein. In this circular movement transcendence — going beyond beings — occurs. It is in this sense that Dasein is transcendence, and thinking and Being are the same for Heidegger. On the one hand, Heidegger’s thinking or philosophizing, which is derived from the nothing and initiated by wonder, reveals the difference between being and Being, viz., the ontological difference. Nonetheless, at the same time it unifies the two. If we turn our attention to section 18 of the LM 1, we can trace out why Arendt finds Heidegger’s account of thinking to be problematic with respect to seek a ground of morality with its relation to thinking.

\textsuperscript{12} Heidegger, Basic Writings, 103.  
\textsuperscript{13} Heidegger, Basic Writings, 103.  
\textsuperscript{14} Heidegger, Basic Writings, 110.  
\textsuperscript{15} Heidegger, Basic Writings, 109.
2. The two-in-one: The problem of the difference

The topic of section 18 of LM 1 is again Socrates, but this time Arendt’s focus is on the thinking dialogue one carries one with oneself, which is described as the “two-in-one”. Arendt sheds light on Socrates’ statement that “It would be better for me that my lyre or a chorus I directed should be out of tune and loud with discord, and that multitudes of men should disagree with me rather than I, being one should be out of harmony with myself and contradict me”. In thinking reflection, I split into two: the one who interrogates and the other who is interrogated. The split occurs when I am conscious of my thinking activity and so “I also am for myself”. What causes this split is a “difference” that “is inserted into my oneness”. The question is, then, the determination of the origin and nature of that difference and the unity of the two forms. It is here that Arendt again brings Heidegger back into her discussion.

Arendt quotes from Heidegger’s *Identity and Difference* where Heidegger analyses Plato’s *Sophist*:

The stranger in the dialogue states that of two things — for instance, rest and motion — ‘each one is different [from the other], but itself for itself the same’ (*hekaston heautô tauton*). In interpreting the sentence, Heidegger puts the emphasis on the dative, *heautô*, for Plato does not say, as we would expect, *hekaston auto tauton*, ‘each one itself [taken out of context] is the same’, in the sense of the tautological A is A, where difference arises out of the plurality of things. According to Heidegger, this dative means that ‘each thing itself is returned to itself, each itself is the same for itself [because it is] with itself… Sameness implies the relation of ‘with’, that is, a mediation, a connection, a synthesis: the unification into a unity.

Arendt criticizes both Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato and Plato’s implications in the quoted lines. Her point is that to claim that a thing’s identification with itself by

taking that thing out of its context with other things reveals no difference and no otherness, and in “its relation to something it is not” it loses reality.\(^\text{20}\) Arendt thinks that such an understanding of the relation between difference and identity is erroneous, at least as Heidegger proposed.\(^\text{21}\) She points out that “nothing can be itself and at the same time for itself”.\(^\text{22}\) The “for” of the “for itself” suggest the reflective nature of thinking activity, which takes the form of a dialogue between me and myself. However, it does not “constitute the unity”, as Heidegger formulates.\(^\text{23}\) Quite to the contrary, the duality is unified into one again when I stop thinking and appear to the other.\(^\text{24}\)

To counter Heidegger, Arendt posits that the dialogue between me and myself in the thinking dialogue is the specifically human actualization of consciousness.\(^\text{25}\) She continues to say that consciousness and thinking are not the same; the former is “intentional” and thus a “cognitive act”, whereas the thinking ego “does not think something but about something”, which is “dialectical”.\(^\text{26}\) The difference inserted in the thinking dialogue between me and myself has its origin not in thinking activity but in the world of appearances that consists of human plurality. What is actualized in consciousness is “difference and otherness” derived from the world of appearances.\(^\text{27}\) It is in these utterances that we find the clue for grasping Arendt’s criticism of Heidegger’s circularity. For that purpose, we must pay attention to Arendt’s account of appearance, action, and freedom.

For Arendt, appearance means primarily action.\(^\text{28}\) I appear to others through my words and deeds, viz., action with the mode of “it-seems-to-me” (dokei moi). My appearance reflects how I see things and how I want to be seen by others. Every appearance carries the mode of seeming, because there is not a person but

\(^{20}\) Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, 1, 184.
\(^{21}\) Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, 1, Ibid.
\(^{22}\) Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, 1, 185.
\(^{23}\) Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, 1, 183.
\(^{24}\) Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, 1, Ibid.
\(^{25}\) Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, 1, 187.
\(^{26}\) Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, 1, Ibid.
\(^{27}\) Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, 1, Ibid.
\(^{28}\) Arendt distinguishes between “self-display” and “self-presentation”. While “self-presentation” involves in choosing how I appear to others, “self-display” just show whatever properties a living being being possesses. Thus, when I appear, it is a “self-presentation”. See, Arendt, *The life of the Mind*, 1, 36.
persons who exist in this world. In other words, the human sense of reality entirely depends on the plurality of standpoints. Thus, for Arendt, perception is intersubjective. This is especially important and relevant when it comes to human affairs, since the matter of human affairs, i.e., events, cannot be explained by sheer causality. By its nature, human affairs are a matter of that which “could be otherwise”, which has its root in human freedom. In other words, because we are free, we can bring something new to the world of appearances that can be inexplicable by the law of causality. Thus, the objectivity of human events is not measurable quantitatively but solely depends on a shared understanding derived from intersubjective perception. Moreover, since human events result from human action, our sense of reality about history rests on human plurality. Putting it another way, human plurality is the condition of human freedom; as such, the self, the identity of who I am, also has its basis in human plurality. In short, for Arendt, the hallmark of human existence is plurality. That is the reason why she proclaims that we are not merely in but of the world, and thus “Being and Appearing coincide”.

All these considerations suggest that, when she points out that “thinking and consciousness are not the same” in section 18 of LM 1, what she is alluding to is twofold. One is Heidegger’s identification of Being and thinking as the authentic mode of the Being of Dasein. The other is his account of the self. Since, if in fact it is in this mode of the Being of Dasein that the ontological difference between Being and being is revealed and unified, as Heidegger claims, then the identity of Dasein, the who of Dasein, i.e., the self is what Arendt puts into question. Taken together, Arendt’s respective criticisms go to the heart of the circularity found in Heidegger’s own thought.

Our question to ask next is on what account Arendt’s criticism is related to the moral question. In the following section, we will look into another text of

29 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 1, 21. “[O]ur certainty that what we perceive has an existence independent of the act of perceiving, depends entirely on the object’s also appearing as such to others and being acknowledged by them. Without this tacit acknowledgement by others we would not even be able to put faith in the way we appear to ourselves”. Ibid, 46

30 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 1, 19.
3. Transcendence as the horizon: The Self in Heidegger

There are two reasons for us taking up KPM for our discussion. The first is to clarify the relation between thinking (Being) and the self in Heidegger’s account. The second is to shed light on the relation between productive imagination and freedom in the same text. As we shall later show, it is against these two sets of relations that Arendt develops her account of morality and its relation to thinking. In order to articulate Arendt’s criticism of Heidegger in general, first let us look into her 1946 essay, “What is Existential Philosophy?”

In the essay, Arendt analyzes Heidegger’s Self in “absolute isolation”, which is the “total opposite of man”. Because of human finitude, the human person is “thrown” into the world from which “he attempts to escape by means of a ‘projection’ in anticipation of death as his utmost possibility”. What is revealed in there is “nothingness” as the negative ground of human existence, which marks Dasein as “guilty”. All that the human person could do existentially is to “Willing-to-have-conscience commits itself to this being-guilty”. Arendt’s point of criticism of Heidegger’s Self is its absoluteness brought by facing its own death, which allows the human person to remove himself from the “They” who constantly prevent him from his being-a-Self. Since Kant, humanity is considered to be represented in every human being, and since the declaration of human rights during the French revolution, the concept of the human person states that all of humanity could be debased or exalted in every individual. Thus, Arendt says that Heidegger’s concept of Self is “a concept of man that leaves the individual existing independent

of humanity and representative of no one but himself”.37 With Arendt’s critique of Heidegger’s Self in mind, we now examine KPM.

Heidegger’s ontological interpretation of Kant is set forth in human finitude and is characterized by taking the transcendental imagination as the common root of both intuition and concept, which enables him to delineate the synthetic a priori judgment as the time-horizon. Kant finds the objective validity of human knowledge in the agreement of two sets of conditions: “The conditions for the possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions for the possibility of the objects of experience”.38 Heidegger, in his ontological interpretation on Kant, pays attention to the same set of conditions but specifically focuses on the “at the same time”.39 He suggests that, in order for us as finite beings to know something, the object must appear to us, or be for us. What makes the act of experiencing possible is what at the same time makes the object able to be encountered by us possible, viz., it makes the object “experienceable”.40

Based on the first edition of CPR, Heidegger interprets concept and intuition as the two different modes of synthesis of transcendental imagination. “Apprehension”, as the synthesis of productive imagination, and time as pure intuition, is understood as that which “produces — the immediate look of the now as such”.41 It forms the “immediate look of the now as such” spontaneously out of itself.42 It spontaneously forms an immediate view in which it is given, i.e., the “field of manifestness which every ontic view can enter and become manifest”.43

40 “[W]hat makes an experiencing possible at the same time makes possible the experienceable, or rather experiencing [an experienceable] as such. This means: transcendence makes the being in itself accessible to a finite creature”. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Fifth Edition, Enlarged, Ibid.
41 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Fifth Edition, Enlarged, 126, emphasis added.
Heidegger posits that intuition “spontaneous receptivity”. He offers similar explanation on the concept. As the “recognition”, the synthesis of transcendental imagination is understood as that which explores the horizon in advance by representing sameness, for the “concept is indeed the representing of unity which as selfsame ‘applies to many’”. He understands that the “I think” as holding “before us in advance the represented unities which give direction to every possible unification that is represented”. For its projective nature, “recognition” as the synthesis of transcendental imagination is identified with the future. Again, it carries a formative character, but because the concept cannot comprehend anything without the manifold given in intuition, Heidegger posits the “concept” as a “receptive spontaneity”. By taking intuition and concept as different modes of the synthesis of transcendental imagination, Heidegger enables to the synthetic a priori judgment as forming a time-horizon. In other words, since Kant’s synthesis of intuition and concept “rests on the unity of apperception”. Heidegger understands that knowing activity is a way to form self-consciousness as the horizon of experience, and as such he proposes viewing self-consciousness as Being of the self.

It is particularly important for our purposes that Heidegger assigns the synthesis in the concept as exploring the horizon in advance by representing the sameness. The key here is that Heidegger says that rule-giving is “from out of itself”, and as such it is understood as “self-orienting toward. . .”. He writes,

In such an orienting-toward…, or rather in the “self” which was “thrown out” with it, the “I” of this “self” is necessarily apparent. In this way, the “I propose” “accompanies” all representing. — The “I” “goes with” in the pure self-orienting. To the extent that it is itself only what it is in this “I think,” the essence of pure thinking as well as that of the I lies in “pure

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self-consciousness.” This “consciousness” of the self, however, can only be elucidated based on the Being of the self (,).\textsuperscript{51}

Yet, “self”-consciousness’ relation to the rule is not passive, since the rule is given within itself or “from out of itself”. What he suggests is that the “I” and the “I think” form an identity, and it is in that identity that “self”-consciousness is formed. Thus, when he claims that the “self” as pure thinking activity \textit{per se} is to be understood as forming the identity out of the relation between the “I” and the “I think”. In other words, Heidegger’s account of the “self” is established in the relation of the self \textit{with} itself.

At this point we should recall two things: Arendt proposes “love” as a beginning of philosophizing in §15 of \textit{LM} 1, and, two, in §18 of the same text, she comments on Heidegger’s reading of Plato’s \textit{Sophist}, claiming that thinking activity does not constitute unity. Whereas Heidegger posited that the beginning of philosophizing occurs in nothingness, as noted in his 1929 essay, Arendt, on the other hand, grants “love” to be the origin, disagreeing with Heidegger in this regard. In §25 of \textit{KPM}, Heidegger discusses “Nothing”. It is in reading this section that we can see more clearly how Arendt’s discussions in §15 and §18 of \textit{LM} 1 are in fact preparation for her own account of thinking and its relation to morality.

In §25 of \textit{KPM}, Heidegger identifies “Nothing” with Kant’s transcendental object = X. The “Nothing” here is equal to Self-consciousness, or the time-horizon, which is the very essence of transcendence. For Heidegger, this is ontological knowledge. The horizon is nothing, since it is not a being. But it is because of that horizon that it is possible for a being to be experienced. Nothing is \textit{correlatum}, pure horizon.\textsuperscript{52} It is ontological knowledge because “it holds open this horizon”.\textsuperscript{53} In other words, since that horizon is the Being of the Self, and since ontological knowledge is designated to be the forming activity \textit{per se}, Being is thinking. Furthermore, in Heidegger’s understanding of pure thinking in \textit{KPM}, freedom is experienced in thinking precisely because its spontaneous nature is derived from the productive imagination, which forms the identity between the I and the I think. Indeed, in §30 of the same text, Heidegger discusses moral feeling (practical reason).


\textsuperscript{52} Heidegger, \textit{Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Fifth Edition, Enlarged}, 86.

as “free, self-affecting of the law, — is pure spontaneity”. This thinking is initiated by gazing at its own activity. Thus, for Heidegger, philosophizing occurs in nothingness (transcendence) in which ontological difference is revealed. In that sense, Heidegger’s thinking takes the form of self-knowledge. In other words, Heidegger’s ontological interpretation of Kant aims to unveil the difference between the condition of making Dasein possible to be experienced and the condition of making beings experienceable, the ontological difference between Being and being, viz., transcendence. In turn, the structure of his exposition of transcendence travels a full circle between the question of Being and the question of the Being of Dasein, respectively. At the center of this exposition is Heidegger’s interpretation of transcendental imagination as productive imagination, for it is its formative (spontaneous) nature that allows for self-consciousness as the time-horizon, the finitude of Dasein as the negative ground of raising the question on Being.

But through the eyes of Arendt, such a self appears as “a concept of man that leaves the individual existing independent of humanity and representative of no one but himself” — this for two reasons: freedom and morality. Arendt’s pointed questioning of Heidegger’s account of thinking is to ask if it can truly offer a moral foundation for humanity. In short, she believes the answer is negative. When Arendt proclaims that Being is Appearing in the world of appearances, she seeks a different account of thinking than Heidegger’s. The key is her account of imagination as being reproductive.

4. Arendt on the relation between thinking and morality: Her account of transcendence

Arendt mentions reproductive imagination in two places: one in LM 1 on page 86, and pages 79 and 80 in Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy. In both places, Arendt’s claims are the same. That is, productive imagination is not entirely productive but actually depends on reproductive imagination. If we refrain from limiting ourselves from specifying either productive imagination or reproductive

imagination in both texts, again, we find Arendt giving strongly consistent statements about imagination’s characteristics. She sees imagination as the power to make things present that are absent; as such, it becomes the condition for memory. Yet, we must not hastily think that when Arendt considers imagination as the condition for memory, she means only the past. Rather, she takes memory to be something that encompasses both no more (past) and not yet (future).

In order for us to illuminate Arendt’s reproductive imagination, let us make use of her essay, “Some Questions of Moral Philosophy”. Here, Arendt suggests that moral conduct “seems to depend primarily upon the intercourse of man with himself”, for it is in that silent dialogue that I have with myself that I return to my deed, which I have done. Thus, memory is the condition of such thinking. Arendt suggests that “[t]hinking and remembering — is the human way of striking roots, of taking one’s place in the world”. Needless to say, if memory is the condition of thinking, then the condition of memory is imagination. Arendt further claims that the capacity to have a dialogue with myself is “creativity”, by which she means that it is through such a dialogue that the self constitutes the person. To be sure, by saying so, Arendt does not mean that thinking creates my-self out of raw material, in the way that a sculptor creates a statue out of stone. Rather, thinking prepares “self-presentation”. I reflect on myself and choose how I want to appear and so be seen by others. My-self is formed over the course of the repetitive practice of this capacity to choose, trying to be consistent, so that I appear in the same way over the course of time. That is why, for Arendt, “[t]hinking and remembering” takes one’s place in the world.

58 For instance, see, Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 1, 76 & 85; Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, 80.
60 Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment, 67.
61 Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment, 100.
63 Arendt writes, “Only self-presentation is open to hypocrisy and pretense, properly speaking, and the only way to tell pretense and make-believe from reality and truth is the former’s failure to endure and remain consistent. — All virtue begins with a compliment paid to it, by which I express my being pleased with it. The compliment implies a promise to the world, to those to whom I appear, to act in accordance with my pleasure, and it is the
Similarly to Heidegger, the thinking reflexivity forms the unity between me and myself in the silent dialogue in Arendt’s account. Yet, the reason behind this unity points here to the opposite pole. It reflects the fact that I was born in this world, welcomed as a newcomer, and will be remembered after I depart from the world. In other words, my life story can be told only after my life is completed. Thus, though I am the actor of my life story, I cannot be the storyteller of it. The task of storytelling is left to others, and as such my life story will be added to human history. Her claim of imagination as being primarily “reproductive” imagination has its basis in my relation with others in the world of appearances. The relation between thinking and remembering suggests that the essential mode of Being of human existence is appearance, which is fundamentally enmeshed in human plurality.
Hence, for Arendt, the reproductive imagination is the condition of thinking and remembering.\(^\text{65}\) It provides the theoretical basis as to why thinking has its root in the world of appearances where we live with others. It asks me to transcend myself to think beyond my lifespan. The not, which leads to this transcendence in thinking, thus points to the basis of morality in human plurality. I transcend my limitation for the “love” of the world of appearances.

References


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\(^\text{65}\) There is an excellent discussion on Arendt’s notion of “natality” and the role of reproductive imagination by Ichiro Mori: Ichiro Mori, *Shi to Tanjyo [Death and Birth]* Heidegger, *Syuzo Kuki, Arendt*. (Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Press, 2008).


Preface

Philosophy in “the more conventional sense” can also be “education for grownups”. Philosophy only stops being that when it starts thinking of itself as a collection of “specializations” (like medical “specializations”). But philosophy, even in “the more conventional sense” need not and must not think of itself in that way. It is when different insights from different sources are connected with one another that philosophy truly educates us. — Hilary Putnam

The history of philosophy, East and West, is inseparable from questions of translation. Issues of translation range from the conventional sense of interlinguistic conversion, to matters of much broader, cross-cultural, and intracultural significance and endeavour. Across this broad range, the scope of translation opens paths across terrain with diverse boundaries and borders. It becomes a means of traversing the landscapes of philosophy today. That writers and readers are always positioned somehow in relation to language, and that this positioning is essential to the very possibilities of thought and community, is echoed in modulations of the preposition in our title-phrase, in the philosophy of translation, philosophy in translation, and philosophy as translation. The implications of these modulations echo through the papers that follow.

It is definitional of translation that it involves some kind of relationship to the other: to translate, in its most familiar meaning, is to render an expression in a language that is other than its present form. But the accustomed phrasing of this in terms of “source” and “target” is apt to cover over the subtlety of this relation. For here there is already the intimation of other cultures and ways of life, and hence of other ways of thinking and, perhaps, of philosophizing. Boundaries here are inevitably blurred: what we perceive to be our “identities” is destabilized. To acknowledge this much takes us a long way, but it would be wrong not to recognize also that this blurring is part of the dynamism of language itself, its opening to new meanings: hence, it points to an alterity within culture (blurring what we perceive to

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be cultural identity) and within each of us ourselves, extending into thought and reason itself, and characterizing the \textit{pathos} of life. In the light of this, the familiar and understandable tendency to see translation as a task of a primarily technical kind needs to be exposed for its inadequacy. Such an assumption involves a misconception of what happens in translating from one language to another — as though, in principle, this were an isomorphic matter, a matching of compatible systems, when in fact it imposes on the translator the responsibility of a continual exercise of judgement in the face of incommensurability. What is more, that assumption radically misunderstands the extent to which translation is at work in ourselves and, hence, is crucial to any convincing philosophy of mind.

The fact that philosophizing and in fact thinking as a whole are always conditioned in some degree by translation indicates how problematic it is to present what is at stake here as a set of isolated issues: the philosophical questions raised by translation admit of no simple mapping onto the discrete categories of philosophy as commonly practised. As the lines of argument in the papers in this volume show, translation puts on trial the identity of philosophy itself. And it is difficult to get “behind” the problems raised, to view them from a neutral vantage-point, because they are, as a dimension of the languages we use, always already there.

In the light of this, the papers selected here have been arranged in three groups. In the first of these, “Translation: Understanding Others”, three papers provide a more substantial and specific account of the problematics sketched above, emphasizing the plurality already there in language and the importance of not obscuring this. Language is not primarily a codification of thought or a representation of things in the world. Rather it is the very element of our world and our lives together, and the relation to the other is inherent in these. “Philosophy in Translation”, the umbrella under which the papers in Part II are gathered, points to the critical part that translation has played in the development of philosophy’s ways of thought and central concepts, ranging from consciousness, reason, and \textit{pathos}, to truth itself. While these terms can sound somewhat lofty, the point being made extends to concepts current in the development of professional forms of practice, as in the case of “student guidance” and “care”. The focus of Part III, “Translation, East-West”, is on particular examples of the relation between Japanese (and Chinese), on the one hand, and English (and German), on the other, bearing in mind the distorting effects of the global hegemony of English. Thus, the discussion here serves in part as an occasion for reflection on the particular linguistic and conceptual pressures under which any distinctively Japanese philosophy must bear up.
Translation can be seen to function also between academic disciplines. The papers in the collection continually raise questions about how to read the texts of philosophy: translation opens new dimensions in the text and makes new connections. Combining the literal sense of translation with its broader and more fundamental senses (as a matter of human transformation), the papers gradually reveal the disciplinary border of philosophy to be open already to other disciplines in the humanities — in particular, to education, literature, theology, and political studies. The cross-cultural interaction of the voices in this volume will serve, we hope, to open further such interdisciplinary possibilities.

The impetus for the present special issue came in part from a symposium, “Philosophy and Translation”, invited by the Philosophical Association of Japan for its annual meeting in 2018, two papers from which, by Sarah Hutton and Paul Standish, are included here. That endeavour and this collection will have served their purpose if they succeed in raising amongst philosophers awareness of both the unavoidability of translation and the imperative to acknowledge the way it is at work in our philosophizing as in our daily lives. This can be an uncomfortable thought for those whose aspirations for philosophy are for ways of reasoning that are untouched by the contingencies of experience in language. In the end, however, to turn towards the translated conditions of the signs and the meanings we make is to find a path to greater philosophical rigour. It is through the connection of different insights from different sources that, as Hilary Putnam remarks, “philosophy truly educates us”.

SAITO Naoko

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I. Translation: Understanding Others
Abstract: Is Heidegger’s philosophy of language capable of receiving the other that is quite different? Of seeing or witnessing this? This paper attempts to demonstrate the limits of Heidegger in terms of the capacity to recognise and acknowledge the complete otherness of the other. In doing so, I examine some of Heidegger’s remarks regarding being and language, particularly in relation to his attitude toward other languages. Through exploring this, I move from language to languages, and then to translation. I explore translation, beyond the technical understanding of it, as a site of diversity and plurality — that is, the place for a responsible response to the other. To this end, I acknowledge language already in its plurality, as sustained in and by that plurality rather than as being rooted. Understanding language in this way is also to acknowledge the very condition of human being in its plurality, always already in relation to the other. In this sense, no matter how thought-provoking his account of language is, Heidegger’s philosophy of language may not be enough to address current problems in society — that is, societies now, more evidently than ever before, that are based on human plurality.

Is Heidegger’s philosophy of language capable of receiving the other that is quite different? Of seeing or witnessing this? This paper attempts to demonstrate the limits of Heidegger in terms of the capacity to recognise and acknowledge the complete otherness of the other. In doing so, I examine some of Heidegger’s remarks regarding being and language, particularly in relation to his attitude toward other languages. Through exploring this, I move from language to languages, and then to translation. I explore translation, beyond the technical understanding of it, as a site of diversity and plurality — that is, the place for a responsible response to the other. To this end, Barbara Cassin provides us with helpful resources by means of her book *Nostalgia: When Are We Ever at Home?* (Cassin, 2016).

After the so-called ‘turn’ in his philosophy, Heidegger’s attention moves from the focus on being to questions of language and poetry. However, although rather indirectly, his reflections on being had intertwined with questions of language.
In this way, Heidegger’s account of language is inextricably related to being. I shall begin with one of Heidegger’s most striking remarks: language is the house of being. With these words Heidegger is attempting to show that it is language that enables us to think and is a source of thought. Various accounts have been offered of how Heidegger’s thinking about language helps us to think beyond traditional understandings of it and hence to think education anew (see for example, Standish 1992; Williams 2013). This is made possible especially through the richness of Heidegger’s thought, which directs us towards paying attention to new possibilities for responsiveness and receptivity to things. While there is no doubt of his contribution, there still remain things to be questioned or answered, and to do this it is necessary to take further steps, sometimes beyond but sometimes with Heidegger. In this paper, I suggest that a leap from language to languages is needed, and then from this toward a proper understanding of translation.

Let us repeat the question: to what extent is Heidegger open to the otherness of the other, particularly when the other is completely different? This question may seem quite ironic given the richness of Heidegger’s thought in terms of responsiveness and receptivity to things (others). At the same time, it is reasonable to acknowledge the doubts that are to be found in, for example, Emmanuel Levinas’s criticisms of Heidegger. Levinas suggests that Heidegger’s vision of Mitsein is something like ‘marching-together’ in resolution toward the same destiny and perhaps on the strength of a common identity (Levinas 2002, 137). Levinas basically takes issue with Heidegger over the question central to his philosophy, the question of being, for its totalising power, which reduces the other to the same (see, for example Hodgson 2016). This paper, taking a somewhat different route from thinkers such as Levinas, is to answer the question of whether Heidegger’s thought can acknowledge the other by exploring his thoughts regarding language. I attempt to show that Heidegger’s account of language has a limit when it comes to an understanding of the other, with the conjecture that this comes from the lack of proper attention toward different languages. This is to understand language already in its plurality, as sustained in and by that plurality rather than as being rooted. To understand language in this way is also to acknowledge the very condition of human being in its plurality, always already in relation to the other. In this sense, no matter how thought-provoking his account of language is, Heidegger’s philosophy of language may not be enough to address current problems in society — that is, societies now, more evidently than ever before, that are based on human plurality.
The Problem of Translation

Language is the house of being. This extraordinary phrase appears in several writings of Heidegger such as the “Letter On Humanism”, and “What Are Poets For?”. Let us begin with its use in “A Dialogue on Language: between a Japanese and an Inquirer” (Heidegger 2003) This dialogue is based on an actual meeting of Heidegger and the Japanese scholar, Tezuka Tomio (1903–1983). The Inquirer, who appears to be very much like Heidegger himself, draws, upon his experience of the problem in translating the Japanese words. With the Japanese words *Iki* and *Koto ba*, the Inquirer professes the mysteriousness of East Asian (Japanese) thought. He says:

Some time ago I called language, clumsily enough, the house of Being. If man by virtue of his language dwells within the claim and call of Being, then we Europeans presumably dwell in an entirely different house than Eastasian man (Heidegger 2003, 5).

Here, the Inquirer acknowledges the difference between languages by identifying them as different houses of being. The Inquirer then expresses the belief that it is impossible for an outsider to come to understand Japanese thought and language from the inside. For example, he will never understand the *Noh* play. In this sense, both men in the dialogue, from two different cultures, dwelling in totally different houses, will never fully understand each other. While this may indicate where the problem of translation comes from, this is not, for Heidegger, a problem in a sense that it could, or even should, be fixed. It is the nature of language rather than a problem to be corrected. Let us clarify this point further by firstly considering Heidegger’s worthwhile accounts on language.

Heidegger, in the course of the dialogue, not only illustrates but also allows readers to experience the way of thinking that is beyond representation. This is a poetic thinking in its responsiveness and receptiveness toward things in contrast to the kind of thinking that puts things into pre-existing concepts or classifies them according to given sets of criteria. This is precisely the way of thinking into which

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1 Those respectively can be translated, in English, into art and language. In the dialogue, after a long hesitation, the Japanese explains *Iki* as “the breath of the stillness of luminous delight”, and *Koto ba* as “the petals that stem from *Koto*”, which is the event that gives delight (Heidegger 2003, 44–47).
Heidegger wishes to lead the reader; without this we are ‘still not thinking’ (Heidegger 1976, 4). In Heidegger’s terms, this is ‘poetic thinking’ as an alternative to ‘calculative thinking’, where the latter is to be understood as rendering things as mere objects — *Bestand* — waiting to be mastered, scrutinised, and exploited.

In overcoming calculative thinking, a proper understanding of language comes as a key. Far from traditional ways of understanding language, Heidegger helps us to be aware that human beings are not the agents of language and thus fully in control of it; rather, they are more the products of language. Thus language speaks the human being, not the other way around. Thoughts come to us and we respond to language allowing things to reveal themselves — that is, we respond to the ‘Saying’. In this way we understand language not as a mere communicative tool, rather as a source — a wellspring — of thought from which we can never withdraw. We are, in a real sense, sentenced or convicted by our words, sentenced to be in language in the sense that we cannot extricate ourselves from it. At the same time, the words are not in my control, it always flees from me, beyond my expectations; what I mean is partly decided by others; thus it can seem to be stolen from me. Heidegger’s thought implies that the supposed problem of translation (not only between languages, but also within a language) is precisely what illustrates the nature of language. Moreover, when we attempt to grasp things by means of representation, we only lose it as they become mere objects. Thus it is, Heidegger says, that the dialogue is of language, not about language.

Although I take Heidegger’s insights into language as a basis of my thought, the question I nevertheless want to raise at this point is not of language but, let us say, of *languages*, which, I suggest, start to reveal the limits of his account. While Heidegger certainly seems to be concerned about such foreign languages as Japanese, it is ironically the case, I believe, that his attention is really focused on language, in the singular, not on languages. And I shall suggest that this lies behind his incapacity to receive the other. Needless to say, it raises also some questions (and maybe provides some answers) with regard to Heidegger’s dubious politics. Before proceeding to clarify this fully, let us attend more closely to the dialogue.

It is true that Heidegger does pay attention to foreign languages from time to time. Apart from Japanese (and sometimes Chinese), his great interest is in Greek. I want to show how this may be problematic. In the dialogue, as Paul Standish writes, Heidegger seems to be eulogising the Japanese way of life and thought and thus the Japanese language, while “seeing it as offering a real alternative to the degradation of the West (of the English-speaking world in particular), whose thought had been
progressively colonised by technology” (Saito and Standish 2014, 23). While a language such as English is attuned to calculative thinking, Greek is the language best placed to overcome this in its relation to the truth of being. This favourable gloss on Greek applies also, as we shall see shortly, to German and Japanese.

To help understand this point, consider the full title of the dialogue for a moment. It is a dialogue between a Japanese and an Inquirer. Given that this is based on a real encounter, I want to question why Heidegger is speaking of ‘A Japanese’, not ‘The Japanese’ (or why, for that matter, the man’s name is not used instead), and why the other participant to the dialogue is designated as ‘An Inquirer’ and not as Heidegger himself? While this already sounds strange as there is no identification of the person, the effect is, to some extent, one of generalising or even idealising Japanese (or perhaps in a broad sense East Asian) characteristics. By anonymising the participants in this self-conscious way, Heidegger is projecting the Japanese as an idealised and abstract way.

Despite the belief Heidegger has earlier professed, it seems that both very much understand each other in the end, and they seem united in their aversion to the colonising power of European or American thoughts, “the complete Europeanization” (Heidegger 2003, 15). Also, both of them agree on the intimate relationship between Koto ba and ‘Saying’, taking Saying to be the ‘essential being’: the “Japanese word Koto ba hints and beckons” (Heidegger 2003, 47). With a particular understanding of language — Koto ba — the Japanese goes on to profess, in a kind of mutuality of respect (or flattery), that “we Japanese have an innate understanding” for Heidegger’s thought, regretting in the process the fact that there are not many who could hear “an echo of the nature of language which [the] word Koto ba names” (Heidegger 2003, 50; 53). Koto ba now is understood as an idealised form of Saying. The way both understand the other culture is becoming quite suspicious. Both at first expressed the view that there was something unique in Japanese thought and language that an outsider could never understand, but then, with their common interest in overcoming Westernised thinking, they come to understand each other rather well. The Japanese also seems to be drawn into this exoticisation of Japanese language and thought. Is this not a mystification and then idealisation?

The hyperbole of the assertion “I cannot understand you as you are so different” is used duplicitously in a kind of performative contradiction, and, in spite of its avowed intentions, feeds surreptitiously the exoticisation of the other. It falls far short of a genuine understanding. The Inquirer, in a display of humility, declares the impossibility of understanding the other, in a way that covertly incorporates the
other into the same. Any act of mystifying or idealising only effects the objectification of the other. The boundary between humility and hubris is blurred. This dialogue is in a sense also a dialogue not only about language but about the other. As a dialogue that is stylised, and thus possibly ventriloquised, it reveals what is in the end Heidegger’s incapacity for receiving the other. And this may in some sense be inherent in Heidegger’s account of language as Saying and its relation to the truth of being. A further discussion shall be provided in the following section.

Heidegger may be fully aware of the fact that there are dangers in translation, but he does not seem able entirely to overcome the Western perspective. Translation involves understanding other languages and cultures — that is, the otherness of the other. The problem of translation is not that there is a loss within the process, as we have seen already, but that there are languages that we should acknowledge as equal, which seems obvious but is all too easily forgotten. A lack of understanding may reduce the other to a mere object, in a process of exoticisation or mystification. And this goes hand in hand with privileging one over the other, as will shortly be seen. The loss is not one-sided. What is at stake in translation is to allow myself to lose some part of my language, to ready myself for that loss. This is integral to the path from language to languages, which will be clarified below. I turn my attention now to Heidegger’s much celebrated concept of home, which has different facets and incorporates its own tensions, say, between belonging and being unheimlich. Heidegger’s sense of privileging a certain kind of language (as the house of being) will be further discussed in relation to this.

Stories of Home: From language to languages

Let us make a short digression to glimpse somewhat different ideas of home and nostalgia. Barbara Cassin, in her book Nostalgia, provides three stories of home. Nostalgia, it is to be remembered, literally means the pain of home, homesickness. In her discussion she first considers two stories drawn from classical mythology. One is that of Odysseus, an iconic story of returning home that has much influenced the development of European thought in many ways, and the other is that of Aeneas, who founded Lavinium, the Rome of today. What do these stories tell?

Homer’s The Odyssey recounts the story of Odysseus, who, after a long and exhausting journey, finally returns home to where Penelope, his wife, awaits. Home is epitomised by their marriage-bed, which is made from a yew tree still strongly
rooted in the ground. Thus, home here is literally rooted in the way the bed is. By contrast, the story of Aeneas, which is recounted by Virgil in The Aeneid, has a very different movement. Aeneas also leaves his home city, Troy, when it is destroyed in war, a destruction that means can never go back. Aeneas, unlike Odysseus, leaves for a new place while carrying his homeland and his father, his past, on his back. He, then, founds a new city where he adopts the new language — Latin — which is in contrast with the old language — Greek. In the world of Odysseus, Greek is the language, and this is understood by way of contrast with what is scarcely language, the speech of barbarians. Yet, Aeneas now is in the world of at least two languages, one after the other. The stories of home are nothing more than those of language. And it is only in terms of languages, their difference, their plurality, that he can now think.

It will be helpful at this point to relate the contrast that has been established by Cassin to a further distinction that emerges later in her book: between Heidegger and Hannah Arendt.

Let us begin with Heidegger. Heidegger sometimes expresses the view that there has been a kind of decline in being and in philosophy, which in a certain sense is a decline in thinking itself. And this has come about, according to him, partly through language — specifically, through displacement of Greek by Latin in the classical world. Heidegger thinks that Latin as a language is inclined to arrange and set straight, to set things in order. It might be worth providing some examples at this point. While the Greek word ὕλη means something like “substance” or “material” (both words of Latin origin), there is a sense within the Greek term of a dynamism — that everything grows and is in movement. That character of energy or life is part of the motion of the world. However, with the Latin words, Heidegger contends, this sense of dynamism is neutralised and deadened. Similarly, φύσις, the word closest to our “nature”, implies something in growing or changing, which in turn implies a dynamism or activity, whereas natura, the Latin substitute, indicates just what is there, implying something more static by comparison. Although it may be obvious in biology that things such as trees are growing, but in metaphysical terms they are to a certain extent fixed.

Logos, a term that is the origin of our contemporary usage of the word “logic”, is also of importance for Heidegger. According to Heidegger, at least in the West, “thought about thinking has flourished as ‘logic’” (Heidegger 1976, 21). Yet if we trace it back to its Greek origin, we find logos used in a richer and broader sense than this. This extends to the sense of the verb λέγειν, which means “to lay
Before, lay out, lay to — all this laying” (Heidegger 1976, 198). Thus, if we understand things in the way that Greek does, *logos* originally “includes the senses not only of reasoning but of speaking, and also of gathering, and even of making one’s way” (Standish 2014, 198). It is in Latin that these ideas start to be separate. On the whole, this sense of nature with its energy and growth, and with language interweaving with this, is now, by means of Latin, partly deadened: it becomes, in Heidegger’s terms, *Bestand*. Accordingly, words are relegated to the function of mere tools, and thinking is reduced to representation. Only one particular way of thinking holds sway: thinking as an attempt to dominate and master things. Hence, things are not allowed to be in their own right. This, as we saw before, is calculative thinking. And, for Heidegger, Greek appears to reveal possibilities of overcoming this in its particularity and more appropriate relationship with things, as we saw with *physis* and *hylē*.

While there is no doubt of the value of all these accounts, there are at least two points to be discussed in the present context. First, Heidegger’s affinity to a certain kind of language should be further related to his desire for origins. Greek, for him, has some authentic connection with being, which is then lost in the deterioration from ancient Greek into later forms of Greek, and then into Latin and into the modern languages we have now (most significantly, English, which encourages the separation of human being and world). German, the modern language with more possibilities than most other languages, can reveal and renew our connection to the world. That is how the Greek language (or German which for Heidegger, Cassin says, is even more Greek than Greek) relates to being, origin, and even essence — that is, to a kind of home, a place of return for Heidegger. Hence, his nostalgia for roots. In this respect, the exoticisation of Japanese in the dialogue can be seen more clearly to be coupled with Heidegger’s privileging of one (language and thought) over the other. Heidegger is holding on to a certain kind of language at the expense of others. Even when Heidegger pays attention to other languages, he is to some extent utilising them as a way of extending Greek or German thought. And this sense of an original language, I suggest, gives rise to the second point — i.e., the idealising or rather neutralising of language itself.

To explore the second point fully, it is worth referring to Paul Celan, the Jewish poet who was himself a translator. It is ironic and amazing that Celan, as a poet writing after Auschwitz, finds some affinity to Heidegger’s philosophy. Over a period of some two decades, letters were exchanged between the two, and they even met on several occasions, one of which is described in the poem *Todtnauberg*. This
enigmatic poem records in what appear at first sight to be simple notes an afternoon when Celan visited Heidegger at his mountain hut and walked with him for some ninety minutes in the forest. What emerges, on closer reading, is the desire, on Celan’s part, for a word of explanation from Heidegger about his connections with the horrors of Nazism. In *The Meridian*, which is the speech Celan gave when receiving the Georg Büchner prize, he seems to be thinking of this encounter when he speaks of language and poetry. Celan says that one should not forget that one only speaks, when one speaks, from the particular “angle of inclination”, that is, within one’s existence, one’s being here and now (Celan in Derrida 2005). Human beings, thus are poets, are always leaning toward something or someone rather than standing upright. Celan powerfully continues: “[t]he poem wants to reach the Other, it needs this Other, it needs a vis-à-vis. It searches it out and addresses it” (Celan in Derrida 2005, 181). Thus:

> [t]he poem becomes — and under what conditions! — a poem of one who — as before — perceives, who faces that which appears. Who questions this appearing and addresses it. It becomes dialogue — it is often despairing dialogue.

> Only in the realm of this dialogue does that which is addressed take form and gather around the I who is addressing and naming it. But the one who has been addressed and who, by virtue of having been named, has, as it were, become a thou, also brings its otherness along into the present, into this present. In the here and now of the poem it is still possible — the poem itself, after all, has only this one, unique, limited present — only in this immediacy and proximity does it allow the most idiosyncratic quality of the Other, its time, to participate in the dialogue (Celan in Derrida 2005, 182).

It is in the light of this primary requirement or condition of human being that we must speak to one another. It is upon this condition that the poem becomes a poem and language can have meaning. In language, we address and we are addressed. We are invited to dialogue. Perhaps, in a sense, this is what we see in the life of the very young child. The child does not progressively accumulate knowledge of things, to which is then added the relation to human beings. On the contrary, the animal, inchoate, and inarticulated life of the young child is broken open by the approach of
the mother,\textsuperscript{2} who from the start looks to the child for response. It is by this address and response that the child can come not only into language but into the world. Thus, more strongly, we are already addressed. And this calls for the responsibility to respond in which the other becomes a thou. Yet, is there a thou in Heidegger’s dialogue with a Japanese? Is there any real inclination, or rather stabilising, a consolidation of positions? In Todtnauberg Heidegger is invited to speak, but does he respond? We in some sense are responsible in this way in all that we say. It is certainly by responding to the other that we come into human being, come to be human beings. In The Meridian Celan is dexterously levelling at Heidegger’s accounts of language, at the idea that ‘language speaks’. Such an account is oblivious of the very fact that language is here, between people in conversation, that it is fundamentally an address to the other. In “language speaks”, it is merely impersonalised and neutralised, neutered. As Standish points out, the neutering tendency in Heidegger’s anxious emphasis on authenticity of language has the effect of denying “the partiality of the human and the essential place in language of the address” (Saito and Standish 2017, 66). It is his longing for essence that in effect blocks the possibilities of welcoming the other, and of being aware that we are already addressing the other (and addressed at the same time). And it is true that Heidegger was preoccupied with Wesen — essence. Hence, Cassin writes, “let the essence vacillate! Not to be assured of the essence of things is the best thing that can happen to the world and to us” (Cassin 2016, 60).

Hannah Arendt, the third point of focus in Cassin’s stories of home, is herself an exile from Germany who, after escaping from Europe, settles at last in New York. The contrast between Arendt and Heidegger parallels the other we have considered, that of Odysseus and Aeneas. Arendt’s experience of nostalgia was, as she puts it, for German, not Germany. She became very fluent in French and English, the language in which she came to write, and thus the world she lived in was necessarily one with other languages. This was not just a matter of one other but of all those other languages as well — that is, a necessary plurality. So the whole connection with Germany, of which she was partly deprived, actually proved enabling for her: it enabled the experience of plurality. The condition of being exiled that made all the more evident this richness in plurality, which she understood as nothing but the experience of human plurality. If Heidegger experiences any sense of exile, it is from the original language he imagines; for Arendt, by contrast, the condition of

\textsuperscript{2}The “mother” here could of course be a man. The reference is to the adult caring for the child.
being exiled is one she embraces as the very condition of human being — that is, the condition enables one to understand the other.

We can now see rather clearly how home, language, and the idea of the origin are entangled. The story of Odysseus, like that of Heidegger, indicates an affinity with the origin. Heidegger, while being aware that language is not totalisable, responded by way of a dwelling within language — say, an in-dwelling. What Cassin illustrates through the examples of Aeneas and Arendt is something closer to the experience of being broken open and of living with that rupture. Notably, in the end, Odysseus leaves home for another departure, for a new place distant enough that he will need to renew his language to be understood and to understand. This is the departure from language (or “from logos” as Cassin puts it) to languages (Cassin 2016, 32).

Unlike Heidegger, Arendt experienced language as itself a manifestation of human plurality. We are all in a sense related not just to one language, but to the very fact that there are languages. Even if we cannot speak any other languages, our existence is conditioned by our being in a world that is already and necessarily plural. To explain this more fully, I shall discuss language further, particularly its characteristic of always already being plural. In this way, language may be seen not just as one sign of that plurality, but as plurality par excellence.

Rooted in the air

Is the contrast between being rooted and uprooted sufficient to describe the human condition? Does either term in this apparently obvious contrast apply? Heidegger rightly names the human condition as unheimlich — hence, as never having been at home, or paradoxically as at home and not at home. Would it be right to say that we are already exiled? Exiled and not exiled. As Cassin says, one is neither rooted nor uprooted, but rooted in the air — that is with “airborne roots” (Cassin 2016, 62). What is it, then, to be rooted in the air, what does it mean to be exiled as the very condition of human being? In order to take further the discussion of language, let us begin with its relation to air.

How does air connect with language, or human beings? Of course, there is no doubt we cannot survive without air, yet much more can be said. Let us first think of what happens when we speak. My speaking depends upon fluctuations in the pressure of air. The voice would not be as it is if there were no air. That my vocal
cords change partly depends upon how I control the flow of air. Even the structures of sentences depend on human breathing too, so we can breathe properly at the ends of phrases or sentences before we start up again. Writing is not an exception if we think of where we put commas and full-stops. It is obvious, is it not, how central our breath is to our speaking, and thus to language? We simply cannot speak without air as a physical condition, and without this there would be no language at all; if I cannot speak or hear people speaking, I shall not think either. It is out of that circulation of signs enabled by breathing that I come to hear words, and that we come into language, which is, in the end, inextricable of thinking. It is worth noting that to breathe is also to respire (respiration), to aspire (aspiration), and to inspire (inspiration), all of which share the root sense of spirit. In this way, breathing is involved in both the physical and spiritual — as conditions for language itself.

Spirit here is better understood not in terms of the Christian idea but rather as what we have in every conversation. Spirit is what is alive in the ordinary interchange of people, in the air they breathe, or in the words they express — that is, in addressing one another, as Celan reminds us. Geist, the German word for spirit, which relates also to the sense of the ghostly, is better suggestive of what Derrida has in mind when he speaks of words exceeding one’s death. How can this be so? For me to speak now, I must be using the words that were there even before I was born. And what I speak will still be there after I die. In this way language, extending beyond my death and also beyond presence, is what shows my mortality. Let us clarify further. Language is always opened to new connections and changes. Due to its unsaturated and disseminating character (the dehiscence of the seed-pod), language is new and may falter even in a single word. Language never can be contained in itself. Language, as Derrida puts it, defers, and never arrives at a fixed meaning. Whatever I say is going to connect with the things that are not here now. My thoughts and words actually depend on what is not here now. In this sense, there is a ghostly element in our language. Derrida\(^3\) helps us to understand language as certainly something opened in the air. And this certainly connects with the very condition of human being, which, in Heidegger’s term, is described as an ‘ek-sistence’: our presence depends upon spirit or something that is referred to —

\(^3\) The affinity and difference between Heidegger and Derrida have been discussed from various points of view. For example, Timothy Clark discusses the lack of intersubjectivity in Heidegger’s concept of Dichtung, and in her discussion of Derrida’s text Of Spirit Emma Williams illustrates the residue of Western metaphysics in Heidegger’s thematic of spirit (Clark 2008; Williams 2016).
that is, to something that is not here now. Our being is in this sense a non-being, as we depend on non-presence. Unlike the lives of animals, human beings, as language exceeds itself, are always interrupted and opened to new possibilities: thus, they are not at home; their condition is unheimlich, uncanny. Hence, language, more or less, is the human condition.

Moreover, language cannot be possessed by anyone, and it cannot simply be attached to a people. Heidegger may well agree on the point that language does not belong to any individuals, yet, for him, it could be said to belong to or be a part of a Volk. But Arendt decouples this, and Cassin repeats the point playing on the expression déracine, ‘de-races’, uproots — taking the root out, removing the idea of an origin that was never there. Language always exceeds any particular people — any Volk (Cassin 2016, 56). German cannot be rooted or uprooted, as there is no such thing as an authentic people attached to German. This is powerfully repeated in Derrida’s sentence: “I only have one language; it is not mine” (Derrida 1998, 1). Derrida says, in spite of the fact that he speaks several languages, he has only one language. Any one language is already in relation to others. This is so even for one’s first language. In this sense, there is a no such a thing as a first, let alone the first, language. A first language exists in circumstances that are always plural. Language is already out there, and already in the plural, which is to say also in a muddle, in relation to something other — that is, in relation to otherness that is endless thus it is not mine. It cannot be a property, nor can it be propre (clean) because it is never secure, stable, or self-contained. Odysseus was not living in one language. He only had the illusion of living in one language. The Greek he was brought up into was already itself plural. Thus the myth of an original language is now dispelled.

Cassin asks, “When are we ever at home?” Maybe we are always on the way home. But this is not in the sense of endless adventure and floating. It is neither staying in a sense of rootedness, nor a smooth nomadism. It is rather, to employ a crucial concept of Henry David Thoreau, a matter of ‘sojourning’ — of spending ‘the day’, that is, some time, and then moving on. We arrive home only to leave home. This might be a matter of literally moving from one place to another, yet, for most people, it will most likely be living in a particular place — in one’s marriage, one’s family, one’s community — and necessarily in relationship to the other. These are places that will not stay the same and that, in consequence, require us to sojourn if we are to live well. Often there are illusions of permanence or origin. Of course it is true that we, at least to some extent, stabilise things, and that in a way language has been stabilised. But then we must be ready to leave, to be open to new
connections. This, is it not, actually is our reality, and thus the healthy way to understand and to be in the world? “Rootedness and uprootedness: that is nostalgia” (Cassin 2016, 7). If there are roots, they are only airborne roots. To conclude, I turn back to translation, particularly with regard to the relationship with the other.

Translation and the address of the other

Translation is about the relation to the other. To understand this fully it is necessary to see that we are always open to the air, toward new connections, and that we are already plural, perhaps more importantly, in the place of the address. As one who speaks, I am already in this circulation, most significantly in conversation. This is the place in which word connects to word and thought gives rise to new thought. Moreover, it is through this circulation of signs that I transform, renew myself. Being aware of what has been discussed, I am ready to be affected and for a responsible response. Hence, understanding language in this way helps us understand the other as already exceeding ourselves.

At this point, it is worth pondering what Lovisa Bergdahl says regarding the ‘double desire’ that I assume everyone may to some extent have. Bergdahl writes of the desire that is “between see me, hear me, understand me and do not reduce me by imposing your definition of who I am — [which] cuts to the very heart of who, as human beings, we are” (Bergdahl 2009, 7). To do justice to this, on the one hand, we need to remind ourselves that we are encountering something untranslatable but, and on the other, to still keep trying to translate. And this endeavour requires of me precisely new words, concepts and ways of speaking, which will become a new source for my thoughts. It is to understand and say things better, in allowing something new to come and affect me, although we know that we will struggle in welcoming the other. This is in a sense to open a new path of thinking. Rather than following what others say and being complacent about it, I must respond with my voice, in addressing others and in being addressed. Translation indeed involves this invention, this creation of language — a transformation of my language, of myself. And this is nothing less than ethics.

The possibility of understanding the other involves plunging into a different world that exists between different words. An idea of transformation has been glimpsed here; it is through being broken open by the other that I can transform myself; it is precisely to transform this language of mine, which actually is not mine.
This is how we should venture in languages — like the adventure of Odysseus, not only to return but to set sail again, towards plurality. And this is by sojourning, rather than searching for an essence or origin — a permanent place; by understanding language, and thus translation, as the place of the address.

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The Covert “See” in Perception of Another Person’s Feeling

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Abstract: Translation and understanding are always interwoven with each other. No matter in daily life or academic research, understanding is usually founded on appropriate translations. However, due to the specific grammars or syntaxes of different languages, sometimes we are apt to be “lost in translation”. Particularly, in the field of philosophy, translations may either cover up or manifest the key points of philosophical problems. In this paper I argue that, in both English and Japanese, the verb “see” are covert or hidden by grammars in our formulations of perceptions of another person’s feeling; and actually we are able to “see” the feelings of another person in some sense. Furthermore, in my view, some special but illuminating Japanese expressions may help us to solve the issues involved. I will carry on research in the light of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, especially his “Psychological Philosophy”, which I believe will shed light on the philosophical problems concerned.

1. Preliminary Discussion: Translation and Understanding in Perception

Translation and understanding are so inseparable that they look like twin sisters or even two sides of a coin. Both of them somehow depend on synonymy. More specifically, the substitution of synonyms is one of the necessary conditions for proper translation between two languages, and to some extent understanding can be expressed by substitution between different ways of expressions. That is why W. V. Quine’s skepticism on radical translation and synonymy has such a great impact on analytical philosophy. And no wonder that translation may cause trouble in ordinary languages or philosophy.

As for me, a special kind of expression in Japanese is worth noting, which can help us as a prima facie example to figure out the covert philosophical problems in ordinary languages. It is also a typical instance about the roles of translation and understanding in both linguistic and philosophical fields.
Japanese are always said to be a very introverted and cautious people, and due to this disposition they seem not to be willing to talk about another person’s feeling directly. For example, when faced with a lonely person, a Japanese observer is not inclined to say “He is lonely”, which directly refers to the person’s feeling. On the contrary, he tends to choose the following more reserved formulation:

彼は寂しそうです。（He seems to be lonely. /He looks lonely.）

Instead of using verbs such as “seem” or “look”, he adopts such a special syntactic structure to express his *perception*¹ of another person’s feeling. The same or homologous formulations are also used in different kinds of contexts. When what is in question is something in the outer world, as the objects could be observed or referred to directly,² it will be much easier for us to express and communicate. In Japanese there are several ways to express the subtleness of different attitudes or intentions. For example, when talking about the weather we can say:

雨が降るそうです。（It is said that/I heard that it is going to rain.）
雨が降るようです。（It seems to rain.）
雨が降りそうです。（It is going to rain.）

Please notice that only the last sentence is akin to our representative example “He looks lonely”, whereas the two corresponding translated English sentences (“He looks lonely” and “It is going to rain”) have distinct forms. Of course there are some culture differences here. British or Americans are said to be much more extrovert and do not shame to express their own ideas directly. In contrast it is hard to find an expression such as “He is lonely” (彼は寂しいです) in Japanese. However, culture difference is not the point for us. What we are going to deal with in this paper is something philosophical rather than linguistic or cultural. Actually what is involved here is the formulation of perception, which is a common topic in philosophy. Although we have different ways of speaking, none of us could transcend limitation of human being, which is reflected in all kinds of human languages. A legitimate formulation has to fit with human nature, logical possibilities and so on. That is why contradictions are excluded in all of the languages. So I advocate that the

¹ Now I use “perception” in a relative loose sense. Someone may argue that it is a kind of thinking or inference instead of perception. I will clarify this later.
² On the contrary, another person’s feelings are always hidden from us, which means that they could not be observed directly. See the next section.
The Covert “See” in Perception of Another Person’s Feeling

significance of the Japanese expressions mentioned above lies in their fitness with the possibilities of our ways of perceptions.

2. Dilemma in Perception of Another Person’s Feeling: The Covert “See”

In daily life, when trying to comfort someone or express our concern, there is often a dilemma. For example, when your lover or boyfriend/girlfriend is lonely, you may want to say “I know/understand your feeling” or “I can feel your loneliness”. However, are the expressions really proper or not? Not quite easy to answer. On the one hand, from a philosophical point of view, “I can feel your loneliness” might be misleading, because definitely it is impossible for us to feel another person’s feelings directly. On the other hand, on your interlocutor’s behalf, “I know/understand your feeling” might not be acceptable either, because the verbs such as “know” or “understand” only convey something intellectual, which falls under a category different from feeling or sensation. Furthermore, only if I regard your feeling as plausible objects I can “know” or “understand” it. In this way, however, your feelings are just cognitive objects, just as physical things or facts existing in external world. Nevertheless, what she or he really needs is much more than your intellectual understanding or knowing, especially when she or he is quite sensitive.

It is reasonable to call this scenario a dilemma, for neither choice could meet our needs: they are either false (from a philosophical point of view) or useless (on the behalf of the interlocutor). So in the case of “I can…your feelings”, do we have some other choice to assign to “…”? In order to solve this problem, we have to look deeply into the heart of things.

Actually, from the perspective of philosophy, the candidate verbs mentioned above could be divided into two groups. The first group consists of verbs referring to sensations or feelings, such as “feel”, while the second one concerning intellectual activities, such as “know” or “understand”. More precisely, for both groups, the appropriate formulation should be paraphrased as “I can feel/know/understand that you are lonely”, whose grammatical object is a clause “you are lonely”, rather than “your loneliness”. Can your feelings (e.g. loneliness) become the object in this kind of formulation, and at the same time are not regarded only as physical objects or events? Considering the subject and object should be connected by a verb, the question turns to be: is there a proper verb in this kind of formulation? It is just the heart of the whole story.
What shall we learn from the aforesaid scenes? The answer should be: in the formulation “I can...your feelings”, we need an exactly appropriate verb to assign to “…”, and otherwise we can only say “I can feel/know that you are lonely”. A subject could not feel what another subject feels, but only sympathize with or be affected by him. Then can we find out an acceptable verb to bridge the gulf between two subjects? Or in other words, is it reasonable for us to talk about feelings intersubjectively in terms of a certain kind of verbs?

Luckily we do have another group for choice, which consists of verbs of perception. In effect, if observing our ordinary language carefully, a usual but significant verb will attract our attention, namely “see”.

Here I construe “see” as verbs of perception, as well as “hear” or “notice”. However, if we regard perception just as pure sensations or pure observations, it might be illegitimate to say “I see your feeling”. The differences and connections between pure observation and perception will be dealt with later.

Even though it is a legitimate formulation, does it stand for the subject’s activity involved here? After all, in English the verb itself is always covert, whilst only its cognates arise, such as “seem” and “look” (“He looks lonely”). Whereas in Japanese, it even disappears. However, please bear in mind that the grammars of ordinary languages cover the real logical structures of propositions from time to time. Even a word is absent in literal sense, it may still plays some significant role logically. For example, a lot of Japanese sentences do not have subjects, but it is not said that there is no subjects in reality. By the same token, even though the speaker has not asserted that he is seeing or perceiving, the concerning activities still exist in reality. In short, we should not ignore the covert word “see”.

However, the still unsolved problem is: can this verb really connect the subject and another person’s feeling? No doubt that we can see “that a person is lonely”, but can we see his or her “loneliness” directly? Or to put it another way: does “I see your loneliness” make any sense? If it does, “see” will become “the chosen one”.

3 In the original German text Wittgenstein uses the verb “sehen” and the gerund “Sehen” alternately. So in this paper the uses of verb “see” and gerund “seeing” are also context-dependent and sometimes interchangeable.

4 I use “activity” in a quite loose sense here, applicable to both physical and mental terms which can be characterized by a verb. So both “seeing” and “thinking” can be called “activity”, regardless of the difference from behaviors such as “raising hands”.

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3. Different Meanings of “See”: From a Wittgensteinian Point of View

At this point it is time for us to introduce some new philosophy resource to deal with the problems mentioned above. In my view, some of Wittgenstein’s remarks on “Psychological Philosophy” are very powerful reinforcements. “Psychological Philosophy” is not formulated in a single book, but scatters in his manuscripts such as Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology and Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology. It is a significant branch of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, which is quite different from other two relevant terms: philosophy of mind and psychology. Philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy, the themes of which include nature of mind, the relationship between mind and body or that between mind and world. Psychology is normally regarded as a branch of science, dealing with scientific problems of our mental occurrences or nervous system by means of experiments and observations. “Psychological Philosophy”, however, specifically refers to a special way of investigating the foundational problems of psychology, by means of, in the light of Wittgenstein’s characteristic method, clarifying the intricate relationships between various psychological concepts. Considering Wittgenstein’s celebrated slogan “meaning is use”,^5^ one of the primary missions of “Psychological Philosophy” is to clarify the actual or practical uses of psychological concepts. In this section I am not going to analyze Wittgenstein’s texts in detail, but to follow his methods and solve our problems in a Wittgensteinian way.

Go back to the previous question. Does “I see your loneliness” make any sense? It is not easy to answer it without making every key component clear. With our purpose in mind, the use of “see” should be the foremost one, because its meanings and uses determine whether the feeling of another person could become the legitimate object of it.

Then what does “see” mean? Or in other words, what can we see? The second question sounds a little odd, for of course we are able to see countless kinds of things. In everyday life, we can “see” shapes, colors, facial expressions, similarity and so on. Some of them are visual properties of objects, some are not. However, is there any essential difference between the objects that can be seen? Are all the objects of “see” on a par, or fall under the same category? Wittgenstein also tries to answer the bundle of questions in his own way. He says:

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^5^ I have not taken it for granted that the slogan is completely right or characterizes Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. In fact some remarks in his drafts directly go against it. But as far as our investigations in this paper, this slogan is acceptable in a certain way.
“I see that the child wants to touch the dog, but doesn’t dare.” How can I see that? — Is this description of what is seen on the same level as a description of moving shapes and colours? Is an interpretation in question? Well, remember that you may also mimic a human being who would like to touch something, but doesn’t dare. And what you mimic is after all a piece of behavior. But you will perhaps be able to give a characteristic imitation of this behavior only in a wider context. (RPP I 1066)

But now am I to say that I really “see” the fearfulness in this behavior — or that I really “see” the facial expression? Why not? But that is not to deny the difference between two concepts of what is perceived. A picture of the face might reproduce its features very accurately, but not get the expression right; it might, however, be right as far as the expression goes and not hit the features off well. “Similar expression” takes faces together in a quite different way from “similar anatomy”. (RPP I 1068)

There are both kinships and significant differences between seeing fearfulness and seeing a facial expression. The relations here seem to be perplexing. But at any rate “see fearfulness” does make sense here, and the possibility that “fearfulness” or “loneliness” can be seen lies in the irreducibility of descriptions of the object of see. In other words, fearfulness could not be completely reduced to the features of face, just as expressions could not be reduced to facial features. Furthermore, both expressions and features can be seen, but there must be some indispensable differences between them. In the following remarks Wittgenstein tries to make much more explicit assertions about this:

On the other hand one would like to say: We surely can’t “see” the expression, the shy behavior, in the same sense as we see movement, shapes and colours. What is there in this? (Naturally, the question is not to be answered physiologically.) Well, one does say, that one sees both the dog’s movement and its joy. If one shuts one’s eyes one can see neither the one nor the other. But if one says of someone who could accurately reproduce the movement of the dog in some fashion in pictures, that he saw all there was to see, he would not have to recognize the dog’s joy… But remember the meaning in which we learn to use the word “see”. We certainly say we see this human being, this flower, while our optical picture
— the colours and shapes — is continually altering, and within the widest limits at that. Now that just is how we do use the word “see”… (RPP I 1070)

Just as Wittgenstein’s words, our optical pictures “is continually altering”, without preventing us to see the objects at all. This is such an essential characteristic of usages of “see” that there is no way to find or create a “better” (more appropriate) word to take the place of it. As we have argued, a person who has copied a face exactly may still fail to recognize the facial expression or its similarity with another face, so facial expression, similarity or fearfulness (loneliness) could not be just reduced to properties such as shapes or colors. More specifically, the grammar of “see” determines that these entities could be the objects of it, and accordingly the entities fall under distinct categories. At this point the differences and connections between pure observations and perceptions are involved. If we take it for granted that perception (e.g. see) is no more than sensory or cognitive activity which corresponds to pure visual properties, the distinction between features of a face and expressions of it will disappear. As a result we have to admit that see is not a simple cognitive activity, and could be related to different kinds of objects.

Admittedly a lot of things could be the objects of a perception (see). In Wittgenstein’s words, of course we can see the fearfulness of another person, but not “in the same sense as we see movement, shapes and colours”. In a word, “see” has complicated different meanings; or better to say, it is a “family resemble” concept which has different but akin uses.\(^6\)

Wittgenstein distinguishes two uses of see:

Two uses of the word “see”.
The one: “What do you see there?” — “I see this” (and then a description, a drawing, a copy). The other: “I see a likeness in these two faces” — let the man to whom I tell this be seeing the faces as clearly as I do myself.

What is important is the categorical difference between the two ‘objects’ of sight. (PI II xi 111)

The first meaning of “see” corresponds to description, drawing and copy, and in these cases you can describe the corresponding visual properties. Its second meaning nonetheless does not definitely have a simple visual object, although there

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\(^6\) It is the same for the term “perception” itself, which is akin to both sensation and thinking, but equals to neither of them. This issue will be handled in the next section.
is always a grammatical object such as “likeness” (or better to say “similarity”, the German word is “Ähnlichkeit”). From this it can be learned that, once accepting that “see” has two kinds of uses and two kinds of “objects”, it will also be acceptable to say “I see your loneliness” in the second meaning of this verb. In this way, the covert component in the perception of another person’s feeling has been dug out. Although there is no verb involved in corresponding Japanese expressions, we can still assert that the “loneliness” is “seen” by the Japanese observer. After all, linguistic or translating factors only cover or hide the mental activities of observer, but cannot eliminate them: no matter which type of formulations is chosen, the corresponding mental activities always exist. Our purpose is just to identify what the activities are and how they are covert, rather than why they are covert or why this type is chosen; the latter should be linguists’ job.

4. Why is it “Seeing” rather than “Thinking”? 

However, even though “I see his loneliness” makes sense, it is still not clear that why the covert mental activity involved is not “thinking”. No doubt that the English sentence “I think he is lonely” is valid, and when uttering these words we seem to have made some inferences, which apparently belong to the field of thinking. As for Japanese we can also use patterns such as “…と思います” to make an assertion. In this case why is the activity in question not a kind of thinking? As has been said before, “I know/understand your feeling” is not good enough to comfort another one. But that is not the point here, for what has to be examined is the relation between seeing and thinking.

According to Wittgenstein’s remarks in the previous section, there seems to be a vague boundary between activities of seeing and thinking, or rather we have to regard seeing as a mixture or fusion with thinking. However, it does not follow that there is no relatively clear boundary. As a matter of fact, seeing and thinking can be distinguished with respect to certain contexts, or in a Wittgensteinian phrase: language games.

In practice, the proposition “I see a red circle” could be proved to be false when the object turns out to be yellow or a square. In this circumstance, it is not that the observer has made a false assertion or judgement. In contrast, it is better to say he has come up with an illusion or misconception. Illusion is not a mistake in the
following sense: I calculate 2+2 as 5, in which something wrong arises in the progress of calculation. What is the subtle difference here?

When thinking about another person’s feelings, we come up with a thought or an idea simultaneously, which could be either true or false according to the actual situations. Correspondingly the thought could be restated as: he looks *so and so*, so I guess/ think that he is *such and such*. The point is that “so and so” and “such and such” could not be identical or mere paraphrase, otherwise the pattern will turn to be a tautology or trivial truth. Consequently, one essential characteristics of thinking is that the observer (or better to say “thinker”) makes an inference based on something different (from “so and so” to “such and such”).

However, in “seeing” we could not make such a distinction between two parts of a mental process (say making an inference). More precisely “seeing” does not have two parts at all. It is not that we “see” the shapes or features of a face and then “see” or “grasp” the facial expression or feeling; rather we see the expression immediately. If the observer is asked to describe what has been seen, the proper description is no doubt the one directly referring to the facial expression or feeling. Because as remarked above, description about expression or feeling could not be reduced to the one about shapes, colors and so on. In summary, the structure of “seeing” never consists of two parts. “Seeing” is a unified activity, by no means a step from “so and so” to “such and such”. In this way we can draw the boundary between “seen” and “thinking”.

Now let us reconsider the special Japanese expression at the very beginning. Just as this article’s title, in this formulation the verb “see” is covert, along with the observer’s mental activities. No doubt that an observer could not “see” (in the first sense of it) another person’s feeling directly, but what is in question is not a pure inference either. Strictly speaking, it is inappropriate to say there is only one single type of mental activity involved. When we “see” the feeling of another person, this kind of “seeing” is neither a pure sensation nor inference, but akin to both of them. In most cases we do not need to “infer” the inner state of the observed, as we can see the feeling of him in the second sense of “see”. Although due to some special linguistic factors the verbs are always absent in corresponding Japanese sentences, if we are asked to identify what the involved mental activity is, it is definitely to be “seeing”, just mixed with some “thinking” anyway. At this moment the misleading linguistic or translating factors have been cleaned up.

I am not asserting that the activities in question will never be a kind of thinking. It is better to say the possibilities of talking about another person’s feeling
make up a spectrum. “He is such and such” stands on one end of this spectrum, whereas a deliberate inference such as “he looks so and so, so I guess/think that he is such and such” stands on the other end. The formulations in all kinds of languages correspond to various positions on the spectrum, which present various dispositions of the language users. The complexity here again reminds us to be cautious about talking about another person’s feeling.

5. Further Investigation: The Role of Psychological Adjectives

It has been seen that we can “see” another person’s feeling in a specific sense of this verb. However, there is still something worth noticing. In addition to the verb which characterizes the mental activity involved, the psychological adjective which characterizes the feeling of another person also plays significant role.

Let us reconsider the expression “He looks lonely”. No doubt that sometimes we may make mistakes, or the observed may be simulating or pretending. Simulation is a very special situation, in which the internal relation between feeling (the inner part) and performance (the outer part) seems to be broken up and turns to be an external or contingent one.\(^7\) However, even in this case, the inclination to use the same psychological adjective word reminds unchanged. That is to say, we are still inclined to use “lonely” or “loneliness” to describe what has been seen, and our public criterion on the proper description is constant. The possibility of simulation or making mistake exists in the gulf between what has been seen and what has happened in reality. In this case, it is better to say we come across a quite different kind of language game, which but still depends on the more fundamental games about observing or seeing.

In the typical formulation “I see your loneliness”, besides the verb “see”, “loneliness” or “lonely” also play fundamental roles: they are always the proper concepts to describe what has been seen. If you want to express what you feel (your own experience), you should use this word; by the same token, if you want to describe what you have seen, you should use exactly the same word. In this way the psychological concept (adjective) bridges the gulf between two subjects.

\(^7\) For Wittgenstein’s distinction between internal/external relations (especially in his later philosophy), see M. ter Hark’s book Beyond the Inner and the Outer, p.31, pp. 182–184; and Jakub Mácha’s book Wittgenstein on Internal and External Relations: Tracing All the Connections. The latter one is a systematic study on this subject. But it is such a tough work that I would not like to mention it too much in this paper.
What is the role of a concept? This is not a simple question, but in most cases an adult does know how to use concepts, including psychological adjectives or nouns. The role of psychological adjectives or nouns looks like a Janus who has two faces: one looks towards a human being’s inner world (feelings), the other looks towards the outer world (performances or behaviors). However, neither side could itself characterize the entire meanings or usages of such a concept. In the Japanese expression “彼は寂しそうです”, adjective “寂しい” or the corresponding noun “寂しさ” is always the felicitous word here, which seems to express something both universal and individual. In any case, criterion is always something public, whereas feelings are private or personal.

However, the two-facedness of psychological words (adjectives) should not be misconstrued as “containing two successive or independent parts”. At times we are tempted to divide its two faces into two separate subsidiaries, one of which belongs to the inner side, the other one belongs to the outer. But can we really separate them? We cannot “separate” different ingredients or components of a kind of alloy unless we have decomposed it. An ingredient is a “part” of this alloy, but we cannot separate it from other ones directly, just as dismantling Lego Bricks. It is the same for Janus: once one of the faces is separated, it will not be Janus any longer. Similarly, if a psychological adjective has only one side, it will cease to make sense. Any attempt to construe this kind of words from only one side is doomed to fail.

Regardless of the culture and linguistic distinctions, the roles of verbs and psychological adjectives are always essential. The investigations above can be summarized as a complicated answer to the following question: “How can we see another person’s feeling?” The answer partially lies in the complicated meaning of “see” (mixed with pure sensation and thinking), partially in the two-facedness of psychological words which are vital in our perception of other ones’ feelings.

6. Conclusion and Further Comments

No matter whether in English, Japanese or Chinese, in spite of the countless ways of expressions, we all face such a dilemma: it is impossible for us to feel another person’s feeling directly, but we have to talk about it intersubjectively. Nevertheless, to regard another person’s feeling as an object is not always proper for our aims. Different languages have different ways of utterance, which corresponds to different

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ways of thinking, or different ways of life. However, such diversity roots deeply in the possibilities of perceiving, feeling and thinking. Just as mentioned above, these possibilities form a spectrum, which reflects the various human dispositions. Here we seem to touch the boundary or limitation of human beings. It is possible for us to imagine that there is a much more advanced being who is able to directly “xx” other ones’ feelings, and in their “language” there is an appropriate verb for “xx”, but we will never know what it is like to be such a kind of being.  

What we have discussed above should just be regarded as a preliminary works for further investigations. And finally, I would like to make some further comments with regard to the whole paper. Philosophy always deals with the universal items, regardless of the manifold diversity of differentiations. However, when doing philosophy, we have to use different languages, which can limit our ways of talking or thinking. Sometimes the linguistic differences seem to be essential to our discussion, and we may be “lost in translations”, or better to say, lost in the linguistic world. However, in my view, they just reveal a variety of aspects of philosophy, instead of different kinds of philosophy. Languages somehow present the limitation of human beings, but adequate communications and careful technical discussions can help us to “see” the answers to philosophical problems clearly through the dense fog of forms of languages.

References


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9 I use this expression in a similar way with Thomas Nagel’s paper “What is it like to be a bat?”, *The Philosophical Review*, vol. 83, no. 4, 1974, pp. 435–450.

10 For example, in Chinese there is also a very special expression “我覺得”, which is always translated as “I think…” or “…と思います”. However, technically it equals to neither of them. Actually this expression presents an inclination to fuse feeling and thinking together, and hide the attitude of speaker at the same time. It is a pity that we do not have time to investigate it here.
The Covert “See” in Perception of Another Person’s Feeling


Language, Translation, and the Hegemony of English

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Abstract: This discussion begins from philosophy’s tendencies towards forms of universalism, taking this as a backdrop for the consideration of ways that philosophy’s own development has been marked by the vicissitudes of circumstance and translation. Such contingencies in fact extend to the very operation of language itself, albeit that this is likely to have been occluded by those tendencies within philosophy towards abstraction and the idealization of thought. Careful attention to examples of the problematics of translation within philosophy provides a means of seeing the importance of a different, more contextually attuned construction of the subject, in which a necessary pluralism of language and thought is more properly acknowledged. The necessity in the experience of translation of the exercise of judgement is recognized, and the importance of this for practical reason is stressed. This means that those who are monolingual may be morally blind, especially in circumstances of linguistic hegemony.

The aspiration of Western philosophy to universality has been confronted in fresh ways over the past half century by questions of cultural difference. While in its most abstract central domains, and especially in its Anglophone forms, it may to some extent have insulated itself from such pressures, it has not remained immune. Thus, the work of Edward Said or Frantz Fanon may have seemed insufficiently philosophical to have a bearing on work in the mainstream of philosophy, but the influence of that work in the wider culture, in the academy and beyond, has meant that it has become increasingly difficult to ignore. At the same time, challenges to the mainstream within philosophy — the rise of feminist epistemology provides one such example — have also made it more difficult (or more indefensible) simply to carry on with business as usual. Another manifestation of cultural difference has been the increasing internationalization of philosophy as an academic subject, as well as the contribution made by burgeoning numbers of those teaching, researching, and studying in the field who are from different cultural and language backgrounds. Yet a further factor lies in the fact that philosophy itself, in the course of its history,
has scarcely developed in a unified cultural tradition. Its inheritance is marked by traditions of enquiry that, given the vicissitudes of circumstance, have sometimes survived only precariously. Its canonical work, however contentiously identified, has passed through processes of translation that have brought not only distortions of thought but also new and sometimes dynamic connections.

One response to these circumstances is to shore up the discipline: to hearken back to origins and to attempt to overcome the contingencies of language in an imagined purity of thought itself. This can bring with it a certain nostalgia for origins and, reaching forward, aspire to the establishment of a common language. That this last idea is a troubling one, however, is now widely recognized, and the dream of a universal language — whether in the dominance of one natural language or through the creation of an Esperanto of some kind — can come to seem a nightmare. It was against this background, and acknowledging the many ways in which an avowed universalism might cloak parochialism of a kind, that Hilary Putnam made the following remarks:

> [E]ven posing the issue of cultural diversity, and of the sense that cultural diversity is in tension with the Enlightenment, in terms of “religions” (perhaps the concept of “religions” is itself a uniquely Western concept) and “history” (a notion that has come to have a special sense in the West in the last two or three centuries) is itself unduly parochial. Perhaps we in the West have far too narrow a sense of the wealth of human cultural diversity, and perhaps this makes it easier for some of us to contemplate the idea of a world with one language, one literature, one music, one art, one politics — in a word, one culture (Putnam, 1995).

The views Putnam questioned were, in fact, those of some fellow philosophers whom he held in high esteem. Rudolph Carnap, for example, who tended to believe that “for all $x$, planned $x$ is better than unplanned $x$”, was attracted to the idea of a universal language. “Thus”, Putnam continues,

the idea of a socialist world in which everyone spoke Esperanto (except scientists, who, for their technical work, would employ notations from symbolic logic) was one which would have delighted him. And I recently had a conversation with a student who remarked quite casually that it would
not be a bad idea if there were only one language and one literature: “We would get used to it, and it might help to prevent war”.

In quietly controlled dismay at these thoughts, Putnam turns to the humility to be found in words of William James: “No one has insight into all the ideals. No one should presume to judge them off-hand. The pretension to dogmatize about them in each other is the root of most human injustices and cruelties, and the trait in human character most likely to make the angels weep” (William James quoted in Hilary Putnam 1994, p. 196).\footnote{Hilary Putnam, “Pragmatism and Relativism”, p. 196. These lines are taken from William James, “What Makes a Life Significant?” in \textit{Talks to Teachers on Psychology and Some of Life’s Ideals} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 150.}

These considerations provide a fitting preamble to what follows, especially in respect of the need to count the costs and the opportunities that come through the multiplicity of languages that is the reality of our common world. As we have seen, that reality has been evident in the history of philosophy, where translation has been at work not just as a technical means of transferring thought from one language to another but as a source of slippages and accretions, in a process that, in generating new meaning, has contributed to the substance of philosophy itself. But what is translation? A closer examination is needed, so how are we to proceed?

**What is translation?**

A familiar model of translation takes it that the translator’s task is to convert an expression from the source language to the target language while preserving the original meaning. But there are problems with this view. At its most extreme, it embodies three assumptions. First, each language is imagined to be clearly separate, autonomous, and pure. In a way this is a natural enough assumption. We do for the most part experience languages that we are not familiar with as opaque and systematically separated from our own. Yet a moment’s reflection reveals the way that languages overlap, with etymological connections revealing links between words and common structures of thought, just as there is the common adoption of, for example, terms relating to new technology. Second, each language is understood to be more or less static and stable. The relatively slow pace of change from one generation to another hides the larger shifts that occur and the fact that, in its
everyday use, language is in flux. A third factor is that words are taken to correlate with concepts and that concepts are stable in spite of the variation between the languages that represent them. This assumption is manifest in the belief that the English “table” and Spanish mesa stand in a common relation to the idea of the table.

The fairly clear Platonist origins of this last thought need to be seen in the light of two further distinctions, which become manifest at the level of the larger unit of the proposition. The distinction between concept and word needs, then, to be related to a contrast between propositions and statements, and a further contrast with sentences themselves. Consider, for example, the English sentence “The bottle is on the table” and its French equivalent La bouteille est sur la table. Understood in terms of propositions, these two sentences are indeed equivalent. They express the same proposition, the truth-value of which is impervious to the difference in languages. The proposition is, of course, the stock-in-trade of philosophy in its Anglophone analytical dispensation, and hence this imperviousness to language difference has a powerful hold within the discipline. It was part of Foucault’s achievement that he insisted on the need to examine not propositions but statements, taking the discourse regimes that enable human intercourse to be consolidations of thought within a history of statements. But what is a statement and how does it differ from a proposition? Certainly it is the case that to insist on statements is to make a move towards the acknowledgement of natural languages and away from the abstraction of the proposition. The crucial factor here is temporality or datability. “She made that statement when he refused to answer the telephone”. The word “statement” in this sentence is not replaceable by “proposition”, because propositions are not “made” and they are not said to occur at particular times. The word is simply not used in that way. The conceptual field it opens up is the timeless world of logic rather than the world of lived experience. Once again, philosophy’s inclination towards logic reflects a Platonist impulse. While the proposition draws attention to logic and is understood primarily in terms of the binary of truth and falsehood, the statement relates to time and place, and is inclined to situate the thought it expresses in relation to lived experience.

It remains the case, however, that we have here, in our example, two sentences but one statement. In a court of law, other things being equal, the two sentences would be taken in this way. And so it is necessary to draw a contrast also between statements and sentences, where the latter term does indeed turn the attention to the difference between languages. Clearly there are two sentences here,
one in English and one in French. And this encourages the recognition of their different sounds and rhythms, as well as the different conceptual ranges and connections in sound that they activate. The reality is, of course, that our thought does not occur in propositions or statements *tout court*: it occurs in the sentences of a natural language. Hence, it occurs not exactly in “language” in the abstract, but in a particular language — in French, Japanese, Spanish, English.

At the levels of the proposition and of the statement, questions of translation are plainly hidden, and it may seem that they can be ignored or understood merely as technical problems to be overcome. At the level of the sentence, translation comes to the fore, and the philosophical significance of differences in the terms that are used becomes more apparent. Differences between sentences become more prominent where the text in question is literary in form, especially so in the case of poetry. But given that philosophising also depends upon natural language, this recognition should both weaken the ancient distinction between philosophy and literature, and undermine the retreat, as it were, to formal logic as the bastion of reason.

**Different words, different conceptual schemes**

Translation offers a way of reflecting on the relation between *different* conceptual schemes — say, between different cultures. This extends beyond different vocabularies (e.g. different words for “blue” in Spanish) to different structures of thought (different grammars). Consider the simple example of translating “I am happy” into Japanese. The middle-voiced *Ureshii desu* conveys a more generalized or diffuse sense of happiness than the first-person accentuation of the English. On the other hand, *Watashi wa ureshii desu* would accentuate the first-person in a more emphatic way than does the English expression. So the actual translation employed would need to be contextually sensitive, but it remains the case that neither expression is an ideal match: in other words, there is no ideal (no Platonic form) with which the two expressions might correlate. The recognition of this makes apparent the fact that what is at stake is not just a refinement in classification but a different opening of meaningfulness. This is at work in the most everyday speech as well as in the translation of philosophy itself. Hence, it is worth considering in this respect the introduction of philosophy into Japan and into Japanese.

When, in the late 19th century, Amane Nishi introduced philosophy as an academic subject into Japan, he coined the word *tetsugaku* (哲学). The assiduous
project of translating key works from the Western canon that was then undertaken inevitably encountered difficulties at every turn, and choices made then over key terms had a decisive effect in shaping the course of the discipline. As Naoki Sakai has demonstrated, the central and pivotal term “human subject” proved especially difficult for Japanese translators. The two possibilities that presented themselves, *shukan* (主観) and *shutai* (主体), carried connotations respectively of the epistemological subject and the subject of *praxis*, effecting a division that was more stark than in the uses of the corresponding terms in European languages. Hence, Nishi’s preference for the former installed a certain conception of subjectivity at the heart of philosophy, setting the course for philosophy as it was to develop in Japan, with trail effects in other subjects of study and streams of thought. There is a degree of irony to this, as well as a further suggestion of colonisation. The irony lies in the fact that the idea of a shutai-like (that is, practice-oriented, bodily-conditioned) subject, the subject effectively occluded by Nishi’s choice, is closer to the indigenous life and thought of Japan — a country that had not witnessed the revolution brought about by René Descartes and the rapid rise of science, which were such crucial factors in modern Europe, but that was steeped in religious and cultural practices in which such factors as behaviour, bodily performance and appearance, and gesture were of paramount importance.²

In his *Translation and Subjectivity: On “Japan” and Cultural Nationalism*, Sakai relates the distinction between *shukan* and *shutai* to a contrast in approaches to translation itself. Taking Akira Suzuki’s examination in the early nineteenth century of the idea of foreign language learning as his specific point of departure, he explains how, during the Edo period, such learning was based in a set of assumptions and practices different from those in which it is typically framed today, and how it was oriented especially to the understanding of an ancient language, of China or Japan. In their familiar forms in contemporary schools and universities, the study of literature might be conceived in terms of, say, a literary-critical approach, and a foreign language might be learned for instrumental reasons only. In the earlier context the learning of the language was taken to involve an absorption of the textures of a social and political reality different from one’s own, and in the course of which there would be a “cofiguring” of each. Such learning is closer to the experience of the novice monk, where one becomes absorbed in the content and textual practices of the language in question, including its characteristic disciplining of the body. One commits or submits oneself to its ethos.

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² For further discussion, see Standish (2011).
Such an account of learning a foreign language is overtly related to the construction of subjectivity, with all the ethical richness that that implies. Sakai takes this to be “an ecstatic project”, where “ecstasy” implies being taken outside oneself and a readiness for this to happen. It was “a project of moving away from and getting out of the selfsame that the figure of a foreign language solicits me to venture into. It is a project of transforming me into that which is not familiar rather than a project of returning to the authentic self” (Sakai, 1997, p. 33). In the contrast thus drawn, it can be seen that questions of the possibilities of the human are at stake, and these are matters of freedom itself. Sakai develops the point in relation to the idea of the contrast in conceptions of the human subject on which the present discussion is turning: “By shutai, therefore”, he writes,

I like to suggest the impossibility of full saturation of any identity and, particularly, of the agent of action, as well as an undecidability that underwrites the possibility of social and ethical action. Yet the shutai is not the agent of action possessing free choice as it is understood in liberal humanism because freedom is neither owned by it nor in it (p. 150).

Sakai’s account makes it possible to see a kind of colonisation in the displacement of such an orientation to foreign-language learning and of the reading practices that went with it. The foregrounding of the epistemological subject, which maintains a more distanced and less engaged relation to practice, colludes in this. As was acknowledged above, the practice of translation is not confined in its effects to matters of such moment as is found in this philosophical example: the effects are more subtle and more pervasive. The practice involves the exercise of judgment on the part of the translator that may come to the fore at such moments but that is, in fact, there as an undercurrent throughout.

It is time, however, to combine this insight with a thought that was ventured early in the present discussion. Let us recapitulate in order to see where this leads. Languages are not tidily sealed off from one another; nor are they static. Their signs are open to the reactions of the addressee or receiver, who brings new connotations and connections to them. This is, it is true, the arena in which not just understanding but misunderstanding occur, and this prompts the unnerving thought that meaning can at any time go astray. But that way lies skepticism. The fact that signs are open to new association and connection is descriptive of what the signs that human beings use are like — that is, it is descriptive of language itself. Indeed, it seems likely that
the signs of animals work in a more mechanistic way and generally without the possibility of extension and new connotation. But animals have no culture. The working of human language, by contrast, is precisely the engine of culture, the means and possibility of human creativity. It is true that these are also conditions in which we can at times wonder whether we have been misunderstood, but these are the very conditions in which we, for the most part, accept that we have been understood. This is not a recipe for skepticism (that is, for the thought that “you can never really be sure”): these are the conditions in which human misunderstanding and understanding are possible, the condition of human being itself. Hence, it can be seen that the problems faced by the translator, who works between languages that are not simply commensurable, are not simply to be separated from the conditions that apply intralingually. In this sense, then, translation is at work in our thought itself.

In the remainder of this paper, I want next to give further attention to the consequences of this. Finally, however, I shall turn back to the question of foreign languages, but this time with an emphasis on language in its plurality, an emphasis that, as we shall see, will draw the argument more fully into the realm of the political.

**The truth is translated**

The discussion here opens onto the idea of translation as a philosophical and educational theme and as a substantive feature of philosophy of certain kinds.

In 1971 Stanley Cavell wrote what he calls his “little book on Walden” (Cavell, 1992), a text that puts emphasis on language, and on the movement of thought that takes place within language, especially as these qualities are revealed and explored in the writings of Thoreau. In fact, Thoreau explicitly describes this in terms of translation, as a remark late in Walden indicates: “The volatile truth of our words should continually betray the inadequacy of the residual statement. Their truth is translated: its literal monument alone remains” (Thoreau, 1992, p. 216). Thoreau’s words are cryptic, so let me expand on them a little. “The volatile truth” would imply that there is something elusive about truth or perhaps that it flies away, perhaps especially when we try most earnestly to grasp it. Would this not suggest also the danger of too direct an approach to truth (say in the caricature of the philosopher’s search for “The Truth”!) and that what is needed is a more indirect
approach and relationship (see Standish, 2014)? Certainly Thoreau seems to be echoing here a thought that is found in the writings of his friend and sometime teacher, Emerson. In Emerson’s essay “Experience”, he writes: “I take this evanescence and lubricity of all objects, which lets them slip through our fingers then when we clutch hardest, to be the most unhandsome part of our condition” (Emerson, 1983, p. 473). The sensuous qualities of Emerson’s vocabulary here, with the onomatopoeia of “evanescence”, “lubricity”, and “slip” pitched against “objects” and “clutch”, the soft sounds contrasting with the harsh, elicit a response to words in their materiality as signs that remains inarticulate when these lines are understood in terms of propositions and not sentences, and that is denied, or cannot be acknowledged, in the supposed rigour of conceptual analysis. They prepare the way for the more surprising, strange, and therefore challenging term “unhandsome”, an expression that, in straining to say “unbeautiful”, draws attention back to the hand and to what eludes it, with its anticipations of Heidegger’s intimation of thinking as a handicraft. Our condition is unhandsome in part because we persist in clutching, expecting a firm grasp of things, turning things into “objects”.

The continuation of Thoreau’s statement with the words “should betray” has the force of implying that the volatile truth in fact reveals something, suggesting again an indirectness of understanding or a revealing that is granted where we do not clutch and grasp. The “inadequacy of the residual statement” adverts to the material nature of the signs we use, the sound-waves of our spoken words, or the ink-marks or pixels of those that are written. They are residual in that they remain there, however fleetingly, even when thought has already moved on. The idea of a residue is of something left over, of something that remains, perhaps as dust or bones, after the life that matters has gone away. The monument is “literal” in the senses both of its being a monument in letters and of its being only or exactly a monument — a material trace of the dynamic thought that was there in their creation, a relic of its passing, not the real thing in its life and vitality.

Thoreau says something of the distance between the settlement or fixation of thought in words, and the dynamic and sometimes elusive nature of meaning; the distance relates being to becoming. In a sense Thoreau anticipates thoughts that are to become current a century later. There are connections to Wittgenstein’s writings on language games and what it is to follow a rule, as well as to the equivocations in his remarks about signs, where he writes: “Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life?—In use it is alive. Is life breathed into it there?—Or is the use its life?” (Philosophical Investigations, #432). And they relate also to Levinas’s distinction, in
Otherwise than Being, between le dire and le dit (the saying and the said) (Levinas, 1978). While Levinas warns against a fixity of thought in which the relation to the other is arrested, Thoreau is concerned that our holding too fast to the crystallisation of thought in words may lead to a false security, causing us to cling to false necessities. If this insight is related to the earlier discussion of propositions, its salience should become all the more clear. The truth, on this view, is tied to a dynamism. Not everything can be simply shown. In thought there is a certain volatility, which is at the same time the element within which culture and creativity are possible — precisely, as we saw, the conditions of human being. On this view, the dynamism in meaning that is found in translation as conventionally understood is in fact, as I have tried to show, already there within language itself, not just interlingually but intralingually. The movement of meaning in translation from one language to another is part of the movement within language more generally. To the extent that language is constitutive of reality, this movement of meaning is inherent in that reality, and it is the means and substance of human transformation of various kinds.

Cavell claims that “Thoreau’s book on Walden can be taken as a whole to be precisely about the problem of translation, call it the transfiguration from one form of life to another” (Cavell, 2012). The religious inflection that is given by the word “transfiguration” implies nothing other-worldly but a dimension of ordinary human experience. This is Cavell’s sense of the sublime in the ordinary, or transcendence down. Thus, translation in these senses is a quality that is internal to Cavell’s ordinary language philosophy, which is associated, obviously, with J.L. Austin and, less explicitly, with Wittgenstein. This is to see translation not as a metaphor for human transformation but rather as a metonym of our lives. This is a quality that is hidden from view where philosophy proceeds with too great a confidence in the machinery of rational scrutiny and reasoned argument, with logic as the bastion of rational thought, as this was put earlier, in the manner that is found in parts of its mainstream. To the extent that language is constitutive of reality, this movement of meaning is inherent in that reality.

Translation and the plurality of languages

Barbara Cassin’s recent book, Nostalgia: When Are We Ever At Home? (2016), is an unusual reflection on the themes of home and belonging, language, and what it is to
think. The book’s guiding thought is a contrast between the archetypal figure of the return home in the story of Odysseus with that of exile and the establishment of the new city in that of Aeneas.

The story of Odysseus’ return provides one of the most culturally powerful images of home and belonging, an emblem and orientation for Europe. This is accentuated by the symbolism of the marriage bed, the heart of the home to which Odysseus returns: the bed is carved from a yew tree that is still rooted in the ground. His return is only possible after a hazardous journey that takes many years. Aeneas too will undergo a protracted and hazardous journey. But Aeneas’ initial escape is from his home, from Troy the city that has been sacked, and this is a city to which he will never return. It is his fate that he must escape, leaving his wife and children, and — extraordinarily — carrying his aged father on his back. The place where he will arrive is Lavinium, and there eventually he will lay the foundations for the city that is to become Rome. While, after years amongst strange peoples, Odysseus returns home, sustaining his native Greek throughout, Aeneas does not return and adopts instead the language of this new place he has found — Latin, the language of the city he will have founded. His experience of and relation to language is then fundamentally different because there is already another language with which this, his second language, contrasts: both languages (and then others) come to be understood in terms of this contrast. Languages exist plurally, opening possibilities of thinking and an experience of the political to which the monolingual Odysseus has been blind.

This classic contrast that Cassin draws in the second and third chapters of her short book is followed by a fourth and final chapter in which Hannah Arendt’s exile from Germany and eventual settlement in New York is examined. The contrast between Odysseus and Aeneas, which constitutes the most powerful part of her argument, is then extended by a discussion of Hannah Arendt’s experience of exile. Some time after she had settled in the United States, Arendt was asked if she felt any nostalgia for the Germany in which she had spent the earlier years of her life. Her response was that she felt a kind of nostalgia not for Germany but for German. Her friend, the poet Randall Jarrell, quipped: “The country I like best of all is German” (Jarrell, quoted in Cassin, 2016, p. 56). As a mark of this perhaps, she never lost the heavy German intonation in the English she came to speak every day. Pluralism was alive in her experience, as in her politics, as is clearly evident in her writings.

It is worth reflecting on the further contrast that this then prompts, between her own thinking and that of Martin Heidegger. This is a contrast that in some ways
can be mapped onto the one already established between Odysseus and Aeneas, and so in this context it has added potency. Heidegger was obviously so profound an influence on Arendt, and yet the pluralism of her developing thought surely escaped him. He had paid much attention to the thought of Ancient Greece, and it would be wrong to suggest that his interest in other cultures ended there: his attitude to what he knew of East Asian thinking was almost one of homage (and he borrowed liberally from its ideas), but this was not without a certain exoticisation and mystification. This is demonstrated especially in his “A Dialogue on Language” (Heidegger, 1971). In this text, the two men in dialogue are identified mysteriously as “A Japanese” and “An Inquirer”, the latter bearing a remarkable resemblance to Heidegger himself. The Inquirer comments on the mystery and unfathomability of the Japanese way of thinking, and attention is given to the untranslatability of essential ideas, especially concerning language. But the Inquirer fawns before the Japanese, revealing, inadvertently, so it seems, that he at least has understood something. But this failure of humility, its collapse into hubris, betokens an inability to countenance the alterity that would open the way for a plural politics and philosophy.

Heidegger provides a powerful vision of language and thought as in decline from time of the Ancient Greeks. This is a debilitation that is accelerated with the shift from Greek to Latin, with logos now divided as ratio and verbum, and with the dynamism of Greek metaphysics, as reflected in its vocabulary, arrested by the more static connotations of the corresponding Latin terms. The fluid gathering and way-making of thought in logos gives way to an idealisation of thought: dynamism is displaced by stasis, figured sometimes as origin, sometimes as telos — whether in Platonism or Russell’s theory of descriptions. Yet, for all the richness of Heidegger’s understanding of language, his thinking hankers after an origin; it is haunted by the idea of an arche, as his reaching back towards still earlier German or Greek sources indicates.

A century ago, Esperanto was the linguistic accomplice of this degenerate metaphysics. Evidently, the possibility of such a universal language was attractive to Carnap; yet now the very idea surely seems faintly ludicrous. There is a sense, however, in which a new possibility of a universal language is materialising in the form of the hegemony of English. This universalisation has come about less as a unified and self-conscious project than by default. The English that now takes centre-stage as the lingua franca is by no means equivalent to Esperanto, but it is a depleted language in important respects. In fact, the international language is not
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English but English-as-a-Second-Language. This is not a snub to non-native speakers of the language, who may well be highly technically proficient. The point is rather than the language in question is severed from the the language with which most of its speakers grew up. It is severed from the language of intimacy and from the mother tongue. In many circumstances — say, where the focus of concern is on primarily technical matters, and where a common vocabulary is readily shared — this may be of little consequence, but in thinking in the humanities and the social sciences, it is likely to be of considerable importance. The lack of connection with the language of intimacy is likely to propel a technicisation of the forms of discourse current in those forms of enquiry. There may be a further danger related to this. This is that there are ways in which English, for all its unquestionable richness as a language in many respects, is particularly vulnerable to technicisation. Consider, for example, its familiar and somewhat stubborn ordering of subject-verb-object. Consider its lack of a middle voice, its limitatoins when it comes to constructing new words and phrases. And consider how these tendencies may be accentuated in the words of speakers already committed to what they see as technical purposes.

Of course where English is hegemonic in this way, the native speaker enjoys an advantage in certain respects — especially in academic circumstances where there is competition over getting published. But that advantage comes also with a kind of complacency: for many native speakers there will be little practical point in learning a foreign language because so often the non-native speakers encountered will have a command of English that outstrips whatever foreign language the native speaker might attempt. But if the argument advanced above is right, then those who operate in contexts that require them to speak a language that is not their own are compelled to exercise and develop their judgement continually, around problematic key terms and in the course of the everyday. That exercise of judgment, where no rule applies, where systems of thinking are not fully commensurable, is in fact exemplary for judgement in our wider practical lives — which is to say it is relevant to our moral experience. This is to recognise in the monolingual person limitations of which they may be unaware. Judgement of this kind — between incommensurables, and where each move opens new paths for thought — extends to the most important matters in our lives. It involves an exercise of thought to which the monolingual person may be morally blind.
References


II. Philosophy and Translation
Times of the Signs:
translation proper as an analogy for modernity’s semiosis

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Abstract: This paper examines Roman Jakobson’s distinction between three kinds of translations involved in the interpretation of verbal signs: rewording, translation proper, and transmutation. What is revealing here is that Jakobson uses the word “translation” as both the set of all interpretive acts and as one type of interpretative act. This is because, I will argue, there is something about “translation proper” that makes it the most suitable analogy for describing what goes on in the act of semiotic interpretation. Unlike rewording and transmutation, translation does not express sameness or difference, but works through the transformation of signs in a realm that can only be described ultimately as empty and beyond sameness and difference. However, the notion of translation (proper) as the most appropriate analogy for interpreting linguistic signs is a modern one, being based as it is on the idea that signs in the past are equal to our own (there are no sacred sages in modernity) and the key to knowledge is translating the world as it presents itself to us from our own standpoint in a stable present moment.

Modernity and the hailing of translation proper that goes with it, has been attacked for masking unequal representations and for avoiding the real issues that confront translation proper in the act of interpreting texts. These charges are valid, helpful, but not detrimental. A further argument is that translation proper is impossible because signs leak into one another across languages and texts, and so are never really proper to begin with. However, this argument ignores that to interpret a sign, no matter how plural it may be in meaning, means always for a moment to take a singular standpoint. Translation proper provides coherence to all pluralities.

1. The two understandings of translation
Roman Jakobson states that “the meaning of any linguistic sign is its translation into some further, alternative sign. . . ”.¹ This translation can take three forms which Jakobson labels as: intralingual translation (“rewording”), interlingual translation (“translation proper”), and intersemiotic translation (“transmutation”). These “three kinds of translation” explicitly “distinguish three ways of interpreting a verbal sign”. What is noteworthy here is the fact that Jakobson has used the same term “translation” to describe two different things: (a) the interpretation of a verbal sign and its transformation into another sign, and (b) translating between two mutually incomprehensible natural languages (“translation proper”).

It is essential to point out at this stage, as strongly emphasized by Umberto Eco in his book *Experiences in Translation*, that the use of translation in both cases should be seen as effectively analogous, and that “he does not say that interpreting and translating are always the same operation”.² However, what is important here is Jakobson’s decision to compare the meaning of a sign to translation proper, and not to the alternatives: rewording or transmutation. The analogy works when the assumption is made that understanding a sign and translating between languages are one and the same phenomenon, the latter being merely the most intense and most complete example of the former. In other words, translation between languages is the exemplar, the ideal form of all semiotic processes. It is the mold, the standard, the model from which all other semiotic processes compare themselves and describe themselves.

To understand the special status of “translation proper” in the fuller schema of all semiosis as translation, let us compare it to the other forms of translation (intralingual and intersemiotic) that Jakobson has mentioned. First of all, with intralingual translation there is a certain sameness between the original sign and its transformation. When we reword “dog” as “canine” we are still in the same verbal sign system (in this case, the English language). The sameness between both words is more marked than their difference. To mark their difference an effort must be made by the user of the sign system. The sameness is natural and given (“‘dog’ means ‘canine’”). The difference involves further thinking, further interpretation (“but ‘canine’ has a different nuance to ‘dog’”). On the other hand, a transmutation marks difference more than sameness. In terms of sign systems, there is nothing in common between source and target sign. For example, the word “dog” is just three circles with extra lines when seen as a picture and the picture of the dog is illegible

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when read as letters. To describe the sameness between the two it is necessary, again, for the interpreter of the new sign to think further about the (intersemiotic) translation. In other words, it is necessary to involve something exterior to the sign systems the words and the pictures are part of because on their own, without outside intervention, both systems are utterly alien and different to one another. Intralingual translation strives to make a difference between signs that are fundamentally the same (“dog” and “canine”), whereas intersemiotic translation strives to find the sameness between signs that are fundamentally different (the word “dog” and a picture of a dog).

Where does translation proper fit into this scenario? Is it about sameness or difference? It would be nice to describe it as the happy medium between the two but this would be to miss the radical nature of translation, the characteristic that makes it the purest analogy for human linguistic understanding at its core. For with translation there is no ‘medium’. Translation works at that point where sameness and difference disappear into a zero point of pure empty form. When “dog” is translated as “犬” there is no sameness or difference between these signs. Instead there has been a complete shift between sign-systems to the extent that neither system overlaps. Both systems are standalone isolates. Either system (that of the source text or the target text) could disappear and be forever unknown, and the meaning would still remain (This is not the case in transmutation). Any external connections being made between both systems simply become further systems and further translations which are themselves isolates. Connections between the source sign and target sign in translation can only be made within the realm of non-signifiicable emptiness, and hence cannot be made at all.

In this way, it is translation proper, and not the other kinds of translation, that demonstrates the bizarre human capacity to completely switch systems of signs while still meaning the same thing. The ‘same thing’ cannot be pointed at (i.e. signified), as this involves a further switch, a further translation. The ‘same thing’, that which a translation preserves, is formless and empty. That is to say, it cannot be given form and still be the same translation. And it is this signification through formlessness that makes translation the ultimate ‘signifier’ of all signification. This is why translation proper is the purest exemplar of all semiotic translations.

To make the same point but with a different concrete explanation, let me ask again what is the difference between rewording and transmutation, on the one hand, and translation proper on the other? The essential answer is that reworded and transmuted texts still need the existence of the source signs to be fully interpretable.
In other words, if I reword the word “dog” as “canine” I still need to have these two words in my text (otherwise the text will not be an intralingual translation but merely a new original text). Similarly, if I have the word “dog” and draw a picture of it, there needs to be some understanding that the picture is referring to or being informed by the word “dog” (otherwise it is simply an isolated and original picture of a dog). However, for me to translate “dog” as “犬” also means for me to erase the word “dog” and have this new word “犬” in its place (otherwise the text is not a translation but a multilingual rewording). Translation proper means that the new sign is utterly independent, textually, from the sign from which it was interpreted.

To explain again from yet another angle, rewording involves the growth of a text in time (new words are added, the text becomes longer to read) and transmutation involves the growth of a text in space (illustrations are added to a text, or an explanation is added to an illustration). However, translation proper, when done properly, is transcendent of time and space. It appears as a sign with its own interpretability unmoored, once it has appeared, to any other signs. Of course the objection could arise that, for example, a graded reader version of a classic novel in the same language is a standalone text which is no longer dependent on the original. Similarly a manga transmutation of a novel is an isolate. However, a graded reader is an impoverished version of the original, and a manga adaptation is an irreversible change (one cannot draw the original novel back into existence). Translation proper, when proper (which, of course is an ideal), will always mean that no impoverishment has occurred in the move from source to target text, and that both source and target texts can reproduce each other through reverse operations (back translations). Neither rewording nor transmutation can make these claims.

2. The modern discovery of translation

Jakobson’s description of translation, to repeat, makes it both the set of all semiotic processes and one element in this set. As such translation is both the universalization of the particular and the particularization of the universal. Proper translation exemplifies what happens in all translations, and all translations are like translation proper. But is the evocation of translation proper as the signifier for all signification something historical and contingent? In other circumstances, could one of the other forms of translation be seen as the dominant analogy? In another vision of semiotics from another time in history, could we be talking about how, to borrow (and distort)
Jakobson’s words again, the meaning of any linguistic sign is its transmutation into some further, alternative sign?

Here I wish to argue that, indeed, the primacy of translation is something that has emerged in history and is consistent with the rise of modernity. If we look at translation proper in pre-modern history it tended to be a hidden and underemphasized activity. It is not that translation did not happen but that it was a more fluid exercise tending to be either sporadic and unsystematic or something that was let veer into the other categories of interpretation that stand between pure rewording and pure translation.

For example, David Bellos, in his well-received book on translation entitled *Is that a Fish in your Ear?*, uses the example of Christopher Columbus to illustrate the non-systematic nature of translation in pre-modernity. He describes how Columbus could operate in a variety of languages, orally and in writing. Bellos comments:

How many languages did Columbus know when he sailed the ocean in 1492? As in today’s India, where a degree of intercomprehensibility exists among several of its languages, the answer would be somewhat arbitrary. It’s unlikely Columbus even conceptualized Italian, Castilian, or Portuguese as distinct languages, for they did not yet have any grammar books. He was a learned man in being able to read and write the three ancient tongues. But beyond that, he was just a Mediterranean sailor, speaking whatever variety of language that he needed to do his job.3

The point to note here is that where one language began and one ended was quite vague in those eras prior to modern nationalism and the standardization of vernacular languages that came with it. As such, translation proper would not have been done in any proper systematic sense. What is also noteworthy is the fact that being learned was coterminal to being versed in chosen ancient tongues. Translation’s role in the world of learning in this context was that of a tool in the emulation of ancient texts in their own languages, not as a means to present old texts in vernacular language. Ruth Copeland in her book *Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation in the Middle Ages* points out the secondary status of translation in the primary goal of understanding ancient texts in their ancient languages. She comments: “Within grammatical study, translation was considered to be a special

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3 Bellos, *Is That a Fish in Your Ear?*, 5.
aspect of textual commentary; within rhetorical study, translation was seen as a special form of imitation”.4

Similarly in Japan the ancient texts were in Chinese and the tradition was to keep them that way. Maruyama Masao points out how it was Ogyu Sorai, the reforming Edo period scholar, who first made the “discovery” that the ancient classics of China were being experienced as translations, a discovery that was only obvious after the fact. Maruyama commented:

What I think is great about Ogyu Sorai is that, with the long relationship Japan had with China, the intellectual class at least anyway could read and write classical Chinese, as though they had been completely educated in the Chinese classics. With that, Sorai makes the astonishing declaration that “the ‘Analects of Confucius’ and ‘Discourses of Mencius’ that we read are written in a foreign language. We have been reading them just as translations from long ago”. It was what they call a Columbus’ egg situation. [My translation]5

The denigration of translation in premodernity was, I would argue, very much in keeping with certain basic assumptions that informed the premodern world. Foremost, was the assumption that earlier and later times were not equal. In the premodern world earlier times were more sacred or pure or sagacious. The consequences being that semiosis, the translation of signs into each other, tended to be temporally and spatially asymmetrical. The signs of the ancient texts were more pure than that of any vulgar vernacular translation. In other words, contrary to my earlier description above, translation proper was not to be seen as beyond space and time (i.e. a symmetrical shift in sign systems that are isolates but equals) but an inherent transmutation where that mutation was a profane distortion of a sacred original.

A common view was that the readership history of a sacred text is the history of its constant degradation and obscurcation. The sagacity of the ancient Sages could only ever be viewed through the foggy glimpse of a pure past that recedes ever

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4 Copeland, 10.
5 「ぼくが荻生徂徠は偉いとおもったのは、日本が中国と長い関係にあって、少なくとも知識階級は漢文は読めるし、書くし、中国古典をすっかり自分の教養にしたつもりになっていた。そこへ徂徠は、「われわれの読んでいる『論語』、『孟子』というのは外国語で書かれている。われわれは昔から翻訳でよんでいるだけだ」と爆弾宣言をした。これはいわばコロンバスの卵です。」丸山真男、加藤周一『翻訳と日本の近代』, 24.
further into the dim mists of time. Part of Fukuzawa Yukichi’s modernization program, indeed, was to highlight and attack this premodern assumption. In *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization* he points out that for the premodern Japanese:

All they could do was lament that their learning fell far short of the sages of old. Therefore, the longer the Way of the sages is transmitted to men of later generations, the more impoverished it becomes. With the passage of time it reduces man’s knowledge and virtue while increasing the number of evil and ignorant people. Since the Way has been transmitted from generation to generation until our own degenerate times, it can be shown by calculation that the world has already gone to the dogs.⁶

One plank of Fukuzawa’s modernization project was to reverse this assumption and introduce the more positivist perspective that knowledge is something to be gained through discovery of the new, not the old, and is something that increases and improves with the passage of time, and not the opposite, as had been assumed. To discover new knowledge one must signify it. To signify it, one must translate it. And thus for Fukuzawa translation was a potent engine for driving forth the modernization of Japan. The point was not to replace Chinese classics with Western ones but to translate what was to be known into one’s own language without any sense of self-disqualification. As Yanabu Akira comments: “Fukuzawa, whilst seeing fully the advanced nature of Western civilization, also always commenced from words that were alive in the reality of Japan. From this point, he constructed words, seeking to open up the perspective of civilization”. [My translation]⁷

One way of understanding the transformation from pre-modernity to modernity is to borrow Karatani Kojin’s notion in *The Origins of Modern Japanese Literature* of an “inversion of a semiotic constellation”. For Karatani, it seems, much of what we take for granted in modernity, such as the existence of realistic landscapes to be painted, or inner selves to be expressed in writing, are discoveries derived from a new semiotic constellation that sees a singularity and homogeneity in our representations of the world. For instance, whereas pre-modernity allowed for kanji to enjoy figurative value and beauty in their own right and a defiance of

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⁷ 「…福沢は、西洋文明の先進性を十分認めながら、他方、いつでも日本の現実に生きていることばから出発して、そこからことばを組み立て、その彼方に文明の展望を開こうとしていたのである。」柳父章『翻訳成立事情』, 38.
standard transcriptions, modernity and its inverted semiotic constellation “requires the repression of the signification, or figurative language (Chinese characters) that precedes ‘things’, as well as the existence of a language that is supposedly transparent”. Modernity, if we are to bundle together Karatani’s various examples, seems to be about seeing an equality between the signs of the world out there (the world in modernity has “a homogenous sense of space, a bourgeois society”) which means that the value signs must have to be read and intelligible dwell within the interpreter. With this new found status ascribed to the interpreter comes, I would argue, a new found respect for translation proper. For it is translation proper that reveals most ideally how meaning and interpretation can move between interpreters in a world where signs no longer enjoy the hierarchies figurative usage can grant.

Modernity did not bring the invention of translation and of course translation had always existed. Rather, modernity revalued translation. In the modern world, languages are no longer vernacular unwritten dialects that fade into one another as one goes from village to village. Instead, they are clearly defined, separate, standalone, standard languages that straddle entire nations ensuring that the farmers in the villages and the literati in the cities all know what language they speak and what language they do not. In such a world, a translator’s services are easier to peddle and to bill. Similarly, the modern world holds no languages, ancient or otherwise, to be sacred. Translation can move freely between all tongues in this age of equality, reason, and discovery.

Borrowing Karl Mannheim’s insights, we can suggest that modernity has produced two broad styles of thought: Enlightenment and Romanticism. Very generally speaking, Enlightenment thought, which values individualism and rationalism, embraces the modernity project uncritically while Romanticist thought offers a critique of and reaction to modernity through the espousal of group consciousness and the acceptance of alternative non-rational visions. This dichotomy can be seen accordingly in the two main trends in modern translation theory: domesticating French belle infidèle and foreignizing German romanticism. The difference can be summarized through Friedrich Schleiermacher’s description

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8 Karatani, Origins of Modern Japanese Literature, 61. Karatani, in fact, discusses the influence translation had on Meiji writers (who were also often translators), in particular Futabatei Shimei, and describes how they found new voices, genres and styles as they engaged and reflected on their own translation work. This was in contrast to the early Meiji period when translations tended to be rough adaptations. See 『日本近代学の起源』, 86–95.
9 Karatani, 62–3.
10 Mannheim, “Essays on sociology and social psychology”
of translation strategies as being either that which brings the writer to the reader (domestication) or that which brings the reader to the writer (foreignization).\footnote{Schleiermacher, “On the Different Methods of Translating”, 42.}

A domesticating strategy with its emphasis on the reader as an ahistorical individual liberated through membership of a standard language community is very much a part of the Enlightenment mode of thought: the national polity is a contract to protect individual liberty, the national language is a tool to allow individual free expression (and each national language is as good as the other for doing this), and translation is a device to facilitate the enjoyment of world literatures by individuals unhindered by the prescriptive restrictions of collective tradition or cultural affiliations. By contrast, foreignizing strategies are justified through a Romanticist prism. There are no individuals, only collective cultural groupings with their own self-contained semiotic modes. The national polity is strong through collective bonds of nationalist identity which can be broken when the outside world starts to become too homogenized and too transparent. Foreignizing builds differences with the other outside hence strengthening the unity within.

Whilst Romanticism, with its cravings for opacity, may seem like a rejection of modernity, it nevertheless is founded on the same principle as that of Enlightenment modes of thought: that national languages come in unified standard self-contained packages. As such, Romanticism, even in its embracement of foreignizing translation strategies, is always still working within the assumption that interlingual translation is translation proper. Romanticism, whether it be to do with translation, literature, art, or politics, was always too wedded to notions of standardized non-plural national identities to ever fully break free of modernity.

3. The always final standpoint of translation

Modernity, of course, has its critics. And so too does translation when presented in its modern guise, as the equal shift of signification between languages under the rules of universal equivalence. Those who want to go beyond modernity to the posture and condition of post-modernity (which here includes post-colonialism), when they turn their attention to translation, seek to uncover the hidden violence and inequalities that occur with translation proper and its singular obsession with equivalence. Translation proper may occur on a plane of equal signs but it plows on mercilessly according to hidden social power vectors. On three grounds in particular
post-modernity attacks translation proper: (1) its improprieties (2) its impotencies, and (3) its impositions.

First of all, there is the fact that translation takes place in the context of real power relations to the extent that translation will often be an instrument in the subjugation of one language group by another.\textsuperscript{12} This is all true and needs to be taken into account when surveying the role and function of translation. The modern view that translation bridges cultures and brings people together needs to be asserted with less naivety. However, this postmodern view of translation does not truly go beyond modernity. Translation proper is still a neutral act in itself. It is its application and social circumstances that is controversial. Besides, one can make the counter claim that translation proper has the potential to keep alive marginalized languages and cultures as much as it has the power to destroy them.

A second criticism is that translation proper is rare. So rare, indeed, that one can wonder whether translation proper is really the proper instrument for dealing with most acts of semiosis, as they have existed in history or as they will appear in our coming future of postmodern multimedia hyper-semiotic fragmentation. Having a clear source text from which to produce a clear target text is a situation that does not truly describe the world of translation where we find such constant cases of translation-defying texts such as speech acts and genre specific lexical formulae. The translation of salutations, knock-knock jokes, or Zen koans, to give some examples, entails ripping the word-signs of the source text from social norms and genre expectations that do not exist in the target text context. Similarly, texts often work through a multitude of sign-systems: modern poetry written in wild fonts, text messages with symbols and graphics, movies with culturally specific body-gestures. This is all true of course, but what such complications reveal is how translation proper can only work truly properly with texts that are rewordable in their own language (note, for example, how knock-knock jokes cannot be reworded in English)\textsuperscript{13} or texts that are purely words without other sign systems interfering (such as illustrations or smiley icons). In other words, the original schemata that

\textsuperscript{12} As Niranjana describes it: “Translation thus produces strategies of containment. By employing certain modes of representing the other — which it thereby also brings into being — translation reinforces hegemonic versions of the colonized, helping them acquire the status of what Edward Said calls representations, or objects without history.” See Tejaswini Niranjana\textit{ Siting Translation}, 3.

translation proper is different to rewording or transmutation remains correct and is proven by the difficulties translation proper faces in the real world where many texts are not truly rewordable or devoid of ‘noise’ from other semiotic systems.

The final attack on modern notions of translation proper seeks not to complicate the picture but to reject it completely. This is the idea that the modern notion of translation as a neutral shift of signs is wrong and impossible. When “dog” is rendered “犬” this is not because the signs are equivalent and equal, but because an ideological violence has been committed. Assigning equivalence to both signs means to grant domination to one of the signs. Translation, when done properly, means implanting a new sign on an old one, like Columbus erasing an old world by pretending to himself that he had discovered a new one. Translation is not about equality (since it crushes a source sign), it is not about reason (since it destroys the alternative views and arguments of the other through hegemonic resignification), and it does not produce discoveries (since it destroys that which the source text sought to express).

Post-modernity’s solution to the violence of translation proper is to ensure that translation is always done improperly, that the erased source sign always has a chance to reemerge through the cracks in the improperly translated target text. An example is Jacque Derrida’s pondering over the phrase “he war” in James Joyce’s *Finnegans Wake*. He points out how the phrase suggests both doing “war” and he “was” (where “war” is a German verb). He notes how the phrase has already roughly translated itself and how it invites translation as much as it prohibits it. It is this kind of muddle, this mutation in the translation process that postmodernity would want us to make paradigmatic of all translation. These in-between cases are not the exception to the smooth rules of translation proper, but the pathologies that manifest the latent false delusions of a translation ever being proper. What Joyce’s “he war” makes explicit is the fact that all signs harbor within them a multitude of interpretations and when a translator choses one he or she has erased that multitude, creating the violent illusionary singularity of a target sign. In this account, perhaps, the analogy for interpreting a verbal sign is not translation but transmutation.

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14 Derrida, *Ulysse gramophone, deux mots pour Joyce*, 40. See also discussion in Benjamin, *Translation and the Nature of Philosophy*.

15 Derrida, in his article “Des Tours de Babel” explicitly attacks Jakobson’s analogy of translation proper for interpretation on the grounds that it is based on the notion of a transparency in the move between languages. The boundaries between languages are vague and leak into one another and analogies, themselves, (such as “Babel”) are language specific. Translation proper can have no proper universally translatable analogy. Derrida takes this
However, Umberto Eco has commented in depth on the issue of translating *Finnegans Wake* with all its “plurilingual” issues, noting that Joyce himself may have dabbled in translating his own work into Italian and French. Eco remarks:

The fact remains that *Finnegans Wake* is not even a plurilingual text: or, rather, it is, but from the standpoint of the English language. It is a plurilingual text written as an English-speaker conceived of one. It seems to me therefore that Joyce’s decision to translate himself was based on the idea of thinking of the target text (French or Italian) as a plurilingual text the way a French- or Italian-speaker might have conceived of one.\textsuperscript{16}

The essential point here is that *Finnegans Wake* is “from the standpoint of the English language”, focusing on the key word “standpoint”. What is being recognized here is that any text, to be a text (and not a random array of squiggles) must be based on an experience of intelligibility, of comprehension, of verbal signs decoded. Here, in fact we can reverse Jacobson’s analogy and say that it is not just that interpreting a verbal sign is like translation, but that translation is like interpreting a verbal sign. When we interpret a verbal sign we experience a moment of pure comprehension, otherwise our interpretation would not be coherent and, would be in essence, an act of non-comprehension. And as C.S. Pierce pointed out, when we interpret a sign, create an interpretant, this interpretant, stable as it is, will become a further sign.\textsuperscript{17}

Of course, this is the potentially eternal game of semiosis which creates the insecurities of meaning deferred and impossibilities of full comprehension of any texts that has haunted and obsessed the post-modern project. And yet all these insecurities, aporias, deferrals and erasions, are, like the plurilinguistics of *Finnegans Wake* built upon standpoints that are grounded in a present act of comprehension. In this way, translation proper, like interpreting a verbal sign, is not

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\textsuperscript{16} Eco, *Experiences in Translation*, 108.

\textsuperscript{17} This is explained in detail in Dinda L. Gorlée’s discussion of C.S. Pierce. See Gorlée, *Semiotics and the Problem of Translation*, 56 et passim.
about a lost past or a deferred future but is utterly in the present offering a comprehension that is at once from an unavoidable standpoint but, at the same time, productive of future potentialities for new perspectives. The deeper point is that whilst an act of interpretation is an act of seeing opposites (what is and what is not represented in a sign), it is also about uniting those opposites in a present act of singular comprehension. Post-modernity is correct to remind us that translation proper can only ever be one standpoint. But only one standpoint nevertheless will always be that point from which all the world, with all its pluralities and innate opposites forms itself for us, for our interpretation and from which we are both equally creators and discoverers. As Nishida Kitaro has written:

In the world as unity of opposites, moving from the formed towards the forming, past and future, negating each other, join in the present; the present, as a unity of opposites, has form, and moves, forming itself, from present to present. The world moves, as one single present, from the formed to the forming. The form of the present, as unity of opposites, is a style of the productivity of the world. This world is a world of poiesis.18

Translation is ultimately the analogy for how meaning in this world is ultimately formless but never without its sign. And how recognizing emptiness as not different to form and form as not different to emptiness remains a surprisingly modern standpoint.

Reference


18 Nishida Kitaro, Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness, 186.


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Special Theme: Philosophy and Translation
Philosophie als Übersetzung.
Heidegger übersetzt die *Nikomachische Ethik*

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**Abstract:** Martin Heidegger’s publication of *Being and Time* in 1927 is the watershed for Heidegger’s approach on translation: before 1927 he translated Aristoteles and other classics without a clear approach on translation. Following 1927 he started an explicit, although fragmentary, reflection on translation, restricting his remarks to single words such as φύσις, λόγος, χρεών, ἀλήθεια. This paper focuses on the first period of Heidegger’s production and I will show that in order to understand his philosophical gestures during the twenties translation is a good indicator. I will limit my analyses on his engagement with Aristotle and on his translations of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, especially of some excerpts from the Book VI concerning the “dianoetic virtues”. Heidegger’s translational relation with Aristotle and the philosophical tradition is characterized by retrospection and destruction (Destruktion), where translation reactivates the vigour of the elementary philosophical words. Furthermore, in his translations of the *Nicomachean Ethics* Heidegger elaborates some crucial aspects of his early philosophical position: e.g. understanding truth as unconcealment (ἀλήθεια), the human being (Dasein) as prior condition for this unconcealing, the ontologisation of the Dasein which finds his unitary grounding in temporality. In conclusion, the work on Aristotle produces also the structure of *Being and Time*, which appears as Heidegger’s translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

Die Hypothese, von der diese Arbeit ausgeht, lautet, dass die Übersetzung der Lackmustest ist, um die Besonderheiten von Heideggers philosophischer Geste in den zwanziger Jahren zu offenbaren.

In der Phase seines Denkens vor der Veröffentlichung von *Sein und Zeit* (1927) übersetzt Heidegger viel und nur selten verweilt er ausdrücklich bei Überlegungen zur Praxis des Übersetzens. Nach 1927 ändert sich dies: Die
Bemerkungen zur Übersetzung werden immer zahlreicher und seine Übersetzungspraxis fokussiert auf einzelne Wörter.


An dieser bestimmten Auseinandersetzungsstelle extrapoliert Heidegger aus dem aristotelischem Text entscheidende Themen seiner philosophischen Perspektive: das menschliche Dasein als Ort der „Wahrheit“ und die Ontologisierung des Daseins, das in der Zeitlichkeit seine einheitliche Grundlage findet.


1. Die Tradition: Retrospektion und Destruktion

Heidegger stellt die Analyse des sechsten Buchs der Nikomachischen Ethik als Einleitung dem Kurs zu Platons Sophistes voran und diese Einleitung nimmt

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ungefähr ein Drittel des Bandes ein. Warum? Heidegger antwortet mit einer Formel, die auf den ersten Blick möglicherweise befremdlich wirkt:

Wenn wir in die wirkliche philosophische Arbeit Platos eindringen wollen, dann müssen wir die Gewähr haben, daß wir von Anfang an den rechten Zugang nehmen, d. h. gerade auf das stoßen, was nicht da steht. Dazu bedarf es eines *Leitfadens*. Bisher ist es üblich, die platonische Philosophie in der Weise zu interpretieren, daß man von Sokrates und den Vorsokratikern zu Plato fortschreitet. Wir wollen den umgekehrten Weg einschlagen, von Aristoteles zu Plato zurück.²

Die Voraussetzung ist, dass Aristoteles Platon nicht nur verstanden hat, sondern dass er ihn besser verstanden hat als Platon sich selbst. Der beste Weg zu seinem philosophischen Denken kann also nicht direkt, sondern nur indirekt, retrospektiv, sekundär sein. Bei der reflektierenden Rückschau auf Platon mittels Aristoteles hegt Heidegger die Absicht, sich die griechische Haltung zu eigen zu machen, den ursprünglichen griechischen Sinnhorizont zu gewinnen, der zuerst von Aristoteles und danach von der aus ihm entspringenden Tradition verzerrt wurde und der heute auch denen fremd erscheint, die zu dieser Tradition gehören.

Die Aneignung der Vergangenheit dient Heidegger in dieser Phase dazu, die Grundlage seines eigenen Diskurses zu schaffen, und das Verständnis der geschichtlichen Dimension ist ein Sollen: „Die Geschichte verstehen kann nichts anderes besagen, als uns selbst zu verstehen, nicht in dem Sinne, daß wir konstatieren können, wie es mit uns steht, sondern daß wir erfahren, was wir sollen“.³

Der Ausgangspunkt jeder Untersuchung ist also die Tradition, in der wir eingetaucht sind und die uns überliefert wurde; unsere Arbeit besteht darin, rückwärtszugraben bis zu jenen „ursprünglichen Erfahrungen“,⁴ bis zu jenen „ursprünglichen Motivquellen oder Grunderfahrungsmöglichkeiten“,⁵ die die philosophische Erfahrung und damit die Tradition eröffnen.

³ Ebd.
⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Ausarbeitung für die Marburger und Göttinger Philosophische Fakultät (1922)* (Frankfurt am Main: Reclam, 2002), 34–35.
Das ist die Aufgabe, die beginnend mit dem Natorp-Bericht bis hin zu Sein und Zeit der „Destruktion“ übertragen wird, die auf zwei verschiedenen Wegen die Tradition bearbeitet: die direkte Auseinandersetzung mit ihren entscheidenden Momenten, um ihre spezifischen Voraussetzungen herauszufinden, und die Neufassung des terminologisch-begrifflichen Wortschatzes der philosophischen Sprache. Auf beiden Wegen ist die Destruktion Übersetzung. Parmenides, Platon, Aristoteles, Augustinus, Thomas von Aquin und Descartes erscheinen in griechischer oder lateinischer Sprache, begleitet von Heideggers Version, das Deutsche (von Kant und von Hegel) wird hingegen ständig durch eine sogenannte innersprachliche Übersetzung neu formuliert.\(^6\)

Gleichwohl ist es am Ende das Geschäft der Philosophie, die Kraft der elementarsten Worte, in denen sich das Dasein ausspricht, davor zu bewahren, daß sie durch den gemeinen Verstand zur Unverständlichkeit nivelliert werden, die ihrerseits als Quelle für Scheinprobleme fungiert.\(^7\)

Schon auf diesem Niveau wird klar, dass die Übersetzung keine sekundäre Tätigkeit sein kann, oder besser gesagt: Wenn sie sekundär ist, dann nicht im Sinne von Beiwerk, sondern weil die Nachträglichkeit ein Merkmal des Philosophierens ist. Jede Philosophie ist tatsächlich immer in einen vorbestimmten Horizont eingetaucht, unvermeidlich weit von ihrer Quelle entfernt, aber stets auf sie bezogen.

2. Die Ontologisierung der Frage nach der Wahrheit

Die Destruktion des philosophischen Erbes geht von der Frage nach der Wahrheit aus.

Schon im Natorp-Bericht hatte die destruktive Übersetzung das aristotelische ἀληθεύειν vom erworbenen logisch-gnoseologischen Belag befreit. Von dem von

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\(^7\) Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 220.
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der Tradition bestimmten Horizont aus springt Heidegger rückwärts, er entfernt sich
von der überlieferten Ausrichtung, um diese Überlieferung von außen zu betrachten.

Er geht von dem aristotelischen Wort als Spur aus, um die griechische
Denkweise zu rekonstruieren, wagt eine Darlegung der Bedeutung, in der sich diese
Spur abgesetzt hat. Wenn man also absichtlich vergisst, was man gelernt hat, und die
stets wiederholten Interpretationsschemata beseitigt, erstrahlt die aristotelische Spur
in neuem Glanz. Und sie deutet an, dass die Welt für die Griechen verschleiert und
verborgen ist.

Wenn das Wort „Wahrheit“ auf seiner Reise durch die Jahrhunderte von der
Römerzeit bis zu unserer Zeit zermürbt wurde, ist es notwendig, ἀληθεύειν anders
to formulieren. Die Stelle, die Heidegger ausgesucht hat, um das griechischen
ἀληθεύειν neu zu übersetzen, findet sich nicht im Organon, sondern im sechsten
Buch der Nikomachischen Ethik. Das sind die von Heidegger vorgeschlagenen
Formulierungen:
− Natorp-Bericht: „Seiendes als Unverhülltes in Verwahrung bringen[en] und
nehmen[en]“;8
− Kurs Platon: Sophistes: „das Seiende erschließen[en]“,9
− Sein und Zeit: „das Seiende […] aus seiner Verborgenheit herausnehmen
und es als Unverborgenes (ἀληθές) sehen lassen, entdecken“.10

Die grundsätzliche Perspektive bleibt dieselbe: Das Sein ist geschlossen,
bedeckt, verschleiert und die Bewegung des ἀληθεύειν ist ein Hervorbringen, ein
Das-Seiende-sehen-Lassen. Was sich aber im Laufe der Jahre ändert, ist das
Gewicht, das diese Grunderfahrung in Heideggers Diskurs gewinnt. Während im
Natorp-Bericht die Übersetzung dieses aristotelischen Passus eines von mehreren
Beispielen der zu erklärenden phänomenologischen Methode zu sein scheint, wird
die Analyse von ἀληθεύειν im Kurs zum Sophistes sowohl methodologisch als auch
thematisch zu einer unentbehrlichen Voraussetzung, um Platon zu verstehen. In Sein
und Zeit wird die Übersetzung des Begriffs „Wahrheit“ dann entscheidend für die
menschliche Möglichkeit, sich selbst zu verstehen. An Gewicht gewinnt immer
mehr die Rolle dessen, der entdeckt: die aristotelische ψυχή, die Seele im
Natorp-Bericht, das menschliche Dasein im Kurs zum Sophistes.11

8 Heidegger, Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles, 46.
9 Heidegger, Platon: Sophistes, 21.
10 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 33.
11 Ein proleptischer Exkurs über Heideggers Auslegung der aristotelischen ψυχή findet sich
z. B. in Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1996) 52.

3. Die zeitliche Grundlage der Ontologie

Aristoteles verzeichnet fünf Arten, auf die der Mensch das Seiende entdeckt, und diese Arten entsprechen traditionsgemäß den „dianoetischen Tugenden“, die aber in dieser Bedeutung für Heidegger „Nachklang alter Einstellung!“ sind.12

Im Mittelpunkt des sechsten Buchs der Nikomachischen Ethik steht die Diskussion über die Arten des ἀληθεύειν und besonders über deren Hierarchie. Diese richtet sich laut Aristoteles nach zwei Kriterien: nach dem Sein des Seienden, das sich durch sie erschließt, und nach ihrer Fähigkeit, die ἀρχή dieses Seienden zu offenbaren. Hier Heideggers Übersetzung des Passus, wo dieser methodologische Hinweis gegeben wird:

πρὸς γὰρ τὰ τὸ γένει ἐτερα καὶ τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἐτερον τὸ γένει τὸ πρὸς ἐκάτερον περικός (1139a8 sqq.)

[…] dann muß gegenüber der Verschiedenheit des Seienden auch jede Weise des seelischen Verhaltens — des Aufdeckens — seiner Seinsstruktur nach anders sein mit Bezug auf das jeweilige Seiende.13

Zu beachten ist, dass Heidegger hier nicht so sehr die Seinsstruktur des Seienden explizit macht, sondern vielmehr die Struktur der Seele desjenigen, der aufdeckt, dass er von Mal zu Mal anders involviert wird, je nach Art des Seienden. Für Aristoteles gibt es grundsätzlich zwei Arten davon: es gibt Seiende, die anders sein können als sie sind, und andere, die es nicht können. Diese Letzten sind notwendig also ewig. Gerade das zeitliche Merkmal und zwar die von Aristoteles vorausgesetzte Zeitlichkeit der Seienden betont Heidegger am stärksten in seiner Übersetzung der Wortfamilie um ἀδιότον. Mehr als „immer“ heißt ἀεὶ „immerwährend“, „stets“, „was nie unterbrochen ist“.14 Der Aspekt der Zeitlichkeit,

12 Heideggers handschriftlicher Zusatz in Heidegger, Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles, 45.
14 Ebd., 33.
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der hier in der Übersetzung radikalisiert wird, ist die Dauer, die Beständigkeit in der Präsenz, die in der Übersetzung von \( \alpha\iota\omega\nu \) mit Anwesenheit gipfelt. Heidegger betont außerdem, dass nicht nur das Seiende ausgehend von seiner Zeitlichkeit in seiner ontologischen Besonderheit verstanden wurde, sondern auch die \( \dot{\alpha}\rho\jchi\alpha \) als etwas, das schon immer ist, zeitlich ausgelegt wurden. Der implizite Inhalt des aristotelischen Diskurses, der die Voraussetzung der Tradition bildet, ist die Auffassung des Seienden als Anwesenheit. Heideggers Übersetzung macht diese Voraussetzung explizit und erlaubt eine weitere Klärung: Wenn das Sein als Anwesenheit verstanden wird, ist die Gegenwart die privilegierte zeitliche Dimension.  

Die vorstehenden Ausführungen zum Verständnis des Seins als Anwesenheit erleichtern es uns, den Vorrang zu verstehen, den Aristoteles gegenüber anderen Formen des Entschleierns der \( \sigma\omicron\omicron\iota\alpha \) einräumt. Diese äußert sich in der theoretischen Haltung reiner, autonomer Kontemplation der ewigen Seienden und von allen menschlichen Tätigkeiten ist sie die ranghöchste, die einem Sterblichen gewährt wird und die ihn Gott ähnlich macht. Dabei wird die theoretizistische Haltung eingenommen, die Heidegger in der Tradition erkennt.

Heideggers Übersetzung der aristotelischen Texte hat ermöglicht, zu erfassen und explizit zu machen, was in deren Standardübersetzungen implizit und vorausgesetzt blieb: 1) die ontologische Dimension als Grundlage der Differenzierung „dianoetischer Tugenden“, die ihrerseits zu Formen des das Seiende entdeckenden Daseins werden; 2) die Zurückführung der ontologischen zur zeitlichen Dimension; 3) das Verständnis des Seins als Anwesenheit, ausgehend von der zeitlichen Dimension der Welt.

Heideggers Übersetzung macht also die in der Tradition erstarrten Elemente des aristotelischen Textes explizit; er will sich von den Prämissen seines eigenen ererbten Horizonts distanzieren, der jetzt korrigiert und neu gegründet werden kann. Denn es ist durchaus möglich, dass Heidegger im aristotelischen Diskurs eine grundlegende Widersprüchlichkeit in der Struktur des \( \alpha\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\omega\epsilon\nu \) erkannt hat: Wenn der Mensch selbst die Welt enthüllt, wieso sollte er vom Seienden ontologisch bestimmt werden? Warum sollte die zeitliche Dimension des Lebens nach der Beständigkeit dieser Welt bemessen werden, wo doch das Leben ontisch und die Zeit vulgär betrachtet wird?

15 In den romanischen Sprachen ist der Zusammenklang von ontologischer Anwesenheit und Gegenwärtigkeit im Wort „presente/presenza“ (ital.) bzw. „présent/présence“ (frz.) noch deutlicher.

Der primäre Ort der Wahrheit ist also nicht der Satz, das Urteil oder die adaequatio zwischen Subjekt und Objekt, wie es die Tradition will, sondern das Dasein mit seiner Fähigkeit, das Verborgene zu enthüllen. Das Seiende zeigt sich nur, weil es sich uns zeigt, und ist also nur in einem abgeleiteten Sinne wahr. Die Grundlage des Seins in der Wahrheit des Daseins ist also seine Erschlossenheit, die wie das aristotelische ἀληθεύειν als erschlossen wie auch als erschließend zu verstehen ist. Das Dasein ist der Welt ausgesetzt, ist in ihr und gehört ihr als Erschlossenheit mit. Die Erschlossenheit gliedert sich in Heideggers Diskurs in drei Modi: Befindlichkeit, Verstehen und Rede.

Die Befindlichkeit stammt aus der Auseinandersetzung mit Aristoteles’ Rhetorik während des Sommersemesters 1924, in dem der Terminus Befindlichkeit διάθεσις übersetzt und Heidegger bei der Analyse der πάθη verwirrt, besonders beim φόβος. Man ist geneigt, im Verstehen die theoretische Haltung zu erkennen, da es sowohl im Natorp-Bericht als auch im Kurs zum Sophistes die σοφία übersetzt, aber es lässt sich schwer die praktische Funktion leugnen, die das Verstehen in Sein und Zeit durch die Dimension des Projekts übernimmt.

Die Rede, als Übersetzung des λόγος, spielt beim Enthüllen traditionsgemäß eine privilegierte Rolle und laut Heidegger lässt sie die Auslegung von der „Zuhandenheit“ zur „Vorhandenheit“ übergehen. Diese zwei Begriffe entsprechen nach Volpi der ποίησις bzw. der θεωρία und werden von Heidegger als Seinsweisen...
des Seienden behandelt. Der λόγος kann aber sowohl enthüllen als auch verdecken, wenn das Wort zu bloßer Meinung oder Gerede kristallisiert. Jede authentische philosophische Aktivität muss also der Dekadenz des veräußerlichten λόγος entgegentreten, um den λόγος zusammen mit den anderen Arten des Enthüllens in seiner eigenen Dimension zu behalten.

Heidegger setzt seine Arbeit an Aristoteles mit der Suche nach einer einheitlichen Grundlage der dreifachen Gliederung der Erschlossenheit (ἀληθεύειν) des Daseins fort und findet sie in der Sorge, die überraschenderweise im Incipit der Metaphysik als Heideggers Übersetzung des aristotelischen ὀρέγονται vorkommt:

πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει
Im Sein des Menschen liegt wesenhaft die Sorge des Sehens.

Heideggers Übersetzung der Nikomachischen Ethik wird aber ergänzt durch die weitere Suche nach der einheitlichen Grundlage der ontologischen Modi des Daseins, die Heidegger in seiner eigenen Zeitlichkeit ausfindig macht (Sein und Zeit, zweiter Abschnitt). Was zu seiner zeitlichen Dimension zurückgeführt wird, ist also nicht mehr das Sein des Seienden, sondern das Sein des Daseins, und man versteht es ausgehend von seiner eigenen Möglichkeit als Ganzsein, das heißt von seinem Tod (Kap. 1). Aus dieser Perspektive können dann die Begriffe des Gewissens und der Entschlossenheit, die die aristotelische φρόνησις bzw. die εὐβουλία übersetzen, neu ausgelegt werden. Das Gewissen bezieht sich also auf das Seiende, das anders sein kann, aber sein τέλος in sich selbst und in seinem Handeln hat: das menschliche Leben als Ganzes (Kap. 2).

Nachdem die einheitliche Grundlage des Lebens in

22 Vgl. §8 und §22 des Kurses zum Sophistes: „Die φρόνησις ist nichts anderes als das in Bewegung gesetzte Gewissen, das eine Handlung durchsichtig macht“. Heidegger, Platon: Sophistes, 56.

Unter Berufung auf das Sommersemester 1926 bringt Volpi hingegen die „Entschlossenheit“ mit der aristotelischen προαίρεσις in Zusammenhang, und diese Übereinstimmung findet sich auch im Kurs zum Sophistes: „Der Sophist entscheidet sich für


23 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 391.

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— Martin Heidegger, Identität und Differenz (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2006) 58 ff.
Translation and Seventeenth-Century Philosophy.
Some considerations of the impact of translation on British philosophy, with particular reference to Ralph Cudworth.

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Abstract: The seventeenth century was the period when philosophers abandoned Latin in favour of the vernacular as the language of philosophy. I draw on the notion of “cultural transfer” in order to highlight the role of translation in some of the conceptual developments in philosophy in this period. I illustrate this in the case of Ralph Cudworth (1617–1688), who was one of the first English philosophers to write entirely in the vernacular. I commence with a brief survey the period, from antiquity to the Renaissance when Latin was the language of philosophy. I then argue that the shift to the vernacular gave a new importance to translation as a means of philosophical communication. But this vernacular turn had its challenges. Whereas previously translation into the vernacular had been essential for reaching a lay audience, now translation into Latin became a necessity for intellectual exchange within the international philosophical community. Another challenge was how to develop a conceptual vocabulary where none had existed previously. I illustrate this with the example of Cudworth. I argue that translation from classical languages played a crucial creative role in his formulation of some of his most original philosophical ideas, in particular his concepts of consciousness and unconsciousness.

Introduction

Philosophy thrives on intellectual exchange. Intellectual exchange requires a common language, or, failing that, translation from one language to another. In this paper I consider the role of translation in philosophy from a historical perspective, by discussing philosophical translation and seventeenth-century British philosophy. The seventeenth century was the period which saw the transition from Latin to vernacular languages in philosophy throughout Europe, a process which might be called the “vernacular turn” in philosophy. I shall discuss the impact of translation
on early modern philosophy, by examining some of the first British philosophers to write in the vernacular. In so doing, I shall draw on the historical notion of “cultural transfer” which has been developed by historians to study intellectual and cultural relations. “Cultural transfer”, as opposed to mere exchange or circulation of ideas, is conceived a multi-directional process of interchange, which entails active participation of recipients, such that a change of context results in transformation through re-conception, re-interpretation and re-application of ideas. This is highlighted by attention to the means or “vectors” of transfer, as much as the elements transferred. Translation may be considered such a “vector”. I shall begin with an overview of translation in the history of European philosophy from antiquity to the Renaissance. After a survey of vernacular and Latin translations of English language philosophy, I shall consider the role of translation in some of the conceptual transformations in philosophy itself by means of a case study of one of the first philosophers to write solely in English, Ralph Cudworth, the philosopher who is credited with introducing the term “consciousness” into English philosophical terminology. By examining the relationship between vernacular and classical philosophical terminology in Cudworth’s philosophical vocabulary, I shall argue that translation plays a key part in Cudworth’s articulation of his philosophy of mind.

The Language of Philosophy from the Greeks and to the Renaissance:

Historically, in unbroken continuity from Roman times to the early modern period, the language of intellectual activity in Europe was Latin. Latin became the language of philosophy when the Romans learned philosophy from the Greeks: when the Roman statesman and lawyer, Marcus Tullius Cicero, consciously set out to emulate Greek philosophy using the Latin language — as he put it, to “teach philosophy to speak Latin” (Tusculan Disputations 2.3). ¹ Arguably, therefore, the Western European philosophical tradition originated through translation. This is registered in terminology we use today. The names of the branches of philosophy (physics, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics) derive from Greek via Latin. Much of our conceptual vocabulary, especially logic (e.g. syllogism, enthymeme, paradigm,

eudaimonia) is imported from Greek. Even the word “philosophy” comes from Greek. Other philosophical terms originate from Latin (e.g. cause, intellect, morality). In fact, most of the abstract terminology in the English language derives from Latin (e.g. rationality, abstraction, multiplication). Many of these terms enter philosophy as wholesale importations from Greek and Latin.

Thanks to the cultural importance of Rome from antiquity through the Middles Ages, Latin remained the common language of intellectual exchange, transforming from a vernacular which was common currency to all people, to becoming a specialist language used by educated people. As such it was a living language which developed to meet the needs of the specialists. Latin would become, as Guido Giglioni puts it, “a privileged medium that allowed a trans-national, trans-linguistic, and trans-cultural discussion and transmission of ideas”. Since philosophers had a common language, with an inherited conceptual vocabulary, translation was not a necessary pre-condition for philosophical interchange across linguistic borders. But this changes in the seventeenth century, with the shift to the vernacular as the medium of intellectual exchange. This vernacular turn affects philosophy no less than other fields of human learning. Although many seventeenth-century philosophers continued to write primarily or partly in Latin (e.g. Bacon, Descartes and Hobbes), the vernacular was used increasingly as the primary language for philosophy (e.g. by Locke and Malebranche), a development which gives translation an increasingly important role as a vector of intellectual interchange.

Philosophy in Latin: a Common Heritage

Ever since Roman times, philosophy and translation were integrally inter-related. Cicero’s successful transposition of philosophy from Greek into Latin, helped to make Latin the lingua franca of philosophy for several centuries, obviating the need for translation. Cicero’s coinages included many terms which have survived to this day: vacuum (void), qualitas (suchness), assensio (assent), individuum (atom). But Latin did not remain static. After the fall of the Roman Empire, it was not a “dead” language, because its continued use meant continual development. In philosophy, we

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Special Theme: Philosophy and Translation
see the emergence of the highly specialist technical vocabulary of medieval scholasticism. Nevertheless, translation continued to play a role: Latin philosophy was invigorated by two key sources which required translation. The first of these was the transmission of Aristotelian texts and commentaries from Arabic: Arabic translations of Aristotle, and the Latin translations of those works and their Arabic commentators. In this respect much of this medieval philosophy was indebted to translation. The second great age of philosophical translation was the Renaissance. This golden age of translation was made possible by the movement known as Humanism. The humanists took a new interest in the ancient past. In order to access the writings of ancient Greece and Rome, they developed new tools of scholarship, and set new standards for translation. In philosophy, the impact of humanism is most apparent in the humanist recovery of ancient Greek texts, many of which had been unknown in the Middle Ages. The most notable example is Marsilio Ficino’s translation of the entire Thrasyllan canon of the works of Plato, for which like Cicero before him, he had to find a suitable idiom in Latin. Prior to this Plato was known largely through a partial translation of his *Timaeus*. Other philosophers, notably Aristotle, were re-translated directly from the Greek. (e.g. Leonardo Bruni’s translations of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*). Later humanists, such as Alessandro Piccolomini turned their attention to vernacular translations of classical philosophy, although vernacular translation was not highly valued by most humanists. Thus one of the great contributions of Renaissance humanists was the

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7 See Luca Bianchi, Simon Gilson and Jill Kraye, *Vernacular Aristotelianism in Italy from the Fourteenth to the Seventeenth Century* (London: Warburg Institute, 2016); Warren Boutcher, “Vernacular Humanism in the sixteenth century”, in Kraye (ed.), *Renaissance
production of more accurate editions of original texts of ancient philosophy in both Greek and Latin. The humanist recovery of Greek philosophy, vastly increased the pantheon of philosophers making many known who had been either unknown or only partially known before (Plato, Plotinus, Proclus, Sextus Empiricus). Rather less appreciated is that through vernacular translation of classical philosophers, they enhanced the accessibility of philosophy for wider audiences.

Ciceronian Latin

Paradoxically, Cicero served as a model for both the philologists and rhetoricians, and the philosophers. In pursuing their programme of translation, humanist scholars had the example of Cicero before them, who furnished not just a standard of Latin language, but a model for making Greek philosophy “speak Latin” (*Tusculan Questions* 2.3). Just as the stylists used Cicero as a model for how to write Latin, so Renaissance philosophers could appeal to Cicero’s own preparedness to take linguistic liberties in coining new terms in order to forge a technical vocabulary for philosophy. The humanists of the Renaissance purged Latin of what they considered to be medieval scholastic barbarisms, in order to restore the language to its original Roman purity. Their favourite stylistic model was Cicero (the excesses of Renaissance “Ciceronianism” were satirised in Erasmus of Rotterdam’s *Ciceronianus*, 1528). In fact, much of what the humanists stripped out was a highly developed specialist philosophical vocabulary, replete with terms coined for philosophical purposes (terms such as *quidditas*). Lorenzo Valla deplored the Latin coinages of Boethius. However, this linguistic and stylistic turn met with opposition among philosophers, who defended the retention of non-classical philosophical Latin. For example, in a letter to the humanist Ermolao Barbaro, the Italian philosopher Pico della Mirandola defended the use of philosophical terminology coined by medieval philosophers.10

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Special Theme: Philosophy and Translation
The legacy of humanism to early modern European philosophy is usually overlooked in histories of philosophy. Given the shift to the vernacular in seventeenth-century philosophy, it is easy to ignore. However, humanists made an impact on later philosophy in a number of ways. As already mentioned, by producing reliable editions and translations of ancient philosophical works they massively increased the repertoire of ancient philosophy available to seventeenth-century philosophers. The new standards which they set for translation impacted on subsequent translations into the vernacular. The humanists’ rejection of the highly specialised conceptual vocabulary of medieval scholastic philosophy anticipates the new philosophers of the seventeenth century who shared the philological purists’ characterisation of scholastic philosophy as “barbarism”, and shared the ideal of stylistic lucidity prized by Cicero. Although medieval Latin philosophical terms retain their hold, by the end of the sixteenth century, every philosopher educated at university learned Ciceronian Latin and encountered Greek philosophers in their own language. This applies even to those, like Bacon and Descartes, who attempted to renew philosophy by claiming to make a break with the past. However much or little Greek they new, all philosophers had a grounding in philosophical Latin, usually through a grounding in Aristotelianism. Latin remained the lingua franca of Europe, and it continued to hold its own among the highly educated throughout the next two centuries and into the twentieth century. Consequently vernacular translation was not an essential prerequisite for the dissemination of ideas, and translation from Latin into the vernacular was not necessarily essential even as recently as the 1940s. In the seventeenth-century, Hobbes, Bacon and Herbert of Cherbury all wrote primarily in Latin for both an international readership and for a learned audience at home. The same is true of Gassendi and Grotius. The Latin heritage of early modern philosophy leaves its imprint on the philosophical vocabulary of seventeenth-century philosophy.11

The Vernacular Turn of the Seventeenth Century

Although Latin remained in use as the professional and international language of philosophy, in the seventeenth century it was becoming the second language, as philosophers adopted the vernacular as their primary language. This vernacular turn in the seventeenth century puts the spotlight on translation in various ways. The most obvious is that it gave a new importance to translation as a means of philosophical communication. The adoption of the vernacular as the language of philosophy, was driven in large part by the emergence of a non-specialist or “lay” audience for philosophy, as social, economic and educational conditions changed — increased literacy among non-professionals, and enhanced economic conditions account for a broadening of the audience for philosophy beyond universities and colleges. Although they were better educated, this new non-specialist philosophical readership was not necessarily Latinate. To cater for this readership, translation from Latin into the vernacular was essential. Although Hobbes wrote in Latin for an educated international readership, he wrote his most famous book, *Leviathan*, in English, in order to address a more general audience of his fellow-countrymen. He nonetheless arranged for a translation of *Leviathan* into Latin, in order to address an international audience. The obverse is the case with Richard Cumberland, whose *De legibus naturae* was translated into English for home consumption. There were two English translations, one by John Maxwell in 1727, and the other by John Towers in 1750.

**The Shift from Latin and the Cartesian Revolution**

The vernacular turn in philosophy is often associated with Descartes who chose to write in his native French for both his non-specialist philosophical writings (*Discours de la method* (1637), and *Les Passions de l’Ame* (1649), both of which appeal directly to the philosophical amateur, that is the reader without a formal academic training, who would require only common sense in order to follow his arguments. In actual fact Descartes wrote in Latin for his main work of natural philosophy, *Principia philosophiae* (Paris, 1644) and for his *Meditationes* (Paris, 1641). But both texts were translated into French in his lifetime: a translation of *Principia philosophiae*, commissioned by Descartes from Abbé Picot was published as *Les Principes* in 1647, while the Duc de Luynes’s translation of *Meditations* appeared in 1647.
Descartes was not the first early modern philosopher to use the vernacular for philosophy. His use of the vernacular is anticipated by sixteenth-century philosophers such as Montaigne and Bruno. In England Francis Bacon’s *Advancement of Learning* antedates Descartes’s *Discours* by 32 years; it was first published in English in 1605, and addressed to the King. This was followed in 1644 by Kenelm Digby’s *Two Treatises* which was published in Paris in 1644.\(^\text{12}\) Since Digby frequented the circle of Marin Mersenne, it is possible that his decision to write in English was motivated by Descartes’s adoption of the vernacular. The first philosophers to write consistently in English were the so-called Cambridge Platonists, Henry More (1615–1687) and Ralph Cudworth (1617–1688).\(^\text{13}\) By the 1690s English had been established the primary language of British philosophy: Locke, Shaftesbury, and Berkeley all philosophised in English, as did the philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment. There were, of course, exceptions: Henry More for example published works on ethics and metaphysics in Latin for an academic readership (his *Enchiridion ethicum* and his *Enchiridion metaphysicum*). The vernacular turn also affected classical philosophy, of which English translations begin to appear, some of them translated from translations. Examples are Boileau’s *The Life, and Philosophy, of Epictetus*, and La Rochfoucauld’s *Maximes* of Epictetus, all published in 1670.

**Translation: English and Latin**

Perhaps the most obvious consequence of the vernacular turn was that it changed the linguistic boundaries, raising many new ones. Where previously the boundary to be crossed was that between Latin and the vernacular, which demarcated a difference between professional/academic and lay readerships, now there was increasing demand for translation from one vernacular (e.g. English) into another (e.g. French). This was not just for the benefit of the lay public, but it also benefited philosophers. Pierre Bayle, for example did not read English, and Leibniz only imperfectly. Both profited from the French translations published by Jean Le Clerc in his journal, *Bibliotheque choisie*. Vernacular translation becomes essential for both lay and professional readers of philosophy alike. Thus, where originally the vernacular was

\(^{12}\) Kenelm Digby, *Two treatises. In the one of which, the Nature of Bodies; in the other, the Nature of Mans Soule* (Paris: Gilles Blaizot, 1644).

\(^{13}\) See my *British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), chapter 6.
used particularly, for non-specialist audiences, in the seventeenth century it was increasingly used for specialist audiences. By the same token, since more philosophical works were written in the vernacular, translation from the vernacular into Latin becomes increasingly important for reaching an international audience.

With the increasing use of the vernacular as the language of philosophy, translation into English increased in importance — from both foreign vernaculars and from Latin. The first work by Descartes to be translated into English was *Discours de la méthode* which was published in 1649 as *A Discourse of a Method for the Well-guiding of Reason, and the Discovery of Truth in the Sciences*, followed by *The Passions of the Soule* in 1650. Descartes’s *Méditations* did not appear in English until 1680, when William Molyneux published his translation with the title, *Six Metaphysical Meditations*. Other French philosophical works translated into English include Cureau de la Chambre, *Art de connoistre les homes*, by Hobbes’s friend, John Davies of Kidwelly and Pierre Nicole’s *Essais de morale* (which was translated as *Moral Essays*, 1677, followed in 1712 by Locke’s translation of the first three essays).  

Pierre Nicole and Antoine Arnauld’s *Logique, ou l’art de penser* (the so-called Port Royal logic) was translated into English as *Logic or the Art of Thinking*, in 1685. Malebranche was translated by several different translators: *Recherche de la vérité* (translated as *Malebranch’s Search after truth*, 1694), *Traité de la nature et de la grace* (translated as *A Treatise of Nature and Grace by: Richard Sault in 1695*), and *Traité de Morale* (translated as *A Treatise of Morality*, by James Shipton in 1699).

The vernacular turn in philosophy was not uni-directional, as may be illustrated by the number of translations of English philosophical texts into European languages. Francis Bacon’s *Essays* were translated into French (by Sir Arthur Gorges and by Jean Baudoin, both in 1619), Italian (possibly by Bacon’s friend Tobie Matthew) and German (in 1654). A French translation of his *Advancement of Learning* by A. Maugars was published in 1624 with a French translation of the Latin version in 1632. Locke’s *Essay concerning Human Understanding* was

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14 Full title: *Discourses on the being of a God, and the immortality of the soul; of the weakness of man; and concerning the way of preserving peace with men* (London: J. Downing, 1712). Locke dedicated his translation to the Earl of Shaftesbury.

15 First published in French in 1662, this was published in England in Latin in 1674.

translated into French by Pierre Coste in 1700 (Malebranche read Locke in Coste’s translation). Pierre Coste also translated Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1695) and The Reasonableness of Christianity (1696). A French translation Locke’s Two Treatises of Government by David Mazel, was published in Amsterdam in 1691 (reprinted 1700), and a Dutch translation in 1736. A German translation of the second Treatise (Le Gouvernement Civil, oder die Kunst Whol zu Regieren) appeared in 1718. There was only one vernacular translation of Hobbes’s Leviathan (Abraham van Berkel’s Leviathan of van der stoffe, 1667) perhaps because Hobbes’s political philosophy was available in both Latin and vernacular translations: De cive was translated into Dutch as De erste beginselen van een burger-staat (1675), and into French as Elemens philosophiques du citoyen by Samuel Sorbière in 1649, followed by Du Verdus’ French translation of De cive parts I and II, in 1660 with the title Elemens de la politique. The only other English work Hobbes to be translated was Of Libertie and Necessity in a Dutch translation, Een tractaatje van vrijwilligheyd en noodsakelijckheyd (1698).17

Translation into Latin:

Another way of dealing with linguistic borders was through translation into a lingua franca. Eventually, French would emerge as the language of intellectual exchange in the European Republic of Letters. In consequence, translation into French was increasingly important for the dissemination of British Philosophy in Europe. This may be why Locke chose to publish in French and may have influenced the decision to translate into French a work by his friend Lady Masham: her A Discourse Concerning the Love of God was published in French as Discours sur l’Amour Divin (1705). Francophone learned journals served as a clearing house for English philosophy: Jean Le Clerc’s Bibliotheque choisie and Bibliotheque universelle and Jacques Basnages’ Nouvelles de la République de letters centred in the Huguenot réfuge in Holland. The first (abridged) version of Locke’s Essay was published in French in Jean Le Clerc’s Bibliotheque Choisie as “Extrait d’un livre anglois … intitulé essai philosophique concernant l’entendement” translated by Le Clerc. French translations of a substantial number of articles from the Royal Society’s

17 Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes, 464–69. Another French translation Le corps politique ou les éléments de la loi, appeared in 1652. There were also French translations of Hobbes’s works by du Verdus, but these have not survived.
Philosophical Transactions were printed in the Journal des Scavans between 1665 and 1701.¹⁸

Prior to the emergence of French as the common currency of intellectual exchange, the lingua franca was Latin. The continued demand for works in Latin testifies to the resilience of Latin as the language of education in general and philosophy in particular. Of course, translation into Latin was nothing new, as we know from the example of Marsilio Ficino’s Latin translation of the works of Plato. In the seventeenth century the reasons for translating into Latin had less to do with making Greek philosophy available to Latinate philosophers, but was more the direct consequence of the vernacular turn in philosophy. The main purpose of translation into Latin was to make vernacular philosophy available to the international philosophical community. It was common practice for philosophers to oversee the translation of their works into Latin themselves, e.g. Francis Bacon, whose De augmentis scientiarum was translated in his life time.¹⁹ Hobbes’s Opera philosophica was published by Blaeu in Amsterdam. A Latin translation of Leviathan was printed in Amsterdam (1668, overseen by Sorbière). Henry More, too translated his collected works into Latin in order to reach a European audience: his Opera Omnia appeared in 1679. John Locke normally wrote in English, but he oversaw a Latin translation of his Essay by Ezekiel Burridge (published as De intellectu humano in 1701). This translation had wide European circulation, with reprints published across Europe in Leipzig, Naples and Krakow in the eighteenth century. Robert Boyle, had his writings translated for international consumption: with over 26 translations to his name, he was probably the most translated natural philosopher. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society was the most important medium for natural philosophy, but its being in English was a disadvantage for international circulation. To remedy this a Latin translation of the first volumes was commissioned from Christoph Sand in 1671. Many translations were posthumous. There was a Latin translation of Bacon’s Essays by William Rawley in 1638. Jacob Gruter translated Bacon’s Sylva sylvarum together with New Atlantis in 1626. Isaac Gruter published Bacon’s Scripta in naturali et universali

¹⁹ This is an expanded version of The Advancement and was reprinted in France (1625), Germany (1635) and The Netherlands (1645). It was translated back into English in 1640. See Stephen Gaukroger, Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 132, n.
philosophia, in the Netherlands in 1653 (reprinted 1685). Bacon’s Opera omnia was published in Frankfurt in 1665, with a further edition in 1694. A philosopher whose European reputation suffered because he did not publish in Latin was Ralph Cudworth — at least, not in his lifetime. Cudworth’s main philosophical treatise, The True Intellectual System of the Universe was published in English. No less a philosopher than Leibniz had difficulty reading Cudworth for this reason. Instead he had to rely on the French translations of excerpts from Cudworth’s book in Le Clerc’s journal, Bibliotheque choisie. It was not until the Latin translation of Cudworth’s works by Mosheim in 1733 that his philosophy became widely known in Europe.

Just as there were Latin translations of English-language philosophy for foreign consumption, so also Latin versions of French and other texts were printed for home consumption. For example, a Latin version of the Descartes’ Discours was printed in Cambridge in 1668. The first version of his Meditations to be published in England was the Meditaciones de prima philosophia in 1664. Also Malebranche’s La recherche de la verité was published in London in 1687 (De inquirenda veritate libri sex). As these examples show, there was continued demand for works in Latin, so it would be misleading to suggest that the vernacular turn meant that classical languages were swept aside comprehensively and definitively.

The Challenges of Translating: Finding Words

One of the biggest challenges for translators was the formation of a conceptual vocabulary in languages where none had existed previously. A cognate problem was the need to generate terminology to express new ideas. To a large extent the challenge of forming a vernacular conceptual vocabulary, was mitigated by the fact that translators were working in a cultural climate where the influence of Latin was already apparent, and had already made its mark in the vernacular. So it was natural for them to draw on classical languages for the purpose of coining terms. On the
other hand, seventeenth-century philosophers who eschewed scholastic philosophy and presented themselves as doing something new, deliberately rejected old forms, in favour of “common sense” and plain speech. These new non-scholastic vernacular philosophies, presented somewhat different challenges. Since many of them made a virtue of using ordinary language, finding appropriate terms in other vernaculars was not necessarily difficult. But translating into Latin might be more challenging.

It is striking that British philosophers were highly conscious of the importance of language in philosophy. Francis Bacon, for example, identifies inappropriate use of language as responsible for false conceptions in philosophy. These are what he calls “idols of the market place”. Bacon himself uses familiar philosophical nomenclature, but in a different sense from received philosophical traditions. And he coins new terms and nomenclature for his new natural philosophy in Novum organum. For Locke too concern for language and terminology is at the foundation of his philosophical concerns. In the Preface to Essay Concerning Human Understanding he criticises terminological obfuscation in other philosophies, the confusion arising from the terminology in use (the “frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or un-intelligible Terms, introduced into the Sciences”).21 He himself strove for clarity and deliberately adopted a plain, every-day style suitable for non-experts. Another development which is not un-connected with the demise of Latin and the complexities of producing vernacular translations is the interest in formulating a universal language, to overcome the difficulty of communication in the vernacular environment. This was partly inspired by Europeans’ first encounter with oriental orthographical systems. The best known example is John Wilkins, Essay towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language (1668).22

Translation and Conceptual Coinage: Ralph Cudworth

An important way in which translation impacts on philosophy is in the philosophical vocabulary adopted by philosophers writing in the vernacular. A particularly striking case where translation plays constructive role in concept-formation in seventeenth-century English philosophy is Ralph Cudworth. A distinctive feature of Cudworth’s philosophical vocabulary is that he not only taps into the reservoir of Latin terminology, but also draws on Greek. This is well exemplified in his conception of both consciousness and unconsciousness. The remainder of this essay takes Cudworth as a case study of the transformative role of translated vocabularies on the conceptual vocabulary of early modern philosophy.

Cudworth was one of the so-called Cambridge Platonists, who were the first philosophers to publish primarily in English. In so doing, they coined many English philosophical terms, some of which form part of our modern philosophical vocabulary. Like Cicero before them, they had, as G.F. Powell says of Cicero, to “forge a new conceptual ‘toolkit’ ” for vernacular philosophy (i.e. English). Unlike Cicero, the Cambridge Platonists did not have the ambition to emulate or even surpass the Greeks. The same can be said of their view of the moderns. But they did come up with many new coinages, which reflect their engagement with both ancient and modern philosophy. This is particularly striking in the case of Ralph Cudworth, who draws not just on Latin, but on Greek. Just as Cicero did with Latin, Cudworth appropriates Greek words, ideas and concepts to construct an English philosophical vocabulary capable of handling new philosophical concepts. Cudworth’s practice of translating terminology to generate new coinages is made abundantly visible in his stylistic habit of replicating terms in appositional phrasing, and his use of multiple synonyms.

Cudworth’s recourse to ancient philosophy, his practice of retaining of Greek words, and of coining neologisms may be exemplified in his use of the term “power” and “powers”. In Cudworth power can mean an active principle, a force, ability or capacity. Powers may be intellectual, “noetical” and “cogniscitive” powers; powers of perception, sensation and passion; mechanical and self-moving powers. “Power”

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24 G. F. Powell “Cicero’s translations from Greek”, in his *Cicero the Philosopher*. 

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is the term by which he translates both the Latin *potestas* and *vix* and the Greek *dynamis*. He also imports Greek terminology, such as the term *energy*, taken directly from Greek *energeia*. Transliterated Greek terms are used especially in his theory of the soul, in particular terms to express the key notion of “self-power” — *autokinesie* (self-movement), *autexousion*, *hegemonikon*, *to eph’ hēmin.* These imports, and their anglicised versions are not mere humanistic affectation, or simple transplantations from the Greek sources, but they are terms used to express original components of Cudworth’s own philosophy. They are functional terms adopted in order to formulate new ideas and new theories. A case in point is his philosophy of mind.

**Cudworth on consciousness and unconsciousness**

As already mentioned, Cudworth has been credited with introducing the very term “consciousness” into the English philosophical terminology. In fact, he may also be credited with coining the term “unconscious”. The modern notion of consciousness, as an inner perception of our mental states and activities, is something we owe to the seventeenth century. The Latin term for it, *conscientia*, does not distinguish conscience in a moral sense, from the psychological idea of the mind’s awareness of itself, which, philosophically speaking, is usually associated with Descartes’s conception of the *cogito*, or *res cogitans* as *conscious.* Descartes was interpreted as meaning that thinking and consciousness as co-terminous, that the *res cogitans* is always conscious.

In his main philosophical work, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe* (1678), Cudworth objects to “the Narrow Principles of some late Philosophers”, who hold that that the soul is always conscious — a clear reference to Descartes, but also, perhaps to Arnauld and Nicole’s Port Royal logic. There are strong reasons therefore, for assuming that Cudworth’s terminology derives from the French/Latin

25 For a fuller discussion, see my “Salving the phenomena of mind: energy, hegemonikon, and sympathy in Cudworth”, *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 45.3(2016), 465–86.
27 “[O]ur thought or perception is essentially reflective upon itself: or, as it is said rather better in Latin, est sui conscia. For I do not think without knowing that I think. I do not know a square without knowing that I know it”. Arnauld and Nicole, *Logic, or, The Art of Thinking*, translated by Jill Vance Buroker, 71.
conscience/conscientia. However, in the context in which Cudworth frames his objection to the Cartesians, it is clear that more is at stake than mere terminology. There is a conceptual development in process. For Cudworth notes that the activity of the soul includes life-processes which cannot be explained either in terms of the body or in terms of cogitation. He therefore wants to make a distinction between self-aware states of the soul when the soul is conscious, i.e. when it is thinking, and states when the soul obviously continues to perform vital functions (e.g. regulating heartbeat) without being conscious of these activities. Cudworth describes this state, as unconscious (e.g. when asleep), defining it negatively by reference to being conscious. Taken together, consciousness and unconsciousness are part of a more complex account of the soul and mind than the Cartesian res cogitans. One might argue that Cudworth has simply re-interpreted Descartes, adapting and developing his terminology for this purpose. This may, of course, be the case. But there is an alternative source for Cudworth’s conception of consciousness: not Descartes, but Plotinus. And this is abundantly evident from the fact that Cudworth refers to the self-awareness of the soul by means of two synonyms: “consense or consciousness”. Cudworth’s use of the term “consense” is sufficient indication that his source is not Cartesian. In fact as Udo Thiel has pointed out, “consense” is a translation of Plotinus’s term “synaisthesis” or “inner sense”. To rub the point home Cudworth describes consciousness by means of multiple apposition of terms and phrases, some imported from Greek (autokinesie and synaesthesis) and some from deriving from Latin (animadversive, attentive) and some translated (con-sense):

there may be a simple Internal Energy or Vital Autokinesie, … that is included in the Nature of synaesthesis, Con-sense and Consciousness, which makes a Being to be Present with it self, Attentive to its own Actions, or Animadversive of them.  

A state of unconsciousness is also a state where the soul possesses “Vital Energy”, but without “Synaesthesia” [consense], “express Consciousness” and “Self-perception”. In this way Cudworth, turns to both Latin and classical Greek philosophy to supply terms for expressing ideas of consciousness and unconsciousness, which are distinct from Descartes. But this is not a case of simple terminological substitution nor has he merely reproduced Plotinus’s notion of

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consciousness. Rather he has adapted it in the very process of adopting Plotinus’s vocabulary, so as to propose a theory of consciousness by means of transformative translation which involves a re-interpretation and re-application of Plotinus to tackle a problem in the Cartesian conception of mind.

Conclusion

In the vernacular turn of the seventeenth century, translation had an increasingly important role in the dissemination of philosophical ideas. However, the impact of translation was more than a matter of communication and reception. The example of Cudworth illustrates the creative impact of translation on philosophy itself. Considered as a vector of cultural transfer, translation can be shown to contribute to the development of new philosophical ideas. In both processes, it is important not to under-estimate the significance of Latin but also of Greek in the vernacular turn of the seventeenth century.
Are Footnotes Enough?  
The Challenges of Translating the Philosophy of Sexual Difference

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Abstract: Luce Irigaray challenged the world to think about the concept of equality which had, for several centuries, provided a paradigm from where to measure the freedom (or lack of it) of women, who were not initially included in the Enlightenment project. Irigaray’s provocative question (“Equal to whom?”) was rooted in the broader women’s movement, full of excitement at the time, that wished to transform the world into a place whereby women and men could live in a changed and happier relationship to one another and to the world itself. However, times have changed rapidly over the past decades and the philosophical work pursued by Irigaray and others engaged in a similar project has diverged significantly from the direction taken by feminist thinking and practice in the English-speaking world. In the face of such divergence (and a clear imbalance in impact and influence given the predominance that the English language has taken on globally during the same period; a predominance resulting in many assumptions as to the authority of the philosophy done in English in leading trends of philosophical inquiry) this paper seeks to explore whether faithful translation of this other, less considered or understood, philosophy is even possible. The matter is made more complex given that the philosophical work in question is rooted in the human relationship to language itself, seeking to effect change through transforming the symbolic order. A philosophy based on the transformation of the symbolic order is evidently highly concerned with language itself and the signifiers attributed to it, thus presenting the translator with potential stumbling blocks. Is she, faced with transmitting meaning that will not be easily passed into the other language, going to have to produce constant footnotes, the usual resource for this dilemma? Here we will look at specific terms such as the sexuate, the symbolic order of the mother and (female) authority in order to provide a working example of some of the issues at stake.

Introduction
Is it possible to translate a philosophical body of thought that is in turn also a living political movement? Not only this, what if, embedded within the said philosophy, is the belief that the usage of language itself can act as a transformative force. That is, that the re-signification of words and/or terms in relationship with/to others also involved in this political project is an integral founding element of the philosophy itself. If that transformative force is perceived to be dynamic and alive, acquiring new meaning through being re-thought in relationship with others, how is it possible to render this significant into another language, where such an endeavour is not taking place?

Additionally: what if that other language, English in this case (representing an already established symbolic order the meanings of whose words are often taken as being *the* meanings), is potentially hostile or indifferent to the new meanings being generated in relation to the words being used with transforming political intent? If we translate such language without making the transformational intent explicit, what dangers do we incur?

This article seeks to explore these issues using the experience of the author who has acted as translator over several decades for the work taking place in certain European countries. This work is sometimes referred to under the umbrella of “continental philosophy” but much of it, through lack of translation and outside interest, is still unknown to those working only in English.

Particular examples of words or terms will be used to explore some of the issues involved. It might be observed that because the general field and historical time within which this philosophical thinking has taken place is one that the English-speaking world *is* familiar with, even probably considering itself a leader in the field (that is, feminist philosophy and theory), there is considerable scope for exploration of the extent to which misunderstanding occurs. Of specific interest is the extent to which this thinking has been misunderstood and misappropriated\(^1\) by those who do know the philosophical terrain in question but who have in fact failed to grasp significant elements of its original intended meaning.

If this is the case, there are vital issues at stake for the matter of translation. Is it possible to translate with any accuracy at all something that the target audience does not understand on many levels, or is such an attempt likely to contribute to the misappropriation indicated above?

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\(^1\) The concept of misappropriation is particularly relevant here given that it is so central to Irigaray’s initial thesis concerning the usurpation of the female/feminine throughout patriarchal history.
The philosophy of sexual difference

Luce Irigaray is generally considered to have kicked off a new wave of feminist thinking when she began to question the history of philosophy predominant in western civilization.\(^2\) Of particular concern to her was the paradigm of equality and its usage in feminism. Interrogating the principle of equality is a matter of huge philosophical (and political) significance which has perhaps only gained traction in recent years; it is becoming ever more urgent to investigate both the philosophical and real supposed shared understandings around it, given how easily the word is now bandied about without any kind of profound discussion at all as to what it actually means.\(^3\) The relationship between equality and freedom in lived experience, in a study of almost anyone’s life, may have much to reveal, not all of it comfortable. For example, two twentieth century women, Doris Lessing and Carmen Martin Gaite, showed in their lives and their writings just how mistaken we may be to think that the said relationship (between equality and freedom) is a simple or necessarily direct one.

The last couple of hundred years have seen the concept of equality endowed with huge meaning. Indeed, we might think that much of western so-called civilisation has depended upon the notion. Certainly, feminism in its many manifestations has relied heavily upon it, to the extent that achieving it is still generally held to be the main goal for women in the modern world. It is not a term generally considered to be in need of interrogation. Nevertheless, Irigaray’s concern, pertaining to the direction that the women’s movement should go in, was in many ways shared by many of the feminist thinkers of the nineteen seventies. However, it


\(^3\) This leads us also into hugely complex terrain whereby the already troubled relationship between western feminist theories and the (automatic) assumptions made about the freedom, or rather, non-freedom, of those outside of that history goes on to yet another level: if Irigaray, for example, is asking us to consider that the feminist theory predominant in the western world is fundamentally flawed, this also has the capacity to shake up the relationship between the supposed “free” and “non-free” women on a global level. This paper does not have the scope to enter into discussions around this in any greater depth but undoubtedlly one of the motivations for translation in the first place is the hope that far deeper and wider reflections and conversations might take place, precisely in reaction to a greater understanding of Irigaray’s challenge to think beyond the philosophical framework of equality.
has been left largely to one side in the English-speaking culture.\(^4\) In the general culture, however, it is now possible to hear men (and some women) say that the aims of equality have been achieved in modern western societies; the implication is that feminism is no longer required. This is quite frequently said whilst those in power proceed to reinforce the worst kinds of male white protectionism and bullying tactics so as to rather desperately keep control and power over others. Presumably, the declaration that equality is now a given relates to the fact that it is inscribed in laws across the western world. Technically, then, it can happen if all other conditions are in place.

Unfortunately, the fact that in theory women (in some parts of the world at least) have equal rights, seems to have generated a tendency for it to be used as a strategy for in practice keeping women out and perhaps enacting a subtle power grab as yet undocumented due to a lack of language with which to describe it. Clearly, having control over the language used is an integral part of this power game.\(^5\)

However, if we care to look back to the sixties and seventies and the vast amount of feminist scholarship and activism that took place then, we see that the question of what equality is and why women might want to fight for it was not an indifferent one. At the time, it would seem apparent that the general aim was not merely to be equal to men, but rather to transform the world and social relationships in their entirety, so that women and men might co-exist rather more freely and in a different relationship to one another. Kate Millet, recently deceased, coined this rather well as \textit{sexual politics}, and her intuition and consequent argument that sexual politics was at the centre of many of the issues involved is still very relevant today.

Returning to Irigaray’s question however, what happened was that it led to a questioning of the history of philosophy itself. Her thesis, broadly put, was that

\(^{4}\) There are exceptions to this and a small but strong body of scholarship and discussion now exists in relation to Irigaray’s work. However, this does not seem to have permeated mainstream perceptions of what feminism is about in any way. Neither has the work carried out steadfastly in Italy and Spain over the past decades to further deepen the thinking of sexual difference, as yet, been considered as having a potentially more global reach.

\(^{5}\) This paper was written just before the outpourings in certain parts of the world of women’s voices, embodied thus far most strongly in the #MeToo movement. This movement can be seen as an expression of many things but it surely needs deeper work if it is really the case that there can be a genuine change in how women’s voices are able to shape the world. Again, the issues raised in this article are vitally important if we are to stay grounded and focussed on achieving genuine transformation both in women’s lives but also, perhaps crucially, in the relationships between the sexes, if we are to cease seeing feminism in terms of battle and war with men and to find a way to exist (happily) as co-creators of our world.
western philosophy developed with the misappropriation of the female mind and body, using it as suited but in fact excluding women themselves from the *polis*, where both politics and philosophy are made. The *polis*, and the knowledge produced from it, is thus not only incomplete but fundamentally biased and out of balance, as she sought to show with her theory of usurpation of the work and existence of the female sex.

If we accept her theory, we are, in our known history at least, at the very beginnings (and in many cases, seemingly yet to even arrive there) of finding out what it might mean to make politics and philosophy in a world where both sexes create and define meaning, in a transformed relationship to one another, where that relationship is in itself a fertile place of creation of new meaning.

In the English-speaking world, to speak of these matters is almost impossible. However, in Italy and in Spain, concerted attempts have been made over the last decades to take Irigaray up on her challenge to think through what a *sexuate* world might look like (It is no surprise that my spell-check does not of course recognise the word *sexuate*).

Irigaray herself was read by a few English-speaking feminists from quite early on, and, it has to be said, was largely, especially at first, misunderstood. A relatively early exception to this, perhaps the first in English, was Margaret Whitford,⁶ who gently encouraged a readership in the English language to stop trying to subjugate Irigaray’s thought and ideas to their own paradigms, and rather open themselves to its potential for new meaning. Later, others have arrived at far more sophisticated understandings.

What has seemed far less easy to bring to the consideration of the English-speaking world has been the work that has taken place in both Italy and Spain to develop a *politics* that roots itself in and sets out from the philosophy of sexual difference. I understand this philosophy to originate with Irigaray’s notion that sexual difference is *the* thing to be thought through (and thus re-signified) in the second half of the twentieth century. She cited Heidegger as the source of the idea that each age has something to “think through”.

In the English-speaking world, however, we now regularly equate anything feminist with equality (usually its failure) and little else. The notion that feminism and the theories it birthed was always intended to transform the world, not make it worse, often seems to have almost been forgotten. Meanwhile, our worlds of education, business and politics have been taken over by what a female politician

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recently denoted as the politics of bullying. Obviously, to survive in that world, women are often complicit in the said politics, unfortunately leading many to equate their behaviour with the belief that this implies that women are no better than men when it comes to power. Whilst on some level this may be the case, it obviates the fact that the history of women and men has been so radically different until very recently that any conclusions we might arrive at concerning the nature of either men or women and how they might operate in systems and societies not saturated in paradigms of power, money and competition are premature.

But feminism really wasn’t intended merely as a battle to be able to participate on an equal footing with politics and policies of domination, power and abuse of others. When we now hear comments as to how individual women are “no better than men” when in positions of power that should of course be of no surprise. It is logical that staying within the same system, including women in it (and reluctantly, at that) will not lead to deep change.

Irigaray, in her more recent developments on the theme, is very clear that if we continue in the same vein, philosophically speaking our relationship to the real is not hopeful. She sees the arrival of the sexuate onto the scene as the only hope for a civilisation that is otherwise doomed to re-enact the same enclosed system that allows for no new life. Rather, the continued imposition of the (historically undeniably patriarchal) existing system and the repeated efforts to destroy the apparition of the sexuate, particularly, but not only, in the female, is what is causing this world to slowly die. The following quotation offers a sample of her writing as to the consequences of excluding the female/feminine difference from the symbolic order:

Thus a God, unique and in the masculine, has occupied the place of the ecstasy opened and safeguarded by her. From then on, the world is closed upon itself, and the way is prepared for the hell at work today (In the Beginning, She Was: 4).

The language in the above citation is full of meanings that a scholar of Irigaray would have a fairly instant grasp of. However, this would not necessarily be the case for somebody reading in the English language. Nevertheless, Irigaray has been quite extensively translated into English and significant work has also been done as to the reception of her thinking, opening us up to the possibility of discussion of her ideas.

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Are Footnotes Enough?

However, as indicated above, this has not been the case with the work originating in the philosophy of sexual difference taking place in Italy and Spain that has attempted to also become a politics.

Let us now take three words/terms as examples of problems to solve in translation. It should be noted that although the target language in question is English, due to its being the author’s native tongue, presumably the issues at stake would arise to an even greater extent in other languages that might be completely disparate in root, form and cultural context, and thus throw up even harder problems.8

The three words/terms chosen are interesting in relation to the issues posed here in this paper because each of them manifests different characteristics in terms of origin, development of meaning, and potential for recognition (or not) of shared meaning.

Example 1: Sexuate

The term sexuate is one very clearly coined by Irigaray herself, one that emerges out of her initial work. In this work she establishes the concept of sexual difference as a founding element of her philosophical thinking, such as in *The Ethics of Sexual Difference*. As mentioned above, initial grasp of her work was limited and often erroneous. However, this has been rectified in many ways over the past decades until today, when we can put the term sexuate into a commonly used search engine and find many references and scholarly articles on the topic. Many of these clearly have worked hard to engage with Irigaray’s thinking and in doing so, have evolved an understanding of the meaning intended by her. However, on many occasions, there are difficulties in the feminist community itself about the said meaning. Mainly, this relates to an ongoing discussion as to whether a philosophy that roots itself so fundamentally in the (sexuate) body can be viable. There is no scope to go further into this discussion here but it is one that has existed since the beginnings of the concept of sexual difference being translated into the English language and has led to many misunderstandings of her work, leading to the erroneous critique that this was a philosophy based on essentialism, on female biology alone, and as such,

8 It would be highly desirable if this paper encouraged those translating into other languages and cultures with very few apparent similarities or shared history to develop the issues at stake even further.
unacceptable for any feminist project seeking to impact on the world on a much broader scale.

When we come to the matter of translating *sexué*, then, we find that translators into English have nearly all found their way to the word *sexuate*. The option might have been to use the already existing word *sexed*, as in “to sex an animal”, to discover the sex of something, but this was clearly deemed to be insufficient to transmit the meanings contained in the French word. Sexué translates quite nicely into other Latin origin languages such as Spanish and Italian but in English the word *sexuate* was a new invention that did not fit quite so neatly.

As such, given Irigaray’s intentions to put something new into motion, this is not necessarily a bad thing. Inventing a word provokes and invites discussion and debate, something that is surely desirable particularly in the context of her project. It is interesting that many of those seeking to render this project intelligible to those reading in English use the terms *sexuate difference* or *sexual difference* indiscriminately, which could create problems of meaning. However, we might consider that this constitutes a lesser problem, if it means that the reader has already crossed the threshold into Irigaray’s thought and is hopefully interested in exploring deeper subtleties forthwith.

With this word, sexuate, the translator’s task turns out to be relatively simple, because there is now a body of scholarship in the English language whereby decisions have already been made to introduce the term. For a translator, this quite clear consensus makes the decision to use it too, if required, quite unequivocal.

However, if we have the time as a translator we might look into the varying interpretations of this word and see that there are elements left unresolved. We might discover that even Irigaray herself, over a long trajectory as a philosopher emboldened to think freely and newly on all levels, setting out from a new ontological perspective, changed her thinking and ideas at different stages of her career. If the thinking emerging from her philosophy of sexual or sexuate difference is not fixed, and she herself would seem to enjoy this fluidity of meaning and how it is expressed through language, how might a translator manage?

In the case of this particular term, the interesting thing is that even a translator absolutely new and potentially indifferent to Irigaray’s philosophical project would, in all likelihood, thanks to our modern technological translating

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9 Although I have found this version used in earlier translations of Irigaray and remember my own indecision when starting out with the translation of the term; it is interesting that it now seems so clearly insufficient.
resources, reach the word sexuate and quickly find enough corroboration and references to it to be fairly sure that this is an appropriate translation.

Would a footnote be, in any case, helpful here? Perhaps it would, given that some readers will not know much, if anything, about the said project. What would the footnote cover? Perhaps a brief commentary on Irigaray’s work and some related bibliography, but also a mention of the fact that, even now, many of the terms and concepts of this work are in the air as to how they might be received and interpreted by different cultures and languages.

Example 2: The Symbolic Order of the Mother

If we move on to the second term, we find ourselves with the new coining of a phrase that, unlike the word sexuate, turns up relatively few entries on our search machine, thus presenting a translator with some different issues.

The philosophical concept of a politics of the symbolic evolved out of the term used by Luisa Muraro in her ground-breaking work *The Symbolic Order of the Mother*. Muraro’s work and that of the groups she has consistently worked closely with over decades, the Milan Women’s Bookstore and the Diotima group at the University of Verona, as well as her later connection with Duoda, at the University of Barcelona, was quite closely connected in origin with that of Irigaray, although they do not tend to make overt reference to each other. The thinking underlying the text *The Symbolic Order of the Mother* is very clearly rooted in the evolution of the philosophy of sexual difference, then.

However, very little of the quite significant body of work produced in Italy, and slightly later, Spain, has been translated into English. Teresa de Lauretis produced a fine translation of an earlier work by Muraro and others as the Milan Women’s Bookstore Collective and accompanied it with an excellent introductory essay. This book did not enjoy huge success, though, and attempts by Italian and Spanish women to open up debate with the English-speaking world largely fell by the wayside. *The Symbolic Order of the Mother* was translated into Spanish and German, but not, to date, English; in itself perhaps something to think about.¹¹

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¹¹ In the course of preparing this paper, I was delighted to discover that an English translation is on its way, due to be released in early 2018. Hopefully this will enable new discussions to take place in the English language.
When those in the English language read or hear talk of anything to do with the mother in feminism, the tendency is to equate this with a certain trend in feminism to raise the status of mothers and mothering in the established world. Whilst there is nothing wrong with this of itself, many feminists who have fought to be part of the world on every level, to be makers of the *polis* (and symbolic order) alongside their male counterparts, react in a quite hostile way to any attempt to put the maternal at the centre.

Making reference to the mother, therefore, in feminist theory or philosophy, can lead to a triggering of this hostility and cause some to reject what Muraro’s work might have to offer to a greater audience. *The Symbolic Order of the Mother*, however, is not exactly a treatise seeking to literally put mothers at the fore; it is rather a philosophical text which sets out from the premise already articulated by Irigaray (thus accessible in English), that the work and being of women at almost every level in history has been controlled, usurped and sometimes abused by a male patriarchal symbolic order organised for its own benefit (Quite why the men controlling the development of societies in our known history needed to limit and suppress female existence and women’s contribution to the symbolic order is another, interesting, question but there is no scope to address it here).

*The Symbolic Order of the Mother* is, then, a journey into starting again or returning to making a symbolic order but this time giving female existence and experience a place and a voice. It is part of an endeavour to sexuate philosophy and thus to effect change on the symbolic order so as to bring into being a sexuate world.

To translate this into English without understanding the background of the text or the philosophy being developed behind it can be seen to carry dangers if the language used is not to trigger important misunderstandings, starting with the use of the word mother in the title itself. Unlike the present-day situation with the work of Irigaray, the Internet or other texts will not turn up much that will help the translator to decide how to proceed. The term symbolic order also probably requires explanation.

It is difficult to see how to get beyond these problems without considerable usage of footnotes. This in turn requires the translator to have considerable understanding of the philosophical content and context — quite a demand. It is difficult to see how a translator might produce a faithful translation without making considerable effort to understand where Muraro is coming from. This is not a problem in itself, but it is a lot of work. Here the possibility of recommending related bibliography in English is clearly very limited.
This text could be seen as the ground from which the Italian and Spanish women concerned evolved what they have called the politics of the symbolic. The politics of the symbolic is an attempt to transform the symbolic order through connecting language, embodying or signifying words in relation to new political practices, or if not new, through explicitly naming them to endow them with greater transformative force.

If that relationship between language, meaning and transformation of the real are all so vitally and indissolubly connected but are taking place only in a particular language, then how is translation possible if the meaning attributed to the words is not only not the same but has no correlation in the target language? We see this problem most clearly in relation to Muraro’s text because there really is no correlation to it in the English-speaking world. This philosophy was born out of the women’s movement and as such has evolved in a context that those involved perceive to be political. It is this they refer to as the politics of the symbolic. In English, a phrase was coined in the earlier days of feminism: the personal is political. Unfortunately, the momentum gained by the women’s politics then that could also be described as a politics of the symbolic, that is, one aiming to transform the symbolic order in which human beings exist and express themselves, not just survive in a hostile environment still controlled overall by some men, has largely, to date, in the English-speaking world, been lost.

For a translator, then, making this text comprehensible might require a lot of footnotes and a lot of research... It will be very interesting to see how this has been managed by the translator in the forthcoming text and hopefully, the existence of this translation will enable the growth of a greater community of discourse than that which presently exists.

Example 3: Female/feminine authority

In their philosophical and political work, the Italian women of Diotima and the Milan Women’s Bookstore spent a lot of time thinking about the meanings of specific words which they could see were motives for confusion in the existing symbolic order. One of perhaps the most interesting of these was authority, or, more precisely, female or feminine authority. In terms of this paper and its focus, the interesting thing for a translator is that authority is a word and concept that in theory should offer no problems when it comes to translation. The collocation female authority, however, is another thing altogether. To sexuate the word authority in
English without explaining what it means to do so is highly problematic and probably dangerous to do without making explicit that it arises out of a deep discussion as to both what it means to sexuate, and the difference between authority and power.

In any case, we might consider that authority as a concept now, certainly if we look at the politics currently operating in the world, is in an almost complete meltdown. What do we mean when we use it in English? Do we distinguish it from power? Do new generations, who are responsible for passing down future meanings, understand it as separate from power?

In Lia Cigarini’s book *La politica del desiderio* (The Politics of Desire), 1995, she refers to the crisis of the concept of authority in the twentieth century in the western world. This follows on from the work of Hannah Arendt in “What Is Authority?”.

Arendt analyses the meaning and history of authority in the western world, from Plato who introduces authority as a political form, to how the Greeks applied persuasion in the managing of domestic affairs, and force and violence in foreign ones, through to the rise of the totalitarianism that led to the second world war. She differentiates authority from both force and coercion, depending rather upon a shared recognition of hierarchy and the passing down of knowledge from one generation to the next. On this view, when this hierarchy is no longer accepted by all parties, conflict arises.

However, Arendt does not perceive the crises of the twentieth century to signal the end of civilization, writing:

> With the loss of tradition we have lost the thread which safely guided us through the vast realms of the past, but this thread was also the chain fettering each successive generation to a predetermined aspect of the past. It could be that only now will the past open up to us with unexpected freshness and tell us things no one has yet had ears to hear […] But the loss of worldly permanence and reliability — which politically is identical with the loss of authority — does not entail, at least not necessarily, the loss of the human capacity for building, preserving, and caring for a world that can survive us and remain a place fit to live in for those who come after us (1956).

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12 Originally “What Was Authority?” in C. Friedrich, ed., *Authority* [Harvard University Press, 1959].
It might be thought that the concept of authority passed down through a male elite philosophical and political tradition had to be in crisis. We could posit that the practice of “building, preserving and caring” in a male-dominated society was of an extremely ambivalent nature, given the warlike tendencies of many patriarchal societies. So, what Arendt tentatively suggests in relation to a possible future where those values and practices are not necessarily lost may be an understatement.

In the work of the Italian women, authority was to be distinguished from power, which depended more on coercion and force than on the transmission of the past. Authority, however, on their view, was a relational structure, containing knowledge and ways of doing, passed on over time and recognised as valid because of the value of the relationships endorsing that knowledge.

To translate the term female authority is then far more complicated than we might initially believe. On the one hand, we may feel that this is a word that we already have a handle on in the English-speaking world and therefore one that will generate no problem for a translator. However, the incomplete brief discussion above of the in-depth work to signify the term reveals to us that we lack the knowledge of this history or re-signification in the English language. There is almost no trace of it at all in English to be found on the Internet, for example. It is thus, ironically perhaps, this seemingly shared word that in fact is shown not to be shared at all, revealing just how hard it is as a translator to faithfully render a text true to its origins. Footnotes would, once again, be necessary in this case but also perhaps a suggestion that without going deeper into the work done to re-signify the term, it will still be very difficult to grasp.

Too, it might be observed that to use the adjective female, or even feminine, without making explicit that this usage is grounded in a project to bring sexuate difference into the world, that is, the philosophy of sexual difference, is dangerous, given that in the English-speaking world usage of any such terms tends to be misinterpreted as a hostile takeover bid for power on the part of rabid feminists desiring to overthrow men. In English the trend, rather sadly, has been towards the erasure of the sexuate in language when possible, in the name of equality; for example, we no longer find women referred to as actresses — they are now completely assimilated into the male world as actors — they are called the same as men. The cost of this assimilation and the beliefs that underpin it require urgent interrogation, if we are to listen to those urging us to bring a sexuate world into being.
Conclusions: What are the issues for translation brought up by such examples?

We see that translating this philosophical thinking into English (which considers itself as somewhat hegemonic in the field of feminist theories) becomes quite problematic. The English-speaking world does not tend, apart from a few exceptions, to consider that it might have something to learn from the European (or other) strands of feminist thinking that have challenged us to create a new world based on sexuate difference, rather than reluctantly granting women permission to join in with men as long as they adapt to the male-established terms.

Contemporary discourses in the English-speaking world appear to barely question the political paradigm which holds equality in the existing symbolic order as the maximum objective, and women who were not around in the seventies or eighties have little or no idea of the visions of those decades, manifested through a huge amount of work on so many levels: to transform the world, not assimilate into it on any terms, at any cost. We see many perversions of this and that so-called equality is in fact used against women, confusing them, since they lack a language or vision for anything greater. Does this make the translation of the philosophy of sexual difference into the English language even more urgent?

Irigaray’s initial critique of equality, then, if unpacked, holds the key to much of today’s confusion and manipulation of the term feminism and yet it is rarely examined. Irigaray was asking us to consider that the concept of equality itself was embedded within a particular historical culture and politics. In the English-speaking world, this concept is almost never put into question as it continues to function as a way of measuring human parity.

Is the translation of the philosophy of sexual difference and politics of the symbolic thus doomed? What would it require for it to become meaningful? Could it become meaningful in the English language or has the more idealistic feminism of previous decades now gone too far along other darker roads? Do we owe it to younger women and men, to new generations, to attempt to transmit what this history was? Does the concept of the sexuate have any hope or relevance today in an English-speaking context? If we do accept that history is sexuate and that the future needs to be sexuate, how do we begin, in English, to translate both the philosophy and the practices evolved from it?
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III. Translation, East-West
Philosophy in the Age of Globalization, But in Which Language? Translation, or Loving the Experience of Enduring Pathos

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Abstract: Philosophy has always proclaimed itself to be an act of thinking that is based on ‘universality’. However, in which language do we achieve this universality? In this era of globalization, if the position of English as the new lingua franca is stable, then in which language should we or can we philosophize? And what does it mean these days to philosophize in Japanese, not just for Japanese speakers but also for Non-Japanese speakers? In order to investigate these issues, we first focus on the thesis, “The Problem of Japanese Language and Philosophy” written by Tetsurō Watsuji (1889–1960). Rather, based on the thought of this outstanding, modern Japanese philosopher, who addressed such questions sincerely, we attempt to consider the type of framework involved in thinking about them, and ways to clarify how we should comprehend the concept of philosophy in the age of globalization. Watsuji searched for a way to philosophize in Japanese, particularly in “pure” or “everyday” Japanese, so that the language would be rooted in the ethics associated with practical, man-to-man communication. Watsuji’s attempt, however, required too much ‘purity and homogeneity’ in the language, and therefore resulted in little consideration of the foreign or hybrid. Referring to the fundamental relationship between philosophy and translation, as elaborated by Martin Heidegger, Antoine Berman, Gilles Deleuze, Pierre-Félix Guattari, and Hannah Arendt, we also attempt to find new possibilities for understanding philosophy, in the concept of translation as a dual experience, which involves both suffering, as one endures exposure to otherness, and pleasure, when one receives

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1 This paper, which addresses the special theme of the Journal, is a newly revised, major rewrite of a paper on the subjectivity of translation and education, which was originally published in Japanese (Ono 2015), and the revised version in German on the theme, “Bildung in foreign languages, Globalization and multilingualism” (Ono 2018). In this paper, based specifically on the discussion in chapters 4, 5, and 6 of the original paper, the author attempts to address, in a new way, using additional information, the relationship of philosophy in a particular language to universality, and to consider the relationship between philosophy and language, and between philosophy and translation, by referring to the essential connections between philosophy, translation, and the experience of enduring pathos.
and welcomes it. Philosophy as translation will thus be defined anew, or again, as loving the experience of enduring pathos.

Introduction

Philosophy has always proclaimed itself to be an act of thinking that is based on ‘universality’ It is said that there is no (or little) place for particularity; there is only room for universality when it comes to ideas and the truth. A typical case is found in the *characteristica universalis*, or universal language, imagined by Gottfried Leibniz, which is an attempt to sophisticate natural languages into universal characters, based on the model of mathematics. Liebniz wanted to modify language to enhance its universality, because language itself is, in fact, defined by its particular nature. Philosophers have often dreamed of bringing philosophy closer to mathematics. However, the more they deny the particularity of language, the more entrenched it becomes, much like Freud’s ‘return of the repressed’

In this day and age, when it is well known that ‘English language imperialism’ has gained strength and momentum in the wake of globalization, how do we face the reality of academia forging ties with English to the exclusion of other languages? If the position of English as the new *lingua franca* is stable, then, in which language should we or can we philosophize? There have been many languages of philosophy, of course, and thus, many linguistic approaches to philosophy. With regard to the journal, *Tetsugaku*, German and French still enjoy certain privileges today in the study of philosophy, along with English. However, German and French in philosophy are beginning to rank lower in either relative or absolute terms. This might be considered to be a serious matter by German and French philosophers, or by those who studied in Germany and France, but is the situation the same for other languages; for example, Japanese, Korean or Arabic?

What is the difference between philosophizing in German or in English for Japanese philosophers, apart from the struggle for cultural and linguistic hegemony? Of course, German and French remain practically indispensable for philosophers insofar as the following assumption still survives: one should read Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, and Adorno in German, and Descartes, Bergson, and Lévinas in French. With the expansion of globalization in recent years, the number of books and papers in English on Heidegger has continued to increase, and it is anticipated that more and more philosophers will read Heidegger only as an English translation.
Nevertheless, Heidegger remains Heidegger, and German will probably hold its position for the moment.

Is it then possible for the Japanese language to be a philosophical language in an ‘authentic’ sense (or was it actually once such a philosophical language)? Is philosophy in Japanese still significant for Japanese speakers in the age of globalization?

Modern Japanese philosophers have struggled somewhat with the question of whether it is really possible to philosophize in Japanese, and whether philosophy in Japanese is comparable to German or English philosophy. This is not just a question of cultural eugenics but one that concerns the accessibility of the Japanese language as it relates to the ‘universality’ of philosophy. Furthermore, the meaning of philosophizing in Japanese is simultaneously questioned, not only for Japanese speakers, but also for Non-Japanese speakers; in other words, is philosophy in Japanese as a ‘world philosophy’ on the same level as world literature or world religion? Therefore, the issues raised here by the question, “What meaning does philosophizing in Japanese have?” are related to (1) the meaning for Japanese speakers, (2) the meaning for Non-Japanese speakers, and (3) universality.

The first point concerns not only ‘importing’ or accepting Western philosophy, and ‘indigenizing’ it in Japanese society, but also producing Japanese philosophy and developing a ‘philosophical culture’ in Japan. As for the second point, it is, in contrast, aimed at translating or ‘exporting’ Japanese philosophy into other cultures. In this case, significance in both the particular and universal dimensions is expected, resulting in both the production of a philosophical-spiritual culture that is peculiar to Japan, as well as elements that can translate across cultures. The latter relates to the subject of the third point, the question of ‘universality’ in Japanese philosophy.

Nevertheless, we are not concerned in this paper with directly answering these questions; it is not our purpose here to give a definitive, yes-no answer to the question of whether or not we can significantly philosophize in Japanese, or to explain in detail whether philosophizing in Japanese still has meaning. Instead, based on the thought of the modern Japanese philosopher, Tetsurō Watsuji (1889–1960), who addressed such questions sincerely, we attempt to consider the type of framework involved in thinking about them, and thus clarify how we should

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2 As to whether or not there is a privileged language for philosophizing, without hesitation, we can answer, “No”. That is because there is not a single natural language that we use in which we could not think and in that sense, no language can deny any other language the right to engage in the practice of philosophy. Common sense tells us that this is true, but nevertheless there still remains such question solidly.
comprehend the concept of philosophy in the age of globalization. Referring to the fundamental relationship between philosophy and translation, we also attempt to find new possibilities for understanding philosophy in the concept of translation as a dual experience, which involves both suffering, as one endures exposure to otherness, and pleasure, when one receives and welcomes it.

1. The Problematics of the Thought of Tetsurō Watsuji

In order to investigate the problems at issue, we consider the thesis “The Problem of Japanese Language and Philosophy (日本語と哲学の問題)” (1935) written by Watsuji. Watsuji was one of the most outstanding and remarkable philosophers of modern Japan. He was a member of the so-called Kyoto School of Philosophy and later became a Professor of Ethics at the Imperial University of Tokyo. The philosophy of Watsuji is widely known for the historical studies of ideas in Japan, cultural studies of Japanese tradition, typological works on climate and culture as well as the philosophical-anthropological works of ethics based on the betweenness of human beings.

In this thesis “The Problem of Japanese Language and Philosophy”, Watsuji attempts to develop a new ontology based on the nature of the Japanese language after his encounter with Heidegger’s *Being and Time (Sein und Zeit)* during his stay in Germany (1927–1928). Soon after returning home, Watsuji gave a public lecture entitled “Japanese Language and Philosophy” in December 1928 to the Kyoto Society of Philosophy, which had been revised and included in his work *A Sequel to the Study of the Japanese History of Ideas* (続日本精神史研究) (1935). In the beginning of the thesis, Watsuji states as follows: “In this thesis, I attempt to make a historical study of ideas in order to interpret a fundamental aspect of the spiritual activities of the Japanese nation by considering the nature of the Japanese language

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3 Robert E. Carter notes that, Watsuji was “one of that handful of philosophers in Japan during the current century who brought Japanese philosophy to the attention of the world. Like those in the Kyoto School, he sought to understand the richness of Japanese culture anew, while at the same time distancing himself from it through his study of Western cultural and philosophical thought. The result was both a dialogue with Heidegger and others in the West and a robust rediscovery of the vitality of Japanese ways” (Carter 1996, 1).
to be one such activity” (Watsuji 1962, 506). It goes without saying that the act of interpreting the “spiritual activities of a nation” which operate within a language is nothing new. It was inherited from German Historicism conducted by J. G. Herder, Brothers Grimm, W. von Humboldt, and others. However, it is at least worth noting that Watsuji’s intention was partly to develop a Japanese version of this perspective. It is from this perspective that he is able to make additional criticisms of Heidegger.

The Dasein is fundamentally emphasized by him [Heidegger] as the individual and never a human-being who has the dual nature of individuality and sociality. Therefore, he analyzes the nature of language only as comprehensive communication between the individual and instruments, never as practical communication between man and man. […] If the structure of a social being were thought of apart from its social body, it would have nothing to do with the difference of language and the spiritual nature of nations. It is the sole way to correctly solve the problem and so that we understand the nature of the place of social beings. Additionally, a path to the nature of place is provided to us by a phenomenon called Fūdo or Suido [climate]. (Watsuji 1962, 508)

Watsuji insists that Dasein is already a completely social being and it is, therefore, necessary for ontology to understand “the nature of the place of social beings”. He also refers to such sociality as a “social body” and considers it “the particularity of expressing the Dasein’s self-comprehensibility”, namely “the particularity of languages” (Watsuji 1962, 509). Thus, for Watsuji, such sociality must concretely express itself in language.

On that note, Watsuji’s awareness of the issues was not limited to accepting Dasein under the concept of the “social body” or to analyze how a language — which is its expressed form — ought to be. In addition, while revealing the characteristics of the Japanese language, he attempted to respond to the subject of giving birth to a philosophy based in the Japanese language. In that sense, for Watsuji, the problem of philosophy could be none other than the problem of the Japanese language. Watsuji writes:

4 So far there is no English translation of this thesis, and therefore the following citations are translated into English by me. The same also applies to the citations from Karatani (2002), Isomae (2013), and Berman (1999).
Now, when we regard the Japanese language as a particular but complete expression, in other words, as an objectively understandable expression of a Japanese spiritual life that derives from its historical and national nature, we are first of all interested in the fact that we have fewer scientific and philosophical works written in pure Japanese, although we have a rich heritage of literature and historical works written in pure Japanese that we can proudly present to foreign cultures. This doesn’t mean that the Japanese do not think scientifically and philosophically. Everyone must admit that the Japanese have attempted to contemplate deeply and think philosophically in the fields of Buddhism and Confucianism, even in the ancient era. In this regard, however, it is clear that they did not attempt to produce such thought in pure Japanese, in other words, that the expression of thought, a great part of the spiritual life, has never appeared in Japanese. (Watsuji 1962, 509f.)

The understanding expressed here is, simply put, that in comparison to other works of literature and history, scientific and philosophical works were rarely written in Japanese. I assume he is pointing to classic Japanese literature such as the *Man’yoshu* (a book of the oldest collection of Japanese poems in existence from AD 759), *Kojiki* (Records of Ancient Matters composed in AD 712), *Nihon Shoki* (The Chronicles of Japan finished in AD 720), *Kokin Wakashū* (a collection of Japanese poems from ancient times, published around AD 905), or Dogen’s (1200–1253) Buddhist Studies from the Middle Ages and the studies of Confucianism during the Edo period. Still, we must question what he means by “pure Japanese” here.

It is true that the “pure Japanese” that Watsuji mentioned is derived from a corollary of the counter-consciousness that one “can proudly present to foreign cultures”. It is no wonder that a type of cultural nationalism would arise in this person who just returned home from his study abroad. Actually, after his travels to Europe, he finished his famous work of cultural typology, *On Fūdo* (風土 Climate and Culture, 1935). In this book, he attempted to make a comparative study of cultural characteristics of various areas in Eurasia based on his phenomenological-hermeneutic analyses of climate and culture. According to Watsuji, the distinction between nature and culture is integrated in the *Fūdo* (climate) from which each characteristic of each nation arises. He classifies three types of climate: the monsoon (South and East Asia), the desert (West Asia), and the meadow (Europe). It is true, on the one hand, that such a typology itself is interesting and unique. On the other hand, it is based on a kind of cultural
essentialism. As Naoki Sakai appropriately criticizes, it is realizable only through the “transferential and countertransferential exchanges between Asian cultural essentialisms and the narcissism of the West” (Sakai 1997, 126).

The mechanism where internal homogeneity and purity is constructed through facing the exteriority remains in force even in Watsuji’s expression of “pure Japanese”, which is used in stark contrast to “Buddhism and Confucianism” “in the ancient era”. Such “purity” is derived from a counter-consciousness against Chinese language and Chinese characters.

When Japanese people accepted the highly developed concepts and knowledge of Buddhism and Confucianism, they could not easily express their logical content in Japanese, even though it was so free and rich in intuitive and particular expressions. Therefore, they thought through Chinese texts and wrote through the Chinese language. Consequently, the Chinese language became a system of Japanese thought and it has been Japanized gradually. (Watsuji 1962, 510)

As far as logic is concerned, the nature of the Japanese language that Watsuji defines here is never unusual. Based on the history of the evolution of the Japanese language through the establishment of the Japanese writing system using both Kanji (Chinese characters and Sino-Japanese vocabulary) and Kana (the Japanized characters), he one-sidedly assigned logicality and conceptuality to the Chinese language and intuitiveness and emotionality to, as it were, the primitive Japanese language. In other words, it only repeats the metaphysical dichotomous pattern of the ideology of Kokugaku (the nationalistic study of ancient Japanese thought and culture), such as Kanji versus Kana, “reason” in Chinese literature versus “emotion” in traditional Japanese poetry, Kara-gokoro (Chinese spirits) versus Yamato-gokoro (Japanese spirits), and Masurao-buri (the masculine and tolerant style of poetry) versus Taoyame-buri (the feminine and delicate style of poetry).

This is true for now; however, although Watsuji’s consideration of the problems did not stand out over others, he did address at least one topic that could

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5 For a discussion on identity based on “homosociality”, see Sakai (1997), especially in Chapter IV. In this book, Sakai points out that “practice is essentially antagonistic”, but the fact is sometimes denied because of an urge “to displace the anxiety brought forth in a specific practical relationship”. Here we can find “a strange complicity between Asian cultural essentialisms that willingly internalize the stereotypes imposed on them by racism and what Robert Young refers to as the narcissism of the West” (Sakai 1997, 126f.).
not be ignored. That is the subject of engaging in philosophy in ordinary everyday language. Before we look into this subject, let us verify what he understood the everyday language to be. In the passage following the previous quote, he states:

However, it brought about circumstances that there is always a gap between scientific and philosophical language and the literary and everyday language. That is why the Japanese language could keep its relatively pure state as a language. It was rich in expressions for the pre-reflective experience and has always been connected with emotional expressions without developing the pre-reflective natural thinking into logical expressions. (Watsuji 1962, 510)

What is depicted here as everyday language does not refer to the academic terminology of the Chinese language, which controls concepts and intellectual reflection, but a language that controls the “natural thinking” and “experience” before such conceptual reflection. Watsuji believes that it is precisely in everyday language that “emotion” is kept in its complete state and that “everyday language, apart from academic concepts but close to the expression of the arts, still maintains a pure state of language as naïve as possible” (Watsuji 1962, 512).

With that said, we should focus on the theory that there is a “gap” constantly present between the two. Though Watsuji himself had deemed the gap to be so, by no means does it exist on its own. Rather, it should be understood once again as something that is derived from the characteristics of the Japanese language itself where they accepted Chinese Kanji characters and created a dual reading system based on the original Japanese pronunciation of the meaning of those characters (kun’yomi) and the pronunciation based on imported Chinese words that were associated with those characters (on’yomi). The writing system known as Kanji is something that has been brought inside but will always exist as an outside foreign object. As Kojin Karatani points out, it is a subject that is both accepted and continually being eliminated at the same time (Karatani 2002). That is to say, as it becomes internalized, it will forever continue to preserve its exogenous nature. This effect is a “gap” which appeared in Watsuji’s consciousness.

Kojin Karatani points out that a “[n]ational language is complete when it is forgotten that it came from a translation of a written language (e.g. from Latin or Kanji) and instead is felt that it came from direct emotion and from within” (Karatani 2002, 21). When Watsuji stated that “when the German philosophers of a century’s past fiercely freed themselves from the shackles of the Latin language
which held them captive for the longest time, that very act had perked up and livened up philosophy” (Watsuji 1962, 551), he had at this point “forgotten” that this “perked up and livened up” philosophy could not have resulted without being translated from a written language. Perhaps he could have not imagined that in reality no language or philosophy could “free oneself” from a kind of “shackle”.

2. Everyday Language, Philosophy, and Practical Communication of Humans

Despite some controversial ideas, Watsuji’s analyses of the nature of Japanese language contain several interesting issues. For example, originally in Japanese, the concept “know” is not very developed in the intellectual or cognitive sense but rather, it has been understood through the concept “way”. Another example is that the word “aru” (be) originally meant “motsu” (have), primarily because the Japanese believed that being was having. Above all, the investigation into the question “what is to be?” in the latter half of this thesis is one of the landmark achievements of the study of the Japanese history of ideas. Therefore, it can be considered a good example of philosophy in Japanese prior to some works from the Kyoto School such as Shuzo Kuki’s The Structure of ‘Iki’ (1930), Junzo Karaki’s On Evanescence (1964), and Hiroshi Ichikawa’s The Structure of ‘Mi’ (1985) or Megumi Sakabe’s philosophical works such as Hermeneutics of Persona (1976) and Philosophy of ‘Fureru’ or Touching (1983). Furthermore, Watsuji’s study of Japanese linguistics has, in a sense, some similarities with Motoki Tokieda’s “language process theory” in The Principles of Japanese Linguistics (1941), which is one of the most unique and interesting studies on the linguistic theories of modern Japan. It is, however, beyond the scope of this paper to argue all of this in detail.

I would rather bring our focus back once again to the reason why Watsuji considered that philosophy in Japanese has not developed further. This is because, so Watsuji explains, the concept of “pure Japanese” has not been developed within academic concepts, and the everyday language, unlike the academic terminologies, includes “experience” and “emotions” in its pure form.

If that were true, could the everyday language and Japanese language then never become the language of philosophy? According to Watsuji, that is not the case. He explains his perspective as follows: “Even if the former Japanese language was so, it does not cancel out a new possibility of the coming Japanese language”
(Watsuji 1962, 522). Because Japanese is used as a daily language, “possibility” is already included within “reality”.

The Japanese language is not a thing that can be viewed but it is the way of our being. Therefore, to consider a possible aspect of the Japanese language means that we are being under conditions of what the Japanese language already is and we ourselves must walk along the way of what the Japanese language must become. [...] That is to say, one must rely on the pure meaning of the Japanese language (without bringing in from the outside the conceptual content that does not originally exist within the meanings of the language) and question and contemplate on our own. (Watsuji 1962, 523)

This quote is saying that the Japanese language is not a subject to be viewed but rather must be understood as a living practice itself. When he says that the “Japanese language is the way of our being”, the Japanese language will appear to be an active agent of a practical-bodily subject (shutai) rather than a theoretical-epistemological subject (shukan). For Watsuji, the “pure Japanese language” as a daily language exists as a process of becoming that folds within itself the way of being. To him, being aware of “how to become” and to linguistically express the meaning that is the foundation is the act of “contemplation” and philosophy.

If I may add further reflections here, when it comes to the dichotomies in Watsuji that are constantly referenced, that is to say, differentiated from conceptual knowledge, understanding-based awareness, observational understanding, etc., specifically the practical communication of humans is the source of the meaning of pure Japanese. As such, when Watsuji puts the betweenness of humans at the root of ontology, he makes this practical communication of humans the essential element in his ethical conception. In this argumentation, as always, the Japanese language is understood as something that has developed the characteristics of the latter more than the former of such dichotomies, that is to say, the Japanese language is “excellent for expressing the emotional experience” and that it is a language deeply tied to the practice of daily living. From there, we arrive at the ideology that Japanese is a language rooted in ethics known as the practical communication of humans.

Therefore, in Watsuji’s mind, there is an emotional experience that came before the epistemic, conceptual understanding and a concrete expression of the betweenness that is rooted in the ordinary lives of humans. For Watsuji, to engage in
philosophy in the daily language means to develop directly such experience and expressions towards theory through languages. This requires the double action of maintaining the gap and filling it at the same time. However, from his point of view, this also means to consider ethics as the first philosophy and to see ethical practice as the underlying theory.

If we look quickly at the issues with this, we see that Watsuji’s idea of practical communication of humans does not include foreigners. Ultimately, it is most likely not the type of practical ethics that would constantly lead to its rationale being questioned by the experience of the foreign (Heidegger/Berman), which likely would have occurred between the self and the other. Following Sakai, it is said that what Watsuji lacks is the “undecidability of the social, inherent in the ‘being-in-common’ with others” and “[w]hat is achieved in his use of the term shutai is, in fact, a displacement of the practical relation by the epistemic relation” (Sakai 1997, 145).

3. Translation, Experience, or Being Tongue-Tied

In the opening, I mentioned English hegemony as the lingua franca. Would placing German, for example, in opposition to the dominance of English solve this problem? Of course not. That is because if we were to simply place German in opposition to English, though it would provide some relativization, it would simply end in adding privileged members to the academic world.

Should we then refuse to use English as the academic language in opposition to this hegemony? No, we should not. Simply refusing to participate in the system would ultimately lead to endorsing the hegemony and there are also opinions that state this refusal is not the same thing as criticism. Furthermore, if globalization advances further, no matter where one lives, it is no longer possible to be unaffected by it and there is concern that before you know it, life could erode away. Thus, no matter which path one chooses, it does not seem possible to avoid such difficulties.

So, what does it mean to philosophize in Japanese when faced with the difficulties before us, as we try to avoid both narcissistic self-satisfaction and spoiling the particularity of the philosophy through the use of a universal language?

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6 To be more precise, there is also the option of not involving ourselves in a battle over hegemony (e.g. to completely reject English or quit living as a scholar). As such, I must also admit to feeling that I would like to punch some holes in the system and bet on the possibility of changing the system itself.
There now appear to be two ways to look at the language of philosophy from a new perspective. The first is to think of the language of philosophy as having characteristics that are not pure but hybrid. For example, when we talk about the *unique* historical conditions in which the Japanese language developed under the interlinguistic influence of Chinese, and probably other languages such as Korean, we implicitly assume, sometimes without even being aware of it, that foreign languages are themselves homogenous, having never been influenced by other languages. Needless to say, making such an assumption is a serious error. Nonetheless, when faced with the untranslatable while translating, we are often apt to insist that it results from the very *richness* of the Japanese language in sense and meaning or, to put it the other way around, from the *poorness* of foreign languages. For instance, European languages also developed out of linguistic and cultural translations, such as the Arabic cultures in the Golden Age of Translation, the existence of ‘Christian Hebraists’ during the age of Renaissance, the vulgar language in the Reformation, the Germanization of Greek and Latin classics, and Shakespeare’s English in German Romanticism. In this sense, translation is a very normal condition for the language of philosophy.

Still, come to think of it, even if I thought only in my native language, this would not be a stable experience either. For example, behind the trends of “Cool Japan” and Japanimation, to this day, there are conscious and subconscious mixed feelings about the Japanese language among former colonial countries. Assuming that all are of a uniform quality, would the Japanese spoken and written by generations of Koreans in Japan or the Ainu or Okinawan people be considered the “pure Japanese language” as put forth by Watsuji? Like it or not, the Japanese language is a post-colonial language as pointed out by Jun’ich Isomae when he said that “historical circumstances lead us Japanese speakers to live both as the perpetrator and the victim of its colonization” (Isomae 2013, 20).

Watsuji concluded his thesis with the clarion call, “Oh philosophers who would think in Japanese, come to life!” (Watsuji 1962, 551) He also mentioned that “philosophy far removed from the daily conversation is never a happy philosophy” (Watsuji 1962, 550f.). If we look only at the calls and propositions, it looks as though it is all good and there is no room for objection. In this day and age, when contemplating and expressing oneself in Japanese could be considered a *poor and inferior* act in academia, perhaps Watsuji’s calls should act as a foundation to accept

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7 “Cool Japan” is a brand strategy adopted by the Japanese Government in order to promote Japanese cultures internationally and to make them be an engine of economic growth.
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the ordinary life as it is, or perhaps after all this time, still inspire us (if I may dare to use the problematic jargon of the Kyoto School of Philosophy) as celebratory words of the “world-historical viewpoint” of the Japanese language and philosophy in Japanese. At best, this will give us Japanese speakers and users a place to exist and at worst, such a call would at least tickle our romantic narcissism.

Even so, as made clear above, because neither the concept of a national language nor the concept of everyday language can be “pure” in Watsuji’s sense, I cannot respond to this call wholeheartedly and sincerely even though we may be living in a time where philosophizing in Japanese is facing difficult and critical challenges and even if there are rich possibilities in the act of contemplating in Japanese as a response to this crisis.

Of course, it would be not a simple problem that can be resolved by using hybridity as a solution to the issue of purity and homogeneity. Therefore, there is a second approach to the language of philosophy, which is, in accordance with Antoine Berman, a way of understanding philosophy as an experience of translation or rather, as the translation of an experience.

When Berman was developing traductologie, the idea of the experience of the foreign (l’épreuve de l’étranger / die Erfahrung des Fremden) that was taken from the words of Heidegger reading Hölderlin seems to give us some pointers. In other words, it provides us with an understanding that the experience of learning something proper is a dual exercise that occurs simultaneously with the experience of the foreign (Berman 1984; Berman 1999). Berman writes:

Experience is a broadening and an infinitization, a passage from the particular to the universal, the experience of scission, of the finite, of the conditioned. It is voyage (Reise) and migration (Wanderung). Its essence is to throw the “same” into a dimension that will transform it. It is the movement of the “same” which, changing, finds itself to be “other”. (Berman 1984, 74 / Berman 1992, 44)

And Heidegger, to whom Berman referred when he defined the concept of experience, states the following in Way to Language (Unterwegs zur Sprache):

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8 I am referring to the original text in French, with some partial corrections to the English translation.
To undergo an experience [eine Erfahrung machen] with something — be it a thing, a person, or a god — means that this something befalls us, strikes us, comes over us, overwhelms and transforms us. When we talk of “undergoing” an experience, we mean specifically that the experience is not of our own making; to undergo here means that we endure [durchmachen] it, suffer [erleiden] it, receive it as it strikes us [das uns Treffende vernehmend empfangen] and submit [annehmen] to it. It is this something itself that comes about, comes to pass, happens. / To undergo an experience with language, then, means to let ourselves be properly concerned by the claim of language by entering into and submitting to it [German addition mine]. (Heidegger 1985, 149 / Heidegger 1971, 57)

To have an experience means, in this context, to endure, to suffer, to bear, and to simultaneously receive what is coming to us, and therefore, to welcome the foreign and the other with hospitality. Thus, Berman emphasizes, along with Heidegger, that “such is the translation: experience. Experience of works and of the being-work, of languages and of the being-language. Experience, at the same time, of itself, of its essence” (Berman 1999, 16).

We cannot over-emphasize the importance of Berman’s description of the essential connection between translation and experience, because translation, like experience, is “the movement of the ‘same’ which, changing, finds itself to be ‘other’”; translation is the act of discovering what is proper, as well as the act of enduring and suffering the foreign, that is, of welcoming the beyond. That is why translation as experience brings clarity as to the form of the conflicts in this dual exercise. It also questions the self-evident framework that brings out differences between the proper and the foreign, and describes the economy in which such differences occur. In other words, the experience of translation is a heuristic one in which one’s own thoughts are perceived as unstable, as if one were standing on an edge or a threshold.

In contrast, how then can we understand Heidegger’s statements in an interview with Der Spiegel titled, “Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten (Only a God Can Save Us)”, which took place in 1966:

Heidegger: I am thinking of the special inner kinship between the German language and the language of the Greeks and their thought. This is something that the French confirm for me again and again today. When
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they begin to think, they speak German. They assure [me] that they do not succeed with their own language.

SPIEGEL: Is that how you explain the fact that in the countries of romance languages, especially among the French, you have had such a strong influence?

Heidegger: [It is] because they see that despite all of their great rationality they no longer make a go at it in today’s world when it comes to an issue of understanding this world in the origin of its essence. One can no more translate thought than one can translate a poem. At best, one can paraphrase it. As soon as one attempts a literal translation, everything is transformed.

SPIEGEL: A disturbing thought.

Heidegger: It would be good if this disturbance were taken seriously in good measure, and people finally gave some thought to what a portentous transformation Greek thought underwent by translation into the Latin of Rome, an event that even today prevents an adequate reflection upon the fundamental words of Greek thought [underlines mine]. (Heidegger 1976, 217 / Heidegger 1981, 62f.)

No matter how caricaturistic this romantic fantasy is, Heidegger was convinced, at least, that philosophy belonged to the German language, and that, contrary to Berman’s description, thought cannot be translated. Although it may not be obvious, were we to ask today if this type of philosophical ethnocentrism has now been removed from the world of philosophy, we, unfortunately, could not reply in the affirmative. Are there then two Heideggers, namely, an ethnocentric Heidegger, on the one hand, and an ethnorecentric or ethnodecentric one on the other?

Let us not try to close the question too hastily. Instead, let us develop the discussion of philosophy and translation further in the last chapter of the conclusion, by referencing the work of Heidegger’s student, Hannah Arendt, who learned about and succeeded in the richest of possibilities associated with the interpretation of his concept of experience as endurance (das Durchmachen) and suffering (das Erleiden).

Before that, we ask one additional question concerning the image we should have of translation. As emphasized above with Berman, “translation occupies an ambiguous position” in which the “contradiction between the reductionist aim of culture and the ethical aim of translating can be found” (Berman 1984, 16 / Berman1992, 4).

However, if we simply consider that such experience of translation occurs always only between one’s own language and a foreign language, is it not a kind of fallacy? If the experience of translation, as Berman says, is really “the movement of
the ‘same’ which, changing, finds itself to be ‘other’”, does translation not occur within one’s own language on a daily basis? If such questions are considered to be legitimate, then Deleuze’s and Guattari’s understanding, as quoted below, will perhaps help us understand what translation means in this context:

It was Proust who said that ‘masterpieces are written in a kind of foreign language.’ That is the same as stammering, making language *langue* stammer rather than stammering in speech [*parole*]. To be a foreigner, but in one’s own tongue, not only when speaking a language other than one’s own. To be bilingual, multilingual, but in one and the same language, without even a dialect or patois. To be a bastard, a half-breed, but through a purification of race. That is when style becomes a language. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 98)

To stammer in one’s own language is like the intrinsic experience of constantly feeling convulsions and tremors in the process and experience of forming one’s own self. Etymologically to say, the original intention of such a concept was that the concept of experience was to get through a peril and that in itself would be to receive pain or suffering as one tries and goes through something (*ex-perīnī* in Latin from *per-* in Proto-Indo-European). Instead of words coming lightly and easily, and certainly not to silence oneself, at the threshold of what becomes a word and what does not, the stammering of the tongue, the quivering of the lips, and the hesitations are the *creaking* of existence. It is as though the party of concerned individuals lost their concernedness, as if they were left with a fractured identity so that when they take a step forward, they trip on their own feet. The subjectivity in stammering in a language, or something being with the *creaking* of words, must be the subjectivity in translation in this way.

If so, the “ambiguous position” occupied by translation should be found not only between several languages but also within a single language. In other words, the experience of endurance and suffering can occur not just in translation between the proper and the foreign but also in translation within one’s own language, or even within one’s own monologue. Translation can therefore be equated with the experience of wonder, through the discovery that one’s ‘own’ language always already belongs to someone else; in this sense, we are all “bilingual, multilingual, but in one and the same language” and “[bastards, half-breeds], but through a purification of race”.

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Special Theme: Philosophy and Translation
Conclusion: Philosophy as Loving the Experience of Enduring Pathos

At the end of our inquiry, we will return to the ‘origin of philosophy [archē philosophias]’. In Socrates’ well-known words, it is said that philosophy begins in wonder [thaumazein], as derived from Plato’s Theaetetus [155D]: “μάλα γάρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν: οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἄρχη φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη” (Plato 1903). This assertion is translated as follows in standard English language versions: “That is because you are a philosopher, for philosophy begins in wonder” (Plato 1892, 126) by Benjamin Jowett, and “[f]or this feeling of wonder shows that you are a philosopher, since wonder is the only beginning of philosophy” (Plato 1921a, 155) by Harold N. Fowler. The former completely lacks the nuance of “pathos”, and in the latter, the word “pathos” is translated as “feeling”.

When compared to these cases, it is remarkable that Arendt’s translation of this sentence emphasizes the meaning, “to endure” of the word, “pathos”, as follows: “for wonder is what the philosopher endures most; for there is no other beginning of philosophy than wonder” (Arendt 2005, 32). She continues further:

*Thaumazein*, the wonder at that which is as it is, is according to Plato a *pathos*, something which is endured [...]. The wonder which man endures or which befalls him cannot be related in words because it is too general for words. [...] It is from the actual experience of not-knowing, in which one of the basic aspects of the human condition on earth reveals itself, that the ultimate questions arise [...]. The philosopher, who, so to speak, is an expert in wondering and in asking those questions which arise out of wondering [...]. Since the *pathos* of wonder is not alien to men but, on the contrary, one of the most general characteristics of the human condition. [...] [The philosopher’s] distinction from his fellow citizens is not that he possesses any special truth from which the multitude is excluded, but that he remains always ready to endure the *pathos* of wonder and thereby avoids the dogmatism of mere opinion holders (Arendt 2005, 32–36).

9 By the way, Plato’s German translator Otto Apelt translated as follows: “Denn gerade den Philosophen kennzeichnet diese Gemütsverfassung, die Verwunderung. Denn diese, und nichts anderes, ist der Anfang der Philosophie” (Plato 1921b, 51). *Pathos* was not interpreted as endurance here, either, but simply as an emotional state (Gemütsverfassung).
Conventional translations have always placed the emphasis only on the meaning of wonder, and have therefore neglected to translate pathos as such or have, at least, given little thought to its meaning. As Arendt appropriately mentions, the ultimate experience of philosophy is the speechless experience, the experience of not-knowing.

However, such a moment of speechless experience as defined by Arendt, which is found in the sense of being remote from political life and the plurality of living together with others, was destroyed by philosophers. As a result, the Socratic insight of bringing the experience of the pathos of wonder into the world in which he lives with others was lost (Arendt 2005, 36). Through these criticisms, Arendt attempts to open up the philosophical experience to such plurality, to turn again the experience of the pathos of wonder to otherness, politics, speech, and therefore to logos.

To engage in philosophy in this way may be, as previously mentioned, inseparable even from stammering in one’s own language. If the act of philosophy is experienced in its original sense, that is to say, rooted in the experience of suffering and peril, then at that moment the act of philosophy is replaced by words, as in the act of translation, and will continually experience the entanglement of the tongue. Constant re-reading, so as to be faithful and honest, with all the mistakes, excesses, upsets, and disturbances that are likely, can serve as a catalyst for questioning one’s own foundation, which is the purpose of philosophy.

As such, there is no reason why we cannot hope that this stammering and entanglement of the tongue will contribute even in some small way to cracking the structure of linguistic hegemony.

Finally, we come back to Watsuji, who once wrote that “it is obvious that there is no universal language separated from any particular language” (Watsuji 1962, 509). This assertion itself is completely appropriate. Watsuji encounters here the problem of how Japanese, as a particular language, can be translated into the universality that the language of philosophy demands: this is the theme of philosophy and translation. However, in developing his thought on betweenness, Watsuji made the concept transparent, and changed direction toward a search for the homogeneity of “philosophy in [the] pure Japanese language”. As a result of this, the themes of “the experience of the foreign” and “the pathos of wonder” that must be aroused by translation faded into the background. Is it not the case, however, that the very nature of human betweenness is to be primarily a place where one can experience the foreign and the pathos of wonder? As long as we are true to
Watsuji’s understanding, as mentioned above, even the universal language of philosophy cannot help but include a moment of translation.

Therefore, if we are to consider Watsuji’s concepts of “practical communication between humans” and the “social body” as meaningful in this day and age, it will by no means be through the homogenization of the “pure Japanese language”; rather, in contrast to Watsuji’s own words, to philosophize in Japanese is to practice the act of translation through “the experience of pathos”, even if it means stammering in one’s own language. Even if there is some form of “purification”, some “bastard” or “half-breed” will accompany it. When this happens for the first time, the question Watsuji raised regarding the basis of human betweenness, which runs through language, ethos, and ethics, will be renewed as a substantive ethical practice. This seems to provide us with new food for thought with respect to the reality that we live together with others.

Once again, philosophy is an experience of translation, namely an experience of endurance and suffering. However, this endurance of otherness can simultaneously be a pleasure to receive and welcome, providing an opportunity for openness to respond to the foreign, and to transform oneself. Indeed, philosophy [φίλος-σοφία] is none other than the act of loving wisdom; however, as long as philosophy begins in the pathos of wonder, its love must aim not merely for wisdom, but also for the experience of the pathos of wonder. Philosophy, as a result, is the act of loving wisdom produced in this place of duality — in the “ambiguous position” of suffering and pleasure — or rather, if we might dare to say, the act of loving the duality, ambiguity, and betweenness of experience. To reiterate the idea developed by Arendt of “love for the world” (dilectio mundi / amor mundi), to love the experience of enduring the pathos of wonder, of speechlessness, and of not-knowing belongs also to translation itself.

References

10 Arendt defined “love for the world, which makes it ‘worldly’” (Arendt 1996, 66) by interpreting the texts of Saint Augustine, as follows: “For the ‘world’ is the name given not only to this fabric which God made, heaven and earth; but the inhabitants of the world are also called the world… all lovers of the world are also called the ‘world’” (ibid.). Arendt’s concept of love deeply connects with that of worldliness and of politics; however, it is beyond the scope of this paper to argue its connection in detail. See Love and Saint Augustine (Arendt 1996) and The Human Condition (Arendt 1958).


Philosophy in the Age of Globalization, But in Which Language?

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The Philosophical Scope for “Ri [理]” without “Ratio”

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Abstract: European terms pertaining to the concept of “ratio” in Latin (rationality or reason) are generally rendered in Japanese as “ri [理]”. This translation appears to be so firmly established that the interchangeability of these terms nowadays is generally accepted without question. This paper will focus on this translation and explore the possibility of its imperfection. This is done through a genealogical examination of early attempts to translate terms pertaining to the idea of ratio into Japanese, such as Nishi Amane’s creation of new words. We reveal the disparity between the two terms and shed light on the extent of the abyss between different philosophical traditions. In order to elucidate this disparity further, this paper will draw attention to two Japanese philosophers of the pre-Meiji era, Ogyū Sorai and Miura Baien. Both are considered rationalistic thinkers in Japan, but the affinity between their philosophical thinking and modern European philosophy paradoxically reveals the complexity of the disjunction between their interpretations of rationality or reason. This not only points to an absence of the concept of ratio in Japanese philosophical discourse but also illuminates differences in the epistemological, ethical, and ontological concerns that underlie that absence. Consequently, a comparative study of ratio and ri leads to the awareness of a philosophical framework that forms conceptions of “principles” that we may take for granted. In this way, this paper aims to exemplify the potential of philosophy to act as a translation in the service of transcultural practice.

1. Introduction

The Latin term ratio has great significance in the history of continental philosophy. Since ancient Greek times a form of logical reasoning was seen as necessary for the determination of truth, and the way to guide it was called “logos [λόγος]” (definition). The term “logos” was later rendered in Latin as “ratio”, signifying both “rational principles” as identifiers of truth, and “reason” as the human capacity to capture such principles. The rise of rationalism and scientism magnified the impact
of ratio beyond the field of epistemology. It not only promoted scientific discoveries but also redefined human beings as rational beings in which intellect and reason were inherent; intellect discovers rational principles, while reason recognizes moral codes.

There have been various critical reactions to the dominance of rationality as such, for example in the re-evaluation of sensibility in the field of aesthetics and advocacy for the power of the body in Nietzschean philosophy. However, its credentials have grown yet stronger, broadly in accordance with internationalization in the form of westernization. Rational reasoning is central to the establishment of knowledge in academic disciplines. In the face of worldwide ethical problems, rationality or reason plays one of the central roles in discussions of ethics internationally. The significance of ratio permeates both society and individual life, as the basis of our pursuit of knowledge and moral behavior. Ratio has become deeply engrained in our mindset.¹

Should it be a matter of course to presuppose the universal value of ratio in our current global society? Or, is there still some room left for self-criticism of this mindset, not as a reaction — as it is still grounded in a dualistic view between the rational and the irrational — but as an encounter with a different thought structure? If that were even possible, such a discovery would allow us to undergo a radical transformation of mentality precisely because of the extent of ratio’s permeation of our mind. And it is attention to the act of translation that could trigger such a transformation, and which this paper attempts to draw.

European words pertaining to the concept of ratio are generally translated into Japanese using the term “ri [理]”, which is often used to signify “rational principles” or “rationality”. As well as the permeation of the concept, its translation is now almost automatized as though it were instinctively accepted. This paper does not propose an objection to this automatization. What matters is whether it

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¹ In the preface of the research project entitled “Problems of Rationality”, Yamada Kei’ichi construes rationality as a precondition of any kind of explanation or understanding. He argues that the fundamentality of this concept makes a philosophical discussion difficult, as an explanation of rationality inevitably presupposes rationality in itself. Although the term “rationality” is used in its broadest sense in this preface, his claim shares with this essay the problem of consciousness. See Yamada Kei’ichi [山田圭一], “Kantōgen: Yamada Kei’ichi hen ‘gōrisei no shomondai’” [巻頭言：山田圭一編『合理性の諸問題』] (Preface: ‘Problems of Rationality’)”, in Chiba Daigaku Daigakuin Jinbun Shakai Kenkyū Purojekuto Hōkokusho [千葉大学大学院人文社会科学研究プロジェクト報告書] (Chiba University Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences Research Project Reports) 312 (2017): at: http://opac.ll.chiba-u.jp/da/curator/103384/.
suppresses the possibility of encountering an alternative way of thinking about knowledge, the existence of human beings and our surroundings. In order to explore this question, the pioneering translators of these terms merit some reflection. When put under the spotlight, the clarity of the concept of rationality is immediately thrown into question. To put it more precisely, the terms “ratio” and “ri” are revealed to be non-interchangeable, as will be discussed shortly. This helps us to rediscover a philosophical framework that shapes our thought patterns and prompts us to recognize an alternative schema. This recognition gives us the potential to transcend the boundaries of our mentality and envisage a more comprehensive and flexible approach to considering epistemic and ethical themes. An analysis of the philosophical abyss between ratio and ri exemplifies such potential.

2. Linkage

In the history of Japanese literature, probably the oldest recorded translation of ratio into ri dates back to the Latin-Portuguese-Japanese Dictionary published in Amakusa in 1595 — known as the oldest dictionary of European languages and Japanese in existence. This dictionary had an entry “ratio” in Latin, in which the word was translated as the compound noun “dōri [道理]” — a combination of “the way” (dō [道]) and “principle” (ri [理]). It is noteworthy that “dōri [道理]” was used here rather than the single “ri”, but what is important here is establishing such an early encounter with the term ri. The Japanese-Portuguese Dictionary published in Nagasaki in 1603 also contained the entry “ri/cotouari”, which was rendered as the

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2 As a relevant topic to this essay, the untranslatability of the term ri (li in Chinese) into English has been debated in English-language literature, especially from the viewpoint of the comparative study of European and Chinese philosophy. For example, Jana S. Rošker considered that the ancient Greek term logos might be the closest to the meaning of what li is referring to, but she also stated that the term logos cannot cover the entire semantic scope of the term li. She proposed an idea of seeing the term li as a concept of a dynamic, relational and all-encompassing structure. See Jana S. Rošker, “Structuralism and its Chinese ancestors: Traditional Chinese perception theories and the concept of structure (li)”, Anali Pazu HD 1, no.2 (2015): 137–138. Brook Ziporyn also noted the problem of translating li into English using the existing philosophical lexicon, including “reason”, “logos” and “principle”. He offers ample explications about the history of the concept of li in Chinese philosophy, which led him to interpreting li as “a harmonious coherence, which, when a human being becomes harmoniously coherent with it, leads to further harmonious coherence”. See Brook Ziporyn, “Form, principle, pattern or coherence? Li in Chinese philosophy”, Philosophy Compass 3, no.3 (2008): 403, 415.
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Portuguese “rezão” (ratio).\(^3\) Here, ri and ratio were clearly seen as interchangeable. Furthermore, the Spanish Dominican, Father Diego Collado, published a *Latin-Spanish-Japanese Dictionary* written in Rome in 1632, in which the Latin term “ratio” was also spelled in Roman letters as “ri”.\(^4\) Thus, as can be seen from the above, translations in the Christian missionary era confirm that the meanings of ratio and ri were perceived to be similar from the time of the very first translation of the term.

The reflexive interchange between ratio and ri was reinforced during the Meiji restoration, firstly by Tsuda Mamichi (1829–1903) and Nishi Amane (1829–1897).\(^5\) Both studied Western thought at Leiden University together and used their knowledge of Europe to build a new political and social system in Japan. Tsuda’s *Theory of Human Nature* (*Seiri-ron* [性理論]), which is assumed to have been written around 1861, includes a brief afterword contributed by Nishi in which Nishi considered Tsuda’s quest for “human nature” (*seiri* [性理]) to be equivalent to what was called “philosophy” (*kitetsugaku* [希哲学]) in the West (NAZ1: 13).\(^6\) Nishi’s attempt to draw an association between Tsuda’s essay on humanity and philosophy was controversial.\(^7\) However, when his essay, *Tengaidokugo* [天外独語] and his

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\(^3\) Doi Tadao [土井 忠生], *Nippo jisho: vocabulario da Lingoa de Iapam* [日葡辞書] (Japanese-Portuguese Dictionary), (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1960), 417. “Ri” is “on’yomi [音読み]”, or the Chinese reading of the kanji “理”, while “cotouari (its current Romanization is kotowari)” is “kun’yomi [訓読み]” or the Japanese reading of this character. The term “cotouari” was also rendered as “事分り” (understanding things) or “言分り” (understanding statement) in archaic Japanese.

\(^4\) Diego Collado and Ōtsuka Takanobu [大塚 高信], *Koryado Nihon bunten* [コリャード 日本文典] (Grammar of the Japanese Language), Reprinted (Tokyo: Kazama Shobō, 1966), 111.

\(^5\) In this paper pre-Meiji Japanese thinkers are referred to by their first name, and Meiji and post-Meiji Japanese thinkers by their surname. This is the customary way of referring to Japanese writers.

\(^6\) The word “kitetsugaku” written here is famously known as the progenitor of the current translation of “philosophy”, namely “tetsugaku [哲学]”, which was also coined by Nishi in his later works. In this essay, references to Nishi Amane’s works adopt the pagination of the *Nishi Amane Zenshū* edited by Ōkubo Toshiaki. This edition is designated by “NAZ”, plus the volume and page number.

\(^7\) Lin argues that Nishi could not understand the peculiarity of the idea of knowledge developed through the history of philosophy, and arguably lumped together the study of ri with philosophy. He claims that Nishi adopted the idea of knowledge based on positivistic empiricism and utilitarianism. See Lin Méi mao [林 美茂], “Tetsugaku ka, soretomo rigaku ka: Nishi Amane no philosophy gainen no hon’yaku mondai wo megutte [哲学か、それとも理学か：西周の哲学概念の翻訳問題をめぐって]” (Philosophy or
article “Kaika wo susumuru hōhō wo ronzu [開化ヲ進ル方法ヲ論ズ]” are taken into consideration, it is possible to show that Tsuda applied the term ri to the concept of “the rational principle” as used in physics in Western science. In those writings, as Maeda argues, astronomy, physics, chemistry, medicine, economics, and philosophy in Western academia were introduced as subjects pursuing apodictic ri, based on proofs and demonstration. This shows the influence of ideas of truth in Western science on his use of the term “ri”. That is to say, the term “ri” was used to signify provable and demonstrable principles in the service of determining truths in academic disciplines. Thus, it is apparent that the deliberate approximation of ratio with ri had already begun with the dawn of the Meiji restoration.

Nishi played a more decisive role in translating ratio into ri in Japanese. This he achieved through his frequent use of the term “ri” as a suffix or prefix when translating numerous terms from European academic terminology. For example, the English term “psychology” was first translated as “seiri-gaku [性理学]” whose literal meaning is “a study of human nature” (NAZ1: 31), and later modified to “shinri-gaku [心理学]” whose literal meaning is “a study of the principle of kokoro”; George Berkeley’s concept of “reason” as a faculty of cognition through the intellectual inference of things perceived was rendered as “ri-sei”, which compounds “ri” with “sei [性]” (innate quality) (NAZ1: 32); Francis Bacon’s

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8 Maeda Tsutomu [前田 勉], “Tsuda Mamichi no shoki shisō (jinbun, shakaigaku hen)[津田真道の初期思想(人文・社会学編)] (The Early Thoughts of Tsuda Mamichi)”, Bulletin of Aichi University of Education 56 (2007): 53−55.

9 George Berkeley, “A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge,” in The Works of George Berkeley . . . To Which Are Added, an Account of His Life and Several of His Letters to Thomas Prior, Esq., Dean Gervais, Mr. Pope, & C., also by Lewis Bingley Wynne, and Joseph Stock (London: Printed for T. Tegg and son, [etc., etc.], 1837), 11: “It remains therefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external things, it must be by reason, inferring their existence from what is immediately perceived by sense”.

10 The term “sei [性]” has three meanings in Nishi’s philosophical anthropology. First, it means the physical or physiological nature of human beings; second, it means the innate psychological nature of human beings; and third, it means the a posteriori psychological nature of human beings. When “reason” was rendered as “risei,” the meaning of the term “sei” belonged to the second category. To define “sei” as “innate nature” may be seen as being derived from Ogyū Sorai’s understanding of “sei” as the inherent nature of things. For details about the link between Nishi and Sorai in terms of their understanding of the concept of “sei”, see Koizumi Takashi [小泉 仰], “‘Hyakuichishinron’ ni okeru Nishi Amane no ningensei-ron to Ogyū Sorai [『百一新論』における西周の人間性論と荻生徂徠] (Nishi
concept of “truth” as sound knowledge through observation and experiment\textsuperscript{11} was expressed as “shin-ri”, which comprises “shin [真]” (true) and “ri”; and the word “physics” was translated as “butsuri-gaku [物理学]”, which literally means the study of the principle of matters — in contrast with metaphysics “chōri-gaku [超理学]”, whose meaning can be interpreted as the study of the principle which is beyond the principle of the existence of matters (NAZ1: 34, 42). These usages of the term \textit{ri} recur throughout Nishi’s translations of scientific and philosophical terms.

As a result, many of them have become commonplace in current Japanese. Importantly, a translation of the word “principle” was also coined by Nishi and rendered as “genri [原理]” ([元理] in his original writings), which consists of “gen [原 or 元]” (source, origin) and “ri” (NAZ1: 169, 460). According to Takano Shigeo’s linguistic research, it appears that the term “genri” had become the definitive translation of “principle” by 1912.\textsuperscript{12} Consequently the term “\textit{ri}” was widely applied to the concept of scientific, physical and rational principles, and through this the linguistic interchange between \textit{ri} and \textit{ratio} became established.

3. Disjunction

Recognizing Nishi’s significant contribution to the current Japanese language raises the question of whether the words already in existence during his time were insufficient for translations of \textit{ratio}, and that is why he saw the need to create new terms. In fact, there were several acknowledgements of the imperfection of this translation. In earlier times, Portuguese Jesuit priest João Rodrigue wrote in \textit{Arte da

\textsuperscript{11} Francis Bacon, “The New Organon”, in \textit{The Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon}, ed. John M. Robertson (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2013), 60: “... the truth is that the knowledge of simple natures well examined and defined is as light: it gives entrance to all the secrets of nature’s workshop, and virtually includes and draws after it whole bands and troops of works, and opens to us the sources of the noblest axioms”; ibid., 76: “... first of all we must prepare a natural and experimental history, sufficient and good; and this is the foundation of all, for we are not to imagine or suppose, but to discover, what nature does or may be made to do”.

\textsuperscript{12} Takano Shigeo [高野 繁男], \textit{Kindaikango no kenkyu: Nihongo no zōgohō・yakugohō [近代漢語の研究: 日本語の造語法・訳語法] (Research into Modern Words of Chinese Origin: Methods of Creation and Translation in Japanese)} (Tokyo: Meiji Shoin, 2004), 73. In this book Takano conducts a detailed analysis of the stems of new words created in the Meiji era in the service of importing Western philosophy and science.
Lingoa de Japam in 1604 that the Latin word “rationalitas” (rationality) to describe the faculty of judgment generally could not be found in the Japanese language.\(^\text{13}\) His brief remark provides no further explanation. However, it alludes to the absence of some aspect of the concept of ratio and suggests that a philosophical disparity between ratio and ri might be explored.

One thinker who played a more decisive role in questioning this disparity was Nishi, who actually solidified the translation. In his Shōhaku sakki (An unaccomplished man’s reading notes), Nishi cautioned that the term “ri” was not completely interchangeable in every European language (NAZ1: 168).\(^\text{14}\) This caution should not be overlooked, as it draws attention to the conceptual disjunction between ratio and ri. In other words, despite its current permeation the translation of ratio into ri could be seen as imperfect. If so, how might these two concepts conflict with each other? In order to examine this point further, it is important to examine Nishi’s reflection on this translation.

Nishi’s attention to the imperfection of this translation is based on his view that the customary use of the term ri applied to two concepts in modern European thought: the laws of nature and reason (NAZ1: 169). Referring to scientific discoveries such as Newton’s law of gravity, Nishi focused on the objectivity of natural scientific knowledge, stating that, “…even if the law is discovered by human beings, it is different from ri which is determined with the aid of the mind’s imagination. The law of nature belongs to the realm of objectivity” (NAZ1: 169).\(^\text{15}\) His argument here corresponds to the argument of the objectivity of ratio in the realm of physical nature in modern European philosophy. According to a rationalistic account of true knowledge, even if a proposition was considered to be true by everybody, it would be seen as necessary but insufficient. As Descartes emphasized, the realm of the existence of the object is separate from the realm of the


\(^{15}\) Author’s translation.
subject who perceives it.\footnote{Rene Descartes: “They [corporeal objects] are not perhaps exactly such as we perceive by the senses, in many instances, very obscure and confused; but it is at least necessary to admit that all which I clearly and distinctly conceive as in them, …really exists external to me” (AT VII 80). The brackets are inserted by the author. For Descartes’ works, the \textit{Philosophical Writings of Descartes}, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch have been followed. Citations of Descartes’ works take their pagination from the modern standard edition of the original Latin and French, \textit{Oeuvres de Descartes}, translated and edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery. This edition is designated by “AT” plus the volume and page number.} True knowledge, then, belongs to the former. When Kantian epistemology distinguished knowledge from opinion and belief, objective sufficiency became paramount.\footnote{Slavko Splichal succinctly highlighted this point in his \textit{Principles of Publicity and Press Freedom} (Lanham; Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 99. For a detailed definition of truth in Kantian epistemology, see Kant’s argument about \textit{a priori} knowledge in his \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} (AK3:B740–747).} It has been argued by scholars that the discovery of and emphasis on subjectivity in this context made the translation of this term difficult in the Meiji era.\footnote{There are rich arguments on this point in the literature on this subject. For example, see Kobayashi Toshiaki [小林 敏明], ‘Shutai’ no yukue [「主体」のゆくえ : 日本近代思想史への一視角] (\textit{The Evolution of “Subject”}) (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2010).}

Curiously the current translation of “objectivity” into Japanese, namely “\textit{kyakkan} [客観]” (“客観” in old characters), was used by Nishi for the first time as a counterword to denote the European concept of “objectivity” (NAZ1: 169). Furthermore, with his affinity for Auguste Comte’s positivism, Nishi promoted the introduction of scientific methodology in academia in Japan. This suggests that Nishi’s notion of objectivity signifies more than a mere explanation of the concept. More importantly, Nishi may be seen as one of the first Japanese thinkers who re-conceptualized true knowledge by using the concept of \textit{ratio}, which entails objectivity, and explained this delineation of truth in Japanese using the term “\textit{ri}”.

In this way he clearly distinguished the law of nature from that of humanity. Faced with translating the term “reason” into Japanese, he argued that the word could mean the human faculty to judge right and wrong, and called it “\textit{risei [理性]}” (NAZ1: 169). He further pointed out that the term “reason” also signified the grounds for such judgment. Importantly, he considered that reason as the grounds for judgment could not be completely objectifiable. Rather, he thought that it was “…nothing other than that which is determined by the human mind” (NAZ1: 169).\footnote{Author’s translation.} That is to say, while he defined the law of nature using the concept of objectivity,
Nishi thought that reason was more closely associated with the realm of the human mind. Since one of his fields of specialty lay in the natural law theories, it might be assumed that his thinking here pertains to the distinction between the natural scientific law and the moral law that modern European philosophers dealt with; judgment of correctness in science was thought to be qualitatively different from judgment of justice in moral practice. The former is based on the law of nature as “*physis* [φύσις]” — the realm of causal necessity — while the latter is derived from the human mind as “*nous* [νοûς]” — the realm of freedom. Nishi did not refer to the concept of freedom. Instead, he used the idea of “imagination” or “human mind” and attempted to clarify the necessity of distinguishing the law of nature from that of humanity. Accordingly, human capacity to realize these two different principles was also divided; human faculty, “intellect” (*Verstand*), which deals with knowledge was distinguished from “reason” (*Vernunft*) (“practical reason” in particular), which deals with morality. Nishi’s translation “*risei*” as reason applies exclusively to the latter.

This is where the untranslatability of the term *ri* that Nishi referred to comes in. It is because, despite the intrinsic difference between the law of nature and that of humanity which he saw in European thought, Nishi believed that the term *ri* was traditionally used to include both. For example, in view of his criticism of neo-Confucianism, which he thought equated the principle of heaven with that of human beings and thus advocated consonance between natural disasters and human politics, he claimed that in some theories of *ri* there was no clear separation at play between the principle of nature and that of humanity (*NAZ1*: 170). This claim carries the implication that the “*ri*” of nature only subsists in this cosmos and that the “*ri*” of human nature is identically contained in the principle of nature. The dualism between nature and humanity disappears in this sense because the former is determinably inclusive of the latter. This idea of *ri* was therefore seen as incompatible with the concept of *ratio*, which entails a dualistic view that separates nature (*physis*) from mind (*nous*). In other words, Nishi’s caution concerning the non-interchangeability of *ratio* with *ri* was based on his belief that traditional Japanese and Chinese thought often combined both the intellectual and moral

20 In his *Chisetsu* [知説], Nishi clearly differentiated “*risei* [理性]” (reason) from “*gosei* [悟性]” (understanding) (*NAZ1*: 464).

21 For details of Nishi’s perceptions of European dualism and the way in which he attempted to reconcile it, refer to Nakamura, “Nishi Amane’s Response to European Dualism”, 24–35.
spheres. Consequently, the concept of reason as an independent faculty for judging what is right or wrong did not exist in these traditions. This implication is compatible with the claim made by the Portuguese Jesuit at the beginning of the seventeenth century: that the word “rationality” was absent from the Japanese language. It was important for Nishi to emphasize the independent realm of reason in European philosophy; otherwise it would have been misleading to apply the term “ri” to the translation of the word “reason”.

Consequently, going back to the idea of ri as rational principle, if the law of nature and the law of human beings were originally seen as identical in theories of “ri”, the principle that supports this identity had to be essentially distinguished from the principle based on ratio. Moreover, if ri was thought to be the principle that covered both nature and human beings, then such a principle should be based on a different ontology. Nishi did not explicate this issue further. He merely pointed out that there were fine classifications in philosophical terminology regarding the concept of reason or rationality in European philosophy, while the term ri could be too inclusive and ambiguous in Japanese. However, by virtue of Nishi’s awareness and struggle with translation, it has become possible to expect that traditional ideas of “ri” might undercut the interchangeability of ri and ratio. This expectation will be examined shortly through an analysis of two Japanese philosophers in the pre-Meiji era: Ogyū Sorai (1666–1728) and Miura Baien (1723–1789), whose rationalistic ideas about knowledge paradoxically illuminated a philosophical disjunction between the two concepts.

4. Ri without ratio

One of the prominent philosophical works that helps us to explore the philosophical proximity and distance between ratio and ri is Confucius scholar Ogyū Sorai’s Benmei [弁明] (Distinguishing the Names). In this book Sorai defined “ri” as the principle of “discerning something” (NM16: 194; JT 296), although whether a “thing” is discerned logically or experientially is not clearly spelled out. It is at

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least possible to point out that his concept of “ri” may be partly construed as a logical principle used in arithmetic — for instance, in addition the principle of equations is identified with ri (NM16: 163; JT 212). The universality of a mathematical formula is consistent with Sorai’s assumption that ri is a single principle that “…all affairs and things naturally have” (JT 295). This shows that Sorai considered ri to be a universally applicable principle. In this context, the concept of “ri” has affinity with the meaning of ratio as the grounds for true knowledge. Here, “ri” can be rendered as “a rational principle”, as used in the English translation of Benmei.

However, the fact that Sorai did not differentiate experiential discernibility from logical discernibility in his definition of “ri” is no trivial matter. This is because it prevents his argument about ri from separating the purely objective principle from principles of behavior. Immediately following his discussion of the permeation of the single principle in all affairs and things, Sorai also stated: “Whoever wants to do good indeed will see ri for what they should do and will do it. Whoever wants to do evil also will see ri for what they should do and will do it” (JT 295–96).23 Here the concept of “ri” belongs to behavioral principles. And since he conceded that codes of behavior may vary according to self-interest, ri inevitably involves relativity. Precisely because of this relativity, he concluded that “the principles offer no fixed standards” (NM16: 192; JT 296). This is incompatible with moral theories in modern European philosophy, where morality requires goodness for the sake of goodness rather than for the sake of own interest, and thus its principle can be universalized. This conception accords with the attribution of moral judgment to the realm of reason rather than sensory perception. At this point, the connotation of ri radically moves away from ratio as the universalizable principle in the rationalistic sense. Thus, translating Sorai’s term “ri” to “rational principles” entails an element of disparity.

However, this does not mean that Sorai did not seek the universal principle of moral code. Indeed he did seek to overcome the relativity of the behavioral code. To attain such knowledge was in fact one of the central topics in his writings. The point is that Sorai could not develop a universal principle as such using the concept of ri, because he saw the relativity of ri in human behavior as one of the essential

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23 Tucker’s version translates “ri” as “the rational principles” in this passage. However, in order to highlight the philosophical disjunction between ratio and ri, the original term “ri” is left as it is in this quotation.
characteristics of humanity. In order to develop an ultimate principle that would override this relativity, a different idea was called for. This was the technique of the sages; that is, “the way” (dō [道] - dao or tao in Chinese).

Sorai introduced the concept of “sages”, taken from the Confucian Analects, and explained them in the following manner:

There is nowhere that the rational principles [ri] do not penetrate. Yet what people perceive of principles differs according to their human nature…[T]here are differences in perception of principles. Therefore, if we do not plumb all the principles, we will be unable to grasp the unity of things. Yet how can anyone possibly plumb all principles below heaven? Only the sages were capable of exhausting our human natures. Able to exhaust the human natures of people and able to exhaust the nature of things, the sages matched their virtues with those of heaven and earth. For these reasons, only the sages had the ability to exhaust all principles and found the ultimate standards. (NM16: 192; JT 296)

Under the title of “sages”, this passage offers a concept of the ideal status of human beings: he or she must be able to act upon the principles of both knowledge and “virtue” (toku [徳] — de [德] in Chinese). The concept of toku that appears in Sorai’s definition of sages is specifically associated with “humanness” (jin [仁] — ren in Chinese) and was expected to be reflected through behaviour (NM16: 144). In this context, toku can be interpreted as a virtuous skill that makes it possible to harmonize the principle of “the nature of things” with that of “human nature”. In order to reach the wisdom of this harmonization, it was seen as being necessary to go beyond ri.

In this way, Sorai delineated ultimate wisdom as knowledge of “the way”, or “dō [道]” to bring peace by means of the synthesis of knowledge and toku. As a result, the relativity of “ri” was seen to be overcome. This conception implies that Sorai believed the quintessence of an object to be determined by “ought to be” rather than “is”. This is different from the European epistemological tradition, which places strong emphasis on the pursuit of “is” by means of purely logical reasoning.25

24 The brackets are inserted by the author.
25 This trait may go back as far as the time of the Ancient Greeks. For example, Parmenides proposed “the truth” [ἀλήθεια] (aletheia) as being that which is thinkable and utterable without violating the law of contradiction, and saw the necessity of logos to lead the truth. See his Fragment 1: 29–30 and Fragment 2. 3–6. Plato made a firm distinction between

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The revelation of “ought-to-be” in Sorai’s context is not attributed to the power of reason as a faculty of judgment but to _toku_, which is conceptually closer to the faculty of feeling. On top of this, it was considered that _dō_ manifests itself via behaviour rather than comprehension (NM16: 144). This is why he construed _dō_ as a “technique” (“_jutsu_ [術]”) of the sages. Consequently, there was no need for Sorai to prioritize or manipulate _ratio_ in order to define ethics or knowledge, because the significance of _ri_ was ultimately absorbed by the notion of _dō_.

Miura Baien’s philosophy also provides an interesting test case of the proximity and disjunction between _ratio_ and _ri_ in pre-Meiji era thought. As a result of his interest in Dutch studies, Baien’s epistemology in one sense reflects a natural scientific account of knowledge. He tested experimental texts such as _Anatomische Tabellen_ and took an interest in astronomy developed by Tycho Brahe and Copernicus. More importantly, his epistemology potentially approaches the idea of “true knowledge” as “_res veritas_” (true thing) in modern European thinking: what is demonstrable by showing the internal nexus between objective realities. First, Baien attributed the locus of truth about an object to the object itself — borrowing his terminology, “heaven-and-earth”. He aimed to avoid the subjective identification of truth and pursued true knowledge, which “heaven-and earth” alone reveals. In this sense, Baien’s epistemology of “the principle” or “_ri_” in Japanese signifies a principle that inheres within objects. He called such a principle “_jyō-ri_ [条理]”, applying the meaning of “_jō_” as in branch of a tree and “_ri_” as in grain of the wood. As far as his pursuit of principle in the realm of object is concerned, the logical reasoning and sensory perception and prioritized the former in the attainment of truth. Aristotle took a different position, according to his conceptions of “practical wisdom” [φρόνησις] (_phronesis_). However, his definition of “truth” (_aletheia_) is based on the identification of intrinsic unity between subject and predicate which is an outcome of logical reasoning. See his _Metaphysics_ (1027b20; 1030a1). David Lynn Hall and Roger T. Ames overviewed the history of _logocentrism_ in European philosophy and stated that “…no serious cracks appeared in the well-nigh monolithic culture of rationality until the nineteenth century”. See David Lynn Hall and Roger T. Ames, “Rationality, Correlativity, and The Language of Process”, _The Journal of Speculative Philosophy New Series_ 5, no. 2 (1991): 85–86.

26 Miura Baien, _Deep Words: Miura Baien’s System of Natural Philosophy_, trans. Rosemary Mercer (Leiden & New York: E.J. Brill, 1991), 186: “…to understand heaven-and-earth we must follow heaven-and-earth as it is, without attributing our ideas to it, there is no teacher to equal heaven-and-earth”.

27 Ibid., 160–161. According to Mercer’s description of Baien’s philosophical wording, he sometimes combines two Chinese characters in a new way in order to reconfigure the traditional usage of the term. His invented terms include “_jōri_” ibid., 8.
concept of *jyōri* has some affinity with that of *ratio* as grounds for truth in the realm of objective realities.

In order to discover the *jyōri*, Baien proposed the following three processes: “discarding habits of thought, following the correct signs, and seeing opposites as one”. The first two processes can be related to a rationalistic process of knowing. To be more specific, the discard of habitual thought reinforces a liberation from unquestioning obedience to what was believed to be true. Baien pointed out the need to test the accuracy of the habitual thoughts through experiments intended to distinguish “correct signs” from “wrong signs”. Although his discussion pays little attention to the difference between induction and deduction, it calls for at least a demonstrable attestation of knowledge. This fact also reveals that his epistemology presupposes the existence of a human capacity for judgment that makes reasoning demonstrable, although this was not one of his main concerns. Such a capacity in Latin is called *ratio* (or reason in English). Therefore, it can be said that Baien’s conception of *jyōri* is supported by his presumption of the existence of *ratio* as intellectual reasoning to attest truth demonstrably. It can also be stated that the grounds for this demonstrability can be attributed to the discovery of a principle that is inherent in objective realities. Up to this point his delineation of the concept of “*rī*” has affinity with what rationalists envisaged as *ratio*.

However, when it comes to the ultimate process of knowing, or “seeing opposites as one” (*hankan gōitsu* [反観合一]), Baien’s approach to natural science was never welded to rationalistic or empirical epistemology. This marks an irreconcilable gap between *ratio* and Baien’s delineation of the concept of *rī*. His ontological statement runs as follows:

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[J]\ovī, signifying that one possesses two, and two open one. When there are two, their distinctness reveals *jōri*, when there is one, the two merge and no seams are visible. Seeing opposites as one is the art of discovering things in this way.\]

Importantly this dialectic model of cognitive process is based on Baien’s claim about heaven-and-earth as a single totality that entails the following dual modality: “heaven” as incorporeal entity and “earth” as corporeal entity. His general interpretation of an object in his *Gengo* [玄語] follows this principle. The existential

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28 Ibid., 160.
29 Ibid., 161. The bracket is inserted by the author.
form of incorporeal entity was called “ki [気]” (qi or ch’i in Chinese), which originally meant “breath” or “air” and was often rendered as “force”.

30 By contrast, the existential form of the corporeal entity was called “tai [体]” (body). The unity between ki and tai was construed as the essence of existence. This recalls the mind and matter dualism of European philosophy. However, while the dualism explains the unity between them as the constitution of an individual entity, the relationship between ki and tai that Baien delineated requires the involvement of the surroundings of an object. He stated:

Object [mono] has nature and nature is endowed with object. Nature and object merge without seams. Thus they are one whole. Nature pairs with body, object pairs with ki. Nature and object stand distinct, this is jōri. Thus they are two sides. Nature is nature alongside object, object is object alongside nature. Therefore one is one and one, and one and one is one.

31 This passage indicates that Baien considered a single object referred to as matter (mono [物]) to consist of both corporeal and incorporeal space coexisting alongside each other. That is to say, an object could be regarded as a single entity only through connecting its material space with its immaterial environmental space. Existentially divisible unity between these two kinds of space was thought to be the essence of existence. Here Baien’s ontology may be interpreted as an example of substantializing space. In this context there is no void space. Incorporeal space is substantialized as a living plenum that receives the potential to be embodied from corporeal matter and also supplies living force, or “ki”, to matter so that mere matter can become the “tai” (body) of life. This is consistent with the fact that Baien stated not only that “one is one and one” but also added “one and one is one”, and suggested that each object is united one with another based on the ceaseless unity between incorporeal living force and corporeal life.

32 The chain of this nexus of objects ultimately encompassed what he called “heaven-and-earth” as a whole.

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30 For an explanation of the word “ki”, see the introduction to Deep Words written by Mercer, ibid., 8.
31 Ibid., 78. The bracket is inserted by the author.
32 Ibid.: “By parting, two stand distinct, by combining, two merge into one. If one were simply one there would be neither separation nor combination, and if two were simply two, there would be no division or contrast. One and two are not simply one and two. Stability entails severalty, and being entails wholeness. By division, one is parted, by contrast, two are combined. Division is the warp, contrast is the woof. Warp and woof are parted spontaneously by jōri”.

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Baien’s ontology does not support the idea of a purely individual object, only the totality of this single cosmos. It is not a static unity but an organic unification through a motif of biotic terms such as “ki” and “tai”. The principle that supports this ontology is what Baien called *jyōri*.

At this point, the gap between *ratio* and *ri* in Baien’s inquiries into truth does not only suggest a different definition of the principle of this universe; it also strongly pertains to how to think about an individual object. The difference between the concept of *mono* (thing) in Baien’s ontology and “a thing perceived” defined as “representation” (*repraesentatio*) in modern European philosophy now becomes apparent. Representation is conceptually separate from an object, let alone an object itself. According to the Cartesian definition, an object is determined through an extraction of “clear-distinct” perception from “things perceived” in general. At this point an object becomes that which is determinable in accordance with *ratio*. In a strict rationalistic sense, what is determinable in this way is qualified as real existence. By contrast, according to Baien’s epistemology “object” signifies a relational being that entails recognition of not only representation but also non-representation. Empty space that gives neither stimulation to senses nor meanings to intellectual understanding is supposedly substantialized as the meaningful plenum. *Mono* (a thing/object) does not directly signify “a thing perceived”. It includes its surroundings and thus avoids being individually perceived. It contains not only its material surroundings but also its spatial surroundings. The nexus of the continuous linkage between them constitutes a whole entity, that is, cosmos as life. It is incompatible with the idea of *ratio*, that is, unchangeable, static, universal principles that are applied to explain the logic of “things perceived”. Knowing “*mono*” in Baien’s philosophy presupposes a perception of non-representation. The principle, or “*ri*” is thought to permeate this ontological system. Consequently, *ri* is established without *ratio*.

5. Conclusion

The genealogical study of the use of the term *ri* in translation reveals the disparity between the concept of *ratio* and that of *ri*. This is despite the conceptual approximation prevalent in the current use of these terms. This disparity does not just indicate the absence of the concept of *ratio* in Japanese traditional thought. As can be seen from both Sorai’s and Baien’s epistemological concerns, there has been...
some interest in rational principles that might be perceived as being similar to the quest for *ratio* in European philosophy. However, their usage of the term *ri* illuminates a philosophical abyss between *ratio* and *ri*. This is due to their delineation of truth and/or morality without the need to use the concept of *ratio*. Elucidation of this disjunction involves epistemological, ethical and ontological exploration.

In Sorai’s case, the concept of *ri* was far removed from that of *ratio*; he considered the essence of human beings to entail relativity concerning their reasoning in behaviors and regarded it as the apodictic principle or “*ri*” of human nature. Therefore, more importance was placed on “ought-to-be” than “is” in the service of peace in the community as a whole. Accordingly, “the way” or *dō* preceded *ri* in its significance. *Dō* is defined as the synthesis of knowledge and “virtue” or *toku*. Since the locus of *dō* lies in practice rather than pure observation, rationalization of moral principles using reason was not a central issue for Sorai. Consequently, he developed a moral philosophy without the concept of *ratio*. As far as Baien’s philosophy is concerned, despite his valuation of rational reasoning his epistemology was never welded to the concept of *ratio* in European philosophy. His biotic dualism between “*ki*” (breath, force) and “*tai*” (body) was deduced from his understanding of this cosmos as a vital totality. This idea entails the view that there is no void space; emptiness is substantIALIZED. This is irreconcilable with the view that this universe consists of the nexus of each individual and there is a static and apodictic principle that underlies this relation on which the concept of *ratio* stands. In this way, the philosophical disjunctions between *ratio* and *ri* as shown above give us the opportunity to elucidate a philosophical framework of epistemological, ethical and ontological questions in different cultural traditions.

Drawing attention to the imperfection of the translation does not necessarily need to foster negative criticism. Rather, as Nishi’s struggle with translation shows, it can invoke a reconsideration of the basis of philosophical schema that we may be unaware of otherwise. This pertains to what James W. Heisig called “thick translation”, which “…begins where dictionaries and reference works reach their limits” and aims to “…express the content of the original” in the service of a de-privatization of philosophical thought.\(^{33}\) Heisig’s conception of “thick translation” suggests the difficulty and necessity of making dialogue possible bearing a plurality of traditions in mind. Such an attempt goes beyond a description of a cultural history.

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and leads to “transcultural” practice. In advocating philosophy as translation, Saito Naoko also states that it will wake us up to a hidden dimension of our thinking, and give us a means of transforming our mode of thinking and mindset from within through our re-engagement with language. As this essay has attempted to exemplify, a re-examination of the translation between ratio and ri has the potential for such a transformation.

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34 The idea of transcultural practice is based on Wolfgang Welsch’s idea of transculturality. He stated that, “The concept of transculturality aims for a multi-meshed and inclusive, not separatist and exclusive, understanding of culture. It intends a culture and society whose pragmatic feats exist not in delimitation, but in the ability to link and undergo transition. In meeting with other lifeforms there are always not only divergences but opportunities to link up, and these can be developed and extended so that a common lifeform is fashioned which includes even reserves which hadn’t earlier seemed capable of being linked in. Extensions of this type represent a pressing task today”. See Wolfgang Welsch, “Transculturality — The Puzzling Form of Cultures Today”. Spaces of Culture: City, Nation, World (1999): 194–213.


The Philosophical Scope for “Rī” without “Ratio”


(Self-)Transformation as Translation
The Birth of the Individual from German Bildung and Japanese kata

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Abstract: Pedagogical processes are always connected to translation. This is very obvious in those practices of teaching where knowledge is transmitted through mediation. However, processes of self-formation or self-education, and especially the development of individuality, don’t seem to be connected directly to processes of translation. The following paper suggests that processes of individuation, too, can be understood as translations. In contrasting two culturally very different positions — the German idea of Bildung and the Japanese practice of exercising kata — it should become clear that both cannot be understood without referring to a concept of translation.

Introduction

Pedagogical processes are deeply connected to processes of translation. If we understand ‘translating’ as the process and a ‘translation’ as the result of transferring something into another medium, then there is no pedagogy without translating or translation — especially when taking into account the concept of translation elaborated by George Steiner who prominently called one of the chapters of his seminal work After Babel (1975) ‘Understanding as Translation’. For Steiner, to understand or to achieve some sort of understanding (one might even say: to give an interpretation) is to translate a foreign idiom into one’s own, or to present one’s own idiom in a form that it might be understood by the recipient. Those structures are obvious if one was to consider pedagogical processes of education — especially those which are somehow goal-oriented or goal-driven and where education is a process of initiated or guided learning towards a certain goal. Here the educator has something in mind, which s/he has to translate into something external (as speech or action) and of which s/he hopes it will be translated again into something cognitive/internal by the student (hopefully resulting in something roughly identical to what the educator started with). Most teaching consists of translating a specific content
into a certain form that is thought to be conceivable by the student, and most teachers use educational environments which are informed by materialised invitations for learning: the goal of teaching is translated into a material form in order to find its way into the student’s mind — the traditional form of entrances of school-buildings that separated girls from boys was as much an agenda translated into stone as is our modern refusal of such separating entrances. There was no age where educational content was not translated into materiality in order to, consciously or unconsciously, inform everyone living in this material world: placing the church/palace/parliament/agora/gathering house at the centre of the village or town is as much about educating the inhabitants about the structures of power as the repetitive presentation of the lore and legends that express the same structures, only translated into words.

However, not so easily recognisable are the structures of translation in pedagogical processes of self-formation and the emergence of individuality. By definition not about simply transferring something pre-existing from the educator to the student (a process that involves, as shown above, several stages of translation), it needs to be asked whether or not individuation or self-formation can and should be understood as translation. This paper endeavours to show that ultimately pedagogical processes of the (self-)formation of the individual can be understood as translation, even though different cultures might have different ideas as to what is translated into what in those processes. In order to show this, the paper will introduce and thereby contrast two seemingly opposing views of (self-)formation of the individual: the German idea of Bildung in its Classic 18th century form and the Classic Japanese concept of (self-)formation of the individual through the practising of kata (形/型). 1 Although both concepts of the emergence of individuality are quite different, they do agree in proposing that those processes are processes of translation. Contrasting both traditions in this way would help to find a common ground for relating both traditions and to point towards a shared frame of reference for comparing both traditions — hereby not only questioning the often repeated description of the uniqueness of both traditions but also offering a basis for comparison that is somewhat richer than the frameworks used in modern comparative studies focusing on student attainment.

1 In traditional texts, two different characters are used to express kata: 形 and 型. Both mean “form”, and “model”. However, 型 refers more to something like a mould; whereas 形 usually means a shape or appearance. Both meanings are part of the understanding of kata. However, a difference can and should be made as will be shown below.
**Bildung — Translating the Opaque**

A very brief and often overlooked passage in Humboldt’s text about the *Theory of Bildung*\(^2\) can serve as an entrance point not only for the presentation of this Classic concept of *Bildung*\(^3\) but also for the demarcation of the difference to pre-Classic concepts of *Bildung* — a difference that is intrinsically connected to the idea of the development of the individual as translation.

The sculptor, for example, does not actually wish to present the image of a god, but to express and make fast the fullness of his plastic imagination in this figure.\(^4\)

Why is this a significant passage in Humboldt’s text? Because it reverses the pre-Classic (one might say: original) idea of *Bildung* as becoming (again) the true image (=*imago*/ *Bild* in German) of God, regaining Godlikeness. This original concept of *Bildung* that is very much informed by the German mystic Meister Eckhart, perceived *Bildung* as the process in which humankind as a whole and the individual human attempt to regain their prelapsarian state of being like God in whose image every human was created. This process was indeed a process of de-individualization, as Godlikeness was thought to be the result of intentional self-negation. With Humboldt now, it is not the human that has to become like God, but it’s the god that has to be created according to the plastic imagination of the human. Not the human becomes godlike, but the god becomes humanlike. And one can easily see from here that it is the individual and its capacities that became of central interest to this type of philosophy and educational thinking. And indeed: *Bildung* in its 18th century guise soon became one of the two core concepts of German educational discourse which since then is represented by the two complementary notions of *Erziehung* and *Bildung* mapping out the horizon of possibility along the axes of heteronomous (*Erziehung*) and autonomous (*Bildung*) anthropopoiesis.

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\(^2\) Humboldt (2000).

\(^3\) For a general introduction to the concept of *Bildung* see: Horlacher (2016).

\(^4\) Humboldt (2000, 61).
(Self-)Transformation as Translation

Coming back to Humboldt’s concept it needs to be asked what Bildung actually meant when its root is not the formation according to a pre-given image (of God). It is here that we encounter the concept of the development of the individual as translation.

Humboldt builds his musings about Bildung around an anthropological statement that provides the foundation for what is developed later. For him, the individual human “wishes only to strengthen and heighten the powers of his nature and secure value and permanence for his being”. To achieve this goal, one has to relate oneself to the outside world, as Humboldt points out:

It is the ultimate task of our existence to achieve as much substance as possible for the concept of humanity in our person, both during the span of our life and beyond it, through the traces we leave by means of our vital activity. This can be fulfilled only by the linking of the self to the world to achieve the most general, most animated, and most unrestrained interplay.

As can be seen, the individuality of every single person plays an important role in this kind of concept: It is the concrete individuality of the single human that expands the very idea of humanity; the life of every single person is proof of the very potential of humanity — every life pushes the boundaries of what is thought to be ‘human’ further and thereby expands the idea of ‘humanity’. This expansion of the idea of humanity is, according to Humboldt, set as the general obligation of all human beings; to give up on this is tantamount to renouncing your humanity. To better comprehend why this can be described as a translation, we have to look more closely at the process that is thought to be supporting this development of individuality.

Humboldt states that this is done through linking the self to the world. What exactly happens here? The individual is supposed to act upon the world, and it is those actions that bind and relate her/him to the world:

To this end, however, he must bring the mass of objects closer to himself, impress his mind upon this matter, and create more of a resemblance

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5 Humboldt (2000, 58).
6 Humboldt (2000, 58).
between the two. Perfect unity and constant interplay are contained within him; thus he must apply both to Nature.\footnote{Humboldt (2000, 59).}

Humboldt here relates to classic descriptions of human reason as being a unity of multitudes — a unity of diverse faculties which create the idea or image of an object as composition of different aspects. It now is the task to learn how to perceive nature, that is the outside world, in exactly the same way; to see and represent nature as unity of multitudes is to impress the human mind upon the inhuman realm which in being acted upon resembles more and more the human mind and spirit. It is not by chance that Humboldt was one of the advisors of the new and modern German university, as this is exactly what he has in mind here: The academic endeavour to represent the world as a multitude of aspects which are nevertheless connected by for example natural laws or laws of causality means nothing else than seeing the world as unity of complexity, and every academic discipline represents the world from a certain angle, but it always does this as a project of analyzing (taking apart) and synthesizing (bringing it together) again. With regard to the individual that means: Every person should aspire to perceive the world from a specific, individual angle in order not only to identify the multitude of objects before him/her, but also to set out to connect all those objects and relate them to each other in order to create unity within this diversity. As every human can and should achieve this from her/his own individual point of view, the world is seen anew in every single person, and in doing so, every person bears witness to the potential of the human race. This is what Bildung as a personal and at the same time social evolution is all about.

And as can now be seen, Bildung as self-formation is a translation. Like in the example of the sculptor, Bildung is the process wherein the initially unknown inner potential of every person and of the whole race is gradually expressed in the outside world. The single person and with it the whole of humanity has been given specific potential from the first moment of existence, and somehow this potential is inscribed in us. Even though Humboldt himself does not elaborate as to how this inscription actually is to be understood (even though he does assume it to be inscribed somehow), one could refer to contemporary comparisons of humans to plants, using the unfolding and growing of a plant out of a single seed as model for the development of the human as, under the right circumstances, unfolding of something that is already ingrained into the human germ cells. Whatever is ingrained, and in whatever way it is ingrained: to actually become recognizable as individually
specific traits, it has to unfold into the outside world. And in doing this, it is translated into a ‘language’ of acts, of behavior, of life, that now is understood not only by the individual itself but also by other humans. Without translation, the potential never becomes real, perceivable and comprehensible; without this project of translation the individual would neither be understood nor understand itself; without translation there is no individuality. Bildung as the formation of individuality therefore can be understood as translation of an opaque potential into an understood reality.

Bildung in the sense described above is very much a product of the Classic German culture of the 18th century. It therefore is appropriate to compare this understanding with another Classic concept of individuation like the Japanese idea of kata 型 which is an integral part of the traditional culture of Japan, and, so can be argued, even of modern culture: Japan is a “culture of form”. And even though individuation through kata, too, can be understood as translation, as will be shown in the following paragraphs, the fundamental differences between both concepts will also become clear.

**Practicing kata — Translating the Universal**

Night after night, often in the backyard of the Azato house as the master looked on, I would practice a kata (“formal exercise”) time and again, week after week, sometimes month after month, until I had mastered it to my teacher’s satisfaction. This constant repetition of a single kata was gruelling, often exasperating and on occasion humiliating. More than once I had to lick the dust on the floor of the dojo or in the Azato backyard. But practice was strict, and I was never permitted to move on to another kata until Azato was convinced that I had satisfactorily understood the one I had been working on.

Here Funakoshi Gichin 船越 義珍, the founder of modern karate, describes his martial arts training. The role of kata practice can easily be recognized in this quote:

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8 It is only later, especially with Herbart, that this form of pre-determination implied by the idea of ingrained traits gave way to the more open concept of Bildsamkeit which refers to the general educability of a person.
9 Sasaki (2008, 47).
10 Funakoshi (1989, 6).
Not only is kata central to the whole way of teaching and learning — it also is extremely challenging as it demands a never-ending repetition until the kata is mastered. However — what exactly is kata?

It is as easy to explain as it is hard to understand. Kata is the heart of all traditional training, of traditional teaching and learning: Kata is the inheritance that every pupil is bestowed with by the tradition and by the old masters of the art. Matsunobu states:

Japanese arts have been preserved and transmitted through kata, literally “form” or “mold”, through which students learn structures of art, patterns of artistic and social behaviours, and moral and ethical values, all in accordance with prescribed formulae. Kata is a set of bodily movements that have been developed and preserved by precedent artists. The most efficient and authentic way to master the artistry, it is believed, is to follow the model defined as kata.\(^{11}\)

Kata therefore, on a more superficial level, is a set and combination of specific movements, whose order and way of presenting is fixed and prescribed — and which, as a form of pre-arranged training, usually hasn’t changed much for centuries; each kata includes different and similar movements, and the sum of all kata of an art represents the scope and horizon of the art itself. And this representation is not only a representation on the visible surface: the sum of all kata of an art represents the very heart of the art itself — its physical, mental and spiritual core. Mastering all kata is tantamount to mastering the art as a whole — and it would not be unusual if there is only one kata that makes up the whole art (as, for example, in tea ceremony). Kata are known not only in basically all martial arts, but also in all traditional arts and ways (dō 道) of Japan and in other formally acknowledged arts in Asia.\(^{12}\)

However, it has to be asked what “mastering the kata” means. Two sets of contraries might help to better understand what this mastership entails.

Ikuta introduces the important difference between kata 型 and katachi 形 by stating that

\(^{11}\) Matsunobu (2011, 47f.).
\(^{12}\) This kind of pre-arranged training is, however, known in especially combat or martial arts all over the world; it is not exclusively Asian. But it might be considered a Japanese specialty to have widened out those pre-structuring of practice and training on basically all arts and crafts.
“Katachi” is an apparent physical form of action shown by the performer (sic) of a certain “Waza” [technique], which may be decomposed into parts and described as a sequence of procedures. […] On the contrary, “Kata”, which has been regarded as the ultimate goal of the learner to attain in learning “Waza”, is not a simple collection of parts of action like “Katachi”, but an artistic and personal expression of “Katachi” bearing the meaning connected with a socio-historical factor of the world of a certain “Waza”, which is supposed to be mastered through the activity of imitating and repeating superficial “Katachi” with great pains.13

As can be seen here, kata is more than just the superficial repetition of a set of movements as it might appear to the ignorant eye; kata is about doing the right movements and at the same time understanding them in a way that goes far beyond a physical exercise: It is about ‘owning’ the kata, so to speak. It is this form of deeper understanding that the training of kata is aiming at — and it is exactly this form of understanding that is so difficult or maybe even impossible to explain for those without experience in such a kind of training. For Ikuta, it is this difficulty because of which trainers and educators using kata as method of teaching and learning always are drawn to use metaphorical language for explaining what the physical activity should look like or what it should or will achieve in the end. And it might be the reason why much of this practicing of kata is exercised in silence,14 without explanations or verbal comments. The account Herrigel gives of his experiences in being taught Japanese archery (kyūdō 弓道) shows in great detail not only the silence that often surrounds his exercising, but also the metaphorical language his teacher used to express his occasional comments on his pupil’s learning.15

Keeping in mind the difference between kata and katachi, it is easily to be understood why Egami Shigeru 江上 茂, a master of modern karate, distinguishes between two different types of practice and exercise: keiko 稽古 and renshū 練習.16 Whereas renshū refers to a practice of repetition, of training as drill, keiko for

13 Ikuta (1990, 138).
14 Hare (1998).
15 Herrigel (1948). The account Herrigel gives of his training has been criticised lately. However, those criticisms usually question whether or not his archery can justifiably be called a practice in Zen, as he thought — they do not question his descriptions of silence being a strong feature of his training.
16 Wittwer (2007, 117).
Egami means much more: *keiko* is *renshū* expanded by remembrance of the ancestors, or here: of the old masters. Far from being a mere physical activity, exercising and practising *kata* has a mental and spiritual dimension that connects the practitioner with the tradition: it is the mental and spiritual aspect of the physical activity that is the main aim of making *kata* the heart of practising; it is the heart-to-heart-communication between the masters of all ages and their followers which usually is referred to as *ishin-denshin* 以心伝心 that *kata* is aiming at. Yuasa has shown just how central the idea of the connectedness or even oneness of mind and body is in Asian cultures of practising, and that it is the physical activity that lays the ground for the formation of the mind and, subsequently, of the self.\(^{17}\)

It is the last remark that takes us now into a new direction: *kata* is as much about mastering the art as it is about the development of the self. Practising and mastering *kata* is tantamount to developing the self. As has been shown by Dodd & Brown, mastering the *kata* has been regarded as a way to develop the self.\(^{18}\) Not only the self in its relation to the art, but the entire self changes in the process of practising *kata*. As Matsunobu has put it: “The goal is not to accumulate knowledge or seek a higher level of technical and artistic achievement but to deepen one’s experience for the artful fulfillment of mind, body, and spirit”.\(^{19}\) Here it is irrelevant to ask which *kata* of which specific art is practised: the structures of *kata*-practising in general serve as an instrument to form the self. Nothing was more obvious than this to the masters of Japanese arts. Even in those arts which were introduced to serve a specific practical purpose, the mental and spiritual side and the sense for the formation of the whole self was never absent, as can easily be seen in the art of sword-fighting of Miyamoto Musashi 宮本 武藏.\(^{20}\) Musashi, who indeed perceived his art of fighting as an art to ensure the very survival in battles and duels, was very much aware of the mental and spiritual dimension of the physical activity of wielding a sword, and his art of fighting is at first an art of the mental and spiritual discipline of the self; practising the art therefore is in its main parts a development of the whole self. For those arts which were somewhat disconnected from the physical necessities of survival, the mental and spiritual side of the practice and the formation of the whole self was even more obvious, as can be seen not only in Sen no Rikyū’s 千利休 account of tea ceremony\(^{21}\) but also in those martial arts

\(^{17}\) Yuasa (1987).

\(^{18}\) Dodd & Brown (2016).

\(^{19}\) Matsunobu (2017, 114).

\(^{20}\) Musashi (2010).

\(^{21}\) Kenklies (2016).
who changed from being understood as *bujutsu* 武術 (technique of war/ fight) to being understood as *budō* 武道 (way/ path of war/ fight) — a development that started with the pacification of Japan during the Tokugawa shogunate 徳川幕府.²²

It now has to be considered what the practice of *kata* means for the development of the self. From here it then will become obvious why it would be justified to refer to this process of individuation as a process of translating.

The emphasis Egami puts on *keiko* as a practice that is transcended by a remembrance of the ancestors and old masters encapsulates what *kata* practising means: It aims at the introduction of the practitioner into the realm of tradition. Whoever practises *kata* aspires to become part of the tradition of which the *kata* represents the very heart. Mastering the *kata* means to inhabit the country of the ancestors; practising is the way of in-habiting, that is: of becoming an inhabitant of the Promised Land. It is a journey on the path (*dō* 道) that the masters walked before.

Nowhere can this be seen better than in the travels and journeys of Matsuo Bashō 松尾 芭蕉.²³ Bashō’s travels can be understood as journeys into the land of his ancestors: the mytho-historical map of Japan in his head, Bashō travels to those places which have some meaning for the people of Japan in general and for his noble ancestor poets in particular to grasp and understand the lore of the ancients in a much deeper way as he could from a distance. And not only does he attempt to understand: in adding his own personal poem to the numerous poems and stories that already address those places and bestow them with meaning, Bashō writes himself into the mytho-historical narrative of the land and at the same time forms himself in accordance to this ancestral narrative — thereby creating a self-image that is expressed in his famous diaries. Practising *kata* forms the practitioner to become a part of the tradition. Imai calls this self-formation through *kata* an “aesthetic construction” of the self as it does shape itself after the image provided by *kata*.²⁴

Now — why is this process of self-formation and individuation a translation?

As has been stated above, *kata* is the traditional model that has been transmitted through the teacher of the art so that the student can form him/herself in accordance to this model. In showing the *kata*, the teacher provides the instrument for the student to become part of this tradition. *Kata* therefore represents the blueprint of the art, the universal model that is the measure against which every

²² Kanno (2009).
practitioner and every practice has to be judged. It stands beyond the individual students and masters of the art and could be called the universal law of the art. However, it needs to be noted that learning the *kata* and thereby immersing oneself into the tradition is only the first step — or only the second step, if we count with Ikuta: starting with a mere physical imitation, *katachi*, that is followed by a state of a spiritually and mentally enriched understanding of the practice, *kata*, this path leads to yet another state — a state where *kata* as universal form is expressed in an individualised way — a state, where the practitioner reaches beyond what is universal and transcends the form: mastership lies beyond the traditional and therefore universal *kata* — it is based upon creativity. This step beyond can be seen in all arts: Sen no Rikyū mentions it with regard to his tea ceremony, Matsuo Bashō’s in-habitation of the ancestral country leads him far beyond what has been suggested to him, and in the Martial Arts this often is the moment where the student creates his/ her own style (*ryū*). As can be seen in the numerous anecdotes of the masters of arts: they tend to represent quite unique personalities. Mastership (and, similarly, enlightenment) does not mean conformity but, on the contrary, individuality. And it is this individuation that can now be seen to be a translation: Practising *kata* in the end leads to a translation of the universal into something individual; becoming a master through mastering the *kata* consists in finding and expressing a very unique translation of the universal idiom of the *kata*; mastering the *kata* means to understand the universal form and oneself in relation to it — what appears to be a practice of uniformity reveals itself to be an epitomization of individuation through translation.

**Individuation and (Self-)Formation — Education as Translation**

As can be seen now, *Bildung* and the practice of *kata* can be understood as processes of individuation through translation. Both concepts need the crossover from one idiom to another; in both concepts the expression and hereby understanding of individuality rests upon the transformation of something else. However, it should have also become obvious that there are fundamental differences in the conceptualization of the individuation processes. As Imai has phrased it, the

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26 Kenklies (2016).
28 Matsunobu (2016).
Japanese individual does not seem to be connected to some sort of inner self: the practising and mastering of kata seems to produce a superficial self as it aspires to represent the mere surface of the visible kata. And even if we agree with Ikuta that kata represents a somewhat deeper understanding, then it has to be remembered that especially because this understanding is produced and transmitted through the usage of metaphors it needs a connection and a shared social life in order to understand those metaphors. The absolute individual seems to have no place here. In contrast to this, the German idea of Bildung is directly founded upon the presupposition of such a strong core of the individual which is given somehow but not yet given to the person him/herself, and not yet to anyone else. Not yet aware and conscious of what it truly is, the individual needs to undergo the process of Bildung in order to express and understand him/herself. And it is only through this expression that one gets to understand the individual, i.e. the individuality of the person. However, it needs to be asked in what way Japanese thinking conceptualizes the possibility of transcending the form. That it includes the idea of transcending, of going beyond the mere form seems to be obvious, but it is not so clear how this achievement can be explained with regard to the existence of the absolute individuality that seems to be necessary as foundation of such a transgression (further research needs to be done here). And on the other hand, it needs to be asked in exactly what way the individuality of a person is already ingrained in its very beginning so that it just needs to be supported to express itself: the German concept of Bildung as expression of an initially opaque individuality remains itself somewhat opaque.

And another important difference has to be acknowledged: whereas the German individuation through Bildung seems to be almost exclusively focussed upon intellectuality, it is the Japanese idea of individuation through kata that combines in a much deeper (and one might even say: more modern) way body and mind inasmuch all those practices of kata include intellectual/ spiritual as well as bodily performances as they attempt to initiate a development in both realms — trying to achieve what is usually called a unity of mind and body. It needs another paper to explore the intricate and maybe even paradoxical relationship between self and cosmos (or nothingness) that lies at the heart of a traditional Japanese concept of the self.

From a pedagogical point of view, there seems to be a fundamental difference in the conceptual framing of both processes of translation: whereas the

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29 Imai (2004).
German concept sets the unveiling of the individual as direct goal of the development, the Japanese idea of practicing kata does not directly aim at individuality as its goal — it simply emerges. It might be recognized as such in the end, but individuality is not part of the pedagogical framework that is used to infer the right practice of development. Individuality so could be said, is a direct aspiration of Bildung and an indirect result of kata-practice. This has consequences for the practices that surround those concepts of individuation. However, this is beyond my present scope.

Translations lie at the core of pedagogical processes. Not only are those practices of education that involve mediation founded upon concepts of translation. Also those educational practices that are involved in the formation of the self with regard to its individuation can justifiably be referred to as translations. Although there might be cultural differences when it comes to describing the very nature of those translations, it remains nevertheless true that education always entails an act of translating.

References


Well-done Steak or Gyū Sashi?
“Sacred Cows” and “Thickening” in Japanese-English Philosophical Translation

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Abstract: The influential and prolific philosopher and translator of philosophy James Heisig has argued for “desacralizing” translation into Japanese, and against “perfect translation” and for “thick translation” in Japanese to English translation. Heisig prioritizes broad appeal and readability over accuracy, bringing the translated philosopher into the reader’s space and facilitating an encounter on the latter’s terms rather than treating the author as a “sacred cow”. This article discusses Heisig’s programmatic statements on translation strategy in the context of the global dominance of English, the effects of declining language capabilities and unequal distribution of translation capabilities among Anglograph philosophers, the tendentially conservative and “domesticating” Anglospheric regime of translation, and the “foreignizing” alternatives found in Japanese translation history and in Schleiermacher, Nietzsche, Benjamin, and contemporary translation theorists. It suggests that learning from professional practices in the translation industry could help translating philosophers strike a suitable balance between domestication and foreignization.

Aber nun der eigentliche Übersetzer, der diese beiden ganz getrennten Personen, seinen Schriftsteller und seinen Leser, wirklich einander zuführen, und dem letzten, ohne ihn jedoch aus dem Kreise seiner Muttersprache heraus zu nötigen, zu einem möglichst richtigen und vollständigen Verständniß und Genuß des ersten verhelfen will, was für Wege kann er hierzu einschlagen? Meines Erachtens gibt es deren nur zwei. Entweder der Übersetzer läßt den Schriftsteller möglichst in Ruhe, und bewegt den Leser ihm entgegen; oder er läßt den Leser möglichst in Ruhe und bewegt den Schriftsteller ihm entgegen (Schleiermacher 1813: 4–5).
The study of Japanese philosophy abroad has blossomed in recent years and translation plays a critical role in making the ideas of Japanese thinkers available. New journals and book series have been launched, conferences held by the Japanese philosophy associations are well attended, there have been major translation projects, such as Heisig, Kasulis & Maraldo’s monumental sourcebook (Heisig et al. eds. 2011), and handbooks of Japanese philosophy have appeared (Davis ed. 2014; Yusa ed. 2017). Japanese philosophy appears to be flourishing internationally, yet the Philosophical Association of Japan launched this journal voicing fears for the future of philosophy. While Japanese philosophy is thriving abroad, there is a sense that academic philosophy in Japan is under existential threat from outside academia, or that it “feeds off itself, as if in the effort to grow as small as possible and eventually disappear” (Katō 2015; Heisig 2003: 46). In contrast, others hold that Japan is in the midst of an “age of philosophy” 哲学の時代 and in the throes of a “philosophy boom” where “many people are now interested in philosophy” いま多くの人が哲学に関心を抱いている (Bunshun Online 2017; Okamoto 2016).

Whatever one makes of the state of Japanese philosophy in the world and of philosophy in Japan, translation of the texts that are the mainstay of philosophical debate is a key aspect shaping the study of Japanese philosophy abroad. This article therefore contextually discusses two programmatic statements by James Heisig about translation strategy (Heisig 2003; 2010). Where Heisig works firmly within the hegemonic, domesticating, Anglospheric “regime of translation” (Sakai 2006), the article considers the subaltern counter-tradition of foreignization elaborated by Schleiermacher, Nietzsche, Benjamin, Berman, and Venuti as an alternative approach practiced more in Japan, and suggests that valuable lessons may be learnt from professional translators.

1. Translating philosophy in an “Anglobalizing” world

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1 The background to Katō’s concern was the controversy surrounding MEXT’s ambiguous June 2015 statements, which suggested mass closure of social science and humanities departments. This caused an international “tsunami in a yunomi” or media storm in a teacup when mistranslated reports were picked up by the foreign media, leading the Ministry to issue a clarifying statement in English. (See Steffensen 2015 and Aoki 2017).

2 An indication of the popular interest in philosophy is the fact that one can pick up philosophy dictionaries, introductions to Nietzsche, or primers on logic in convenience stores and from vending machines in train stations.
Philosophy in the Anglosphere is among the least sociologically and intellectually diverse humanities disciplines; philosophers tend to be disproportionately white, male, and socio-economically privileged, with a conception of philosophy as exclusively “derived from Europe and the English-speaking world” (Garfield & van Norden 2016). Its ethnocentric conservatism, claims to universality, and blindness to changing, demographic, economic and political realities is reminiscent of the blinkered “cultural hubris” of the decaying Qing empire (Basu 2014: 937). The current flowering of Japanese philosophy is thus taking place on the margins of a discipline that is skeptical if not downright hostile to non-Western thought, not unlike the “anti-Westernism” that accompanied the collapse of the traditional East Asian order (Wakabayashi 1992). The out-of-touch mandarins today are not Neo-Confucians but the inhabitants of the increasingly detached dreaming spires of seats of Western learning. As a result, scholars of Japanese philosophy often ply their trade in area studies and religious studies departments, and this colors what is considered Japanese philosophy and what is translated (Steffensen 2017: 69).

Western specialists in Japanese philosophy have overwhelmingly focused on Buddhism in its “religious and soteriological aspects” (Parkes 1997: 307). A tendency towards Orientalism, exoticism and “systematically overestimating the role of religion” in the non-West (Sen 2005: 69) reproduces itself through translation. The selection of texts thus plays a crucial role in constituting “Japanese philosophy” as generally synonymous with Buddhist philosophy. As Steven Bein sums it up: “Of all the many volumes of nineteenth and twentieth century Japanese philosophy, almost everything to reach Western audiences is Buddhist philosophy” (Bein 2017: 207).

The gatekeeping and boundary-maintaining role of the leading translators is all the more important in the context of what might be called “Anglobalization”. Globalization is more complex than “the spreading economic and military might of the US” (Jameson 2000: 50), but two centuries of British and American hegemony have made English the first global lingua franca now used by more non-native than native speakers. Outside the Anglosphere, English has come to dominate at the expense of other languages, and inside it fewer academics read in languages other than their native tongue. A few decades ago, the average European undergraduate had a functional knowledge of classical and modern European languages. In Japan, unmediated reading is still considered a hallmark of expertise, but students in continental Europe today will often read Kant, Hegel or Foucault in English translation supported by English-language secondary literature. The distance
becomes even greater when students or academics take an interest in East Asian philosophy, where independent reading ability is scarcer, the corpus of translations much less complete and, arguably, slanted to channel them in certain conservative directions. Research therefore often remains derivative and reliant on translation by a few figures, whose linguistic and hence interpretive authority the readers are ill-equipped to query.3

While the global spread of English and decline in foreign language abilities in the Anglosphere has led to linguistic homogenization and narrowing of horizons, there is also a sense that philosophy should reflect and reflect upon the cultural plurality that surrounds it. This means broadening the scope beyond the Greek-Roman and Western European traditions to include Islamic and non-Western thought. There are good reasons for philosophy to become more pluralistic and inclusive, just as it is for it to address its gender imbalance. As Foucault remarked: “should there be a philosophy of the future, it will be born outside of Europe, or as a result of encounters and impacts between Europe and non-Europe” (Foucault 1994: 623).4

The ideal where all can read original sources is unrealistic, and limiting ourselves to the languages we can read is restrictive. It is therefore, as Michiko Yusa has phrased it, an “inevitable fact that we are all indebted to translations”, but there is also a “necessity of learning the language in which the text is written”. This is not only for epistemic, but also for ethical and political reasons; engagement and encounter on as equal terms as possible requires reciprocity and linguistic competence equal to that of generations of Japanese scholars for whom mastery of European languages and intellectual idioms has been the norm for over a century and a half. For Yusa, there is a hierarchy of Japanese proficiency, going from a “passive” ability to compare original and translation over an ability “to read the text accurately, even if one is not able to converse in the target language” to a level of fluency where “one can read, speak, listen, think, and write in it and translate it into another language” (Yusa 2017: 16).

3 Relatively fewer Anglophone philosophers writing on Japanese philosophy seem able to read Japanese than e.g. historians, ethnographers, political scientists, and literary scholars specialising in Japan. It is thus much more common to see doctorates in philosophy based entirely on translated sources than in most neighbouring disciplines.

4 “Si une philosophie de l’avenir existe, elle doit naître en dehors de l’Europe ou bien elle doit naître en conséquence de rencontres et de percussions entre l’Europe et la non-Europe”. Apart from making the pronouncement, Foucault’s understanding remained abstract and superficial, with Japan as a disorientating “enigma” (Lazreg 2017: 216).
Well-done Steak or Gyū Sashi?

Translation into Japanese is justified even when reading proficiency in European languages is widespread, and there is a need for good translations into English of philosophy written in Japanese. The question becomes what constitutes good translation in philosophy and by which procedures we can ensure that such translations are produced. The current distribution of language skills within the Anglograph Japanese philosophy community creates a dependency on a few authority figures and a conservative bias towards reproducing their intellectual agenda and de facto equation of Japanese philosophy with Buddhist philosophy.

2. Desacralization, imperfection and how to serve the meat of a sacred cow

James Heisig is greatest living Anglophone scholar of the Kyoto School building on the tradition founded by his predecessors at the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture. He is also a prolific translator into English and pivotal in the further transmission of Japanese philosophy into Spanish.\(^5\) He is not only an eminent theologian, philosopher, and translator; he has also reflected theoretically on how to translate philosophical texts. In one article, he argues for “desacralizing” translation, in another he sets out the “case against perfect translations” (Heisig 2003; 2010).

There is much of value that most translators will agree with in Heisig’s considerations. In “Desacralizing Philosophical Translation” he paints a picture of an academic establishment in Japan that is divorced from wider societal discourse and becoming irrelevant through excessive specialization and elitism. According to

\(^5\) In addition to Japanese and several other European languages, Heisig is fluent in Spanish and has authored several works since 1976 in the language of Cervantes. Spanish translations often follow on from previous English translations, e.g. Raquel Bouso García’s translation of Jan van Bragt’s translation of Nishitani’s Shūkyō to wa nani ka 宗教とは何か as La religión y la nada. Bouso has also translated Heisig, Robert Carter and Thomas Kasulis into Spanish and a Spanish-language version of Heisig, Kasulis and Maraldo’s sourcebook. Perhaps more than any other of the major Western language communities, the Spanish-speaking world is dependent on English-language scholarship and on English as an intermediary pivot language. Judging by the critical reception (e.g. Vallverdu 2017), this is largely considered unproblematic and Heisig and Bouso, indeed, defended translation via English when the book was launched at Casa Asia. With some exceptions such as Agustín Jacinto Zavala much Spanish research is based on translations of translations with the inevitable risk of a “Chinese whispers” effect. The risk is particularly pronounced when translating books like Carter’s, which is based solely on English-language sources. This risk is much less pronounced among German and French-speaking scholars, where Japanese literacy is more widespread.
Heisig, an important reason is that philosophical texts are not translated “to be widely read”. For him, translation should spread the word as widely as possible, and translators should be freed from constraints. Accuracy and loyalty to the author’s voice take second place:

I would like to argue the case for a radical liberalization of the standards of philosophical translation in Japan. It is time great numbers of aspiring philosophers were set free to err on the side of creativity and rhetorical elegance, which have been longstanding victims of the largely tacit but powerful assumptions regarding translation. The step is an audacious one only because it is unfamiliar. Once taken, however, I am convinced that it will help to free the thinking of the young generation of philosophical minds who typically begin their careers with translating texts, and at the same time increase the reading public of philosophy. Accordingly, the object of my argument here will be the sacred cow of fidelity to the original text (Heisig 2003: 48).

Seven years later, Heisig inveighed “against perfect translations”. This time, his target was translation from East Asian into European languages, and he argued for “redrawing the canons of translation of East Asian philosophical texts in order to draw Western philosophers more deeply into conversation with them” (Heisig 2010: 81).

I am convinced that much more is gained in the presentation of Asian philosophies in Western languages than is lost, and that, on balance, it is better to err on the side of readable, widely accessible translation than on the side of a meticulous, esoteric rendering. The addiction to the opinions of a small but critical readership of specialists in the field is nearly epidemic among translators of philosophical texts, and for this, there is no known rational cure. One can only stand by and watch the same irony play itself out again and again as obscurity of thinking and inadequate skill at expression are projected onto the insistence that the original text is responsible for the clumsiness of the translation. This kind of failure is understandable enough, but it should become more and more inexcusable as time goes by. For that to happen, we need to take a posture of critical suspicion towards all claims
that communication should suffer in the name of fidelity to the text (Heisig 2010: 84–85, emphasis in original).

To save philosophy in Japan and spread East Asian philosophy in the West, Heisig seeks to interlingually disseminate ideas efficiently and effectively. To achieve his mission, he is willing to slaughter the “sacred cow of fidelity to the original text” while preserving the sanctity of the target language (Heisig 2003: 46). Extending his metaphor, one could add that his next step is to cook a well-done “thickly” cut steak rather than serve it raw as “thinly” sliced gyū sashi. Heisig distinguishes between “thin” and “thick” translation, building on an idea of Gilbert Ryle’s, which Clifford Geertz popularized in his work on “thick description” in intercultural hermeneutics (Geertz 1973). Heisig defines “thin” or “perfect” translation as follows:

By a thin translation, I mean a largely literal rendition, faithful to the original phrase by phrase, consistent in its translation of terms, often annotated to indicate obscure allusions, and resigned to forfeiting literary style of the original for the sake of the meanings and ambiguities of the words themselves, even where this involves a certain clumsiness in syntax. The thin translation is typically marked by the introduction of neologisms or foreign words, the insertion of bracketed remarks, and an unnatural flow in style. For the translated text to introduce nuances of meaning not present in the original is as much a fault as is the mistranslation of a term or the misreading of a grammatical construct. How perfectly the translation is executed depends also on the knowledge and skill of the translator. The ideal translation, therefore, is one in which interference by the translator and by the medium of translation is so thin as to be all but transparent, and the accuracy of the equivalences of such a high standard as to render it translucent of the underlying original. Even if such perfection were possible, the translation would be of little use to those who can read the text fluently in the original, except perhaps to save them the time when they need to cite it in translation. But for those to whom the original is closed off, it is the best they can hope for; and for those who read the original with difficulty, its thinness enables them to navigate their way quickly to the parts they want to check in the

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6 Gyū sashi is beef sashimi, i.e. slices of raw meat.
original. In any case, the thinner and more perfect the translation, the more it is considered reliable for “scholarly” purposes (Heisig 2010: 85).

Against this, he argues for “thick translation” as a superior strategy:

If the shadow of the original hangs forever over any perfection achieved in a thin translation, it is all but absent in the completion of a thick translation. Its aim is to express the content of the original in a syntax, idiom, and fluency of prose that makes it at once intelligible and satisfying to the linguistic tastes of the translator, and appealing to the native reader of the language of translation. The thickening of the translation begins where dictionaries and reference works reach their limits. The translator breathes in the text, holds it, and then breathes it out so that the words frozen stiff on the printed page can melt into a vernacular that flows naturally for the reader. Like a good editor, the translator is not bound by the syntax and idioms of the author but aims at improving the original or, in the case of a masterly written text, making it at least plausible in translation. Lapses of logical connection are restored, wordiness is tightened, rigidity is loosened up. Sound and rhythm replace the tiresome, heavy plod of what has been carelessly written or what would appear to be carelessly written if presented in a thinner, more literal rendition. The result is not a finished product because the thick translation is not aiming at perfection (Heisig 2010: 86).

It must be noted that this conception of “thick translation” differs from other treatments, such as those of Kwame Anthony Appiah (Appiah 1993) and Theo Hermans, who also draw on Ryle but arrive at their conceptions via Grice and Searle’s philosophy of language and Geertz’s notion of ethnographic “thick description”, to which it is “grafted on” (Hermans 2003:385). This means that for Appiah, “thick translation” is almost diametrically the opposite of what Heisig proposes. It is a form of “’academic’ translation, translation that seeks with its annotations and its accompanying glosses to locate the text in a rich cultural and linguistic context”. And unlike Heisig, Appiah argues that such work is “eminently worth doing”, not only for research but also for teaching purposes. Unlike for Heisig, for Appiah a “thick translation” is one that does not aim to be a work of philosophy in itself but one that “tells us about the culture from which the object-text it translates has come” (Appiah 1993: 817).
In his distinctions between “thin” and “thick”, and “perfection” versus “desacralization”, Heisig voices dilemmas as old as the practice of translation itself and comes down squarely on one side, that of the reader. For Schleiermacher, translation is an intersubjective exchange mediated by the translator, and, as Sakai notes, the translator “regulates communicative transactions, but her mediation must be erased in the representation of translation according to which the message issued by the writer in one language is transferred into an equivalent message in another language, which is then received by the readers” (Sakai 1997: 9–10). The translator is always torn between two ideals that pull in opposite directions — on the one hand, a wish to be faithful to the author and to write a translation that accurately reflects the source text and, on the other hand, a desire to recompose a text that reads fluently in the target language. For Heisig, the aim “is not to retain the purity and innocence of an original text at all costs, but to engage the original in conversation, faithful to its meaning if not always to its idiom” (Heisig 2010: 87).

As successful examples of the strategy, he points to Jan van Bragt’s translation of Nishitani’s Religion and Nothingness and his own collaboration with Takeuchi Yasunori and Valdo Viglielmo on Tanabe’s Philosophy as Metanoetics. Heisig cites the testimony of the theologian Joseph Kitagawa, who found these translations “often to be clearer and more interesting than the original Japanese” (Heisig 2010: 86). Kitagawa realized that things “had been found in the English version that were only dimly there, if they were indeed there at all, in the original”. This is because “the text had been thickened to draw connections and conclusions as English style required, and to introduce ambiguity where the Japanese was straightforward and univocal. To the native reader of English, the translations read as if written originally in English, but to achieve this, a heavy editorial hand was needed” (Heisig 2010: 87). The proof of the pudding is thus its easy digestibility.

What distinguishes a good translation, according to Heisig, is that it leaves no traces of its foreignness, and leaves philosophical English unchanged. What some would consider the mistake of over-translation (insertion of things that were not in the original) is turned into a virtue. The translator presents an interpretation and there is no need for the reader to “be a cow” and practice the Nietzschean “art of reading” as “rumination” (Nietzsche 2006: 9). The sacred cow is cut up, cooked and served to the reader to be effortlessly digested.

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7 As testimony to his influence and the well-deserved esteem he is held in, Heisig was closely involved in van Bragt’s project as well as in Graham Parkes and Setsuko Aihara’s translation of Nishitani’s The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism (Heisig 2009: 299)
Even if Heisig’s brand of comparative and continental philosophy is a minority interest struggling for recognition against resistance from a mostly analytic Anglophone academy, his “thickening” translation strategy is firmly within the mainstream Anglophone tradition and very different from the Japanese “thin” translation he criticizes. As Indra Levy has succinctly stated, “modern Japan is a culture of translation” which has tended to preserve “the foreign character of the source text in a way that radically expands the horizons of the target language” (Levy 2011: 1, 3). Writing “translationese” or honyakugo 翻訳語 is not considered a sociolinguistic sin and modern academic Japanese is very much a hybrid language. Translation has been used for social and intellectual transformation in a subaltern culture and “played a formative role in the constitution of Japanese modernity” (Haag 2011: 16; Maruyama & Katō 1998; Clements 2015). Japan has been an importer of ideas and the Anglosphere a net exporter. As Heisig’s recommendations underline, translation into English takes place in an assimilatory regime and serves to uphold the existing order of discourse rather than to disturb it. The question is whether philosophy is best served by assimilation or by efforts to “deposit something resistant and Oriental beneath the skin of the Western tradition” (Williams 2002: 4).

3. Bringing the author home or sending the reader abroad?

As the epigraph expresses, translation is an intersubjective encounter between author and reader mediated by the agency of the translator. The strategic choices are between different degrees of intervention in either direction: “Either the translator leaves the author in peace, as much as possible, and moves the reader towards him; or he leaves the reader in peace, as much as possible, and moves the author towards him” (Schleiermacher 1813: 5; Venuti 2008: 84). Schleiermacher preferred to “leave the author in peace” and move the reader towards the author.

In articulating the dilemma and the choice in these terms, Schleiermacher was the first in a succession of mostly German-writing thinkers to propose what nowadays is termed a “foreignizing method” and theorized by scholars associated with the “cultural turn” in translation studies (Berman 1984, 2008; Lefevere 1990; Venuti 2008: 84–99). The argument for foreignizing and “sending the reader abroad” rather than “brining the author home” has been a reaction against the tendency by
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hegemonic cultures to assimilate subaltern texts at least since Roman antiquity. For Nietzsche, Roman translators of Greek poetry had:

no sympathy for the antiquarian inquisitiveness that precedes the historical sense; as poets, they had no time for all those very personal things and names and whatever might be considered the costume and mask of a city, a coast, or a century: quickly, they replaced it with what was contemporary and Roman. They seem to ask us: Should we not make new for ourselves what is old and find ourselves in it? Should we not have the right to breathe our own soul into this dead body? For it is dead after all; how ugly is everything dead! They did not know the delights of the historical sense; what was past and alien was an embarrassment for them; and being Romans, they saw it as an incentive for a Roman conquest. Indeed, translation was a form of conquest. Not only did one omit what was historical; one also added allusions to the present and, above all, struck out the name of the poet and replaced it with one’s own—not with any sense of theft but with the very best conscience of the imperium Romanum (Nietzsche 1974: 137–138).

What Nietzsche warns against is the “desacralization” and “thick translation” which requires betrayal of the idiom of a text and its conquest by the target culture. Any act of translation is inevitably also an act of interpretation, but there is a risk that “thick translation” becomes over-translation, obscures the ambiguities of the source text and imposes too much of the translator’s interpretation. Translators should perhaps be less concerned with making it easy for readers and more with representing authors, with all their ambiguities, stylistic idiosyncrasies, historicity, and foreignness.

Where Heisig believes we should strive to translate Japanese as if written originally in English, Benjamin conceived of the task as that of intervening in and transforming the target language:

Our translations, even the best ones, proceed from a wrong premise. They want to turn Hindi, Greek, English into German instead of turning German into Hindi, Greek, English. Our translators have a far greater reverence for the usage of their own language than for the spirit of the foreign works.... The basic error of the translator is that he preserves the state in which his own language happens to be instead of allowing his language to be
powerfully affected by the foreign tongue. Particularly when translating from a language very remote from his own he must go back to the primal elements of language itself and penetrate to the point where work, image, and tone converge. He must expand and deepen his language by means of the foreign language. It is not generally realized to what extent this is possible, to what extent any language can be transformed, how language differs from language almost the way dialect differs from dialect; however, this last is true only if one takes language seriously enough, not if one takes it lightly (Benjamin 2007: 80–81).

What Benjamin advocates comes close to Bertolt Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt (variously translated as alienation, distancing, or estrangement effect) as a dramaturgical device whereby the audience is prevented from losing itself in the narrative and is instead made a conscious, critical observer. To translate in such an alienating, distancing, or estranging way would work on transforming and pluralising Western-language philosophy rather than assimilating non-Western thought through “domestication”. Venuti argues in the spirit of Schleiermacher, Nietzsche and Benjamin that the ethical choice is “to register the linguistic and cultural difference of the foreign text, sending the reader abroad” (Venuti 1995: 20), where Heisig holds that insufficient adaptation to the target language and culture can “frighten away the very minds that one wishes most to find a way into the dialogue” (Heisig 2010: 83). Both seek to further communication and productive dialogue, either by “bringing the author home” or “sending the reader abroad”. For Heisig, the reason we must bring the author home is to popularize the foreign philosophy. Miki Kiyoshi, a philosopher with great popular appeal as a public intellectual, asked in July 1932: “Can philosophy not be made easy?” 哲学はやさしくできないか (Miki 1967a: 477–487). His answer — “thinly” translated — was this:

Philosophy is lost in popularization, and a loss of philosophy does not make philosophy easy to understand. When using the pretext of making philosophy easy to understand, one should be wary of whether the philosophy itself will be erased or the philosophical spirit will be lost by popularization\(^8\) (Miki 1967a: 486).

\(^8\) 俗流化は哲学を失ふ、哲学をなくすことは哲学をわかるようにすることではなかろう。哲学をわかり易くするといふ口実のもとに、俗流化によって、哲学そのも
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Where Heisig wants to save philosophy by making it accessible to a wider audience and add value in translation, the most publicly engaged Kyoto School philosopher warns against loss of “the philosophical spirit”.

4. A proposition in lieu of conclusion: Philosophical translation as specialized translation

Many fields of human endeavor routinely rely on translation, and translating philosophers might learn from the practices of specialized translators in such fields as technology, medicine, law, and financial services. This rests on a widespread, but by no means universally agreed, theoretical distinction between literary and specialized translation, where the latter requires specialist knowledge of a subject field. Specialized translation is carried out by translators, such as Heisig and other philosophers, who in addition to mastery of the source and target language have “the knowledge, the competence, and the recognized status of an expert” in their field (Scarcevic 2006: 10). Literary translation, on the other hand, often tends towards the seamless assimilation that Heisig advocates. On the further assumption that the activity of translating philosophical texts does not in principle differ substantially from that of specialized translation and that the task of the philosophical translator is more akin to that of the specialized than the literary translator, then the theoretical work informing their practices could be of value. Without explicitly considering any applicable lessons that could be learnt from the translation industry, the translations in the special issue on “Japanese Philosophy in the 20th Century” (Philosophie japonaise du XXe siècle) edited by Jacynthe Tremblay similarly emphasized conceptual accuracy over target language conventions (Tremblay 2008: 242). And as suggested above, Tremblay and her collaborators follow a foreignizing rather than domesticating strategy to transform French-language philosophy:

À la façon des philosophes de l’ère Meiji qui transformèrent leur propre langue (création de néologismes et de distinctions à partir des caractères chinois, nouvelles significations données aux vieux vocables, altération de la

のが抹殺されたり、哲學的精神が失われたりすることがありはしないかを警戒せねばならぬ。

9 For a problematization of the distinction, see Rogers 2015.
Instead of Heisig’s proposed “radical liberalization”, bringing practices more in line with the disciplined conduct of professional translators and with the reception history of modern philosophy in Japan might be worth considering. Philosophical translation should strive for accurate transmission of concepts and arguments, without undermining philosophy in the process, as Heisig suggests is happening at the hands of translator-philosophers in Japan (Heisig 2003: 47). He believes that, “in Japan’s academic world, translation is seen as a technical issue, not a proper philosophical question”, but it should be seen as both, and neither aspect taken lightly. Rather than being philosophically deficient, many academics in Japan and abroad lack the technical skills to translate accurately. In the worst cases, they are too weak both as translators and philosophers and lack “disciplinary preparedness” (Sakai 2009:190; cf. Williams 2004: 47).

The translation of philosophical texts ought to be subject to similar demands of conceptual rigor, consistency and accuracy as the medical, legal, and financial texts upon which lives and livelihoods often depend. Rather than maximizing its aesthetic appeal to ease reading, translation should aim to accurately transfer the meanings of the source text. As Miki argued, philosophy should not be unnecessarily complicated, but it should not popularize itself out of existence. The monolingual student or philosopher is in principle no different from the banker making an investment decision or the lawyer interpreting a contract. The practical need is to understand the text and to work productively with it. Similar

If that were the case, modern philosophy would never have taken off in Japan, as the style of translation and writing he so deplores has characterized academic philosophy since the19th century. Modern Japanese philosophers (and many novelists) have always translated and written in “foreignizing” ways. The crisis Heisig perceives must have other sources than translation, and the view that philosophy suffers from “academicism” is nothing new, as some of Tosaka’s and Miki’s writings from the 1930s attest to (Steffensen 2016; Miki 1967b). Furthermore, the abovementioned “philosophy boom” suggests that the reading public in Japan has a voracious appetite for philosophy. If philosophy did not appeal to the public in 2003, the crisis seems to have blown over by 2017.
intersubjectively verifiable quality standards should apply as to other fields that rely on textual transfer of meanings between languages.

The needs of the target audience of philosophical translation are not principally aesthetic, as Heisig seems to think when writing that “the idea that texts are more beautiful, or at least richer, in the original is a truism that no translator of philosophy would dare challenge in public” (Heisig 2003: 48). Its beauty has no bearing on whether a translation serves its purpose of representing the author’s ideas, including his or her possibly awkward of downright ugly style. Philosophers in Japan write in very different styles and often have the soundness of the philosophy as the main concern. This can result in technical, complex texts that are also difficult for native readers to follow, just as Heidegger is challenging for German-speakers. Following Heisig’s advice “to err on the side of creativity and rhetorical elegance” runs the risk that the resulting “thick translation” gives “a very bad idea of the linguistic character of the original” (Heisig 2003: 48; Beard 2013: 33). Because interpretive choices are involved, there can be no direct equivalence between the source and target text, but the translator must remain as invisible as possible and have the stylistic flexibility to represent the author.

Following basic quality control procedures ought both to produce readable texts and transmit ideas more accurately. This is easily achieved if translators, publishers, and peer reviewers ask themselves standard questions posed in the translation industry. Too many academic translations fail basic tests encapsulated in questions like: “Have all the contents been translated?”; “Have specialist terms been translated accurately?”; “Have terms been translated consistently?” and so forth. In striking the balance between “domestication” and “foreignization”, between “thick” and “thin”, it may be better to follow the author than the translator’s “creativity and rhetorical elegance”, even if this is more demanding on the reader and sends her “abroad” into intellectually unfamiliar territory. The “butchery” of the author’s “sacred cow” of a text will be less severe, and the reader might learn more by being challenged.

The task can be seen as a technical rather than artistic exercise that inevitably interprets the author’s words but prioritizes loyalty to his or her style of writing and argumentation. “Thin” translation combined with Geertzian thick description would invite non-Western philosophy to join the party dressed as it is, not dressed up as

11 Sakai rightly notes that being Japanese is no guarantee of comprehension and that pre-war Kyoto School philosophy is as alien to Japanese educated after 1945 as it is to non-Japanese with the required combination of linguistic and philosophical skills.
something else. Respecting the author and challenging the reader will have a stronger transformative effect than familiarizing and assimilating the non-Western. Employing a family metaphor, it would be less like adopting a child and more like an encounter between equal adults. Translators should, obviously, not write unintelligible gibberish, and Heisig’s complaint that bad translators often blame the author for their failings is valid. Nevertheless, words written in one language can be recomposed in another in a way that preserves their character and does not overly impose the conventions of the translator’s language and culture on it. Applying the tested common-sense procedures that professional translators follow and striking a sensible balance between author and reader that treats the source text with due respect and strives for the ideal of perfection would reciprocate what modern Japanese philosophers did in their “fateful encounter” with the European tradition. Ideally, the translator should not have to mediate between author and reader, but since some degree of butchery is involved, the translator has to decide on how to serve the beef. Something philosophically new might emerge if gyū sashi is put on the menu instead of well-done steak.

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The Equal Onto-Epistemology of
the “Equal Discourse of Things” [齊物論 Qiwulun] Chapter:

A Semantic Approach

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Abstract: The 齊物論 Qiwulun chapter is perhaps the most controversial and difficult chapter of the Zhuangzi, not only philosophically speaking, but also semantically so. Indeed, precisely because of this semantic difficulty that the chapter proves to be more philosophically challenging. The title itself holds some controversy on whether it should be read as 2–1 or 1–2: the first option being that it is a discussion of the ontological equality of things, while the other option yields to the interpretation that it is an equalizing of the different schools of thought and their discussions thereof, making it a matter of epistemological relevance and an account on the matter of Truth. Needless to say, several sinologists who have translated the text for the Anglophone world have translated this differently. It is thus my aim in this article to shed a fresher Anglophone understanding through translating the chapter as “Equal Onto-Epistemology” which I support by translating — for brevity’s sake — three subsequent passages in Qiwulun which I believe aptly captures three key claims in it, specifically those with regard to philosophy of language, value, and over-all non-relative onto-epistemology. I will then provide a blow by blow interpretation.

What this leads to is the philosophical implication that Zhuangzi was a realist, as he does acknowledge an appropriate position among myriad views: that of the whole as found in the particular, that is, the “fulcrum of Dao”, or 道樞 daoshu. Zhuangzi thus was a realist not only in the sense that he is not beholden to the idea of a romantic Oneness which universalizes all, but also, in the sense that he maintained that there’s an objective world — even though we can’t know it fully, complex and ever-changing as it is.

The 齐物论 Qiwulun chapter is perhaps the most controversial and difficult chapter of the Zhuangzi, not only philosophically speaking, but also semantically so. Indeed, precisely because of this semantic difficulty that the chapter proves to be more
philosophically challenging. The title itself holds some controversy on whether it should be read as 2–1 or 1–2: the first option being that it is a discussion of the ontological equality of things, while the other option yields to the interpretation that it is an equalizing of the different schools of thought and their discussions thereof, making it a matter of epistemological relevance and an account on the matter of Truth. Needless to say, several sinologists who have translated the text for the Anglophone world have translated this differently. The most famous seminal of these translations can perhaps be said to be that of Burton Watson, who translated the chapter into “Discussion on Making All Things Equal.”¹ In the same vein, Victor H. Mair and Feng Yu-lan both rendered the chapter as “On the Equality of Things”.² A.C. Graham, takes the same path as the initial predecessors and translates it as “The Sorting Which Evens Things Out”.³

Rather idiosyncratically, however, Herbert Giles translated the chapter as “The Identity of Contraries”⁴ and with good reason, as the chapter is a general attack against binary thought; similarly, James Legge translated the chapter into “The Adjustment of Controversies”.⁵ Giles and Legge thus read the title as 1–2, instead of 2–1 as Watson, Mair, Feng Yu-lan, and A.C. Graham does. Brook Ziporyn, however, innovatively preserves the ambiguity of the title by translating it as “Equalizing Assessments of Things”.⁶

It is thus now apparent that different cuts in the characters render the meaning in different ways, but what exactly is problematic about the above-mentioned translations. For one, the 2–1 translation by Watson, Feng Yu-lan, and Legge, does not really work because, as previously mentioned, the chapter is a general discussion against binary thought, apparent in the discussions of Confucians, Mohists, and those from the School of Names, as well the pervading themes of

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linguistic thought and our notions of what is right or wrong. In other words, it is quite apparent that the chapter does talk about our value judgments. The problem with translations of Giles and Legge, however, is that they take away from the original. This is an altogether different debate regarding the translation of Classical Chinese (or any other language with a different syntax for that matter) into English, but to be brief, I would like to point out that Chinese is very textured in terms of its identity and character as a language. As such, although the liberal translations of Giles and Legge may help the Anglophone reader to understand the text better, it presents too high a risk of losing the texture of original in favor of a more Western understanding, in which case it defeats its purpose of attacking the binary logic and aversion to obscurity that we know modern mathematical logic to have. This is especially apparent in Giles’ translation which includes in it “contrary” — a word that is not only missing in the original, but also carries with it a baggage from Aristotle and traditional logic.

No doubt that Ziporyn renders it most sophisticated among the major translations, but to my mind, it poses a minor linguistic problem which nevertheless yields philosophical implications. That is, by translating 齊 qi as equalizing, it seems to suggest an ambiguously relativist account. That is, if we take his account to mean both ways, though the 1–2 reading of his translation yields an aptly epistemological point, the 2–1 part seems to pose the problem of subjective idealism, that is skeptical relativism. In other words it seems to suggest that this is a chapter of several assessments which seeks to equal-ize things. By opting for this action verb, it also opts to give humans an active power to change the nature of things, which seems to me what the Qiwulun is precisely criticizing. Though Ziporyn himself would have no problem with calling Zhuangzi a relativist, he does acknowledge that it is of a very different kind,7 and calls it the “the absolutist view”.8 Precisely for this reason, however, that I am uncomfortable of labeling Zhuangzi as relativist. In fact it seems to me that Zhuangzi was a realist, in the sense of having acknowledged

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7 Ziporyn notes: “Is Zhuangzi then a relativist? Certainly. But he is a relativist of a very distinctive stripe, which can lead to many misunderstandings … One of the features of this position is that it sees all positions as necessarily involved in contradicting themselves and thus inevitably subject to transformation into other perspectives … The contradicting of itself doesn’t make the position go away, or fail to operate. It seems rather to be a necessary condition of its operation, of its being a position at all — and indeed, if anything, merely further exemplifies the claim”. See Brook Ziporyn, Ironies of Oneness and Difference: Coherence in Early Chinese Thought, Suny Series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012), 192–193.

8 Ibid.
the existence of moral truths. Indeed, it is quite uncommon to consider the Zhuangzi as a realist due to the emphases on change and transformation that can be seen in the text, but as we shall see, this is not mutually contradictory with his willingness to acknowledge an appropriate position among myriad views: that of the whole as found in the particular, that is, the “fulcrum of Dao”, or 道樞 daoshu. Zhuangzi thus was a realist not only in the sense that he is not beholden to the idea of a romantic Oneness which universalizes all, but also, in the sense that he maintained that there’s an objective world — even though we can’t know it fully, complex and ever-changing as it is. Heaven itself is presented as an objective reality that has full autonomy outside the human mind, even though he does mock the futile attempts of other philosophical schools to map the entirety of reality with only a view of a single angle among thousands as their standard, and even though that very reality

As such, I opt for a more basic translation, which is “Equal Discourse of Things”. This takes, primarily, an epistemological position of 1–2, but like Ziporyn’s, aims to preserve not simply the ambiguity but the two-pronged nature of the title, in that it talks about the equality of discourses precisely because things in general have an equal ontological status of existence. In other words, for Zhuangzi, this is not simply a discussion on how all discourses of things are actually equal in epistemological status, but also, that this is the Equal position when it comes to the Discussion of Things — an account of how things are and what that means about how we know things. For convenience’s sake, I shall call this position with the crude name Equal Onto-Epistemology.10


10 I use the word onto-epistemology because unlike in the history of Western philosophy where the split between reality and knowledge has been propagated ever since Plato and his cave, this is not the case for Chinese Philosophy. Ever since the Yijing, Chinese Philosophy did not assume a sharp binary between reality and knowledge where one dominates the other, but between forces or energies such as yin and yang, and even then, binaries were mostly seen as holistic and complementary in their opposition. Jana S. Rošker notes: “Traditional Chinese thinkers did not strictly or categorically distinguish between the spheres of matter and idea, nor between any other dualistic connotations resulting from this basic dichotomy”. See Jana S. Rošker, “The Concept of Structure as a Basic Epistemological Paradigm of Traditional Chinese Thought”, Asian Philosophy 20, no. 1 (March 2010): 81–82. In other words, we get the sense that the stream of thought itself is
In order to explain what exactly this means, I take — for brevity’s sake — three subsequent passages in *Qiwulun* which I believe aptly captures three key claims in it, specifically those with regard to philosophy of language, value, and over-all non-relative onto-epistemology. I will then provide a blow by blow interpretation. In order to get closer to an idiosyncratically Chinese-Daoist interpretation, however, I will present the passages in translations that may seem to be slightly awkward, as I will seek to be as close to the original as possible, in order to dig out the texture and flavor of the text with hopes that such exposure would bring a fresher Anglophone understanding.

I. Speech, Meaning, and Truth

I.A Translation

I.A1 夫言非吹也。言者有言，其所言者特未定也。

Speech are not [mere] winds blowing. Speech has reference, its reference is distinctively indefinite.

part of the changing and dynamic nature of reality. The tension thus in the Zhuangzi is found in the insistence of fixed absolutism as opposed to becoming in sync or in harmony with the flow of the natural reality.

11 言 *yan* like many words in Chinese be both noun and verb. Here, it is used in a way that is similar to the *Dao De Jing*’s first verse [*道可道，非常道。*] wherein the second instance is referred to as its reference, specifically its supposed purposive or essential connotation. As such, we can be justified in believing that the second instance refers to something in reality rather than going with the translation “meaning” or something of the sort. This becomes more obvious in the following phrase wherein it describes the second *yan* as distinctively indefinite, meaning always different (as opposed to patterned sameness) and never fixed (as opposed to our fixed “contentions”). This is one of the major reasons why this work asserts that Zhuangzi is a realist of a skeptical kind. Although I have qualms labeling him as an internal realist, as Jeeloo Liu does, I would agree on her explanation that “Zhuangzi is a realist with regard to the way the world is, but he is also a relativist with regard to the way we conceive the world. His arguments show that we can never have a conception of the way the world is independently of our perspective, but he does not go as far as radical relativists in upholding that all perspectives are equally right.” See Jeeloo Liu, “The Daoist Conception of Truth: Laozi’s Metaphysical Realism vs. Zhuangzi’s Internal Realism”, in Comparative Approaches to Chinese Philosophy, ed. Bo Mou, Ashgate World Philosophies Series (Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate, 2003), 289. I would, however, disagree with Jeeloo Liu that we can never conceive of the way of the world, and the very notion of the sage throughout the text should be testament to this. Moreover, it is my contention that
I.A2 果有言邪？其未嘗有言邪？
Consequently, is there something it speaks of? Or does it never have something it speaks of? Did he really say something, or did he not say anything?

I.A3 其以為異於鷇音，亦有辯乎，其無辯乎？
Your presumption is that [speech] is different from the sound of chicks? Likewise, does it have a contention, or does your [speech] have no contention?

I.A4 道惡乎隱而有真偽？言惡乎隱而有是非？
How come the Way is obfuscated and then have a genuine versus artificial? How come meaning is obfuscated and then have a right versus wrong?\(^{12}\)

I.A5 道惡乎往而不存？言惡乎存而不可？
How come the Way goes and does not remain? How come speech exists and yet is incapable?

I.A6 道隱於小成，言隱於榮華。
Dao is obfuscated in little achievements, speech is obfuscated in flowery elaborations.

I.A7 故有儒、墨之是非，以是其所非，而非其所是。
Thus we have [arguments of] right and wrong between the Ru [school] and Mo [school], [whose notion] of what is right, is the [Ru school]’s [notion of] what is wrong, and whose [notion of] what is wrong, is the [Mo school]’s [notion of] what is right.

I.A8 欲是其所非而非其所是，則莫若以明。
If we intend to affirm their notion of what is wrong or to deny their notion of what is right, then nothing compares to the employment of enlightenment.

I.B Interpretation

This passage tells us that speech refers to something, it is not meaningless, but the difficulty (and why we might thing it is meaningless) is because what it refers to is distinctively indefinite. In other words, because reality is always changing and complex, no one thing stays the same at any given time. The moment change

the seemingly endless squabbling is not without direction, as I shall later discuss in the last section of this work.

\(^{12}\) I took 而 er here to mean “and then” instead of simply a conjunctive in which case it would mean that one simply doesn’t know what is the truly right or truly wrong, which would be inconsistent with the rest of the passage. As such it means here that the obfuscation results in binaries – that is, the quality of being hidden is the cause for binary thinking.
happens, everything changes with it, which makes each moment distinct from the other — everything is in flux, nothing is at rest, each object and each assemblage of objects altogether create a singular and unique spatio-temporal moment. Now because what it refers to is in constant change, one’s exact same words will refer to something different at a different time than what it refers to now, does this then mean that speech has something it refers to, or does it imply that it actually has nothing that it refers to? With a shaky referent, moreover, do the words (signifier) still function in the same manner, or does it cease to be able to perform its function? If the referents are always changing, this means that the supposedly fixed structure of the signifying process actually changes as well. Since speech fails to capture the exact slice of reality that it originally referred to, does this mean that our claims no longer hold any firm ground, drowning into meaninglessness, like the meaningless sounds that chicks produce? But because the Dao of things and meaning is hidden in this manner — refusing to be captured — it gives rise to binary thinking and the split between right and wrong. Again, this is because the Dao of things is always in flux that it does not, as is said, remain, and because of this flux, speech is rendered incapable, precisely because the very nature of speech and naming is to slice a piece of reality in a fixed moment in time. As such, the nature of these two things leave a dissonant gap. This leads, according to the passage, the Mohists and Confucians to take their slice of that reality as right and everything else wrong. So what do we ought to do? In (I.A8) Zhuangzi does offer a solution, and he suggests that if we want to be able to see through their established notions, that is, to affirm what they disprove and disprove what they affirm, in other words to see that what they hold to be true really is not the end-all-be-all truth of reality, then nothing is better that use 明 ming. Although I translated ming as enlightenment here, its more literal sense is to make something clear, or make manifest, but what exactly must be made manifest is not yet explained in this line.

What we can take this passage to claim, however, is that because speech is that tries to determine something that is indeterminate, there emerges the problem of taking ever-changing truths into something that is absolute, leading to the misguided conception that one is right, while everyone or everything else is wrong.

II. On the Constant Transformations and Inter-Connections of Things and Truth
II.A Translation

II.A1 物無非彼，物無非是。自彼則不見，自知則知之。
Nothing is not “that”, nothing is not “this”. But being from “that” then it cannot be perceived, [since] from knowing follows knowing “this”.¹³

II.A2 故曰：彼出於是，是亦因彼。彼是，方生之說也。
Therefore we can say: “that” comes out from “this”, “this” similarly is caused by “that”. “This” and “that”, is what is called as the scope of life.

II.A3 雖然，方生方死，方死方生；方可方不可，方不可方可；¹⁴
So, when there is life there is death, when there is death there is life; When there is possibility there is impossibility, when there is impossibility there is possibility.

II.A4 因是因非，因非因是。
The reason for rightness [can also be] the reason for wrongness, the reason for wrongness [can also be] the reason for rightness.

II.A5 是以聖人不由，而照之于天，亦因是也。
By this, the sage does not follow [any-fixed-one of these], but [goes] by Heaven’s illumination, [which is] likewise the reason for “this”.¹⁵

¹³ 之 zhi here is taken to mean “this” because of the that-this parallelism.

¹⁴ Although the word 方 fang is more usually used as a spatial reference, the word also has the meaning of spatio-temporality. As such, it can refer to time, as it does here, or in some other classical texts as in the 戰國策 Zhan Guo Ce (Warring States Strategies) wherein the word fang is taken to mean “while” in the following passage: 「趙且伐燕，蘇代為燕王謂惠王曰：「今者臣來，過易水，蚌方出曝，而鷸啄其肉，蚌合而鉗其喙。」

¹⁵ Graham translates this as: “This is why the sage does not take this course, but opens things up to the light of Heaven; his too is a ‘That’s it’ which goes by circumstance”. See Graham, 52. Ziporyn, moreover, similarly translates as “Thus, the Sage does not proceed from any one of them alone but instead lets them all bask in the broad daylight of Heaven. And that too is only a case of going by the rightness of the present “this.” See Ziporyn, Zhuangzi, 12 (2:16), emphasis mine. However, it seems to me the case that 之 zhi here has the meaning more similar to “goes by” (similar to the phrase「先 君 之 思 以 勖 寡 人 」 in 詩經 Shi Jing 28) In the the in which case Heaven does point to something instead of letting them all bask in its 照 zhao or illumination. It is also more consistent with the next phrase with Heaven as the subject instead of the sage (who nevertheless is capable of the perspective of all of it similitary to Ziporyn’s translation). The difference in meaning is subtle, but here we are taking Heaven as the reason for present circumstances and the sage simply follows, as opposed to the sage actively shedding Heaven’s light on them. The implication of this being that he proceeds according to the situation, and that is Heaven’s way, that is, the way that is objective but indeterminate and one that is not fixed.
II.B Interpretation

The seminal translation of Herbert Giles has rendered 彼 bi as “objective” and 是 shi as “subjective”.\(^{16}\) Though this wasn’t followed by Legge, who went with the more conventional “this” and “that”, Giles’ translation qua interpretation nevertheless affected how the succeeding sinologists understood the function and relation of these two words. A.C. Graham, for instance, translated it as “other” abd “it” respectively.\(^{17}\) It brings into question, however, if the Zhuangzi really intended bi and shi to mean as internal vs. external. It seems to me that this was not necessarily the case, for it could very well mean that “this” is one view, “that” is one view, nothing is internal, nothing is external, and as such there need not be such subjective-objective split (which shall then, again, leads to subjective idealism). It is more likely that “this” and “that” are taken to be binary views like right and wrong, or even yin and yang. Having this latter interpretation of “this” and “that” also appears to be more consistent with the previously discussed passage on speech, meaning, and the ever-changing truth. In this manner, if we take each seemingly opposing view as intra-connected, then we come up with a plausible reading of interpretation of (II.A1–2) as having a relationship that is similar to yin and yang. That is to say, that each thing, and in turn each view, has its opposite within it, and is actually what affirms its existence: “that” is within “this” and that which affirms its existence as “this,” and vice versa. Giving rise to and transforming each other, and even complementing each other by completing each other, this is what all there is to life — this and that. The following lines re-inforce this as well, claiming that there is always something in causes and reasons that can make it either the cause or reason for right or for wrong, as everything is inter-connected and intertwined among each other in such a way that life presupposes death the moment it emerges, as though with every step we walk towards death; similarly, death would suppose that there once was life, something had died. In the same way possibility also presupposes impossibility and vice versa. In (II.A5) thus we are told he who realizes this is the sage. As such, the sage does not confine himself to any narrow single-sided view, but sees the entirety and inter-connectedness of the web of being and consequently, of knowledge. The sage thus does have hold a fixed rightness or wrongness but goes by the guidance of Heaven — the truth of any given moment, while acknowledge that it is ever-changing. As a preliminary note, I would like to mention that this way

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\(^{16}\) Giles, 18.

\(^{17}\) Graham, 53.
of Heaven is also what I think the *ming* points to in the previous passage, that is, to be in-sync with the ever-changing truth of *this*, but we shall get to that more in the following section.

**III. The central coherence and boundlessness of things**

**III.A Translation**

III.A1 是亦彼也，彼亦是也。
“This” is also “that”, “that” is also “this”.

III.A2 彼亦一是非，此亦一是非。
“That” also has a [set of] right and wrong, “this” also has a [set of] right and wrong.

III.A3 果且有彼是乎哉？果且無彼是乎哉？
Consequently, is it both having a “that” and “this”? Or is it both not having “that” and “this”?

III.A4 彼是莫得其偶，謂之道樞。
When “this” and “that” do not take [each other as] their opposite, it is called the fulcrum of Dao.

III.A5 樞始得其環中，以應無窮。
When the fulcrum begins to seize the center of its loop, it responds boundlessly.

III.A6 是亦一無窮，非亦一無窮也。
Rightness is also a single boundlessness, wrongness is also a single boundlessness.

III.A7 故曰「莫若以明」。
Therefore we say: nothing compares to the employment of enlightenment.

III.A8 以指喻指之非指，不若以非指喻指之非指也；
To use the finger to understand the non-fingerness of the finger, does not compare to using a non-finger to understand the non-fingerness of the finger;

III.A9 以馬喻馬之非馬，不若以非馬喻馬之非馬也。
To use a horse to understand the non-horseness of the horse, does not compare to using a non-horse to understand the non-horseness of the horse.

III.A10 天地，一指也；萬物，一馬也。
Heaven and Earth, is one finger; the ten thousand things is one horse.
III.B Interpretation

This passage continues on where the previous one left off. Because nothing is not “that”, and no thing is not “this”, then it only follows that “this” is also “that”, and “that” is also “this”. “That” and “this” are endlessly intertwined and that is how all things are. Each “that” and “this” has their own rightness and wrongness at distinctive moments in time and therefore form a single boundlessness each. As such, it is both and it is neither — a complementary contradiction. It is at this point that they are no longer contradictory and are seen from point of view of the “fulcrum of Dao”. At this still-point middle, moreover, one is able to “respond boundlessly”. Because things are always changing, as is the point made in the first passage, no moment is the same with any other moment, nothing is the same with any other thing; as such, it becomes apparent that there are boundless configurations of “this” and “that” and their corresponding rightness and wrongness. To see from this point, again, is what is meant by 以明 yiming, or the appropriateness of Heaven’s position at the given point in a given time. This is reminiscent of the passage in the 道德經 Dao De Jing, which is as follows:

三十辐，共一毂，當其無，有車之用。
Thirty spokes, altogether are one hub, abiding in its nothingness, is where there is the use of the cart.18

Although here the 無 wu or nothingness is taken in a more metaphysical way, we get a similar sense of a viewpoint from the still-point middle that makes on realize the equality of things and functions as an onto-epistemological flattening. In this manner, one “responds boundlessly”.

Now III.A8–10 is derivative of the paradox introduced by a logician named Gongsun Long: “a white horse is not a horse”.19 According to Gongsun Long, if one says “horse” then it should mean horses of all colors, but if one says “white horse” then obviously horses of other colors no longer belong to this category. The fact that “white horse” can be so singularly distinct from other types of horses, that is, opposite to them, then how can they all be the same horses? This seems to be an

argument against the essential oneness of a category of beings. In other words, what Zhuangzi seems to be pointing at here is that any standard according to which we strictly name and categorize truths is bound to contradict itself. As such, in order for us to be able to tell what is what, then nothing is better than the no-position of the still-point middle or the “fulcrum of Dao”, which would mean that Heaven and Earth is also one finger, and the entire world is also just one horse, that is, sharing the same essence of particularly unique and entirely different essences in the same way that change means no one moment can replicate itself but, at the same time, each and every moment is also inter-connected to all other moments in the process of change.

IV. Conclusion

In sum, we have seen that Zhuangzi talks about an appropriate position which means that not just any position will do, and this is why he criticizes narrower views. What is most noteworthy about the chapter, moreover, is that there really is no single right or wrong in the absolute sense, and once one positions himself in the center (that is, in the unbiased and withdrawn sense), then one will see the interchangeability of values, the tension between speech and reality, and that although not all angles contribute equally to our struggle for truth, they are all equal in their onto-epistemological status. That is to say, that they all exists as things and as views which have, in a certain sense, their own validity.

There is no fixed rule nor any transcendent final signified here that helps us determine what is absolutely right or absolutely wrong — what is absolutely true or absolutely false. Though our discussions and arguments may very well be like those of chicks making random sounds, those sounds are both nothing and something at the same time. Nothing in that they do not generate any fixed and enduring value or truth at all, but still something, in that they are generative of new members of the assemblage, that is, new angles when we do make our way to the “fulcrum of Dao”. In other words, each time we generate these new members, the entirety of fulcrum re-generates itself, producing new norms that enable us to have a wider grasp of the arena that we call reality, which is existence beyond the human mind. Finite as we may be, thus, Heaven does provide ways for limited access to its way. Logically, this would mean that meaning and truth no longer depend on the functions of signs and words or of arguments and discourses themselves, but in their relations,
inter-connectivity, and inherent contradictions which are bound to happen if only because there is no longer an absolute One from which we can derive all other truths from. Again, the whole exists only in as much as everything else converges on a particular point, which is why “this” always has “that” and vice versa, but what is meant by Heaven and Earth being “one finger” and the entire world as “one horse”, is that all the this’s and that’s can and will have a presence in a this. In other words, to see one “this” or “that” as it truly is, is to see the whole, that is, the entirety of the whole but never-ending network converging in it. This is what makes everything equal in their ontological and epistemological status in the Qiwulun. As such, why it should be translated as “Equal Discourse of Things” — as denotative of both the claims that all discourses are equal in epistemological status (precisely because all things are equal in ontological status), and that this chapter claims the position of the “fulcrum of Dao”, that is, of an equal onto-epistemology of things that is as realist as it is skeptical.

References

The Equal Onto-Epistemology of the “Equal Discourse of Things” Chapter


Seito Shidō (Guidance) as a Space for Philosophy in Translation

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Abstract: This article attempts to set up the Japanese concept of “seito shidō” (literally student guidance) as a space for philosophical reflection both inside and outside Japanese contexts. It begins with an overview of the history of student guidance in the United States of America and in Japan. In the former, the idea of “student guidance” began as a pastoral concept, transformed into practical guidance, and then into psychological guidance. This idea of psychological guidance entered Japan after the war, particularly through Alfred E. Traxler’s Techniques of Guidance (1945). However, this concept transformed in interacting with traditional Japanese ideas on “life guidance” (seikatsu shidō). The result of this translational interaction was seito shidō, which became a key concept of Japanese educational discourse, with official handbooks published by the Ministry of Education of Japan. The definition and aims of seito shidō are discussed on the basis of this “canonical” form. In the second half of this article, seito shidō is analyzed philosophically, translating from policy and praxis to theory. From the point of view of Nel Noddings’ caring education, seito shidō has the potential to bridge the gap between teaching and counseling, subsuming both under shidō as caring. Furthermore, seito shidō can play a crucial role in moral education as caring education. From the point of view of Gert Biesta’s postmodern approach to education, we see the value of the tension between individuality and community that is clearly expressed in the official handbooks on seito shidō. But there are severe limitations to the official view of “individuality” that beg further consideration.

Introduction

In this article, I would like to demonstrate that the Japanese concept of seito shidō (literally “student guidance”) can be a fruitful space for the global task of philosophizing on education. Seito shidō encompasses a broad range of phenomena:

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how to teach students academic subjects in a way that goes beyond developing merely academic competencies, how to make space for the bond between students, how to deal with a student who is struggling with problems (both academic and inter/intra-personal), how to set up club activities to build character, how to cooperate with parents and other educators to help a student, et cetera. The phrase is at once narrower than “education” and broader than “student guidance”, making it difficult to discuss in English. But at the same time, it is the premier space where the ethical relationship between the teacher and the student unfolds.

However, setting up this space is a complex endeavor. Seito shidō was born through the meeting of two histories — of guidance in America and shidō in Japan. Furthermore, both the English and the Japanese terms are contested — with various interpretations in theory, policy, and praxis. Any philosophy of seito shidō must traverse multiple dimensions of translation between languages, cultures, and modes of research.

In this article, in order to lay out the groundwork for this philosophical space, I will briefly sketch the histories of “student guidance” in North America and “seito shidō” in Japan, and how these two histories intersected in post-war Japan. I will then describe the basic outlines of seito shidō through its “canonical” form — the outlines presented by Japan’s Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT). Finally, I will philosophically analyze the potential and dangers of this conception of seito shidō through the ethics of care of Nel Noddings and the ethics of education of Gert Biesta.

Student Guidance and Life Guidance

The concept of “seito shidō” traces back to a translation of the phrase “pupil guidance,” which was imported from the United States. Let us briefly trace the history of this concept and its entry into Japan.

According to the research of John J. Schmidt, prior to the 20th century, the word “guidance” in American schools simply referred to the many ways in which teachers engaged holistically with students, beyond mere academic concerns, to deal with social, personal, vocational, and even spiritual life. I refer to this as the

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“pastoral” form of guidance, drawing from its kinship to the role of priests and pastors in education.

However, the birth of “student guidance” as a formal concept occurred during the American Industrial Revolution. In response to the human costs of this social upheaval, people like Frank Parsons (1854–1908, the “Father of Guidance”) began to focus on vocational/career guidance, helping young men in a practical way.

During the period of the two world wars, guidance became strongly tied to counseling and psychological testing. This would eventually be exemplified by E. G. Williamson’s “Trait-Factor Approach”, which suggested analysis of students (psychological assessment), diagnosis, and intervention — akin to the psychiatric model. This also began to shift the view of guidance from a function shared by teachers and staff to a distinct “area” focused on by counselors in an auxiliary office, an approach referred to as the “clinical-services model”. To put it simply, the idea of “guidance” shifted from pastoral guidance to practical guidance and then to psychological guidance.

It was an early form of the psychological model that entered Japan in 1947, after Japan’s defeat in World War II. As Japan struggled to remake its educational system into a more democratic form, many progressive American ideas were introduced in Japan, one of which was student guidance. In particular, Alfred E. Traxler’s *Techniques of Guidance* (1945) was the key influence in the early development of Japanese student guidance.

The idea of guidance presented by Traxler gives us an idea of the “pre-translation concept of guidance”. Allow me a lengthy quote from Traxler:

Ideally conceived, guidance enables each individual to understand his abilities and interests, to develop them as well as possible, to relate them to life goals, and finally to reach a state of complete and mature self-guidance as a desirable citizen of a democratic social order. Guidance is thus vitally

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3 Ibid., 6.
4 Yamamoto Toshirō 山本 敏郎, Fujii Hiroyuki 藤井 啓之, Takahashi Eiji 高橋 英児, Fukuda Atsushi 福田 敦志, *Atarashii jidai no seikatsu shidō* 新しい時代の生活指導 (Tokyo: Aruma, 2014), 49. Traxler was introduced via the lectures at the “Institute for Educational Leadership” (IFEL). For this information, I credit Kume Yūko from Kyūshū University.
5 However, strictly speaking, there is no one pre-translation concept, as ideas on guidance had trickled into Japan even prior to the war, and new ideas continued to enter even after Traxler’s.
related to every aspect of the school — the curriculum, the methods of instruction, the supervision of instruction, disciplinary procedures, attendance, problems of scheduling, the extracurriculum, the health and physical fitness program, and home and community relations. . . . Although guidance is closely related to all areas of the school, those charged with responsibility for the guidance program . . . are to collect and systematize accurate information about pupils, to provide an individual counseling service, and to carry on a dynamic educational program among their colleagues and among the pupils and their parents that will lead to intelligent use of the information that the guidance department is able to provide.\(^6\)

Traxler saw his view of guidance as combining humanitarianism, religion, mental health, and a response to social change, but with a new emphasis on the need to know students as individuals through psychological testing.\(^7\) His view of guidance was thus primarily psychological, but with residues of pastoral and practical guidance.

This American history of guidance would then be brought into contact with the Japanese history of guidance. According to Yamamoto et al.,\(^8\) “guidance” first became established as a Japanese concept during the Taishō period (1912–1926). In response to the top-down, centralized, and authoritarian character of Japan’s newly formed modern educational system, two movements arose from Japanese teachers: the “life composition method” (seikatsu tsuzurikata) and “life training” (seikatsu kunren). In the former, teachers made use of one of the few subjects they had free rein on — essay writing — to give students an opportunity to reflect on their actual life situations and express their concerns. They gradually saw that the ability to narrate well was tied to the ability of students to live well — thus developing this simple method into a holistic form of student formation.\(^9\) In the latter, teachers tried to develop the ability of students to govern themselves through selection/election of class leaders, meetings, and discussions. Both movements would intermingle to form what is now known as “life guidance” (seikatsu shidō).

\(^7\) Ibid., 4–6.
\(^8\) Yamamoto et al., 28–37.
With the introduction of Traxler, the western history of guidance came to meet the Japanese history of guidance, in an encounter that is politically loaded and contested up to today. First, there was some confusion as to how to translate “guidance” between “student guidance” and “life guidance”. While teachers were already accustomed to the latter term, MEXT’s outline chose to consistently use the former, “seito shidō,” supposedly to avoid the ambiguity of the latter.\(^\text{10}\) Gerald LeTendre suggests something more political, that the latter term has left-wing undertones and needed to be avoided in official circulars.\(^\text{11}\) Up to today, both terms are in use, with “life guidance” appearing in non-official contexts.

This foreshadows the difficult question of the relationship between the two terms. One can follow LeTendre and say that the two terms are referring to the same thing, but with a difference in context. MEXT does not deliberately state the difference between the two terms either. In contrast, adherents of seikatsu shidō deliberately distance their terminology from seito shidō, stressing the anti-institutionalism of their position in opposition to seito shidō.\(^\text{12}\) I do not hope to resolve this argument here. But for this article, I will preliminarily refer to both seito shidō and seikatsu shidō using “seito shidō” in a neutral, inclusive sense, with seikatsu shidō as one particular movement within seito shidō.

The idea of seikatsu shidō became the ground on which the English word “guidance” would be received as well as resisted.\(^\text{13}\) One of the early works from Tokyo Educational University on Seikatsu shidō (1950)\(^\text{14}\) critiqued Traxler’s move

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13 Yamamoto et al. would disagree with this assertion, as they attempt to completely separate the genealogies of seikatsu shidō and seito shidō. While I am sympathetic to their critiques, I disagree with this complete bifurcation. See Yamamoto et al., 257-258.
14 Tokyo Educational University Educational Science Research Laboratory 東京教育大学教育学研究室 (ed.), Seikatsu shidō 生活指導 (Tokyo: Kaneko Shobō, 1950). I also received this lead from Kume Yūko.
to outsource guidance to non-teaching personnel, the tendency to focus on the individual and individual guidance, and the tendency to focus on “problematic” students. Eventually, the idea of seito shidō would include western ideas like testing and counseling, but compromise with the need for forming group dynamics and understanding the way of life of students. The center of gravity of seikatsu shidō transformed guidance, such that psychological guidance was brought back to something closer to the pastoral and practical sense of guidance, with its focus on the holistic view of the child and on the immediate concerns of his/her lifeworld.

The Definition and Aims of Seito Shidō

In 1965, the Manual for Student Guidance (Seito shidō no tebiki) was published by the Ministry of Education. This manual was to be the official guide to student guidance. The outline was republished in 1981. The latest incarnation of this manual is the Outline of Student Guidance (Seitō shidō teiyō, heretofore Outline) in 2010. These official guides are seen as authoritative, and teachers use them in study groups. The Outline defines student guidance as follows:

“Student guidance” refers to all the educational activities that are carried out in order to respect the personality (jinkaku) of each student and increase social dispositions and practical abilities, while trying to build individuality (kosei). In other words, student guidance aims at the better development of the personality of each and every child, and at the same time aims to make school life more meaningful, interesting, and fulfilling for each child. Student guidance plays an important function in fulfilling the educational aims of the school, and is of great significance alongside academic guidance (gakushū shidō).

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MEXT, 1. All translations are my own.
We see two concept pairs in the above definition: student guidance vs. academic (gakushū) guidance, and individuality vs. sociality. Sumida and Okazaki\textsuperscript{17} suggest a schematic approach: Schools can be seen as a means of transmitting culture. Culture, in turn, can be divided into intellectual culture and normative culture. Academic guidance focuses on the former, and student guidance focus on the latter. However, transmitting normative culture necessarily entails two contrasting elements: the development of the individual, and socialization. These two tensional elements are brought together through “self-guidance”:

Student guidance aims at supporting the sound growth of each student [in activities] both within and outside the curriculum, cultivating the ability for self-guidance (jiko shidō nōryoku) which allows each student to actualize him/herself in the present and the future…\textsuperscript{18}

Self-guidance, a concept already present in Traxler, is interpreted as the yoke that ties individualization and socialization together, and through this, leading to the self-actualization of the student.

Another point of continuity with Traxler is the placement of student guidance within the spectrum of educational activities:

Even in educational activities carried out within the subjects of curriculum (different subjects, moral education, integrated learning time, special activities), the educational function of student guidance is present alongside the academic guidance of content. / . . . Furthermore, this is not restricted merely within the educational curriculum, but also functions in individual guidance carried out during breaks or after school, remedial guidance for students having problems with school work, and educational consultation (that occurs on an on-demand basis).\textsuperscript{19}

Student guidance is carried out when teaching regular academic subjects and moral education classes (the domain of regular teachers), integrated learning time (led by the class moderator), consultation (both teachers and counselors), and even

\textsuperscript{17} Sumida Masaki 住田 正樹, Okazaki Tomonori 岡崎 友典, \textit{Jidō seito shidō no riron to jissen 児童・生徒指導の理論と実践} (Tokyo: Hōsō Daigaku Kyōiku Shinkō Kai, 2011).
\textsuperscript{18} MEXT, 1.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 4–5.
during break time (any staff in school). In other words, guidance is carried out by everyone involved in education and is part of every domain in education, from the curricular to the extra-curricular.

LeTendre offers a moving, ethnographic account of how student guidance is carried out in Japan. Nishioka also describes several important methodologies used by the lifestyle guidance movement, such as life composition, building classroom community (gakkyū shūdan zukuri), learning groups, and informal networks. But to give an overview of the range and practical importance of this function — particularly its “canonical form” — let me briefly describe the topics that MEXT devotes entire chapters to.

MEXT discusses at length the relationship of student guidance to the rest of the curriculum, from academic subjects to special classes like moral education and integrated study (sōgōteki gakushū) (Chapter 2), understanding students through developmental psychology and various means of assessment (Chapter 3), the institutional structure of student guidance in the school as a whole (Chapter 4), educational consultation carried out in homeroom classes and by counselors (Chapter 5), advice on how to deal with problematic situations like misbehavior, juvenile crime, violence, bullying, sexuality, suicide, abuse, school refusal, et cetera (Chapter 6), the laws surrounding guidance (Chapter 7), and the linkages between school, home, local community, and other institutions that are necessary for guidance to go well (Chapter 8).

I think we can see, from the table of contents alone, the curious mix of the western idea of guidance and the Japanese idea of seikatsu shidō, combined in a new term, seito shidō.

Noddings and the Philosophical Value of Guidance

Above, we have examined guidance from an historical approach. But what does it mean to take this as a space for philosophizing?

Regardless of whether one is in Japan, the United States, or the Philippines, the discourse on seito shidō poses essential questions on the nature of education and educative relationships. With the growing number of counselors and advances in the ability to measure various intelligences, aptitudes, and personality traits, coupled
with increasing student diversity and presence of students with psycho-social disabilities, the need to cooperate with staff specialized in psychological counseling and testing is becoming more apparent. At the same time, standards and the tests that accompany them are becoming stricter. With these combined, there seems to be a great temptation to improve efficiency by dividing the provinces of academic teaching and student guidance. This temptation is present not only for those influenced by the “clinical-services model” of the United States, but for all nations, not exempting Japan.  

However, what does this do to the essence of educating itself?

For this, I turn to Nel Noddings’ (1929–) idea of “caring education”. In the closing chapter of her landmark work, *Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education*, Noddings writes:

> The primary aim of every educational institution and of every educational effort must be the maintenance and enhancement of caring. Parents, police, social workers, teachers, preachers, neighbors, older siblings must all embrace this primary aim.

Secondary aims might differ from kindergarten to graduate school, but the primary aim, in so far as there is a cultivation of persons, is caring. This requires that we change the way we see the role of the teacher and the role of the counselor:

> Whatever I do in life, whomever I meet, I am first and always one-caring or one cared-for. I do not ‘assume roles’ unless I become an actor. ‘Mother’ is not a role; ‘Teacher’ is not a role. . . . When I became a teacher, I also entered a very special — and more specialized — caring relation. No

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23 This tendency can be considered as one manifestation of what Jan de Vos calls “psychologisation”, the reduction of a vast range of human phenomena to psychological terminology and frameworks. While *seito shidō* sometimes resists psychologization, it has in other times fallen headlong into it. I leave this point to future research. See Jan de Vos, *Psychologisation in Times of Globalisation* (London: Routledge, 2012).

enterprise or special function I am called upon to serve can relieve me of my responsibilities as one-caring. . . . As teacher, I am, first, one-caring.25

Caring for the student as an entire person is not restricted to counselors or homeroom moderators. Teachers are not there to merely deliver information or to train skills. Rather, everyone in a school is there to care. Noddings writes, “Such arrangements would make it possible for us to expect that teachers should act as counselors and advisors in their subject fields and not just as imparters of knowledge”.26

Noddings’ view of caring education is supported and concretized by the suggestions made in the *seito shidō* discourses. First, the act of *shidō* is very similar to care. It is not only a transmission of “normative culture” but an engagement with the student in his/her entirety. In *seikatsu shidō* (taken as one approach to *seito shidō*), they use the phrase “kodomo o marugoto toraeru” (grasping the student as a whole).27 This is none other than an engrossment with the student’s existence as an individual (as self-actualizing personality) and as a member of various communities (social skills and dispositions). This engagement is aided by various things, ranging from psychological understanding of developmental challenges and disorders, to a Deweyan engagement with the student as he/she is formed and forms his/her “lifestyle”,28 to a narrative sense of knowing in the autobiographic method. This engrossment is then followed by a motivational shift to act in response to and for the sake of the student — from simple day-to-day guidance to patient explanations of ideas and to individual, group, and family counseling (by or with professional counselors). In other words, *seito shidō* is caring par excellence.

Second, *seito shidō* was argued to be a function of education inseparable from academic guidance, rather than a distinct area. This was the result of a long debate that began with Miyasaka Tetsufumi (1918–1965), educator and the main proponent of *seikatsu shidō*. He argued that even while teaching academic subjects, a teacher was also engaging in forming a student holistically. But this was criticized by Ogawa Tarō, who argued that academic guidance and life guidance had a fundamentally different aim, and ought to be kept separate.29

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25 Ibid., 175.
26 Ibid., 187.
27 Takeuchi et al., 15.
28 Takeuchi et al., 18–21.
29 For more on this debate, see Ueno, Takeuchi et al., 7–11. Miyasaka’s position is fully argued in Miyasaka Tetsufumi 宮坂 哲文, Sagawa Michio 寒川 道夫, Haruta Masaharu 305

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While, in policy, the debate was eventually settled in favor of seeing seito shidō as a function always connected to academic guidance rather than a separate area, in practice this remains to be settled. The gap between academic and life guidance is particularly pronounced in high schools in Japan, where the focus is on preparing for university examinations. And in universities and graduate schools, few seem to even consider the relevance of this holistic shidō. But we can read Noddings as reasserting precisely that — teachers are first one-caring, and whether in kindergarten or in graduate school, we respond to the students as persons in every situation, no matter how academic.

There is another facet of shidō that has philosophical merit. Seen from Noddings’ philosophy, guidance is none other than an ethical response. It is not merely a means toward achieving a particular aim (say academic success). By placing guidance as a central element in all education, MEXT is suggesting that education fundamentally plays an ethical role of caring and inculcating care within students.

However, this ethical view of education has important implications for moral education. Noddings writes:

Moral education . . . has for us a dual meaning. It refers to education which is moral in the sense that those planning and conducting education will strive to meet all those involved morally; and it refers to an education that will enhance the ethical ideal of those being educated so that they will continue to meet others morally.30

Seito shidō is moral education in the first sense. What about in the second sense? For this, Noddings offers an alternative to character education and other forms of moral education. She suggests that moral education is about learning to care, naming four elements to this process: Modeling, dialogue, practice, and confirmation. Modeling is how students learn to care by seeing people care for them and for others. Dialogue is how students learn to open up to the needs of others, and to share their needs with others. Practice involves opportunities to actually care for

30 Noddings, 171.
Others. And confirmation means having one’s “best self”, one’s most caring self, awakened in one’s interactions with others.\(^31\)

*Seito shidō* is not only moral education in the first sense, but in the second sense as well. Not only is *seito shidō* carried out in tandem with moral education, MEXT itself considers it to be more concrete than moral education classes:

> While moral education directly aims at cultivating morality (moral affects, judgment, practical motivation, and attitudes), student guidance most often provides guidance concerning the concrete problems each student encounters in his/her daily life.\(^32\)

In *seito shidō*, students are able to experience being cared for by their teachers. Both student counseling and practices of self-governance stressed in *seikatsu kunren* (life training) become opportunities for dialogue. Group guidance gives students an opportunity to care for each other and have a sense of moral responsibility toward each other. And the very focus on guidance is a confirmation — that the student is educated through care, thrives in care, and is educated to care.\(^33\)

**A Biestan Critique of Guidance**

Despite the potential of guidance in reasserting the ethical aspect of education, it raises key questions concerning the relationship of the individual and the group, and consequently, of the citizen and the state. The *Outline* avoids clear pitfalls of taking a one-sided approach to individual and social existence. But how does individuality relate with communality?


\(^{32}\) MEXT, 27–28.

\(^{33}\) For more on moral education and *seikatsu shidō*, see Miyasaka Tetsufumi 宮坂 哲文, *Seikatsu shidō to dōtoku kyōiku* 生活指導と道德教育 (Tokyo: Meiji Tosho Shuppan, 1966).
(academic guidance), socialization, and subjectification. Socialization — the introduction of the student into the various orders of society — is in clear tension with subjectivity. Subjectivity can be defined (at risk of oversimplification) as one’s capacity to begin something new (to be an *initium*) in a world of plurality, and at the same time to take *responsibility* for that. It is important to highlight the tension between subjectification and socialization because this tension is the core of democracy — where individuals need to be able to critique the group when it goes awry, but at the same time there needs to be solidarity, wherein individuals go beyond their own private interests and aim for public goods. For Biesta, the minute individuals are merely absorbed into the totality, or the totality fragments into mere private interests, democracy dies.

The tension between individuality and communality is strangely lacking in MEXT’s present publications on moral education. In contrast, the *Outline of seitō shidō* highlights this tension: “A classroom in a school is, seen in a particular way, a place of collision between the desires of individual students and the demands of groups and society”.

This collision occurs in various settings. For example, group instruction can teach students to relate with each other well, but it sacrifices individuals with different learning needs. Thus, schools need individual instruction, which responds to these differences better. But individual instruction alone tends to lack socialization.

Another interesting way in which these two facets of human existence clash is in the attitude of the teacher. One oft-repeated virtue in student guidance is the ability to take a clear (or even strict) stance (*kizen toshita taido*), particularly when a student has done something wrong. This has to do with the socialization function, and the need to provide clear norms. But at the same time, student guidance demands that a teacher display empathetic understanding (which hearkens to an older discourse on “counseling mind” in education), which has to do with the recognition of the unique circumstances within an individual’s psyche. When a

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37 MEXT, 10.
38 Ibid., 14–16.
teacher is asked to be both strict and warmly empathetic, the tension of the dual-structure of individuality and sociality is experienced poignantly.\textsuperscript{39}

However, despite this acuity, I think there are deficiencies that remain in the idea of “individuality” in the MEXT \textit{Outline} that get in the way of the democratic ideal. Let us examine the following passages:

The great task set before education is that of cultivating the qualities and abilities that enable pupils and students to seek out, by themselves, the completion of their personalities, and attempt to realize themselves. These are carried out while attempting to harmonize with society and while constantly valuing their own desires.\textsuperscript{40}

Why is individuality being equated with desires?

This pattern is repeated in MEXT’s discussion of the virtues of individuality: spontaneity, self-leadership, and autonomy. These virtues are defined as follows. Spontaneity and self-leading is seen as “A stance and attitude of engaging pursuits actively”, or “Acting on the basis of thoughts and judgements that arise within oneself”.\textsuperscript{41} Autonomy is explained as “The quality of not merely expressing and acting on one’s desires and impulses, but when necessary, suppressing these and encouraging [oneself] to act in a planned out manner”.\textsuperscript{42} In these qualities of spontaneity, self-leadership, and autonomy, we once again see the individual as a source of desires, and at the same time the “reality principle” that rationally controls these desires. The limits of the idea of individuality show particularly in the definition of a third ability of individuality, subjectivity:

There are many cases wherein the contents of [a student’s] actions are pre-determined, where one is prevented from acting on “centerstage”, where one is required to act in accordance with a pre-existing plan. In these cases, one tends to fall into a false dilemma between refusing to act [cooperatively] or to act in a manner that suppresses one’s will and desires. However, there is another option for one to act with subjectivity. There is room for one to give

\textsuperscript{39} Fujii completely dismisses the \textit{Outline} as anti-individualistic. He is particularly critical of the idea of strictness. While there are limitations to the idea of individualism in the \textit{Outline}, I think such a blanket critique is one-sided. See Yamamoto et al., 60–63.
\textsuperscript{40} MEXT, 10.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
one’s own meanings [to what one is doing], add one’s own ingenuity, and in so doing, act not merely as a passive object, but act dynamically as a subject.\textsuperscript{43}

Here, we see that while individuality can result in rebellion, the reinterpretation of social demands, or minor adjustments, there seems to be no clear demand for social critique or \textit{moral} disobedience. This individuality is very far from Biesta’s idea of “subjectivity”.

Nor can one say that “subjectivity” is a western concept: One of the most famous stories in moral education in Japan is “Visas for 6000 Lives”, which tells the story of Sugihara Chiune, wartime consular officer in Lithuania, who violated direct orders from the Japanese government in order to save the lives of 6000 Jews. His act was not selfishness. Rather, it was the suppression of selfish desires in order to perform a moral but illegal act. Where is the room for this kind of subjectivity in the idea of the individual? In theory, the idea of “self-actualization” could be brought into play here — but the idea remains vague and unutilized in concrete descriptions of individuality.

Seen from the point of view of Biesta’s philosophy, the concept of individuality presented by MEXT is no more than a neo-liberal, aggregative democracy version of the ego. As it is in rational choice theory, this ego has desires and the ability to rationally control these desires to maximize their fulfillment. But it does not have the capacity for any form of altruism, nor the openness needed for deliberative democracy.\textsuperscript{44}

The \textit{Outline} itself calls for a connection between educating individual students and democracy (yet again, part of the legacy of Traxler):

The first article of the Fundamental Law of Education states the following in parallel: “the completion of personality” and “the upbringing of citizens

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 11–12.
\textsuperscript{44} The view of the individual in \textit{seito shidō} may have a \textit{direct} relationship to neoliberalism. Andrea Gevurtz Arai suggests that Kawai Hayao’s strengthening of the role of school counselors in Japan and his view of social problems as having a psychological basis both can be situated in a neoliberal move to push socio-political problems to the private sphere. While this is plausible (and supported by De Vos’ “psychologisation” thesis), the direct connection between Kawai Hayao and the \textit{seito shidō} discourses need further investigation. See Andrea Gevurtz Arai, \textit{The Strange Child: Education and the Psychology of Patriotism in Recessionary Japan} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), 29–77. Also see Edward Vickers’ book review in \textit{Monumenta Nipponica} 72.1 (2017): 146–152.
(kokumin), healthy in mind and body, with the abilities necessary to form the state and society into a peaceful and democratic form”. This too presupposes a relationship between human development and social development, wherein it is none other than the personality that is protected and raised by society that can become a citizen that is able to form the future of that society and properly nurture the next generation.45

However, as it stands, the only possible relationship between the rational ego (that is concerned merely with fulfilling its desires) and society is one of compromise. In contrast, Biesta’s idea of the subject has a radical connection to democracy. The subject is not a self-serving individual. While unique, the uniqueness of the subject only finds meaning in shaping relationships with others, in responsibility. The freedom to be a unique subject requires democracy. But at the same time, deliberative democracy requires free subjects, who will open up and connect to each other with flexibility and a plurality of interests — much like John Dewey’s vision of democracy as a way of life.46

This is one major limitation of the Japanese idea of student guidance presented by MEXT. However, as a discourse, seito shidō has long attempted to address this concern. One of the main criticisms by the seikatsu shidō movement of the official take on seito shidō is that it lost (or considerably diluted) the focus of the Taishō-era view of guidance on educating “social and practical subjects” (shakaiteki jissen shutai).47 This subject is not merely a member of society, but one that actively transforms society, through its engagement with its own life world. Perhaps this subject is much more aligned with Biesta’s deliberative democracy, and is worth stressing in official versions of seito shidō.

Conclusion

The translational encounter between “guidance” and “seikatsu shidō” has created a new space — seito shidō — where key questions of philosophy of education are being raised: How ought academic instruction and caring be related? In what way is moral education moral? What notions of individuality and totality support

47 See Matsumoto et al., 16.
democracy? As a “space”, seito shidō does not provide clear answers to these questions, but rather a scope of actions and certain focal points, around which different philosophies can come into discourse. I hope the dialogues I tackled above sufficiently demonstrate that seito shidō is indeed a fruitful place for philosophy around the world.

However, there is much more work that remains. First, there are particular positions and traditions within this discourse, such as the seikatsu shidō movement (led by Miyasaka) and the life composition movement, that can provide clear positions that can be philosophically analyzed.

Second, by including counselors and social workers, seito shidō opens up the issue of the place of psychology — from counseling to mindfulness to neuroscientific guides to learning — in education. Does psychology lead to better understanding and responding to students as others? Or does it lead to psychologization, delegation of moral responsibility, and reducing social problems to mere psychological problems? While the space itself does not answer these questions, it provides a venue where different disciplines can talk with (and not across) each other.

And third, shidō is a space for praxis. How are ideas like “caring”, “subjectification”, “responding to the other” realized in the actual space of the homeroom class? In essay writing activities? In club activities and group guidance? Might an engagement with these practices not alter the theories themselves?

A translational space is a space for dialogue. I hope others will continue the dialogue of shidō, regardless of nationality, academic field, or research language.
Editorial Statement

The first issue of the internet journal *Tetsugaku: International Journal of the Philosophical Association of Japan* was published on line in April 2017 by the Philosophical Association of Japan (PAJ). Now it is our great pleasure to publish the second issue with eighteen academic papers.

For this second issue, we have selected three articles by PAJ members for “Articles”. We chose “Philosophy and Translation” for the special theme, and are happy to have received many submissions from all over the world. We finally selected thirteen excellent papers on various topics concerning translation. In relation to the special theme, we included two papers for “Philosophical Activities in Japan”, translated from Japanese into English, on the translation into Japanese of Aristotle’s philosophy.

During the editorial process, several scholars in and outside Japan gave us valuable advice. Tsuda Shiori helped us editing the issue. We appreciate their kind support.

The Special Theme for the third issue is “Japanese Philosophy”. We hope that our international journal will keep encouraging philosophical activities and dialogue between Japan and the world.

1 April 2018

Editors of *Tetsugaku: International Journal of the Philosophical Association of Japan*
Call for papers for *Tetsugaku* Vol.3, 2019 Spring
Special Issue: “Japanese Philosophy”

In Japan, the field of philosophy was established in the second half of the 19th century, alongside the assimilation of Western philosophy. The development of this new field, however, did not mean a discontinuation with the scholarship and thought of the pre-Meiji period. Rather, Japanese philosophy developed through taking up traditions such as Confucianism and Buddhism and reflecting on them in a critical manner. It is not possible to specify exactly when the field bearing the title of Japanese Philosophy (*Nihon Tetsugaku*) appeared, however Nishida Kitarō, the leading figure of the Kyoto school, wrote in 1944 that: “I hope that in respect to philosophy, Japan will in the future manage to develop a grand Japanese philosophy.”

From the war years onwards, research in Japanese philosophy has been closely tied to the thinking of the Kyoto School. However, this still young academic field has enjoyed significant growth in recent years, particularly abroad. Today, we see the development of a variety of approaches, as well as an increasing amount of research focusing on topics other than the Kyoto School.

In this special issue, we wish to highlight this energetic global academic environment for research in Japanese philosophy, drawing attention to some of the latest work that is now taking place. Please consider submitting papers which engage in the following topics:

- Japanese Philosophy of the Meiji and Taishō periods
- Historical investigations into Japanese philosophy
- Philosophy of the Kyoto School
- Japanese philosophy and war, ideology
- Comparative research — Japanese philosophy and East Asian philosophy (comparisons with Buddhism, Confucianism, etc.)
- Comparative research — Japanese philosophy and Western philosophy
- Investigations into language, culture and art in Japanese philosophy
- Theories of the body, technology, and science in Japanese philosophy
- Logic in Japanese philosophy
- Beauty and Aesthetics in Japanese philosophy
- Theories of time in Japanese philosophy

[Deadline: 30 September 2018]