In the PhP, Merleau-Ponty extends the phenomenal sphere far beyond the objective to include all the pre-objective world. He then is able to characterize all the forms of consciousness as perceptive. His most comprehensive conception of phenomenon and its associated form of consciousness must be based on the anti-Cartesian notion of generative subjectivity. As such, the early Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental phenomenology seems to me only reflecting a truncated form of making visible the transcendence and hence the other. This way, the foreignness of the other cannot but be compromised because the other can only have the otherness as incorporated to the possibility of my existence. Yet the non-compromised other or otherness must be the constitutive condition of the selfhood and hence invisible. For this reason, the foreignness of the other as the invisible constitutes the point where the phenomenological thinking must be integrated into a phenomenological ontology.
Aristotle on Mixed Actions

Wu Tianyue

Most of commentators believe that the so-called mixed actions in NE 3.1 are actually voluntary, which conflicts with Aristotle’s classification of compelled actions as involuntary in NE 5.8 and EE 2.8. By examining these different discussions, I argue that Aristotle provides a superior account of mixed actions in NE 3.1, which is grounded upon a morally loaded conception of voluntariness rather than upon an ontological approach to human behavior he adopts elsewhere. I also argue that this non-ontological conception of voluntariness helps us better understand moral dilemmas such as the one Agamemnon faces in Aulis.