Can We Translate Thinking? On the Translated Word “Koufuku”\(^1\)

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Kanzaki published five books (including a posthumous one) on Plato, Nietzsche, Foucault and Aristotle; he edited several books including the New Complete Works of Aristotle (2013–). He published some forty academic papers, but all were written in Japanese. I chose this article as one of the representative works of his academic discussion and translated it with his family’s permission.

In this paper, Kanzaki translated various ancient texts (from Homer to St. Augustine) into beautiful Japanese to show how such a translation is possible (including his own Nicomachean Ethics translation). I dare not present my own translations; instead, I use the standard translations in Britain and America. My

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\(^1\) This paper is based on a presentation given at the International Research Center for Philosophy, at Toyo University 東洋大学国際哲学研究センター, held on 28 February 2015. While preparing for it, I heard of the death of Prof. Iwata Yasuo. I hope that this paper commemorates my teacher.
translation is often free (i.e., iyaku 意訳) wherever the original Japanese is highly nuanced.

1. The relatively new appearance of the word “koufuku”

Because we are now discussing the philosophical methods and significance of translation, I would like to examine the Greek word eudaimoniā in light of my own experience of translating Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.\(^2\) By focusing on this word, I will question whether any framework of thinking can be translated into another. First, we should know that the word koufuku 幸福 is a relatively new addition to the Japanese vocabulary. It seems to have been introduced around the last phase of the Edo Period and the Enlightenment of the Meiji Period, because Nihon-kokugo-dai-jiten 日本国語大事典 (Large Dictionary of Japanese Language, 2nd ed., 2001) cites Ueda Akinari 上田秋成’s Tandai-shoushin-roku 胆大小心録 (1808)\(^3\) and then the early English dictionary, Angeriarorin-taisei 諳厄利亜語林大成 (1814),\(^4\) for its early examples.

However, Ueda Akinari used other words — like mei-fuku 冥福, mei-roku 命禄 and ten-roku 天禄 — as well. Mei-fuku refers to the Buddhist concept of the good effects in this world that originate from good deeds performed in a previous life and thus without a person’s current awareness (although this word is now customarily used in funerals to refer to the sense of happiness in the afterlife). Mei-roku\(^5\) and ten-roku refer to the order of Heaven 天命 in Confucianism. Therefore, whether one pronounces the Chinese word 幸福 “kau-fuku かうふく” or “sai-hahi さいはひ”, Akinari may have used it as a new word unrelated to


\(^3\) Cf. §155, etc. His masterpiece, Ugetsu Monogatari 雨月物語, written earlier in 1776, has examples of the word 幸福 (Books 1 and 5), but the Large Dictionary of Japanese Language does not include them. Is this because it was pronounced sai-hahi?

\(^4\) It has entries for “happiness” and “happy”, with the translations 幸福 and 幸, 幸福. But it is not clear whether these should be read as kou-fuku, sachi or saiwai.

\(^5\) Ueda is thought to have taken this word from Ōjū 王充’s Ronkō 論衡 (in the Later Han period), chapter 3, Meiroku 命禄. Having suffered much misfortune in his late middle age (e.g., the loss of his house in a fire, the loss of his wife, the failure of the family business, and loss of sight in his right eye), Akinari wrote stories about the suffering of good people in Shun-u Monogatari 春雨物語 and Tandai-shoushin-roku. This is the background of his use of the words meiroku and guu-fuguu 遇不遇 (cf. Ronkō, chapter 1).
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Buddhist or Confucian doctrines, since he belonged to the Koku-gaku (Japanese Studies) school of Kamo-no Mabuchi 賀茂真淵. 6 In any case, it was only during the Meiji Period that the word *koufuku* came to be widely used in ordinary situations.

In Nakamura Masanao 中村正直’s *Saigoku-rissshi-hen* 西国立志編 (the translation of Samuel Smiles Self-Help, 1859) in 1871, we see the word *koufuku*, along with ordinary words of morality, such as *doutoku* 道徳, *jiyuu* 自由 and *kairaku* 快楽. But here again, the translation of happiness is not fixed; Nakamura also used other words, like *fukushi* 福祉, *fukushou* 福祥, *fuku-un* 福運 and *fukubun* 福分. However, in the *Meiroku Journal* 明六雑誌 published later (whose contributors included Nakamura Masanao, Mori Arinori 森有礼, Nishi Amane, Tsuda Mamichi 津田真道 and Katō Hiroyuki 加藤弘之), the word *koufuku* was fixed as the translation of “happiness”. 7

On the other hand, the *Raponichi-jiten* 羅葡日辞典 (Dictionarium Latino-Lustanicum ac Japonicum) — published three hundred before in 1595 at the Jesuit School of Amakusa 天草 — contained the following description in the entries or beatitudo and felicitas: 8


We can read here *kahou* 果報, *goshou-no-katoku* 後生の果得 and *kahou* 果報, *eiyou* 栄耀, *eiga* 栄華 from the old-style transcription in Latin alphabets. This shows that the word *koufuku* did not exist or at least was not used much at that time. The translations *kahou* and *eiga*, used in sixteenth century Christian writings, came from the Greek *eudaimoniā* via the Latin *felicitas* or *beatitudo*. We may think

6 Neither *meifuku* in Buddhism, nor *meiroku*, nor *tenroku* in Confucianism guarantees good deeds in this world, since in Buddhist thought, such goodness was predestined by events in one’s previous life, and in Confucian thought, these matters are fully determined by Heaven’s order.

7 However, the *Shinteit Dai-genkai* 新訂・大言海, edited by Ōtsuki Fumihiko 大槻文彦 and published in 1932, contains “shiawase” but no entry of “*koufuku*”. The enlarged edition of *Philosophy Wordbook* (Zouho Tetsugaku-jii 增補・哲学字彙), edited by Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎 and Ariga Nagao 有賀長雄 in 1884, has no entry for “happiness” or its translation.

8 In these articles, the genitive form follows an entry. Lus.=Portuguese; Iap.=Japanese.
that these translations are better than “koufuku”,\(^9\) since several scholars in the Anglophone world have recently insisted that “flourishing” or “well-being” is a better translation than “happiness”, which originally comes from the word “happen”.

We can conclude that the word *koufuku* is a relatively new word, which spread as the translation of “happiness”. Before that, the words *kahou* and *eiga* were used, at least in the Kyushu Area. These were probably used until quite recently. In Ishimure Michiko’s *Kukai-jōdo* (1968), the word *eiga* 栄華, uttered by an old fisherman on the Shiranui Sea, echoes this old meaning. He says: “Fish are given by Heaven. I live each day by what is given from Heaven for free; thinking this is what I need. Is there any more *eiga* than this wherever I may go?” (Ch.4, Fish of Heaven). In this passage, in which we see a clear contrast between the disastrous situation of Minamata-disease (caused by water pollution in the 1960s) and the fertility of the Shiranui Sea before the calamity, the author describes the felicitous and self-sufficient life enjoyed in nature, in dreadful contrast with a miserable, wasted life.

If the Japanese Christians had not been suppressed in the subsequent few centuries (17–19C), the translation *eiga* for *beatitudo* or *felicitas* might have survived. But even though *eiga* fits “flourishing” better than “happiness” and may correspond to recent translation trends in the Anglophone world, I did not adopt this word for *eudaimoniā* in my new translation of the Nicomachean Ethics. Obviously, modern people no longer have a cultural background for using this term. Moreover, if we think of the changing ideas about happiness over two thousand years (from the fourth century BC to the sixteenth century), we see that adopting a word influenced by thinkers of some particular period is inadequate as a translation or that it even constitutes a mistranslation in the wider perspective of the history of philosophy.

In this sense, *koufuku* can be an adequate translation because it is free from religious and ideological background, i.e., it is not affected by the Buddhist idea of causation (like *kahou\(^{10}\)*) or the Confucian idea of Heaven’s order (like *meiroku* and *tenroku*). Although any translation should reflect correctly what it represents, we

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\(9\) *Kahou* is the appearance of the good cause (or bad cause) of the previous life as the good effect (or bad effect) in the present life. *Kahou* 花報, as the effect of the cause in this same life, is sometimes distinguished from *kahou* 果報=Quafō. However, the *Raponichi-jiten* does not include 花報=Cafo. It is not certain whether there was any association between 花 (flower) and 華 in *eiga* 栄華.

\(10\) It is interesting that *kahou* 果報 has a good connotation (like *koufuku*), whereas *inga* 因果 has a bad connotation (like *fuko* 不幸). See Satake Akihiro 佐竹昭弘, *Minwa-no-shishō* 民話の思想, Chūkō-bunko.
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should, in some cases, choose expressions whose meanings are not narrowly defined. In particular, this can be true for words whose original definitions have gone through several shifts or changes in meaning, as we will see below.

2. Changing meanings of *eudaimoniā*

The early Greek words for *koufuku* in Homer appear as follows:

> Ah, happy (*makar*) son of Atreus, child of fortune (*moirēgenes*), blest of heaven (*olbodaimon*); now see I that youths of the Achaeans full many are made subject unto thee (*Iliad* III. 182–183, trans. A. T. Murray).

Here, the words *makar* (*makarios*) and *olbos* (with its related word *olbodaimōn*) are used. However, later *eudaimōn* and its noun, *eudaimoniā*, became the most popular terms.

The word *eudaimōn* originally meant “having a good *daimōn*”, but it is not clear how much of the etymology people were conscious of in using the term. However, people agreed that it refers to “beauty, or strength, or wealth, or glory, or anything of the sort” (Xenophon, *Memorabilia* IV.2.34). It was against this common view of happiness that Socrates expressed his own view, that body and money can be called good only if they are based on virtue, since he encouraged people to care for the soul, instead of caring for the body or money (Plato, *Apology* 30b). Xenophon also argues against the vulgar view of happiness by reference to those who ruined themselves because of beauty, ability, wealth, fame or power. He attributed an anti-vulgar position similar to that of his contemporaries, Antisthenes and the Cynics, to Socrates.

On the other hand, Plato saw in Socrates the original thought that not only separates happiness from popular ideas but also brings a fundamental change to the concept of happiness. In the *Gorgias*, the Macedonian tyrant Archelaus provides the antithesis to the Socratic thought that unjust people are unhappy, and Plato develops this idea in a more systematic way in the so-called “Glaucon’s Challenge” in Book

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11 In philosophical writings, Plato’s *Republic* VII. 540c1–2 etymologically associates a happy person (*eudaimōn*) with *daimōn*, and Xenocrates, a pupil of Plato, used this etymology to show that a virtuous person is happy (cf. Arist. *Top.* 112a36–38).
Two of the Republic. To examine the power of justice in itself, he presents a thought-experiment in which just people suffer unhappy situations.

A tyrant who has usurped political power without legal authority possesses a great power to monopolise wealth and power, and for that purpose he confiscates the property of others or banishes or executes them. The wealth and power acquired in this unjust way are regarded as happiness in the vulgar view, but Socrates insists that such a person is athlios. This Greek word is the antonym of happiness, and it is sometimes translated as “miserable”, which represents the subjective condition or emotion of the observer. However, it can be translated as “collapse” or “failure”, words that describe the objective situation of the agent.

Concerning this point, Cicero gave in the Tusculan Disputations a translation of the Gorgias passage. Because this is of interest given our translation theme, let us consider it an example of Cicero’s Latin translation of Plato’s Greek. Let us focus on the following text: when Socrates asks Polus whether the tyrant Archelaus is happy or miserable, he says, “I say that the admirable and good person, man or woman, is happy but that the one who’s unjust and wicked is miserable” (Gorgias 470e9–11, trans. Donald J. Zeyl). Cicero translated this sentence: “good people are happy, unjust people are miserable (bonos beatos, improbos miseros)” (Tusc. Disp. V.35). One may wonder whether this is a translation sensu stricto or not; however, it is clear from the context that Cicero intended to translate, not to summarise or paraphrase, Plato’s Greek into Latin.

Cicero translates the phrase kalos kai agathos into a single word: bonus. We can suppose that he took these words as a set (kalokagathia) but did not omit or simplify them. However, in the next phrase, in which Socrates deliberately states “man or woman”, Cicero expresses it in the masculine only. Although this can be explained as changing the singular into the plural (to include both sexes), it ignores something important in the emphasised phrase.12

A more important point is the shift in meaning caused by translating the Greek athlios into the Latin miser. As stated above, athlios is the word that signifies the objective, disastrous situation of the agent. Although the Latin miser originally had a similar connotation, Cicero argues in the previous passages of Book 5 of the Tusculan Disputations (which contains the translation of the Gorgias) that being driven by insensible passion, the excitement and disturbance of the upset mind, and

12 Here we should remember that Socrates points out in Meno 73b that there is no difference between virtue in men and virtue in women. Since Cicero mentions the Meno’s argument in Tusculan Disputations I.57, he must have known that passage. It would not be unfair to see here a kind of gender bias among Romans.
anger prevents happiness, and that fear of death, pain, poverty, disgrace, infamy, weakness, blindness and slavery leads people into the situation of miser (Tusc. Disp. V.15). Based on this consideration, Cicero concludes that happiness is “a quiet and peaceful state of the soul (animi quietus et placatus status)”, escaping from the disturbance (perturbatio) of such irrational fears. He compares happiness to the “tranquillity of the sea (maris tranquillitas)” \(^{13}\) (ibid. V.16), and regards “disturbance of the mind (perturbatio animi)” as emotions which mislead us into wrong judgements. The last phrase is Cicero’s translation of the Greek word pathos (III.7). Here we can see a mixture of two theories, namely, the Stoic theory of emotion (that the sage is in the state of apatheia without ever being affected by such emotions) on the one hand and the Epicurean theory of peacefulness of mind (ataraxiā) — which can be attained by purging ungrounded fears from our mind using correct understanding of the world —on the other. The reference to the Gorgias passage was given in order to buttress the idea of the Stoic Zeno with the authority of Plato.

In short, during Cicero’s time, the word miser changed in meaning from a hard situation to the mental attitude toward such a situation. Correspondingly, the notion of happiness shifted its meaning from the objective situation to the mental attitude of the people concerned with the situation.\(^ {14}\)

In fact, in the three main trends of Hellenistic philosophy after Aristotle —namely, Epicurean, Stoic and Sceptic — the notion of eudaimoniā or beatitudo came to mean ataraxiā or tranquillitas (Epicurean and Sceptic), apatheia or good flow of life (euroia biou) (Stoic), all of which are subjective. This change can be characterised as a shift from action to mental state or from activity to tranquillity.

3. From happiness as activity to happiness as a mental state

\(^{13}\) In this context, the Latin tranquillitas is used as the translation of the Greek galēnē. Aristotle says in Topics 108b25 that “the sameness of a calm (galēnē) at sea, and windlessness (nēnemiā) in the air (each being a form of rest (hēsychiā))”.

\(^{14}\) We should remember that in the medieval Japanese language, tanoshi 楽し means richness, and kanashi 悲し poverty (bingu 貧窮 or bokushou 乏少). Also, the word saki-hahi represented the flourishing state of flowers, and sachi originally signified arrowhead, being a symbol for fertility in the sea and mountains. The former belongs to the fertility of the Flora type, while the latter to that of the Fauna type. Both are the roots of our view of happiness.
We had this in mind when we said in the first section that “we should, in some cases, choose expressions whose meanings are not narrowly defined”. According to the Greek traditional view of happiness, the possession of wealth, fame, power, family, health and beauty is necessary for happiness. However, not everyone can obtain these things; acquiring these fortunes is a matter of good or bad luck. On the contrary, the possession of such things may cause unhappiness, and thence the unworldly or anti-profane view appeared, suggesting that not possessing them is happiness. To Xenophon and Antisthenes, Socrates seemed to take this position.

However, Plato pushed this position further, putting forward the following view: because only virtue is unconditionally good, the good person can never be harmed (Ap. 41d1–3, cf. 30c9–d1), even if his property is confiscated, or his family is harmed, or he himself is banished or killed, his virtue (as the goodness of his soul) is never damaged. Plato saw in Socrates, who took this view, a revolutionary figure in changing the views of happiness. He insisted that those who commit unjust acts without being punished are unhappy (Gorgias 472d). Since death does not destroy the virtue of good men, but can be an opportunity for improvement of one’s soul, the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is not only cosmological but also an ethical theoretical postulate. Moreover, in the Republic, Plato insists that happiness is not brought about by good luck. Instead, it should be achieved through our own actions. Therefore, Plato referred to eudaimonia as “good deed” (eupragiā, or its verbal form eu prattein). In this sense, it is symbolic that the Republic ends with the words “we shall do well = be happy (eu prattomen)” (621d2–3).

Aristotle doubtless faced these radical changes in the traditional view of happiness introduced by Socrates and Plato, but he did not reject traditional elements of happiness, such as wealth, fame, political power, health, family, beauty and good luck. Instead, he put important limitations on these conditions (i.e., that happiness can be realised by the actuality of virtue). In this respect, Aristotle, being a Macedonian metoikos, was more conservative. He defined the essence of happiness

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16 For the former, see the Apology, 30d, 35a–b; for the latter, see Laws 854d–855a, 881a.
17 Cf. Charmides 172a3, 173d4, 174b12–c1, Euthydemus 278e, Protagoras 344e–345a, Gorgias 507c, Republic 353e5, 621d2–3.
18 Aristotle, in Rhetoric I.5, regards this vulgar happiness as a part of happiness, and enumerates good birth, plenty of friends, good friends, wealth, good children, plenty of children, a happy old age, health, beauty, strength, large stature, athletic powers, fame, honour, good luck and finally virtue.
as “complete activity through complete virtue” via the location of external goods or fortunes (i.e., property or family and friends) within the conditions of happiness. (This is why the word praxis is changed to energeia; the latter includes théōrīa as well as praxis). Aristotle then added the framework of complete life into the Nicomachean Ethics.\footnote{Cf. Nicomachean Ethics I.10, 1101a15–17, and Eudemian Ethics II.1, 1219a39. Later the Doxography of Arius Didymus defined happiness as the prior use of complete virtue in complete life, or the complete activity of life according to virtue (Stobaeus, Eclogues II.7.16). Although it is uncertain whether Cicero read Aristotle’s Corpus, his expression “the exercise of virtue with well-being lasting throughout a complete life-time (virtus usum cum vitae perfectae prosperitate)” (Fin. II.19) probably came from such doxographical reports.} This was a search for the possibility of wholeness and unity of life within the limited human lifespan, against his own background following Socrates and Plato, who assumed the everlasting existence of the soul after death.\footnote{Cf. J. Annas, The Morality of Happiness, Ch. 1, Making Sense of My Life as a Whole.}

However, the divergence of views lay not only between the general population and intellectuals, but also between philosophers’ views; the general understanding that happiness is doing well was already crumbling among philosophers, when Aristotle argued in the following way:

Pretty well most people are agreed about what to call it: both ordinary people and people of quality say “happiness (eudaimoniā)”, and suppose that living well (eu zēn) and doing well (eu prattein) are the same thing as being happy (eudaimoneuein). But they are in dispute about what happiness actually is, and ordinary people do not give the same answer as intellectuals (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.4, 1095a17–22, trans. Sarah Broadie and Christopher Rowe).

The precursor of this view was Democritus, who forwarded contrary philosophical opinions in many fields. He may have called happiness euestō (well-being), and in the bibliographical list of Diogenes Laertius, the title “On cheerfulness (euthymiā)” is included (IX.7.46). To this, Diogenes added a note that we found no title of “well-being”.\footnote{Diels-Kranz, 68A33, cf. B4, 140.} In fact, the term euthymiā became common after Democritus.\footnote{Arius Didymus reported in the first century BC. that Democritus had called eudaimoniā by various names, including euthymiā, euestō, harmoniā, symmetriā and ataraxiā (Stobaeus, Eclogues II. p.52).} In this sense as well, Democritus shared the objectivist view of happiness up to the fourth century BC by using the word euestō, but we may say that,
at the same time, he started a new subjectivist view of happiness by using the word *euthymiā*.

This feature is well observed in the following fragment:

> For men achieve cheerfulness (*euthymiā*) by moderation in pleasure and by proportion in their life; excess and deficiency are apt to fluctuate and cause great changes (disturbances) in the soul. And souls which change over great intervals are neither stable nor cheerful. So one should set one’s mind on what is possible and be content with what one has, taking little account of those who are admired and envied, and not dwelling on them in thought, but one should consider the lives of those who are in distress, thinking of their grievous sufferings, so that what one has and possesses will seem great and enviable, and one will cease to suffer in one’s soul through the desire for more (Democritus, B191 DK, trans. C. C. W. Taylor).

The influence of Democritus’ view of happiness can be seen in Pyrrho, the founder of scepticism,\(^\text{24}\) and this fact provides good evidence of a transitional process from the objectivist to the subjectivist view of happiness. Pyrrho explained three necessary factors or three stages for becoming happy: “First, what things really are, second, how we can behave ourselves towards things, and finally, what result is brought about to such a person” (Eusebius, *Praep. Ev.*, XIV.18, 2–4). The first point involves indifference (*adiaphora*) in the world, the second is the epistemological attitude of *epoke*, and the third is what accompanies this attitude, namely, peacefulness of mind (*ataraxia*). In other words, happiness is shifted through these stages, from the objective situation of the world, through our judgement (or suspension of judgement) towards it, and eventually to our mental state or the mental art. In this way, happiness is shifted from an individual’s being to their subjective feelings.

It is no coincidence that Epicurus — who studied under Nausiphanes, a pupil of Pyrrho’s — posited *ataraxia* as the goal of life, just like Pyrrho.\(^\text{25}\) However, although they had the same goal, they pursued it via different routes. Whereas Pyrrho suspended judgements because real things are all indifferent, Epicurus believed that the firm recognition of things can remove irrational fears and therefore allow one to attain *ataraxia* (i.e., happiness). Vergil, who was familiar with


\(^{24}\) Pyrrho was said to have learned from Anaxarchus, a pupil of Metrodorus, who was a pupil of Democritus (Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* VII.87–88).

\(^{25}\) For the teacher-pupil relationship between them, see Diogenes Laertius, IX.11.64.
Epicureanism from his youth, simply stated: “Happy, who had the skill to understand / Nature’s hid causes, and beneath his feet / All terrors cast, and death’s relentless doom, / And the loud roar of greedy Acheron” (Georgica II.490–492, trans. J. B. Greenough). For Epicurus, unlike the sceptics, believed that a clear understanding of the world can resolve our fears and anxieties, and he believed that such diverse fears could be ultimately reduced to the fear of death.

Lucretius, whose influence we can assume in Virgil’s poem above, stated in De Rerum Natura:

> Fear of death induces one man to violate honour, another to break the bonds of friendship, and in a word to overthrow all natural feeling . . . For as children tremble and fear everything in the blind darkness, so we in the light sometimes fear what is no more to be feared than the things that children in the dark hold in terror and imagine will come true. This terror, therefore, and darkness of the mind must be dispersed, not by rays of the sun nor the bright shafts of daylight, but by the aspect and law of nature (Lucretius, De Rerum Natura III.83–98, trans. Martin F. Smith).

Lucretius, a scholar poet contemporary of Cicero, who reconstructed the entire philosophy of Epicurus in Latin verse, argues particularly in Book 3 that our desires, accumulation of property, and quest for honour are all based on the fear of death. One wants to beget children out of fear of one’s own corruption or perishing. The desire to keep as large a property as possible for future stability has the same origin. However, Epicurus’ materialistic philosophy shows that “death is nothing for us”. The fear of death is irrational because we cannot experience death; therefore, rational understanding can resolve fear of death. When the fear of death is removed in this way, we can get rid of additional things, such as desires for property and for honour. This way of thinking eventually allows one to reach ataraxiā. Thus, Pyrrhonian scepticism and Epicurean hedonism, both influenced by Democritus, converge on the same goal (i.e., ataraxiā) through different routes.

In this way, the view of happiness has drastically changed in the Hellenistic period, when the history of philosophy marked a new stage after Aristotle. This change did not occur at once. As we have seen, it emerged through some stages, in particular when Cicero translated the passage of Plato’s Gorgias, which we examined as a definite stage of this transition. In the Hellenistic period, of the three main schools — the Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics — the last two discussed
happiness in terms of atarxiā (the negation of tarachē, i.e., trouble) in Greek and tranquillitas in Latin,\(^{26}\) and the first school considered happiness in terms of apatheia or euroia biou (good flow of life).\(^{27}\) In both cases, it is obvious that they departed from the traditional view of happiness held by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, all of whom believed that happiness came from good actions or activity.

In this regard, one passage in Plato’s Republic may seem to be foreseeing the new view:

Taking all this into calculations, he will keep quiet (hēsychiā), and mind his own business, like someone taking shelter behind a wall when he is caught by a storm of driving dust and rain. He sees everyone else brim-full of lawlessness, and counts himself lucky if he himself can somehow live his life here pure, free from injustice and unholy actions, and depart with high hopes, with a spirit of kindness and goodwill, on his release from it (Plato, Republic VI.496d5–e2, trans. Tom Griffith).

If we take this description as that of a self-sufficient life on a farm (kēpos), it represents the Epicurean way of life, in which people detach themselves from political activities. And if we consider a situation in which one stands on the inner fortress (acropolis)\(^{28}\) so as not to have his or her mind disturbed by various emotions, it represents the mental state of the Stoic sage, led by the controlling part (hēgemonikon) of the soul. Of course, it is only in our hindsight that Plato foresaw the future situation. If “high hopes” means the soul’s release from the body, just as in the Phaedo (67b7–c3), his view is fundamentally different from that of the Epicureans and Stoics, who believed that each individual perishes when the body dies.

Despite these differences, we must appreciate Plato’s sharp sense of direction about the subsequent trends of thought: Plato demonstrates a view that treats happiness not in terms of action or activity but as a state of the soul, whether it is tranquillity or apatheia. This seems to be closely connected with the changing frameworks surrounding thinking on human life and time. Let us finally get some hints concerning this point.


\(^{27}\) Cf. SVF. III.35.12; cf. ibid. III.16.

\(^{28}\) For this metaphor, see Marcus Aurelius, Meditationes VIII.48.
4. Happiness and Time

When we read the *Phaedo*, we notice that it uses the word *elpis* (hope) several times in the first part. It may be assumed that this dialogue deals with the previous life because it discusses the theory of recollection (*anamnēsis*); however, the word *elpis* rather points to the eternity of life after death and the prospect of the next life. The Socratic belief that anyone who commits crimes and unjust deeds without receiving punishment is unhappy, and that good persons will never be unhappy even if they are persecuted, influenced the Cynics and Stoics later, but at least the figure of Socrates depicted in Plato’s dialogues expresses the immortality of the soul and the eternity of life as inseparable conditions, whether they came from Pythagoreanism or not. In this way, happiness (and its opposite) inevitably involved the existence of the soul after death.

Although the Epicureans are hedonistic in so far as they appreciate pleasures, they may be dubbed ascetic in that they try to avoid excessive pleasures. Moreover, with respect to the eternity of life, they believed that the prolongation of time in life does not increase happiness, since they deny the subsistence of the soul after death.

We must not go beyond the bounds, but keep within the boundary and measure that applies to such things, and must reckon that the person who is afraid of abstinence from animate creatures, even if it is for pleasure that he takes to meat-eating, is afraid of death. For he immediately connects with deprivation of meat the presence of some terror without limit, and from this presence comes death. From causes like these, and from analogous causes, there arises an insatiable desire for life, wealth, money and fame, because people think that with these they will, given a longer time, increase their sum of good, and because they fear the terror of death as something without limit (Porphyry, *On Abstinence from Killing Animals* 1.54.2–3, trans. Gillian Clark).

Here Porphyry presented the Epicurean view that excessive and superfluous desires, without necessary bodily conditions in accordance with nature, are caused by the fear of death. In this view, Epicurus criticised the wrong assumption that the

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prolongation of life can advance the good, the object of desires, and can thus postpone death. This sense of eternity of life did not guarantee happiness for the Epicureans. In other words, they believed that it does not matter whether a life is long or short. This is consistent with their belief that happiness lies in peacefulness of mind.

Lucretius, for example, expressed this view in the following poem:

Nor do we, or can we, by prolonging life subtract anything from the time of death, so as perhaps to shorten our period extinction! Hence you may live to see out as many centuries as you like: no less will that everlasting death await you. No shorter will be the period of non-existence for one who has ended his life from today than for one who perished many months or years ago (Lucretius, De Rerum Natura III.1087–94, trans. A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley, 24G).

This is no direct reference to happiness, but this quote is interesting because it expresses the notion of time in Epicureanism. This notion of time can also be seen in Cicero’s testimony on the Epicurean’s main interest, pleasure, that “no greater pleasure could be derived from a life of infinite duration than is actually afforded by this existence which we know to be finite” (De Finibus, I. 19–63, trans. H. Rackham).

A similar thought can be seen in the Stoics, being materialists like Epicureans, who assumed the limit of life:

A good is not augmented by addition of time; but, if one be prudent even for a moment, one will not be at all inferior in happiness to him who exercises virtue for ever and blissfully lives out his life in it (Plutarch, On Common Conceptions 1061F–1062A, trans. Harold Cherniss).

Because of their differing definitions of the good, the Stoics focused on happiness based on virtue, and the Epicureans focused on pleasure. However, both agreed that length of life cannot be a decisive factor for happiness. Moreover, in so far as the Stoics based their view of happiness on apatheia or good flow of life, their conception of happiness corresponds to the ataraxiā of the Epicureans.
Can We Translate *Thinking*?

Whoever had the idea that permanence increases the good, it may not be difficult to attribute it also to Plato. Aristotle, in criticising the Form of the Good, says that it is not the case that “what is white and long-lasting is whiter than what is white and short-lived”. This criticism implies that time permanence does not increase quality and value for those who possess it. This does not mean that Aristotle had ideas similar to those of the Epicureans or Stoics. However, in this respect, one passage of Epicurus reminds us of Aristotle:

Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures by reason the limits of pleasure. The flesh perceives the limits of pleasure as unlimited and unlimited time is required to supply it. But the mind, having attained a reasoned understanding of the ultimate good of the flesh and its limits and having dissipated the fears concerning the time to come, supplies us with the complete life (*pantelēs bios*), and we have no further need of infinite time: but neither does the mind shun pleasure, nor when circumstances begin to bring about the departure from life, does it approach its end as though it fell short in any way of the best life (Epicurus, *Cyriai Doxai ix–xx = DL. X.145*, trans. Cyril Bailey).

Here “the complete life” or “the best life” reminds us of the following passage and others (e.g., 1100a4–5) of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, despite the fact that Aristotle’s thought is not compatible with that of Epicurus and Lucretius (in the above citation), who maintained that momentary happiness is in essence no different from everlasting happiness:

The human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue (and if there are more virtues than one, in accordance with the best and the most complete). But furthermore it will be this in a complete life (*teleios bios*). For a single swallow does not make spring; in the same way, neither does a single day, or a short time, make a man blessed and happy (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* I.6, 1096b3–5, and *Eudemian Ethics* I.8, 1218a9–15).

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30 The point of Hatano Seiichi 波多野精一, in *Time and Eternity 時と永遠* (Iwanami-shoten, 1943, pp. 98–99), that unlimitness of time is not eternity but the ultimate form of incompleteness, can be true for a vulgar form of Platonism, if not for Plato himself.


32 For this passage, see J. Annas, *The Morality of Happiness*, pp. 345–347.
This passage shows that human happiness needs a certain length of time and maturity in time so that activity can realise happiness, as long as it depends on exercising both intellectual and ethical virtues. This indicates a different message from that of the Epicureans, who insisted that, if a life gains true pleasures, it is a complete life, however short it is.

The difference between these views is explained by Arius Didymus, a doxographer of the first century BC, from his comparison of doctrines. “The Epicurean philosophers do not accept the view that happiness lies in activity, since they regard the supreme good as something passive, i.e. pleasure, but not something practical”. Didymus must have had Aristotle in mind when he discussed the view that happiness lies in activity.

Based on the idea of a complete life, Aristotle refrains from admitting that children can attain happiness. He bases this view on the following points: (A) happiness is concerned with reason (logos) because it requires activity based on virtue, and (B) for that reason a certain length of time is necessary for one to obtain happiness, so that happiness is not fully judged until the end of one’s life. Aristotle thus believed (based on point A) that happiness cannot be applied to animals and (based on points A and B) that it cannot be applied to children.

This may sound harsh to modern people, who naturally associate innocence and simple-minded happiness with children, but it is a natural conclusion for Aristotle, who defines happiness as activity based on virtue. Yet, since he might have regretted this view as an overstatement in accordance with his contemporary common views, he added that “those children that are said to be happy are being called blessed because of their hope (elpis) for the future. This is because, as we

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34 Plotinus, Enn. I.4.1: “Suppose we assume the good life and well-being to be one and the same; shall we then have to allow a share in them to other living things as well as ourselves? If they can live the way natural to them without impediment, what prevents us from saying that they too are in a good state of life? For whether one considers the good life as consisting in satisfactory experience or accomplishing one’s proper works, in either case it will belong to the other living things as well as us” (trans. A. H. Armstrong). Like Didymus, Plotinus, distinguishing between active and passive aspects of happiness, attributed happiness in a wider sense to all animals, since he made no distinction between points A and B.
have said, happiness requires both complete virtue and a complete life” (*Nicomachean Ethics* I.9, 1100a3–5, trans. Broadie and Rowe, slightly modified).

Noticeably, the word “hope” is used here. Of course, it is the hope for a future in this world, but not hope for the next life, as expressed in Plato’s *Phaedo* and *Republic*. We do not know whether Aristotle intended this or not, but this passage implies a sort of Aristotelian real-worldism, namely, the emphasis on the complete life in this world, in contrast to the commitment to the world after death. It is the complete life attainable within finite time. Like Plato, Aristotle talks of “becoming like a god as much as possible”, but he does not believe that men can hope for everlasting life, or that such a life is realisable. Instead, man’s goal must be integrity of life rather than eternity of life.

5. Concluding remarks

We started our discussion by showing that the Aristotelian concept of happiness may have been introduced into Japan through the Christian writings of the Jesuits in the latter half of the sixteenth century. In this consideration, we have examined several stages of change concerning the concept of happiness. We now recognise clearly that we cannot state that this translation was completed when *eudaimoniā* was replaced by *beatitudo* or *felicitas*, or when it was replaced by *kahou* or *eiga*, or now *koufuku*. This is not to introduce the indeterminacy of translation or interpretation. Instead, I intend to show that translation requires us to engage in archaeological work to carefully peel away the layers of word meanings to observe their changes, by presenting some examples on *koufuku* or happiness.

In this sense, when I state that the Aristotelian concept of happiness may have been introduced into Japan through Christian writings, this is far from exact, although not entirely untrue. Whether the appropriate translation is *beatitudo* or *felicitas*, it no longer refers to Aristotle’s “happiness as activity”. We should also consider the connection with happiness as a mental attitude, like *ataraxiā* or *apatheia*, in recalling that the *New Testament* was edited during the Hellenistic period, when these ideas were predominant. A more complicating factor is that Christian writings introduced into early modern Japan were a part of the Jesuit

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activities based on Scholasticism, which was in turn based on the theology of
Thomas Aquinas. Of course, Aquinas established his theology via examination of
Aristotle’s philosophy.

It is important to consider the difference between the traditional Greek and
the Christian views of happiness: the former was happiness for the strong, since they
based it on virtue, whereas the latter was considered happiness for the weak, as we
see in the Gospels of Matthew (5.3–12) and of Luke (6.20–26). Moreover, the
concept of virtue also underwent a Christian transformation. This is clearly shown in
the following passage in Augustine:

For if our virtues are genuine — and genuine virtues can exist only in those
who are endowed with true piety — they do not lay claim to such powers as
to say that men in whom they reside will suffer no miseries (for true virtues
are not so fraudulent in their claims); but they do say that our human life,
though it is compelled by all the great evils of this age to be wretched, is
happy in the expectation of a future life in so far as it enjoys the expectation
of salvation too. For how can a life be happy, if it has no salvation yet? So
the apostle Paul, speaking not of men who lacked prudence, patience,
temperance and justice, but of men who lived in accordance with true piety,
and whose virtues were therefore genuine, says: “Now we are saved by hope.
But hope that is seen is not hope. For how should a man hope for what he
sees? But if we hope for that which we do not see, then we look forward with
endurance” (Romans 8.24–25) (Augustinus, De Civitate Dei XIX.4, trans. W.
C. Greene).

Here, Augustine rejects not only wealth, power and honour from happiness
but also the view of Socrates and the Cynics that the good person cannot be harmed.
He instead insists that the weak are blessed. Accordingly, he presents “hope” as a
virtue, instead of “prudence, patience, temperance and justice”. For Augustine, the
theological virtues are hope plus faith and charity.

In the Dochirina Kirishitan (Doctrina Christiana, Jesuit texts published in
Japan in the end of the sixteenth century) the passage from the Gospel of Matthew
(5.4) was translated into “Naku-mono wa yorokobase-raru-beki niyotte kahou nari
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(weeping person is kahou because he will be pleased)\(^{36}\); i.e., a sufferer is happy. In this sentence, “beki” signifies not duty but a definite future. In other words, it does not mean to have a present hope for future salvation, but to be happy now in anticipation of an already secured future reward.

Here the word “hope” is used again, this time to describe the virtue of the weak, but it differs from the hope of Socrates and Plato based on the immortality of the soul. Whereas the latter is the hope for the release of the soul from the body at death, the former is hope for the salvation of the soul through the resurrection of the body.\(^{37}\) In the latter, the coming world does not exist yet, whereas the former assumes the eternal place to which the soul belongs.

Although it is often emphasised how much Neoplatonism, especially Plotinus, influenced Augustine and Christianity, we should not ignore Plotinus’ differing views concerning the special role of body and time in Christian thinking on happiness. The difference is suggested in the following passage in the *Enneads*:

So, if well-being is a matter of good life, obviously the life concerned must be that of real being; for this is the best. So it must not be counted by time but by eternity; and this is neither more nor less nor of any extension, but is a “this here”, unextended and timeless. So one must not join being to non-being or time or everlastingness of time to eternity nor must one extend the unextended; one must take it as a whole if one takes it at all, and apprehend, not the undividedness of time but the life of eternity, which is not made up of many times, but is all together from the whole of time (Plotinus, *Ennead* I.5, 7.20–30, trans. A. H. Armstrong).

In this passage, a new view of happiness is indicated, which is different from the happiness realised in activity or from the happiness as mental attitude, though this view is modelled on Plato.

When we observe the final trend of the Greek views of happiness, a new Christian view of happiness, modelled on views of Aristotle, emerges in contrast with the Greek views. This new perspective on happiness integrates the realisation

\(^{36}\) Of the four editions, the Vatican edition of 1591 and the Roman edition of 1592 have “喜ばせられるべきによって”, while the other two editions corrected them into “宥め喜ばせるるによって”.

of happiness through action and through mental attitude, since it offers us hope for future resurrection and enables us to bear present sufferings as precursors to happiness. I believe that this new aspect can properly locate the significance of the introduction of Aristotle into Japan through Christian writings in the sixteenth century.