

The Problem of Meaning in Nishida's Early Writings

Miikael-Adam Lotman

JSPS Research Fellow, Kyoto University

***Abstract:** This paper revisits a traditional problem in Nishidian scholarship regarding the link between Nishida Kitarō's maiden work *An Inquiry into the Good* (1911) and his next major treatise *Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness* (1917). In this paper I will show that the problem of fact vs. meaning, which is explicitly treated in *Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness*, is influenced by the writings of Mōtōra Yūjirō. I make the case that Nishida's adoption of Royce's thought experiment of "the perfect map of England" as a model for "self-consciousness" was instrumental in his attempt to explain the entirety of reality.*

In the first section, I show that Nishida's earliest ambition of explaining everything with the concept of pure experience accommodates his contemporaries' understanding of the scope and task of philosophy. However, Nishida developed his own explanation of philosophy's task. According to Nishida, philosophy arises in response to a sense of anguish one feels after contemplating on the meaning of the world.

In the second section, I explain why Nishida believed that a reflection on the world's meaning causes philosophical anguish. This is due to an incompatibility between Nishida's metaphysical views and a criterion of meaning that he inherited from Mōtōra. This combination left Nishida with a dilemma: either the world has no meaning, or everything has meaning but the world does not exist as a single entity.

*In the last section, I argue that Royce's "perfect map of England" offered resolved this dilemma, by showing how the world as a single entity can have meaning in relation to its proper parts. These proper parts are numerically distinct perfect images of the original image of the world. I also point to a discrepancy between Nishida's and Royce's models, which would become problematic in *Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness*.*

Introduction

Nishida Kitarō is often hailed as Japan's foremost philosopher. Although it is uncontroversial that Nishida's philosophy underwent a series of intellectual developments, it is not clear what kinds of problems motivated Nishida's thinking and which of the various concepts are essential for understanding his philosophy. According to one traditional view, the developments in Nishida's philosophy culminated with the advent of his "logic of place" as expounded in his seminal paper "Place" (1926). One of the major proponents of this view is Kosaka Kunitsugu, who claims that "even though the formative process of Nishida's philosophy can be categorized into several periods, any such attempt admits the standpoint of "place" as one of its turning-points" (Kosaka 1994, 78). Given that this view is correct, we must still tackle the problem of philosophical motivation. What kinds of problems left Nishida dissatisfied with his earlier standpoints (*e.g.* the theories of "pure experience" or "self-consciousness") and in what way did the "logic of place" serve as a viable solution?

It has been recently argued that the ontological and logical status of "meaning" is one of the underlying problems that lead Nishida to develop his "logic of place" (Asakura 2018, 161–179). According to Asakura, the philosophical weight of this problem can be recognized in *Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness*, which he deems Nishida's "first genuinely philosophical treatise" (*ibid.*, 163). It is well-known that in *Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness* Nishida set out to solve the problem of fact *vs.* meaning. In this paper, I will supplement Asakura's interpretation by showing that the problem of meaning predates Nishida's 1917 opus and can be traced back to his earliest manuscripts that would later comprise his maiden work *An Inquiry into the Good*. However, according to my interpretation the problem of meaning is not exhaustively addressed by the question of its logical or ontological status. Rather, I will argue that the most fundamental problem for Nishida consisted in the task of giving meaning to the totality of life in the broadest possible sense.

In the first two sections, I will reveal the nature and background of the problem by clarifying Nishida's fundamental beliefs about the holistic character of true reality and his understanding of the nature meaning, which he inherited from the writings of Motora Yūjirō. In the last section, I will introduce Josiah Royce's thought experiment about the "perfect map of England" and explain why it served as a solution to Nishida's original problem.

1. To Explain Everything

In *An Inquiry into the Good* Nishida Kitarō attempted “to explain everything by deeming pure experience the sole reality” (Nishida 1990, xxx). In his next major work *Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness* he re-addressed the problem of the “entirety of reality” with the concept of self-consciousness, narrowing his focus to the explication of “the connection of fact and meaning, existence and value” (NKZa 2, 3)¹. But why did Nishida undertake the herculean task of “explaining everything”, rather than confining himself to some specific problem in, say, metaphysics, ontology, ethics or aesthetics?

An indirect answer to the first question has to do with the way Meiji-era thinkers understood philosophy. In *Dictionary of Philosophy* (1905) — the first Japanese explanatory dictionary of philosophy — Tomonaga Sanjūrō defines the field in terms of its form, method and object. According to Tomonaga, philosophy deals with the form of cognition (as opposed to emotion), which is organized into a coherent system of knowledge. Thus, its form is cognitive and method systematic. Regarding its object, Tomonaga writes:

3 Object Philosophy always appears in the form of systematic cognitions, *i.e.* as science. What then distinguishes it from other sciences? The difference lies in its object. Having said this, the difference is not necessarily of quality but [rather] of quantity. Other sciences deal with objects of local scope. In contradistinction, philosophy deals with objects of global and universal [全般的普汎] scope. . . . Other sciences take parts of everything [萬有] as their research objects. In contradistinction, the research object of philosophy is the totality of everything in the entire universe [萬有全般宇宙全体]. (Tomonaga 1905, 163)

The above understanding of philosophy as a field that ought to treat “the totality of everything in the entire universe” is echoed in Kihira Tadayoshi’s “The division of labor in academia and the task of philosophy” (1905), published two years before Nishida’s first article. In this article Kihira laments the decline of philosophy, which has fragmented into independent disciplines and become subservient to the progress of natural sciences. According to Kihira, philosophy is originally a holistic

¹ Nishida’s writings in *Nishida Kitarō Zenshū* [Complete works of Nishida Kitarō] are cited as “NKZa”, followed by volume and page numbers.

enterprise that is tasked with the pursuit of “ultimate knowledge” (終局的知識). As such, it is diametrically opposed to the direction of natural sciences, which pursue specific and partial knowledge of reality, thus providing us with a fragmented worldview at best. Therefore, Nishida's attempt at “explaining everything by deeming pure experience the sole reality” was in line with his contemporaries' understanding of the task and scope of philosophy.

This, however, does not mean that Nishida did not have his own reasons for believing in the holistic nature of philosophy. In the “Fragments related to pure experience” (NKZa 16, 276–572), which contains Nishida's personal research notes and paragraphs that he scrapped from the publication of *An Inquiry into the Good*, we find a passage where Nishida explains the emergence of philosophical thought as an essentially holistic enterprise:

Philosophy emerges from the demand for new life rather than from the demands of pure knowledge. In this regard, philosophy shares its origins with religion. . . . [T]hose who know not of anguish, or those who do not seek for a deeper life even at the bounds of despair, have no need for philosophy. However, there isn't a person who — having been driven to the bounds of despair or otherwise thought about the totality of life — has not felt a particular anguish in their hearts. There are those who will thence try to discover a new meaning of the world and of life; these people feel the true demand of philosophy. (NKZa 16, 566–567)

As seen in the above, for Nishida “the true demand of philosophy” consists in an attempt at forging a new meaning of “the world and of life”. That is, philosophy aims at making sense of everything. Although this paragraph did not make it to the 1907 article, he would remain convinced that true reality (*i.e.* everything related to the “the world and of life”) is not “not simply an existence but something with meaning” (Nishida 1990, 49).

According to the scrapped paragraph, the holistic task of philosophy is perpetuated by a sense of anguish, which arises when one thinks about the meaning of true reality. Thus, the task of explaining everything condemns philosophers to a potentially infinite life of despair. Perhaps this overly gloomy upshot of philosophy is why Nishida thought it best to remove this paragraph from the final draft. In the published article, Nishida presented a more optimistic view of philosophy, promising the reader that the “clarification of the nature of the universe, human life,

and true reality” (ibid, 38) will be conducive to moral knowledge and peace of mind (安心).

In the first chapter of *An Inquiry into the Good* (published in 1909 as “Pure experience, thinking, will and intellectual intuition”), Nishida elaborated on the epistemological aspects of pure experience deeming it synonymous with true reality as the preconceptual foundation of all phenomena of consciousness. This state of experience is famously exemplified with the following:

The moment of seeing a color or hearing a sound, for example, is prior not only to the thought that the color or sound is the activity of an external object or that one is sensing it, but also to the judgment of what the color or sound might be. (Nishida 1990, 3)

In brief, pure experience is the experience of *that* before the *what?* or the consciousness of a brute fact before the question of its meaning is allowed to arise. It is in this sense that Nishida characterizes pure experience as “simply the present consciousness of facts just as they are” with no meaning whatsoever (NKZa 1, 15). When read as a monograph this characterization is in contradiction with that of true reality as “something with meaning”. But when read in the chronological order as a series of articles and with reference to the above scrapped paragraph, it can be interpreted as a final solution to the problem of philosophical anguish, albeit an escapist one. Given that philosophical anguish is caused by a reflection on the totality of life, and further that a clarification of the nature of true reality is conducive to peace of mind, then the solution to the problem of anguish can be seen in the vanishing of the question of meaning. That is, peace of mind would be achieved by accepting the totality of experience as it is, without any further inquiry into its meaning.

Even if the above interpretation is theoretically viable, Nishida himself was evidently dissatisfied with such a solution. In fact, in the 1911 preface to his maiden work Nishida admits to becoming gradually aware of the discrepancy between his initial goal and the direction he was heading in:

At first I intended to develop my ideas in the section on reality and then publish what I had written. Hindered by illness and other circumstances, I failed to achieve this goal. In the following years, my thought changed somewhat, and I began to sense the difficulty of doing what I had initially

intended. At that point I decided to publish this book just as it was. (Nishida 1990, xxix)

To summarize, Nishida's attempt at "explaining everything by deeming pure experience the sole reality" can be interpreted as an expression of Nishida belief in the intrinsically holistic nature of philosophy. For Nishida, the true demand of philosophy emerges as a response to the feeling of anguish that accompanies one's reflections on the totality of life. His further characterization of pure experience as something utterly meaningless can be interpreted as a provisional solution to the problem of philosophical anguish. This solution, however, threatens to undermine the whole project of philosophy.

2. Meaning and Totality

Why did Nishida believe that reflecting on the totality of life begets anguish in the first place? In this section I will argue that it follows from a conflict between Nishida's view of reality as a self-contained totality and his understanding of the nature of explanation. The latter, in turn, is related to a psychologistic criterion of meaning that Nishida adopted from Motora. Let us start from the latter.

By the time Nishida started drafting his earliest article in August 1906, Motora had already published a series of articles in *Tetsugaku-zasshi* about the definitions of experience and the relationship between fact and meaning. The articles published from May to July 1906 should be of particular interest for Nishida scholarship: "What is experience?", "What is experience? (cont.)", "The distinction between self-sufficient and incomplete experience", "The relation between fact and its meaning", "The relation between fact and its meaning (cont.)". For the purposes of this paper I will confine myself to "The relation between fact and its meaning".

One of Motora's main concerns in the essay is to offer a unified view of reality, which is neither biased towards traditional empiricism that grounds reality in matters of fact nor towards rationalism that grounds reality on the relation of ideas. According to Motora both views originate from the illegitimate dichotomy of mind and matter, and "have yet to evade the residual maladies of common-sense dualism" (Motora 1915, 890). His alternative draws from William James' notion of radical empiricism, which "must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced"

(James 1912, 41). What sets radical empiricism apart from its traditional counterpart is James' insistence that "the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system" (ibid). That is, even though reality is sought exclusively in experience, experience is to consist in both relations and their relata. Hence the prior are not viewed as any less real than the latter.

Motora analyzed the relation-relata structure by distinguishing between two stages in the development of experience: self-sufficient experience (自全経験) and incomplete experience (不全経験):

Self-sufficient experience is something that does not relate to anything else but is self-subsistent; since it does not allow for any acts of inference nor expectation whatsoever it is a pure experience or a so-called "fact". In contradistinction, incomplete experience possesses a fringe² and points to something else. Moreover, since the means that constitute its necessary conditions for development are naturally distinct and varied depending on its purpose, incomplete experience can, at times, take the form of judgements, techniques or imagination. (Motora 1915, 884)

Motora's psychologistic criterion of meaning is based on the above characterization of experience: a given actual experience (*i.e.* something that is already revealed in experience; 既に経験となり) is meaningful if only if it relates to a discrete potential experience (*i.e.* something that is yet to appear as an experience; 経験に現れんとして未だに現れざる). If an actual experience fails to relate to a potential experience, then it is "self-sufficient" and hence barren of meaning. Motora refers to the latter state of experience with the term "fact", because it requires no further acts of inference or expectation but simply is there. For example, the "the clouds' evening glow" means "tomorrow's good weather", whereas the meaning of "ploughing fields" is "to harvest crops". The first is an example of inference, the

² The term originates from James' essay "Stream of Consciousness" (1892) referring to the "halo of relations" or "psychic overtones" that are said to accompany "all objects before the mind". James exemplifies this notion with instances of trying to recall a name that is on the tip of one's tongue but at the same time wholly absent from the mind. James considers these experiences counterexamples to the "ridiculous theory of Hume and Berkeley that we can have no images but of perfectly definite things" (James 1892, 254). For Motora, the fringe is not characteristic of all objects or mental images but only of underdeveloped stages of experience.

second exemplifies the purpose of an activity, but both kinds of meaning are supposed to signify a relation between an actual experience and a potential experience. Motora concludes from this analysis, that meaning is a state of “incomplete experience” and facts are states of “self-sufficient experience” (ibid, 892–893). Although Motora does not explicitly state this, his underlying intuition seems to be that nothing can have meaning in and of itself; meaning is essentially a relation between two discrete terms. This intuition is clearly reflected in Nishida's maiden work:

The meanings of, or judgments about, an experience are simply expressions of its relation to other experiences. . . . [Meanings and judgments] indicate the relation between present consciousness and other consciousnesses, and therefore merely express the position of present consciousness within the network of consciousness. For example, when one interprets an auditory sensation to be the sound of a bell, one has merely established the sensation's position relative to past experiences. (Nishida 1990, 9)

In the above passage, Nishida substitutes “actual experience” with “present consciousness” and “potential experience” with “other consciousnesses” but the understanding of meaning as a relation between discrete terms remains the same. Furthermore, this criterion informs his understanding of the nature of explanation: “to explain is to be able to include other things into a single system” (ibid, 29).

While Motora's criterion could be used to “explain everything” for some metaphysical systems (e.g. James's pluralistic “mosaic philosophy”), it proves malignant for Nishida's theory of pure experience. To see that this is the case, we need to come to terms with two important features of Nishida's theory. Firstly, that it is a clear instance of immanence philosophy (内在哲学) and, secondly, that it reifies the totality of reality in terms of “the self-development of *a single entity*” (ibid, 57; emphasis mine). Immanence philosophy as defined by Tomonaga refers to:

[t]he philosophy that is based on immediately given facts or pure experience. The “immanence” [in “immanence philosophy”] is opposed to “transcendence”, signifying the scope of experience. One of the characteristics of immanence philosophy is that it attempts to explain the

world by reducing the entirety of reality to the contents of consciousness, *i.e.* its immanent elements. (Tomonaga 1905, 285)

This definition is clearly reiterated in Chapter 2 of *An Inquiry into the Good*:

From the perspective of pure experience, there are no independent, self-sufficient facts apart from our phenomena of consciousness . . . Our world consists of the facts called phenomena of consciousness, and all of the various philosophical and scientific systems are no more than explanations of these facts. (Nishida 1991, 44)

Now, let us assume that reality is wholly reducible to the facts of consciousness. Next, consider consciousness as a single entity Ω . Lastly, let us adopt Mottola's criterion of meaning. Given these premises, we face an obvious dilemma: either Ω exists as a meaningless totality, for no fact can transcend Ω to make it meaningful, or everything has meaning but Ω does not exist as a self-contained reality. With this in mind, we can finally see why Nishida believed that reflecting on the totality of life is the cause of philosophical anguish. For, if life constitutes a self-contained totality in the state of pure experience, then all reflections on its meaning render our lives incomplete: “[t]he state of pure experience thus breaks apart and crumbles away. Such things as meanings and judgments are states of this disunity” (ibid, 9). To be sure, Nishida envisioned this tension between pure experience and its meaning as a dialectical process of self-development, whereby reality gains ever greater depth of meaning. However, even at that, this process can never terminate as a meaningful self-contained totality.

3. Roycean Solution

In the above sections I showed why Nishida's attempt at comprehending the meaning of everything led him to conclude that the experience of totality itself (*i.e.* pure experience) must be meaningless. After the publication of *An Inquiry into the Good*, however, Nishida started to speak of pure experience as “the world of understanding and meaning” (NKZa 1, 227) or “the world of value and meaning” (NKZa 1, 301). In this section, I will argue that Nishida's reading of Josiah Royce

The Problem of Meaning in Nishida's Early Writings

allowed him to defend the idea of self-contained reality without having to give up its claim to meaning.

To escape from the meaninglessness of the totality of facts Nishida had to reject Motora's criterion of meaning as an external relation between two terms. In his response to Takahashi Satomi's criticism of *An Inquiry into the Good's* conflicting accounts of meaning, Nishida writes:

As Takahashi claims, consciousness as a fact ought to be able to have meaning. . . . For the fact [of consciousness] to have meaning, it should not refer to some transcendent thing that has no bearing whatsoever on its contents. Shouldn't we deem the fact of immediate experience as one furnished with meaning in itself? (NKZa 1, 311)

As revealed in a rather cryptic passage in "Fragments related to pure experience", Nishida had already grown aware of this problem while drafting the manuscripts of *An Inquiry into the Good*. In this passage he calls Motora's psychologistic account of meaning into question and suggests that an alternative account can be found in the form of Josiah Royce's absolute idealism:

[Marginalia: Against Prof. Motora] Consciousness in general is not inference but fact. . . . Isn't it possible that within myself I feel the personal self as much as I feel the social self, or the cosmic self? . . . In what form does "the consciousness" exist? How does it function in the present? . . . How is everything (事々物々) absolute? Consult Royce. (NKZa 16, 544)

Here, Nishida criticizes Motora's view of consciousness as something that is characteristic of inference. To recall, for Motora all acts of inferring, expecting or imagining are meaningful states of consciousness or states of "incomplete experience" that seek to establish a link between an actual and a potential experience. While this view could account for partial psychological acts, Nishida contends that it cannot make sense of consciousness in its most general form. By "general consciousness" or "the consciousness" Nishida refers to consciousness of the broadest possible scope, *i.e.* of the "entire universe" (全宇宙; *ibid*, 543).

When we are reading a book, the book is absolute; it is the entire universe. We do not seek for its external cause. . . . Should we accept this hypothesis

of universal consciousness (which I call “the consciousness”), we will find that the universe . . . always exists in the present. It has no past or future. Thus, there is no need to demand for causal laws to govern it. (ibid, 543)

The above passages suggest that the most general form of consciousness, comprising the totality of facts, can be meaningful in relation to its parts: the cosmic self, the social self and the personal self. In other words, Motora’s criterion of meaning can be revised without arriving at the precarious conclusion that facts can mean themselves. The key is to distinguish between discreteness and distinctness: the observation that some items are different does not entail that they are separate, for parts and wholes are examples of distinct yet non-discrete items.

The whole-part structure can be applied to facts of consciousness. For example, the fact that someone is ploughing a field means that there is a plough on the field. It is in this sense that Nishida can claim that facts have meaning *in themselves* without claiming that facts mean themselves. However, this insight by itself is insufficient for concluding that the fact of all facts can be meaningful. In order to claim this, we would need to arrive at a perspective where parts can mean wholes. Unfortunately, the fact that there is a plough on the field does not mean that someone is ploughing the field. In order to solve this problem, let us follow Nishida in consulting Royce's example of “the perfect map of England”.

In his supplementary essay for *The World and the Individual* (1900), Royce offers a thought experiment devised in defense of the concept of actual infinity (Royce 1900, 475–476). He asks us to imagine the following scenario: “[u]pon and within the surface of England there exists somehow (no matter how or when made) an absolutely perfect map of the whole of England” (ibid, 506). The perfect map in question is in one-to-one correspondence with the mapped territory. Since the map itself lies on the surface of England it must be included as part of the territory. This will result in a “series of maps within maps such that no one of the maps was the last in the series” (ibid).

For our purposes, this experiment offers a way of vindicating the meaning of ultimate fact of consciousness. That is, it enables us to assign a meaning to the original self-contained totality Ω in relation to its proper part Ω' , a meaning to Ω' in relation to Ω'' and so on *ad infinitum*. The proper part Ω' can mean its whole because it is a numerically distinct perfect image of Ω . Ultimately, the totality will include an infinite series of subordinate totalities and is designed for the sole purpose of giving meaning to itself. This means that Nishida can, in theory, continue his quest for the

explanation of everything without the need to revise his fundamental belief about the nature of reality as a self-contained fact.

Alas, Nishida never explicated his motivations for adopting Royce's thought experiment as a model for "self-consciousness". Thus, we cannot be certain whether Royce's writings were instrumental in solving the problem of meaning. Given the historiographical evidence presented up to this point, it seems like a plausible explanation. There is yet another sense in which this explanation is charitable, owing to a fundamental difference between Royce's original thought experiment and Nishida's interpretation thereof.

As already mentioned, Royce's thought experiment served to vindicate the concept of actual infinity from traditional charges of self-contradiction. This, in turn, was meant as a defense of the reality of relations from Bradley's regress arguments in *Appearance and Reality* (1897). In brief, Royce's strategy was to grant Bradley the major premise that if one relation exists then an infinite number of relations should exist, but to deny the hasty conclusion that if something is infinite in number, then it cannot exist in actuality. It is for this reason that Royce adamantly insists that when it comes to infinite number series "the whole infinite series, possessing no last member, is asserted as an *existing fact*" (ibid, 506; emphasis mine). Again, in terms of the "perfect map": "there would be implied the assertion *not now of a process of trying to draw maps*, but of the contemporaneous presence, in England, of an infinite number of maps" (ibid, 507; emphasis mine).

In sharp contrast, Nishida interprets the "perfect map" as representative of a potentially infinite process of "reflecting the self within the self" (自己の中に自己を写す), noting that the only thing left is "to clarify its relation to the actual" (NKZa 16, 543). Nishida undertook this task in Chapter 10 of *Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness* (NKZa 2, 67–72). *Prima facie*, this constitutes a gross misunderstanding of Royce's entire idea and it would have saved Nishida a great deal of trouble had he adopted Royce's "perfect map" as an example of actual infinity. However, when viewed in terms of our original problem, it would make sense for Nishida to adopt some of its structural features without the subscribing to the doctrine of the actually infinite. That is, Nishida's interpretation of Royce accounts for the possibility of making sense of the totality of life, while leaving room for the significance of our actual mortality. In other words, it shows us how an eternal Being could make potentially infinite sense of itself without the need for invoking another transcendent being. And yet, the meaning of life for us mortal beings is paradoxically grounded in the very negation of this possibility.

Conclusion

The broader aim of this paper is to contribute to Nishidian scholarship by supplementing a recent interpretation, according to which the problem of meaning was essential for Nishida's intellectual development. More specifically, I argued that Nishida adopted some aspects of Royce's "perfect map of England" for his concept of "self-consciousness" in order to give a meaningful explanation to reality as a self-contained totality. That is, I showed that a totality, which contains an infinite series of subtotalities, can satisfy a minimum requirement of meaning. The requirement in question dictates that nothing can mean itself. The totality, as described above, satisfies this requirement because its proper parts are numerically distinct perfect images of the original totality. For Nishida, this model satisfied two metaphysical features of his theory of pure experience: immanence philosophy and reification of the ultimate totality. The first requires that reality is wholly contained in consciousness and the second dictates that consciousness as the totality is itself an entity.

I also pointed to a major difference between Nishida and Royce. That is, Nishida's understanding of self-consciousness is potentially not actually infinite. I suggested that this might be due to Nishida's understanding of self-consciousness as an endless process of meaning-making, which is bounded by our actual mortality. However, the problem of actual *vs.* potential infinity became a central issue in *Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness* and must await a separate treatment. For the purposes of this paper, it suffices to show that the problem of meaning links Nishida's maiden work to his second major treatise.

References

- Asakura, Tomomi (2018) Basho-teki ronri no keiseiki ni okeru imi no mondai. *The kobe Gaidai ronso*, 68. 2, 161–180.
- James, William (1892) *Principles of Psychology Vol 1*. (New York: Holt).
- James, William (1912) *Essays in Radical Empiricism*. (New York: Longmans).
- Kosaka, Kunitsugu (1994) *Tetsugaku to shukyo*. (Tokyo: Minerva-shobo).
- Motora, Yūjirō (1915) *Shinrigaku gairon*. (Tokyo: Teimatsu-shuppansha).

The Problem of Meaning in Nishida's Early Writings

Nishida, Kitarō (1990) *An Inquiry into the Good*, Trans. Abe, M. and Ives, C. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press).

Nishida, Kitarō (1965–1966) *Nishida Kitaro Zenshu*. 19 vols. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2nd ed.)

Royce, Josiah (1900) *The World and the Individual, First Series, Supplementary Essay*. (New York: The Macmillan Company).

Tomonaga, Sanjūrō (1905) *Tetsugaku-jiten*. (Tokyo: Hobunkan).