

How Could Ōmori Shōzō Use Wittgenstein to Fight against Wittgenstein?

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***Abstract:** Ōmori Shōzō’s philosophy can be generally described a hybrid system composed of both a Wittgensteinian skin and a Husserlian core, in the sense that he systematically uses a Wittgensteinian philosophical methodology to fight against Wittgenstein’s own publicity-oriented philosophical tendency. His first recipe for doing so, according to my reconstruction, is to appeal to the notion of tachiaraware (namely, “phenomena standing for themselves”), via which the gap between synthesizing activity and sense-data to be synthesized can be filled. Therefore, the first-personal character of tachiaraware could be easily transmitted to the formal features of “my language”, without which no public language can be formed. Ōmori’s second recipe for refuting Wittgenstein is to appeal to his Kasane-egaki (namely, “recoloring”)-narrative, according to which the ordinary language (L2) is nothing but the “recoloring” of the phenomenal language (L1), while the scientific language (L3) is nothing but the “recoloring” of the ordinary language. Given that the L1-L2-L3-hierarchy has to be elaborated without implementing double standards, a Wittgensteinian emphasis on the putative primacy of public languages cannot be recommended due to its patent violation of the so-called “Double-Standard-Abominating Principle” (DSAP). Hence, since both the respect of the “tachiaraware” and DSAP are required by a thorough implementation of the phenomenological principle itself, Ōmori’s stance simply appears to be a natural result of radicalizing Wittgenstein’s stance alongside the phenomenological route.*

1. Introduction

Due to the widely known philosophical affinity between continental philosophy and the Kyoto School, Japanese philosophy has long been viewed as a Japanese counterpart of European continental philosophy, rather than that of Anglophone

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analytic philosophy. Nonetheless, this view fails to do justice to the postwar philosophical development in Japan as a reborn country both politically and culturally connected to United States. Especially, the view is unfair to the achievements made by Ōmori Shōzō (大森莊藏, 1921–1997),² who systematically introduced analytic philosophy into Japan.

Ōmori's first major at the University of Tokyo was physics rather than philosophy. His interests in philosophy were triggered by his wartime service at the Institute of Technology of Imperial Navy, where he became fascinated with some philosophical problems related to optical issues. Hence, he re-registered as a philosophy student at his Alma Mater just after the war, and then he got a chance to study analytic philosophy in U.S. (at Stanford and Harvard), where he became interested in Wittgenstein. Notably, although English is widely assumed to be the primary linguistic tool for doing analytic philosophy, Ōmori had long been using Japanese as his working language ever since he began his teaching career at the Komaba campus of the University of Tokyo in 1953. Unfortunately, both Ōmori's own adherence to his mother tongue and the rarity of English translations of his writings prevented him from being widely recognized in the west.³ However, his influence within Japan is still nonnegligible. One may appreciate such influence through the works of Ōmori's philosophical followers, such as Nagai Hitoshi (永井均), Noe Keiichi (野家啓一), Fujimoto Takashi (藤本隆志), Noya Shigeki (野矢茂樹), Tanji Nobuharu (丹治信春), Nakajima Yoshimiji (中島義道), Iida Takashi (飯田隆), etc.. In my view, his preference to his mother tongue may be still in accordance with the style of Wittgenstein himself, who also preferred to use German (which is his mother tongue) to do philosophy even at Cambridge, probably due to his consideration that the emergence of right types of philosophical intuitions do go hand in hand with a stubborn adherence to one's native language. But Wittgenstein is still luckier than Ōmori in the sense that his mother tongue, namely, German, is not as mysterious as Japanese to the English-speaking world. Put another way, in contrast to the "Anglicization" of Wittgenstein, more efforts need to be spent to make Ōmori "Anglicized".

This article attempts to make Ōmori "Anglicized". However, it might be natural for anyone ignorant of Ōmori (but still familiar with Wittgenstein) to ask the following question first: Why do I need to care about Ōmori, if his philosophy is

² Throughout this paper all Japanese names will be spelled in this way: Surnames first, then first names.

³ As far as I know, Kobayashi (2019) is the only English literature that includes a brief introduction to Ōmori. There is no English translation of any of Ōmori's books yet.

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nothing but a Japanese counterpart of Wittgenstein’s philosophy? To respond to this query, my discussion will begin with a seemingly mysterious contrast between Ōmori and Wittgenstein: Ōmori seems to have used a Wittgensteinian methodology to fight against Wittgenstein himself.

2. How Could Ōmori Use Wittgenstein to Fight against Wittgenstein?

First of all, note that insofar as their writing styles are concerned, the link between Ōmori and later Wittgenstein is fairly visible. For instance, Ōmori’s general view of philosophy and language, formulated in the preface of his *Language, Perception and World* (Ōmori 1971), looks simply like a Japanese re-writing of later Wittgenstein’s corresponding views in his *Philosophical Investigation* (Hereafter *PI*. Wittgenstein 1958, cf. table-1)

Ōmori’s expressions	Wittgenstein’s expressions
Wittgenstein did metaphorically view philosophy as a fly catcher which catches a fly. If this metaphor makes sense, then one can use nothing—more appropriate than “spinning” to metaphorically describe the development of philosophy (Ōmori 1971, iii).	What is your aim in philosophy?—To shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle (Wittgenstein 1958, §309).
Unlike science, philosophy is not intended to discover new facts or elaborate new theories. If there is “new facts” in philosophy, then that cannot be anything else than a case of seeing through the surface of a picture to perceive a hidden picture.... Philosophy is nothing but to see through what has been seen (Ōmori 1971, iv).	When we look into ourselves as we do philosophy, we often get to see just such a picture. A full-blown pictorial representation of our grammar. Not facts; but as it were illustrated turns of speech (Wittgenstein 1958, §295).
If there were no language, then human beings would not be able to	Here the term “language-game” is meant to bring into prominence the

<p>exist qua human beings. The diversity of the functions of speech acts is nothing but the diversity of human life. Humans may shout loudly, give orders, make accusations, make threats, cheat others, sing songs, make inquiries, be silent...there is simply no way to make a complete list of infinitely many modes of speech acts (Ōmori 1971, 3).</p>	<p>fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life. Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following examples, and in others: Giving orders, and obeying them—Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements—Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)—Reporting an event—Speculating about an event—(Wittgenstein 1958, §23)</p>
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Table-1. The metaphilosophical similarity between Ōmori and Wittgenstein

However, it is noteworthy that in the same book, Ōmori also articulates his quasi-solipsist position, which looks patently conflicting with later Wittgenstein’s hostility towards the possibility of a “private language”:

For confirming whether the “red impressions” in his tongue is the same as my impression, it is necessary to compare his impressions with mine. In order to do this comparison, I have to acquire his impression; but it is impossible to do this, because I simply have no access to what another person could perceive. In order to experience his perception, I have to be himself; but this is not what can be realized due to the constraints imposed on myself. There is simply no way to work this out. Even though I were one of the Siamese twins, I still could not perceive what my brother perceives, given that I am nobody else but myself, and I cannot be my brother (Ōmori 1971, 13–14).

Ōmori’s mentioning of the case of “Siamese twins” in the preceding citation definitely refers to the same case used by Wittgenstein in *PI*:

In so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is also possible for us both to have the same pain. (And it would also be imaginable for two people to feel pain in the same—not just the corresponding—place.

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That might be the case with Siamese twins, for instance.) (Wittgenstein 1958, §253)

Ōmori looks quite aware of the fact that the same case of “Siamese twins” is used by himself and later Wittgenstein in entirely opposite directions. In Ōmori’s own case, it is used in a solipsism-oriented direction, while in Wittgenstein’s case, it is used in a publicity-oriented direction. Ōmori also formulates his puzzles about the soundness of the arguments underpinning Wittgenstein’s relevant position as follows:

The point mentioned in the main text (citer’s note: it refers to the point that the attribution of “bellyache” to a person is based on the observation of his relevant behaviors, which cannot be transferred into explicit propositions. Cf. Ōmori 1971, 15), if I am not wrong, can be ascribed to Wittgenstein. But I cannot not accept his argument for the publicity of the mental experience, namely, an argument implied by the preceding point. (Ōmori 1971, 17 note 1)

Now a sharp question arises: How could Ōmori use a Wittgensteinian methodology to fight against later Wittgenstein’s own position? Here is my answer: His use of the Wittgensteinian methodology, which can be described as a derived version of “phenomenological method” (or “linguistic phenomenology”), is more thorough than Wittgenstein himself, and such thoroughness in turn makes Wittgenstein’s own emphasis on the primacy of public language fade away in Ōmori’s narrative.

However, in what sense could Wittgenstein’s methodology be categorized as “linguistic phenomenology”? My relevant observation is based on Spiegelberg’s (1981) general account of the relationship between analytic philosophy and phenomenology. As he (Spiegelberg 1981, 83–93) insightfully points out, J. Austin’s treatment of ordinary language, which is undoubtedly within the tradition of later Wittgenstein, is not only labeled by Austin himself as “linguistic phenomenology” (cf. J. Austin 1957) but substantially parallels Husserlian phenomenology in the sense that both philosophers intend to preclude transcendent entities which are beyond the scope of “the Given”. (Though for Austin, “the Given” means the linguistic phenomena whereas for Husserl “the Given” means “the phenomena within consciousness”, this distinction can be neglected from a high-level perspective. Cf. Spiegelberg 1981, 85). Hence, there is no reason not to

apply the label of “linguistic phenomenology” to later Wittgenstein, whose indifference to natural science in philosophical discourses is a perfect counterpart of Husserl’s rejection of the so-called “naturalistic attitude” (cf. Wittgenstein 1980, §218, where he claims that a purely phenomenological color theory does not need to appeal to scientifically identifiable entities like “cones”, “rods”, “waves”, etc.). The same phenomenological tendency could be also found in citations used by table-1, *PI* §295 (Wittgenstein 1958, §295), according to which the nature of philosophy is phenomenologically construed as an activity of “seeing just such a picture”, a formulation fairly similar to the Husserlian notion of “eidetic intuition” (cf. Husserl 1913/1982, sec. 2).

Spiegelberg is very likely ignorant of Ōmori’s philosophy, which is definitely precluded from Spiegelberg’s own historical account of the “context of phenomenology”. But if he could read Ōmori’s philosophy, he, as I believe, would quickly identify it as a new variant of “linguistic phenomenology”, which is featured both by a Wittgensteinian skin and a Husserlian core. More precisely, a more formal name of Ōmori’s position is “*tachiaraware*-based monism”. As I will explain immediately, it is via the notion of “*tachiaraware*”, that a more thorough execution of the phenomenological method could be possible. This method further helps Ōmori to overcome the phenomenologically ungraspable dichotomy between sense-data and perceptual structures. By contrast, Wittgenstein’s assimilation of perceptual structures to grammatical structures, which are supposed to be a part of a public language, may lead a Wittgensteinian to be committed to such a dichotomy, resulting in at most a lukewarm version of linguistic phenomenology.

3. Ōmori’s *Tachiaraware*-based Monism

As aforementioned, a more formal expression of Ōmori’s position is “*tachiaraware*-based monism”. Here, the Japanese term “*tachiaraware*”(立ち現われ) literally means “phenomena manifesting/standing for themselves”, which can be more succinctly but less precisely translated as “emergence” or “appearance”. It looks somehow similar to the Russellian term “sense-data”, but without the atomist implications of the Russellian logic atomism (Russell 1918; 1919). Hence, it looks more similar to Wittgenstein’s conception of “phenomena”, which is deeply interwoven into a priori grammars like that of color-space, and such a space can be

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unpacked as a cluster of necessarily true propositions like “Red is warmer than green.” (cf. Wittgenstein 1929/1994, 213).

Ōmori is probably unfamiliar with Wittgenstein’s comments on color-space. That said, as a reader of Husserl, he is aware of the relevance between his conception of *tachiaraware* and the Husserlian conception of “*Abschattung*”. As he says:

Tachiaraware is something equivalent to the Husserlian conception of “*Abschattung*”. However, my notion is still different from Husserl’s in the sense that in my case, in the mode of *tachiaraware/Abschattung*, “what is pointed at” is the *tachiaraware* “directly” standing for themselves. (Ōmori 1976/2015, 201)

A brief commentary is needed here. “*Abschattung*” means “profile”, “adumbration” or “aspect” in English. It is used to highlight the “link between transcendence and time”, or the point that “human perception always overruns itself with its anticipations and protentions on the one side as well as its retentions on the other” (Moran 2004, 161). Hence, this term helps to explicate “the idea of an action of a shadow that gradually presents defined contours” (Verissimo 2016, 522). Accordingly, in Husserl’s context, the functioning of *Abschattung* presupposes some form of mental activity which gradually makes the contours of perceived objects visible. In contrast, according to Ōmori’s previous citation, contours of perceived objects will directly stand for themselves without being the results of some further mental activities synthesizing material which is supposed to be more primary. Here we can easily perceive the metaphilosophical similarity between Ōmori and Wittgenstein. It is obvious that the Husserlian dichotomy between synthesizing activity and perceived objects or projected meanings, or the so-called *Noesis-Noema* dichotomy, presupposes a form of the Aristotelian form-matter dichotomy. The application of this dichotomy requires some form of reflection, but such reflection may go beyond the scope of what phenomenological subjects can actually perceive. In contrast, Ōmori’s strategy is just to appeal to *tachiaraware* as what can be directly perceived by subjects in a reflection-free manner. Assuming that the Husserlian intuition-reflection contrast could be metaphorically construed in terms of the dichotomy between “savages” and “civilized people”, Ōmori’s preceding strategy simply echoes Wittgenstein’s following comment: “When we do philosophy we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the expressions of civilized men, put

a false interpretation on them, and then draw the queerest conclusions from it” (Wittgenstein 1958, §194).

However, the preclusion of the “civilized” reflection from *tachiaraware* by no means implies that perceptions are free from any form of thoughts. Rather, a rejection of the Aristotelian form-matter dichotomy, which is the result of the philosophical reflection of the preceding type, precisely reveals the thought-imbued nature of any perception from a *tachiaraware*-based point of view. This is also highlighted by Ōmori’s following comment:

Perceptions, or the *tachiaraware* of perceptions, definitely cannot exist without thoughts. In other words, the multiplicity of intuitions is not possible to exist, if all elements of understanding are precluded from intuitions. However, no matter how “intensive” thoughts are “injected into” the perceptions, it is still a cake walk for a small kid to quickly grasp the differences among cases like “seeing a table”, “touching a table” and “imaging a table in his mind’s eye without seeing or touching it”. Hence, it is unforgettable that pure perceptual *tachiaraware* cannot be regarded as something like sense-data, since all perceptions are thought-imbued. (Ōmori 1976/2015, 305)

Prima facie, the spirit of Ōmori’s preceding comment bears some affinity with Wilfrid Sellars’ (1997) criticism of the “myth of the given”, since both Ōmori and Sellars’ criticisms lead to the denial of the existence of sense-data *tout court*, if they are supposed to be immune to any reasoning on a higher level. But unlike Sellars’ position, the Ōmori’s version of the “rejection of the myth of the given” is substantially supplemented by his solipsism-oriented idea that the thoughts which are supposed to pervade perceptions are fundamentally “my” thoughts:

However, no matter how much information language could acquire from external environments, and no matter how many times language was adjusted, all this is merely for one’s purpose for learning or adjusting the language. For me, the meaning of language could be construed only from my perspective. Even the language of others is nothing but the language that I can understand. For instance, when somebody else says “red sedan”, no matter how he understands the term “red”, and whatever sensations that he has, in my own case, my understanding of “red” is always based on my

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understanding of my term, and the attribution of the meaning of the term is always up to me. Though language is sharable by many, and come into being due to its being shared, understanding a language is still one's own business. (Ōmori 1971, 21)

Accordingly, for Ōmori, it is always problematic to accept the Wittgensteinian assumption that the only type of grammatical structure that is permitted to exist is what belongs to a public language. The implicit argument underlying Ōmori's criticism can be reconstructed as the follows:

1. It is part of common sense that mutual misunderstanding between individuals does exist, even though individuals may speak the same public language.
2. There are only two possible explanations of this phenomenon: firstly, misunderstandings arise from the different sense-data privileged by different individuals, whereas the similar divergence does not appear on the grammatical level; secondly, divergences appear both on the levels of sense-data and grammar.
3. The first option looks hopeless, given that it entails a *tachiaraware*-theory-prohibiting dichotomy between sense-data and grammar.
4. The second option is permitted since it does not entail a dichotomy between sense-data and grammar, a dichotomy that is prohibited by the whole *tachiaraware*-narrative.
5. Hence, only the second option is left on the table. Hence, according to the duality-undermining feature of the whole *tachiaraware*-narrative, it will be very probable that the inter-subjective divergence of sense-data do go hand in hand with the inter-subjective divergence on the grammatical level. Hence, it is fairly legitimate to say that everyone speaks his own language. Accordingly, A's attempts to understand B should be construed as the reconstruction of B's language from the lens of A's language.
6. Accordingly, the sameness of A's language and B's language on the level of public language has to be reconstructed as something built on the overlapping place between A's personal language and B's personal language.
7. Therefore, the primacy of a public language cannot be taken as granted.

Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the preceding conclusion does not imply the possibility of a private language. According to Wittgenstein, "The words of this

[private] language are to refer to what only the speaker can know—to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language” (Wittgenstein 1958, § 243). In fact, this is not what Ōmori actually intends to mean. In particular, he definitely allows another person to understand the speaker’s own language *in some degree*. What he intends to deny is just the possibility of understanding another person entirely and thoroughly. Hence, it seems that Ōmori stands precisely in the middle between a radical solipsist endorsement of private language (according to which only my language is understandable) and a Wittgensteinian endorsement of the public language (according to which understanding is possible only by resorting to a public language). This moderate position surely facilitates Ōmori’s explanations of both the inter-subjective misunderstanding and understanding, whereas Wittgenstein’s position can only explain mutual understanding alone.

However, there is a further question that needs be answered here, otherwise Ōmori would still be recognized as a “*radical solipsist*”: how could the publicity of scientific language, rather than ordinary language alone, be accounted for with more details in Ōmori’s framework? The key word included in the requisite response is “*Kasane-egaki*”(重ね描き).

4. Ōmori’s Reconstruction of Publicity in Terms of “*Kasane-egaki*”

The literal meaning of *Kasane-egaki* is recoloring, or a procedure of applying a new layer of color on a previously painted surface to produce an effect of a mixed color. Thereby the initial layer of the color is not completely covered; rather, it can still reveal its own shades under the cover of the second layer. Ōmori uses *Kasane-egaki* to analogically explicate the relationship between the first-layer language and the second-layer language. For instance, if the first-layer language is construed as a *tachiaraware*-oriented language, then an operation of *Kasane-egaki*/recoloring will result in a second language through which the “shades” of the first layer could still be seen. Conceivably, the similar *Kasane-egaki*-relationship could hold between the second layer and the third layer, etc..

If Ōmori’s whole philosophical career is taken into account, there are three layers of languages involved in the preceding *Kasane-egaki*-relationships. Not surprisingly, the most fundamental level is *tachiaraware*-oriented, and a more formal name of this language is “*chikakuzōgo*” (知覚像語), or “the language of the perpetual images” in English. The second-layer language is “*monogengo*” (物言語)

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or “*nichijōgengo*” (日常言語), which respectively mean “the language of objects” and “the ordinary language” in English. The third layer is “*kagakugengo*” (科学言語) or “scientific language” in English (cf. Ōmori 1971:94–95). For the sake of brevity, hereafter I will call the preceding three languages as Language I (L1), Language II (L2) and Language III (L3), respectively.⁴

Insofar as the *Kasane-egaki*-relationship between L1 and L2 is concerned, it can be more specifically defined as a relationship between elements of a set and a set itself. For instance, the former could be illustrated as linguistic entities encoding specific perpetual images of, say, a cup, whereas the latter could be illustrated as a symbol representing “the cup itself”—a symbol which is nothing but an idealized set composed of infinitely many elements of images of the very cup. The “cup itself” is definitely the “*Kasane-egaki*” of the images of the cup in the sense that it covers the individual images in some degree on the one hand, and reveals the information of the individual images in some degree on the other. And the set itself does not come from nowhere. Rather, it is produced in accordance with a mental algorithm guiding the direction of *Kasane-egaki* (Ōmori 1971, 91). More specifically, which images have to be included as elements of the requisite set is “not merely defined in accordance with one’s own habit or intellectual interests, but in accordance with one’s way of betting on his own life and hence close to one’s own life” (Ōmori 1976/2015, 219). Hence, Ōmori seems to indicate here that arbitrary and hence irresponsible decisions concerning the direction of *Kasane-egaki* have to be precluded for the sake of the security of life. Accordingly, *Kasane-egaki* definitely requires some prudence in producing the requisite sets to achieve minimal successfulness in intersubjective communications concerning the same set. This position is definitely less solipsism-oriented than his *tachiaraware*-narrative.

⁴ The introduction of “*Kasane-egaki*” may be regarded by some researchers as a feature that has to be attributed to later Ōmori, but it is noteworthy that it occupies a salient position even in Ōmori (1971, 283–284), which is often regarded as the representative work of early Ōmori. Hence, as to the division of Ōmori’s philosophical career, I am quite sympathetic to Noya’s (2015, 33–34) point that the transition of Ōmori’s philosophy is merely a transition of his methodology for treating experiences rather than that of his philosophical position. To be more specific, according to Noya (2015, 82), early Ōmori is more interested in treating the *Kasane-egaki*-relationship between L1 and L2, while later Ōmori is more interested in treating the *Kasane-egaki*-relationship between L2 and L3. And difference of this type is definitely less significant than the difference between early Wittgenstein and later Wittgenstein.

Now let's move on to the *Kasane-egaki*-relationship between L2 and L3, namely, that between ordinary language and scientific language. Ōmori's relevant comment goes as the follows:

It is necessary to abandon the routinely conceived idea that “atoms do exist first of all, and we just use a language to express their existence afterwards”. The truth is precisely the opposite: First of all, through the operation of *Kasane-egaki*, which is applied to the ordinary language, what is invented is a new way of talking, namely, the scientific language as a new language. Afterwards the meaning of the atoms could be developed within this language. Accordingly, I expect that people can think in the following way: objectivity is revealed just as the result of its being discussed, and the objectivity itself keeps on developing itself within its existence. Hence, a new meaning of existence is produced in a new linguistic narrative which is called as the “scientific language”. It is the narrative of scientific language that creates the meaning of the existence of atoms. (Ōmori 1992, 142)

It is obvious that in this citation, Ōmori, being a *tachiaraware*-based monist notwithstanding, still shows his minimal respect to the ontological commitments made by scientists. These commitments are made merely within the sphere of a L3, which is produced via the *Kasane-egaki*-guiding operations of L2, and L2 is in turn the result of the *Kasane-egaki*-guiding operations of L1.

But what about the details concerning the creation of L3 on the basis of L2? Here, Ōmori (1994, 75–134) appeals to the dichotomy between “*ryakuga*” (略画) and “*mitsuga*” (密画), which mean “sketchy painting” and “meticulous painting” respectively. An example of the former is a sketchy representation of, say, the landscape, while an instance of the latter is a precise map produced with the aid of more complicated tools. According to Ōmori, the evolution from the sketchy paintings to meticulous ones looks unavoidable due to practical interests related to the mobilization of military troops or economical activities (Ōmori 1994, 97). Another motivation for the evolution is to eliminate unexplainable contradictions involved in sketchy paintings, such as the contradiction between, say, Kepler's new cosmological observation of the movement of Mars and the pre-Keplerian sketchy cosmological law that the orbits of planets are round rather than elliptical (Ōmori 1994, 98–99).

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A more contemporary-philosophy-of-mind-friendly label of the preceding *Kasane-egaki*-relationship may be “non-reductionism”, according to which a description on a high level can be supervenient on a description on a lower level without being reducible to the latter. This stance can be further cashed out in terms of non-reductive physicalism, e.g., Donald Davidson’s (1980) anomalous monism and John Searle’s (2004) biological naturalism. According to non-reductive physicalism, mental properties are metaphysically physical events, but they are linguistically/epistemologically irreducible to physical events. Ōmori’s *Kasane-egaki*-based narrative can be also viewed as an illustration of non-reductionism, but in an opposite direction: the most fundamental layer in Ōmori’s sandwich-like *Kasane-egaki*-structure is L1, which corresponds to phenomena standing for themselves, while languages on higher levels, namely, L2&L3, are constructed out of L1 and are irreducible to L1. Hence, analogous to his non-reductive physicalist counterpart, Ōmori’s position is also intended to achieve a compromise between the scientific narrative and folk theories (folk psychology in particular), though his starting point is Husserlian rather than naturalistic. Therefore, his position can be fairly labeled as “non-reductive phenomenology” due to the phenomenological nature of L1 and the irreducibility of L2&L3.

However, what Wittgenstein would say about Ōmori’s *Kasane-egaki*-based account of L1-L2-L3-hierarchy? He, according to my understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, would have to rearrange this hierarchy in a way that his starting point is neither Husserlian nor naturalistic but inter-subjective. Accordingly, the most fundamental layer in a Wittgensteinian narrative is L2, on which L3 is built, whereas L1 does not deserve an independent niche since it is supposed to play merely a marginal role in L2, a role that is ontologically ambiguous between “existence” and “non-existence” (cf. Wittgenstein 1956, §304). It is not hard to perceive that this rearrangement itself is based on two theoretical resources: firstly, insofar as the priority of L2 to L3 is concerned, this rearrangement is based on a general sense of “linguistic phenomenology”, given Wittgenstein’s observation that L3 is not something directly revealed in ordinary linguistic phenomena (cf. Wittgenstein 1980, §218); secondly, insofar as the marginalization of L1 within the sphere of L2 is concerned, it is simply based on Wittgenstein’s famous private language argument, according to which sensation-relevant language-games can be played even without actually possessing the sensations in question.

But from Ōmori’s perspective (surely from the lens of my understanding of his perspective), Wittgenstein’s position is untenable since it cannot be compatible

with the following principle, namely, the Double-Standard-Abominating Principle (hereafter DSAP), which is self-evidently true:

DSAP: If both objects A and B bear a desirable feature F, and A bears F more than B does (*ceteris paribus*), then there is no way to prefer B to A, otherwise double standards will be applied to A/B.

However, the following argument can easily show that Wittgenstein has violated DSAP:

1. L2 is preferable to L1, since L1 is peripheral to L2. (Wittgenstein's position)
2. L2 is preferable to L3, since L2 is more fundamental than L3. (Wittgenstein's position)
3. Wittgenstein's reason for preferring L2 to L3 is related to the affinity between L2 and linguistic phenomena.
4. Hence, insofar as the L2-L3 relationship is concerned, "bearing affinity with linguistic phenomena" (hereafter F_1) is the highlighted feature of any candidate language which is supposed to be properly located in a Wittgensteinian *Kasane-egaki*-hierarchy.
5. Locally speaking, Wittgenstein's preference for L2 to L3 does not violate DSAP, since L2 does bear F_1 more than L3 does.
6. Wittgenstein's reason for preferring L2 to L1 is related to the affinity between L2 and openness to publicity.
7. Hence, insofar as the L1-L2 relationship is concerned, "openness to publicity" is the highlighted feature (hereafter F_2) of any candidate language which is supposed to be properly located in a Wittgensteinian *Kasane-egaki*-hierarchy.
8. Locally speaking, Wittgenstein's preference for L2 to L1 does not violate DSAP, since L2 does bear F_2 more than L3 does.
9. Nonetheless, if L1&L2&L3 are all taken into account and F_1 is the highlighted feature, then L1 simply bears more F_1 than L2/L3 do, hence, L1 has to be preferred. And Wittgenstein's rejection of preferring L1 has violated DSAP.
10. Symmetrically, if L1&L2&L3 are all taken into account and F_2 is the highlighted feature, then L3 simply bears more F_2 than L1 or L2 does. Hence, L3 has to be preferred. And Wittgenstein's rejection of preferring L3 has violated DSAP again.
11. Therefore, for Wittgenstein, there is no way *not* to violate DSAP, no matter

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whether F_1 or F_2 is highlighted.

Facing the preceding criticism, a Wittgensteinian may contend that Wittgenstein himself does not violate DSAP if the highlighted feature is neither F_1 alone nor F_2 alone but $F_1 \&F_2$. Accordingly, the preference of L2 is completely compatible with DSAP. However, my rejoinder is this: this strategy can work only when having F_1 is not going to be conflicting with having F_2 . But a further problem is: how to check the compatibility between F_1 and F_2 , given that some seemingly mutually compatible feature-pair may turn out to be mutually incompatible on a deeper level? The best way to do the desired check is to appeal to the “extremity test” (ET), which can be used to pick out a considerable number, albeit perhaps not all, of feature-pairs which are potentially mutually incompatible:

ET: If the intensities of both F_1 and F_2 are enhanced to extremities to result in, say, F_{1E} and F_{2E} , and if F_{1E} and F_{2E} are patently mutually incompatible, then F_1 and F_2 are at least potentially mutually incompatible as well. Otherwise F_1 and F_2 are very likely mutually compatible.

ET can be illustrated via the following cases. “Being red” is completely compatible with “being round” in the light of ET, since no matter how red or how round a patch is, a round-and-red patch is always conceivable. In contrast, “being loyal to a king” and “being prudent” are not mutually compatible due to the following consideration: Prima facie, surely there are many ministers who are both loyal to their kings and are judged as prudent by historians. But if the intensities of both “loyalty to the king” and “prudence” are enhanced to extremities to result in “*blind* loyalty to the king” and “*extreme* prudence”, then it will not be hard to perceive the impossibility of being an extremely prudent minister who is simultaneously blindly loyal to the king, given that the intellectual autonomy required by “prudence” is not compatible with the preceding type of intellectual blindness.

For similar reasons, $F_1 \&F_2$, namely, “bearing-affinity-with-phenomena-and-open-to-publicity”, cannot pass ET either. Surely public ordinary language can carry this compound feature, but to pass ET requires more than this. Specifically, if the intensities of both “bearing affinity with phenomena” and “being open to publicity” are enhanced to extremities, then what we can get is nothing but: (1) *tachiaraware*, or phenomena standing for themselves in a science-precluding manner; (2) *scientific* accounts in a subjectivity-precluding

manner. The mutual incompatibility between the two is no less than that between “being blindly loyal to the king” and “being prudent”. Therefore, Wittgenstein still violates DSAP.

Conceivably, a quick solution to Wittgenstein’s preceding predicament is simply to acknowledge the primary status of either L1 or L3. To choose L3 will naturally lead to physicalist monism with a scientific flavor, which can be viewed as the result of carrying on later Wittgenstein’s publicity-oriented proposal to the extreme. By contrast, choosing L1 will quickly result in Ōmori’s *tachiaraware*-based monism with a Husserlian flavor, which can be viewed as a result of carrying on later Wittgenstein’s phenomena-oriented proposal to the extreme. Between the two preceding remedies, Ōmori’s route appears to be a bit more Wittgensteinian in the sense that his theory, especially through its *Kasane-egaki*-narrative, shows more respect to commonsensical language than what L3-adherents do, whereas to have this minimal respect is the bottom-line that any Wittgensteinian has to hold. Therefore, compared with physicalism, Ōmori’s solution looks more like a remedy, rather than a replacement, of Wittgenstein’s position.

5. Conclusion

Hitherto I have explicated how Ōmori uses a variant of Wittgensteinian linguistic phenomenology to fight against Wittgenstein’s own publicity-oriented philosophical tendency. Ōmori’s first recipe for doing so, according to my reconstruction, is to appeal to the notion of *tachiaraware*, by which the gap between synthesizing activity and sense-data to be synthesized can be filled. Therefore, the first-personal character of *tachiaraware* could be easily transmitted to the formal features of “my language”, without which there is no public language can be formed. Ōmori’s second recipe is to elaborate the L1-L2-L3-hierarchy within his *Kasane-egaki*-narrative in a non-DASP-violating manner, while there is no way for a Wittgensteinian emphasis of the putative primacy of public languages *not* to violate DASP. Hence, since both the respect of *tachiaraware* and DASP are required by the thorough implementation of any phenomenological principle, Ōmori’s stance simply appears to be a natural result of radicalizing Wittgenstein’s stance alongside the phenomenological route. Thus, as I have mentioned, Ōmori’s philosophy could be described as a hybrid system composed of both a Wittgensteinian skin and a

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Husserlian core. In this sense, Ōmori's philosophy has a special value for reviving the phenomenological tradition via a Wittgensteinian lens.

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