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Statement

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We are experiencing today the worldwide phenomena of crises in both the humanities and the social sciences, crises to which Japan is also subject. In the face of this situation, we have decided to launch an international journal issued annually on its own website in the hope of meeting these crises through a new solidarity with philosophers and philosophical associations overseas as well as sharing our studies in philosophy worldwide.

Let me first briefly summarize the history of the Philosophical Association of Japan. In 1874 NISHI Amane (1829-1897), who had studied social sciences and philosophy from 1863 to 1865 at the University of Leiden/the Netherlands, first translated the word "philosophy" with the Japanese term "tetsugaku." This term, written in Chinese characters, was widely adopted in East Asia. This new term penetrated naturally into Japanese society and gradually became to play an important role in the development of humanities during half a century. In 1949, the Philosophical Association of Japan was founded by Japanese philosophers, and AMANO Teiyū (1884-1980) was elected its first president. Beginning in 1952, especially through the efforts of the presidents AMANO, IDE Takashi (1892-1980), SHIMOMURA Toratarō (1902-1995), MUTAI Risaku (1880-1974), WATSUJI Tetsurō (1889-1960), the journal PHILOSOPHY (Tetsugaku): Annual Review of the Philosophical Association of Japan (mainly in Japanese) was published with the primary purpose of offering occasions for the exchange of opinions and information about research in philosophy inside and outside of Japan. Since then, the journal has been published annually, with its most recent, Volume 66, being published in April of 2015. The members of our Association number about 1500 at present, and we focus mainly on western philosophy from ancient to contemporary, from theoretical

to practical, from the philosophy of science to applied philosophy as well as Japanese modern philosophy.

As to our current situation, the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) abruptly announced in June 2015 a drastically revised plan (including a plan of discontinuance) for the departments of Humanities and Social Sciences in our national universities. This is the visible indication of the real crisis of Humanities and Social Sciences, and therefore of the crisis of philosophy, philosophical investigations, and studies in philosophy in Japan.

Encountering this crisis, the Philosophical Association of Japan has resolved to explore opportunities to reach out to philosophers overseas in order to have exchanges through papers (in English, German and French) in our new international Journal. This new international journal, *Tetsugaku: International Journal of the Philosophical Association of Japan*, will be launched in April 2017, by setting up a website on the Internet.

Until now international activities of our association have been quite limited, with the exception of the "Japan-China Philosophy Forum" and the "World Congress of Philosophy". We hope that through our new international journal we can build new academic solidarity with philosophers and philosophical associations overseas and thereby become more open to them.

Our International Journal will include "Articles" (contributed papers by the members of the Philosophical Association of Japan), Featured Articles related to chosen themes ("Special themes"), and "Research Reports" about studies in philosophy related to Japan. For the Featured Articles, we invite researchers overseas to submit papers on each particular theme on to this journal (please look at the "Call for papers"). We sincerely hope that this online publication of *Tetsugaku: International Journal of the Philosophical Association of Japan* will contribute greatly to promote worldwide philosophical arguments.

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Philosophical Activities in Japan

The Crisis of the Humanities and Social Sciences in the Age of "Innovation"[1]: Philosophy as a Critical Facilitator toward a "Civic Turn" of the University

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***Abstract**: The concept of "innovation" dominates and commands all over the world. This confronts us with a deep crisis, in that faculties for the Humanities and Social Sciences are being curtailed steadily in universities. Japan is no exception. In the case of Japan, both the "notice of June 8th" and the "Science and Technology Basic Plans" constituting the background of this notice propose to reduce these faculties in Japanese national universities radically. I am afraid that the death of philosophy would start from this curtailment of the philosophy faculty. By making a historical detour to Kant's philosophy, especially his arguments on the university in* The Conflict of the Faculties *(1798), I argue for the claim that both philosophy and the philosophy faculty should transgress established disciplinary boundaries, and that in this way philosophy as a "critical facilitator" could mediate between academic expertise and common sense of civil society. That is what I mean by a "civic turn" of the university. I hope that we could find in "applied ethics" and "applied philosophy" methodologies that could help philosophy assume this role in Japan.*

The concept of "innovation" dominates and commands modern society. Japanese society is no exception. In Japan, the "Science and Technology Basic Law",[2] with the goal of "building a nation that is creative in science-based technology", plays a leading role in "innovating" society technologically. The 3rd "Science and Technology Basic Plan"[3] (as ratified by the Japanese Cabinet in March 2006 for the

[1] This paper is one result of Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A) 25244001, and is based on my Presidential Address on 15 May 2016. I would like to express my gratitude to Robin Weichert for his support with the translation of this paper.
[2] MEXT, " On the Science and Technology Basic Law" (20 February 2017), <http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/kagaku/kihonkei/kihonhou/mokuji.htm>.
[3] MEXT, "Science and Technology Basic Plan" (20 February 2017), <http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/kagaku/kihon/main5_a4.htm>. The abbreviation for

period 2006-2010), which was drawn up according to that Law, defines "innovation" as "renewal that creates new social and economic values by fusing and developing scientific discoveries and technological inventions" (STBP III, 4). From the third through the fourth (2011-2015) and the current fifth period (2016-2020) of the "Science and Technology Basic Plan", "innovation" has been its core concept. More, on the basis of the definition quoted above, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) further stresses "models of innovation with impact on the market and technology" and "models of innovation, which relate to the creation of economic values."[4] This readily shows how closely the concept is linked to the problem of the "market".

In the following I will first give an overview of how "innovation through science-based technology", the key concept within these Science and Technology Basic Plans, subjects both the university and the humanities and social sciences (HSS) to market principles and compromises their original functions. Second, I will consider how the university and the HSS can overcome this crisis. Finally, I will discuss what kind of contribution philosophy might make, by focusing on its critical and reflexive, as well as its boundary-transgressing and interdisciplinary function. This also means the possibility of transgressing the boundary between "HSS (Geisteswissenschaften)" and "natural sciences", which presupposes the ontological distinction between "spirit" and "nature". E. Cassirer's idea of "Cultural Sciences (Kulturwissenschaften)" is a good precedent for such a philosophical project,[5] since one may certainly discover here evidence of philosophy's transgressing established disciplinary boundaries. In my understanding, however, we could find in "applied ethics" and "applied philosophy" methodologies that could help philosophy assume this role, especially in Japan now. Through these "applied" methodology philosophy may transgress disciplinary boundaries to form new fields, such as that of "bioethics" that cooperates closely with the medical sciences, for example. By "applying" itself

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Science and Technology Basic Plan will be used: STBP, which will be followed by the period and page number from this web site.

[4] MEXT, "Column No.07 What is innovation?" (20 February 2017), <http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/hakusho/html/hpaa200601/column/007.htm>.

[5] Cf. Daniel Weidner, "Pluralities, Memories, Translations: Remarks on European Cultures of Knowledge in the Humanities", in: Katja Mayer, Thomas König, Helga Nowotony (eds.), *Horizons for Social Sciences and Humanities*, Mykolas Romeris University Publishing, Vilnius, 2013, p.49ff. <http://horizons.mruni.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2014/02/ssh_mru_conference_report_final.pdf > (23 February 2017). Henceforth I refer to this conference report as HfSSH.

and thereby "transgressing" supposedly given boundaries philosophy may thus provide a foundation for interdisciplinary research.

1. The HSS under the regime of "innovation"

In June 2015 MEXT issued the so-called "notice of June 8th", which was reported not only in Japan but all over the world as having proclaimed that faculties for the HSS would be radically reduced in Japanese national universities. The real background for this "notice" can be discerned in the notion of "innovation" in the STBPs. The ideas of the 3rd Basic Plan about "innovation" are revealed quite clearly in the following quote:

> It takes years before the accumulation of intellectual capital is concretized as value. Whether the strengths in science-based technologies, which have increased due to the investments in the period of the 1st and 2nd STBP, can be realized through innovations in various economic and social fields, contribute to the solution of social issues by strengthening industrial competitiveness, security, health, etc., and thus secure the prosperity of the Japanese economy and population, will depend on further efforts. (STBP III, 4)

"Innovation" thus is to mean "innovation through science-based technology". This is the basic strategic concept that is supposed to aid the Japanese economy to survive in the market and thereby solve social problems. With this concept as one's criterion, the HSS inevitably appear to be of limited value. And within frameworks such as "cooperation between science and industry" or "cooperation between science, public administration and industry", "university-originated ventures" are emphasized. Through the concept of "innovation" the university is thus incorporated into the market. However, the concept does not determine the 3rd STBP completely. In fact, there are several aspects to it, which may well be assessed positively. (1) The plan shows some understanding toward autonomous and diverse basic research carried out by the universities. For example, it states that "it is important to ensure that the university's function of training excellent researchers is supported, and that the level of basic research is raised, and it is advisable not to one-sidedly emphasize certain areas of research, but to maintain a wide range of subjects and promote

emerging fields in order to preserve the diversity of fundamental research" (STBP III, 25). It thus refrains from the full-scale marketization of all functions of the university. (2) With respect to "basic research which produces diverse knowledge and innovations", the plan states that "basic research, which creates human wisdom and is the source of knowledge, is the most uncertain among all research and development activities" (STBP III, 11). It thus shows some concern toward fundamental research precisely because of its "uncertainty". With respect to basic research, its assessments are mostly correct. (3) "Basic research includes research within the humanities and social sciences which is based on the free thoughts of researchers, and research which is based on policies and aimed at future applications. Both should be supported" (ibid.). With this position the plan backs up diverse basic research in the humanities and social sciences while it also encourages interdisciplinary research involving both natural sciences and humanities/social sciences and aiming at solving social problems. Further, when it states that (4) "An integrative approach to promote specialized and segmented knowledge, including the humanities and social sciences, is necessary" (STBP III, 14) and defines basic research as (5) "generating human wisdom", it distinguishes different levels to which science and technology can make contributions, i.e. "contributions to the world", "to society", and "to the nation". With "contributions to the world" it posits a dimension beyond the scope of the nation state.

The 3rd Basic Plan clearly aims to combine universities or research in universities with "innovation" and to subject them to market principles. But on the other hand, it still leaves room for disciplines which cannot or need not be part of marketization, in other words "short-term economically useless" disciplines or "reine Wissenschaft", as opposed to "Brotwissenschaft". Regarding this point and the position of the humanities and social sciences, the 3rd STBP thus is ambivalent.

The following 4th Science and Technology Basic Plan, which was adopted after the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011, propagates a concept which is difficult to translate in any foreign language: "innovation through science-based technology", which supposedly "comprehends scientific and technological measures and innovative strategies as one unit" (STBP IV, 3). It is defined as "intellectual and cultural creation, based on new knowledge derived from scientific discoveries and inventions, and innovations which develop such knowledge and connect with the creation of economic, social, and public values" (STBP IV, 7). With this concept, the marketization line has become even more manifest. The 4th STBP also stresses that "the fundamental strengthening of basic research rich in creativity and diversity,

which may create new concepts and generate knowledge for mankind, is necessary" (STBP IV, 4), but the aim of this is to "construct the foundations to develop the sciences and technology of our country" (ibid.). This reduces the issue to the scientific and technological context, and thus also inserts the humanities and social sciences into this diminished context. This is reflected in an extreme way in the statement that "science and technology are to be maintained as culture" (STBP IV, 6). While the position taken is rather regressive compared to the 3rd STBP, the 4th STBP still points to the need for interdisciplinary research and grants that basic research should be based on free, diverse and original ideas of researchers.

By contrast, the 5th STBP defines the present as an "era of drastic change" (STBP V, 4), and affirms that in future Japan will become a "super smart society" and Japanese universities in such a society will be positioned as follows:

> To maximize the potential accumulated from investments to date, universities must be reformed with the recognition that they contribute to society through their education and research, and partnerships between industry, academia, and government must be expanded. (STBP V, 1)

Through this simplification the universities and the HSS are much more deeply embedded within the "innovation through science-based technology" framework and thereby directed toward marketization.

The points that attract attention here are (1) the altered status of basic research, (2) the substantial withdrawal or rather loss of the prospects of "human wisdom" or "knowledge for all mankind". Regarding (1), in the 5th STBP basic research has been redefined as "academic research". Moreover, "results" are particularly emphasized, when it mentions "academic research that produces a variety of creative and high-quality results grounded in researchers' intrinsic motivations" (STBP V, 37). In this context, the wording "basic research driven by policy strategy and demand" (ibid.) is also introduced, which shows how the importance of basic research has changed. While a balance between intrinsic motivation and social exigencies is considered, "academic research" is required to "respond to the public mandate" (STBP V, 38). And the long-term perspective, i.e. the contribution to "human wisdom" which was included in the previous STBPs, has nearly disappeared. Consequently, "basic research" is reduced to "academic research" and to "short-term solution-finding research". In connection with this, there is, moreover, a focus on a drastic reform of the university. It is suggested that

universities become "core executioners" of "innovation through science-based technology" (compare STBP V, 46ff.). The so-called "notice of June 8th" by MEXT in 2015, which demanded a substantial reform including the removal of faculties for the humanities and social science in Japanese national universities, was nothing but a preliminary announcement of these aims. In any case, the 5th STBP announces the "drastic change" toward a "super smart society", "Society 5.0" accomplished by "innovation through science-based technology" and engineering. If the HSS still have a role to play, it is but a subordinate one. Because, according to the 5th STBP, social problems are solved by science-based technologies, and the "drastic change" of Japanese society can also be accomplished through science-based technology, the HSS do not really find their place within its structure. They are essentially excluded from it. The first step in this respect is their retreat from Japanese national universities. The effect is that "innovation through science-based technology" turns out to mean that social change is equivalent to the progress of science-based technology.

That the universities and academic research in the HSS and natural sciences are exposed to marketization by way of the concept of "innovation", and that the HSS are in such a sorry state, is, however, not a uniquely Japanese phenomenon. These are symptoms that appear worldwide. The 5th STBP in Japan, in fact, corresponds to "Horizon 2020" (2014-2020), adopted by the EU in January 2014. According to the analysis of the Japan Science and Technology Agency, the aim of "Horizon 2020" is "to connect the results of research with innovation, economic growth and employment."[6] And the baseline of its international strategy is supposed to be "raising the economic and industrial competitive strength of European research" and "dealing with social problems affecting the whole world". This "dealing with social problems" then "may contain different programs ranging from basic research to innovation, to social science research."[7] Here I simply want to point out the harsh fact that just as the 5th STBP in Japan clearly neglects the HSS, so does "Horizon 2020". Yet, to oppose this form of neglect, in 2013 representatives of the HSS in the EU gathered at Mykolas Romeris University in Lithuania. They convened at the "Vilnius Conference" and discussed countermeasures. In the following section I will look at the main points raised during this conference.

[6] Center for Research and Development Strategy – Japan Science and Technology Agency, "The outline of Horizon 2020", <https://www.jst.go.jp/crds/pdf/2013/FU/EU20140221.pdf > (24 February 2017).
[7] Ibid.

2. Strategies for survival of the HSS in the EU

"Horizon 2020" is an EU programme to establish research frameworks, running for 7 years from 2014 onwards. According to the executive committee of the "Vilnius Conference" the characteristics of "Horizon 2020" may be seen in two aspects. On the one hand, one of the priorities of "Horizon 2020" is to address the so-called "social challenges" within the EU, on the other hand, an "integrative approach" is meant to promote interdisciplinary research across established disciplines. Both aspects correspond with the Japanese 5th STBP. Within the framework of "Horizon 2020", the first one involves a model of "short-term solutions". If the interdisciplinary research of the "integrative approach" is linked with this, the HSS must content themselves with subordinate functions within this approach. In the worst case, they are simply excluded. It was out of concern that particular research fields within the HSS were to be reduced that the "Vilnius Conference" was organized. This is certainly a concern we share. In this sense, the crisis of the HSS is prevalent in the "East" just as in the "West".

The aim of the "Vilnius Conference" as designed by the executive committee was to alter "Horizon 2020" as far as it gave reason to worry that the HSS would lose ground, but also to find out how the HSS may be actively promoted under the conditions of the program. For this reason, "policy-makers" and "administrators" were invited to the conference to discuss these issues with experts from the HSS. Departing from the humanities and social sciences scholars' standard assumptions about their research, they made suggestions how a concrete and active contribution within the "integrative approach" of "Horizon 2020" might be possible. Concretely, the following issues were discussed: "what are the potential contributions which the SSH [social sciences and humanities] can bring to solving/enlightening the specific societal challenge? And what are specific conditions that need to be met for the SSH in order to be able to make this contribution?"[8] The conference summarized its result in the "Vilnius Declaration". This Declaration lists the conditions under which HSS might be integrated into "Horizon 2020" with "benefits" for these disciplines.

How does the Declaration comprehend the "benefits" of this integration? What kind of particularities of the HSS does it consider? According to the "Vilnius Declaration", the distinguishing features of the European humanities and social sciences are to be found in the fact that they can consider social diversity

[8] HfSSH, p.17.

pluralistically, and in the fact that they are intellectual resources for social change. In so far as these sciences are integrated into "Horizon 2020", it becomes possible to grasp "innovation" not simply as progress of science-based technology, but as a matter of social change. If "innovation" is understood properly, and is assigned an appropriate place in society, it may help in tackling social problems more effectively. Originally the HSS are fundamental tools to connect society and science-based technology. What is important is that *through the mediation of the HSS* the self-serving teleology of "innovation" is avoided, that the domination of the social by science-based technology can be prevented, and that it is thereby possible to raise the "reflective capacity of society." This "reflective capacity" itself is essential to ensure that society can continue to be a democratic and pluralistic one. Thus the HSS can contribute to slowing the homogenization and simplification of society by "innovation through science-based technology" and to maintaining social diversity.

In this way, the HSS might become intellectual resources that help to sustain or enhance a pluralistic and democratic society, and at the same time they can help -- through their mediation between science-based technology and society -- to design a system that integrates "innovation" appropriately within society. That is the main import of the "Vilnius Declaration". This could lead us to a new concept of "innovation" mediated by the HSS, which I call "social human innovation". The first requirement of "social human innovation" is interdisciplinary research through the mediation of the HSS that makes it possible to connect research evaluation and social values. That is, in the framework of this new "innovation" the HSS come to play a double role, i.e. they mediate between science-based technology and society as well as between research in general and society. Such a mediating role of the HSS is in a sense identical with the procedural method of "translation". Only through the mediation of the HSS is it possible that both technology and research in general conceive and communicate the diversity of society and vice versa.

Concerning these points D. Weidner has also provided several interesting arguments on the ways that "Cultural Sciences (Kulturwissenschaften)" produce hybrid knowledge as follows:

> It [Kulturwissenschaften] aims to transport a knowledge that is no longer disciplinary but not yet systematic. While transgressing disciplinary boundaries, it does not omit them; instead it is constituted by the various transfers of specific concepts of one discipline and discourse into another.[9]

[9] Weidner (2013), p.50 on HfSSH.

That means that he sees the particularity of the HSS in the method of "translation", especially "the diversity of translation in which various discourses relate to each other productively through mutual exchange."[10] With recourse to Cassirer he engages the concept of "Cultural Sciences (Kulturwissenschaften)" as one good example that originates from the same "translation" type of methodology.

According to him, through this kind of methodological approach the HSS within themselves produce hybrid knowledge and open up new areas of research, and in this sense, the "translation" is original and creative. Weidner proposes to transport this method beyond the HSS, that is, to make use of it in interdisciplinary research engaging the humanities, social sciences, natural sciences, and engineering. By using the method of "translation", joint research of the HSS with natural sciences and engineering may thus create new hybrid knowledge. That is, disciplinary boundaries are transgressed by way of "translation". At the same time it will be possible to institutionalize "innovation" adequately in society. Viewing the process from the point of the HSS, it is through the process of "translation" that the HSS may eventually integrate "innovation" within society, i.e. may convert "innovation through science-based technology" into "social human innovation" meaningfully.

Weidner's thesis is an interesting proposition, which takes the particular character of the HSS as its point of departure in order to relate them to "Horizon 2020". The problem is, however, that he does not address how his interesting observations may be related to the university's own functions.

But reconsidering the issue, one may come up with another idea: wasn't philosophy just the discipline that transgressed established disciplinary boundaries, in other words, the discipline that played a "translation" role originally? The real situation of philosophy now is harsh, though. For example, departments of philosophy at Japanese universities have already been downsized. I am afraid that philosophy may face an existential crisis all over the world (perhaps except for China). In the next section, I want to make a historical detour that hopefully allows a fresh look at the situation philosophy is facing in the present from another point of view. The detour leads to a field in which I work: Kant's philosophy and the situation in philosophy at the end of the 18th century, especially in Germany. I make this detour because Kant thinks the boundary-transgressing potentialities immanent to philosophy together with the university's own functions, and because I think that Kant's ideas point to possibilities for the survival of philosophy as a discipline.

[10] Weidner (2013), p.52 on HfSSH.

3. On the public use of philosophy in the university – Toward a "civic turn" of the university

The cooperation or partnership of industry, government and university is not a new idea at all. In the 18th century J. D. Michaelis already defined the essential function of the German universities in terms of "utility (Nützlichkeit)", stating that the "the state should profit from the university."[11] In this context, it was Kant who in *The Conflict of the Faculties* (1798)[12] proposed a new social function and role for the university. Kant's discourse eventually became the theoretical foundation of the University of Berlin, which constitutes the starting point of the modern university.

Kant initially follows the tradition in distinguishing the higher faculties, the "theological", "legal", and "medical", from the lower faculty, the "philosophy". Departing from this distinction, he notes that it was made by the government, and moreover that the government's interest focused on the higher faculties, not the "philosophy" faculty. That is, the reason why the higher faculties are supposed to be "higher" is but the government. Just as the medical faculty is occupied with health and longevity, which the people in general desires on the basis of their natural instincts, so the other higher faculties react to social needs in order to realize the general happiness of the people. More, the government is actually interested in controlling the population through the higher faculties. In this sense, the university, which is dominated by the higher faculties, is nothing more than one of the "instruments of the government" (Streit, VII, 18), a "space for utility", which the government makes a large profit from. In this way, the higher faculties are part of a chain for the fulfillment of happiness mediating between the government and the

[11] Johann David Michaelis, *Räsonnement über die protestantischen Universitäten in Deutschland*, *Teil I*, Aalen, 1973 (Neudruck der Ausgabe Frankfurt und Leipzig 1768), p.1.

[12] The abbreviations used for Kant's work are as follows, and are followed by the volume and page number from the German academy edition: *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*, edited by the "Königlich Preussiche Akademie der Wissenschaften" (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1902ff.). The English translations of Kant's works are based on the Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel Kant:

Aufklärung Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? (What is Enlightenment?)
Briefe Briefe (Letters)
KrV Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason)
MS Die Metaphysik der Sitten (The Metaphysics of Morals)
Streit Der Streit der Fakultäten (The Conflict of the Faculties)

people. J. D. Michaelis' argument mentioned above is just one classic discourse justifying such a passive and utilitarian concept of the university.

By contrast, the philosophy faculty as the lower is not under the control of the government, but under that of reason. "So the philosophy faculty, because it must answer for the truth of the teachings it is to adopt or even allow, must be conceived as free and subject only to laws given by reason, not by the government" (Streit, VII, 27). If the division of the faculties is analyzed from the perspective of "reason", there is yet another difference hiding in the background. This is certainly, as E. Cassirer puts it, the difference between the "conventions and power" of the government and "scientific reason",[13] but I understand it yet more precisely as that between the "private" and the "public" use of "reason" in the scientific field. Kant defines the difference between these two uses of "reason" in his *What is Enlightenment?* as follows:

> For this enlightenment, however, nothing is required but *freedom*, and indeed the least harmful of anything that could even be called freedom: namely, freedom to make *public use* of one's reason in all matters … The *public* use of one's reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among human beings; the private use of one's reason may, however, often be very narrowly restricted without this particularly hindering the progress of enlightenment. But by the public use of one's own reason I understand that use which someone makes of it *as a scholar* before the entire public of the *world of readers*. What I call the private use of reason is that which one may make of it in a certain *civil* post or office with which he is entrusted. Now, for many affairs conducted in the interest of a commonwealth a certain mechanism is necessary, by means of which some members of the commonwealth must behave merely passively, so as to be directed by the government, through an artful unanimity, to public ends (or at least prevented from destroying such ends). Here it is, certainly, impermissible to argue; instead, one must obey. But insofar as this part of the machine also regards himself as a member of a whole commonwealth, even of the society of citizens of the world, and so in his capacity of a scholar who by his writings addresses a public in the proper sense of the world, he can certainly argue … (Aufklärung, VIII, 37f.)

[13] Cf. Ernst Cassirer, *Kants Leben und Lehre*, Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1923, p. 431.

According to Kant's argument quoted above, the "private" use of reason means that which is merely under the control of the government and must behave passively according to its directions. By contrast, the "public" use is that which is entirely free from this control: it is purely based on "reason" and can address the citizens as members of the whole commonwealth and of world society. Here, the meaning of "private" and "public" is rather different from and even contradictory the usual meaning in ordinary language. In my understanding, the distinction between "private" and "public" corresponds to the distinction between the role of the philosophy faculty and that of other "higher faculties" in the university in respect to their use of "reason", in so far as Kant stresses that "—Now the power to judge autonomously – that is, freely (according to principles of thought in general) – is called reason. So the philosophy faculty, because it must answer for the truth of the teachings it is to adopt or even allow, must be conceived as free and subject only to laws given by reason, not by the government" (Streit, VII, 27); while the philosophy faculty is free from the control of the government and purely based on "reason" and therefore can use it in public (öffentlich), the "higher faculties" depend on the "conventions and power" of the government and are always subjected to the constraints and limitations set by it. So to guarantee academic freedom, the philosophy faculty is required to always be free, especially free from the government.

Consequently, Kant concludes that "… a university must have a faculty of philosophy. Its function in relation to the three higher faculties is to control them and, in this way, be useful to them, since *truth* [Wahrheit] (the essential and first condition of learning in general) is the main thing, whereas the *utility* [Nützlichkeit] the higher faculties promise the government is of secondary importance … /The philosophy faculty can, therefore, lay claim to any teaching, in order to test its truth. The government cannot forbid it to do this without acting against its own proper and essential purpose; and the higher faculties must put up with the objections and doubts it brings forward in public [öffentlich], though they may well find this irksome..."(Streit, VII, 28). This conclusion means the following: (1) The philosophy faculty goes beyond the individual specialized disciplines; using "reason" in public, it critically questions the established boundaries and conditions of academic disciplines; it thereby subjects the higher faculties to the "critique of reason"; (2) as the higher faculties are thus exposed to the "critique of reason", they are removed from government control and can then practice self-reflection and self-criticism in regard to their dependence on the government. To put it bluntly, it is the "free rational discourse (die freie Vernünftelei)" of the philosophy faculty, i.e. of

philosophy, which questions and breaks up the "magic power" (Streit, VII, 31) of the higher faculties. This "magic power" drives from the government, which employs the three higher faculties to respond to the people's needs and thereby controls the people; the "magic power", therefore, is but the power of "utility". Further, through this questioning the university can be rationalized from within. It opens up the possibility that reason itself becomes institutionalized. By including philosophy, the university gains the capacity to reflect and criticize itself. That means that the "freedom" of "free rational discourse" within the philosophy faculty is nothing more than the "freedom" from "utility" and also the freedom from "government control"; "The philosophy faculty can, therefore, lay claim to any teaching, in order to test its truth. The government cannot forbid it to do this" (Streit, VII, 28). Moreover, the philosophy faculty "is independent of the government's command with regard to its teachings"; "having no commands to give", this faculty "is free to evaluate everything" (Streit, VII, 19). Finally, philosophy is the most adequate discipline to take on this task. As "boundary-transgressing scholarship", philosophy includes other disciplines from other faculties, questions their scientific foundations critically, and thus changes the function of the university itself; throughout this process the fundamental function of the university can be demystified and stripped of the "magic power" of the government. Thus, through the critical function of philosophy as "scholarship that transgresses disciplinary boundaries", in other words through the public use of philosophy, the university is transformed from a "space for utility" into a "space for truth". When the philosophy faculty occupies the center of the university as the higher faculty, the question what kind of purpose the university has will be answered with "truth".

How is Kant's "interest in truth" as the university's guiding principle to be understood? "Truth" in whose interest and for what kind of purpose? R. Brandt's interpretation that "the purpose of the university (...) is to grasp truth for truth's sake, to consequently blend out human interests and benefits"[14] seems to be mistaken. For Kant an "external touchstone for truth" (cf. KrV, B 848) is required, and thus according to him, "truth" has to be open to the public sphere.[15] It is closely related to "publicity" or "sociality" of "truth" and not a hermetic "truth for truth's sake". That the university is first and foremost a "space for truth" and not a "space for utility" therefore means that the university is not directly linked to the government, but

[14] Reinhard Brandt, "Zum »Streit der Fakultäten«", in: *Kant-Forschungen*, vol. 1, p.34.
[15] Cf. Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013, p.108f.

addresses the citizens in a different manner, other than in terms of "utility". Kant calls this "an agreement [Eintracht] of the learned and civil community" (Seit, VII, 35). As a "learned community" the university cooperates primarily not with the government but with the citizens. The new relationship that it forms in this "cooperation" consists in the university's assuming the role of the self-reflection of civil society. "Utility" is of course thereby not completely abandoned by the university. As long as there is a medical faculty within it, the health and longevity of the people remain the goal of its knowledge-producing endeavor. If this is the case, what does it mean to say that the university in "agreement with the civil community" functions as self-reflection of civil society?

When the university develops its self-reflective function, the form of civil society itself becomes a topic of discussion, and problems, such as whether a particular institution is to be reformed or not, or whether society as a whole is sufficiently democratic and pluralistic etc., are discussed. This can be easily understood. What is more important is that when the philosophy faculty becomes a higher faculty and the university adopts the function of such self-reflection of civil society, philosophy takes on a new role based on its own public use, too. For example, it will transgress established disciplinary boundaries and then intervene in the medical faculty, and critically examine medical issues. In this case, the "utility" of the medical faculty will be questioned, and the validity of advanced medical technologies will be scrutinized. From the position of the traditional university, the government should provide citizens with advanced medical technologies; the ethical validity of medical technologies and treatment methods is perceived as self-evident and not problematized. Citizens receive medical care and treatment only passively. By contrast, in the university according to Kant, through its examination of the ethical validity of the advanced medical technologies and treatment methods, philosophy will link medical experts and citizens, medical expertise and common sense of civil society. With philosophy working as such a "critical facilitator" to back up the citizens' human dignity, human rights and demands, an "agreement [Eintracht] of the learned and civil community" is instituted within the university and embodied as a new interdisciplinary field of scholarship of "bioethics" on the boundary between philosophy and the medical sciences. In this way, both the advanced medical technologies and the advanced scientific technologies are also critically institutionalized and adequately implemented in civil society.

In *The Metaphysics of Morals* Kant himself has mentioned the aporia of "vaccination", which represented an advance in medical treatment at the time:

"Anyone who decides to be vaccinated against smallpox puts his life in danger, even though he does it in order to preserve his life; (…) Is small inoculation, then, permitted?" (MS, VI, 424). In the context of this aporia, Kant confronts the actual suffering of citizens (cf. Letters, XIII, 283-284, Letters, XV, 972). His academic attitude toward citizens represents just the reflexive function in society which philosophy may assume. Out of this aporia Kant himself has not actually developed "bioethics" as a new interdisciplinary field of scholarship. But when philosophy functions as a "critical facilitator" within the university, the university will free itself from the control of the government and create such new forms and fields of scholarship, which will mediate between academic expertise and common sense of civil society, as "bioethics", "environmental ethics" and "engineering ethics" etc. As a form of scholarship that transgresses disciplinary boundaries, philosophy should include in itself as its own principle for interdisciplinary research that of "application", which lies at the basis of "applied ethics" and "applied philosophy". When this principle is properly employed and philosophy plays its role as "public" discipline within the university, experts within the natural sciences and members of society can conceive and communicate issues like the "quality of life (QOL)" of "bioethics", "intrinsic value of nature" of "environmental ethics" and "corporate social responsibility (CSR)" of "business ethics" etc. The process of "translation" is already incorporated in this principle: When philosophy transgresses boundaries to other academic disciplines, it opens up new fields, such as "applied ethics", on the boundary between philosophy and these disciplines. Their expertise is examined by means of philosophical concepts and approaches and crucial problems inherent to it may be pointed out. Philosophy then "translates" these forms of expertise into a common language that might be understood by ordinary citizens. This is one kind of labor philosophy may carry out according to the principle of "application". At the same time fundamental philosophical concepts and approaches, which are discussed within "pure philosophy", are also to be reexamined and reinterpreted from the vantage point of "applied ethics" and "applied philosophy". Examples may include the concepts of the "person", of "dignity", or of "value" etc. Both "applied ethics" and "applied philosophy" are also a form of self-reflection of "pure philosophy". The reflective moment within the principle of "application", again, is important for philosophy's transgression of disciplinary boundaries. It will serve to reflect and reform the university and civil society, and eventually philosophy itself, not least in Japan.

When it comes to the question of how to make use of the potential inherent in Kant’s theory of the university, I suggest one may speak of a “civic turn” of the university guided by the public use of philosophy as a critical facilitator. Only through this turn can we radically transform the “innovation through science-based technology” into a “social human innovation” (i.e. what Kant calls “Enlightenment”) in civil society. This would free us from the extreme regime of present-day “innovation”. It is thus necessary that the Philosophical Association of Japan follows this “civic turn” and establishes roots within our society.

How Western Philosophy Was Received in Japan Compared to Western Music*

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Abstract: *Western philosophy and music came to Japan at around the same time when Japan opened her border after two and a half centuries of seclusion. There is a certain parallelism in the developments of both in modern Japan; until the 1960s both Japanese philosophers and composers had been much preoccupied with creating works which represented Japanese national character, but this ceased to be their main concern thereafter. I argue that this change was caused by the decline of the ideology of nationalism on one hand, and the radical reconsideration of the nature of music and philosophy on the other.*

Despite their parallel development Western music and Western philosophy have come to occupy different places in modern Japan. I end the paper with some thoughts on what may have brought about this difference, and one proposal for the future of philosophy in Japan.

1

I have recently read three thick volumes that deal with the history of "classical music"[1] in postwar Japan[2]. While I was reading them, I was constantly reminded of the history of Japanese philosophy during the same period.

One striking fact I learned from them is that, even as late as the postwar period, the most important question for a Japanese composer for many years was

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[1] The name "classical music" here is used in distinction to "popular music". It goes without saying that this way of marking the distinction between the genres of music is unsatisfactory; for one thing, some "classical music" is not classical but contemporary in its origin, and some "popular music" is not popular at all. Other names like "art music" and "serious music" have similar shortcomings.

[2] [Nagaki 2010], [Nihon-sengo 2007a], and [Nihon-sengo 2007b].

how to express something specifically Japanese in a work composed in the style of Western modern music which had come to Japan in the late 19th century.

A similar situation held in philosophy; it was an important motive in Japanese philosophy to achieve some sort of synthesis of traditional Japanese or broadly Oriental philosophies and newly imported Western philosophy, even though there had been a backlash just after the defeat of Japan against a "nationalistic" tendency during the war years.

In this connection, an observation which I find particularly interesting is that a big change in postwar Japanese music took place around 1970, after which many Japanese composers ceased to seek consciously for something Japanese in their work. The reason why this observation has a special interest to me is that, when several years ago I had occasion to think about the development of a philosophical language in Japan, I came to the conclusion that it was not in the prewar era, as is generally thought, but in the 1960's that such a language came to maturity in Japan[3]. The above observation about the music scene in postwar Japan suggests another parallelism between philosophy and music: philosophy in Japan freed itself from the obsession with things specifically or essentially Japanese only in the late 1960s, when we finally came to possess a philosophically matured language.

Of course, there are many differences between music and philosophy. First, just as any other culture, Japan had its own musical tradition before Western music came. This traditional music is called *hō-gaku* (邦楽) and had been a part of everyday life of a Japanese until a half century ago. It greatly differs from Western modern music in its tone system, instruments and vocalization. Still, no one would refuse to call it *on-gaku* (音楽), a Japanese word for music in general.

Although Japan had also a philosophical tradition derived from Buddhism and Confucianism before Western philosophy was introduced, a Japanese word for philosophy, *tetsu-gaku* (哲学)[4] was coined to designate a learning that was thought never to have existed in Japan. Thus, those people who first used this term emphasized the difference between Western philosophy and traditional schools of thought like Buddhism and Confucianism rather than the similarities between them. Even now in the 21st century, it is common that *tetsu-gaku* (哲学) is exclusively used for philosophical activity that is supposed to have its origin in the Western

[3] I proposed this hypothesis in a session at the World Congress of Philosophy at Athens in 2013. See [Iida 2013].

[4] Although *on-gaku* and *tetsu-gaku* seem to have *gaku* in common, it is not really so, as you can see from the difference between the Chinese characters 楽 and 学.

world, and that another word *shi-sō* (思想) is reserved for other philosophical traditions that originated in China or India.

Another difference between music and philosophy is a more general one. Philosophical activity should be conducted in some particular language, just as its results should be expressed in one. If one wishes to understand a philosophical work that is not expressed in one's own language, a translation is necessary. Some might compare different tone systems with different languages, but there is no need for anything similar to translation between languages for appreciating the music that belongs to a different tradition.

In the history of modern music in Japan you can find many attempts to incorporate melodies or rhythms of traditional music into a piece composed in the Western style, as well as reverse attempts to introduce a Western musical form to a piece of traditional music. These attempts are essentially different from the translations in philosophy which try to express a concept that is originally expressed in another language in one's own language.

It is true, however, that language in the ordinary sense is very important in one central area of music, namely, vocal music. In it, words and music are closely linked to each other. Frequently, performing a song originally composed for words in one language with words in another poses a big problem. Not only that. The rhythm and intonation of a language have a great effect on the music of the people who speak it. Hence, it has been one of the tasks of a Japanese composer to accommodate Western styles of music to the Japanese language.

In this paper, by considering the similarities and differences between the acceptance of Western music and that of Western philosophy in modern Japan, I hope to shed some light on the place of philosophy in our present society. For that purpose, I will proceed in the following way. In the next two sections, many parallelisms between the reception of Western modern music and that of Western philosophy will be pointed out, first, in the prewar period (§2), and then in the postwar period (§3). In §4, I take up the question why the coming to maturity of a philosophical language in Japan coincided in time with philosophy's growing out of the obsession with what is Japanese. In the last two sections, I discuss what has made the difference between the fates of Western music and philosophy in modern Japan.

2

In the middle of the 19th century, Japan opened her border to the outside world after she had closed it two and a half centuries before. During that period of seclusion, Western medicine and sciences like astronomy and chemistry had not been unknown in Japan, but opening the country brought about a great change. The West that Japan encountered for the first time in two and a half centuries had a powerful presence with an enormous military power, which was made possible by the Scientific Revolution and the subsequent Industrial Revolution.

It was absolutely necessary for the newly formed Meiji government to develop domestic industries so that it could create armed forces that were strong enough to stand up to the Western powers. For that, the government tried to import Western learning and technology in a short time. There were two ways to do that; either by inviting a foreigner who had such knowledge and was able to teach it, or sending a Japanese overseas in order to learn it and teach it to others after he or she came back to Japan. Both ways were tried in any area that Japan was thought to need to learn from the West, and philosophy and music were no exception.

Let us start with those Japanese who were sent to Western countries. For philosophy, the most important figure was Nishi Amane (1829-1897), who is sometimes called "the father of modern Japanese philosophy". He stayed in the Netherlands from 1862 to 1865. Though his official mission was to study jurisprudence, the knowledge of which was thought essential to deal with Western countries, he had an interest in Western philosophy and studied it privately during his stay in the Netherlands. After he came back to Japan, he spread Western philosophy through lectures and writings, in one of which he coined the word *tetsu-gaku* as a translation of "philosophy", which subsequently became established practice.

As for music, a similar figure must be Izawa Shūji (1851-1917), who played a decisive role in introducing Western music to the educational system of Japan and was the principal of Tokyo Ongaku Gakkō (Tokyo Music School), which later became Tokyo Geijutsu Daigaku (Tokyo University of Arts). He was sent to the United States from 1874 to 1877 for the purpose of studying its educational system. It was his experience there that made him realize the importance of musical education[5].

[5] For the crucial role which Izawa played in the introduction of Western music to Japan, see [Okunaka 2008].

The two pioneers, one in philosophy and the other in music, had also a keen interest in the latest ideas in the West. This is shown by the fact that Nishi translated J. S. Mill's *Utilitarianism* (1861) in 1877 and that Izawa translated T. Huxley's *On the Origin of Species* (1863) in 1889.

As the names of Mill and Huxley suggest, German influence had not become overwhelming yet, but it would be so by the end of the 19th century both in philosophy and music. One important factor which contributed to the change was the existence of foreign teachers who were brought to Japan to teach these subjects. Among them, the most famous was Raphael von Koeber (1848-1923), a German-Russian, who came to Japan in 1893 and taught philosophy at Tokyo Teikoku Daigaku (Tokyo Imperial University, the predecessor of the present Tokyo University) until 1914. He was also a pianist with professional training and taught at Tokyo Ongaku Gakkō, which hired a number of German teachers as well.

Up to the end of the Meiji Era (1868-1912), Japan had been too preoccupied with importing Western philosophy and music, and it did not produce any original philosophical work or musical composition. It is generally thought that the change came with the 1911 publication of *Zen no Kenkyū* (An Inquiry into the Good) by Nishida Kitarō (1870-1945) in philosophy, and the 1914 premiere of two musical compositions by Yamada Kōsaku (1886-1965): the symphony in F major *Kachidoki to Heiwa* (Triumph and Peace) and the symphonic poem *Mandara no Hana* (Flowers of Mandara). It may not be just a coincidence that the two dates are only three years apart.

In spite of the difference between philosophy and music, it is not difficult to draw similarities between these works. In them, Nishida and Yamada both succeeded in expressing some core parts of their personalities which had been formed through their experiences of having lived through the period in which Japan underwent many changes. And they did so in frameworks which were influential at that time in the West: in the case of Nishida, various contemporary trends in the West which fell under *Lebensphilosophie* in a broad sense, and the late Romantic musical language in the case of Yamada. These two people had been the central figures in their respective fields until the end of World War II, and their influences were strongly felt even after it.

There are dissimilarities between the two fields as well. In the case of music, there was a movement among Japanese traditional musicians – in particular, performers of shakuhachi (bamboo flute) and of the string instruments called *sankyoku* (三曲), that is, shamisen, sō (or koto), and kokyū – to create a new style of

music inspired by Western music. The most famous among them is Miyagi Michio (1894-1956), whose composition *Haru no Umi* (The Sea in Spring, 1929) is well-known. His first compositions were heard in a concert in 1919, not long after the Japan premiere of Yamada Kōsaku's orchestral music.

Miyagi Michio was at the center of the modernizing movement of traditional music in the 1920s and 1930s. Its aim was to create "New Japanese Music" by introducing new ideas from Western music to traditional Japanese music. In order to realize this, various attempts were made to improve traditional instruments, make an ensemble of Western and Japanese instruments, and introduce Western compositional methods[6]. But, in the end, it had to succumb to the current of the times, according to which the only music warranting that name should be music based on the modern Western tone system.

Can we find a similar development in philosophy? There was a modernizing movement among Buddhist thinkers, but few must have thought that it was a movement to create "New Japanese Philosophy" like "New Japanese Music". It is rare even now that a modern Japanese thinker who has a Buddhist background is called a *tetsu-gaku-sya* (哲学者, philosopher); there is another word for such a person, namely, *shi-sō-ka* (思想家, thinker)[7].

Rather, the people who wished to create "Japanese Philosophy" intentionally were found among those whose starting points were in Western philosophy. It seems that the philosophers of the Kyoto School, including Nishida Kitarō, thought that Western philosophy was the only framework for philosophy, and tried to incorporate into it some elements which were specifically Japanese or Oriental.

3

The defeat of Japan in 1945 brought about great changes both in music and philosophy.

First of all, Marxist thought came back to life after its suppression before and during the war, and it wielded a strong influence on music as well as philosophy. In music, on one hand, this took the form of activities like mobilizing musicians for

[6] See [Chiba 2007].

[7] [Sueki 2004] studied how Japanese Buddhist thinkers in the Meiji era came to grips with Western philosophy. In it they are called *shi-sō-ka* (thinkers), not *tetsu-gaku-sha* (philosophers).

Rō-on (Worker's Union for Music), an organization for bringing music to workers, and forming workers' choirs through Utagoe-Undō (Singing Movement), and on the other, it set composers the task of creating music which was "accessible" and dealt with "progressive" themes.

Secondly, Japanese composers came to know what was happening musically in Europe after a decade's forced ignorance. They also had a first contact with American musical culture through the occupation forces. New compositional methods like Twelve-tone music, *musique concrete*, and electronic music, were introduced and tried. This marked the beginning of "avant-garde" music in Japan.

As the Cold War deepened, the contrast between these two trends in postwar music became more pronounced. Composers and performers who promoted "avant-garde" music actively campaigned for their music in order to secure its audience, but it was a forgone conclusion that it could not get a wide audience considering its nature. In spite of the support of NHK, that is, Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai (Japan Broadcasting Corporation), its audience remained small; it consisted of those who got tired of the limited repertoire of Western music concerts, which had become more commonplace in metropolitan areas by then.

On the other hand, aiming for "accessible" music with "progressive" themes hardly agreed with creating an innovative musical style. It encouraged compositions that used folk material supposed to have roots in the people, and hence, the prewar concerns with what is Japanese in music lived on among the "progressive" composers. This made a strong contrast to the musical "avant-garde" that was of international character. For most of the composers of this group, the prewar concerns were no longer theirs, and they learned to use traditional elements in their compositions as just one part of their material.

A similar contrast can be clearly seen in philosophy during the same period. One important factor that contributed to this situation was that logical positivism, which had been known before the war without getting any academic footing, came again to Japan from the United States. It was a philosophical movement which did not find much value in the traditional philosophy, and in this respect it had much in common with the avant-garde music of postwar Europe. Two books introducing logical positivism were translated in the mid1950s, namely, H. Reichenbach's *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy* (originally published in 1951) and A. J. Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic* (1936).

Both Marxism and logical positivism professed a philosophy based on a "scientific" point of view, and claimed that philosophy had the same universality –

and validity, irrespective of the differences between people or culture – that sciences had. They differed, however, in what they thought was the paradigm of a science; for Marxism it was a social science like economics, while it was a natural science like physics for logical positivism. This difference led the members of the two schools to different ways of understanding themselves as philosophers in modern Japan. On one hand, the philosophers influenced by logical positivism or analytical philosophy had no particular interest in creating a Japanese philosophy with distinguishing features, because they thought that there could no more be a Japanese philosophy than a Japanese physics. In contrast, it must have been an important task for most of the Marxist philosophers to understand the local, that is, Japanese situation, and adjust their philosophical activities to the "reality" of modern Japanese society, including the traditional thought it had inherited.

The period from the 1960's to the beginning of the 1970's saw several changes in both music and philosophy, the importance of which was not apparent at the time but is now clear with the knowledge of later developments. In music John Cage's visit to Japan in the fall of 1962 has been singled out as a decisive event that brought about such changes among Japanese composers[8]. By posing the question "What is music?" he helped Japanese composers to recognize anew that Western modern music is not the only music there is and that it is not universal either. Such a recognition freed them from the obsessive quest for a "Japanese" music in the Western musical idiom; it was an illusion to think that this was a worthwhile goal.

We may discern a similar development in philosophy from a number of books that were published in the same period. They clearly showed that it was possible to do philosophy without any obsession with being a Japanese philosopher. By this time, analytical philosophy had taken the place of the logical positivism in vogue one generation ago. The former discarded many dogmatic elements of the latter and started to deal with much wider subjects in philosophy beyond the philosophy of mathematics and natural sciences. Beginning with two books published in 1963, *Tetsugaku-teki Bunseki* (Philosophical Analysis) by Ichii Saburō (1922-1989) and *Gendai ni okeru Tetsugaku to Ronri* (Philosophy and Logic Today) by Sawada Nobushige (1916-2006), continuing with the three volume anthology *Kagaku Jidai no Tetsugaku* (Philosophy in the Scientific Age, 1967) with contributions from many philosophers and scientists, and culminating with *Gengo, Chikaku, Sekai* (Language, Perception and the World, 1971), the first collection of papers by Ohmori Shōzō (1921-1997), this school of philosophy produced many

[8] [Nihon-sengo 2007a], p.340.

influential works, which definitely showed that there was a way of doing philosophy which was neither studying some particular figure in the history of Western philosophy nor reflecting on the self in the style of the Kyoto School.

As I am going to argue in the next section, it is no coincidence that a philosophical language in Japan finally came to maturity in this period. Though within a small circle only, it became possible for the first time to conduct a philosophical discussion using a language which was not far from everyday one, without citing any past philosophers or current trends in overseas philosophy.

4

The time of the modernization of Japan, namely, the latter half of the 19th century and the earlier half of the 20th, was also, from a global perspective, a time of nationalism. Nationalism had various manifestations in the cultural realm. In literature, the idea of national literature was promoted in many parts of the world, and it was also imported to Japan. Thus, many Japanese writers tried to create a new form of literature that could be called the literature of modern Japan. Such a trend was even clearer in music. Musical nationalism was the dominant ideology in music throughout the 19th century and beyond. It was natural that Japanese composers embraced this ideology together with Western modern music.

I suspect that the Japanese philosophers who were not satisfied with only learning what Western philosophers past and present taught must have been strongly influenced by this sort of nationalism. They must have wished to create a "Japanese" school of philosophy that was to be the philosophy of the nation. Thus, there resulted various attempts at the "synthesis" of Western thought and Japanese or Eastern thought. If someone was pursuing such a goal, then she could not help regarding herself as doing philosophy as a representative of her nation and its tradition.

To make matters worse, what was available to her was a transitional language in the making. As Japanese at the time did not have words for various abstract concepts, new words had to be coined from the linguistic material that was available then. Japanese already had a long history of importing words that expressed concepts new to them from China; these imported Chinese words were written in Chinese characters and pronounced in a Japanese way. The same method was applied; the Western words for abstract concepts were translated into the

abstract nouns written in Chinese characters and pronounced in a Japanese way. A person who has to use such a transitional language is just like someone who is given a set of tools which are only imperfect reproductions made from the material which happened to be at hand, and told to use them in spite of the fact that she does not have precise information as to their purpose or usages.

In such a situation, a philosopher has to face a far greater difficulty than a natural scientist or a novelist does. In the case of natural science, you can point to concrete objects or situations to which a concept newly learned will apply; in a novel, if there appears an abstract concept, it must appear through some concrete instances. In philosophy, however, it is not always the case that abstract concepts are illustrated by some concrete examples. They may be explained only by connecting them with other abstract concepts and describing their histories of usage by various philosophers that may go back centuries.

Thus, for many years, a Japanese philosopher could not help thinking that she did not have a full understanding of a philosophical term she was using, because it had its origin as a translation of a Western word, which might have an intricate connection with other abstract concepts that had not been fully understood by her, or have a long history hidden to her.

You may imagine how liberating it must have been for such a philosopher to hear that in reality there is nothing substantial or meaningful in this elaborate system of abstract concepts and that you could use your words with your meaning without worrying about whether your understanding of them was right or not. Of course, such iconoclasm met much resistance from many philosophers in Japan at the time; for them, someone who had no regard for the "great" figures in Western philosophy could never be doing philosophy; philosophy was above all a subject that should be "studied" through the writings of past philosophers[9].

However, the appearance of a group of philosophers whose main concern was advancing and criticizing arguments for some conclusion or other as clearly as possible, instead of being "specialists" of some Western philosopher who had died long ago, had an effect on Japanese philosophy. A number of philosophers realized that it was possible for them to use a philosophical term with a meaning which they themselves put into it if they had taken care to define or characterize it in sufficient detail; they discovered that they could use philosophical terms on their own. It was very fortunate for them that there existed a language which they could use for their

[9] Moreover, they should be studied in their original languages like ancient Greek and German.

purposes, namely, modern Japanese with many new words coined in the 19th century.

In this respect their situation was crucially different from the one Nishida had found himself in when he was composing *Zen no Kenkyū* (An Inquiry into the Good) at the beginning of the 20th century. Two developments had taken place in the meantime. On one hand, as newly coined words circulated among a wider population, they became familiar, their Western origins becoming inconspicuous, if not forgotten. This made it possible to use them without too much regard for their origins. On the other hand, as many Japanese scholars became more familiar with the history of Western philosophy, its concepts came to be understood much better, and the best of these scholars succeeded in distinguishing various different meanings associated with the same term and explaining them in clear Japanese. This means that when a Japanese philosopher happens to wish to use some concept of Western origin she may be able to explain its meaning to the extent that is necessary for her purpose.

Thus, almost one century after Western philosophy came to Japan in the 1860s, it became possible for Japanese philosophers to be the masters of their own philosophical language.

I think that this development would not have been possible if every Japanese philosopher was still seeking after the "synthesis" of Western thought and Japanese or Eastern thought. For such a project, a philosopher should always be aware of the two traditions with their entire histories, and as every word she might use has a history, it would be out of the question to use a philosophical term on her own without any consideration of its origin and history. Thus, in order to be a master of her own philosophical language, it was necessary for a Japanese philosopher to cease to consider herself as a representative of a Japanese or Eastern tradition.

5

We have been talking about the similarities between the reception of Western music and that of Western philosophy in modern Japan, focusing on "classical" music and academic philosophy. But if we consider how Western music and philosophy in general were received by the public in the same period, then a different, much more contrastive, picture emerges.

What we now understand by *on-gaku* (music) is music written in the staff notation, based on harmonic progression, and performed on instruments like piano and guitar; this applies not only to "classical" music, but also all sorts of "popular" music including *enka*, J-Pop, and rock[10]. Thus, we may say that Western music now has complete domination in Japan. How this came about is a theme that has attracted many musicologists and historians.

Similarly, the Japanese word *tetsu-gaku* refers to the philosophy which had its origin in ancient Greece, was influenced by Christianity, and developed further in modern Europe, while another word *shi-sō* is reserved for the philosophical traditions that go back to ancient China and India. Does this mean that Western philosophy is dominant now in Japan just as Western music is?

The parallelism does not hold here, I think. For, there are fundamental differences between Western modern music and Western philosophy as regards the extent to which they have become part of modern Japanese society and the roles they play in it.

On one hand, as was remarked just now, the Western musical language is now so familiar that it is found in every aspect of our lives. Various musical activities are now an important means of self-expression for many people and the music played in them is based on it. On the other, although Western philosophy has dominance in academic circles, it is not true that philosophical activities are something we frequently meet in an everyday context. It seems that most Japanese have the impression that philosophy is something very remote from the life of ordinary people. This divergence may partly come from the intrinsic differences between music and philosophy, but for the most part it is due to some special circumstances that obtained when they were imported to Japan. Two factors seem to be most relevant: the ways they were introduced into the educational system, and the roles of language in them.

The real reason why Japan imported Western music was for the sake of the creation of a modern army; modern Western music was necessary for a military band, which was considered indispensible to a modern army. Another important feature was school songs (*shō-ka* 唱歌). Before the Meiji-era, large group of people singing together was unheard-of. Many school songs composed in the Western scale were introduced into elementary education in order to make a national identity, and in this way people quickly became familiar with Western music[11].

[10] [Okunaka 2008], p.i.
[11] See [Chiba 2007] and [Okunaka 2008].

The introduction of Western philosophy had nothing to do with the army or elementary education. Nishi Amane was sent to the University of Leiden to learn jurisprudence, economics and statistics, and he learned philosophy as his personal interest and outside his official curriculum. The people who introduced Western philosophy in the early Meiji period, including Nishi, were now classified as enlightenment thinkers. Some of them opposed in vain as the primary subject into elementary education the introduction of *shū-shin* (修身, moral training). It was based on Confucian thoughts, and it was not a subject which encouraged the students to hold a discussion with due regard to each other's opinion, although such activities must have been the foundation of Western philosophy.

It is not true, however, that Western philosophy had no impact outside the academic world. There were at least two areas where the new ideas coming from contemporary Western philosophy were eagerly sought after and made use of. They were literature and journalism. Let us start with the former.

There are two questions that should be asked about the relation between Western philosophy and modern Japanese literature.

1. How did Western philosophy contribute to the development of modern Japanese literature?
2. What role did the literature play in creating a popular image of philosophy in modern Japan?

I suppose that many scholars have already tried to answer the former question. It branches into many specific questions, all of which are extremely interesting and worth pursuing further. Questions like the following immediately come to mind. There are many figures of a philosopher in the novels of Natsume Sōseki (1867-1916); why is this? In the works of Mori Ōgai (1862-1922), another great novelist in the Meiji-era, we find many references to contemporary German philosophers like Edward von Hartmann (1842-1906) and Hans Vaihinger (1852-1933); how serious were his interests in these thinkers and did they influence his creative work in general? Hagiwara Sakutarō (1886-1942), who is arguably the greatest poet in modern Japan, wrote many "philosophical aphorisms" that show influences from Nietzsche and other modern philosophers of the West; how do they relate to his poetry?

But in the present context, the more relevant question is 2. In thie case, what we should ask is rather: how did the figures of a philosopher in Natsume Sōseki's novels contribute to a popular image of a philosopher in Japan?; what impressions did a reader of Mori Ōgai's works get from his references to contemporary German

philosophical ideas?; what idea about philosophy did Hagiwara Sakutarō's prose give rise to in its readers?

Though we should wait for systematic and through research, we may anticipate that the images of philosophy and a philosopher which we get from Japanese literary works in the modern period will vary greatly to the extent that they almost contradict each other. Thus, the conceptions of philosophy these images suggest should differ from each other. Among them we may discern two contrasting ones. According to one of them, philosophy was something which came from the very heart of a person's being; a philosopher was essentially a lonely being who conducted his[12] thinking far from the common run of mankind, and practicing philosophy was a lonely occupation that could not be done in the company of other people. According to the other, the aim of learning philosophy was to find a world view which one could identify with. As Japan had become a place where every new development in Western arts and learning was quickly known, plenty of candidates for such world views were always available. Under such a conception of philosophy, it was something that existed independently of a person who professed it, and hence, you could adopt or discard it for whatever reason you thought appropriate. We may term this a "pre-existing" conception in contrast to the first, which may be called an "inner essence" conception of philosophy.

Journalism played a significant role in spreading Western philosophy, promoting "pre-existing" conception of philosophy for the most part. Of course, journalism was not unconnected to literature or academic philosophy; many literary figures and academic philosophers contributed articles and essays with a philosophical content to newspapers and journals[13]. But the most frequently debated philosophical topics in journalism were concerned with social justice and how to achieve it in modern Japan, and it was journalists, not academic philosophers who introduced the enlightenment thinkers like Rousseau and more recent developments in the social philosophy of the West. The most important of them was Nakae Chōmin (1847-1901) who promoted Western democratic ideas through a liberal newspaper which he helped to start.

After the Russian revolutions which resulted in a communist regime, Marxism started to attract the attention of many young people. In academic circles

[12] A philosopher was thought to be male as it was thought so in the West at the time.

[13] The relation between academic philosophy and journalism is an important topic that should be explored in detail. It might be argued that journalism has played a greater role than academic organizations like various philosophical societies in the development of modern philosophy in Japan.

which had sympathy with Marxism, Marx was regarded as an heir to German idealist philosophy from Kant to Hegel. Miki Kiyoshi (1897-1945) belonged to one such circle; he studied philosophy under Nishida Kitarō in Kyoto Imperial University, and became a journalist when he was unable to get an academic post[14].

In the area of social and political philosophy, one was confronted with a number of "schools" or "-isms", like liberalism, anarchism, and Marxism. In the 1920's and 1930's, when young students had a discussion, the likeliest topic was which philosophical school or which –ism they should commit to. Thus, the conception of philosophy that underlined such discussions was the "pre-existing" one. But here a person was compelled to choose, unlike a novelist or a poet who wished to have some theoretical background or was just curious about the contemporary thinking in the West, and the main choice was between Marxism and non-Marxism. Commitment to Marxism at that time meant a lot; it meant giving up a privilege one had and facing a real danger of being persecuted. This gave rise to yet another conception of philosophy, which was, as it were, a hybrid of the "inner essence" one and the "pre-existing" one; philosophy was something which existed independently of you and it was up to you to adopt it or not, but if you adopted it, you had to completely identify with it so that it ended up an essential part of you.

Except for an ideal figure of a philosopher, which was more like an Eastern idea of a wise man, the images of philosophy in non-academic contexts suggested more or less the "pre-existing" conception of philosophy[15]. For most Japanese, philosophy was something that had newly come from overseas, and hence, it lacked the reality the traditional morality had, which was taught in a *shū-shin* class of an elementary school. It could not hope to be a part of popular culture.

The situation was very different with Western music. Even in the prewar period, Westernization of popular music in Japan had been well under way. While

[14] As was mentioned above, Marxist philosophy was completely suppressed during the war. But after the war, it became the most influential social philosophy among Japanese intellectuals and remained so until the 1970's in spite of many criticisms. In the academic world, Marxist philosophy was rarely taught or studied in a philosophy department, but many philosophy students chose to study German Idealist philosophy only because they thought that understanding it was necessary to get a better understanding of Marxist philosophy.

[15] This "pre-existing" conception of philosophy was found not only in non-academic contexts but also in academic ones. It persisted well after the war; I remember that most of the philosophy students I met when I was one in the 1970's were studying some philosopher or other of the past because they felt some sympathy with the figure. I seldom encountered a student whose motivation to major in philosophy came from a particular philosophical problem.

the traditional music continued to have a big audience, new styles of popular music which showed an influence of Western musical idiom had been attracting younger people. They may not have felt this kind of music as foreign, because they had already been exposed to the Western tone system through *shō-ka* (school song) they learned in school. Thus, Western music was already a part of popular culture in Japan before the war, in contrast to Western philosophy.

6

The "pre-existing" conception of philosophy and the "inner essence" one both miss an essential fact about philosophy, namely, that it is above all an activity which a person engages in with others. It could not remain a solitary enterprise as the "internal essence" conception has it; discussion is an essential part of philosophy, and discussion should be done with others. Philosophy cannot be a matter of finding some world view to your liking, either, as the "pre-existing" conception supposes. Sometimes a person comes to have an interest in philosophy, not because she is attracted by the outlook or personality of a certain philosopher, but because she is intrigued by some problems discussed in a work of philosophy. For her, the point of doing philosophy is to understand a philosophical problem better and solve it. In fact, the world views that past philosophy offers are often the final products of attempts to solve various philosophical problems.

If you think philosophy should be like this, then it consists of presentation, refinement and solution of philosophical problems, and the chief means of solving the latter is to advance arguments; discussing with others is important for philosophy because an argument should be tested for its validity by seeing whether or how well it withstands counterarguments.

Already in the prewar period, there were some people who found delight in discussing philosophical problems; their main concern was no longer to find out "the true meaning" of the "great" work of some past master, but to solve some particular philosophical problems to their satisfaction; in a word, they started to think their own thoughts. Surely those in the circle of Nishida and his students were among such people. There might have been some other circles like Nishida's which engaged in philosophical discussions, whether it was within the academic world or not.

In the same period, those who practiced this way of doing philosophy were also under the influence of the idea of creating a "Japanese" school of philosophy, which was comparable to various "schools" of Western philosophy. This produced biases in the goals and directions of their arguments, which sometimes had undesirable consequences. Still, the realization of the centrality of arguments in philosophy was an important achievement of prewar academic philosophy.

But it must have been difficult for an ordinary person to appreciate the importance of arguments in philosophy for two reasons. First, she had no experience of philosophical discussion comparable to that of *shō-ka* (school song) in the case of music. Secondly, there was a problem of language, which we discussed above in §4.

Of course, language is also important in music, both in a literal sense and a metaphorical one. In the early phase of the introduction of Western music, people got accustomed to Japanese words sung with a melody written on the Western scale, through the teaching of school songs (*shō-ka*) in elementary education. This experience made it possible to combine Japanese words with Western musical idiom without much awkwardness in many popular genres of music[16]. In terms of language in the sense of musical style, the Western one was fundamentally different from the Japanese traditional one, and Japanese experienced many difficulties in accepting it, as many studies have attested. However, as is shown by the fact that a piece of music in the traditional style may strike many Japanese now as alien, Western musical style has taken place of traditional one over the last century and a half.

In contrast, philosophy can be done only in one's own language. Hence, unless you exchange Japanese with a Western language[17], it is necessary to have a Japanese expression for a concept that is originally expressed in a Western language. For that purpose, many words were coined as translations of these Western words, and added to Japanese. It was not enough to have new words; it was also necessary to create a literary style that makes it possible to express new thoughts and arguments in a clear manner. For a long time, philosophical arguments had been conducted in a language which was far from that of an ordinary person. They were written in a style for the initiates. It must have been very hard for an outsider to

[16] The problem seems still unresolved in the case of "classical" music, if we think that there does not yet exist a truly successful "Japanese" opera, that is, an opera sung in Japanese. However, it might show only that opera is no longer a viable genre, no matter which language is used.

[17] It is notorious that Mori Arinori (1847-1889), the first Minister of Education, proposed to adopt English as the national language of Japan.

understand them. As I have argued above, it was only in the 1960's that Japanese philosophy came to have a more understandable style.

Now, the changes that took place after the 1970's may mean a lot to both music and philosophy in Japan.

The commercialization and diversification of music are worldwide phenomena, and they have turned "classical" music into just one of various musical tastes. It no longer has the prestige it used to have in Japan. But, irrespective of their origins, most of the various styles of music owe their notation, instruments and harmony to Western modern music. In this respect, musical life in Japan has experienced an irreversible change.

Even though in Japan it was generally thought that philosophy has little in common with an ordinary person's life, there used to be a time when philosophy had a certain prestige. This is seen from the fact that philosophy was taught in every Japanese university until the 1970's, because it was supposed that its knowledge was indispensable to general education. That time is now past, and philosophy is now just one subject among the variety of subjects offered in a university.

This turn of events was very ironic, because it happened at the time when we came to have a well-informed and flexible language for philosophical discussion, and there appeared a number of writers and their books which taught a reader what philosophy is about in an interesting and accessible way[18].

Moreover, many concepts that had their origin in Western philosophy and have gradually become part of the Japanese language are now indispensable to our thinking in various areas including everyday life, and in that respect it may be said that Western philosophy has had a success comparable to Western modern music here. The big difference, however, is that philosophy as such is still remote from our everyday concern.

I suspect that this is because we have been living in a society in which it is not customary that people with different opinions express themselves and discuss the point at issue in order to reach some rational solution. To some this may look like an essential trait of a Japanese society, but it is always risky to say such a thing. Just as the introduction of *shō-ka* (school songs) in the Meiji-era had changed the musical life of Japanese, it might be possible to change the way a Japanese thinks and acts

[18] Another irony is that when Japanese philosophers finally came to possess a reasonably good language of their own to do philosophy, the "globalization", that is, the elevation of English to the status of the internationally common language in many areas including philosophy, was in progress. I discussed this in [Iida 2013].

together with other people. Moreover, the current trend of internationalization within and without Japan, may make such a change in our society even necessary.

Now that one of the two obstacles which had made philosophy remote from the ordinary life of a Japanese, namely, the absence of a philosophical language accessible to her, has been removed, we might try to remove another, that is, the absence of philosophy in elementary education. Introducing philosophy to much younger students than those at university may contribute to a change that is necessary in our society. At any rate, the main issue is not when the acceptance of Western philosophy will be complete, but whether we will participate in philosophy as an indispensable activity for any human being in the future.

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Articles

The Object of Thought (*Dianoia*) in Plato's Divided Line, 509d1-511e5

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Abstract: *Each of the four subsections of the divided line seems to represent a certain type of* entity *(*pace *Fine). What is represented by the second subsection, which corresponds to thought (*dianoia*)? Following Adam, Burnyeat, and Denyer, I contend that it stands for mathematical entities that are intermediary between Forms and sensibles, rather than for Forms themselves (Ross, Murphy,* et al.*); for propositions concerned with Forms via sensibles (Gonzalez* et al.*); or for certain sensibles (Smith* et al.*). My main reason for favoring this interpretation is that it can make good sense of the geometrician's practice: when dealing with a triangle, she does not deal with the visible triangle that she has drawn, but with the intelligible triangle that it represents. Yet this triangle is different from the Form of Triangle, in that there are many such geometrical triangles while there is only one Triangle. I suggest that the geometrician's triangles derive their identity from the* geometrical problems *that she deals with. The emphasis of the word 'itself,' as in 'the square itself' (510d7-8) does not have to indicate that the Form is in question. It can, instead, contrast the geometrical square itself with the inaccurately drawn figure. Finally, although Socrates speaks of the intelligible realm as being inhabited by Forms, this may not mean that the Forms are the only inhabitants but just that they are* representative *ones. I conclude by addressing the question of what to make of the equality in length of the two middle subsections of the line. In my view, what is represented by one of these subsections (thought) is actually 'clearer' than what is represented by the other (belief); hence, the two subsections should not have been equal. By planting this inadequacy, I would suggest that Plato is warning the reader of the limits of a simile.*

After comparing the Good to the sun (507a7-509b9), Socrates invites Glaucon to imagine a line (AE) that is divided into two unequal sections (AC and

CE, presumably with the former being longer[1]). AC represents the intelligible realm and CE the visible one. These sections are each to be divided in the same proportion as AC to CE (AC is divided into AB and BC; and CE into CD and DE). Socrates distributes four 'states of mind' (*pathēmata en tē[i] psychē[i]*) amongst these four subsections: intellect (*noēsis*) is assigned to AB; thought (*dianoia*) to BC; belief (*pistis*) to CD; and imagination (*eikasia*) to DE. Intellect partakes of the highest degree of clearness (*saphēneia*). It is followed in order by thought, belief, and imagination. Socrates attributes thought to mathematicians, including geometricians, and intellect to dialecticians. Their practices are distinguished in the following two respects. First, whereas the mathematician takes her hypotheses for granted and deduces conclusions from them (510b4-d3), the dialectician moves from her hypotheses back to their ultimate 'principle' (*archē*) (511b1-c1)[2]. Second, the geometrician, unlike the dialectician, makes use of visible figures as assistance for her inquiry (510d5-511c2).

In this paper, I shall consider what subsection BC is meant to represent. Most interpreters agree that each subsection stands for a certain *type of entity*, i.e., the object of its corresponding cognitive state of mind. (More than one subsection may represent the same type of objects as being dealt with in different manners.) By contrast, Gail Fine holds that (1)[3] the four subsections represent four *modes of reasoning*.

As for the majority interpretation, it seems generally agreed that AB stands for Forms; CD for visible entities such as animals, plants, and artifacts; and DE for images of these, such as shadows and reflections in water. But what does BC stand for? I.e., what are the objects of thought? Four kinds of answers have been proposed[4]:

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[1] Cf. Smith, 27-8. Denyer contends, though, that it does not really matter which section is meant to be longer. Denyer, 292-4.

[2] For the method of hypothesis, cf. *Meno*, 86e1-87e4, *Phaedo*, 99d4-102a3.

[3] I shall number interpretations in this way.

[4] Some interpreters give no definite answer. Annas examines and rejects (2) and (3). She finds (3) to be in conflict with the contention at 510d, which is that mathematicians talk about 'the square itself' and 'the diagonal itself'; Annas takes these to refer to the Forms. (But see Section Three, below.) In (2), Annas argues, the original-image relationship of the bottom part of the line (between CD and DE) would have no real analogy in the top part (between AB and BC), which would mean a break-down of the scheme of the divided line.

(2) Forms (Shorey, Nettleship, Cornford, Hackforth, Murphy, Ross, Cross & Woozley, and Ota).
(3) Mathematical entities, which are intermediary between Forms and sensibles (Adam, Burnyeat, and Denyer).
(4) Propositions that are concerned with Forms via sensibles (Boyle and Gonzalez).
(5) Sensibles (Fogelin, Bedu-Addo, White, N. P., and Smith).

In what follows, I shall support interpretation (3). I do not mean to present a decisive argument for it or against alternative interpretations. My only aim is to show how I find (3) especially plausible. In Section One I will briefly explain the five interpretations. In Section Two I will state why I am reluctant to adopt (1), (2), (4), or (5). In Section Three I will respond to certain objections to my favored interpretation. In Section Four I will present two considerations that could support (3). And in Section Five I will consider a related issue, on the basis of my foregoing discussion.

1. Five Kinds of Interpretations

According to interpretation (1), e.g., Fine's[5], the four subsections represent four types of reasoning. AB and BC represent two sorts of knowledge, and CD and DE two sorts of beliefs (*doxa*). DE, i.e., imagination, is a state of mind in which one cannot systematically discriminate between images and their originals. In CD, i.e., belief, one can do so but cannot adequately explain their difference. In BC, i.e., thought, one knows certain Forms without knowing that they are Forms[6]. In AB, i.e., intellect, one not only knows Forms but also knows that they are Forms. Fine's interpretation of the divided line constitutes part of her broader project of showing that Plato, in the *Republic,* does not analyze knowledge or other cognitive states in terms of their objects, and that he is not committed to the view that knowledge is concerned with Forms and only with Forms[7].

Annas finds this problem insoluble. Annas (1981), 251-2. Cf. also Benson, 203, n. 3, Foley, 3.
[5] Fine, 101-6.
[6] Fine, 101-12.
[7] Fine, 85-116.

The other interpretations, i.e., (2) to (5), presuppose that BC stands for a certain type of object. Interpretation (2) identifies it as *Forms*. Although intellect and thought are both concerned with Forms, they do so in different manners[8]. Mathematicians[9] study Forms indirectly, while dialecticians study them directly and purely, proceeding through Forms to Forms. There are three main points that seem to support this interpretation. First, as Ross remarks[10], Socrates gives no special explanation of the mathematicals in the divided line passage. (This point is also an objection to interpretation (3), to which I shall respond in Section Three.) Secondly, as Murphy points out[11], the upper subsections (AB and BC), which stand for '*noēton eidos*' (509d4) or '*nooumenon genos*' (509d8), can naturally be taken as the subdivisions *of the Forms*. For, in the simile of the sun, Socrates has spoken of what is intelligible solely in terms of the Forms[12]. (This constitutes another objection to (3).) Finally, at 510d7-8, Socrates speaks of '*tou tetragōnou autou'* (the square itself) and '*diametrou autēs'* (diagonal itself) to refer to objects of geometry[13]. But in the middle dialogues such locutions are frequently used to refer to Forms[14]. (This is yet another objection to (3).) In this interpretation, the reason for which Socrates tells Glaucon not to embark on the further division of the intelligible realm, at VII, 534a5-8, would be that the objects of intellect are actually identical to those of thought.

According to interpretation (3), e.g., Adam's, the objects of thought are intermediaries between Forms and sensibles. When geometricians draw figures, they are not really dealing with the figures *qua* visible but the figure *qua* intelligible, represented by the former. Such figures are among the intermediaries. They are

[8] E.g., Cross & Woozley, 237-8.
[9] Is mathematics the only context in which one can have thought? Murphy and Ross answer in the affirmative. Murphy, 168-72, Ross, 63. By contrast, Nettleship maintains that the zoologist, e.g., can have thought insofar as she considers the essence of each animal, which is a Form. Nettleship, 250. See also Hackforth, 2, 7, Fine, 106, Gonzalez, 363, n. 19, Ota, 20.
[10] Ross (1951), 59. However, he admits that interpretation (3) is attractive.
[11] Murphy, 167.
[12] Murphy also points out that the phrase '*ditta eidē* (twofold kind)' at 509d4 is reminiscent of 507a7-b10, where Socrates distinguishes *the Forms* from the sensibles. Murphy, 167, n. 2.
[13] E.g., Cornford, 62-3, Hackforth, 3, Ota, 17. Also, Wedberg holds that the Square and the Diagonal mentioned here are archetypes, of which their participants are imitations. Wedberg, 44, n. 21. Some interpreters, while rejecting (2), consider the Square and the Diagonal to be Forms. Fine, 105-6, n. 35, Boyle (1973), 5, Bedu-Addo, 101, Smith, 33.
[14] *Symposium*, 211d3, *Phaedo*, 65d4-5, e3, 74a12, c1, c4-5, d6, e7, 75b6, c11-d1, 78d1, 100b6-7, c4-5, d5, 102d6, 103b4, *Republic*, 490b2-3, 507b4, 532a7, b1, 597a2, c3, *Phaedrus*, 247d6-7, 250e2.

different from sensibles in that they are eternal, and different from Forms in that – whereas the Form of the Triangle, for example, is unique – there are many 'intermediary' triangles, such as the right triangle and the equilateral one, as Burnyeat suggests[15]. Adam says, "since *dianoia* is intermediate between *nous* and *doxa* (511 D), we may reasonably suppose that its objects are likewise intermediate between the higher *noēta* and *doxasta.*[16]" So there are *four* kinds of objects corresponding to the *four* states of mind. This accords with the fact that Socrates, at 511e1-3, implies that the four states of mind participate in clearness (*saphēneia*), to the same degree as their objects participate in truth (*alētheia*). Ascribing the idea of the mathematicals to Plato is as old as Aristotle. He reports that Plato postulated 'the intermediates' (*ta metaxu*) between Forms and sensibles (*Metaph.* A.6.987b14-8, Z.2.1028b19[17]), although he does not tell us in which period of life Plato came up with this idea[18].

According to interpretation (4), e.g., Gonzalez', the objects of thought are *propositions* that mirror Forms in a deficient way, and that state universal (though abstract) truths mirrored by a plurality of sensible objects[19]. Since the proportion of AB to BC is equal to that of CD to DE, and since DE stands for images of what CD stands for, Gonzalez argues that BC must represent some images of what AB represents, i.e., of Forms. These images are, in turn, imaged by sensibles. To support his claim that propositions are considered to be images of Forms, he cites *Phaedo* 99d4-e6, where Socrates compares '*ta onta'* (beings) to the sun and '*logoi'* (propositions) to images of the sun reflected on water[20].

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[15] Cf. Burnyeat, 34-5.
[16] Adam, 68-9.
[17] Cf. M.13.1086a12. Ross lists the passages in the *Metaphysics* where Aristotle talks about the doctrine of the intermediaries. Ross (1924), 166. Annas suggests that the attribution of the idea of the intermediaries to Plato may derive from an attempt on Aristotle's part to make sense of everything that Plato says about the numbers. Annas (1976), 21.
[18] Annas maintains that, in Platonic dialogues, there is no textual evidence for the kind of intermediates that Aristotle ascribes to Plato in the *Metaphysics*. Annas (1975), 156-64.
[19] Gonzalez (1998), 219-20. Gonzalez follows Boyle in thinking that the following point constitutes a reason for rejecting interpretation (3). Gonzalez (1998), 363, n. 19. As Boyle says, the objects of thought should be images of the objects of intellect, i.e., Forms. But it seems impossible for 'intermediaries' to be images of Forms. Generally speaking, an image requires a medium for it to be in, but it is not clear what the medium would be in this case. Boyle (1973), 3-4, (1974), 7. Response to this objection to interpretation (3) could be that the geometrical space may serve as the medium for geometricals to inhabit. Both the geometrical space and the realm of Forms belong to the intelligible realm, but the former, unlike the latter, is spatially extended.
[20] Gonzalez (1998), 363, n. 19.

Finally, interpretation (5) assumes that the objects of thought are sensibles, such as figures drawn by geometricians. Like Gonzalez, Smith supposes that the equality of the proportion of CD to DE, and of AB to BC, shows that BC stands for images of what AC stands for[21]. However, unlike Gonzalez, he takes these images to be sensibles such as drawn figures. For, Smith thinks, the original-image relationship that Plato generally speaks of in the middle dialogues lies between Forms and sensible participants in them. If Plato introduced some non-sensibles as images of intelligible originals, he would deviate from his normal pattern without telling us anything about this deviation[22]. (This point constitutes an objection to (2), (3), and (4), which identify the objects of thought as some kind of non-sensibles.) So, Smith thinks, if we are to exempt Plato from a failure in explanation, we should assume that he places the objects of thought in the sensible realm.

2. Why I Hesitate to Take Interpretations (1), (2), (4), or (5)

In this section, I shall point out difficulties in interpretations (1), (2), (4), and (5). First, let me examine (1) (Fine's). In this interpretation, Plato would be presenting his idea in a highly misleading way. When Socrates introduces images such as shadows and reflections and, second, their originals (509d9-510a7), he says nothing about the modes of reasoning that would correspond to imagination and belief. Socrates only talks about different types of entities. This strongly suggests that it is in terms of the types of objects that these two states of mind are distinguished. If, as Fine holds, the distinction concerns the mode of reasoning, Socrates' way of speaking would be pointless and misleading.

Let me next examine interpretation (2). Certainly, within the passage of the divided line (509d1-511e5), there may seem to be no evidence that the objects of thought are *not* Forms. However, let us turn our eyes to 532b6-c4, where Socrates connects the description of the cave with his foregoing discussion of mathematical sciences. He says:

> And the release from chains? The turning away from the shadows towards the images and the firelight? The upward path from the underground cave to the daylight, and the ability there to look, not in the first instance at animals and

[21] Smith, 34-40. For the same kind of reading, see Fogelin, 375-82, White, N. P., 184-6, and Bedu-Addo, 93-103.
[22] Smith, 36.

> plants and the light of the sun, but *at their divine reflections in water and the shadows of the real things*, rather than the shadows of models cast by a light which is itself a shadow in comparison with the sun?[23] (Italics mine).

Socrates tells us that mathematical sciences finally enable the released prisoner, outside the cave, to look at the 'shadows' (*skias*) or 'reflections' (*phantasmata*) of the 'real things.' Since these 'real things' should represent the Forms, and since their 'reflections' and 'shadows' should be distinct from 'the real things,' mathematical sciences are supposed here *not* to be concerned with Forms themselves, but with something less real that is still located in the intelligible realm. Here Socrates seems clearly to imply that mathematics and dialectic have different types of entities as their objects.

Let me then consider interpretation (4). It seems implausible that the objects of thought are propositions. As Gonzalez agrees, the objects of intellect are Forms, entities that the dialectician is concerned with. So the parallelism seems to require that the objects of thought are entities that the mathematician is concerned with. If the objects of thought were mathematical propositions, the objects of intellect would be dialectical propositions and not Forms. (True, Gonzalez is aware that what the dialectician knows is irreducible to any set of propositions. But the same can be said of what the mathematician knows.)

Regarding interpretation (5), my main reason for rejecting it has been pointed out by Ota[24]. Smith identifies the objects of thought as "objects with which thinkers at the level of thought are most aptly associated,"[25] in other words, objects *by means of which* mathematicians engage in their study[26]. However, it seems stretched to take the objects of thought in this way. At 511a4-8, Socrates identifies the lesser part of the intelligible realm as *what is studied.* He says:

> This is the class that I described as intelligible, it is true, but with the reservation first that the soul is compelled to employ assumptions in the investigation *of it* (*peri tēn zētēsin autou*)...[27]

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[23] Griffith's translation.
[24] Ota, 17.
[25] Smith, 39.
[26] Similarly, Bedu-Addo says that we must distinguish between what one, in the state of thought, thinks about – i.e., per his reading, Forms – on the one hand and, on the other hand, the objects that correspond to BC. Bedu-Addo, 101-2.
[27] Shorey's translation.

Here, '*autou*' refers to what BC represents, and Socrates speaks of it as the object, not a means, of investigation. This suggests that the objects of thought are not sensibles but intelligibles[28].

3. Replies to the Objections to (3)

In Section One, when presenting some of the interpretations, I mentioned main points that are supposed to support them. Some of these points constitute substantially reasons for not taking on (3). In this section, I shall respond to three such objections to my favored interpretation.

First, we saw some interpreters object to (3), in that there is no special account of mathematicals in the text[29]. To respond to this objection, I would point out that Plato, especially in the middle dialogues, tends to avoid the full consideration of highly detailed or subtle issues, which might lead to a huge undesirable digression. In such a case, Plato is inclined to touch upon those issues only in passing, in order to focus on his main discussion. One example of this tendency is found at *Phaedo*, 100c9-d8, where Plato, before proceeding on to the final argument for the immortality of the soul, has Socrates hint that there could be a problem with regard to the relation of the Form to its participant. He then immediately sets aside this issue to return to the main one[30]. Another example is at *Republic*, V, 476a7: Socrates refers to the 'association' (*koinōnia*) of the Forms with one another, without explicating or developing this idea[31]. In the same vein, as Burnyeat points out[32], when Socrates prevents Glaucon from further division of the intelligible realm, at 534a5-8, this could be taken as an example of such avoidance on the part of Plato. So, it seems possible to suppose that Plato purposely avoids

[28] Moreover, Socrates' encapsulation of the points of the divided line at 534a1-5 seems to speak against Smith's reading. After having called the higher two states of mind, respectively, '*epistēmē*' and '*dianoia*', Socrates puts them together as '*noēsis,*' and remarks that '*noēsis*' is about '*ousia'* (being). Whatever '*ousia*' in this context may mean, it certainly is not sensible. So it seems to be implied here that neither intellect nor thought is concerned with sensibles as their objects.
[29] Ross (1951), 59, Boyle, 3-4, Smith, 36.
[30] This issue is going to be fully discussed at *Parmenides*, 130a2-133a10.
[31] Plato will tackle this issue at *Sophist,* 251d5-259d8. I do not mean that whenever Plato avoids discussing a cumbersome issue, he will give a fuller treatment in a later dialogue.
[32] Burnyeat, 33-4.

offering a full account of the difference between Forms and mathematicals in the *Republic,* because he is not willing to develop the point there.

Second, we saw Murphy object to (3), stating that since, in the simile of the sun, Socrates speaks of what is intelligible solely in terms of the Forms, it is difficult to take '*noēton eidos*' or '*nooumenon genos*' in the divided line—i.e., what the upper section (AC) stands for—as containing items other than Forms. This objection presupposes that, in the sun analogy, Socrates means that the intelligible realm is *exclusively* composed of Forms. However, this presupposition is not so obvious; he may simply mean that the Forms are *representative* inhabitants in this realm. This consideration could be supported by observing an analogous case as regards the visible realm: although Socrates, in the simile of the sun, never mentions images such as shadows and reflections in water, he suddenly tells us that they are contained in '*horaton eidos*' or '*horōmenon genos*' at the beginning of the divided line passage (509d8-510a3). In the same vein, we could naturally assume that Socrates, in the divided line, considers '*noēton eidos*' or '*nooumenon genos*' to include other intelligible objects, i.e., mathematicals, even if he has never mentioned them before.

The third objection to (3) is that locutions such as '*tou tetragōnou autou*' and '*diametrou autēs,*' at 510d7-8, indicate that the Forms are in question here. However, as Denyer correctly points out[33], such locutions do not always refer to the Forms. As he explains, the emphasis of 'itself' in 'the square itself' and 'a diagonal itself' can be taken to indicate only that the square and the diagonal that the geometrician speaks about are free of "something that clutters their diagram," such as the breadth and imperfect straightness of the sides[34]. So 510d7-8 is compatible with the view that Socrates conceives of the geometrical figures as intermediaries.

4. **Considerations in Favor of (3)**

I shall make two considerations in favor of interpretation (3). First and most importantly, as I have said in section two, this reading can make good sense of the mathematicians', especially the geometricians', practice and allow Plato to describe

[33] Denyer, 304. For instance, when Plato uses 'the poet himself' (*autou tou poiētou*) at 394c2 or 'fire itself' (*autō[i] tō[i] puri*) at 404c4, he does not mean the Form of the Poet or Fire at all.
[34] Denyer, 294, 305.

their practice accurately[35]. There are two points to be made. First, e.g., triangles in geometry, unlike the Triangle Itself, are *spacially extended*[36]. Second, when a geometrician considers a triangle, she considers the very triangle that is at issue in the problem she is dealing with. If the problem specifies the triangle just as an isosceles, it *is* an isosceles, and it is *indeterminate* how many degrees any of its angles has. In this sense, the geometrician's triangles, unlike the dialectician's Triangle, derive their identity from the specific geometrical problems at hand. True, the geometrician can consider the general properties of the triangle. Yet she, at each time, deals with *a certain* problem about *a certain* general property, or the relation between *certain* general properties, of the triangle. This context of the specific geometrical problem gives the triangle in question a special identity that may not be shared by triangles considered in other geometrical problems or, a fortiori, by a triangle considered in a non-mathematical context[37]. (This is not to deny that there may be a unified system of geometrical problems.) By contrast, when the dialectician studies the Triangle, I suggest that she focuses on the essence of the triangle *qua* triangle and thereby on the place that it occupies in the whole reality. This should involve placing the geometricals as a whole in the totality of beings. Similarly, I would suggest that the mathematician's numbers derive their identity from the mathematical problems that she deals with[38].

Another consideration in favor of interpretation (3) is that our reading

[35] For other Platonic discussions of the practice of mathematicians, see also *Meno*, 82b9-87b2, *Philebus*, 56c8-57a4, *Laws* VII, 817e5-822d1.
[36] See footnote 19 above.
[37] However, to deny that mathematicians deal with the Forms is not to say that Plato criticizes their practice. Rather, he seems to see mathematical sciences quite positively. To the question of why the future rulers of the ideal city must gain an 'overall picture' (*sunopsin*) of the mathematical sciences' kinship with one another after a long term of training (537b8-c3), Burnyeat illuminatingly answers that Plato regards the kind of systematic thinking acquired through the study of mathematics as a constitutive part of the knowledge of the Good, and not as a mere instrument that leads to it. The significance of the systematic thinking attained through the mathematical study is illustrated by the image of dialectic as the 'coping stone' (*thrinkos*) of the curriculum (534e2). Burnyeat, 34, 74-80. This insightful interpretation helps us understand why Plato puts so much emphasis on mathematics as a prelude to dialectic. For a criticism of Burnyeat, see White, M. J., 233, 241.
[38] The mathematician's care to keep 'one' equal in its every occurrence (526a1-5) may be taken to concern the context of dealing with specific mathematical problems. *Pace* Shorey (1903), 83-5, (1937), 164. There is a Platonic tradition according to which the 'monadic' (*monadikos*), arithmetical number is an image of the 'substantial' (*ousiōdēs*) number, which ontologically ranks above the former. Plotinus, *Ennead*, VI 6. 9. 33-6. For the monadic number, cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* M 8.1083b16-7, 1092b20.

harmonizes with Plato's general attitude toward the image in the *Republic*. As we have seen, at 532b6-c4 Socrates claims that the study of mathematical sciences finally enables one to look at the shadows or reflections of the animals, the stars, etc. outside the cave. Here, Plato seems to expect readers to take these images as representing intelligibles other than Forms. For it seems that throughout the *Republic* he emphasizes both the distinction between images and their originals and the superiority of the latter to the former. When Socrates distributes four states of mind to four subsections of the line (511d6-e4), he treats images and their originals as different types of entities, with the former participating in a lesser degree of truth. Furthermore, in Book X, 596a5-598d7, when Plato downgrades imitative painters and poets on the grounds that they create mere images (*eidōla*)[39], he remarks that the former are at three removes from Forms, while the latter are just two removes away. Given that both this distinction and the superiority of originals to images are congenial to Plato's general view of images in the *Republic*, it is likely that he also maintains this at 532b6-c4, in a description of the cave analogy. So it seems a plausible guess that the shadows and reflections outside the cave represent intelligible entities other than Forms, most likely, mathematical entities.

5. Further Consideration

So far, I have shown how I find it plausible to assume, with Adam, Denyer, and Burnyeat, that for Plato the objects of thought are, at least for one thing, the mathematical entities that are intermediary between Forms and sensibles. Given this interpretation, let me then turn to a related issue: the fact that BC and CD are made equal in length seems to imply that the two states of mind corresponding to these subsections, i.e., belief and thought, are meant to participate in the *same* degree of clearness[40]. However, this is contrary not only to our anticipation that thought should be better than belief in clearness but also to what Socrates himself implies at 533d4-6, i.e., that thought (*dianoia*) is clearer than *doxa,* which consists of belief (*pistis*) and imagination (*eikasia*). Plato, again, does not explicate this shocking

[39] Furthermore, at 598b3-5 Socrates asks whether the painting imitates appearance (*phantasma*) or truth. Plato uses the same word, '*phantasma,*' at 510a1-2 (in the divided line passage), to mention examples of the image (*eikōn*), i.e., reflections in water and on smooth surfaces.

[40] Moreover, the objects of those two states of mind also would partake in the same degree of truth.

implication in the divided line passage. Although this is a separate issue from the main one for the present paper, I wish to address it, partly because of its own interest and partly because some of the foregoing consideration can help us here.

Foley believes that there is no coherent solution to this problem, and that Plato expects readers to progress sequentially through the four states of mind presented in the divided line. Upon first reading of the divided line passage, they may uncritically accept the image (imagination); then they may notice, when seeing the line drawn, that the two middle subsections may be equal (belief); next they ascertain, by mathematical proof, that these subsections are really equal (thought); and they deal with the difficulty of making sense of the implication of this equality in regard to the relation between belief and thought (intellect)[41]. I agree with Foley that there is no coherent solution to the problem of equality, and that Plato sends us some messages by posing this problem. However, I am inclined to see differently Plato's reason for doing so. It seems a slight stretch to claim, as Foley does, that upon the first reading of the divided line, one is in the state of imagination, comparable to the state of looking at shadows or reflections. For one thing, even if one is captured by the description, one is unlikely to forget that it is a simile.

Denyer enumerates three possible reasons that might explain why Plato makes the middle subsections equal in length (though he avoids choosing any of these as his own answer)[42]: (i) Plato is suggesting that since an image always falls short of the original of which it is an image, and since the divided line is itself an image, the divided line, too, is defective[43]; (ii) he is hinting that thought is actually no better than belief, unless it develops to the finest state of mind, i.e., intellect; and (iii) by writing the text in such a way as to allow these two incompatible interpretations, he is provoking the reader to go beyond the contradictory appearances, just as in the case of the largeness or smallness of fingers (523b9-524d7)[44].

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[41] Foley, 19-23.
[42] Denyer, 296.
[43] For the same line of suggestion, see also Smith, 43.
[44] Bedu-Addo explains the equality by saying that both BC and CD represent the same objects, i.e., sensibles. Yet mathematicians, when dealing with the sensible figures that they draw, take them as images of Forms, while ordinary people are unaware that sensibles can be images of Forms, since they are unaware of Forms. That both BC and CD stand for sensibles is, Bedu-Addo claims, confirmed by the fact that what BC represents (i.e., reflections and shadows outside the cave), and what CD does (i.e., statuettes and puppets in the cave), are ontologically the same type of objects, in that both are direct images of the real things outside the cave. Bedu-Addo, 103-8. Smith, although he agrees with Bedu-Addo

Of these three, I consider (i) to be the most plausible. For one thing, this interpretation seems to harmonize with Plato's overall view that we have seen, which is that images are bound to suffer from imperfection. And that intentional (as I believe) 'defect' in Plato's presentation of the divided line would be understood as his implicit warning not to rely totally on images, not even ones of his own[45]. Secondly, both (ii) and (iii) entail that thought is actually no better than belief, but it is difficult to believe that Plato really thinks so. It would be odd if the state of mind acquired by a long term of mathematical training should be merely as clear as that of ordinary people.

Some related issues should be discussed on later occasions. One such issue is how the dialectician will treat mathematics.

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in taking the objects of thought to be sensibles, considers him to fail to explain why thought and belief are supposed to participate in the same degree of clearness. Smith, 40-2.

[45] Cf. 506d7-e3, where Socrates confesses that he is unable to state what the Good is itself, and-proposes to present an image or simile of it instead. For Socrates' cognitive condition in this dependence on images, see Gonzalez (1996), n. 50, 273, Ferber, 236-7. See also *Timaeus*, 27d5-29d3, where Timaeus says that he cannot offer an exact but only a likely account (*eikōs logos*) of the generation of the universe.

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La « métaphysique positive » de Bergson et la pensée positive en France au 19e siècle

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Abstract : *Pourquoi Henri Bergson choisit-il l'expression « métaphysique positive » pour désigner son projet de recherche qui exige un travail collectif et progressif de la philosophie et de la science ? Auguste Comte qualifie de « positive » une nouvelle philosophie qui fournit des connaissances « réelles », « utiles », « certaines » et « précises ». En vue de surmonter la pensée systématique, cette philosophie propose une nouvelle façon d'« organiser » les sciences et s'applique à établir les lois qui déterminent la « relation » entre des phénomènes. À l'opposé, pour Bergson, la philosophie est un effort « empirique » pour approfondir la « réalité ». C'est en reposant sur la théorie de la vérité, telle que la conçoit Claude Bernard, que le philosophe propose une recherche empirique visant à se rapprocher d'une « certitude » par une confrontation entre la philosophie et la science. De plus, la confrontation avec la science « précise » l'intuition philosophique. Bergson appelle ainsi son projet de recherche « métaphysique positive ». Cette pensée positive renouvelle la relation entre la philosophie et les sciences. Chez Comte, la philosophie devient une science au sens où elle adopte la même méthode que la science. Édouard Le Roy propose un projet de recherche appelé « positivisme nouveau » pour substituer la philosophie à la science. Chez Bergson, la philosophie intervient dans la recherche empirique de la réalité en collaboration avec la science. La philosophie et la science travaillent ensemble.*

Introduction

Dans une conférence faite devant les membres de la Société française de philosophie le 2 mai 1901, Henri Bergson (1859-1941) propose un projet de recherche appelé « métaphysique positive »[1]. Cette expression peut sembler

[1] Bergson, Henri, « Le parallélisme psycho-physique et la métaphysique positive » (1901), EP, p. 231-272. Dans cet article, nous nous servons des abréviations pour les ouvrages de

contradictoire pour les positivistes qui opposent le « positif » à la métaphysique[2]. Bergson lui-même n'accepterait pas une interprétation qui le rattache à la philosophie positive d'Auguste Comte (1798-1857). Bien qu'il s'intéresse à la classification conçue par ce dernier, il a en effet laissé à titre confidentiel une critique sévère dans un entretien avec Jacques Chevalier[3].

Le projet de « métaphysique positive » pouvait également étonner les membres qui avaient assisté à la séance de la même société le 28 février 1901. Édouard Le Roy (1870-1954), disciple de Bergson, y a donné une conférence provocatrice qu'il a publiée le mois suivant sous le titre « Un positivisme nouveau »[4]. Ce positivisme nouveau s'oppose à « l'ancien positivisme » proposé par Auguste Comte. Le Roy remet en cause la validité des théories scientifiques en remarquant les intérêts pratiques qui conduisent les scientifiques à fabriquer des faits. Le positivisme nouveau consiste à revenir, à travers la critique de la science, à « la pureté de l'intuition primitive vécue »[5]. Bergson a certes développé une telle méthodologie philosophique dans un article publié en 1903 sous le titre « Introduction à la métaphysique ». Mais, la « métaphysique positive » professée dans la conférence de 1901 désigne une autre méthode. Dans l'article de 1903, Bergson oppose l'intuition à l'intelligence pour mettre en évidence la confrontation entre la philosophie et la science. Au contraire, dans la conférence de 1901, il essaie

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[2] Gouhier, Henri, *Bergson et le Christ des évangiles*, Paris, Fayard, 1961, p. 43-44.

[3] Chevalier, Jacques, *Entretiens avec Bergson*, Paris, Plon, 1959, p. 245-246 : « J'ai commencé naguère à lire avec intérêt le *Cours de philosophie positive*. L'idée que se fait Comte de la classification des sciences d'après leur complexité croissante me séduisit. Mais, après avoir lu les premières leçons du Cours, je l'abandonnai lorsque je vis que Comte demandait à l'État d'interdire la théorie des ondulations de la lumière. » Cf. Bergson, Henri, « La philosophie française » (1933), EP, p. 462.

[4] Le Roy, Édouard, « Un positivisme nouveau », *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, t. 9, no. 2, mars 1901, p. 138-153. Sur le débat provoqué par Le Roy, voir Sugiyama, Naoki, « Sur le débat autour de la "philosophie nouvelle" », *Journal of Human Sciences and Arts Faculty of Integrated Arts and Sciences The University of Tokushima*, vol. 4, 1997, p. 67-111 (en japonais) ; Brenner, Anastasios, « Un "positivisme nouveau" en France au début du 20e siècle (Milhaud, Le Roy, Duhem, Poincaré) », in Bitbol, Michel (dir.), Gayon, Jean (dir.), *L'épistémologie française, 1830-1970* (2006), La nouvelle édition, Paris, Matériologiques, 2015.

[5] Le Roy, Édouard, *art. cit.*, p. 149.

d'établir une coopération entre la philosophie et la science, en montrant que les données physiologiques servent à aborder d'une nouvelle façon le problème philosophique de la relation entre la conscience et le corps[6].

Pourquoi Bergson choisit-il l'expression « métaphysique positive » pour désigner son projet de recherche philosophique ? Cette étude vise à montrer comment Bergson élargit et renouvelle le concept de positivité, tel que Comte et Le Roy le proposent, en s'appuyant sur une nouvelle relation entre la philosophie et la science. Il est d'autant plus nécessaire d'aborder ce problème qu'il attire, surtout depuis une dizaine d'années, l'attention d'un certain nombre de philosophes[7].

Une analyse historique est nécessaire pour apprécier la pensée positive chez Bergson. Il faut d'abord analyser la façon dont Auguste Comte caractérise sa philosophie en se servant de la diversité des significations du terme « positif ». Nous montrerons qu'une nouvelle conception de la philosophie conduit à changer le mot « positif » en concept philosophique. Pour déterminer l'originalité de la « métaphysique positive » par rapport à la « philosophie positive » conçue par Comte, nous nous appliquerons ensuite à analyser la pensée d'un physiologiste français : Claude Bernard (1813-1878). Bergson et les historiens positivistes proposent en effet deux lectures de ce dernier pour y reconnaître leur conception de positivité philosophique. Enfin, nous comparerons la « métaphysique positive » avec le « positivisme nouveau », projet conçu par Le Roy. Cette comparaison déterminera la portée du projet de recherche proposé par Bergson.

1. La « philosophie positive » d'Auguste Comte

[6] Sur la « confrontation » et la « coopération » entre la philosophie et la science chez Bergson, voir Gayon, Jean, « Bergson. Entre science et métaphysique », in Worms, Frédéric (éd.), *Annales bergsoniennes III. Bergson et la science*, Paris, PUF, 2007, p. 175-189 ; Abiko, Shin, « Bergson et le positivisme d'Auguste Comte », *Archê*, no. 14, 2006, p. 44-58 (en japonais).

[7] Le colloque international ayant lieu en 2004 à l'Université de Nice a été consacré au problème « Bergson et la science » (cf. Worms, Frédéric (éd.), *Annales bergsoniennes III. Bergson et la science*, Paris, PUF, 2007). Plus récemment, un colloque international a été organisé en 2015 au Japon sous le titre « The Anatomy of *Matter and Memory* : Bergson and Contemporary Theories of Perception, Mind and Time ». Un certain nombre d'ouvrages s'intéressent à ce problème. Nous nous bornons à citer, parmi d'autres, Miquel, Paul-Antoine, *Bergson ou l'imagination métaphysique*, Paris, Kimé, 2007 ; Riquier, Camille, *Archéologie de Bergson : Temps et métaphysique*, Paris, PUF, 2009.

Le terme « positif » a pour origine l'adjectif latin *positivus*, dérivé du verbe *pono* qui signifie « poser » et « établir ». Avant Comte, des philosophes s'en servent pour expliquer leur pensée[8].

Sous l'influence de Claude-Henri de Rouvroy de Saint-Simon (1760-1825)[9], Auguste Comte invoque l'usage journalier du « positif » pour caractériser l'état définitif auquel le développement de l'esprit humain aboutit. Selon le philosophe, l'esprit humain dans ses premiers états veut mettre au jour « la nature intime des êtres » et « l'origine et la fin de tous les phénomènes »[10]. Autrement dit, il cherche leurs « causes premières et finales »[11]. Dans son état primitif qualifié de « théologique », l'esprit humain est entraîné par « sa tendance nécessaire »[12] à invoquer les agents surnaturels, produits par l'imagination, dont l'intervention arbitraire explique tous les phénomènes. Dans l'état suivant, appelé « métaphysique », il règle les questions en substituant aux agents surnaturels « des forces abstraites, véritables entités (abstractions personnifiées) inhérentes aux divers êtres du monde, et conçues comme capables d'engendrer par elles-mêmes tous les phénomènes observés »[13].

À partir de cinq significations du mot « positif », Comte présente le troisième et définitif état de l'esprit humain par rapport à ses premiers états. D'abord, la philosophie positive porte sur le « réel », et non sur le « chimérique ». L'esprit positif s'applique aux « recherches vraiment accessibles à notre intelligence », tandis que l'esprit théologique et l'esprit métaphysique visent à mettre au jour les causes premières et finales, qui sont des « impénétrables mystères »[14]. Ensuite, la connaissance procurée par la philosophie positive est « utile ». Elle a pour but « l'amélioration continue de notre vraie condition, individuelle et collective ». Au

[8] Par exemple, Leibniz et Schelling utilisent le mot « positif ». Cf. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, *Essais de théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal* (1710), « Discours de la conformité de la foi avec la raison », in Janet, Paul (éd.), *Œuvres philosophiques de Leibniz*, t. 2, Paris, Alcan, 1900, p. 28 ; *Les notions philosophiques* (1990), Auroux, Sylvain (éd.), 2e éd., in Jacob, André (éd.), *Encyclopédie philosophique universelle*, « Positif », Paris, PUF, 1998.

[9] Cf. Kremer-Marietti, Angèle, *Le concept de science positive*, Chapitre I « Structures de l'anthropologie positiviste », Paris, L'Harmattan, 1983, p. 7-41.

[10] Comte, Auguste, *Cours*, 1ère leçon, t. I, p. 10. Nous employons les abréviations pour les ouvrages de Comte, « *Cours* » pour *Cours de philosophie positive*, t. I, Paris, Rouen, 1830 ; « *Discours* » pour *Discours sur l'esprit positif* (1844), Paris, Vrin, 2009.

[11] *Ibid.*, 1ère leçon, t. I, p. 4.

[12] Comte, Auguste, *Discours*, § 16, p. 76.

[13] Comte, Auguste, *Cours*, 1ère leçon, t. I, p. 4.

[14] Comte, Auguste, *Discours*, § 31, p. 121.

contraire, dans ses états antérieurs, l'esprit humain ne propose qu'une philosophie « oiseuse » qui fournit « la vaine satisfaction d'une stérile curiosité »[15]. La troisième signification du positif, « certain », s'oppose à « l'indécision » de la philosophie métaphysique. Cette certitude tient à « l'harmonie » apportée par la philosophie positive, tandis que les écoles de la philosophie métaphysique poursuivent des « débats interminables »[16]. Quatrièmement, Comte insiste sur la « précision » de la nouvelle philosophie, s'opposant à des « opinions vagues » auxquelles l'ancien état de l'esprit conduit la philosophie : l'esprit positif tend toujours à « obtenir partout le degré de précision compatible avec la nature des phénomènes et conforme à l'exigence de nos vrais besoins »[17]. Enfin, la philosophie positive est une philosophie qui « affirme », tandis que dans son état métaphysique, l'esprit humain ne fait que « critiquer » et « nier »[18].

À l'époque où Comte développe sa pensée, les dictionnaires mentionnent, outre l'usage en algèbre, droit, religion et théologie, les qualificatifs suivants du terme de *positif* comme « certain », « constant », « assuré », « effectif » et « réel ». Ils remarquent également son opposition aux termes « négatif », « imaginaire » et « arbitraire »[19]. Parmi les définitions du terme proposées par les dictionnaires de son temps, Comte retient « réel », « utile », « certain » et « le contraire de négatif », et il distingue « précis » et « certain », deux acceptions souvent confondues[20].

Comment l'esprit humain dépasse-t-il ses anciens états pour arriver à l'état positif ainsi caractérisé ? « L'inanité radicale »[21] des explications théologiques et métaphysiques tient au fait que l'esprit humain cherche une « connaissance absolue »[22] qui vise à éclaircir « la nature intime des êtres » et « l'origine et la fin de tous les phénomènes ». Pour sortir des états théologique et métaphysique, l'esprit

[15] *Ibid.*, § 31, p. 121.
[16] *Ibid.*, § 31, p. 121.
[17] *Ibid.*, § 31, p. 122.
[18] *Ibid.*, § 32, p. 122-124.
[19] Cf. *Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers*, Diderot, Denis (éd.), D'Alembert, Jean le Rond (éd.), Paris, Briasson, David, Le Breton, Durand ; puis Neuchâtel, S. Faulche, 17 vols, 1751-1766 ; *Dictionnaire universel français et latin, vulgairement appelé Dictionnaire de Trévoux*, Paris, Libraires Associés, 1771 ; *Dictionnaire critique de la langue française*, Féraud, Jean-François (éd.), 3 vols, Marseille, Mossy, 1787-1788 ; *Dictionnaire de l'Académie française*, 5e éd., 2 vols, Paris, Smit, 1798 ; 6e éd., 2 vols, Paris, Firmin Didot, 1835 ; *Dictionnaire universel de la langue française*, Boiste, Pierre (éd.), 2 vols, Bruxelles, Frechet, 1828.
[20] Comte, Auguste, *Discours*, § 31, p. 121-122.
[21] *Ibid.*, § 12, p. 65.
[22] *Ibid.*, § 3, p. 43.

humain s'applique donc à une étude dont le principe consiste à « substituer partout, à l'inaccessible détermination des *causes* proprement dites, la simple recherche des *lois*, c'est-à-dire des relations constantes qui existent entre les phénomènes observés »[23]. Une telle analyse philosophique et historique permet à Comte de qualifier l'esprit positif de « relatif »[24], terme que la plupart des dictionnaires de son temps ne mentionnent pas comme équivalent à « positif »[25].

Chez Comte, dans leur état positif, la philosophie et les sciences emploient donc la même méthode. En ce sens, le « positif » et le « scientifique » sont synonymes. Comment la philosophie peut-elle chercher les lois entre les phénomènes ? C'est en considérant les théories scientifiques comme « autant de phénomènes humains » résultant de l'évolution de l'esprit humain[26] que Comte assigne à la philosophie la tâche de leur systématisation. Cette systématisation n'est pas la réduction de toutes les explications scientifiques à un seul principe d'où elles dérivent[27], mais elle consiste, d'une part, « à déterminer exactement l'esprit de chacune d'elles [diverses sciences positives] » et, d'autre part, « à découvrir leurs relations et leur enchaînement »[28]. À travers l'analyse historique, la philosophie positive tente d'établir deux lois fondamentales : la loi des trois états et la loi de classification. La première loi stipule le développement de l'esprit humain qui passe par les états théologique et métaphysique pour arriver à l'état positif. La loi de classification permet aux toutes les théories scientifiques d'être, selon la simplicité et la généralité des phénomènes qu'elles étudient, classées en mathématique, astronomie, physique, chimie, biologie et sociologie[29]. Dans cette perspective, il ne s'agit plus de critiquer les anciennes théories, en mettant en cause leur vérité[30]. La philosophie positive s'applique à « apprécier » suivant ces deux lois les théories

[23] *Ibid.*, § 12, p. 66.
[24] *Ibid.*, § 33, p. 125-126.
[25] La 4e édition du *Dictionnaire de l'Académie française* publiée en 1762 et le *Dictionnaire critique de la langue française* remarquent même l'opposition de deux termes. Le « positif » s'oppose au « relatif » quand on dit, par exemple, « il n'y a de grandeur positive qu'en Dieu ; toutes les autres sont relatives. » Cf. *Dictionnaire de l'Académie française*, 4e éd., 1762 ; 5e éd., 1798 ; *Dictionnaire critique de la langue française*, 1787-1788.
[26] Comte, Auguste, *Discours*, § 14, p. 69.
[27] Comte, Auguste, *Cours*, 1ère leçon, t. I, p. 52-53.
[28] *Ibid.*, 1ère leçon, t. I, p. 30.
[29] Cf. Comte, Auguste, *Cours*, 2e leçon, t. I, p. 86-98, 111-115.
[30] Cf. Abiko, Shin, « Naissance de la philosophie positive », in Inoue, Shoichi (éd.), Kobayashi, Michio (éd.), *The Evolution of Natural Sciences and the Metaphysics in the Western Civilization*, Tokyo, Kinokuniya-shoten, 1988, p. 251-291 (en japonais).

scientifiques pour les situer dans le système ainsi construit[31]. La méthode « relative » l'affranchit de toute « négation » qui dominait les anciennes philosophies[32].

Chez Auguste Comte, le concept de positivité est fondé sur deux aspects fondamentaux et inséparables de sa philosophie : sa méthode et son objectif. La méthode consiste à abandonner les recherches absolues pour chercher les lois entre les phénomènes. Cela permet d'obtenir des connaissances « réelles », « utiles », « certaines » et « précises ». L'introduction de cette méthode dans la philosophie est rendue possible par la conception d'une nouvelle philosophie qui vise à construire « le système général des conceptions humaines »[33], en établissant la loi de développement de l'esprit humain et la loi de classification. En effet, en adoptant la même méthode que les sciences, la philosophie positive surmonte la systématisation qui déduit toutes les connaissances d'un principe unique et elle s'applique à « apprécier », au lieu de critiquer, les autres doctrines. Chez Comte, les lois établies entre les phénomènes et la nouvelle systématisation des connaissances humaines assurent la positivité de sa philosophie.

D'où vient l'originalité de Bergson par rapport à la pensée positive proposée par Auguste Comte ? La divergence entre les deux philosophes conduit aux différentes lectures de la pensée de Claude Bernard. Il faut analyser ces lectures pour mettre au jour le développement de la pensée positive.

2. La « métaphysique positive » et la vérité chez Claude Bernard

Claude Bernard s'applique à établir la médecine comme discipline expérimentale. Cet effort conduit à beaucoup de découvertes dont, parmi d'autres, nous nous bornons à citer celle de la formation de sucre dans le foie. Comme Comte, le physiologiste critique la méthode systématique. Les systématiciens « raisonnent, dit-il, logiquement et sans expérimenter, et arrivent, de conséquence en conséquence,

[31] Dans « Avertissement de l'auteur » du *Cours de philosophie positive*, Comte qualifie sa philosophie de « positive » pour insister sur sa tâche de « coordination des faits observés ». Cf. Comte, Auguste, *Cours*, « Avertissement de l'auteur », t. I, p. VIII.

[32] La philosophie positive apprécie les conceptions humaines pour les synthétiser ou les « organiser ». Donc, elle ne nie ni ne critique les autres opinions. Ainsi, Comte assimile le « positif » à « l'organique ». Cf. Comte, Auguste, *Discours*, § 32, p. 122-124.

[33] Comte, Auguste, *Cours*, « Avertissement de l'auteur », t. I, p. VIII.

à construire un système qui est logique, mais qui n'a aucune réalité scientifique »[34]. Pour surmonter la méthode systématique, Bernard développe une méthode expérimentale dans l'*Introduction à l'étude de la médecine expérimentale*, ouvrage publié en 1865.

Certains historiens tentent de rapprocher Claude Bernard d'Auguste Comte[35]. Raoul Mourgue et Georges Canguilhem présument que Claude Bernard se familiarise avec les idées d'Auguste Comte en participant à la Société de biologie, fondée en 1848, dont les premiers membres, comme Charles Robin, étaient en grande partie positivistes[36]. Les historiens positivistes considèrent le « déterminisme » conçu par Bernard comme un concept fondamental qui rapproche ce dernier de Comte. Le « déterminisme » est un principe de recherche s'appliquant à toutes les sciences : un phénomène a des conditions physico-chimiques, c'est-à-dire qu'un autre phénomène doit nécessairement le précéder. « Dans les corps vivants comme dans les corps bruts, dit Bernard, les lois sont immuables, et les phénomènes que ces lois régissent sont liés à leurs conditions d'existence par un déterminisme nécessaire et absolu. […] Le déterminisme dans les conditions des phénomènes de la vie doit être un des axiomes du médecin expérimentateur »[37]. En physique, chimie ou physiologie, il faut renoncer à la recherche des « causes premières » pour s'appliquer à trouver la « cause prochaine » ou le déterminisme des phénomènes[38]. C'est un principe que Comte formule en invoquant le terme de « loi »

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[34] Bernard, Claude, *Introduction à l'étude de la médecine expérimentale* (1865), Paris, Flammarion, 2008, p. 87.

[35] Cf. Mourgue, Raoul, « La philosophie biologique d'Auguste Comte », *Archives d'anthropologie criminelle de médecine légale et de psychologie normale et pathologique*, t. 24, 1909, p. 829-870, 911-945 ; Kremer-Marietti, Angèle, « Le positivisme de Claude Bernard », in Michel, Jacques (dir.), *La nécessité de Claude Bernard*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2001, p. 183-193. Par ailleurs, Georges Canguilhem et Annie Petit mettent au jour également la divergence de pensées entre Bernard et Comte. Voir, sur ce point, Canguilhem, Georges, « Théorie et technique de l'expérimentation chez Claude Bernard », *Etudes d'histoire et de philosophie des sciences concernant les vivants et la vie* (1968), 7e éd., Paris, Vrin, 2002, p. 143-155 ; Petit, Annie, « D'Auguste Comte à Claude Bernard : un positivisme déplacé », *Romantisme*, no. 21-22, 1978, p. 45-62.

[36] Cf. Mourgue, Raoul, *art. cit.*, p. 938 ; Canguilhem, Georges, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

[37] Bernard, Claude, *op. cit.*, p. 136-137. Sur le développement du concept de déterminisme chez Bernard, voir Gayon, Jean, « Le déterminisme : origines d'un mot, évaluation d'une idée », in Lesieur, Marcel (éd.), *Turbulence et déterminisme*, PUF, 1998, p. 183-197. Mirko Grmek remarque que le déterminisme est chez Bernard un postulat, un principe *a priori*, indépendant de toute expérience. Cf. Grmek, Mirko D., *Le legs de Claude Bernard*, Paris, Fayard, 1997, p. 99.

[38] Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 131-133.

et sur lequel il fonde le concept « positif ». Kremer-Marietti remarque : « Claude Bernard s'est appuyé sur le principe positiviste fondamental, selon lequel une méthode générale identique préside à toute expérimentation aussi bien dans les corps bruts que dans les corps vivants. La méthode expérimentale use d'un raisonnement rigoureux destiné à soumettre les idées du chercheur à l'expérience des faits »[39]. Cette lecture de la pensée de Claude Bernard reconnaît la positivité dans le concept de déterminisme.

Toutefois, Bernard n'accepterait pas d'être qualifié de positiviste. En effet, il fait une critique du positivisme : « Le positivisme qui, au nom de la science, repousse les systèmes philosophiques, a comme eux le tort d'être un système»[40]. Selon le physiologiste, l'observation et l'expérimentation peuvent fournir des résultats imprévus, résultats qui sont contradictoires avec les conséquences tirées par raisonnement d'une théorie. Par une « croyance exagérée dans les théories »[41], les systématiciens ne retiennent que les faits qui confirment leur théorie. Il leur manque le « sentiment de complexité des phénomènes naturels »[42]. Cette complexité empêche les théories scientifiques d'être définitives. Donc, « il faut être toujours prêt à les abandonner, à les modifier ou à les changer dès qu'elles ne représentent plus la réalité »[43]. C'est une disposition de l'esprit du scientifique que Bernard appelle « doute philosophique »[44]. La méthode expérimentale refuse ainsi de construire un nouveau système et elle est même « la négation de tous les systèmes »[45]. Claude Bernard établit ainsi une théorie de la vérité qui exige un travail progressif : « toutes ces théories sont fausses absolument parlant. Elles ne sont que des vérités partielles et provisoires qui nous sont nécessaires, pour avancer dans l'investigation ; elles ne représentent que l'état actuel de nos connaissances, et, par conséquent, elles devront se modifier avec l'accroissement de la science »[46].

Bergson insiste sur l'importance de cette théorie de la vérité dans un discours prononcé en 1913. Selon le philosophe, chez Bernard, la théorie de la vérité est une théorie dont « l'influence sera probablement plus durable et plus profonde que n'eût

[39] Kremer-Marietti, Angèle, *art. cit.*, p. 187. Voir aussi Mourgue, Raoul, *art. cit.*, p. 843-845.
[40] Bernard, Claude, *op. cit.*, p. 374.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 90.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 87.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 91.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 85.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 370.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 85.

pu l'être celle d'aucune théorie particulière »[47] : elle refuse toute systématisation et montre pourquoi et comment dans les sciences naturelles, la recherche de la vérité exige un travail collectif et progressif.

La « métaphysique positive », projet de recherche proposé par Bergson en 1901, repose sur une théorie de la vérité telle que Claude Bernard l'a conçue[48]. Elle s'oppose à la philosophie systématique qui consiste à « extraire de la réalité un concept simple […] pour le soumettre ensuite à un travail dialectique »[49]. Elle propose une méthode, « faite de corrections, de retouches, de complications graduelles », qui exige « un contact ininterrompu avec la réalité » pour « suivre le réel dans toutes ses sinuosités »[50]. Bergson la précise en introduisant la notion de « ligne de faits ». « Il y a des certitudes scientifiques qui ne s'obtiennent que par des accumulations de probabilités. Il y a *des lignes de faits* dont aucune ne suffirait par elle-même à déterminer une vérité, mais qui la déterminent par leur intersection »[51]. Cette méthode consiste à chercher la convergence des conclusions probables qui sont tirées des recherches faites dans des domaines variés et qui peuvent être corrigées par de nouveaux faits. La convergence permet de rassembler et d'accumuler la probabilité de telles conclusions pour se rapprocher petit à petit d'une certitude, comme d'une limite. Dans *L'évolution créatrice*, Bergson présente comme un exemple de l'application de cette méthode l'hypothèse transformiste de l'évolution biologique[52]. Cette dernière n'est pas démontrable rigoureusement et elle n'est que probable. Toutefois, grâce aux données paléontologiques et à des raisonnements tirés de l'embryologie et de l'anatomie comparées, elle devient de plus en plus probable. Bergson adopte cette méthode pour la recherche philosophique. La métaphysique positive consiste à confronter, avec les données et les théories scientifiques, des conclusions tirées de la réflexion sur l'expérience approfondie, appelée « intuition ». La méthode qui admet une « probabilité

[47] Bergson, Henri, « La philosophie de Claude Bernard » (1913), PM, p. 235. Voir aussi, *ibid.*, p. 232.
[48] *Ibid.*, p. 249. « Je vois au contraire dans la métaphysique à venir, une science empirique à sa manière, progressive, astreinte comme les autres sciences positives, à ne donner que pour provisoirement définitifs, les derniers résultats où elle aura été conduite par une étude attentive du réel. »
[49] Bergson, Henri, « Le parallélisme psycho-physique et la métaphysique positive », EP, p. 254.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 254.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 252.
[52] Cf. Bergson, Henri, EC, p. 23-24. Bergson reprend la pensée de « la probabilité croissante » dans ses ouvrages ultérieurs. Voir, à ce propos, « La conscience et la vie » (1911), ES, p. 1-4 ; DS, p. 262-264.

croissante » rend possible « une philosophie large, ouverte à tous, progressive, où les opinions s'éprouveront elles-mêmes, se corrigeront entre elles au contact d'une seule et même expérience »[53].

Bergson découvre chez Claude Bernard un précurseur de cette méthode qui exige un travail collectif et progressif : « en avançant de plus en plus loin dans la voie où nous commençons à marcher, nous devrons toujours nous rappeler que Claude Bernard a contribué à l'ouvrir »[54]. Bergson tente de compléter la théorie de la vérité proposée par Bernard. Il introduit, d'une part, la notion de ligne de faits comme instrument théorique qui permet d'accumuler les probabilités pour se rapprocher de la vérité. D'autre part, il propose de « dilater notre pensée »[55]. Bernard pense qu'une complexité de phénomènes naturels empêche les sciences d'établir une théorie définitive. C'est en élargissant et approfondissant notre expérience que Bergson tente de surmonter cet « écart entre la logique de l'homme et celle de la nature »[56].

Or, Claude Bernard établit une théorie de la vérité qui lui permet de reprocher au positivisme « d'être un système ». Pourquoi Bergson appelle-t-il « métaphysique positive » un projet de recherche fondé sur la théorie qui s'oppose au positivisme ?

3. La « métaphysique positive » et le « positivisme nouveau » de Le Roy

La même question se pose si l'on compare la pensée de Bergson avec la philosophie qu'Édouard Le Roy appelle « positivisme nouveau » dans la conférence de 1901.

Le Roy prend acte de sa filiation avec Félix Ravaisson (1813-1900) qui annonçait une philosophie à venir appelée « positivisme spiritualiste » dans son rapport sur *La philosophie en France au XIX^e^ siècle*, ouvrage publié en 1867[57]. Ce dernier découvre chez Comte un précurseur de son « positivisme spiritualiste » qui tente de déduire l'explication des phénomènes matériaux d'un principe supérieur

[53] Bergson, Henri, « Le parallélisme psycho-physique et la métaphysique positive », EP, p. 246.
[54] Bergson, Henri, « La philosophie de Claude Bernard », PM, p. 237.
[55] *Ibid.*, p. 237.
[56] *Ibid.*, p. 235.
[57] Ravaisson, Félix, *La philosophie en France au XIXe siècle* (1867), 3^e^ éd., Paris, Hachette, 1889, p. 275. Le Roy cite ce passage (*art. cit.* p. 140).

donné par l'esprit[58]. Comme Ravaisson, Le Roy conçoit une philosophie qui vise à revenir à la réalité de l'esprit. Toutefois, il s'oppose à Comte quand il présente deux thèses dans son article de 1901 : « 1° La nouvelle critique est une réaction contre l'ancien positivisme, trop simpliste, trop utilitaire, trop encombré de principes *a priori*. 2° La nouvelle critique est le point de départ d'un positivisme nouveau, plus réaliste et plus confiant dans les pouvoirs de l'esprit que le premier »[59]. D'abord, d'après Le Roy, l'ancien positivisme est irréel. Le philosophe dénonce les intérêts pratiques qui conduisent les scientifiques à établir des lois et à fabriquer des faits. La philosophie positive de Comte repose sur les lois et les faits scientifiques pour s'écarter de la réalité. Au contraire, le positivisme nouveau est « plus soucieux de garder le contact du réel »[60]. Ensuite, Le Roy affirme que le positivisme nouveau est un « véritable empirisme »[61]. À l'époque, les dictionnaires consignent, outre les qualificatifs « certain », « constant », « assuré » et « réel », qui apparaissent dans les anciens dictionnaires, une autre acception du mot « positif » : « qui s'appuie sur des faits d'expérience, et non sur des raisonnements théoriques et *a priori* »[62]. Le positivisme nouveau vise à « se détacher de la vie pratique et des habitudes qu'elle a suscitées pour revenir par un vigoureux effort d'analyse et d'intériorisation à la pureté de l'intuition primitive vécue »[63]. Le Roy propose ce « vigoureux effort » comme une méthode empirique qui permet de reprendre contact avec la réalité dont les sciences nous écartent. D'après le philosophe, sa pensée mérite d'être qualifiée « positive » parce qu'elle est une recherche empirique de la réalité qui échappe à la « philosophie positive » de Comte.

Dans un article publié en 1903 sous le titre « Introduction à la métaphysique », Bergson propose une philosophie, comme le « positivisme nouveau » de Le Roy, qui dénonce les intérêts pratiques de la science et qui exige un retour à l'expérience appelée « intuition ». De plus, le philosophe n'insiste pas seulement sur ce recours, mais il semble aussi affirmer l'autonomie de l'intuition

[58] Cf. Ravaisson, Félix, *op. cit.*, p. 70-91.
[59] Le Roy, Édouard, *art. cit.*, p. 140.
[60] *Ibid.*, p. 148.
[61] *Ibid.*, p. 149.
[62] *Grand dictionnaire universel du 19e siècle*, Larousse, Pierre, 17 vols, Paris, Administration du grand Dictionnaire universel, 1866-1877. Cf. *Dictionnaire de la langue française*, Littré, Emile, 4 vols, 2e éd., Paris, Hachette, 1883 ; *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie* (1902-1923), Lalande, André (éd.), « positif », 1ère éd. « Quadrige », Paris, PUF, 2002. Ce dernier dictionnaire reprend une lettre de Le Roy dans la note pour l'article « positif ».
[63] Le Roy, Édouard, *art. cit.*, p.149.

philosophique par rapport au contexte historique et aux données scientifiques quand il mentionne Spinoza dans une conférence faite en 1911 : « plus nous remontons vers cette intuition originelle, mieux nous comprenons que, si Spinoza avait vécu avant Descartes, il aurait sans doute écrit autre chose que ce qu'il a écrit, mais que, Spinoza vivant et écrivant, nous étions sûrs d'avoir le spinozisme tout de même »[64]. Pourquoi Bergson n'emploie-t-il pas, comme Le Roy, le terme de positif pour caractériser une philosophie exigeant le retour à l'intuition et gardant son autonomie, mais pour qualifier un projet de recherche collective de la philosophie et de la science ?

D'abord, pour Bergson comme pour Le Roy, la philosophie est certes une recherche empirique de la réalité. Mais il admet que la science porte également sur la réalité. Tandis que Le Roy tente de substituer la philosophie à la science dans la recherche de la réalité, Bergson conçoit un travail collectif de la philosophie et de la science. Ensuite, la « métaphysique positive » repose sur la théorie de la vérité que Claude Bernard établit en accusant le positivisme d'avoir construit un système philosophique. Loin d'être un système, elle propose une méthode pour se rapprocher d'une « certitude » : ce rapprochement s'accomplit petit à petit par une convergence des conclusions probables qui sont tirées des « lignes de faits ». Enfin, Bergson insiste sur la nécessité du recoupement avec les données scientifiques pour préciser l'intuition. L'intuition philosophique n'est donnée que sous forme d'idée vague[65]. Cette expérience ne devient claire qu'en se confrontant avec les données et les théories scientifiques. Camille Riquier trouve dans une telle relation le signe d'une « nouvelle alliance » entre la philosophie et la science[66]. Donc, le projet de recherche philosophique proposé par Bergson n'est pas contradictoire avec son recours à l'intuition comme méthode propre à la philosophie. À l'opposé de Le Roy, Bergson utilise le terme « positif » non seulement pour désigner « réel » et « empirique », mais aussi, pour désigner « précis » et « certain ». « Nous croyons, dit Bergson, qu'elles [la philosophie et la science] sont, ou qu'elles peuvent devenir, également précises et certaines. L'une et l'autre portent sur la réalité même »[67] . Le travail collectif et progressif avec la science apporte une certitude et une précision à l'intuition philosophique. En ce sens, le projet de la « métaphysique positive » assure la positivité de la philosophie.

[64] Bergson, Henri, « L'intuition philosophique », PM, p. 124.
[65] Cf. Bergson, Henri, « Introduction (deuxième partie) », PM, p. 31-32.
[66] Cf. Riquier, Camille, *op. cit.*, p. 234-257.
[67] Bergson, Henri, « Introduction (deuxième partie) », PM, p. 43.

Conclusion

Pour conclure, précisons l'originalité de la pensée positive de Bergson par rapport à celle d'Auguste Comte. Tous les deux s'opposent au système philosophique qui s'applique à l'opération conceptuelle : cette façon de philosopher empêche de fournir des connaissances positives, c'est-à-dire, « réelles », « précises » et « certaines ». Comte conçoit une nouvelle façon de systématiser qui consiste à organiser les sciences suivant les lois déterminant le développement de l'esprit humain et la classification des théories scientifiques. Cette nouvelle systématisation assure la positivité des connaissances. Pour Comte, la philosophie est « le système général des conceptions humaines »[68].

Par contre, pour Bergson, la philosophie est un effort pour approfondir l'expérience. Il souligne que la philosophie et même la science peuvent atteindre la connaissance absolue[69] qu'il faut abandonner dans la perspective de Comte pour arriver à l'état positif. Ensuite, c'est en reposant sur la théorie de Claude Bernard que Bergson considère comme provisoires toutes les conclusions tirées de recherches empiriques pour renoncer à toute systématisation[70]. Il conçoit un travail collectif et progressif des philosophes et des scientifiques portant sur la « réalité » qui se rapproche d'une « certitude » et qui « précise » l'intuition philosophique. Bergson appelle ainsi un tel projet de recherche « métaphysique positive », même si cette dénomination est contradictoire du point de vue de Comte.

Enfin, cette pensée positive entraine un renouvellement de la relation entre la philosophie et la science. Pour Comte, la philosophie devient une science au sens où elle adopte la même méthode que la science. Mais c'est une science qui organise les autres sciences. Au contraire, Le Roy tente de substituer la philosophie à la science pour la recherche empirique de la réalité. Selon Bergson, comme il le remarque dans *L'évolution créatrice*[71], la philosophie ne doit pas se limiter, en vue de donner un fondement théorique aux sciences positives, à l'analyse méthodologique et

[68] Comte, Auguste, *Cours*, « Avertissement de l'auteur », t. I, p. VIII.
[69] Cf. Bergson, Henri, « Introduction (deuxième partie » (1934), PM, p. 33, 42-43, 84 ; « Introduction à la métaphysique » (1903), PM, p. 177-182 ; EC, p. 199-200.
[70] Cf. Bergson, Henri, « Introduction (première partie) » (1934), PM, p. 1-2 ; « Introduction (deuxième partie) », PM, p. 47-49 ; « Le possible et le réel » (1930), PM, p. 115-116 ; « L'intuition philosophique » (1911), PM, p. 117-118, 121-123 ; « Introduction à la métaphysique », PM, p. 221-223.
[71] Bergson, Henri, EC, p. 195-196.

conceptuelle de la connaissance scientifique ni à la critique de la faculté de connaître. Elle ne peut pas non plus profiter de données apportées par les sciences pour étayer ses affirmations. Comme chez Le Roy, elle intervient dans la recherche empirique de la réalité. Mais, loin de remplacer la science, la philosophie travaille avec elle. Dans la conférence de 1901, Bergson propose une méthode souple qui confronte l'intuition philosophique avec les données et les théories scientifiques et qui permet également de prendre en compte sans préjugés la recherche psychique [72] et l'expérience des mystiques [73] . Bergson choisit l'expression « métaphysique positive » pour désigner « une philosophie large, ouverte à tous, progressive ».

[72] Bergson, Henri, « "Fantômes de vivants" et "recherche psychique" », ES, p. 61-84.
[73] Bergson, Henri, DS, Chapitre III, « La religion dynamique », p. 221-282.

Geschichte aus dem Eingedenken: Walter Benjamins Geschichtsphilosophie

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Abstract: *In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird Walter Benjamins Geschichtsphilosophie am Beispiel seiner posthum erschienenen Thesen „Über den Begriff der Geschichte“ sowie im Rückgriff auf deren Entwürfe in der kritischen Ausgabe erörtert. Dabei wird Benjamins Geschichtsdenken aus seinem erschaudernden Staunen angesichts der Krise seiner Zeit in der Absicht betrachtet, die Aufgabe der Geschichtsphilosophie nach den unvorstellbaren Katastrophen seit Beginn des letzten Jahrhunderts zu klären. In der Erörterung wird zunächst berücksichtigt, dass Benjamin die Geschichte auf das „Eingedenken“ zurückführt, wobei der Begriff des Eingedenkens genauer zu erläutern sein wird. Benjamins Geschichtsdenken aus dem Eingedenken als der unwillkürlichen Erinnerung impliziert auch eine radikale Kritik an der modernen Historik, der er den Vorwurf des „Historismus“ macht. Seine Kritik betrifft vor allem deren Konformismus, der durch die Identifizierung mit der „herrschenden Klasse“ die Geschichte samt ihrem Historiker zum Werkzeug der Herrschaft macht. Im Gegensatz zu solcher Heteronomie korrespondiert das Eingedenken mit der nicht-instrumentalisierbaren Medialität der Sprache selbst, die der junge Benjamin in seinem Aufsatz „Über Sprache überhaupt und über die Sprache des Menschen“ als die Einheit von Passivität und Spontaneität charakterisiert. Allerdings wird das zeitgeschichtliche Subjekt, wie es in seinen Schriften aus den dreißiger Jahren anklingt, durch die Erfahrung des Eingedenkens erschüttert. Die frühen Fassungen der Thesen „Über den Begriff der Geschichte“ zeigen besonders deutlich, dass das „Subjekt der Geschichte“ im positiven Sinn sich erst nach der radikalen Zerstörung des bisherigen Subjekts in der Solidarität mit den Toten konstituiert. Diese Konstruktion des Subjekts im Eingedenken geht in Benjamins Geschichtsdenken einher mit dem Vollzug der Geschichtserkenntnis, die durch den kritischen Eingriff ins mythische Kontinuum der herrschenden Narrative der Geschichte die unwillkürliche Erinnerung zu einem Bild auskristallisiert. Er hält dieses Bild für ein sprachliches, das ein Medium ist, in dem eben aus der Spannung zwischen der Vergangenheit und der Gegenwart Gedächtnisse des Gewesenen stets aufs Neue zum Ausdruck gebracht werden können. Abschließend wird die Möglichkeit einer diskontinuierlichen*

Geschichtsdarstellung als Realisierbarkeit von Benjamins Konzept der Geschichte als Sprache des Eingedenkens zur Diskussion gestellt.

1. Walter Benjamins Geschichtsphilosophie

Geschichtsphilosophie könnte als eine Tätigkeit des Denkens bezeichnet werden, die in der Geschichte nach der Geschichte selbst fragt. Es ist nicht möglich, außerhalb der Geschichte zu leben, weil jeder Mensch in eine geschichtliche Welt hineingeboren wird, in der Gedächtnisse der menschlichen Handlungen sedimentiert sind und jedes Selbstbewusstsein immer schon durch bestimmte Geschichtserzählungen tingiert ist. Insofern hieße über die Geschichte zu philosophieren unter solchen Bedingungen, nach dem Wesen der Geschichte im Hinblick auf ihre Möglichkeit in Bezug auf das Leben in der Geschichte zu fragen. Wenn man Geschichtsphilosophie so fassen darf, dann könnte sie heutzutage eine radikale Infragestellung der geläufigen Geschichtsauffassung sein. Denn der Lauf der Geschichte setzt sich fort und geht aufgrund des Narratives von „Entwicklung“ und „Fortschritt“, das die Vorstellung von Geschichte als solcher weitgehend bestimmt, immer noch unzählige Opfer niedertretend weiter und stürzt das Leben selbst dergestalt in die Krise, dass der Fortschritt „von der Steinschleuder zur Megabombe“, wie Theodor W. Adorno in der Nachkriegszeit schrieb, tatsächlich auf eine „totale Drohung der organisierten Menschheit gegen die organisierten Menschen“ hinauszulaufen scheint.[1] Gegen solchen katastrophalen Verlauf sollte das Geschichtsdenken heute also einen neuen Begriff der Geschichte auf die Lebensmöglichkeiten in der Geschichte hin untersuchen.

Solcherart Geschichtsphilosophie gegen „die Geschichte“ hat Walter Benjamin gewagt. Seine Thesen „Über den Begriff der Geschichte“ bezeugen sogar ein Philosophieren über die Geschichte aus dem Staunen heraus. Er bemerkt in einer seiner Thesen zu der seit der Antike immer wieder erwähnten Beziehung zwischen dem Staunen und dem Philosophieren ironisch: „Das Staunen darüber, dass die Dinge, die wir erleben, im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert ‚noch‘ möglich sind, ist kein

[1] Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, in *Gesammelte Schriften* Bd. 6 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1973), 314.

philosophisches“.[2] Weil mit dem Wort „noch“ eine bestimmte Geschichtsauffassung vorausgesetzt wird, ist dieses Staunen für ihn „kein philosophisches“. Damit spielt er auf die moderne Auffassung an, die die Geschichte universal als einen stetigen „Fortschritt“ begreift. Wenn das Staunen echt philosophisch wäre, erführe die herrschende Vorstellung des „Fortschritts“ als „eine historische Norm“ selbst eine Infragestellung.[3] Die ironische Aussage könnte also darauf hindeuten, dass Benjamin in seinen posthumen Thesen von seinem eigenen Staunen her gegen „die Geschichte“ radikal über die Geschichte zu philosophieren versuchte.

Aber was ist Benjamins Staunen? Möglicherweise lässt es sich aus dem folgenden Gestus ablesen: „Seine Augen sind aufgerissen, sein Mund steht offen und seine Flügel sind ausgespannt“.[4] Diese entsetzte Gebärde des Engels, die Benjamin in Paul Klees Bild *Angelus novus* aus dem Jahr 1920 sieht, zeigt, dass sein Staunen kein Anfang einer „philosophia perennis“ ist, sondern der Anfang eines Philosophierens, das zugleich die von Grauen erfüllte Auseinandersetzung mit der Krise seiner Zeit ist. Im Fortgang desselben Textes, scil. in der bekannten neunten These, interpretiert er diesen Gestus auch als den des „Engels der Geschichte“, der vor sich „eine einzige Katastrophe“ sieht.[5] Der wortlose Schrecken des Engels entspräche Benjamins eigenem Schrecken angesichts der katastrophalen Situation.[6] Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Thesen „Über den Begriff der Geschichte“ gehört, dass er sie in seiner Verzweiflung über das Zustandekommen des sogenannten Hitler-Stalin-Paktes am 23. August 1939 verfasst hat.[7]

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[2] Walter Benjamin, „Über den Begriff der Geschichte: Benjamins Handexemplar“, in *Werke und Nachlaß: Kritische Gesamtausgabe* (folgende Abkürzung: *WuN*) Bd. 19: *Über den Begriff der Geschichte*, herausgegeben von Gérard Raulet (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2010), 35.

[3] Loc. cit.

[4] Dies könnte auch durch die Reihenfolge der Thesen bestätigt werden. Die neunte These, in der Benjamin auf die in Klees Bild *Angelus novus* sichtbare Gebärde verweist, reiht sich unmittelbar an die oben genannte achte These an. Die Nummer der Thesen wird hier nach der Fassung „Benjamins Handexemplar“ genannt.

[5] Loc. cit.

[6] Zum wortlosen Schrecken des „Engels der Geschichte“, den Benjamin in Klees Bild *Angelus novus* sieht, siehe: Sigrid Weigel, *Entstellte Ähnlichkeit: Walter Benjamins theoretische Schreibweise* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1997), 62; Stéphane Moses, „Eingedenken und Jetztzeit: Geschichtliches Bewußtsein im Spätwerk Walter Benjamins“, in *Memoria: Vergessen und Erinnern,* herausgegeben von Anselm Haverkamp und Renate Lachmann (München: Fink, 1993), 401.

[7] Cf. Kommentar des Herausgebers zur „Entstehungs- und Publikationsgeschichte“ der Thesen „Über den Begriff der Geschichte“, *WuN* Bd. 19, 182–183.

Freilich hegte Benjamin schon lange vorher den Gedanken, eine philosophische Frage nach dem Wesen der Geschichte zu stellen.[8] Doch erst in den dreißiger Jahren hat er diese Frage ausgearbeitet in der methodologischen Untersuchung für *Das Passagen-Werk*, das „die Urgeschichte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts" aus den Pariser Passagen hervortreten lassen sollte.[9] Darüber hinaus hat sich Benjamins Geschichtsdenken angesichts der kritischen Situation nach dem Hitler-Stalin-Pakt als ein radikales Philosophieren in Form einer selbstständigen Serie von Thesen auskristallisiert. Dass diese Thesen einen neuen Begriff der Geschichte, mit dem man der realen Krise begegnen könnte, zum Ausdruck bringen sollten, zeigt sich in der folgenden Passage aus der achten These: „Die Tradition der Unterdrückten belehrt uns darüber, dass der ‚Ausnahmezustand', in dem wir leben, die Regel ist. Wir müssen zu einem Begriff von Geschichte kommen, der dem entspricht. Dann wird uns als unsere Aufgabe die Herbeiführung des wirklichen Ausnahmezustands vor Augen stehen".[10]

Hier postuliert Benjamin einen Begriff der Geschichte, der aus der Perspektive der „Unterdrückten" gefasst ist und eine Aussicht auf den „wirklichen Ausnahmezustand" eröffnet, womit nichts Geringeres gemeint ist als die Unterbrechung des Geschichtsverlaufs, die er in einer anderen These eine „messianische Stillstellung des Geschehens" nennt.[11] Weil sie den Begriff der

[8] Schon im Herbst 1917 schrieb Benjamin in einem Brief an Scholem im Zusammenhang mit seinem gescheiterten Vorhaben der Dissertation über „Kant und die Geschichte" so: „immer die letzte metaphysische Dignität einer philosophischen Anschauung die wirklich kanonisch sein will sich in ihrer Auseinandersetzung mit der Geschichte am Klarsten zeigen wird". Walter Benjamin, Brief an Gershom Scholem, Bern, 22.10.1917, *Gesammelte Briefe* (folgende Abkürzung: *GB*) Bd. I: 1910–1918 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1995), 391.

[9] Walter Benjamin, *Das Passagen-Werk*, in: *Gesammelte Schriften* (folgende Abkürzung: *GS*) Bd. V (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1982), 579.

[10] Benjamin, „Über den Begriff der Geschichte: Benjamins Handexemplar", *WuN* Bd. 19, 35.

[11] Ibid., 42. Schon in seinem Essay „Zur Kritik der Gewalt" aus dem Jahr 1921 spricht Benjamin von „Philosophie ihrer Geschichte", die die Idee von der revolutionären Unterbrechung des mythischen Geschichtsverlaufs durch die „Entsetzung des Rechts" zeigen soll. Walter Benjamin, „Zur Kritik der Gewalt", *GS* Bd. II (1977), 202. Erst wenn man diesen Zusammenhang berücksichtigt, kann man verstehen, warum Benjamin in seinem Brief an Gretel Adorno, in dem er die Verschickung des Manuskripts seiner geschichtsphilosophischen Thesen ankündigt, schreibt: „Der Krieg und die Konstellation, die ihn mit sich brachte, hat mich dazu geführt, einige Gedanken niederzuschlagen, von denen ich sagen kann, dass ich sie an die zwanzig Jahre bei mir verwahrt, ja, verwahrt vor

Geschichte nicht auf einen kontinuierlichen Nexus der Erzählung, sondern gerade auf dessen Unterbrechung hin untersucht, ist Benjamins Geschichtsphilosophie, wie Adorno einmal an Hannah Arendt schrieb, „freilich von aller traditionellen Auffassung von Philosophie entfernt".[12] Aber gerade weil sie so heterodox ist, könnte sie die bisherige Geschichtsauffassung von ihren Voraussetzungen her in Frage stellen und so die Geschichte an sich auf ihre Möglichkeit hin thematisieren. In den folgenden Abschnitten wird – basierend auf einer Lektüre der Thesen „Über den Begriff der Geschichte" sowie von deren Entwürfen in der *Kritischen Ausgabe* – Benjamins Geschichtsdenken aus seinem Staunen heraus in der Absicht erörtert, die Aufgabe der Geschichtsphilosophie nach den unvorstellbaren Katastrophen, die sich seit dem Beginn des letzten Jahrhunderts ereignet haben, zu klären.[13] Benjamins Begriff der Geschichte soll hierbei als der einer Geschichte aus dem „Eingedenken" charakterisiert werden.[14] Dadurch soll eine Möglichkeit der Geschichtsauffassung angedeutet werden, die im Medium des Bildes die Erfahrung des Erinnerns artikuliert.

2. Geschichte aus dem Eingedenken

In einem Entwurf für die Thesen „Über den Begriff der Geschichte" sieht Benjamin die „ursprüngliche Bestimmung" der Geschichte im „Eingedenken".[15] Wie seine zahlreichen Erwähnungen dieses Begriffs in den Texten zur Geschichtsphilosophie zeigen, setzt er die heute mit dem Wort „Erinnerung" bezeichnete Erfahrung ins Zentrum seines Geschichtsdenkens. Er kontrastiert seine Zugangsweise zum

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mir selber gehalten habe". Walter Benjamin, Brief an Gretel Adorno, Paris, Ende April/Anfang Mai, *GB* Bd. VI: 1938–1940, 435.

[12] Theodor W. Adorno, Brief an Hannah Arendt, Frankfurt am Main, 2.5.1967, *WuN* Bd. 19, 360.

[13] Die vorliegende Arbeit geht auf einen Vortrag des Verfassers im Kolloquium im Sommersemester 2016 (22. Juni 2016) im Institut für Philosophie an der Freien Universität Berlin (geleitet von Sybille Krämer) zurück.

[14] Dieser Gedankengang findet sich auch in einer Monografie des Verfassers: Nobuyuki Kakigi, *Walter Benjamins Sprachphilosophie: Sprache als Übersetzung, Geschichte aus dem Eingedenken* (Japanisch, Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2014). Hier soll er basierend auf einer Lektüre von Texten in der *Kritischen Ausgabe* noch eingehender entwickelt werden.

[15] Walter Benjamin, „Entwürfe und Fassungen", *WuN* Bd. 19, 151. Etymologisch gesehen verweist das Wort „Eingedenken" auf ein respektvolles Gedenken an ein singuläres Vergangenes.

Geschichtsbegriff gegen das positivistische Verfahren der modernen Historik und weist in diesem Entwurf zugleich darauf hin, dass die Historik seit dem neuzehnten Jahrhundert durch ihre positivistischen Methoden diese Bestimmung gänzlich ausgemerzt habe. Anstatt der Toten eingedenk zu sein, inszeniert sie nach Benjamin eine „falsche Lebendigkeit", die „jede[n] Nachhall der ‚Klage' aus der Geschichte" beseitigt.[16] Er kritisiert solche „Vergegenwärtigung" als die „Erschleichung" des Gewesenen, die aus dem Leid des Toten „die Beute" raubt. Dies ist für ihn zugleich die „Einfühlung" in den lebenden „Sieger", der seine „Beute" in seinem „Triumphzuge" zu „Kulturgütern" verklärt.[17]

Benjamins Kritik an der modernen Historik als „Historismus" betrifft vor allem deren Identifizierung mit der herrschenden Klasse. Wenn ein Historiker im Rahmen eines Machtverhältnisses seine Position, die ihm historische Dokumente zu nutzen erlaubt, für selbstverständlich hält und das zu erzählende Geschehnis willkürlich selektiert, dann schreibt er – sich mit einer herrschenden Macht identifizierend – unvermeidlich eine Geschichte der herrschenden Klasse. In der sechsten These schreibt er, dass durch solchen „Konformismus" nicht nur die so geschriebene Geschichte, sondern auch deren Historiker selbst zum Werkzeug der Verklärung eines Machtmonopols würden.[18] Der auf solche Heteronomie des historischen Subjekts hinauslaufenden Willkürlichkeit der „Vergegenwärtigung" in der modernen Historik setzt Benjamin den Begriff der unwillkürlichen Erinnerung als der „ursprünglichen Bestimmung" der Geschichte entgegen, wie in der folgenden Passage aus einem Entwurf für die Thesen präzis ausgedrückt ist: „Historie im strengen Sinn ist also ein Bild aus dem unwillkürlichen Eingedenken [, nämlich] ein Bild[,] das im Augenblick der Gefahr dem Subjekt der Geschichte sich plötzlich einstellt".[19]

Benjamins Frage nach der Geschichte „aus dem unwillkürlichen Eingedenken" findet sich schon in den Aufzeichnungen für *Das Passagen-Werk*.[20]

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[16] Loc. cit.

[17] Loc. cit.; Benjamin, „Über den Begriff der Geschichte: Benjamins Handexemplar", 34.

[18] In der sechsten These „Über den Begriff der Geschichte" schreibt Benjamin dazu folgenderweise: „Die Gefahr droht sowohl dem Bestand der Tradition wie ihren Empfängern. Für beide ist sie ein und dieselbe: sich zum Werkzeug der herrschenden Klasse herzugeben". Benjamin, „Benjamins Handexemplar", 33.

[19] Benjamin, „Entwürfe und Fassungen", 129. Eckige Klammern [...] zeigen Ergänzungen des Verfassers.

[20] Einige davon deuten an, woher sein Begriff „Eingedenken" kommt. Beispielsweise kommt in einer der früheren Aufzeichnungen der Ausdruck „die dialektische, die

Zahlreiche Zitate daraus in den Entwürfen für die Thesen „Über den Begriff der Geschichte“ zeigen, dass er auch in deren Ausarbeitung seine methodologischen Reflexionen für *Das Passagen-Werk* fortgesetzt hat. Dort wird die Erinnerung besonders in Bezug auf Marcel Prousts Begriff der „mémoire involontaire“ betrachtet.[21] In einer Aufzeichnung spricht Benjamin, Prousts *À la recherche du temps perdu* zitierend, von der „kopernikanische[n] Wendung in der geschichtlichen Anschauung“: „[M]an hielt für den fixen Punkt das ‚Gewesene‘ und sah die Gegenwart bemüht, an dieses Feste die Erkenntnis tastend zu führen. Nun soll sich dieses Verhältnis umkehren und das Gewesene zum dialektischen Umschlag, zum Einfall des erwachten Bewußtseins werden“.[22] Wenn die Erinnerung unwillkürlich vollzogen wird, hört „das Gewesene“ auf, ein bloßer Gegenstand der Vergegenwärtigung zu sein und wird „zum Einfall des erwachten Bewusstseins“. Hier bezieht Benjamin Prousts „mémoire involontaire“ auch auf die Erfahrung des Erwachens – „Und in der Tat ist Erwachen der exemplarische Fall des Erinnerns“, – ein Anknüpfungspunkt für Benjamin, um den Begriff der unwillkürlichen Erinnerung zum Prinzip der Geschichtserkenntnis zu elaborieren.[23]

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kopernikanische Wendung des Eingedenkens“ unter Erwähnung des Namens Ernst Bloch vor. Benjamin, „Pariser Passagen I“, in *Das Passagen-Werk*, 1006. Dies lässt vermuten, dass Benjamin das Wort „Eingedenken“ aus Blochs Buch *Geist der Utopie* übernommen hat. Benjamin hatte es in der ersten Auflage aus dem Jahr 1918 gelesen. In der Arbeit für *Das Passagen-Werk* hat er Blochs Terminologie in sein Denken eingeführt, um die Erinnerung als eine unwillkürliche beschreiben zu können. Cf. Ernst Bloch, *Geist der Utopie*, Faksimile der Ausgabe von 1918, *Gesamtausgabe* Bd. 16 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971), 439; Valérie Baumann, *Bilderverbot: Zu Walter Benjamins Praxis der Darstellung: Dialektisches Bild – Traumbild – Vexierbild* (Eggingen: Edition Isele, 2002), 119–125. Benjamin schreibt in den Briefen an Freunde zwischen Herbst und Winter des Jahres 1918 immer wieder, dass er sich mit Blochs *Geist der Utopie* auseinandersetze. Im Brief vom 5.12.1919 teilt er sogar Ernst Schoen mit, dass er eine ausführliche Rezension dieses Buches vorhabe. Sie wurde jedoch nicht vollendet. Walter Benjamin, Brief an Ernst Schoen, Breitenstein, 5.12.1919, *GB* Bd. II (1996), 62.

[21] Benjamin bemerkt immer wieder, dass das Erlebnis von „mémoire involontaire“ wie das von Madeleine, in dem die Vergangenheit die Gegenwart der Wahrnehmung durchdringt, das Prinzip der Konstruktion des Romans *À la recherche du temps perdu* ausmacht. Benjamin hat ihn in den späten zwanziger Jahren teilweise ins Deutsche übersetzt. Cf. Walter Benjamin, „Zum Bilde Prousts“, *GS* Bd. II, 310–324.; „Über einige Motive bei Baudelaire“, *GS* Bd. I (1974), 609–653.

[22] Benjamin, *Das Passagen-Werk*, 490–491.

[23] Ibid., 491.

Allerdings distanziert sich Benjamin im Begriff des Erwachens von Proust. Bei diesem geschieht es im einzelnen Bewusstsein des Narrators im Roman. Aber Benjamin erfasst es als das Erwachen im „Kollektivbewußtsein" aus dem mythischen „Zeit-traum" des Fortschritts.[24] Der Anlass zu diesem Erwachen ist die unerwartete Begegnung mit den Spuren des Gewesenen, die unbekannte Aspekte der Vergangenheit als Reste der Geschichte – er nennt diese Reste „Abfall der Geschichte" – aufzeigen.[25] Diese Begegnung öffnet dem Subjekt in der Gegenwart die Augen für die Lücke im kollektiven Gedächtnis und richtet seinen Blick auf die von ihm vergessene Vergangenheit. Bei Benjamin ist das Erwachen eine solche Erfahrung des Bruchs und dadurch erscheint der gegenwärtige Raum als Ruine, worin der reale Verlauf des Fortschritts Trümmer auf Trümmer aufhäuft.[26] Gerade der Augenblick dieses „Erwachens" aus dem narkotischen Traum des „Fortschritts" ist für Benjamin das „Jetzt der Erkennbarkeit". [27] In diesem polarisierten „Jetzt" treten die Gegenwart und die Vergangenheit „blitzhaft zu einer Konstellation" zusammen.[28] Aufgabe der Geschichtserkenntnis ist es, in diesem stillstehenden Augenblick die unwillkürliche Erinnerung zur Darstellung bringen. Darum sagt Benjamin in der sechzehnten seiner geschichtsphilosophischen Thesen: „Auf den Begriff der Gegenwart, die nicht Übergang ist, sondern in der die Zeit einsteht und zum Stillstand gekommen ist, kann der historische Materialist nicht verzichten. Denn dieser Begriff definiert eben die Gegenwart, in der er für seine Person Geschichte schreibt".[29]

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[24] Loc. cit. Zur Distanzierung von Proust in der Ausarbeitung des Begriffs der Erinnerung als des Prinzips der Erkenntnis siehe: Detlev Schöttker, *Konstruktiver Fragmentalismus: Form und Rezeption der Schriften Walter Benjamins* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999), 253.

[25] Benjamin, Das *Passagen-Werk*, S. 575.

[26] Zum Erwachen als der Erfahrung des Bruchs siehe auch die folgende Passage in einer Aufzeichnung für *Das Passagen-Wer*k: „So ist bei Proust wichtig der Einsatz des ganzen Lebens an der im höchsten Grade dialektischen Bruchstelle des Lebens, das Erwachen". Ibid., 579. In einer anderen Aufzeichnung versucht Benjamin den Begriff des Fortschritts „in der Idee der Katastrophe zu fundieren". „Daß es ‚so weiter' geht, *ist* die Katastrophe". Ibid., 592.

[27] Ibid., 608.

[28] Ibid., 576. Zur Beziehung zwischen dem Bild des Blitzes und der Unwillkürlichkeit der Erkenntnis siehe: Sigrid Weigel, *Grammatologie der Bilder* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2015), 408. Zur Polarisierung der Gegenwart in der Geschichtserkenntnis bei Benjamin siehe: Stéphane Mosès, *Der Engel der Geschichte: Franz Rosenzweig, Walter Benjamin, Gershom Scholem* (Frankfurt am Main: Jüdischer Verlag, 1994), 147–159.

[29] Benjamin, „Über den Begriff der Geschichte: Benjamins Handexemplar", 41.

Geschichtsdarstellung heißt also, in der Konstellation zwischen Gegenwart und Vergangenheit eine unwillkürliche Erinnerung darzubringen. Sie impliziert so auch einen kritischen Eingriff in die als Mythos herrschende Geschichte und kann in diesem Sinn als ein spontaner Akt betrachtet werden. Somit weist die Erinnerung als Prinzip der Geschichtserkenntnis sowohl die Passivität auf, die in der Affektion durch die Wiederkehr der unterdrückten Vergangenheit zu sehen ist, als auch die Spontaneität, die sich im Eingriff in die Herrschaft der bestehenden Geschichte zeigt. Gerade diese Einheit von Passivität und Spontaneität ist die Eigentümlichkeit des „Mediums", die der junge Benjamin in der Sprache als solcher gesehen hat.[30] In seinem frühen Aufsatz „Über Sprache überhaupt und über die Sprache des Menschen" aus dem Jahr 1916 erklärt er, dass die Sprache als „Medium" in der „Übersetzung" sich unmittelbar mitteile.[31] Dementsprechend teilt sich die Erinnerung im Medium des Bildes mit. Benjamin hält seit dem Beginn seiner Arbeit für *Das Passagen-Werk* sogar das „Bild" als Medium der Erinnerung im stillstehenden Augenblick für sprachlich: „Bild ist die Dialektik im Stillstand. [...] – Nur dialektische Bilder sind echte (d.h.: nicht archaische) Bilder; und der Ort, an dem man sie antrifft, ist die Sprache".[32]

3. Destruktion und Rekonstruktion des Subjekts im Eingedenken

Das Eingedenken, das Benjamin ins Zentrum seines Geschichtsbegriffs setzt, vollzieht sich somit im stillstehenden Augenblick der unerwarteten Begegnung mit der unterdrückten Vergangenheit als das Erwachen aus dem mythischen Traum des Kollektivs. Der Vollzug dieses Eingedenkens hat einen medialen Charakter und stellt sich im Medium des sprachlichen Bildes dar. Das Bild lässt sich nun als ein Medium betrachten, in dem das Eingedenken selbst vernehmbar oder sichtbar wird. Zum Begriff des Mediums ist anzumerken, dass es auch das Element der

[30] Walter Benjamin, „Über Sprache überhaupt und über die Sprache des Menschen", *GS* Bd. II, 143.

[31] „Für Empfängnis und Spontaneität zugleich, wie sie sich in dieser Einzigartigkeit der Bindung nur im sprachlichen Bereich finden, hat aber die Sprache ihr eigenes Wort, und dieses Wort gilt auch von jener Empfängnis des Namenlosen im Namen. Es ist die Übersetzung der Sprache der Dinge in die des Menschen". Ibid., 150.

[32] Benjamin, *Das Passagen-Werk*, 577.

Beschwörung des Vergangenen bzw. der Toten meint.[33] In Benjamins Geschichtsdenken fungiert das Eingedenken als die in diesem Sinne mediale Erweckung des Gedächtnisses von Gewesenem in der spannungsvollen Konstellation von Vergangenheit und Gegenwart. Also findet im Eingedenken keine horizontale Vermittlung statt. Vielmehr vollzieht sich in ihm die vertikale Rettung des vergessenen Gewesenen durch sein Zeugnis. Geschichtserkenntnis ist also durch Eingedenken als Rettung des Vergangenen erfahrbar. Bemerkenswert ist, dass Benjamin auch auf die Intensität einer solchen Erfahrung hinweist. Nach ihm muss im wesentlich unwillkürlichen Eingedenken das Subjekt der Erkenntnis seine radikale Erschütterung erfahren.

Anhand der Betrachtung von Baudelaires dichterischer „Chockerfahrung" in „Über einige Motive bei Baudelaire" führt Benjamin die schockhafte Erfahrung des Eingedenkens als ein wesentliches Moment der Erkenntnis in seine Geschichtsphilosophie ein.[34] Dieser Gedankengang könnte in der neunten der Thesen „Über den Begriff der Geschichte" im Entsetzen des „Engels der Geschichte" angesichts der ständigen Katastrophe angedeutet sein; in der siebzehnten These wird ausdrücklich der „Chock" als ein wesentliches Moment der Geschichtserkenntnis erwähnt.[35] Im „unwillkürlichen Eingedenken" erfährt man die anachronische Wiederkehr der unterdrückten Vergangenheit, wodurch die scheinbare Vollendung der Geschehnisse destruiert und so das chronologische

[33] Diese Implikation ist in der folgenden Monographie in Bezug auf Benjamins Sprachphilosophie erörtert worden: Kazuyuki Hosomi, *Walter Benjamins „Über Sprache überhaupt und über die Sprache des Menschen" lesen: Das Wort und das Unsagbare* (Japanisch, Tokyo: Iwanami, 2009).

[34] Sigmund Freud hat bekanntlich nach dem ersten Weltkrieg die Fälle anhaltender Kriegstraumata einer analytischen Betrachtung unterzogen. In seinem Aufsatz „Jenseits des Lustprinzips" aus dem Jahr 1920 hat er im Phänomen, dass die Traumatisierten die Ursache ihrer seelischen Wunde wiederholt agieren, aber nicht verarbeiten können, den Todestrieb gefunden, der nicht nur die menschliche Subjektivität, sondern auch die organische Einheit des Lebewesens zur Zerstörung bringt. Cf. Sigmund Freund, „Jenseits des Lustprinzips", *Gesammelte Werke chronologisch geordnet* Bd. 13 (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1947), 447–455. Freuds Argument zitierend vertieft Benjamin Prousts Begriff von „mémoire involontaire". In „Über einige Motive bei Baudelaire" sieht er in der unwillkürlichen Erinnerung die intensive Wirkung des „Chocks", der das psychische Abwehrsystem erschüttert, und ihm ist „die Chockerfahrung" nichts anderes als das Prinzip der Dichtung von Charles Baudelaire: „Baudelaire hat also die Chockerfahrung ins Herz seiner artistischen Arbeit hineingestellt.". Benjamin, „Über einige Motive bei Baudelaire", 616.

[35] Benjamin, „Über den Begriff der Geschichte: Benjamins Handexemplar", 41–42.

Zeitbewusstsein gestört wird.[36] Dies erschüttert nicht nur die als Mythos herrschende „Geschichte", sondern auch das Subjekt selbst, das bisher aus dieser „Geschichte" seine Identität bezog. Aber erst durch eine solche Zerstörung des Subjekts kann selbiges aus dem Traum des Mythos erwachen und sich für die Wahrnehmung einer neuen Konstellation von Gegenwart und Vergangenheit öffnen. Gerade die Erfahrung dieses Erwachens ist für Benjamin der Ausgangspunkt der Geschichtserkenntnis. Somit ist die Erfahrung der Vergangenheit, die er in der sechzehnten These als die dem „historischen Materialisten" einzig gemäße beschreibt, nichts anderes als die Erfahrung dieser radikalen Erschütterung des Subjekts.[37]

Benjamin sieht in dieser intensiven Erfahrung der Erinnerung einen Schlüssel zur „Solidarität" mit den Toten, einer trauervollen Solidarität, die „das Subjekt der Geschichte" aufs Neue konstituiert. Dies ist im „Hannah-Arendt-Manuskript", das die früheste Form einer selbstständigen Serie der Thesen zeigt, und in dem danach entstandenen, in der *Kritischen Ausgabe* erstmals vollständig abgedruckten „Benjamins Handexemplar" besonders deutlich ausgedrückt. Beide Fassungen enthalten am Schluss einer These – im „Handexemplar" ist es die zwölfte These – das Zitat einer „Parole", die Benjamin in Sowjetrussland als Inschrift auf einem Holzteller gesehen hat.[38] Die Parole „Kein Ruhm dem Sieger, kein Mitleid dem Besiegten" deutet Benjamin als eine „durchgreifende" Haltung, die „eine Solidarität mit den toten Brüdern" zum Ausdruck bringt. Hier führt dieses Zitat die Subjekte der Geschichtserkenntnis dazu, jedes einzelnen Toten, den man in der

[36] Die gegen alle Erwartungen eintretende Wiederkehr des Vergangenen im Gedächtnis lässt sich vor allem bei Menschen beobachten, die eine alle sprachlichen Mittel übersteigende Katastrophe erlitten haben. Bei der Betrachtung der Zeugenschaft solcher Opfer der Katastrophen ist Giorgio Agambens Position, die den Augenzeugen der Shoah, wie etwa Primo Levi, mit dem lateinischen Wort superstes für den Überlebenden belegt, heute unentbehrlich. Cf. Giorgio Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive*, Translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen (New York: Zone Books, 2002), 17–39. Agamben zeigt hier einen Gedankengang auf, der den surperstes, den Zeugen der Katastrophe, als die Verkörperung des Mediums des „Eingedenkens" an der Grenze der Menschlichkeit angesiedelt denken lässt.

[37] Benjamin, „Benjamins Handexemplar", 41.

[38] Walter Benjamin, „Über den Begriff der Geschichte: Das Hannah-Arendt-Manuskript", *WuN* Bd. 19, 23; „Benjamins Handexemplar", 38–39. Dass Benjamin diese Parole in Sowjetrussland als Inschrift in Brandmalerei auf einem Holzteller gesehen hat, wird in den „Kommentaren zu den Werken von Brecht" berichtet. Walter Benjamin, „Kommentare zu Werken von Brecht", *GS* Bd. II, 507.

unwillkürlichen Erinnerung antrifft, nämlich jedes „Unterdrückten“, eingedenk zu sein und dabei jedem Toten gerecht zu werden. Diese Erinnerung an jeden Toten muss von der Verklärung bestimmter Toter scharf geschieden werden. Wo man „die Tradition der Unterdrückten“ durch die „Solidarität“ mit den Toten zu übernehmen versucht, – für Benjamin ist dies die Aufgabe der Geschichtserkenntnis – bildet sich „das Subjekt historischer Erkenntnis“ als „die kämpfende unterdrückte Klasse“.[39] Sie greift in die kontinuierliche Vorstellung der Geschichte des Unterdrückers für die „klassenlosen Gesellschaft“ ein, deren Idee Benjamin für die „messianische“ hält.[40]

„Das Subjekt der Geschichte“ konstituiert sich demnach im „unwillkürlichen Eingedenken“ in der Solidarität mit den Toten. Dieses polarisierte Subjekt bildet sich erst nach der radikalen Erschütterung des bisherigen Subjekts, das der mythischen Geschichtserzählung unterworfen war. Wie Benjamins Bezeichnung des Subjekts als eines im positiven Sinn „kämpfenden“ zeigt, hält er dieses Subjekt für den Akteur des Eingriffs in den realen Verlauf der mythischen Geschichte. In der kritischen Situation seiner Zeit sieht Benjamin die Aufgabe der Geschichte in der Herbeiführung des „wirklichen Ausnahmezustands“ als einer Unterbrechung des Geschichtsverlaufs. Deren Agens konzipiert er in den Thesen „Über den Begriff der Geschichte“ durch die scharfe Kritik am „Konformismus“ als ein durch nichts unterworfenes Subjekt. In diesem Sinne ist „das Subjekt der Geschichte“ bei Benjamin als Akteur „unter dem freien Himmel der Geschichte“ gedacht und es stellt sich daher dar als ein Subjekt, das ein geschichtliches Ereignis herbeiführt.[41]

Aber wie in den bisherigen Abschnitten gezeigt, vollzieht sich das ein geschichtliches Subjekt rekonstruierende „Eingedenken“ in der Konstellation einer Begegnung der Gegenwart mit der Vergangenheit und kristallisiert zu einem Bild aus, das Benjamin ausdrücklich für ein sprachliches hält. So tritt das Subjekt der Geschichte auch als das erkennende in Gestalt der bildlichen Geschichtsdarstellung hervor. Erst dann und nur in diesem Sinne ist das Subjekt dasjenige, „das Geschichte

[39] Benjamin, „Das Hannah-Arendt-Manuskript“, 22; „Benjamins Handexemplar“, 38. Nach einem Entwurf für die Thesen ist es die „Aufgabe der Geschichte“, „der Tradition der Unterdrückten habhaft zu werden“. Benjamin, „Entwürfe und Fassungen“, 123.

[40] Er schreibt in der folgenden Passage, die nur in „Benjamins Handexemplar“ vorkommt: „Marx hat in der Vorstellung der klassenlosen Gesellschaft die Vorstellung der messianischen Zeit säkularisiert. Und das war gut so“. „Benjamins Handexemplar“, 42.

[41] Ibid., 40.

schreibt“ und damit ein „Historiker“ ist.[42] Also denkt Benjamin, dass die sprachliche Selbst-Darstellung einer Geschichtserkenntnis in den Geschichtsverlauf eingreift und das Kontinuum einer Geschichtserzählung aufsprengt. Sein Gedanke, dass in der Geschichte – wie auch Hannah Arendt in Bezug auf die menschliche Handlung zeigt – die kritisch eingreifende Aktion als das Ereignis in eins mit der Sprache zusammenfällt, nämlich mit der Geschichtsdarstellung, könnte nicht nur auf die Bedeutung der heutigen Historiographie gegen bisherige Geschichtserzählungen, sondern auch auf das Verhältnis der Geschichte zum Sprechen bzw. Schreiben ein Licht werfen.[43]

4. Geschichte als die Sprache des Eingedenkens

Benjamins Geschichtsphilosophie geht kongruent mit seiner Sprachphilosophie. Dies zeigt sich in seinem Versuch, das Potential im Wesen der Sprache herauszuarbeiten, um es im Geschichtsdenken zu verwirklichen, was er in seinem frühen Aufsatz „Über Sprache überhaupt und über die Sprache des Menschen“ mit dem Begriff des Namens erfasst hat. Der Begriff des Zitats in seinem Geschichtsdenken verkörpert diesen Versuch. In einer Aufzeichnung für *Das Passagen-Werk* schreibt er: „Geschichte schreiben heißt also Geschichte *zitieren*“.[44] Schon in „Karl Kraus“ aus dem Jahr 1930 bezieht Benjamin das Zitieren darauf,

[42] Ibid., 41; 32. Dass Benjamin in einer These „Über den Begriff der Geschichte“ den Historiker mit dem Bild des „Chronisten“ so beschreibt, wäre im Zusammenhang mit der folgenden Diskussion aufschlussreich: „Der Chronist, welcher die Ereignisse hererzählt, ohne große und kleine zu unterscheiden, trägt damit der Wahrheit Rechnung, dass nichts was sich jemals ereignet hat, für die Geschichte verloren zu geben ist“. Ibid., S. 31.

[43] In ihrem Buch *Vita activa* schreibt Arendt, dass die Handlung zugleich das Sprechen ist und diese beiden Tätigkeiten das Element der Enthüllung einer Person konstituieren. Cf. Hannah Arendt, *Vita activa – oder Vom tätigen Leben* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer 1960), 165. Ein Beispiel eines Versuchs, in der postkolonialen Historiographie aufgrund von Subaltern-Studies die Geschichte des herrschenden Narratives umzukehren, gibt Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of Vanishing Present* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 198–311.

[44] Benjamin, *Das Passagen-Werk*, 595. Hier schwebt ihm vor, dass das Verb zitieren die Bedeutung „jemanden bei seinem Namen herbeirufen“ haben möge, zumal es etymologisch vom lateinischen Wort citare abstammt. Cf. Manfred Voigt, „Zitat“, in: *Benjamins Begriffe,* herausgegeben von Michael Opitz, 2. Band (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000), 832ff.; Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch* Bd. 15, herausgegeben von der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (Leipzig: Heizel, 1956), 1668.

jemanden „beim Namen“ zu rufen.[45] Und in einer der anderen Thesen „Über den Begriff der Geschichte“ entfaltet er die Implikation des Zitierens so: „[E]rst der erlösten Menschheit ist ihre Vergangenheit in jedem ihrer Momente zitierbar geworden. Jeder ihrer gelebten Augenblicke wird zu einer citation à l’ordre du jour – welcher Tag eben der jüngste ist“.[46] Hier sieht er eine zur integralen Erlösung führende Geschichte dort, wo jedes Geschehnis und jeder Tote bei seinem Namen herbeigerufen wird und das Erinnern daran von sich aus entfaltet. Das Medium einer solchen Geschichte ist das Bild als Sprache des Eingedenkens.

Die Geschichtsdarstellung im Geiste Benjamins verzichtet somit keineswegs darauf, jedes einzelne Gewesene zu zitieren, d.h. seine Singularität auf das Bild zu retten. Eben deshalb führt er den Begriff der Monade in sein Geschichtsdenken ein. Seine „Monadologie“ findet sich schon in der „Erkenntniskritischen Vorrede“ zu seiner Schrift *Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels*, worin er die sich im Medium der Sprache als des Namens darstellende Idee als eine Monade bezeichnet.[47] Und in einer weiteren der Thesen „Über den Begriff der Geschichte“ schreibt er, dass aus dem in der Begegnung mit der Vergangenheit stillstehenden Denken mit einem Schock eine Monade auskristallisiert wird: „Wo das Denken in einer von Spannungen gesättigten Konstellation plötzlich einhält [= innehält], da erteilt es derselben einen Chock, durch den sie sich als Monade kristallisiert“.[48] Indem der Begriff der Monade, der bei Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz das Prinzip des Individuums ausmacht, auf das Geschichtsdenken angewandt wird, bezeichnet er das Nachleben jedes einzelnen Vergangenen in seiner Einzigartigkeit.[49] Das Element dieses Nachlebens ist das Bild als Medium des Eingedenkens, und dessen Konstruktion ist die Aufgabe der Geschichtserkenntnis durch Zitat.[50]

Allerdings ist hier bemerkenswert, dass das Zitieren bei Benjamin zugleich ein destruktiver Eingriff ins bisherige Narrativ ist. „Im Begriff des Zitierens liegt

[45] Walter Benjamin, „Karl Kraus“, *GS* Bd. II, 362. Dass für Benjamin das Zitieren zugleich die Benennung ist, wird auch in folgender Monographie erwähnt: Ralf Konersmann, *Erstarrte Unruhe: Walter Benjamins Begriff der Geschichte* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1991), 55.

[46] Benjamin, „Benjamins Handexemplar“, 32.

[47] Walter Benjamin, *Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels*, in *GS* Bd. I, 228.

[48] Benjamin, „Benjamins Handexemplar“, 41–42.

[49] Cf. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *La monadologie/Monadologie*, in *Monadologie und andere metaphysische Schriften* (Hamburg: Meiner, 2002), 110–151.

[50] Nach einer Aufzeichnung für *Das Passagen-Werk* ist das geschichtliche Verstehen „grundsätzlich als ein Nachleben des Verstandenen zu fassen“. Benjamin, *Das Passagen-Werk*, 574.

aber, daß der jeweilige historische Gegenstand aus seinem Zusammenhange gerissen wird“ – und das dadurch konstruierte Bild „sprunghaft“ ist.[51] Mit anderen Worten erhält das Bild von der in ihm selbst enthaltenen Spannung zwischen Vergangenheit und Gegenwart seine expressive Kraft als Monade. Das Bild in Benjamins Geschichtsphilosophie hält sich inmitten der Diskontinuität zwischen Vergangenheit und Gegenwart auf und verbietet sich, ein scheinbar autarkes Bild wie „das ‚ewige‘ Bild der Vergangenheit“ im „Historismus“ zu sein.[52] Durch solche immanente Scheinkritik stellt sich das Bild als das Medium des Eingedenkens dar und eröffnet stets seinen Spielraum. Benjamins monadologisches und zugleich scheinkritisches Geschichtsdenken versucht also, der „Tradition der Unterdrückten“ eine Bahn zu brechen, die sie im Medium des Bildes als diskontinuierliche so fortleben lässt, dass darin das Gedächtnis jedes einzelnen Vergangenen vom Kausalnexus in der mythischen Geschichtserzählung emanzipiert wird.[53] Erst die so erlösende Geschichtsdarstellung im Medium des Bildes kann die Geschichte zur „erlösten Menschheit“ führen, der „ihre Vergangenheit in jedem ihrer Momente zitierbar geworden“ ist – nach Benjamin ist nur diesem Zustand der Erlösung der eigentlich „messianische“ Begriff der „Universalgeschichte“ zu unterstellen.[54]

Der Begriff des Bildes in Benjamins Geschichtsdenken kann damit als der Inbegriff der destruktiven – „[d]ie ‚Konstruktion‘ setzt die ‚Destruktion‘ voraus“ – Konstruktion der Geschichte in der „Tradition der Unterdrückten“ betrachtet werden.[55] Wie ein Entwurf für die Thesen „Über den Begriff der Geschichte“ zeigt, wird die Geschichte aus der Perspektive der Opfer diskontinuierlich in Bildern

[51] Ibid., 595; 576.

[52] Benjamin, „Benjamins Handexemplar“, 41. Eine Erörterung zur Kritik des Scheins in Benjamins Bildtheorie findet sich in folgendem Aufsatz des Verfassers: Nobuyuki Kakigi, „Walter Benjamins Bildtheorie: Von der Scheinkritik zum Erinnerungsbild“, in: *Bild: Zeitschrift für Bildtheorie*, herausgegeben vom Forschungskreis für Bildtheorie, Bd. 1, (Japanisch, Kyoto, 2016), 30–55.

[53] In der folgenden Monographie werden Benjamins Begriffe von „Rettung“ und „Erlösung“ in Bezug auf die Auflösung des Kausalnexus in der bestehenden Geschichtserzählung diskutiert: Jeanne Marie Gagnebin, *Geschichte und Erzählung bei Walter Benjamin*, aus dem Französischen übersetzt von Judith Klein (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2001), 114.

[54] Zum messianischen Begriff der „Universalgeschichte“ bei Benjamin siehe: Benjamin, „Entwürfe und Fassungen“, 109.

[55] Benjamin, *Das Passagen-Werk*, 579.

konstruiert: „Die Geschichte der Unterdrückten ist ein Diskontinuum“.[56] Diese These besagt zunächst eine konsequente Ablehnung der Perspektive, aus der ein Nexus von Geschehnissen überblickt und eine kontinuierliche Geschichte erzählt wird. Benjamin konstatiert, wie oben bereits angedeutet, dass diese überfliegende Perspektive auf der Identifizierung mit dem herrschenden Diskurs basiert. So den „Konformismus“ in der bisherigen Geschichtsschreibung scharf kritisierend untersucht Benjamin die Möglichkeit einer neuen Theorie der Geschichte, die den Bruch mit dem Vergangenen im Eingedenken ernstnimmt und der Gegenwart inmitten der Katastrophe die Augen öffnet für den historischen Raum, wo bereits Trümmer auf unzähligen Trümmern aufgehäuft sind. Als „gelesenes Bild“ wird das Bild durch die kritische Deutung der überdauernden Spuren der Vergangenheit „sprunghaft“ konstruiert.[57] Also stellt sich das Bild als das Medium der Geschichte aus den Resten des Geschichtsverlaufs in der medialen Erfahrung des Eingedenkens als ein fragmentarisches Schriftbild dar.[58]

Wenn Benjamin dieses Bild als „dialektisch“ bezeichnet, meint er letztendlich eine dialektische Umkehr der Geschichte selbst. In einem in der Konstellation von Vergangenheit und Gegenwart stillstehenden Augenblick konstituiert sich das Bild – „Bild ist die Dialektik im Stillstand“ – und es zeigt die Möglichkeit dieser Umkehr. Benjamin versucht durch die Theorie der Geschichte im Medium des Bildes die Geschichte vom kontinuierlichen Narrativ aus der Perspektive des Unterdrückers zur diskontinuierlichen Konstruktion aus der Perspektive des Unterdrückten umzukehren. „Das dialektische Bild“ als Medium dieser umgekehrten Geschichte sollte einen Spielraum eröffnen, in dem das Gedächtnis des Vergangenen anachronisch wiederkehrt und sein eigenes Fortleben entwickelt. Die Erscheinung eines solchen Bildes würde, so Benjamin, im bisherigen Geschichtsverlauf eine revolutionäre Unterbrechung herbeiführen, von der aus ein neuer Kalender anbricht.[59] Das Bild ist dabei nichts anderes als die schriftliche Sprache, die jedes einzelne Geschehnis und jeden einzelnen Toten vom mythischen Kontinuum der Geschichte erlösend bei seinem Namen herbeiruft. Das „Subjekt der

[56] Benjamin, „Entwürfe und Fassungen“, 123.
[57] Benjamin, *Das Passagen-Werk*, 578.
[58] Dass das Bild bei Benjamin das gelesene „Schriftbild“ ist, wird in der folgenden Monographie diskutiert: Weigel, *op. cit.*, 56–57.
[59] „Das Bewußtsein, das Kontinuum der Geschichte aufzusprengen, ist den revolutionären Klassen im Augenblick ihrer Aktion eigentümlich. Die große Revolution verstand sich als ein wiedergekehrtes Rom; und sie führte einen neuen Kalender ein“. Benjamin, „Das Hannah-Arendt-Manuskript“, 25.

Geschichte“, das Benjamin in den Thesen „Über den Begriff der Geschichte“ herbeiruft, stellt sich somit in der Sprache als Medium solchen Erinnerns dar; diese Sprache könnte mit einem Wort, das der junge Benjamin in einem Brief an Martin Buber verwendet, als „un-*mittel*-bar“ bezeichnet werden.[60] Also kommt es in der Theorie der umgekehrten Geschichte aus dem Eingedenken auch auf die Freiheit des Lebens bzw. Überlebens in der Geschichte an.

Analog zu seinen frühen sprachphilosophischen Überlegungen, in welchen er nach dem nicht instrumentalisierbaren Wesen der Sprache fragte, arbeitet Benjamin – die bisherige Geschichtsauffassung radikal in Frage stellend – einen neuen Begriff der Geschichte aus, einer Geschichte, die nicht mehr als ein Werkzeug der Verklärung des Herrschenden gebraucht werden kann. Der Gedankengang, den er in seinen späten Schriften wie „Über den Begriff der Geschichte“ vorlegt, bricht der Geschichtsphilosophie eine Bahn, um die Geschichte von der Erfahrung in der Tiefe des Lebens, nämlich vom unwillkürlichen Eingedenken her denken zu können. Eine derart intensive Erfahrung sollte durch die unerwartete Begegnung mit den Spuren der unterdrückten Vergangenheit veranlassen, dass diese in der Gegenwart in den Überresten, in der Zeugenschaft des Augenzeugen, oder auch in historischen Dokumenten gezeigt werden kann. Der Vollzug des Eingedenkens enthält die in die Materialien versunkene Deutung der Spuren, die zugleich ins Kontinuum des herrschenden Narratives eingreift. Dadurch konstruiert sich das Medium der Geschichtsdarstellung als ein sprachliches Bild, das das Gedächtnis des einzelnen Gewesenen zu erwecken versucht. In dieser medialen Erfahrung des Eingedenkens konstituiert sich auch das Subjekt der Geschichte sprachlich. Benjamins Theorie der sprachlichen Geschichtskonstruktion, die von seinem erschaudernden Staunen angesichts der katastrophalen Situation seiner Zeit ausgeht, führt zur Möglichkeit einer Geschichte in der Gegenwart, die nach den unzähligen sprachlos machenden Katastrophen seit dem Beginn des letzten Jahrhunderts dennoch Erinnerungen aus ihren Spuren zur Sprache zu bringen versucht.[61] Benjamins Einsicht, dass die Darstellung solcher Geschichte diskontinuierlich sein soll, weist auch darauf hin, dass die Geschichte aus der Perspektive der bisher nicht historisch artikulierten Gedächtnisse durch eine diskontinuierliche Konfiguration fragmentarischer

[60] Walter Benjamin, Brief an Martin Buber, München, 17.7.1916, *GB* Bd. I, 326.
[61] Ein solcher Versuch findet sich beispielsweise im folgenden Buch: Georges Didi-Huberman, *Bilder trotz allem*, aus dem Französischen übersetzt von Peter Geimer (München: Fink, 2007).

Schriftbilder dargestellt werden kann.[62] Angesichts der kritischen Situation in der gegenwärtigen Welt, in der es darum geht, des Vergangenen eingedenk zu überleben, ja, in Freiheit zu leben, wäre die konkrete Möglichkeit dieser Geschichte gegen „die Geschichte“ mit Benjamin und über seinen Denkhorizont hinaus philosophisch zu untersuchen.

[62] Die Möglichkeit solcher Geschichte könnte auch mit Rücksicht auf die Methodologie der “microhistoria” erörtert werden: Cf. Carlo Ginzburg, *Spurensicherung: Die Wissenschaft auf der Suche nach sich selbst* aus dem Italienischen übersetzt von Gisela Bonz und Karl F. Hauber (Berlin: Wagenbach, 2011).

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Special Theme
Philosophy and the University

Philosophy has played an essential part in academics and education in universities, which were born in the medieval Europe, introduced into Japan and other Asian countries in the late 19th century, and are now spread all over the world. While the idea of a university has been discussed by many philosophers, including Kant, Fichte, W. von Humboldt, Hegel, Newman, Heidegger, Jaspers, Habermas and Derrida, our contemporary societies cast serious doubts on the ideals and roles of the university and philosophy.

What is the situation of philosophy in the universities around the world today? How did philosophers examine the ideas of the university? What is the ideal form of a university from a philosophical point of view? What can and should philosophy do in and for the university?

What Remains of Philosophers' Reflections on University?

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Abstract: *In modern Europe, the establishment of universities is inseparable from the academic hegemony of philosophy. Kant, Humboldt, Fichte, Schleiermacher, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Ortega, Weber, Jaspers, Derrida, and many other leading thinkers who have written on the topic of universities are almost all university professors who developed their philosophy in a very close relationship with university institutions. When addressing "University and Philosophy," it is essential to ask, with what right can philosophers question the university? How do philosophers have the right to consider the idea and reality of the university? In comparison to others, such as literary scholars or scientists, why do philosophers have the privilege to approach the question of university? Today, in the era of global capitalism where competition is created by a knowledge-oriented economy, the university is going through a decisive transformation induced by economic values. The "solitude and liberty for exercising research" advocated by Humboldt and the independence of the university from society no longer apply. It may well be that the idea of the university that philosophers designed is now considered obsolete. However, from the collapse of the idea, we must find a way to rethink the very question of university. An epistemological question, "what is the idea of university?", was already substituted by an ontological question, "is the university possible?" After having lost the idea of the university, how (and how not) to speak of possibilities to be revived from what remains under the very name of the university?*

1. The Crisis and Resistance of Philosophy

In talking about "Philosophy and University," we cannot help but, in a pessimistic tone, refer to some crisis of philosophy in recent years.

In 2010, the management of London's Middlesex University one-sidedly decided to cut all programs run by the philosophy department for financial reasons. It seemed extremely irrational, as the faculty is famous for its excellent research

developed on an international scale. It worked very well as an important philosophy research center in the U.K., where the study of French theory, critical theory, psychoanalysis, Marxism, etc. achieved outstanding results. Professors and students raised voices against the decision; they occupied some meeting rooms on the campus to conduct public discussions on the necessity of philosophy in the university. Their spontaneous action "Save Middlesex Philosophy" obtained widespread support worldwide through the Internet. Due to the international support, Kingston University proposed taking in the Middlesex research center of philosophy with its faculty members.

In Hungary, since 2010, philosophers have been under increasing pressure from the conservative government. Legislation restricting free speech in the media was passed, and philosophers like Agnes Heller, who protested it, were attacked for misusing government grants. This political attack on philosophy created an international movement demanding the restoration of Heller's lost honor.

The International College of Philosophy (Le Collège international de philosophie: CIPh), founded by François Châtelet and Jacques Derrida, among others, in 1983 in Paris, faced a severe crisis in 2014 when the Ministry of Education decided to suspend its annual budget (240,000 Euro). Under pressure to survive amid international academic competition, the marginal philosophical organization was forced by the French government to integrate with globally leading centers for university-based education and research. In fact, in 2006, the government began to establish 26 centers for research and higher education (Pôles de recherche et d'enseignement supérieur: PRES), and in 2013 these university associations were largely replaced by new university and higher education institution associations (Communautés d'universités et établissements: COMUE). To defuse the budget crisis, program directors drafted the statement, "The Right to Philosophy: Save the International College of Philosophy," which was distributed on the Internet in 18 languages. The international campaign for collecting signatures succeeded, and President Holland finally answered the open letter, saying the government would assure the CIPh's annual budget.

These events show that maintaining philosophical institutions in any society and era is never guaranteed: there is a trend of efficiently managing higher educational institutions by "selection and concentration," there is political pressure to silence critical thinking, and there is a tendency to make light of philosophical activities considered unproductive in the context of industrial capitalism.

In fact, we have heard public statements deprecating the humanities. As a symbolic example, we can refer to former French President Nicolas Sarkozy's anti-intellectual attitude. Bucking the trend of French Presidents, who have generally shown a high degree of respect for cultural heritage, Sarkozy did not disguise his disdain towards the humanities. He declared that people should not pay taxes for classic literature research, but focus on the career prospects of youth. In 2014, British Education Secretary Nicky Morgan habitually downgraded the importance of the arts and humanities for teenagers, provoking an outcry among teachers and supporters of the humanities.

Furthermore, a social trend towards anti-intellectualism has influenced this attitude. Anti-intellectualism does not currently consist of indifference and ignorance, but rather attacking someone aggressively in a certain intellectual manner. Due to information technology, everyone believes they have (and occasionally truly do have) enough knowledge or intellectual information to criticize intellectuals. People criticize a certain type of knowledge, often including the humanities, while assuming a kind of intellectual attitude more or less associated with populism.

In these three cases in England, Hungary and France, philosophers have encouraged international solidarity in the fight against the crisis by initiating petition campaigns. Thanks to an internationally backed movement, the philosophy department at Middlesex University survived by transferring to Kingston University, the political pressure on Hungarian philosophers was gradually reduced, and in France, the Ministry lifted the restrictions on financial contributions to the International College of Philosophy. International exchange provides an important network for research and education in the humanities. If research and education institutions face unreasonable danger, domestic and/or international solidarity for them should be encouraged. This kind of international solidarity against the crisis is often lacking in humanities institutions in Japan.

2. How to Question "Philosophy and University"

In modern Europe, the establishment of universities is inseparable from the academic hegemony of philosophy, and it is surely no accident that philosophers have generally been the ones to question the university. Kant (*The Conflicts of the Faculties*), Humboldt (On the Internal and External Organization of the Higher Scientific Institutions in Berlin), Fichte (*Lectures concerning the Scholar's*

Vocation), Schleiermacher (*Occasional Thoughts on Universities in the German Sense*), Schelling (*Lectures on the Method of Academic Study*), Schopenhauer (On the Philosophy of University), Nietzsche (On the Future of Our Educational Institutions), Heidegger (*The Self-Assertion of the German University*), Ortega (*Mission of the University*), Weber (*On Universities*), Jaspers (*The Idea of University*), Derrida (*Right to Philosophy, The University without Condition*), and many other leading thinkers who have written on the topic of universities are almost all university professors who developed their philosophy in a very close relationship with university institutions[1].

When addressing "University and Philosophy," it is essential to ask, with what right can philosophers question the university? How do philosophers have the right to consider the idea and reality of the university? In comparison to others, such as literary scholars or scientists,[2] why do philosophers have the privilege to approach the question of university?

This right seems largely to be inherited from philosophy's decisive historical role in establishing and shaping the modern univerity. For example, after Prussia suffered a major defeat by Napoleon's army, it tried to establish the University of Berlin to overcome social devastation and stimulate the recovery of spiritual authority. The needs of the time made philosophers create the modern university to reestablish their national culture. In addition, their desire for the knowledge system in German idealism corresponded to the university structure. The university represented a universe where different sciences were organically related to one another. Philosophy was considered important in ensuring the unified idea of the university.

Today, in the era of global capitalism where competition is created by a knowledge-oriented economy, the university is going through a decisive transformation induced by economic values. The "solitude and liberty for exercising research" advocated by Humboldt and the independence of the university from society no longer apply.[3] It may well be that the idea of the university that

[1] For a genealogical study of these philosophers' reflections on university, see Yuji Nishiyama (ed), *Tetsugaku to Daigaku* [*Philosophy and University*], Tokyo: Miraisya, 2009.
[2] As regards the comparative study of different discourses (philosophy, literature, sociology, psychoanalysis, etc.) in the university, see Pierre Macherey, *La parole universitaire*, Paris: La Fabrique éditions, 2011.
[3] At the end of the eighteenth century in Europe, people already demanded the abolishment of university as an outdated relic of the Middle Ages, and enlightenment thinkers demanded education suitable for practical use, focused on vocational skills training. Critical clichés based on the principles of form and utility, such as "the style of university is out-of-date

philosophers designed is now considered obsolete. However, from the collapse of the idea, we must find a way to rethink the very question of university. An epistemological question, "what is the idea of a university?" as John Henry Newman asked at the beginning of the nineteenth century, was soon substituted by an ontological question, "is a university that actually accords with the idea of a university possible?" After having lost the idea of the university, how (and how not) to speak of possibilities to be revived from what remains under the very name of the university?

3. *The Conflict of the Faculties*, Again

To reflect on the relationship between university and society, it is always useful to return to Kant's *The Conflict of the Faculties*. Kant, the first philosopher to assimilate academic freedom with the freedom of the university, opposes the superior (theology, law, and medicine) and lower (philosophy) faculties, and finds the social significance of the university in the relationship of power between them. In contrast to the superior faculties authorized by the government, which exert a direct influence on public life, the faculty of philosophy offers a radical contestation in seeking the right to free and open speech. According to Kant, it is due to a critical contribution by philosophy that the university finds its real place in the midst of society.

The issue, classic and unresolved until today, is the university's autonomy in the face of the State, which has remained a problem. According to Kant, while the superior faculties are often heavily censored by the State, the faculty of philosophy tries to ensure the freedom of reason that judges all the doctrines. Criticism improves the social function of the university, which would be genuinely useful for society and the State.

In our time, it is impossible to consider the university and its role according to Kant's architectonic schema: The growing influence of the concept of excellence in research and education renders the conception that a certain faculty can remain in a place of non-power null and void. Nevertheless, among the questions raised by Kant, that of the ideal structure of university institutions is still greatly important today. The opposition and conflicts between inside and outside, which characterize

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now" and "education and research in the university is useless" have been repeated for a long time.

the relation between university and State power, or between university and society, have already taken place symbolically in the university itself. The relation between faculties reflects, today, oppositions based on criteria such as useful and useless, profitable and non-profitable, and efficient and non-efficient.

As Kant emphasizes, the legal conflict in the university is never the war. The fact that the conflict is not a battle of life and death but a struggle for the truth is critical. As globalization has proceeded in recent years, each university, faculty, or researcher has been forced to join the severe competition in research and education, so one is often in "a state of war" to acquire the budget to survive. One of the criteria of finding the ideas and freedom remaining in the university would be not to turn our situation into a war, but to develop "our legal conflict" productively. Kant made the excellent point that the realization of academic freedom allows the inclusion of freedom of reason, which in turn enables room for social freedoms. Emphasizing the relation between these three kinds of freedom is an excellent remark in Kant's argument on university. If results in research and education are evaluated only on economic criteria, and academic freedom comes under severe pressure, the freedom of the rational thinking mind will be lost in society.

According to Kant, while the superior faculties as the right wing defend State doctrines, the faculty of philosophy, as the opposite party, thinks rigorously about their validity, and if necessary, argues with them. The conflict should be useful even for the State, as long as reason makes an accurate judgment to reveal the truth to the world. Then, the faculty of philosophy takes the position of the right wing and the superior faculties that of the left wing, as if there were a lever mechanism at work. It is important that the architectonic schema maintains the functionality of this lever that allows the university to change direction within the bipolar division of faculties[4] and to leave the door open for multiple political strategies around the truth. When this intellectual struggle is possible no more, a certain signification of university will be lost. The university's task should be to divert a battle between life and death accelerated by a capitalistic economy, and to manage the energy towards the legal conflict around the truth.

4. Karl Jaspers' Philosophical Idea of University

[4] Jacques Derrida focused on the notion of the lever in Kant's text on the university. See Jacques Derrida, *Eyes of University:* Right to Philosophy 2, California: Stanford University Press, 2004, pp. 109-112.

In 1952, Karl Jaspers published *The Idea of the University* to reconstruct the intellectual spirit of university after the moral destruction caused by Nazi totalitarianism. In his argument, we can find the traditional philosophical idea of university inherited from Kant and Humboldt. Jaspers clearly defines university in the introduction; his clear remarks present the idea of university precisely, based on three principles.

1) The principle of autonomy and autogestion of "universitas," that is, associations of professors and students. The "universitas" consists of their existential communication for research and education.

2) The principle of searching for truth without any restriction in the anti-utilitarian or supra-utilitarian dimension. The university has its proper spiritual life independent of society or the State.

3) The principle of the structural complementarity of different disciplines, where each science collaborates with another despite their differences, opposition, or contradiction, in an effort towards integrity of knowledge.

Jaspers emphasized these points against the background of an ominous prediction of the university's failure in the near future. Because the idea of university is realized only in the institution, "a permanent state of tension exists at the university between the idea and the shortcomings of the institutional and corporate reality."[5] Jaspers insisted on the idea against the development of science and technology and the trend of popularization. However, during the rapid economic growth in the 1960s and 70s, popularization and technicism transformed the institutional reality of the university. As a popularized institution, the university is no longer a pure and simple universe of knowledge, but rather a "multi-university" with different purposes. According to Jaspers, "from one point of view, the university resembles an aggregate of professional training schools isolated from one another or an intellectual department store with an abundance of goods for every taste."[6]

It is also significant that Jaspers is concerned about the drastic influence of modern technology on the university cosmos. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, technology has stepped up its presence, "has become an independent

[5] Karl Jaspers, *The Idea of the University*, trans. by H. A. T. Reiche and H. F. Vanderschmidt, Boston: Beacon Press, 1959, p. 70.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 80.

giant."[7] The world and human existence as transformed and controlled through technology obviously became the academic subject of the university. The novel task is now not only to consider the technical world's reality from a utilitarian perspective, but also to think about its meaning and purpose in the human order from a philosophical one. Therefore, Jaspers consciously focuses on the integration of the technical faculty in the existing university. "Along with the incorporation of a school of technology, other changes would become essential. Above all, the old philosophical faculty must be reunified. The division into natural sciences and humanities must be overcome. Only reunification can impart sufficient force to the basic theoretical disciplines to counteract the increased impact and scope of the practical disciplines." [8] Although Jaspers recognized the technical world's independence and universality as a modern phenomenon, he could still believe in the philosophy faculty's task, that is, to elaborate the "metaphysical foundation of a new way of life, which technology has made possible."[9]

As for the current situation, this issue of the technical world is not limited to such a dialogue between faculties, but influences a whole university over decades. The mindset associated with technology and engineering has strengthened its presence in university administration in the form of educational technology and social engineering. One has developed a strong tendency to evaluate various factors of the university in the (analytic, mathematical, metrical) style of science and engineering, with terms of management such as "PDCA (plan-do-check-act) cycle," "quality assurance," "governance," and "performance." There is a growing emphasis on designing a rational and efficient system including a teaching and study method or learning environment; this situation makes it increasingly difficult for philosophy to maintain the "metaphysical foundation" of the university against the engineering design.

5. The Age of Evaluation

With the gradual loss of the idea of university, new conceptions have gained more influence in university administration in this age of globalization.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 92.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 94.
[9] *Ibid.*

1) Evaluation as the Medicine/Poison[10]

Since its beginning, the university has been closely linked to the logic of evaluation. Since the conferral of degrees is a privilege of the university, the evaluation criteria in developing human resources is key. In the twelfth century, universities were spontaneously created as intellectual societies. A charter from the Pope or emperor approved the establishment of universities from the fourteenth century, and the State approved it from the fifteenth century. In the U.S., from the nineteenth century, numerous universities were founded based on a system of self-evaluation, developed early on. Later, the system of accreditation established in the U.S. would become a global standard for university evaluation. Thus universities have been constantly subject to evaluation, be it by a higher authority (the church or State), other universities, or themselves. However, in the last 30 years, there have been notable changes in the evaluation system. The increase in the number of graduates and universities, which also led to budget growth, economic efficiency, and public interest in the university, became more significant and led to the sort of evaluation that aims to subject research and education to the point of view of administration and hold it accountable to society.

Evaluation is both medicine and poison for the university. It works as knowledge beyond all knowledge, a discipline beyond all disciplines, and a competition beyond all other competitions. It seems that everything can be evaluated in the university. Every stakeholder is encouraged to participate in evaluating the university as a public educational organization — a tendency which seems impeccably democratic. We all know that democracy is irreconcilable with the arbitrary restriction, blatant censorship, or violent interdiction of academic freedom and artistic expression. Paradoxically, however, the more democratic evaluation there is, the more we see restrictions, censorship, and interdictions exercising an influence on research and education, in a manner that is less visible and more indirect. Shouldn't we say that the severe competition for research funds, the move towards "trendy" research subjects, the increased difficulty in attaining tenure, and the state of employment opportunities for students all have an impact on academic freedom? We should consider whether democratic competition does perhaps lead to a tyranny of evaluation.

2) The Notions of Performance and Excellence

[10] For philosophical reflection on the notion of evaluation, see *Cités*, "L'idéologie de l'évaluation," PUF, N. 37, 2009.

The engines of evaluation in research and education are the notions of performance and excellence. "Performance" is a flexible scale that is adaptive to various domains or fields. It is used as an objective index for evaluating the performance of machines, or abilities in sports or arts. In the logic of management, performance means producing the best result at a minimal cost and time, to fulfill customers' needs and expectations.

"Excellence" is the empty scale that makes the bidding-up of value possible. According to Bill Readings' *The University in Ruins*, the efficacy of the notion of excellence stems from the opacity of its definition, "The need for excellence is what we all agree on. And we all agree upon it because it is not an ideology, in the sense that it has no external referent or internal content."[11] A concept without real substance, excellence allows us to compare values between different domains. It is more attached to quantifying the degree of social contribution than determining the quality of research and education. It makes comparing university performance with that of society possible, introducing the principle of competition in every academic field. Paradoxically, "the point is not that no one knows what excellence is but that everyone has his or her own idea of what it is."[12] To demonstrate their own excellence, universities and researchers have to keep escalating their originality. In this kind of competition, "on the one hand, they all claim that there is a unique educational institution. On the other hand, they all go on to describe this uniqueness in exactly the same way."[13]

With the concepts of performance and excellence, it seems possible to compare and estimate everything: academic results of students, their career options, conference presentations or peer-reviewed articles, the financial position of a university, the quantity of books in libraries, etc. The efficiency of research and educational activities becomes subject to evaluation as does that of the university's administration and its contribution to society. Thus, we will be able to uniformly evaluate universities, museums, hospitals, etc. — institutions whose rationales, goals, content, memberships, and histories differ. Performance and excellence, this flexible scale without scale, plays a crucial part in synchronizing the university with the values of contemporary society, and transforming academic freedom according to economic indexes of efficiency, utility, profitability, etc.

[11] Bill Readings, *The University in Ruins*, Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press, 1997, p. 23.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 33.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

6. Time, Power, and Emotion in the Humanities

The humanities might nevertheless open up some space for criticism, despite the process just described in which research and education in universities have been taken over by the logic of evaluation.

1) Time

Evidently, the human sciences require much smaller budgets than natural sciences. They do not require expensive laboratory equipment and a large research staff, as they are mainly engaged in reading and analyzing texts, to contemplate the spiritual activities of human beings. Rather, the humanities require *time*. Today, on the one hand, we in the humanities spend time reading texts very closely; on the other hand, we are rushed by the swift current of evaluation. The time required for the humanities should be this kind of dual temporality: "we still have some spare time" and "we are always short of time." If the humanities were not rushed by a single kind of time but could create multiple temporalities existing between marginal and rushed or hurried time, it could create a rich temporal motion that would carry them forward.

2) Power

As the word "value" derives from the Latin *valare*, meaning to be powerful or in good health, the question of value or evaluation contains the quality of power. What kind of power is to be acquired with respect to the university's identity? "Faculty" is a polysemic word that could mean "the power (of persons or things) to do anything," "a kind of ability: branch of art or science," or "a conferred power, authority, privilege." During the birth of the university, the Latin word *facultas* was used to indicate a guild of intellectuals, a professional group of professors with the skills and abilities (*facultas*) to impart knowledge, which also has the authority (*facultas*) to certify other people as teachers, and have them join their group.

In Japan, universities were truly diversified after the 1991 reform. In 2008, the Central Council for Education, in its report *On the Formation of Bachelor's Degree Programs*, mentioned that students need to acquire "undergraduate competencies (*gakushi-ryoku*)," which are described as learning "to be able to" do certain things, thereby attaching more importance to the skills students should acquire than to the material the faculty should teach them.

However, is human ability limited only to the passage from "I cannot" to "I can"? Do we grow up only along the line from incompetence to competence? What do we lose by focusing almost entirely on an ability-based model? In the tradition of Western philosophy, Aristotle pointed out the binary distinction between potentiality and actuality: What is potential (*dynamis*) is something that is not yet actualized (*energia*). Based on this Aristotelian viewpoint, Giorgio Agamben, in his essay "On Potentiality," developed the mode of existence of potentiality.[14] According to Agamben, potentiality is not simply a capacity or ability to do this or that, but also a particular mode of existence that simultaneously means doing and not-doing, or being and not-being. An architect is considered an architect as long as she has the potential to construct, even when she does not construct anything. Potentiality is defined as the power of having a privation, which Agamben prefers to call *impotentiality*. Potentiality cannot always be reduced to a process of actualization, but is, for us as human beings, an existence of waiting. In his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle cites examples of potentiality in various human activities, such as grammar, music, architecture, medicine, etc. What we learn in the humanities contains more or less this kind of impotentiality. In fact, it is important for us to obtain the ability "to be able not to do": an ability that is between competence and incompetence as narrowly defined. Even prior to subscribing to freedom in its modern sense, the task of the humanities consists of deepening impotentiality that can be expressed by the phrase "I am able not to do."

3) Emotion and Sensibilities

In evaluating research and education, people often ask, "what does it mean?" or "what is it good for?" However, when it comes to the humanities, we should also ask, "what kind of emotions or sensibilities do they generate?" Throughout the twentieth century, the humanities diversified in terms of theories and methods, going beyond the traditional orthodox interpretation of classic works. It is important not to look for a single sense of the humanities based on the normative model of "great books," but rather to question the sense of the humanities in their fluctuating plurality. The humanities' task consists of not only searching for answers or aspiring to usefulness but also promoting a richness of emotion and sensibility that can suggest directions for our lives. Unlike answers or utility, such sensibilities and emotions cannot and must not be evaluated, or else we risk extinguishing academic freedom. As long as

[14] Giorgio Agamben, "On Potentiality," *Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy*, California: Stanford University Press, 1999.

the humanities provide depth to our life, criticizing the evaluation system conditioning research and education at the university remains a possibility.

7. Figure and Place of Anti-University in the Margins of University

We all know, of course, that the university is not the only place for spiritual life. Intellectual activities have often been developed outside university, refused by the academic circle. During the Renaissance period, humanism came into existence as competition for the medieval university. In the seventeenth century, innovation in natural science and philosophy occurred outside university. In the eighteenth century, the intellectual Enlightenment movement made progress not in the university, but in State-sponsored institutions, such as Académie française or the Royal Society.

1) Movements of Anti-University, Sub-University, or Infra-University

We can find this kind of anti-university, sub-university, or infra-university movement, especially based on the humanities, outside or in the university margins throughout the twentieth century.

The Institute for Social Research (Institut für Sozialforschung) in Frankfurt, founded in 1924, aimed at shedding light on the development of reason in history through sociological and philosophical analysis, and substantive research. When the Nazis banished Jewish professors from their university posts, the New School for Social Research established “The University in Exile” in New York, which received more than 180 Jewish scholars from 1933 to 1945 and achieved tangible results in the study of German and Italian fascism. In Czechoslovakia, when the communist power after WWII controlled and limited academic freedom, Jan Patočka began “The Underground University” (Podzemní Univerzita) in his house in 1948 to teach the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger, which encouraged the students to put philosophy into practice. This underground activity allowed the establishment of The Jan Hus Educational Foundation in 1980, which organized many seminars of Western academics as philosophical action against political pressure, on the initiative of British philosophers at the University of Oxford. In 1961, Ivan Ilich founded the Centro Intercultural de Documentación (CIDOC: Intercultural Documentation Center) at Cuernavaca in Mexico, both a research center offering language courses to North American missionaries, and a free university for conducting an in-depth review of the institutionalization of social values (education,

hospital, labor, etc.) in industrial modernization. In 2002, Michel Onfrey opened the "Université Populaire" (Popular University) at Caen, a small city in the north of France, in an attempt to resist the intellectual centralized system around Paris. The name comes from the "Universités Populaires," which were created spontaneously by workers at the beginning of the twentieth century and expanded to about 230 hubs, to provide adults with the opportunity to learn.

Faced with the difficulties of the times, people have launched intellectual movements to come up with a vision for research and education, in putting forward radical questions to existing institutions such as the university. As for the relations between the institution of the university and anti-university, sub-university, or infra-university movements, it would be too simplistic to say that we should create a new intellectual activity exclusively from the higher education system, because universities do not maintain academic freedom under political and economic powers. On the other hand, it would be naive to claim that the university is already dead. The examples mentioned above give us a clue to question the borders of the research university and educational activity.

3) The Unconditional Right to Say Everything Publicly

One of the university's motives consists of unconditional faith in the truth, which, in turn, drives us to extend beyond the institutional university framework. In *The University without Condition*, Jacques Derrida defines the deconstructive aspect of university as unconditionality for the truth. "The university *professes* the truth, and is its profession. It declares and promises an unlimited commitment to the truth."[15] In reference to the etymology of "professor" and "profession" or "confession," Derrida emphasizes the aspect of confessing the truth in constative and performative manners. To make a profession of truth, it is necessary to keep "the principal right to say everything, even if it be under the heading of fiction and the experimentation of knowledge, and the right to say it publicly, to publish it,"[16] in the university, and particularly in the humanities. However, unexpectedly, Derrida never identifies the unconditionality to say everything with an academic freedom protected within the university. On the contrary, "by reason of this abstract and hyperbolic invincibility, by reason of its very impossibility, this unconditionality exposes as well the

[15] Jacques Derrida, "The University without Condition," *Without Alibi*, trans. Peggy Kamuf, California: Stanford University Press, 2002, p. 202.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 205.

weakness or the vulnerability of the university."[17] This unconditional right does not necessarily enforce the sovereignty of the university in society, but is nearest to its fragility exposed to social powers. Derrida attentively thinks of the unconditionality at the limit of the university's conservation, on the one hand, and innovation, on the other.

"The university without conditions is not necessarily situated or exclusively within the walls of what is today the university. It is not necessarily, exclusively, or exemplarily represented in the figure of the professor. It takes place, it seeks its place wherever this unconditionality can take shape. Everywhere that it, perhaps, gives one (itself) to think. Sometimes even beyond, no doubt, a logic or lexicon of the 'condition.'"[18]

Indeed, the university is not the only privileged place for the right to say everything publicly. However, so that this right can be shared anywhere in our society, we have to save room for it at least in the university. According to Derrida, a university without condition "has never been in effect."[19] As long as the right to say everything publicly survives in the *heart* of the university, this unconditionality can provide different places for thinking the truth.

In the thirteenth century in Europe, the university was spontaneously born as a guild association of professors and students. The first universities had no campus or buildings; lectures were held in a church or a monastery. Students crossed borders to attend the universities, and were free to travel in search of excellent professors. Because the group of professors and students itself was highly mobile, they were willing to move from one university to another.

These historical contexts suggest that the original image of university would be that of traveling. Students always travel to university; furthermore, the university itself without any proper place is on the traveling path. The unconditional right of university would derive from its historical image of traveling; without it, today, we cannot obtain a clear view of its destination.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 206.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 236.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 206.

Home of the Owl?
Kantian Reflections on Philosophy at University

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Abstract: *The focus of this paper will be on Kant and on a text which has often been drawn upon when talking about the present situation of philosophy at university, namely his* The Conflict of the Faculties *of 1798. Kant's claims, though not applicable to the contemporary situation directly, can indeed be worked out in a way which can assign a distinct and clearly identifiable role for university-based philosophy. I need to emphasize, though, that I am not suggesting that this is the only way Kant's thoughts in this respect can be adapted to and utilized for such an account. Quite the contrary, Kant's text offers a manifold of highly important options here.*

In my article I will seek to establish the following claims: a) Kant, in his later years, which therefore amounts to something like his "mature" position, subscribed to a conception of a public use of reason which mainly referred to the Faculties of Philosophy at universities. b) Kant's dismissal of philosophy according to the school conception of it must not be taken as a dismissal of academic philosophy altogether. Philosophy practiced at university by professionals is vital for Kant to build philosophy as a fully worked out discipline and to answer questions revolving around the issue of the compatibility of the theoretical standpoint and Kant's own moral theory. c) Neither a) nor b) can be immediately applied to the contemporary situation we find ourselves in. Combining elements of a) and b), however, a possible route for the actualization of Kant's ideas may open up. At least one of the functions for which university-based philosophy is uniquely qualified is the assessment of the implications of progress in the natural sciences for the conception of a moral standpoint in general, and as such for a core element of our self-understanding as rational beings.

1. Introduction

The university is perhaps the greatest invention of the European Middle Ages, but nonetheless there is no semantic golden age to which we can turn in order to get help about how to organize it and what role the university – as a whole and in its parts – is supposed to play. This is particularly true with regard to the main question for us, namely the role and function of philosophy at university.

Stefan Collini (2012), one of the leading critics of the UK government university policy and in this respect perhaps the counterpart of Reinhard Brandt (2011) in Germany, has recently come up with an intriguing comparison. The concept of university, he says in an article in the *London Review of Books* (2016), is similar to how Alasdair Macintyre (and one could add, Elizabeth Anscombe before him) sees concepts of morality. According to Macintyre, these concepts are like splinters from a system no longer in place and therefore constantly contested and re-interpreted without any authoritative standard to turn to. We cannot simply say that a university should be like it was at a certain period of time, simply because this arrangement complied with the *original* conception of a university. These conceptions need to be argued for in their own right, although a certain amount of confidence and trust in received wisdom certainly would not do too much harm.

Strictly speaking, however, the questions we are facing are not conceptual questions, but substantial ones. Even in the Middle Ages, when the university was invented, the role of the philosophical faculty was fiercely contested and the subject of sometimes acrimonious debates. While some regarded the Faculty of Philosophy, or the Faculty of Arts as it was then usually called, as having a merely preparatory function and offering a basic training in methodological thinking, some members of those faculties went far further than this. In 13th century Paris, for example, as Alain de Libera (1996) has explained in great detail, an alternative, quasi secular, account of the good life was developed which challenged and was perceived as a challenge to the theological orthodoxy.[1] It is worth noting that this was done by an engagement with canonical texts, in this case mainly texts by Aristotle, for example the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

In my paper I will also turn to a canonical text in order to find answers to our question. Of course, it is not because these are canonical texts that the answers are relevant, but – again – because the answers provided there are substantial. Moreover, I will try to keep questions of interpretation on the one hand, and relevance or actualization on the other hand, strictly apart. This, of course, does not diminish the

[1] Perhaps even the concept of the intellectual, familiar from the 20th century, was already formed then.

importance of correct interpretation, but actually enhances it. We need to know the original intention of a classical philosopher in order to find ways of applying his thoughts to contemporary problems. My main focus will be on Kant and on a text which has often been drawn upon when talking about the present situation of philosophy at university, namely his *The Conflict of the Faculties* of 1798. Kant's claims, though not applicable to the contemporary situation directly, can indeed be worked out in a way which can assign a distinct and clearly identifiable role for university-based philosophy. I need to emphasize, though, that I am not suggesting that this is the only way Kant's thoughts in this respect can be adapted to and utilized for such an account. Quite the contrary, Kant's text offers a manifold of highly important options here.[2]

In what follows I will be trying to establish the following claims:

a) Kant, in his later years, which therefore amounts to something like his "mature" position, subscribed to a conception of a public use of reason which mainly referred to the Faculties of Philosophy at universities.
b) Kant's dismissal of philosophy according to the school conception of it must not be taken as a dismissal of academic philosophy altogether. Philosophy practiced at university by professionals is vital for Kant to build philosophy as a fully worked out discipline and to answer questions revolving around the issue of the compatibility of the theoretical standpoint and Kant's own moral theory.
c) Neither a) nor b) can be directly applied to the contemporary situation we find ourselves in. Combining elements of a) and b), however, a possible route for the actualization of Kant's ideas may open up. At least one of the functions for which university-based philosophy is uniquely qualified is the assessment of the implications of progress in the natural sciences for the

[2] To be sure, attempts at justification can easily fall into a trap. The point to stress is that obviously not everything which is important and valuable is so in an instrumental manner. There are things which are good in themselves and intrinsically good, for example when they are part and parcel of what it means to lead a proper human life. In this vein, it is crucial to see that philosophy, just like the arts, music and literature, is both valuable in itself and instrumentally valuable. Hence, my argument for an actualization of Kant's thoughts on the role of philosophy at university utilizes only one possible strategy for such a justification and, moreover, by no means exhausts what Kant has to say about this matter.

conception of a moral standpoint in general, and as such for a core element of our self-understanding as rational beings.

2. Kant on philosophy at university

The idea of public reason[3] plays a prominent role in a number of major contemporary moral and political theorists, such as Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls, who – in this respect – both see themselves as indebted to Kant. While a comprehensive account of Kant's theory of public reason, along with a comparison with these contemporary approaches, cannot be provided in what follows,[4] I shall try to focus on a relatively small, but central element of it, namely the contrast he draws between what he calls the public vs. private *use* of reason. As we shall see, these ideas ultimately lead to very strong claims about the institutional role philosophy is supposed to play at university in particular and society in general, claims which, however, seem to challenge attempts to render Kant's thoughts applicable in today's circumstances.

In a relatively early work (of the critical period, to be sure), namely in his essay, "An answer to the question: What is enlightenment" (AA VII, 35-42), Kant argues on the basis of King Frederick II of Prussia's maxim: "*Argue* as much as you will and about whatever you will, *but obey!*"[5] This 'maxim' – in the non-technical sense of this term – of course raises serious questions about Kant's political philosophy, in particular with regard to the problem of obedience to authority. I will say a little more on this later, but what is of primary concern for our purposes is Kant's very peculiar distinction between the public and private *use* of reason. One could perhaps initially think that the private use of reason occurs in the safe space of privacy, for example in one's home, perhaps in the company of one's friends. Even the image of the philosopher donned in dressing gown and slippers might come to mind. Kant, however, is aiming at something completely different. Conversely, one

[3] See Turner and Gaus (forthcoming) for an account of the main contemporary conceptions. Quong (2013) provides a very reliable overview of the main philosophical issues discussed in connection with public reason today.

[4] See Rauscher (2005) for a recent attempt in this direction.

[5] AA VIII, 37; CE, trans. Gregor, 18. With the exception of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (KrV) Kant's works are quoted according to the pagination of the so-called "Akademie-Ausgabe"(AA), with the Roman number indicating the volume and the Arabic number the page(s). English translations for AA texts are provided on the basis of the corresponding volumes of "The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant" (CE).

could think that the public use of reason must amount to what we now call "freedom of expression", nowadays regarded as one of the fundamental human rights. He says, however:

> "I reply: the *public* use of one's reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among human beings; the *private use* of one's reason may, however, often be very narrowly restricted without this particularly hindering the progress of enlightenment. But by the public use of one's own reason I understand that use which someone makes of it *as a scholar* before the entire public of the *world of readers*. What I call the private use of reason is that which one may make of it in a certain *civil* post or office with which he is entrusted." (AA VIII, 37, trans. Gregor, CE, 18)

Clearly, the picture is rather like this. The private use of reason is the use the holder of a public office may be making in carrying out this public office, judging for example whether the duties or obligations which come along with this office are just, and making his or her opinion known to those affected by his actions as an official. Paradoxically perhaps, this private use is thus connected to something public in the contemporary sense of the term. An example of a private use of reason which is illegitimate for Kant would be a judge who in court openly voices criticism of the law he is to apply, or who even refrains from applying the pertinent law because she takes it to be problematic.

For Kant, the public use of reason by the very same official, by contrast, would consist in giving his assessment of, for example, his duties as an official, or of the quality of the law in our example, *as an author addressing readers*, or more precisely educated readers, specifically: the educated public. In short, what Kant has in mind is a rather restricted realm or a societal "safe haven" of free speech, as we may call it. In line with this idea, the extension of potential 'public users' of reason is rather large. Basically, any active citizen (although the percentage of the overall population counting as active citizens is relatively small in Kant's political theory) can count as somebody entitled to the public use of reason, as long as he (in Kant's account this does not hold for women) enters this safe haven of free speech.

Kant's mature (or at any rate, late) position on this matter, i.e. in his work *The Conflict of the Faculties*, is quite different. Strikingly, Kant now focuses on a

much smaller group of those entitled to a public use of reason.[6] Again, perhaps a representative passage will be helpful. In order to assess this passage properly, however, we first need to take a brief look at the political context of this work: The political situation in Prussia had changed dramatically after the deaths of two monarchs. Frederick William II had succeeded Frederick II to the throne in 1786, and it was under Frederick William II's reign that Kant ran into trouble with regard to his book *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* in 1793. *The Conflict of the Faculties* was published in 1798, one year after Frederick William III was crowned in 1797. As we shall see, the standard picture of this situation, in particular the problems Kant faced with regard to the book on religion, need to be considered rather cautiously, and this in turn is immediately relevant for our main question.

The passage reads as follows:

> "So the philosophy faculty, because it must answer for the truth of the teachings it is to adopt or even allow, must be conceived as free and subject only to laws given by reason, not by the government. But a department of this kind, too, must be established at a university; in other words, a university must have a faculty of philosophy. Its function in relation to the three higher faculties is to control them and, in this way, be useful to them, since *truth* (the essential and first condition of learning in general) is the main thing … Only the business people of the higher faculties (clergymen, legal officials, and doctors) can be prevented from contradicting in public the teachings that the government has entrusted to them to expound in fulfilling their respective offices, and from venturing to play the philosopher's role; for the faculties alone, not the officials appointed by the government, can be allowed to do this, since these officials get their cognition from the faculties … But the result of this freedom, which the philosophy faculty must enjoy unimpaired, is that the higher faculties (themselves better instructed) will lead these officials more and more onto the way of truth." (AA VII, 27-29, trans. Gregor/Anchor, CE, 255-256)

In *The Conflict of the Faculties* Kant tries to clarify the task of the university and of its constituting faculties. In this book, moreover, Kant returns to engaging with religious topics and discusses the relationship between the Christian religion and his

[6] It has to be said, though, that he does not explicitly rule out participation in the public use of reason by non-members of the philosophical faculty *tout court*.

own moral theory. As indicated already, and as is well known, Kant had to face substantial difficulties after publishing *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* in 1793, when the pertinent censorship agency managed to obtain a Royal rescript against him. Kant then promised[7] to refrain from writing on religious matters. This incident has been discussed a great deal in Kant scholarship and among the wider public. Usually, it is seen as a typical instance of reactionary forces blocking the progress of enlightened thinking, very much along the same lines as Wolff's dismissal from Halle earlier (i.e. in 1723) and Fichte's demotion in Jena later (i.e. in 1799). Of course, to a large extent this is true, but the complete story behind these incidents is much more complex, as Bettina Stangneth (2003) has shown in her fascinating introduction to her Meiner edition of the *Religion*.[8] This story includes the familiar mixture of personal and institutional rivalries, and therefore is an important context for what Kant is maintaining in *The Conflict of the Faculties*.

Kant's 'tactics' in his quarrel with censorship are important in their own right. According to Stangneth (2003, XXXVII), it is plausible that Kant may have intentionally provoked something like a showdown with the censorship authorities. The case she makes, at any rate, is quite convincing: He chose to publish the *Religion* in parts and hence as (lengthy) articles in journals, and this made their publication even more difficult. In fact, he must have been surprised that the first one was actually approved. The second part got rejected, as expected, after which Kant changed his plans and turned the papers into a monograph, which required approval only by the university faculty in whose domain the topic fell. Kant approached the theological faculty in Königsberg (i.e. the faculty of his home university) to confirm that it was not a work of theology but of philosophy, and then received the *imprimatur* or permission of publication from the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Jena. After the publication of the book, the said rescript came and, in the wake of it, Kant's promise to refrain from publishing about religion. From today's point of view, it may look as though Kant was much too conciliatory in this respect. In this vein, one could think that he should never have made such a promise. After the death of the monarch Frederick William II, however, Kant at any rate considered himself no longer bound by this promise, as he made clear in the very preface to the *Conflict* (AA VII, 10 fn). If Kant's caving in to the authorities may look like an undue compromise, Kant's claim that he only made his promise to

[7] See Kant's own account of this matter in AA VII, 5-11.
[8] See in particular Stangneth (2003, IX- LIX).

the former king as an individual person at least at first sight looks ethically dubious as well.

For Stangneth (2003, LIII-LIX), by contrast, Kant tried on the one hand to stick to and respect the existing legal framework and at the same time expose its deficits, which were largely due to the strong element of arbitrariness on the part of the individual monarch in enlightened absolutism. Simply put, the quirks of a monarch's mood swings, however preposterous, often amounted to law. In all this, he wanted to provide an example to the ethical community and expose the weaknesses of the existing legal order without dismissing it in its entirety. He did, after all, formally comply with it. Understanding the promise as having been made to the individual monarch in this sense amounted to taking the reality of absolutism seriously, which – as pointed out – licensed arbitrariness of the individual monarch. Moreover, obeying the order to refrain from publishing about religion in the first place must at least be taken as being in line with Kant's often misunderstood principle that the political authorities must be obeyed. However, this principle, rightly understood, does not require us to bow to the will of totalitarian or authoritarian regimes. Rather, Kant sets the bar as to what can legitimately be called "political authority" very high: political authorities need to be obeyed as long as the given political system meets the criterion of being an overall just political system, and a concrete order does not command one to do something intrinsically immoral.

In sum, a proper assessment of Kant's actions can be made as follows: a) They can't be interpreted as a general appeal to freedom of expression; rather he tried to secure what he saw as an essential role for himself as a philosopher holding a public office at a university. b) His actions do not amount to undue submissiveness (although this might still seem debatable), nor to undue sophistry. As we shall see, moreover, c) he is not arguing against a conception of university which focuses on its usefulness to the state. We should not overly idealize his ideal of a university or the university in the idea as a whole. From the perspective of such an idealization, Kant's apparent preparedness to make considerable concessions in the *Conflict*, with regard to the prerogatives of government authorities, may look rather surprising. But it is quite understandable in light of his account of the structure of the university and the function of the faculties (AA VII, 18-36). For Kant, a university essentially consists of four faculties, following the standard developed in the middle ages: the Faculty of Theology, the Faculty of Law, the Faculty of Medicine and the Faculty of Philosophy. In order to understand Kant's point, we need to make an important distinction with regard to the state (in the political sense of this term) in which the

university is situated. There is on the one hand the state as it is, the actually existing state, as it were, and there is the ideal state. Now, the first three faculties, the commonly (but for Kant, according to AA VII, 20, in the end presumably not properly) so-called "higher faculties", not only perform an important function in and for the running of the state as it is, because they supply graduates who can fill the vital functions of such a state, but also with regard to the running of the ideal state. This usefulness is never put into question by Kant, let alone dismissed.

With regard to the material taught in these faculties the state, according to Kant, is entitled to give directives (e.g. AA VII, 19), so that these functions can be performed properly. Of course, Kant is not endorsing unconstrained and arbitrary interference of the government into university teaching, rather this interference itself is regulated by norms of reason which are meant to rule out arbitrariness. Since even an imperfect state is still a state for Kant (although he raises the bar very high for even being an imperfect state), certain interferences may need to be accepted which do not meet the standards of how it should be in the ideal state. To be sure, however, this only refers to the so-called "higher faculties".

The task, or at any rate one of the tasks of the philosophical faculty, is now to scrutinize and test doctrines taught in the higher faculties and sanctioned by the government against the standards of reason and hence also against the standards of what ideally a state should sanction as doctrines for these faculties (AA VII, 27-29). Strikingly, this is true both for the university in an actually existing, imperfect state, and in a perfect state, but mainly in an imperfect state.

This function is to be carried out primarily by means of debates in the realm of scholarly publications of faculty members of the Faculty of Philosophy on the one hand, and members of the other faculties on the other. Moreover, Kant appears to think that the positive effects philosophy can have in improving the doctrines taught at these faculties also – in a mediated manner – reach the graduates of those faculties holding key offices in the state, who in turn and in various ways disseminate the pertinent doctrines to the wider public, thus making a real difference in the world.

As far as the Faculty of Philosophy and Faculty of Law are concerned, Kant's aim is to have philosophers assess positive laws against normative legal and thus ultimately moral theory, and this is to be accomplished also by addressing state officials directly. With regard to the Faculty of Philosophy and the Faculty of Medicine, Kant's points are not immediately obvious. This is perhaps the most idiosyncratic part of the text in which Kant is not shying away from giving a concrete account of the dangers for one's own well-being of engaging in thinking at

the wrong time in one's daily routine (AA VII, 109). At any rate, he establishes an important connection between moral health on the one hand and mental as well as physical health on the other, with moral health being regarded as the condition of true physical and mental well-being. Moreover, he seems to suggest that health is not something to be put into the exclusive charge of the medical profession.

When it comes to the relationship between the Faculty of Theology and the Faculty of Philosophy, his idea is that the clergy are the vehicle for disseminating philosophical moral insights or philosophically purified religious doctrines pertaining to morality to a wider public.

Although, as we have seen, Kant's manoeuvres must be regarded and judged with great care and clearly are less disappointingly submissive than often assumed, Kant's claims quite obviously are not apt for a simple application to our contemporary situation. Even if we limit our attention to his account of the conflict of the philosophical and theological faculties, Kant's ideas of promoting progress within society as a whole may look more paternalistic than one would perhaps expect. The idea behind all this is clearly detectable, though. Kant aims at reform from above by reaching and addressing the pertinent people, those who play an important role in the machinery of the state. Of course, to assess this matter properly would require a full account of his doctrines about the role of philosophy in other areas of human development and character formation, but unfortunately this cannot be accomplished here. Still, the model of the dissemination of moral progress through educational multipliers is worth considering for a contemporary actualization, as are Kant's theses about the role philosophical insights can play in changing conceptions of well-being when addressed to members of the medical faculties and the effect this can have on health professionals in general.

However, I shall try to explore a different route on which Kant's thoughts may be adapted to address a still pressing issue, and at the same time to assign an important function for university-based philosophy. I would like to do this by focusing on what might look like a rather out-dated element in Kant's doctrines, namely his notion of scholarly debate as a vehicle of societal progress. Moreover, I shall have to do this with the hugely different structure of contemporary universities in mind, compared with their 18th century counterparts. While in Kant's time natural sciences, along with historical subjects, were still part of the philosophical faculty – a point addressed by Kant himself in VII, 28 – the natural sciences have since emancipated themselves and turned into faculties in their own right. Hence, my attempt concerns a conflict which would have been an internal conflict in the

Faculty of Philosophy in Kant's time. With this qualification, we can retain his idea of professional philosophy having a unique function when seeing this function in something other than the way Kant himself officially did in the *Conflict*. Indeed, there is some ground for this in Kant's thought itself. This ground, however, cannot be taken up without modification and qualification either. But let us see first what this ground is.

3. Kant and the school conception of philosophy

In what is known as the "transcendental doctrine of method" of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in particular in the so-called "architectonic of pure reason", Kant talks about philosophy and the way it is properly done. To this end, he contrasts what he calls the "school conception" and the "world conception" of philosophy.[9] What is the difference? Kant says:

> "Thus far, however, the concept of philosophy is only a *school concept*, viz., the concept of a system of cognition that is being sought only as science, and that has as its purpose nothing more than the systematic unity of this knowledge and hence the logical perfection of cognition. But there is also a *world concept* (*conceptus cosmicus*) on which this name has always been based, primarily when the concept was, as it were, personified and conceived as an archetype in the ideal of the *philosopher*. From this point of view, philosophy is the science of the reference of all cognition to the essential purposes of human reason (*teleologica rationis humanae*), and the philosopher is not an artist of reason but the legislator of human reason. In such a meaning of the term it would be quite vainglorious to call oneself a philosopher and to claim that one has come to equal the archetype, which lies only in the idea." (KrV A 838sq./B 866sq., trans. Pluhar, 760).

What is striking here is that within the school conception of philosophy, "science" seems to be taken in the sense of a body of propositions or a system, while "science" with regard to the world concept is presumably something which nowadays is sometimes called an epistemic virtue, corresponding to *epistêmê* in the

[9] Important parallel passages can be found, for example, in the (textually slightly problematic) Jäsche Logic (AA IX, 24-27) and the Vienna Logic (AA XXIV, 799-801).

Aristotelian sense. In short, it is a personal quality of the philosopher, in turn taken as an ideal. Such a person has "science" in the sense of a capacity to refer all cognition to the essential purposes of human reason.

The idea seems to be this: there is a variety of essential ends of reason, one of which is the highest end, as Kant calls it later in the text (KrV A840/ B868). The highest end for Kant clearly must involve full moralization of all rational agents, but it is not entirely clear whether Kant identifies the highest end with the so-called (derivative) highest good here, i.e. happiness in proportion to a moral disposition. Kant is not very explicit either here about other essential ends. Plausibly, though, these ends include versatility in acquiring or having knowledge in the sciences as well as in the theoretical disciplines of philosophy, such as metaphysics. Clearly, the philosopher according to the world conception of philosophy, must be able to draw the right consequences, or at least assess properly the implications of insights gained, for example, in the sciences and in theoretical philosophy, for the highest end.

Moreover, while a school philosopher lacks a key quality, Kant suggests that the world philosopher has the skills a school philosopher has, namely his versatility, which turns him into an artist of reason and which enables him to work philosophy into a fully-fledged system. The world philosopher uses the very versatility, which turns the school philosopher into an artist of reason, to properly assess insights from the sciences and theoretical philosophy for the ultimate end of reason. Hence, Kant's point cannot be a dismissal of school philosophy in the sense of academic philosophy altogether,[10] but only a dismissal of a certain form of academic philosophy, namely that which merely aims at artistry in reason and does not heed the ultimately moral vocation of man based on the autonomy of practical reason. Here Kant is definitely not advocating a French or British model of enlightenment philosophy to replace the German model.[11] As is well known, Enlightenment

[10] In this vein, the positive connotations in passages touching upon the importance of professional, specialist philosophy deserve to be appreciated more properly. Of course, it is perfectly possible for Kant to find these standards outside academia, but certainly not usual. Conversely, university-based philosophy can, of course, fail to meet professional standards, be these the standards of Kant's critical philosophy or not. These positive connotations, at any rate, are particularly obvious in passages where he dismisses popular philosophy and in which he seems to entrust the critical part of philosophy to specialists. This is particularly clear in the case of practical philosophy (e.g. AA IV, 409-410, AA VI, 206), but is also prevalent in his account as to how philosophy, in particular metaphysics, is to be worked out into a fully-fledged system and how conflicts within philosophy are to be treated.

[11] As Schneiders (2004, 89sq.) succinctly put it, the German Enlightenment philosophers were by and large pious civil servants.

philosophy in Britain and France was largely sustained by philosophers outside of the university – the gentlemen philosophers and *les philosophes* respectively. Kant rather dismisses academic philosophy according to the school conception of it. True, most probably he also demands that a greater degree of what we could call the existential urgency of critique be displayed by the faculty members. Moreover, he is aiming at effects in the 'real world' as far as the moral vocation of man is concerned, at making a difference in politics and the ethical community.

For Kant, there are philosophical insights particularly pertinent to and useful for this ultimate end of complete moralization, so as not to undermine it. These insights concern the proper assessment of the overall standing of human beings in relation to a world describable by the natural sciences. For Kant, it is essential that the success of natural sciences – for which he thought he had himself given a philosophical account, mainly in the transcendental aesthetic and the transcendental analytic of the *Critique of Pure Reason* – does not undercut the legitimacy of the assumption of our freedom nor the assumption of the existence of God and immortal rational souls. The latter two articles of rational faith for him are indispensable for developing a morally good character, while the compatibility of human freedom with a theoretical standpoint is indispensable for Kant's autonomy-based morality to hold.

Hence, the professional thinkers who have been through the acid test of critique are needed not just to properly turn philosophy, in particular metaphysics, into a system: these professional thinkers are in charge of actually fending off those who try to draw the – from Kant's perspective – wrong conclusion about the explicability of what goes on in space and time by means of science. As Kant sees it, attempts at, for example, inferring ontological naturalism from methodological naturalism (see KrV A 776sq./B 804sq.) ignore the very lessons of transcendental idealism, according to which things in space and time are appearances grounded in things in themselves. Thus, appearances in space and time, with regard to which science is so successful, are not the only type of possible objects for Kant.

4. Kant and university-based philosophy today

It is precisely at this point that I should like to come back to the question of how Kant's thought about the public use of reason in and through university philosophy can be actualized now. Of course, even the most committed Kantian has to admit

that things in philosophy have not turned out as Kant hoped they would. Instead of Kant's critical philosophy providing the framework within which the disputes in philosophy could be settled, critical philosophy itself became the topic of disputes, such as in German Idealism, in which Kant was criticized for an essentially dualist approach to the world, as the very distinction of things in themselves and appearances suggests.

And this is precisely where we can get a foot in the door. Three points seem to be particularly relevant in this respect:

1) Rather than taking it for granted that the task of philosophy is to work out the system of philosophy as an organic whole within which the fundamental concepts have been established, we must recognize that it is still a matter of debate what the fundamentals are in the first place. Maybe, even the idea that philosophy is something like a system (which was perhaps a matter of widespread consensus in certain quarters in Kant's time) is now itself contested. In the light of, for example, Wittgensteinian thoughts, some will surely argue that philosophical issues need to be addressed locally, one at a time.

2) We probably cannot agree with Kant regarding the special class of objects which are allegedly the real focus of our theoretical interest in metaphysics. For all the recent resurgence of philosophical theology and the continued interest in the philosophy of mind, God and rational souls (as separate substances) are perhaps not at the top of the agenda of contemporary philosophical research. If nowadays the focus is at all on non-physical objects, then it is perhaps rather on abstract objects, such as properties or numbers. About these abstract objects Kant says surprisingly little, although abstract objects in general raise a substantial challenge for ontological naturalism.

3) Contrary to Kant's own claims and much to the chagrin of Kantians and most Kant scholars alike, many philosophers remain unconvinced that we have found the correct doctrine of morality already. As the lively debate within the field of moral theory shows, it is – for many – still an open question whether a basically Kantian account of morality is correct, or, for example, a consequentialist, virtue-ethical, natural law, or perhaps even particularist one. The more prominent suggestions of recent years, such as Derek Parfit (2011) and Ronald Dworkin (2011) draw on a combination of Kantianism and consequentialism on the one hand and – although this is contentious – some form of actualization of a basically natural law account on the other. Moreover, these accounts, convincingly, provide a package of moral theory and meta-ethical theories indispensable for an account of the 'place' of

morality in a world of science. In this way, they can count as examples of what I have in mind, although I am of course not only thinking of meta-ethics.

Clearly, even if we cannot agree on which moral theory is correct, the problem of the compatibility of moral theory (whatever the correct one may be) with a scientific picture of the world remains a pressing issue in need of clarification.

We thus reach one way of adapting Kant's account to the contemporary situation which honours the essentially different structure of universities today, characterised by the emancipation of the natural sciences. This situation would – were we to venture into putting it forward – make the claim of truth being the prerogative of philosophy look somewhat presumptuous. Even though the natural sciences now have a strong foothold outside the university, and even though considerations of short term utility are on the rise in the sciences both inside and outside university, there is no denying that finding out the truth about the world is at least to a large extent the domain of these sciences. What remains a genuine philosophical task and, incidentally, belongs to the domain of truth widely conceived is the proper assessment of the scientific grasp of the world for our self-understanding as human and rational beings, for whom the moral standpoint is inescapable, perhaps even an inescapable predicament. A brief example may help clarify what I have in mind. The spectacular progress in neuroscience may tempt some to conclude that the uncovering of the intricate causal mechanism involved in human agency in and by itself amounts to a refutation of the thesis that human beings are free, which – as we have seen – despite it being not provable for Kant, plays such an important role in his approach to morality. Such a conclusion, however, would be premature, since it requires the truth of at least two further, exceedingly contentious premises. Even if we conceded the highly problematic inference from the discovery of a causal mechanism to the establishment of the thesis that this mechanism hints at an overall determinism in the neuronal realm, the conclusion presupposes that freedom and determinism are incompatible. This incompatibility claim, plainly, is not a scientific but a philosophical one, and it is nothing but astonishing that it is often taken for granted.

We can thus try to come to an overall conclusion. What can be retained from the Kantian approach is the necessity of assessing the challenge and the implications of the success of the sciences for our self-consciousness as rational beings more concretely. Academic philosophy is uniquely qualified to do this, as an institution

entering into a scholarly dialogue with academic or non-academic representatives of the sciences. To repeat, Kant's philosophy of transcendental idealism and his moral theory are not generally taken to be correct today. But the point I am trying to make does not presuppose the truth of transcendental idealism or Kant's moral philosophy at all. There is no general consensus as to the fundamental philosophical position one needs to take. Openness as to these positions themselves is rather an important aspect of a healthy and fruitful discussion.[12]

To be sure, what I call the "self-consciousness of rational beings" does not only include questions of morality and questions as to whether and how morality and its possible presuppositions fit in the world as accounted for by the natural sciences, most notably perhaps with regard to neuroscience and evolutionary theory. The "standing" of politics, economics, art and literature, for example, needs to be included here too, of course.

In all this, the most promising approach to addressing these questions is to leave it to the creativity and ingenuity of the thinkers of the profession, both with regard to methodology in philosophy and the relationship of philosophy to its past.

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[12] See, for example, Thomas Nagel's controversial book (2012) and the rather surprising reaction it caused, and also T.M. Scanlon's account of reasons (2014) as key examples for nurturing the discussion of these key questions.

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Being on the Ground:
Philosophy, Reading, and Difficulty

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Abstract: *Philosophy's task in the university of today is to show that there is such a thing as universal knowledge and to teach the student how to receive it. Put another way, it is to help students become highly literate, that is, to learn to read difficult texts. This paper first diagnoses the malaise current in the university through the dialectic of accessibility, whereby the more accessible a thing is made, the harder it is to grasp. It then argues that it is a mistake to presume that the only universal knowledge that can be taught are subjects whose content can be quantified. In fact, the application of the scientific method to cultural reality results in an antinomy that requires the inquirer either to treat language as an event in the world and deny its assertory character or to judge it as a true or false statement. Finally, the author argues that university students need to learn to read texts that will challenge them on the most basic level of their being.*

There is photograph from post-war Japan, which appeared in the *Asahi Shinbun* [newspaper]. People are sleeping on the ground outside the Iwanami bookstore in Kanda, Tokyo.[1] The caption says: "People queue overnight to buy the first book of philosopher Kitaro Nishida's complete works in front of Iwanami Bookstore on July 19, 1947 in Tokyo, Japan." I first came across a copy of this photo more than 25 years ago. At the time I mused, "I hope that someday students will line up to buy my book," and then, more sardonically, "I wish they would line up to buy any philosophy book," and " Will anyone stay up all night to buy any book at all."

[1] The image can be view on the Getty images website. http://www.gettyimages.co.jp/detail/%E3%83%8B%E3%83%A5%E3%83%BC%E3%82%B9%E5%86%99%E7%9C%9F/people-queue-overnight-to-buy-the-first-book-of-philosopher-%E3%83%8B%E3%83%A5%E3%83%BC%E3%82%B9%E5%86%99%E7%9C%9F/468992124#people-queue-overnight-to-buy-the-first-book-of-philosopher-kitaro-picture-id468992124

Indeed, in the intervening years people have stayed up all night to buy things, even books – *Harry Potter*, for example. Whatever one may wish to say about the *Harry Potter* series, it is not Nishida. More commonly people now sleep on the ground to buy a new product, either a game or a gadget. I do not think it is too much to say that something has been lost. I think that there is room to wish for a return by ordinary Japanese to themselves, to their own lives as a serious project to be properly reflected upon.

The photo has a direct bearing on my thesis in that Nishida's writings are notoriously difficult. My thesis is that the role of philosophy in today's university is to teach students to read such difficult texts.[2] We are to teach students to read these texts slowly, carefully, with understanding. As a British colleague of mine reminded me, in Britain it is proper to ask, "What did you read at university?" not "What did you study at university?".

I am not unaware that our students come to us by and large literate. They can read and write. But, not surprisingly, they struggle to read difficult texts; they are literate, not highly literate. It is unsurprising that students would struggle to read difficult texts; what is a cause for concern is that the university no longer sees itself as having the mission to teach this particular art. In fact, philosophy's central task in the university is to teach this art to today's students.

Allow me to clarify what I mean by "difficult" texts. First of all, difficult, in the way I intend it, does not simply equate with complex. There are difficult texts that are complex and others that are not. Nishida wrote in a very grammatically complex Japanese but this does not constitute the real difficulty of the text. Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote in a limpid French and yet his texts are, by my lights, extremely difficult.

In the context of what philosophy does at the university "difficult texts" are those texts that help us to reflect on ourselves in the human predicament. As I will show below, there is no direct approach to the human condition. Rather we reflect on ourselves and try to give that reflection an objective expression. This is done in both art and philosophy. Where philosophy differs from art is that it explicitly reflects on the difficulties inherent in giving an objective expression to my

[2] I must confess that I have been heavily influenced in my use of the word difficult here by Robin Kirkpatrick's excellent study, *Dante's Inferno: Difficulty and Dead Poetry* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). There he ties together the difficulty that character Dante faces in the poem with the difficulty the author Dante faced in writing the poem and how the overcoming of both led to a new, living poetry.

subjective and existential situation. Philosophy makes reflection itself the object of its reflection.

One way of making this clearer is by contrasting the notion of "difficulty" with the related notion of "accessibility." Part of what we do as educators is to make texts more accessible to our students. I am not opposed to this. I appreciate those who write clearly and break down complex ideas to simpler parts. Those of us who teach survey courses in philosophy must simplify some things in order to present a large amount of material in a limited amount of time. This can be done more or less skillfully. But here a different sort of problem arises.

Accessibility itself is subject to its own dialectic – not always, but often enough, the more accessible something becomes, the harder it becomes to grasp. The more any experience, but especially an experience of knowledge, is made available, the less one has of it. Certainly, the more one approaches the goal of knowledge the further away it recedes – the more we know, the more we know that we do not know. One can distinguish two levels to this dialectic. A more general level that applies to varying degrees to any experience and the more radical level of knowing oneself, which is the source of the dialectic in its more general forms.

Philosophy is critical, then, to higher education today because philosophy alone, out of all the disciplines, makes this dialectic an object of its reflection. I believe that the lack of appreciation of this dialectic is one of the major stumbling blocks to getting an education at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Let us begin with the dialectic more common form. It occurs even on the level of physical accessibility. To borrow an example from the American novelist Walker Percy, in the sixteenth century the Grand Canyon was a very difficult place to reach and one can imagine Gracía López de Cárdenas's awe when the ground opened beneath his feet after his ordeal of crossing hundreds of miles of mesquite.[3] In sharp contrast, we drive right up to the rim, get out, take a few pictures and leave. Have we *seen* the Grand Canyon? How does our experience compare with García López?

In the university, we are not sightseeing. But the experience is not totally different either. We present our students with some of the greatest texts ever

[3] This example appears in Chapter 2, "The Loss of the Creature" of his book *The Message in the Bottle: How Queer Man Is, How Queer Language Is, and What One Has to Do with the Other* (New York, Picador, 2000). He opens the chapter with these words: "Every explorer names his island Formosa, beautiful. To him it is beautiful because, being first, he has access to it and can see it for what it is. But to no one else is it ever as beautiful - except the rare man who manages to recover it, who knows that has to be recovered."

produced by the human race: Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and so on. Further, these texts come in translation and in relatively inexpensive paperback editions. One can download all the published works of Kant for free. We have numerous commentaries and introductions. In other words, we have constructed roads that lead right up to the rim of these texts. The very existence of these introductory books indicates a desire, an implicit recognition on the part of people that they lack something vital and important to which they are cultural heirs but which they cannot somehow grasp.

So the question emerges: Are our students actually engaging the text on any deeper level than earlier generations of students who had none of these advantages? Or are all these attempts at making the texts accessible somehow obstructing the students approach? Do we educate the students to the fact that text "has to be *re*covered" by each one of them? Dare we teach them that, in the words of Flannery O'Connor,

> the artist uses his reason to discover an answering reason in everything he sees. For him, to be reasonable is to find in the object, in the situation, in the sequence, the spirit which makes it itself. This is not an easy or simple thing to do. It is to intrude upon the timeless, and that is only done by the violence of a single-minded respect for the truth (O'Connor, 1962, 82-3).

This experience with philosophy and literature is nowhere more striking than when it comes to knowledge of ourselves. Rousseau wrote that the inscription at the temple Delphi, "Know thyself" is the most important and most unheeded of the moral precepts. But he also explains why. "So that it is, in a sense, by dint of studying man that we have made ourselves incapable of knowing him" (Rousseau,1992 12). Recall also Nietzsche's haunting words as opens *The Genealogy of Morals*: "We knowers are unknown to ourselves, and for a good reason: how can we ever hope to find what we have never looked for?[…]The sad truth is that we remain necessarily strangers to ourselves, we don't understand our own substance, we *must* mistake ourselves; the axiom, 'Each man is farthest from himself' will hold for to all eternity. Of ourselves we are not 'knowers'…." (Nietzsche, 1990, 149).

The peculiar mode of human self-consciousness is such that a person can gain knowledge of many external facts – the size of Neptune, the aggressive nature of meerkats, the trend of incomes in present-day China – and still be relatively

clueless about who she is. To ourselves, we seem to have an identity that slides between the capacity for marvelous insights, acts of real charity and incredible obtuseness and viciousness. All of us share in St. Paul's plaintive words: "I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate. […] I can will what his right, but I cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do (Rom. 7:15-19).

This radical form of the problem of accessibility is part of the human condition with all of the ethical, epistemological, and metaphysical considerations that implies. Again, philosophy makes this human condition an explicit object of its reflection, and this is the critical point, none of the other knowledge gained in a university will have any meaning without this exploration. Without this all the other studies will be mere information.

But this perennial problem has its contemporary form. The university in the twenty-first century makes its aim to provide an education in the most effective way possible. It provides more and more services to its students. It accommodates more and more diversity. It tracks student learning, it analyses student progress. It requires us as faculty to develop measurable learning outcomes so that we can show that students have gained knowledge that they did not previously possess.

I do not mean to disparage these efforts, in fact I support them. I merely wish to point out a hidden trap that, if we are not aware of it, and if we do not make our students aware of it, can undermine all of our attempts at education in the very attempts we make.

One can provide information about the cosmos in very digestible bite-size units and then test the students to show that they have, in fact, learned something. But one cannot increase a student's self-knowledge or self awareness in the same way. In fact, the very attempt to do so will necessarily backfire. The more we render the student an object to be grasped, the further away the self to be grasped will drift from the self doing the grasping.

I will go further and say that all of our attempts at making an education "easier," more accessible, more accommodating have this unwanted but unavoidable consequence. The process ends up making learning, the grasping of the true essence of something, more and more difficult. This explains the malaise that we often experience in the classroom in which students, brought into contact with the greatest art, literature, thought, and sciences, respond with bored yawn and wonder when the class will be over, when they can collect their credit, collect their degree and get out. Please believe me, I am not blaming the student.

Philosophy is the one discipline that reflects on this inherent difficulty in education and includes ways of helping the student become self-aware and thus begin not so much to overcome this obstacle as to live within its tension. The idea that the closer something is brought to someone, the more it recedes from his or her grasp is a central anthropological insight about which philosophy reflects. Other philosophers may speak about this problem in a different vocabulary than mine but all the great philosophers have recognized this problem. We can begin with Socratic irony which intends to prevent a direct grasp of what is being communicated and end with Heidegger's reflection that the most thought-provoking thing in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking. Plato used the dialogic form in order to force the reader to grapple with what he was trying to express. The more straightforward philosophical treatise exemplifies the dialectic of accessibility in that it seems easier to analyze; it seems more accessible, while, in fact, it only makes this grappling harder because the reader can suffer from the false impression that one needs merely to grasp the reasons and the conclusions that follow necessarily from them. But neither Hume nor Kant can be approached in such a straightforward fashion without missing the depth of what they are trying to express. The beauty of philosophy is when the student recovers for him or herself that depth.

Philosophy is not having information about a philosopher, nor having his or her texts memorized. The one thing necessary for philosophy is the struggle to understand what the philosopher thought, what the philosopher is obliquely trying to communicate through a series of words on the page. This is not done without a certain amount of struggle. These efforts at making something accessible can function as the gateway to an encounter with the mind of great philosopher, if they remind the student of the struggle involved. I do not despise the popularizers. I just want all of us to realize that each time we move the goal closer, it recedes. Letting students struggle with difficult texts is not a bad thing. Students need to be aware that a liberal education is a struggle for the truth that requires a single-mindedness that is not gained in a day. One has to wrest the truth from all of the paraphernalia that the modern university has become and one has to be aware of the need for this wresting.[4]

[4] In the spirit of what I am saying, let me complicate the picture just a bit more. The false conclusion of what I have been arguing is: "Anything that can be rendered accessible is, in the end, not worth having." This is to fall into the opposite trap. One realizes that one must struggle to understand the great texts and then one incorporates the obstacles into the desired object - one thinks that only that over which one has to struggle has worth. The greatest

So far I have argued that philosophy's task is to teach students to read difficult texts and that by difficult I do not simply mean complex but refer to a quality of self-reflection that makes all attempts at a direct grasp useless. By this argument I believe that I have already begun to answer the common objection to the study of philosophy – that it is somehow impractical or useless. To the objection that philosophy bakes no bread, one can only respond, Man does not live by bread alone. That is, without this quality of self-reflection that philosophy helps to provide, all our other studies run the risk of being worse than useless, of being harmful.

The counter argument generally takes the following form. There is one species of knowledge about which there is universal agreement that it is universal: mathematics and the hard sciences, or not to put too fine a point on it, the STEM disciplines. If the university is to teach universal knowledge, and both I and my opponents agree on this, then their conclusion is, to teach those things that everyone can agree are true.

This issue has become, once again, a "hot" issue, in the light of efforts by some in the Japanese Ministry of Education, Cultures, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) to greatly reduce or eliminate the humanities and social sciences in higher education, while increasing the funding and manpower dedicated to the so-called STEM areas.[5] At the Japan Philosophical Association meeting in May of 2016, its President, Yasushi Kato, gave an importance defense of philosophy's place in university education.[6] Such reflections are important because they help each of us to be able, should we be called upon, to give an adequate account to the public as well as to various officials of the necessity of our work.

In speaking to other philosophers, though, I would characterize the problem with this position is that precisely the STEM disciplines cannot account for themselves or for the human who practices them. I again turn to Percy in order to argue that "when the functional method [of science] is elevated to a total organon of reality and other cognitive claims denied, the consequence must be an antinomy, for

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treasures offer themselves gratuitously. One overcomes the obstacles in order to receive something freely.

[5] The controversy began due to a letter sent on June 8, 2015 from Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) that apparently called on national universities to close or reorganize their humanities and social sciences propgrams in favour of more practical, vocational education. See http://apjjf.org/-Jeff-Kingston/4381 for an overview in English.

[6] Please see pp. 8-23 of this journal for the text of this talk.

a nonradical instrument is being required to construe the more radical reality which it presupposes but does not understand" (Percy, 2000, 240).

The scientific method posits a world in which "every detailed occurrence can be correlated with its antecedents in a perfectly definite manner exemplifying general principles" (Percy, 2000, 222). On the other hand, culture can be defined as "the ensemble of all the modes of assertory activity" (Percy, 2000, 222). Here Percy is following Ernst Cassirer and viewing culture as made up of "symbolic forms." That is, culture is the totality of different ways in which the human spirit construes the world and asserts its knowledge and belief. But neither Percy nor Cassirer draws the simple conclusion that given this, then culture is "placed beyond the reach of objective knowledge in general and the scientific method in particular" (Percy, 2000, 223). Rather, an assertion is a real event in time and space and, as such, it can be and has been investigated. So the question that has to be asked is not whether it can be done - it has been done and fact proves possibility, but whether or not such investigations lead to an antinomy - two trains of equally valid thought or argument that lead to two contradictory conclusions. Percy argues that is does.

This antinomy is seen most clearly in the different ways that scientists think about and talk about myths. On the one hand, judging the assertion that "Maui, our ancestor, trapped the wandering sun and made it follow a regular course" as true-or-false claim, scientists are unanimous in declaring it false. There is no evidence that Maui did any such thing, or even that the being Maui actually exists.

On the other hand, if the scientist thinks of the assertion not as a true-or-false claim but sees the assertion itself as a phenomenon under consideration (as in an anthropological study of the mythic mind) then judgments vary. There are those who hold that that myths are in some sense true. Others would hold that myths are necessary for the function of society and that our modern society is impoverished by its lack of myth. We require a new mythology or the recovery of archetypes. A "re-enchantment" of the world.

In this case, Percy observes, the mythical consciousness is not evaluated "according as it is true or false or nonsensical, but according to the degree to which it serves a social or cultural function" (Percy, 2000, 225). And this means that it is a mistake to judge a myth using scientific standards and to proclaim the myth false. A myth can be symbolically true as it satisfies the symbolic needs of the society. But as Percy comments, "the antinomy is manifest in the very usage of the word *myth* by modern ethnologists." On the one hand it is a value-charged term. Myth means a belief which is "not true." On the other hand, the term myth is used neutrally, "as

data-element along with other data-elements, canoes, baskets, dwellings" (Percy, 2000, 225). The result is the prescriptive stance that a culture needs that which the scientist knows to be false. However, this prescription cannot work (and the scientist knows this), if the myth is believed to be false.

This leads to a certain schizophrenia in both the scientific community and the culture at large. We know certain things are false but we somehow need to prop them up in order to enhance our well-being. It ends up postulating two types of humans - those who need myths and those (scientists) who observe and tell the truth. But there are not two types of humans. Rather the antinomy results from the limitations of the scientific method itself.

The scientific method is itself not simply a nexus of cause and event but an assertory or cultural activity. I will follow Percy in summarising the difference between the object of the scientific method and the method itself in the following terms:

> One is a dynamic succession of energy states, the other is an assertion, an immaterial act by which two *entia rationis* are brought into a relation of intentional identity. Both these elements, world event and symbolic assertion, are provided for in the scientific method but it is a topical provision such that a symbolic assertion, *S* is *P*, *E=f(*C), is admitted as the sort of activity which takes place between scientists but is not admitted as a phenomenon under observation. A scientific assertion is received only as a true-or-false claim, which is then proved or disproved by examining the world event to which it refers. *The symbolic assertion cannot itself be examined as a world event unless it be construed as such, as a material event of energy exchanges, in which case its assertory character must be denied*. (Percy, 2000, 237)

Percy goes on to explain that at the subcultural level of phenomena the antinomy does not occur because this distinction between world event and intersubjective assertion holds. But when culture itself becomes the object of scientific investigation the assertion has to be accepted both as a true-or-false claim between scientists and as phenomenon under investigation. The assertion has to be

fitted into the scheme of "event *C* leads to event *E*." But this is impossible. "An assertion is a real event but it is not a space-time event" (Percy, 2000, 237). When one attempts to order an assertion into the scheme of world events then either the assertory character is denied, or it is accepted as an assertion but not as a world event. "The final result is an antinomy with scientists interpreting the same event in a contradictory fashion, as a world event and denying its assertory character, as an assertory event, a true-or-false claim, but refusing to examine it as such" (Percy, 2000, 237).

For his part Percy proposes a radical anthropology that does not stop at the functional linkages of space-time events but includes an account of the scientific method's elements and structures. An "account of the scientific method's elements and structures" is a philosophy of science. It is part of an account of the human as being who can flourish or wither in an astonishing variety of ways that do not at all correlate with good and bad environments.

Thus, a concentration on STEM subjects will lead to a worsening of the already present situation – citizens who know more and more about the world around them and less and less about their own place in it. No is seriously calling for the abandonment or reduction of STEM subjects. There is capital available for these important enterprises and certainly the government and its ministry in Japan and other countries is right to be concerned about these subjects. What I am arguing for is an equal concern for the persons who carry out these activities. These people also need an understanding of themselves.

A better understanding of reality through a better understanding of the self through a better of understanding of difficult texts is the crux of my argument. A "difficult text" then does not refer to one that is "unnecessarily complex" and knowledge of self is an ongoing struggle. These two things work together in a university education because what makes a text "difficult" is that it demands that I change myself in order to understand the it and in so changing myself I also am able to come to some knowledge of myself. Human beings long for change and loathe it. This is also the structure of reading a difficult text – I am drawn to it and I resist it. And this is universal. It is as true of the works of Nishida as it is of the works of Kant. All great texts lead to this point.

I have approached the task of philosophy first from the ground up, as it were, arguing that the basic act of philosophy is to read and understand a text written by another philosopher. In conjunction with this I have also showed why excessive reliance on the STEM disciplines will lead to an antinomy. Now I want to approach

the problem more from the top down, looking at the definition of the university and thinking through the role that philosophy can and should play in it.

John Henry Newman wrote at the beginning of his classic, *The Idea of a University*, that a university is " the place where universal knowledge is taught." He cannot simply be referring to things like mathematics and physics whose research results remain invariant through time and space. Rather, "universal" refers to a quality by which the knowledge has an effect on every person who receives it. Universal knowledge is addressed to everyone and yet reaches him in his particular circumstances.

This becomes clear if we look at the three traditional faculties of the university: medicine, law, and theology. Medicine is not the faculty of biology, rather it teaches the art of healing each and every human in the particular circumstances of his or her illness. Law teaches more than general precepts of what is allowed and what is not allowed, but teaches jurisprudence, the art of judging what law is to be applied and how it is to be applied in each particular case. Finally, theology does not teach general thoughts on God, but teaches how the message of the Gospel is to be understood so that it may be taught to each person in their particular situation.

Further, medicine, law, and theology are universal because all human beings need, want, and deserve good health, a just society, and proper relation with God. That is, these disciplines teach the universal knowledge of which Newman speaks and without which no place of learning can be a university.

If one accepts this, then what is the role of philosophy in the university? It seems to me that it is to enable the student to think universally, that is, to understand or to comprehend the universal knowledge that we are teaching them. We can specify this by saying, that philosophy's task in the university of today is to show that there is such a thing as universal knowledge and to teach the student how to receive it.

We can further specify this by saying that the way in which one shows that there is such a thing as universal knowledge and teaches students to comprehend it is by teaching them how to read difficult texts – texts that either impart universal knowledge or impart knowledge in a universal way.

Finally, this can be even further specified for present day Japan. The role of philosophy in the age of digital devices and instant messaging and tweets is to teach university students how to, slowly and carefully, read relatively long and difficult texts.

Our students come to us with a highly developed set of skills. Generally, they are good test takers, good note takers, good at finding answers to limited questions and skilled at finding where the answers might be. All of our students are literate, they can read and write Japanese and not a few of them can read a fairly complex passage in English.

Through no fault of their own, most of our students cannot read a difficult philosophical or literary text. While they are literate, they are not highly literate. Our task is to make them highly literate, to teach them to read difficult texts.

The first kind of difficulty that students encounter in the university is that of complexity and ambiguity. We have already established that is not the difficulty at which philosophy aims. Students find in the university that things are no longer clear-cut; there are no clear right and wrong answers. Different interpreters offer different views on the same text and these views often clash with one another. There is a real value in reading these complex texts, texts whose grammar and syntax is unfamiliar. It enables the student to hold a complex thought in mind, to see different aspects of a problem simultaneously and to accept that it is often a messy world.

The second level of difficulty is the one in which philosophy has an interest. It occurs when the work makes you face a reality that you would rather not. An example is Rousseau's famous *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences*, in which he responded with a resounding 'No' to the question of whether the Arts and Sciences improved morals. Europeans were proud of their technical, scientific progress and equated it with having a higher moral standard than the primitive peoples about which they were hearing. Say what you will about Rousseau's "noble savage," he did force European intellectuals to look at their own lack of virtue, their hypocrisy, and their smug satisfaction. The university is the time and the place that many students learn of the failings of their society. They learn about the problems of poverty and injustice. They learn about unequal distributions of resources and exploitation. They explore the issues of discrimination and gender. This is an important moment in their development.

But let's be honest. Rousseau's *First Discourse* won the prize from Academy of Dijon that year, that is, the Academy loved hearing how depraved the Academy was. Our students enjoy hearing about how corrupt the establishment is. We can all enjoy either a Marxist or a capitalist critique of the present situation. We may get discouraged but a lot of social critique is used to either make me feel good about myself (I am not part of the establishment) or make me feel romantically bad about

the state of the world (things are terrible, but that is way things are). We are sad, but not too sad.

I do not mean to belittle this moment in which we shock our students into awareness of issues or problems about which, up till that point, they have been blissfully unaware. I do not mean that none of these shocks ever bear fruit. When one talks to very dedicated people, their commitment often is rooted in some experience at the university that opened their eyes and gave their life direction. Philosophy plays a role in this opening of the eyes and in giving some direction.

But I think for that to really happen, we have to reach a new level of difficulty: the internal difficulty of allowing one's self to be challenged by a truth whose shape we cannot really anticipate, the level for which we use the word, conversion. Both streams of the Western tradition, Greek philosophy and Judeo-Christian thought, begin and end with the notion of conversion or change. Plato gives classic expression to it in his allegory of the cave, in which the denizen of the cave is dragged up kicking and screaming into the light and then returns to the cave to tell others about what exists outside the cave (to their utter amusement). The Christian Gospel's message is simply, "Repent, and believe the Good News." This is what makes a text difficult in the way that I intend. They are not difficult in the way that theoretical physics or pure mathematics is difficult. They are difficult because of the real possibility they embody to change the reader. The classic works of the tradition put demands on the reader. All of them proclaim with Rainer Maria Rilke "You must change your life." George Steiner expresses it in this way:

> The archaic torso in Rilke's famous poem says to us: "change your life". So do any poem, novel, play, painting, musical composition worth meeting. The voice of intelligible form, of the needs of direct address from which such form springs, asks: 'What do you feel, what do you think of the possibilities of life, of the alternative shapes of being which are implicit in your experience of me, in our encounter?' The indiscretion of serious art and literature and music is total. It queries the last privacies of our existence (Steiner, 1989, 142).[7]

[7] The whole work should be consulted. It contains both an appreciation and critique of deconstruction with which I find myself in sympathy. More profoundly, Steiner wrestles

Now this proclamation of the need to change is both desired and feared by the reader, by our students, and it is the role of philosophy to develop in students the inner resources so that they can allow their own selves to be challenged and changed on the most intimate level of their existence. Only then does one become capable of grasping universal knowledge.

Thus, by "difficult texts" I mean challenging texts and the challenges exist on multiple levels. The works that we teach them to read will challenge them intellectually, morally, and spiritually. The texts will often, but not always, have a certain level of complexity. They will be the kind of texts that students do not naturally want to read. They will be the kind of texts that change the reader.

But how are we to be changed, how are we to allow ourselves to be challenged on this level of our being in order to reach the truth? I am posing a question here that echoes a question addressed to Jesus in the Gospel of Luke: "How do I inherit eternal life?" Jesus is asked this by a lawyer. This is perhaps the deepest question that one can ask. How do I integrate my life into such a unity that it has eternal significance, that it extends beyond death? Jesus asks in return, "What is written in the Law? How do you read?" He is, of course, referring to the text that Christians know as the Old Testament, but let us recall what the Old Testament was to the Jews of his time. It was not simply a "religious" text that could be set up over against other religious texts or secular texts. The Old Testament was everything to the Jewish people: their legal system, their founding myth, their history, their poetry, their philosophy, their prayer. It was their difficult text, the text that formed and reformed them. When Jesus asks, "How do you read?", he is saying that how you read will determine how your life will go. How you read difficult texts opens up the possibility of death and life. How you accept or reject what you read in difficult texts has eternal consequences. The answer to the deepest questions in our lives is answered by how we read. The way that we read texts is the way that we will read the world, read each other. By teaching our students to read difficult texts we will teach them to answer for themselves the most important questions, not just for once, but for the rest of their lives.

The works that we teach our students to read have the capacity to reorient their lives in this way. In order to truly understand them it is not enough to be intelligent, one has to allow one's thinking to be turned upside down. One has to

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with the central question that I only hint at: Can there be real literature and great art in the absence of God or is God implied in these acts?

allow one's old vision to pass into blindness so that a new vision can be born. We see things differently, which means that we have become different persons.

Now, this is not a one off deal. One does not read the great works and say, 'Well, now I am done with that.' It is an ongoing, constant process that has certain key, unpredictable moments we can look back on.

To return to the image of the people waiting for Nishida's book. It holds the key for us. These people's lives had been undone. They suffered the loss of brothers and sons. They were defeated and devastated. Their homes had been burnt, their cities destroyed. Such was the price that they had to pay, the ordeal they had to undergo in order for reality to be revealed to them. While we do not wish that for ourselves or for anyone else, we do not know when our world might erupt into violence again. Should that happen, we will respond as best we may. But even in quiet times, philosophy can quietly prepare the person for the challenges ahead. Kant serves as a good example. Here is a man who lived a relatively quiet life on the exterior. As is well known, he hardly left the area of Königsberg. Certainly, external events, such as the French Revolution, affected him and affected him deeply. But these were always mediated by the two great softening agents of time and space. Nevertheless, Kant was able to let himself be undone time and time again. Each new work represents a kind of breakthrough, reflects an interior upheaval that can be called a conversion. That this process never stopped is testified to by the *Opus Postumum*.

We spoke above about the dialectic of access, of how making something more accessible renders it less so. Building roads makes the place easier to get to but harder to experience. The point is not: Do not build roads. The point is certainly not, cover up the roads that are there. The point is to teach our students that all of these roads only lead to the edge of what matters. Once you are at the edge, what you do, how you think, the kind of attention that you are capable of paying becomes critical. We are helping our students to develop the capacity to pay real attention to reality.

A final point: the truth is that there are few roads into the world of academic philosophy in Japan for the non-Japanese. Most of our colleagues in the wide world remain ignorant of the current of thoughts that flow through these islands. And so here we have something small but to my mind significant. The Japanese Philosophical Association has decided to inaugurate an English-language journal. That is, the Japanese philosophic community has decided to lower a barrier, to allow more open access and to share itself with the larger community. I cannot help but think that this is hopeful sign of the commitment we share to bringing our students

into contact with the difficult but rich tradition which philosophy is. It is a sign of openness that is consistent with everything I have written about philosophy's role in today's university.

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Is there Japanese / Latin American philosophy? : A reflection on philosophy in university

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Abstract: *In Japan as well as in Latin America, it has been repeatedly asked: "Is there a Japanese philosophy?" and "Is there a Latin American philosophy?" Both the questions and answers contain parallelism. Indeed, there are two major viewpoints with regard to the question; I call them "contextualism" and "universalism" here. The former insists that philosophy has to be rooted in a geographically and historically specific context; consequently, it tends to affirm that each region has its own philosophy. However, the latter highlights the universal validity of intellectual activities, such as examining arguments or grounds of beliefs. From this standpoint, it would not be worthwhile to persistently ask whether or not there is an original philosophy of a region. In this paper, I do not try to find a correct answer to the question. Rather, I am interested in examining Japanese and Latin American contexts in which this kind of question has been asked. I suggest that the question comes from a historical context wherein these two regions: 1) have imported philosophy from the Occidental countries; 2) have done so massively since the second half of the 19th century; 3) have asked this question as one of the subjects in the university system, which was established or redefined in the process of the formation of modern nation states. I further suggest that, on such a historical background, the philosophy researchers of both regions face the following three difficulties: i) isolation from society or lack of understanding on the part of the public; ii) an absence of dialogue or sincere criticism among colleague scholars; and iii) heteronomy of thinking. Finally, I would like to substitute the above-mentioned question with a new one in order to direct the focus of the problem toward autonomous thinking.*

Introduction

Although Japanese and Latin American philosophy have never had much direct contact, they have faced similar doubts which can be expressed as "Is there Japanese philosophy?" and "Is there Latin American philosophy?" Scholars of

philosophy in both regions have repeatedly asked whether or not they have been working on their own philosophy in a genuine sense. In this paper, I first point out the very fact that Japanese and Latin American philosophy have often raised similar questions, though they have never been aware of each other's situation. Secondly, I suggest that the root of this question can be found in the similar historical backgrounds of the two regions, as both of them: 1) have imported philosophy from the Occidental countries; 2) have done so massively since the second half of the 19th century; and 3) have asked this question as one of the subjects in the university system, which was established or redefined in the process of the formation of modern nation states. In contrast to European philosophy, philosophy in these regions has been limited to the university system within the modern nation state regime. I further suggest that, on such a historical background, philosophical studies in both regions have the following three difficulties: i) isolation from society or lack of understanding on the part of the public; ii) an absence of dialogue or sincere criticism among colleague scholars; and iii) heteronomy of thinking. The last aim of this paper is to substitute the question with another one with the purpose of redefining the framework of discussion.

1. Parallelism between Japan and Latin America: "Is there … Philosophy?"

It is strinking to find that through the history of philosophical studies in Japan and Latin America scholars have repeatedly raised similar questions.

In Japan, in 1901, Chomin Nakae said that "in my country, Japan, there has been no philosophy from the ancient times till now"[1]. It is clear that this implicitly constitutes a negative answer to the above-mentioned question. Since then, Japanese philosophical scholars have repeatedly raised a similar question and this trend has not declined up to the present day[2]. In Latin America, this question and related discussions are more explicit. The works of Risieri Frondizi and Augusto Salazar Bondy, published in 1949 and 1968, respectively, had precisely similar questions as

[1] Chomin Nakae, *Ichinen Yu Han. Zoku Ichinen Yu Han*, Iwanami Bunko, 1995, 31.
[2] For example, Tomomi Asakura recently published an exciting book whose title means "Is it true that there is no philosophy in East Asia?": "*Higashi Asia ni Tetsugaku ha Nai" noka*? Iwanami Gendai Zensho, 2014. The articles of Masakatsu Fujita and Megumi Sakabe in the following book are also informative on this point: Masakatsu Fujita (ed.), *Chi no Zahyojiku. Nihon ni okeru Tetsugaku no Keisei to sono Kanousei*, Koyo shobo, 2000.

their titles, and are now considered classics of Latin American philosophy[3]. Salazar Bondy refers to Juan Bautista Alberdi's article in 1842[4] as one of the earliest precursors in this field. These Japanese and Latin American philosophers appear to have a common motivation that drives them to question the very existence of their own philosophy[5].

It is equally striking to find that there are similar patterns among the answers to this question in both regions. There are two typical viewpoints in this respect, which can be tentatively called here "contextualism" and "universalism"[6]. Theoretically, each viewpoint can supply positive or negative answers to the question. However, we can seemingly observe the following general tendencies: those who support contextualism insist on the relevance of the question and are inclined to give a positive answer; whereas those who support universalism are not interested in whether there is an original philosophy in their own countries and

[3] Risieri Frondizi, "Is There an Ibero-American Philosophy?", in: *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 9 (3), 1949, 345-355; Augusto Salazar Bondy, *¿Existe una filosofía de nuestra América?*, Siglo XXI, 2ª, 1988 (1ª, 1968).

[4] Juan Bautista Alberdi, "Ideas para presidir a la confección del curso de filosofía contemporánea", in: Zea, L. (comp.), *Fuentes de la cultura latinoamericana* I, México: FCE, 1993.

[5] As my aim in this paper is to illuminate the parallelism between Japanese and Latin American philosophical studies, I cannot examine, and still less provide an answer to, questions such as what constitutes Japanese or Latin American philosophy; whether Buddhist, Confucianist, or Kokugaku studies in pre-modern Japan can be considered philosophical in the genuine sense; and whether Nahuatl philosophy existed. Here, I focus on Japanese and Latin American philosophical studies since the mid-19th century because, as I show below, their common historical context was formed then.

[6] As for the Latin American context, although each author denominates the typical attitudes differently, the major division into two is widely accepted: Francisco Miró Quesada, *Despertar y proyecto del filosofar latinoamericano*, FCE, 1974, 12; Guillermo Hurtado, *El Búho y la Serpiente. Ensayos sobre la filosofía en México en el siglo XX*, UNAM, 2007, 20; Susana Nuccetelli, "Latin American Philosophy", in: Nuccetelli, Susana, Schutte, Ofelia, and Bueno, Otávio (eds.), *A Companion to Latin American Philosophy*, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 343-346. In Japan, the situation is not so clear-cut because there are not many explicit or public debates concerning this topic. However, I think basic attitudes correspond to the two mentioned above with regard to Latin America. In 2008 Akira Omine reported a debate about "philosophy of Japan" held in the annual meeting of the Kansai Philosophical Association in 1967. According to him, the debate was framed by the opposition between "an affirmation that the central stream of philosophy consists in Western philosophy which includes parts that deal with natural science" and another that "such a view is a prejudice and shortsighted": Akira Omine, ""Kimi Jishin ni Kaere" – Nihon no Tetsugaku no tameni", in: *Nihon no Tetsugaku* 9, 2008, 3. Roughly speaking, the former corresponds to universalism, the latter to contextualism.

easily deny the existence of Japanese and Latin American philosophy. Of course this is a generalization and there could be variations and exceptions attached to these tendencies. However, the important thing is to understand the main grounds of each position. In this respect, the tradition of Latin America, especially in Mexico, is beneficial because scholars in philosophy have discussed this topic more publicly than those in Japan. I believe that the main points of this discussion can be applied to Japan as well. Therefore, I present below a brief summary of the main grounds of each attitude[7].

Contextualism tends to demand that philosophy has some regional traits on the grounds that it is and should be based on the subject's particular circumstances. It affirms that Europeans as well as Mexicans start to think philosophically within a certain historical context. Indeed, European philosophers have reflected on the reality of their own society, religion, culture, etc. Equally, Latin American philosophers should not hesitate to discuss Latin American reality, for example, the problem of political, economic, cultural or intellectual dependence on Europe and the United States. Moreover, some scholars have argued that the reception of foreign philosophy is, in case it is internally motivated, inevitably its transformation. There is a thesis that Latin American reception of European philosophy is in reality a kind of creative interpretation. This process is itself an exercise of philosophy, in spite of the fact that foreign authors might consider its products as bad copies, in other words, wrong interpretations of the original thought. In addition, advocates of contextualism tend to tolerate fuzzier boundaries between philosophy and other subjects such as literature and "thought" ("Japanese premodern thought", "Mexican indigenous thought", "religious thought", etc.).

Some of them are criticized for making something national more desirable than the study of philosophy itself. In some cases, it is argued, works that are not philosophically sufficient for the international standard are celebrated as representatives of Latin American philosophy. In these cases the regional exotic traits are confusedly considered as conditions of philosophy.

On the other hand, universalism insists that philosophy is different from literature, thought, and other subjects. Universalists emphasize that philosophy is a rigorous and critical examination of grounds and arguments for a thesis. Such intellectual activities do not depend on any specific regional context. Moreover,

[7] The following is a brief summary of Hirotaka Nakano, "Practical Metaphilosophy: For inhabitants of two-storey houses", *Ochanomizu University studies in arts and culture* 12, 2015, 82-86.

according to them, there are universal topics which can be equally treated by everyone independently of their region, such as being, self, truth, time, etc. As long as philosophers dedicate themselves to these problems, it is irrelevant to ask where they live. From this point of view, it is a mere historical fact that philosophy in this sense was born in Ancient Greece and has been developed in Europe. If people in other regions want to practice philosophy, it is natural that they ought to learn it from Europe and make all efforts to attain the ability to create their own philosophy.

Against this type of universalism too, nevertheless, there are criticisms: so-called universal topics like "reason", "humanity", "self", etc. can in reality be ideals which express a local worldview that reflects only the Western modern culture. If such universalities are then imposed on people of a different background, they can serve as a means of oppression. In fact, Latin American modern history is full of suppression and exploitation of indigenous people under the name of universal "reason" or "humanity".

However, universalism does not always deny the need for confrontation with concrete circumstances of the place where a philosopher lives. There are some scholars who affirm that philosophy should be rooted in a subject's own reality, but according to them this is not sufficient for authentic philosophy. They maintain that it is wrong to consider the relation to one's own reality as a sufficient condition of philosophy. The main task consists in the critical and strict assessment of arguments. For this reason many scholars learn European philosophy as a necessary first step to realize their own, original philosophy someday.

However, there are not many philosophers who advance to the next step, in other words, to the creation of their original philosophy. The majority end up spending their entire philosophical life as researchers of a specific part of European philosophy. Since they study philosophical problems based on European reality and formed by that particular historical context, they have to learn the European context too. They often give preference to knowing European historical reality over confronting their own. They originally intended to reflect on their own circumstances and exercise rigorous examination of arguments with respect to it. However, they eventually only learn philosophy made by European philosophers in European reality.

Although this brief summary of the main points of contextualism and universalism is based on the discussion held among Latin American scholars, I believe that it is, *mutatis mutandis*, valid for the Japanese situation too. If it is

correct, then there is parallelism in not only the questions but also the answers of these two regions. Such a parallelism is quite significant because Japanese and Latin American philosophy have never had direct contact with each other in significant magnitude until today. Unintentionally independent of each other, they have become interested in similar problems and have developed similar answers concerning them. It seems reasonable to interpret this parallelism as grounded on a structural necessity assigned to those who try to study philosophy culturally and geographically far from the center of philosophy. As a matter of fact, today, the center is located in Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States. Scholars outside these regions cannot usually separate the study of philosophy from the learning of a foreign language, foreign culture and the history of a foreign land. Philosophy exercised in that center is not originally a part of their own tradition and, therefore, they have to learn from outside what has been done up until now in the center. The purpose of this learning is to advance someday to the next step in which they may be able to create philosophy on their own account. That is why the question that concerns us in this paper is crucial and urgent for scholars working in philosophy in these regions.

Parallelism exists also in the sense that the question still remains actual and valid more than a century after it was first raised. At the end of the 20th century, Yoshimichi Nakajima noted that younger scholars tried less and less to create something original and focused more on studying a small area of Occidental philosophy[8]. It is certain that there are studies of philosophy in Japan, but it is not evident whether there is a Japanese philosophy[9]. In Latin America too, Francisco Miró Quesada provided a historical review of Latin American philosophy in 1974 and described a similar problem. According to him, philosophers of the younger generation were in doubt as to whether they had already achieved the philosophical creation which their teachers expected of them. Philosophers of previous generations received Western philosophy so that the younger generation could someday create its own original philosophy. However, the reality was that there were many young scholars devoted to the study of specific areas of Western philosophy without studying the real circumstances of Latin America[10]. This trend continues today, although Miró Quesada later gave a more positive evaluation of the situation of

[8] Yoshimichi Nakajima, *Tetsugakusha toha Nanika*, Chikuma Gakugei Bunko, 2000, 40.
[9] Nakajima listed some Japanese names as "philosophers" such as Shozo Omori and Wataru Hiromatsu, considering them as "exceptional": *Ibid*., 18-19.
[10] Miró Quesada, *Despertar y proyecto*, 81-83.

Latin American philosophy[11]. Indeed, other scholars continue to notice similar problems[12]. In short, the doubt concerning the existence of Japanese and Latin American philosophy has not only remained unsolved but has increased over the course of time.

As I mentioned in the Introduction, one of my purposes in this paper is to point out the parallelism between Japanese and Latin American philosophy. It seems important for us to know that there are others in a similar situation, raising similar questions and answering them in a similar way. Otherwise, scholars working on Occidental philosophy are liable to fall (and sometimes have fallen) into a simplistic self-estimation which results from a dichotomy between Western and Eastern cultures, or between Europe and Latin America[13]. They tend to compare their own activities only with that of Europe or the United States, and as a result every characteristic that differs from the European or the North American context appears to be unique for them. It is true that every culture is particular and unique, but scholars sometimes forget the fact that their own culture is not the only exception, but one of many unique cultures. They sometimes ignore other countries outside of the Occidental or Western culture, as if only it and their own culture existed for them, even though there are other marginal cultures that share similar problems. The consequence is that they fail to grasp the universal and structural aspect of their own situation: the question "is there a … philosophy?" is common for those who share a certain historical background concerning philosophy. Now we turn to the next section to examine this point in more detail.

2. Philosophy in the Modern University

Although Japan and Latin America are geographically and culturally distinct, they have a similar historical context with respect to philosophy. The second purpose of this paper is to suggest, though not prove, that this common philosophical context is a ground which has bred a similar question in these regions. There are three

[11] Francisco Miró Quesada, "Posibilidad y limites de una filosofía latinoamericana", in: *Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica* XVI(43), 1978, 75-82.
[12] Hurtado, *El Búho y la Serpiente*, 23-26; Carlos Pereda, *La filosofía en México en el siglo XX. Apuntes de un participante*, CONACULTA, 2013, 42-43.
[13] As Kohsaka points out, Japanese scholars in the first stage of the reception of philosophy assigned themselves to realize an assimilation of the Orient and Occident: Shiro Kohsaka, "Touyou to Seiyou no Tougou", in: *Nihon no Tetsugaku* 8, 2007.

points to discuss here: Philosophy in these regions was imported 1) from outside, in other words, the Occidental world; 2) mainly in the 19th century while countries were rebuilt as modern nation states; and 3) as a subject of the university education system. Of course, the two regions have various differences even in terms of philosophy and the history of its reception. However, in this paper I focus on the similar background which necessitated a common question.

The first point is almost self-evident, but fundamental. Before Japan and Latin America imported philosophy from the Occidental world, they did not have anything precisely corresponding to it. It is true that there had been intellectual activities in its tradition. Japan had a long and rich tradition of intellectual inquiry in areas including Buddhism, Confucianism, and studies of Japanese classical literature (*Kokugaku*). Equally, Latin America has some great Pre-Hispanic civilizations which included rich intellectual activities that can sometimes be interpreted as philosophy[14]. However, it is at least controversial to identify these traditional forms of intellectual activity with philosophy. Everyone who dares to do so has a responsibility for justifying it and explaining the sense in which he/she uses the term "philosophy". This fact already shows that philosophy in the strict sense was originally absent in these regions and imported from abroad at a certain point of their national history.

As for the second point, it is widely accepted that the reception of philosophy in Japan substantially started in the second half of the 19th century. It is true that there had been various comments and reports made by the Japanese concerning philosophy in Western Europe before this time. However, such references to philosophy were rather isolated and partial, and not systematic. The Japanese term "Tetsugaku" was coined by Amane Nishi in 1874 in his *Hyakuichi Shinron*. Ernest Fenollosa started to teach philosophy in Tokyo University in 1878. These were the initial signs of a systematic Japanese reception of philosophy as a united subject.

While this second point is not controversial in relation to Japan, it may be objected that in Latin America philosophy was already introduced in the colonial period. In fact, colonial rulers founded universities in Mexico, Lima, and Santo Domingo in the 16th century, which offered higher education modeled on traditional Liberal Arts[15]. Therefore, students knew Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas,

[14] Miguel León-Portilla, *La filosofía náhuatl estudiada en sus fuentes*, UNAM, 1956.
[15] Luis Fernando Restrepo, "Colonial Thought" in: Nuccetelli, Schutte, and Bueno (eds.), *A Companion to Latin American Philosophy*, 37.

Duns Scotus, Francisco Suárez, etc. Later, Bacon, Descartes, Newton, Galileo were also introduced. However, according to Salazar Bondy, philosophical reflections during this period were made from the Spanish perspective[16]. In other words, the people who studied philosophy did not understand themselves as Latin American, but instead as Spanish. Moreover, Miró Quesada observed that this tradition was not passed on to the younger generations during the time of Independence[17]. It was in the middle or the second half of the 19th century that each country rearranged university education and began to import subjects including philosophy. This time emphasis was placed on modern philosophy, especially positivism. On the other hand, Risieri Frondizi affirms that it was after overcoming positivism during the 19th century that philosophy in this region became independent, in other words, it was studied for its own sake, rather than for the sake of political change[18]. In Latin America, in contrast to Japan, it is surely impossible to determine a starting point of continuous philosophical development up to the present time. Nevertheless, it is not meaningless to consider that the post-Independence period was the time when Latin America accepted European philosophy on its own initiative.

The third point is closely connected with the previous one. In fact, the massive and systematic reception of philosophy has been realized both in Japan and Latin America as a part of the development of the university education system. Such a development was inevitable for every rising nation during the second half of the 19th century. In Japan, the first university was founded in 1877 and education in philosophy started immediately after. From this moment, the development of philosophical studies was inseparable from the university system[19]. There are only a few exceptions among Japanese philosophers or scholars in philosophy up until now who have been independent of the university system.

On the other hand, in Latin America, the university system had already been established in the 16th century. However, the leading universities of today were founded or reestablished by the independent nations from the second half of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th. For example, Universidad Nacional de Colombia was founded in 1867; Universidad de Chile was reestablished in 1842 as the leader of the entire education system in the nation; Universidad Nacional

[16] Salazar Bondy, *¿Existe una filosofía de nuestra América?*, 12.
[17] Miró Quesada, *Despertar y proyecto*, 25-27, 38.
[18] Frondizi, "Is There an Ibero-American Philosophy?", 349.
[19] Takayuki Shibata, "Tetsugakushi no Juyo kara Mierumono", in: Fujita (ed.), *Chi no Zahyojiku*, 63-83.

Autónoma de México was founded in 1910 on the basis of the proposal of Justo Sierra in 1881[20]. Justo Sierra, secretary in charge of culture and education at that time, referred to the special role of philosophy as having the capacity to synthesize the modern sciences[21]. It is important to note that by "philosophy", Sierra meant the modern philosophy of the time, especially positivism, vitalism, and pragmatism. This fact illuminates that the reception of philosophy in Mexico was oriented toward the future progress of the country. Learning the Occidental world's philosophical traditions formed a part of the national project of catching up with the advanced Western countries[22]. Such a characteristic "project" determined philosophy in Latin America in the 20th century, as is described by Miró Quesada in detail[23].

So, to sum up, in these regions, philosophy began as a project within the modern university system in the process of building modern nation states. This project considered European countries, such as the U.K., France, Germany, as well as the U.S. as models to follow. Philosophy, too, was mainly understood as English, French, German, or U.S. philosophy. It is natural that, in Japan as well as in Latin America, reception of philosophy was almost entirely concentrated toward modern philosophy for a long time. It was only after some decades that ancient and medieval philosophies were seen as serious areas to study. It was necessary for the first stage of reception to start with modern philosophy because it was part of the project of catching up with those central countries.

Such a feature does not exist in Europe, where the life of philosophy is not limited to within the university. On the contrary, it is philosophy that has determined schools such as the Academy, the Lyceum, and medieval universities. Philosophy has a longer history than the regime of modern nation states', and it is philosophy that has designed or described the form of modern nations (Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, etc.). In Europe, philosophy has been able to exist independent of any system and institution. It is true that in the 20th century almost all professional philosophers belong to universities, and in this sense, European philosophy is not different from philosophy in Japan and Latin America. However,

[20] To be exact, the UNAM started as Universidad Nacional de México. The qualification "autonomous" was given in 1929.
[21] Justo Sierra, "Discurso en la inauguración de la Universidad Nacional", in: José Luis Martínez (selección, introducción y notas), *El ensayo mexicano moderno I.* 3ª., FCE, 2001, 76-78.
[22] *Cf.* Leopoldo Zea, *La filosofía americana como filosofía sin más*, Siglo XXI, 1969, 19.
[23] Miró Quesada, *Despertar y proyecto*, primera parte.

there seems to be a common understanding in European culture that this is a temporary phenomenon and that, if necessary, philosophy can and will stand on its own feet. It is precisely such a common understanding that Japan and Latin America do not have.

Now I suggest that such a historical circumstances sketched out above in my three points form the background which has bred the question: "Is there … philosophy?" This can be interpreted as an expression of concern regarding the authenticity which philosophy in the region is expected to reach in the process of its evolution. In fact, in the U.K., France, or Germany, scholars do not ask "Is there English/French/German philosophy?" It appears to be obvious that there are such philosophies. The fact that no one asks means that philosophy in these countries is not a project assigned in universities within the framework of modern nation states. It is true that there are certain national traits. For example, Kantian or Hegelian philosophy could not have been born in England. However, it is not an aim or intention of these philosophers to create philosophy with some national traits; this was merely an unintended consequence.

As I said earlier, the question still persists in the present day, which means that the concern expressed in the question remains. On the basis of such an observation, I can point out at least three difficulties which philosophy in Japan and Latin America actually confront.

i) Philosophy in these regions is isolated from the rest of society, or its achievements are not understood satisfactorily by society. In Japan, dissatisfaction on the part of society is often manifested in various media. A good example is a report published by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan in 2009. The report evaluates the past and actual achievement of philosophical studies in Japan and asserts that 'it is not "philosophy', though it might be, so to speak, 'studies about philosophy'"[24]. Indeed, according to the report, Japanese philosophical studies have made a great effort to "understand precisely" the history of Occidental philosophy. It expresses dissatisfaction that scholars do not commit themselves to their actual circumstance, but are only engaged in philological reconstruction of the history of thought and in the interpretation of Western philosophers. In education, the report continues, they concentrate on the education of specialists without imparting philosophical

[24] Subdivision on science, Council for science and technology, "Report on the promotion of humanities and social sciences: a way to the formulation of cultural framework based on dialogue and substantiations", accessed August 29, 2016. http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/gijyutu/gijyutu4/toushin/1246351.htm

thinking to the entirety of society. The isolation of philosophy from society as a whole or a lack of understanding on the part of society has also been pointed out in relation to Latin American philosophy[25].

ii) On the other hand, scholars are not always satisfied with their activities and products. They admit that they only import foreign products and have not arrived at the stage at which they create their original philosophy. To be sure, there have been works which are philosophically creative and original. However, since scholars are busy following up on the latest situation in Europe or the U.S., they do not pay attention to those works made by their colleagues in the same region. As a result, there is no direct discussion, debate, or dialogue among scholars in philosophy, a worry recently raised by Mexican scholars[26].

iii) Moreover, sometimes it is not those who study philosophy in these regions that determine themes, methodologies, and styles. Pedro Stepanenko, director of the Instituto de las Investigaciones Filosóficas of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, assured me in an Interview held in February, 2015 that the national evaluation system of philosophers in Mexico conducts scholars to publish their work more in the English language in established journals of Europe or the U.S. than in the local media. In order to publish their works in those journals, scholars have to survey the latest debates in those countries, choose relevant topics and methodologies, and express arguments in an acceptable style. The problem is that such procedures are sometimes discordant with what they, as sincere philosophers, should and want to do. Such a mode of philosophical research can be called heteronomy. To worsen matters, this tendency is increasing in scale in recent decades because of the globalization of evaluation criteria of academic institutions.

3. Change the direction of the question

As already seen, the question “Is there … philosophy” in Japan and Latin America comes from the historical context in which these regions accepted philosophy from Western Europe and the U.S. from the 19th century as a subject in the university system of the modern nation state. Both regions have not accommodated

[25] Salazar Bondy, *¿Existe una filosofía de nuestra América?*, 31.
[26] Pereda, *La filosofía en México en el siglo XX*, 47; Hurtado, *El Búho y la Serpiente*, 32-36.

philosophy into society at large satisfactorily as yet. Philosophy depends on the university system, and since this is modeled on foreign institutes, it does not always coincide with the actual circumstances of the region.

Answers given by scholars are roughly grouped into two: contextualism suggests that philosophy needs to be based on a particular, cultural, and historical context of the region where a philosopher lives. Universalism is rather indifferent with regard to such a regional character and finds a critical examination of arguments to be essential for the philosophy conducted in any place.

However, in Japan as well as in Latin America, there has not been direct, fruitful debate between these two standpoints because each is based on a firm belief about what philosophy should be. In some cases, the problem is reduced to the matter of the meaning of the word "philosophy". In a typical case, contextualism affirms that, although it is true that there is no philosophy in the European sense, there are certain kinds of great thoughts in pre-modern Japan/Latin America, which can also be called "philosophy" in another sense. Such an affirmation is nonsense for those universalists who limit "philosophy" to critical intellectual activities of examining beliefs, arguments, or their grounds. In this sense, it is obvious that, as a matter of fact, philosophy was born in ancient Greece, developed in Europe, and is learnt and practiced all throughout the world today. If the problem only concerns the meaning of the word, it is not important to answer positively or negatively, it depends solely on arbitrary choice.

It is sure that debates between the two positions sometimes occur, but it is rare that they are developed in a fruitful manner. Each philosopher has a belief concerning what philosophy is, but at the same time is very conscious of the existence of different opinions. The range of this difference is so wide that philosophy according to one opinion is not philosophy at all from another perspective. Such a situation itself is not specific to Japan and Latin America, but extends to Europe and the U.S. Thus, it seems difficult to reach a conclusion which can be accepted by all philosophers in the near future. In addition, the problem concerning what philosophy is and is not cannot be of central concern to many scholars.

If this is correct, then ought we to conclude that the question "is there … philosophy?" is irrelevant for Japan and Latin America? There are scholars who say yes, but in my opinion they fail to recognize the significance of the question. In contrast, I suggest that the question is motivated by real problems in Japan and Latin America that are worth reflecting on. However, although rooted in real

problems, the question does not focus on them in a correct manner. As I mentioned in the previous section, there are real difficulties such as i) isolation from society; ii) lack of mutual dialogue; and iii) heteronomy. These difficulties can be seen as consequences of the historical context through which these regions received philosophy. Philosophy was received 1) from the Occidental countries; 2) massively so since the second half of the 19th century; and 3) as one of the subjects in the university system established or redefined in the process of the formation of modern nation states. After one and a half centuries of reception of philosophy, the question remains real even today and this means that the difficulties have not been overcome. Here I suggest that, although the question "is there … philosophy?" is originally motivated by real difficulties worth thinking about, it fails to be formulated in a manner that would enable scholars to solve the problem.

That is why I propose to reformulate the question in a form oriented to overcoming these difficulties. My question is: "Is philosophy necessary for Japan/Latin America?" I intend to change a dependent, heteronomous formulation into an independent, autonomous one.

The old formulation "Is there … philosophy?" is no doubt motivated by real difficulties, but it is, as a question, already heteronomous. It presupposes the philosophy of the Occidental countries as a model or norm, and asks whether one's own country already has it. Regardless of whether scholars and society really need it or not, philosophy is *a priori* considered as something that must be done. Before giving answers, at the moment of raising the question, those who make the question already accept foreign authority. Then, regardless of whether they answer positively or negatively, the heteronomy of thinking already prevails, and this is precisely what should be overcome.

In contrast, from the perspective of the new formulation "Is philosophy necessary for …?", whether the foreign authority recognizes products of a region as "philosophy" is not relevant. It is true that it still focuses on philosophy, but this time the initiative of evaluation and choice is in the hands of thinkers of each region. The problem is whether and how it is possible to realize autonomous thinking with mutual dialogue in one's own society. In other words, the new question expresses the need to seek the proper form of thinking for people in the region. The main issue is whether thinkers in the region can realize intellectual activities adequately for themselves, independently of whether or not it is called "philosophy". It is not essential that this form of thinking be called "philosophy", but whether thinkers in each region can think what they should think in a proper

way for themselves. It is possible that philosophy is the best way, but it is also possible that what they need is not “philosophy”, but something which does not have any name in the present time yet.

Needless to say, I am not proposing to abandon all of what Japanese and Latin American scholars have learned from Occidental philosophy for more than one and a half centuries. Nor do I affirm that it is hopeful or possible to block the influence of Occidental philosophy or that these nations should stop studying it. Japan and Latin America will continue receiving Occidental philosophy because it is at least one of the most forceful and productive forms of thinking which human beings have ever created. However, the most important point of the new formulation of the question is its focus on the question of “for the sake of whom” thinkers think. Of course they exercise intellectual activities for themselves and for their own society, not for the purpose that foreign authority recognizes them as genuine philosophers. Thus, scholars in a region should try to find the best form of realizing such activities in their own cultural, historical context.

The Presence of Philosophy in Latin American Universities

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Abstract: *This paper describes the key role of Universities in the cultivation of philosophy in Latin America. After a brief revision of the origin of the University in Latin America and its relation to philosophy, the author describes a very small part of the philosophical activity by pointing out some fields where philosophy has been particularly intensive in terms of research and original thought. In his quick overview he indicates what he takes to be the strengths and weaknesses of philosophy nowadays in Latin America by highlighting the status of the current situation in terms of the support which philosophers have for developing their activities.*

§ 1 *Introduction: Philosophical activity in an underdeveloped environment*

It may be hard to imagine how the existence of philosophy (both in the sense of original thinking and in the sense of the specialized work on different areas of the history of philosophy) is possible in a part of the world, such as Latin America, where the cultural goods were and are so dramatically subject to political and economic changes. One should recall that, unlike what has happened during the last two centuries in the USA, all the Latin American countries continue to be underdeveloped nations, carrying all the typical difficulties that are characteristic of underdevelopment: unemployment problems, dictatorships (many of which have come to an end during the last three decades), low levels of education and qualification in a significant part of the population, political corruption (both within dictatorships and democratic governments), and so on.

Given this description, this can be viewed as a very gloomy panorama and indeed it may give the impression that in a context like this one doing philosophy or any other form of scholarly work is almost impossible. However, this has not been the case: in Latin America there are universities that were founded more than four hundred years ago, when this part of the American continent was still a set of colonies which depended on Spain and Portugal. Those universities and other

institutions, created more recently, have allowed the development of philosophical activity in the last century.

America, both North and South, is a very young set of countries; the USA started to exist as an independent nation in 1776, while Argentina, Chile and México established their independence in 1810 (Brazil is even younger than these countries as an independent nation). Among those universities founded more than four hundred years ago, one should mention the Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos (Perú), founded in 1551, and the Universidad Nacional de Córdoba (Argentina), founded in 1613. Other important Latin American Universities were founded during the 18th and 19th centuries, and even during the 20th century. For instance, the Universidade de Sâo Paulo in Brazil, founded in 1934, is probably the most important Latin American university —surely along with the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México— in terms of the amount of programs, research, and teaching.[1]

To be sure, in the universities founded between the 16th and 19th centuries both theology and philosophy were part of the curriculum mandated by the Spanish and Portuguese systems of higher education. We know that Aristotle was one of the major philosophers studied in those centuries (Aristotle's texts were read in Greek, but also in Latin translations). Among the Spanish scholars and philosophers of the 16th and 17th centuries the Jesuit priest Antonio Rubio should be especially recalled. He studied both philosophy and theology at the University of Alcalá (Spain); later he moved to México (1576) and in 1594 he got a Doctorate in theology and philosophy at the Universidad de México. Rubio wrote a *Commentary on Aristotle's* De anima and the *Commentaries on all Aristotelian Logic*, (usually known as *Logica Mexicana*).[2]

[1] An updated report of the research Universities in Latin America can be found in Jorge Balán "Research Universities in Latin America: Public Policy and Political Constraints", in *The Forefront of International Higher Education. A Festschrift in Honor of Philip G. Altbach*, ed. A. Maldonado Maldonado, & R. M. Bassett (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014) 155-171.

[2] This work, as observed by Walter Redmond (in "La Lógica Mexicana de Antonio Rubio: una nota histórica", *Diánoia*, 28, no. 28 (1982), 309-310), was very successful in Europe in the first half of the 18th century, mainly due to its philosophical content (Redmond furnishes the Spanish translation of three prefatory texts of Rubio's logic (325-330). Rubio's book was known by Descartes (who cites it in his Letter to Mersenne *ccvii*, = AT, 3: 185). A summary of Rubio's work can be seen in Leen Spruit, *Species intelligibilis: From perception to knowledge*, vol. II: Renaissance Controversies, *Later Scholasticism, and the Elimination of the Intelligible Species in Modern Philosophy* (Leiden: Brill, 1995),

But what has happened in Latin America during the last decades in terms of philosophical activity? In this paper I intend to briefly describe a very small part of that activity by pointing out some fields where philosophy has been particularly intensive in terms of research and original thought. I will refer to the countries I know the most (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and México) and to some disciplines that were and still are widely cultivated, with a special focus on Ancient philosophy (my field of expertise), Phenomenology and Hermeneutics, and Analytical Philosophy. In my quick overview I shall indicate what I consider to be the strengths and weaknesses of our discipline nowadays in the Latin American environment, by highlighting the status of the current situation in terms of the support which researchers and philosophers have for developing their activities in the different institutions where they work (mainly universities).[3] My exposition will be descriptive, but I will also allow myself to provide a perspective on where the field of philosophy stands at the moment and what can be expected in the coming years.

§ 2 *Doing philosophy in Latin America*

To begin with, let me provide some data that can be helpful to note the approach some Latin American universities have had in the last decades and still have nowadays. At the beginning of the 80s, a French and German approach strongly dominated the trend of philosophical studies in Argentina, Chile, and surely in Brazil as well (where there is a long tradition especially focused on the history of philosophy as well as on ethics and political research). At the Argentine Universities (Argentina is my country of origin) there were a number of courses on French (mostly Descartes, Rousseau, Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur and even Foucault), and German philosophers (especially Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, and Gadamer). There were also courses concentrated on 17th and 18th century British Empiricism (Locke and Hume). Usually you were obligated to gain reading proficiency in one Latin language (different from Spanish, of course: French or Italian), and a Germanic language (German or English). The Faculty of Philosophy at the University of

311-13. In his *Lógica y metafísica en la Nueva España* (UNAM, 2006), 65-75 Mauricio Beuchot provides a helpful and detailed account of Rubio's logic.

[3] This overview is necessarily partial and limited. I am not assuming that this is a complete report of all the philosophical disciplines cultivated in Latin America or of all the researchers and philosophers who are worth being mentioned.

Buenos Aires used to provide excellent courses for learning *to read* English, French, German, and Italian (something similar probably happened in State universities of Brazil, Chile, México, and Perú). Many people had a reasonable command of Italian and English at the reading level before arriving at the University. To be sure, English was the foreign language one had to study in high school as a second language (in Brazil the emphasis sometimes also was and still is on French), so when you arrived at the university you were already partway along the path. In the "philosophical curriculum" what they called "the histories of philosophy" (Ancient, Mediaeval, Modern, and Contemporary philosophy) were very important too. Those were key courses in any undergraduate program at the Argentine universities (and, as far as I know, you could find a similar situation in Brazil, Chile, and México). You could take some optional courses as well (especially seminars where you could read and discuss some of the major philosophers in translation, such as Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Leibniz, Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, and Gadamer). Greek and Latin courses were mandatory; this has changed dramatically in the last twenty-five years, not only in Argentina: the landscape is almost identical in Brazil, México, and Chile, even though in Argentina, Brazil, and México there is still a solid tradition focused on classical studies.

Although there were also (mandatory) courses on logic (*The Methods of Logic* by Quine was a central book), philosophy of language and contemporary epistemology, the "analytical approach" was not so strong yet (I am still talking about the start of the 80s). What I mean is that the trend (at the University of Buenos Aires and at other important Latin American universities I have mentioned above) was vigorously "continental", although the "analytical approach" was arriving very quickly.[4] The "continental approach" at that time was very strong not only in Argentina, but probably also in Brazil, México, Chile, and other Latin American countries where some philosophical activities were taking place (I am mainly thinking of Colombia and Perú, the other two countries where our discipline was professionally cultivated and it continues to be so).

[4] I am aware that today the "analytical-continental distinction" is a bit of an old-fashioned way of talking about these matters and, as Davidson has suggested, it is probably a misunderstanding to make use of such a distinction nowadays. In the lecture he gave in 1992, when the City of Stuttgart awarded him the Hegel prize, he spoke of "the re-engagement of traditions that share a common heritage" (D. Davidson, "Dialectic and Dialogue", in D. Davidson, *Truth, Language, and History* (Clarendon Press, 2005, 251)). However, for the sake of my general description of what was going on in some countries in Latin America at the beginning of the 80s, the distinction continues to be useful.

After this general description of the approaches dominating the Latin American mindscape more than twenty-five years ago, let me briefly concentrate on some philosophical disciplines professionally developed in Latin America. In what follows I will show what I consider to be a high level of sophistication in the domain of philosophical studies in Latin America, and the role of Universities as supporters of those developments.

§ 3 *A very quick overview of philosophical activities in Latin America during the last decades*

Given that my field of expertise is Ancient philosophy, I shall begin by providing a brief description of this discipline in Latin America. Although my exposition will be focused on this branch of philosophy, I shall also refer in passing to the achievements and activities in the field of phenomenology and hermeneutics, and in that of analytical philosophy in Latin America.

The practice of philosophy as a professional activity has produced a process of growing specialization in its different areas. At times people have complained that such an emphasis on specialization tends to kill genuine philosophical creativity. But the specialized study of philosophy, I hold, has helped produce a highly positive result: a better knowledge of the philosophers as well as their ideological backgrounds, argumentative strategies, and so on. Ancient philosophy is not an exception in this respect; on the contrary, this discipline has reached a high level of specialization during the last fifty years in Latin America. But one should recall that the cultivation of Ancient philosophy in Latin America has a history that goes back at least to the mid-40s. However, as I have just said, the discipline has been developed in a more professional way during the last decades: many scholars, belonging to the countries I mentioned above, have published (and continue to publish) papers (both in Spanish and in other languages, mainly English, French, and German), chapters of books, and books in respectable specialized journals and publishing houses (I mean journals edited in Latin America, USA, and Europe).

One of the first records of the philosophical activity focused on Ancient philosophy in Latin America is related to the work of translation and interpretation of Ancient texts. In 1944 the *Bibliotheca Scriptorum Romanorum et Graecorum Mexicana* began to be published in México. This series is still alive and is in good health; it contains Spanish translations of Greek and Latin authors, provides

alongside the original texts, introductions, and notes. The project was very important for highlighting the relevance of reading the Ancient philosophers in their original language at a moment when this kind of job was not very common yet. Actually, José Gaos, a Spanish philosopher who found refuge in México upon escaping from the civil war in Spain, began the activity of translation of the Greek philosophers. Several of his (partial) translations of the Pre-Socratic philosophers, Plato, and Aristotle as well as his papers on those philosophers are still valuable. Gaos' work was an important starting point in the discipline in Latin America.[5]

In Argentina, another milestone occurred when the translation of Plato's *Parmenides* by Rodolfo M. Agoglia appeared.[6] In addition to providing a careful Spanish translation of the Greek text, he offers an introduction and an interpretative essay of the dialogue that is still helpful. Argentina was fortunate enough to receive in its universities two distinguished European scholars devoted to Ancient thought: Rodolfo Mondolfo[7] and Eilhard Schlesinger.[8] Unfortunately, Mondolfo did not leave behind any disciples;[9] Schlesinger, by contrast, trained plenty of disciples.[10]

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[5] See José Gaos, *Antología filosófica: la filosofía griega* (México: La Casa de España en México, 1940), where selected translations of Heraclitus, Parmenides, Aristotle, and Cicero are provided along with philosophical commentaries on those texts that reveal the *status quaestionis* of that moment.

[6] Rodolfo Agoglia, *Platón. Parménides*. Traducción directa del griego con introducción, notas y comentario por Rodolfo M. Agoglia (Buenos Aires: Interamericana, 1944).

[7] Cf. Rodolfo Mondolfo, *El infinito en el pensamiento antiguo de la antigüedad clásica* (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1952) and *Heráclito. Textos y problemas de su interpretación* (México: Siglo XXI, 1977). These books (along with many others contributions of his enormous scientific production) were classic readings at the Argentine universities (and beyond them) for several decades.

[8] When Schlesinger arrived in Argentina, he already was a very well-known philologist. See Eilhard Schlesinger*, Aristóteles, Poética* (Buenos Aires: Emecé, 1947). More information about Schlesinger (before his arrival in Argentina can be found at http://gutenberg-biographics.ub.uni-mainz.de/personen/register/eintrag/eilhard-schlesinger.html).

[9] Hernán Zucchi was one of the few people who met and treated Mondolfo directly. Zucchi remained for almost 40 years in the position previously occupied by Mondolfo (at Universidad Nacional de Tucumán, Argentina). Zucchi contributed to Ancient philosophy mainly through his works on Aristotle. See, for example, Hernán Zucchi, *Aristóteles, Metafísica* (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1976). Another renowned Argentine scholar (who left Argentina very early) is Leonardo Tarán; he developed his professional career at Columbia University (USA) and indeed had close scientific connections with Mondolfo (Rodolfo Mondolfo- Leonardo Tarán, (a cura di), *Eraclito. Testimonianze e imitazioni*, Firenze: "La Nuova Italia" Editrice, 1972. Tarán made remarkable contributions to the study of Parmenides, Speusippus, and Plato, among other Ancient philosophers (see

Conrado Eggers Lan (who developed his career at Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina) concentrated his research on both the Pre-Socratics and Plato, in addition to being the main promoter of the foundation of the International Plato Society (IPS), and the main founder of *Méthexis* (now International Journal for Ancient Philosophy).[11] It is also worth recalling the intense work of translation of Greek philosophers done by Argentine scholars during the last forty years.[12]

My knowledge of the Brazilian philosophy scene dates back to the 80s, although I assume that Latin American scholars interested in Aristotle and in Skepticism should be familiar with the work of Oswaldo Porchat Pereira.[13] In recent years, Brazil has been the center of many important colloquia: at least for eight years Marco Zingano (Universidade de Sâo Paulo) has been organizing meetings focused on Plato and Aristotle, with speakers from Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and México, but also with the participation of key speakers coming from Europe and the USA. In 2012 G. Cornelli organized the first Latin American Area Conference of the IPS,[14] and in July 2016 the XI *Symposium Platonicum* (organized by Cornelli) took

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Leonardo Tarán, *Parmenides. A Text with Translation, Commentary and Critical Essays*, Princeton-New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965, and *Speusippus of Athens: A Critical Study with a Collection of the Related Texts and Commentary* [*Philosophia Antiqua* 39], Leiden: Brill, 1981).

[10] Among whom are Néstor L. Cordero (Cordero is well-known through his work on Parmenides: Néstor L. Cordero, *Les deux chemins de Parménide* (Paris-Brussels: Vrin-Ousia, 1997; 2nd ed.), María I. Santa Cruz, and the late Osvaldo Guariglia (a well-known Aristotelian scholar who later concentrated his work on ethics and political theory).

[11] Some scholars dedicated to Ancient philosophy were part of Eggers Lan's seminars both in the 60s-70s (N.L. Cordero, O. Guariglia, V. E. Juliá, E. La Croce, A. Poratti, M.I. Santa Cruz) and in the 80s (M.D. Boeri, G.R. Carone, A.G. Vigo), when Eggers Lan returned from his exile in México. Among the younger Argentine scholars, one should mention E. Bieda, R. Braicovich I. Costa, M. Divenosa, D. E. Machuca, C. Mársico, F. Mié, E. Mombello, G. Rossi (currently working in Chile), L. Soares, P. Spangenberg, and Graciela Marcos.

[12] See the massive project of translation and annotation of the Pre-Socratic philosophers directed by Eggers Lan (Conrado Eggers Lan, C. *et alii*. *Los fìlósofos presocráticos*, Madrid: Gredos, 1978. Vol. I; 1980 vol. II). In the Spanish-speaking world the translation (endowed with introductions, notes and sometimes commentary) of some of Plato's dialogues and Aristotle's treatises (done by Argentine scholars) is also important.

[13] Among the younger Brazilian scholars one should mention Lucas Angioni, Carolina Araújo, Roberto Bolzani Filho, the recently late Marcelo Pimenta Marques, Miriam Campolina Peixoto, Fernando Rey Puente, Cláudio William Veloso and Marco Zingano.

[14] The Proceedings of that conference (with contributions by several well-known Platonists both from Latin America and Europe) were recently published; see *Plato's Styles and Characters*, ed. Gabriele Cornelli (Hildescheim-Zürich-New York: W. de Gruyter, 2016).

place in Brasília, with the strong support of Universidade de Brasília and other Brazilian institutions.

The situation in Chile is quite different: although there has been some sort of professional work in Ancient philosophy in the past, the real professionalization of the discipline has begun rather recently.[15] It is worth mentioning the task of translation and commentaries undertaken by some Chilean scholars on Aristotle, Plato, and Hellenistic philosophy.

With regard to Colombia, as in the previous cases, I am unfamiliar with the details of the studies in Ancient philosophy before the 80s.[16] I can report the existence of a very important group of young scholars in Colombia working on Plato, Aristotle, Hellenistic philosophy (especially Stoicism), and Medieval philosophy.[17] This research group is based both in the Universidad Nacional de Colombia and Universidad de los Andes (Bogotá), it is very active, and it has been a sort of "seedbed" for the formation of new scholars.

I started my presentation by mentioning the pioneering task of José Gaos, who settled in México at the beginning of the 40s. Nowadays México (along with Argentina and Brazil) stands out among the Latin American countries because of the quality and quantity of its specialized research. As far as I can see, this is due to the push that some relatively young professors and researchers (currently in their 40s and 50s) have given to the discipline in order to make the cultivation of Ancient

[15] Among the relevant Chilean scholars, the late Alfonso Gómez-Lobo should be recalled. Although Gómez-Lobo developed his professional career in the USA (Penn University, Georgetown University), he never lost his links with Chile and Latin America. In fact, in addition to publishing both in English and in German, he continued to write in Spanish. Óscar Velásquez and the recently late Jorge Eduardo Rivera Cruchaga also belong to this group of scholars. Velásquez is a Platonist (who recently introduced, translated, and annotated Plato's *Timaeus*; he also edited and translated Plato's *Alcibiades I*). Rivera was formed in Germany under the supervision of M. Heidegger and H.-G Gadamer, and produced the most recent translation of *Sein und Zeit* into Spanish. But he also devoted his effort to the study of Ancient Philosophy (mainly the Pre-Socratics and Plato). Among the younger Chilean scholars are Manuel Correia, Jorge E. Mittelmann, and Javier Echeñique.

[16] However, I am familiar with the work developed by Juozas Zaranka, who had an important role at the Colombian University since the mid-50s. He produced some studies on Greek philosophy, among which an annotated translation of Plato's *Cratylus* should be noted. See Jouzas Zaranka, *Platón, Crátilo*. Trad. y notas de J. Zaranka (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1983).

[17] Among the most recent scholars worth mentioning are Alfonso Correa Motta, Laura Gómez Espíndola, Jairo Escobar Moncada, Germán Arturo Meléndez, Liliana Carolina Sánchez, Pablo Bermúdez, Andrea Lozano, Juan Felipe González Calderón, and Nicolás Vaughan.

philosophy a real professional activity.[18] Thanks to projects sponsored by the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México and by the Mexican Agency for research (Conacyt), Salles organized and continues to organize several workshops on Ancient philosophy, with speakers coming from different Latin American countries, Europe and the USA.

My knowledge of the activities developed in Perú is rather limited: as far as I know, the most relevant activities of the last years are due to Raúl Gutiérrez' undertakings, not only because of his studies on Plato and Neoplatonism, but also because of the number of international events he has recently organized.

The Ancient philosophy scene in Venezuela for many years was marked by the presence of Ángel J. Cappelletti, an Argentine scholar who developed his career in Venezuela. One of his last contributions to Ancient philosophy before his death (in 1995) was the complete (annotated) translation of von Arnim's *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, vol. I (published by Gredos in Madrid).[19] Other scholars worth mentioning, Francisco Bravo, Fabio Morales, and Javier Aoiz come to mind. Bravo is a well-known and recognized Platonist; Morales has mainly focused on Aristotle, on whom he published a monograph and some important papers. Aoiz has concentrated on Aristotle's physics and psychology (a subject on which he published a book), and he has worked on Stoicism as well. Beyond the political difficulties in Venezuela in the last decade and a half, the Universidad Simón Bolívar apparently continues to be a refuge for serious philosophical work.

Let me provide now some remarks on the developments dealing with contemporary philosophy. Maybe phenomenology (both German and French) as well as analytic philosophy would seem to be two of the "most popular" philosophical disciplines cultivated in Latin America nowadays. The Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset played a very significant role in the introduction of phenomenology into Latin America; between 1916 and 1939 he visited Argentina three times, and left such a profound track that one can state that without him the developments of phenomenology in the region would have been less important than they actually were.[20] Phenomenology and hermeneutics were cultivated in Latin

[18] Certainly, one should mention Andrés Laks (a well reputed French scholar currently working in México), José Molina, Enrique Hülz Piccone, Ricardo Salles, Alberto Ross Hernández, and Héctor Zagal Arreguín, among others.

[19] Cappelletti's production is enormous and goes beyond Ancient philosophy (he was an expert in the philosophy of the Renaissance, and in anarchism).

[20] Among the most prominent figures between the 30s. and the 70s., Francisco Romero (who was consulting foreign editor for *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* from its

America for several decades,[21] but it is still in good health due to the incorporation of new generations of scholars to this discipline as well as to the many colloquia with participants coming from different countries of Latin America and all over the world.[22]

Argentina, Brazil, and México are the leading Latin American countries in this area, but one should also include Chile and Venezuela.[23] All the Latin American scholars just mentioned write and publish not only in their native languages (Spanish and Portuguese), but also in English and German. Many of them are part of the

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foundation), Carlos Cossio, Carlos Astrada, and Eugenio Pucciarelli (in Argentina) should be mentioned. In México Antonio Caso (who without being a phenomenologist published a book on Husserl at the beginning of the 30s.), Eduardo García Máynez, the already mentioned José Gaos, Fernando Salmerón and Luis Villoro (who also played a decisive role in the introduction of analytic philosophy into México). A complete overview of Phenomenology in Latin America during the 20th century can be found in Roberto Walton, "Spain and Latin America", in *Encyclopedia of Phenomenology*, eds. Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna, Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), 675-679.

[21] In the 70s the Colombian philosopher Danilo Cruz Vélez published an excellent book on German phenomenology (*Filosofía sin supuestos: De Husserl a Heidegger*, Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1970) that continues to be helpful today. Another key figure in the area was Adolfo P. Carpio, who developed his career at the Universidad de Buenos Aires for many decades. His favorite philosopher was M. Heidegger, on whom he was an expert. Currently, one of the key figures of German phenomenology in Latin America is Roberto Walton; the amount of his published work is very large; for the sake of brevity, I just mention his last book: *Intencionalidad y Horizonticidad* (Cali: Aula de Humanidades, 2015).

[22] In November 2012 the conference "Husserl: Perception, Affection, Volition" (organized by Roberto Rubio) took place at Alberto Hurtado University (Chile), with speakers coming from Japan (Shigeru Taguchi), USA (Sebastian Luft), Denmark (Søren Overgaard), Argentina (Roberto Walton and Luis Rabanaque), Colombia (Julio César Vargas), and Chile (Mariano Crespo, and Roberto Rubio).

[23] One of the leading figures in Venezuela is Alberto Rosales, a well-known and recognized scholar and philosopher who has made significant contributions: *Transzendenz und Differenz*. (Phaenomenologica vol.33, The Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff, Den Haag, 1970). He is also a well-reputed Kantian scholar, a philosopher on whom he has published a number of influential papers. Possibly the most important representative of German phenomenology in Chile is Jorge Eduardo Rivera Cruchaga (translator of *Sein und Zeit* into Spanish, as mentioned above). Among the younger scholars in this area Bernardo Ainbinder (Chile), Francisco De Lara López (Chile), Róbson Ramos dos Reis (Brazil), Felipe Johnson Muñoz (Chile), Patricio Mena Malet (Chile), Graciela Ralón (Argentina), Rosemary Rizo-Patrón de Lerner (Perú), Roberto G. Rubio (Chile), Antonio Zirión Quijano (México), and Ángel Xolocotzi Yañez (México), among others, deserve to be mentioned.

"Latin American Circle of Phenomenology",[24] an association founded in 1999 that also has a journal,[25] extensive connections with almost all Latin American and European countries, and a very active life.[26]

At the outset of this paper I mentioned that at the start of the 80s the trend at Latin American universities was mainly "continental", but I also indicated that the "analytic approach" was arriving very quickly. Towards the end of the 80s (maybe even before those years, depending on the countries),[27] the analytic approach was a very well-established tradition in several countries of Latin America. Surely such a claim may seem controversial, because in Argentina, for example, at the end of the 60s the SADAF (*Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico = Argentine Society for Philosophical Analysis*) was founded.[28] The interesting point is that this society, probably like others in other Latin American countries, was founded not from within the universities, but outside of them. There may be distinct reasons for that, but it is certainly a point that should not be overlooked when attempting to understand the entrance of analytic philosophy in Latin America. Sometimes analytic philosophy was considered "dangerous" by dictatorships, and therefore it was expelled from

[24] http://www.clafen.org/clfdir.htm

[25] http://alea-blog.blogspot.com/

[26] One should also mention the *Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Heideggerianos* (*Iberoamerican Society of Heideggerian Studies*; http://sociedadheidegger.org/), founded in 2008. This society also promotes the studies of phenomenology in the Spanish speaking-world with a special focus on Heidegger. One of its former presidents is Alejandro G. Vigo, an Argentine scholar and philosopher (now living in Spain), who works on Ancient philosophy (especially Aristotle) and on German phenomenology and hermeneutics (Husserl, Heidegger, and Gadamer). Vigo's contributions to the relation between Heidegger and Aristotle (as well as his phenomenological readings of Aristotle) are well-known among the experts in this area.

[27] I am aware that the analytic tradition was already established at the Mexican Universities in the 70s. (I am talking based on my own experience at the University of Buenos Aires).

[28] The founders of SADAF (http://www.sadaf.org.ar/es/) were Carlos Alchourrón, Eugenio Bulygin, Genaro Carrió, Alberto Coffa, Juan Carlos D'Alessio, Ricardo Gómez, Gregorio Klimovsky, Raúl Orayen, Eduardo Rabossi, Félix Schuster and Thomas Moro Simpson. Some of them were recognized philosophers in Latin America, USA, and Europe. Several distinguished philosophers visited SADAF: Donald Davidson, Ernest Sosa, Fernando Broncano, Graham Priest, Isaac Levi, Jaegwon Kim, John Searle, Manuel García Carpintero, Mario Bunge, Max Kölbel, Ned Block, and Thomas Pogge, among others. Fortunately, the SADAF is still alive and continues organizing philosophical meetings where young generations of scholars and philosophers have the chance to present their work. The SADAF also has a very well-established and recognized journal (*Análisis filosófico*), which publishes papers both in Spanish and English.

universities.[29] During the last three decades or so this situation has been reversed and analytic philosophy has settled at Argentine universities.[30]

Analytic philosophy in México owes a lot to Eduardo García Máynez, Fernando Salmerón,[31] and Luis Villoro. Already by the mid-70s the analytic approach was already well-established in the Mexican university. *Crítica* was founded in 1967 (the journal is tied to the Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México). One might suppose that the presence of papers written by renowned philosophers in the area (such as G.E.M. Anscombe, D.M. Armstrong, Héctor-Neri Castañeda, D. Davidson, R.M. Hare, J.L. Mackie, J. McDowell, T. Nagel, A.N. Prior, H. Putnam, W.V.O. Quine, R. Rorty, G. Ryle, S. Shoemaker, T.M. Simpson, E. Sosa, P.F. Strawson, Bas C. van Fraassen and G.H. von Wright) in the first issues of the journal should have been a significant stimulus for the development of the analytic tradition in Mexico.[32]

Brazilian analytic philosophy is very strong too nowadays, although, compared with Argentina and México, it came later. The journal *Manuscrito*, founded in 1977, is a prestigious journal depending on Universidade Estadual de Campinas (Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência). Although the journal publishes papers focused on a "wide range of philosophical themes" (including history of philosophy, philosophy of language, philosophy of formal sciences, epistemology, ethics, political philosophy, and philosophy of mind), it is a fact that *Manuscrito* has been an essential means for the diffusion and establishment of the analytic way of doing philosophy in Brazil. Besides, it is no coincidence that the journal is located at the University of Campinas and, what is even more important, at the Center for Logic, Epistemology and History of Science. Newton Carneiro Affonso da Costa, the reputed Brazilian mathematician, logician, and

[29] Believe it or not, analytic philosophy was regarded as a "suspect" thought: there was a time in Argentina when mathematical logic was considered "subversive".

[30] Among the new generations of Argentine Analytic philosophers the following people should be mentioned: Alejandro Cassini, Alberto Moretti, Eleonora Orlando (the current president of SADAF and Editor of *Análisis Filosófico*), Eleonora Cresto, Federico Penellas, Diana Pérez.

[31] Salmerón was a disciple of J. Gaos, editor of *Diánoia* and co-founder of *Crítica*. Both *Diánoia* and *Crítica* are two justly well-reputed Latin American philosophical journals. The approach of *Crítica* is strongly analytic, but it also publishes papers dealing with themes of history of philosophy that depict a certain analytic approach.

[32] Axel Arturo Barceló, Alejandro Tomasini Bassols, Maite Ezcurdia Olavarrieta, León Olivé Morett, and Guillermo Hurtado (all of them belonging to Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México), among others, are relevant figures of Analytical philosophy in México.

philosopher recognized worldwide for his work on paraconsistent logic, worked for a number of years at that University and, of course, he promoted the analytic tradition.[33] At the start of the 70s João Paulo Monteiro (who worked on Hume, but also had interests in philosophy of science) and Oswaldo Porchat Pereira added a new drive to the analytic approach in Brazil. Marcelo Dascal (who also worked at the University of Campinas before moving to Israel) is another important figure. In addition to his contributions to Leibniz scholarship, Dascal's work on philosophy of language and cognitive science are well-known in the area.[34]

Finally, let me offer a very quick view on analytical philosophy in Chile. The analytic tradition has arrived in Chile in recent years. Even though some Chilean scholars and philosophers practiced the "analytic method" (Roberto Torretti in his Kantian studies and in his contributions to the philosophy of science, and Alfonso Gómez-Lobo when dealing with Plato and Aristotle), they developed their careers outside of Chile (Torretti in Puerto Rico, Gómez-Lobo in the USA). But more recently Francisco Pereira Gandarillas, supported by a number of other Chilean analytic philosophers (Wilfredo Quesada, Leandro De Brasi, José Tomás Alvarado, Andrés Bobenrieth, Eduardo Fermandois, Glenda Satne, and Nicolas Stindt among others) organized the Sociedad Chilena de Filosofía Analítica (Chilean Society for Analytic Philosophy). The Society has made possible the organization of a couple of international meetings as well as the visits of leading philosophers in the field.

§ 4 *Epilogue: Strengths, Weaknesses and the Role of Universities as supporters of philosophy*

Although Latin America is still an unstable area of the world in political and social terms, I would dare to say that this situation has changed for the better in the last three and a half decades. Governments have been seriously involved in providing

[33] Currently da Costa is an Emeritus Professor at Unicamp (Universidade Federal de Campinas, Brazil). A biographical note (containing some interesting data of da Costa's outstanding career) can be found at the site http://www.cle.unicamp.br/cle-aips-event/newtondacosta.html. My information concerning Perú is much more limited. But I do know that Francisco Miró Quesada and Augusto Salazar Bondy were responsible for the introduction of the analytic approach in that country.

[34] A complete account of the way in which analytic philosophy arrived in Latin American countries is provided by Diana Pérez, & Gustavo Ortiz Millán, "Analytic Philosophy", in *A Companion to Latin American Philosophy*, eds. Susana Nuccetelli, Ofelia Schutte, Otavio Bueno (Malden, Blackwell, 2010), 199-213.

funds for research through their research agencies; I would like to think that politicians finally started to understand that education, research, critical thinking, and knowledge in general are able to fuel human development (in all the thinkable respects: cultural, economic, social, personal, etc.). People devoted to the humanities also receive a part of those funds through the presentation of projects that are evaluated by external referees in order to guarantee their quality and viability. Of course, as usual, the money the humanities receive from those funds is always small, but it's a beginning.

The growing philosophical activity in Latin America –supported by research projects sponsored both by universities and national research agencies– allows one to foresee a promising future. In a general overview one should say that during the last four or five decades some important achievements have been reached. In spite of the qualitative disadvantages which Latin American scholars and philosophers sometimes have (in terms of specialized university libraries, or of the number of professors highly qualified in their disciplines, or economic resources for research), they receive some support from their universities, and the requirements demanded by a serious treatment of the philosophical activity are relatively common (at the universities as well as at the national research councils).

Certainly, it is always necessary to reinforce and strengthen the already mentioned standards, but in general the young generations of scholars start from the assumption that the following standards are non-negotiable: a strong command of some language different from the mother tongue, a reasonable knowledge of the secondary literature, and the techniques of discussion corresponding to philosophy understood as a dialogical conversation where nothing can be taken for granted without debate. I would dare to say that Latin American philosophers and scholars are aware of philosophical developments in other parts of the world, but they are still searching for their "own philosophy" (in case something like that really exists). The permanent exchange among universities (belonging to distinct countries in the Latin American area, the USA, Europe, and Asia) permits us to suppose that the situation has dramatically improved in Latin America, and that hopefully it will continue to improve in the coming years.

The Birth of Philosophy as 哲學 (*Tetsugaku*) in Japan[1]

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Abstract: *Philosophy was introduced into Japan as 哲學 (*tetsugaku*) in the form of the positivist philosophy of Auguste Comte in the latter half of the 19th Century, just around the time when the same philosophy was introduced into Latin America. Despite various similarities surrounding the birth of 'philosophy' in these two regions, there is one crucial difference. In Japan there was a long tradition of Chinese learning, which not only encouraged Japanese scholars avidly to absorb new ideas, when it opened itself to the Western world after the long period of national seclusion (1639-1854), but also created in their minds some inner conflict as to which way to proceed. One of the scholars who tried to establish 'philosophy' at that time was NISHI Amane, a Japanese enlightenment thinker. The word 哲學 (*tetsugaku*) representing philosophy was his coinage. Although it occurred at first to him to translate Greek* philosophia *more literally as 希哲學 (*kitetsugaku*), with 希 (*ki*, love) corresponding to* philo- *and 哲 (tetsu, wisdom) to* sophia*, he immediately discarded it and made Japanese 'philosophy' into 哲學 (*tetsugaku*, learning/science of wisdom), a far cry from the Socratic concept of philosophy, which is 'love/pursuit of wisdom driven by the awareness of ignorance'. Nishi wanted to have a new concept, which is both different from Chinese thought and serviceable as 'the science of sciences' to be taught at university-level education, in which he was deeply involved from the start when Japan began to learn from the Western world.*

[1] This article primarily derives from the first half of a more wide-ranging paper, entitled 'Everlasting Inquiry in Ancient Greek Philosophy: Socrates, Plato and the Sceptics', which I read at the International Conference, 'In Pursuit of Wisdom: Ancient Chinese and Greek Perspectives on Cultivation', held at UNSW, Australia, 15-18 January 2016. The second half is to appear under the title of 'East and West: Sceptics and Doubt', in the forthcoming book, *Ancient Chinese and Greek Perspectives on Cultivation*, edited by the three organizers of the Conference, Karyn Lai, Rick Benitez, and Hyun Jin Kim, to all of whom I would like to express my sincere gratitude for inviting me and giving me a chance to talk among such wonderful scholars. I am also thankful to the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science for the support of JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP25284003. I would like to thank the anonymous referees for their careful reading and very valuable comments.

*His coinage was adopted by his friend, KATŌ Hiroyuki, as the name under which philosophy was to be taught at Tokyo University, when it was opened with Katō as its superintendent in 1877. It was from the curriculum of Tokyo University that the term 哲學 (*zhexue *in Chinese) entered the Chinese lexicon, so that it became established as the name for 'philosophy' throughout East Asia.*

1. NISHI Amane and Philosophy as 希哲學 (Learning/Science of Loving Wisdom)

The Chinese and Japanese word representing 'philosophy', 哲學 (Cn. *zhexue,* Jn. *tetsugaku*),[2] which literally means 'learning/science of wisdom', is different from the Greek *philosophia* in its omission of *philo-* (love) and inclusion of 學 (Cn. *xue*, Jp. *gaku*, learning/science).[3] It was a coinage by a Japanese enlightenment thinker, NISHI Amane (西周, 1829-97), who coined many of the basic philosophical terms now in use on the basis of his understanding of Chinese classics. He studied in Holland in 1863-65 at the end of the Edo period (1603-1867), intending to introduce in Japan the whole system of Western studies.

He was one of the main members of 明六社 (*Meirokusha*), an enlightenment group established in 1873 (明治 6),[4] which was later developed into 東京學士會院 (*Tokyo gakushikaiin*, 1879, 明治 12), the predecessor of the present 日本学士院 (*Nihon gakushiin*), Japan Academy. Seven of the ten members of *Meirokusha* became leaders of *Tokyo gakushikaiin*: NISHI Amane, TSUDA Mamichi (津田眞道, 1829-1903), who studied in Holland with Nishi, FUKUZAWA Yukichi (福澤諭吉, 1834-1901), the first president of *Tokyo gakushikaiin* and the founder of Keio

[2] Pronunciations are added mainly in the Japanese way (Jp.), except when specified as Chinese (Cn.).

[3] According to the data base of 西周『百學連環』(NISHI Amane, *Hyakugaku renkan*) by 袁広泉 (Yuan Guangquan), provided by nDP, the English word that most commonly corresponds to 學 (*gaku*), independently employed, is 'science'. Although 學 is also used as the translation of 'knowledge', it is only once in translating "the branches of the knowledge' (Ōkubo (ed.) (1981) 191). The fact that Nishi defines philosophy in *Hyakugaku renkan* (Ōkubo (ed.) (1981) 146) as 'the science of sciences' with the gloss 學上諸學 suggests that 哲學 should be translated as 'science of wisdom'. But 學 can be used as the verb meaning 'to learn'. This is why I have decided to adopt 'learning/science' as the translation of 學, even though it is rather clumsy.

[4] The name 明六社 (*Meirokusha*) comes from its establishment in the 6th year (*roku nen* (六年)) of the *Meiji* (明治) period, with 社 (*sha*) meaning 'society' or 'club'.

University, KATŌ Hiroyuki (加藤弘之, 1836-1916), the first superintendent of Tokyo University, and three others.[5] They had encyclopedic knowledge, not only of Chinese classics but also of Western human as well as natural sciences, which they had avidly absorbed through their command of Dutch and other European languages. They laid the foundation of Japanese philosophical studies with the help of their grounding in Japanese, Chinese, and Western studies.[6]

As to the word 哲學 (*tetsugaku*), what first occurred to Nishi as the Chinese characters to represent philosophy was not 哲學, but 希哲學 (*kitetsugaku*).[7] 希哲學, which literally means 'learning/science (學) of loving (希) wisdom (哲)', appears two times in Nishi's work: (1) in his short afterword to Tsuda's essay, entitled 性理論 (*Seiriron*), itself rather short, consisting of around two thousand characters, written in 1861 (文久 1), and (2) in a fragmentary draft for his lecture on the History of Western Philosophy, written before June of 1862 (文久 2), or sometime later.[8]

In the former he says that in contrast to the achievements in physics, chemistry, geography, instruments, etc., during the last one hundred years or so in Japan, the subject of 希哲學 (glossed as ヒロソヒ (*hirosohi*, philosophy)) has been neglected by Japanese people, so much so that they mistakenly say that although the West is advanced in natural sciences, it is lagging behind in human sciences; but Tsuda's understanding is such that he could develop a theory that surpasses Western wisdom.[9]

In the latter he says:[10]

> … is the name started by a 賢人 (*kenjin*, wise person) called Pythagoras … after he first used the word ヒロソヒ (*hirosohi*, philosophy),[11] the word being

[5] They were KANDA Takahira (神田孝平, 1830-98), NAKAMURA Masanao (中村正直, 1832-91), MITSUKURI Shūhei (箕作秋坪, 1825-86).

[6] Asō (1942) 1-8.

[7] The information provided by Asō (1942) is most substantial.

[8] Asō (1942) 41-43 puts it before June, Ōkubo (ed.) (1960) 611-613 a little later.

[9] In *Seiriron* Tsuda develops his materialistic view of the world and human nature (性, *sei*) and principle (理, *ri*), on the basis of 気 (*ki*), identified with Western ether, which fills the universe and constitutes the soul (魂, *tamashii*), residing in the brain (Tsuda (2001), vol.1, 3-22, Ōkubo (ed.) (1960) 12-15). Cf. Hazama (2011) 602 [139], (2012) 4-5. 理 is transliterated as '*li*' in Chinese, but as '*ri*' in Japanese (in Japanese both *li* and *ri* sounds are represented as り in kana).

[10] 西洋哲學史の講案斷片 (*Seiyō tetsugaku-shi no kōan dampen*) in Ōkubo (ed.) (1960),16-17 and in Asō (1942) 40-1. The subject of the first sentence is missing.

understood to mean 'to like 賢 (*ken*, wise)'. Around that time there was a 賢人 (*kenjin*, wise person) called Socrates, who also employed this word, while 賢者 (*kenja*, wise people)[12] around that time who engaged in this 學 (*gaku*, learning/science) called themselves Sophists, whose meaning is 賢哲 (*kentetsu*, wise), this being a very prideful title, while Socrates modestly called himself a ヒロソフル (*hirosofur*, philosopher). This word means a person who loves (愛する, *aisuru*) virtue of wisdom (賢徳, *kentoku*), and is supposed to be the same in meaning as 希賢 (*kiken*, loving wisdom).[13] This very philosopher (ヒロソフル, *hirosofur*) was indeed a great person, worthy to be called the founder of 希哲學 (*kitetsugaku*), comparable in that region [in Greece] to our Confucius (吾孔夫子).

2. From 希哲學 (*Kitetsugaku*) to 哲學 (*Tetsugaku*)

However, Nishi soon stopped using 希哲學 (*kitetsugaku*), already in his letter to MATSUOKA Rinjirō (松岡鏻次郎, 1820-98), written about one month *before* he left for Holland (1862, 文久 2).[14] In this letter he uses the transcription of 'philosophy' with the addition of 學 (*gaku*, learning/science), and says: 'ヒロソヒ之學 (*hirosohi no gaku*, learning/science of philosophy) is superior to the Confucianism of 程朱 (*Teishu*, Ch'eng brothers and Chu-tzu)[15] in explaining 性命之理 (*seimei no ri*, the principle of the nature of each thing)'. He continued to use the transcription until his work 開題門 (*Kaidaimon*), written sometime between 1863 (文久 3) and 1865 (慶應 1), during his study in Holland or just after returning to Japan. There he employs 斐鹵蘇比 (*hirosohī*). The very first words of *Kaidaimon* are 東土謂之儒、西洲謂之斐鹵蘇比、皆明天道而立人極、其実一也, meaning that 'Confucianism in the East and Philosophy in the West both clarify 天道 (*tendō*,

[11] Nishi erased 'after he called his comrade ヒロソフル (*hirosofur*, philosopher)' and changed it into 'after he first used the word ヒロソヒ (*hirosohi*, philosophy)'.

[12] 人々 (*hitobito*, people) is erased and changed into 賢者.

[13] As I point out later, 希賢 comes from 通書 (*Tongshu*) of 周茂叔 (Zhou Maoshu = 周敦頤 Zhou Dunyi, 1017-73).

[14] 西洋哲學に對する關心を述べた松岡鏻次郎宛の書翰 (*Seiyō tetsugaku ni taisuru kanshin wo nobeta Matsuoka Rinjirō ateno shokan*, Letter to Matsuoka Rinjirō concerning my interest in Western Philosophy) in Ōkubo (ed.) (1960) 8. It was written on the 15th of May, 1862.

[15] Namely, Neo-Confucianism (宋明理學, or 理學).

the way of heaven) and establish 人極 (*jinkyoku*, human principle/standard). Thus they are in reality one'.[16]

But Nishi was more inclined to the positivist philosophy of Auguste Comte in the West than to Confucianism in the East. Although Chinese classics supplied him with a few words as candidates for the translation of philosophy, he rather evaded such words tinged with Confucian influence, for example, 理學 (*rigaku*), 窮理學 (*kyūrigaku*), and 希賢學 (*kikengaku*).

Nishi's final choice was 哲學 (*tetsugaku*). He returned from Holland in December of 1865 (慶應 1), and the next year in September he was called by Shōgun TOKUGAWA Yoshinobu (徳川慶喜, 1837-1913) to Kyoto. There he was asked by his friend, KIMURA Sōzō (木村宗三), to teach a small number of students Kimura had, while he was away as a member of the delegation to the Paris International Exposition of 1867. After Nishi moved his residence in Kyoto to Kyōjakuji temple in February of 1867 (慶應 3), the number of students increased so that nearly 500 retainers of feudal lords gathered to listen to his lectures on Western law and philosophy.[17] But on the 9th of November, 1867, Shōgun Yoshinobu proposed to return political power to the Emperor, and the Meiji period started in 1868. So the time Nishi could teach in Kyoto was very short, but notes and memos he prepared for this 1867 series of lectures resulted in his 百一新論 (*Hyakuichi shinron*), published in 1874 (明治 7), in which the word 哲學 (*tetsugaku*) appeared for the first time in a published form. Thus, in spite of its appearance in 1874, the time when he decided on 哲學 as the translation of *philosophia* was much earlier, 1867 at the latest.

In 復某氏書 too, written in February, 1870 (明治 3), 哲學 (*tetsugaku*) was employed.[18] He used 哲學 also in a series of lectures entitled 百學連環 (*Hyakugaku*

[16] Ōkubo (ed.) (1960) 19.
[17] Ōkubo (ed.) (1966) 757-759. Cf. Asō (1942) 109ff.
[18] 復某氏書, which means 'in reply to somebody' is a document, written in his hometown, Tsuwano, as a criticism against the learning/science of Japanese classics (國學, *kokugaku*). There he says that the 道 (Cn. *dao, tao*, Jp. *michi, dō*, way, road) of Confucius and Mencius is almost the same as the 哲學 (philosophy) of the West, and that this is naturally the case because they both come from 人理 (*jinri*, human principle), which is the same all over the world. The word 哲學 (*tetsugaku*) appears in Ōkubo (ed.) (1960) 305, and also in 302 and 307; 西哲の學ヒ (*Seitetsu no manabi*, meaning 'learning/science of Western Philosophy') appears in 299.

renkan) given from 1870 (明治 3) to 1871 (明治４) at his private school, 育英舎 (*Ikueisha*), established in November, 1870.[19]

Thus Nishi's change of mind from 希哲學 (*kitetsugaku*) to 哲學 (*tetsugaku*) was very quick. 希哲學 was short-lived (alive in 1861-62), followed by some period of indetermination (1862-65), suggested by his use of transcriptions of 'philosophy', and it was in 1867 or earlier that he adopted 哲學 (*tetsugaku*) as his final choice.

It is interesting that in contrast to Nishi, Tsuda continued to use 希哲學 (*kitetsugaku*) even in his 開化を進る方法を論ず (*Kaika wo susumuru hōhō wo ronzu*), published in 1874 (明治 7). Tsuda was Nishi's close friend. They joined 蕃書調所 (*Bansho shirabesho*, Institute for the Study of Western Documents) together in 1857 (安政 4), went together to Holland in 1863-65, and were fellow-members of 明六社 (*Meirokusha*). Tsuda may have wanted to cherish the memory of their friendship going back to 1857, when they invented together the new word 希哲學.[20]

But what Nishi sought after was different. As mentioned above, when he tried to find an appropriate word for *philosophia*, it was possible for him to adopt some words already in use in Confucianism. But he refused them. This refusal seems to come from the same motive as his discarding of 希哲學 (*kitetsugaku*). He concludes 百一新論 (*Hyakuichi shinron*) with the following remark:[21]

> The thing that clarifies 天道人道 (*tendō jindō*, the way of heaven and the way of humanity) and establishes the method for teaching is ヒロソヒー (*hirosohī*, philosophy), which I translate as 哲學 (*tetsugaku*), the subject discussed since antiquity in the West. I have so far talked about teaching (教, *oshie*) under the title of 百教ハ一致也 (*hyakkō wa icchi nari*, a hundred teachings become one),

[19] Cf. Asō (1942) 240. The school was closed around 1873 (明治 6).

[20] Cf. Asō (1942) 46-47. Between 1854 and 1874 Tsuda seems to have groped for appropriate words for philosophy. Toward the end of his unpublished essay, 天外獨語 (*Tengai dokugo*), written around 1861 (文久 1), four Chinese characters appear in three places: (1) 求 (seek); (2) 聖 (sacred) written on top of 知 (knowledge) (probably rather than '知 on top of 聖'); (3) 學 (learning/science). Along (1) to (3) on the right side there is a gloss, サトリヲモトムルマナビ (*satori wo motomuru manabi*, learning/science seeking *satori*), but there is another gloss, ヒロソヒー (*hirosohī*, philosophy), on the left side along (1) and (2). Ōkubo (1997) 10 sees here Tsuda's adoption of 求聖學 as the translation of philosophy. But it is uncertain which combination of characters was actually intended by Tsuda as the translation of philosophy, 求知, 求知學, 求聖, or 求聖學. 求知 and 求聖 remind us of 希賢 and 希聖 employed by Zhou Maoshu (n.26 below), and both 知 and 聖 can be read as サトリ (*satori*).

[21] Nishi (1874); Ōkubo (ed.) (1960) 289.

> and if you look for its kind, 哲學 (*tetsugaku*) is indeed this very kind. Concerning other teachings, it is usually the case that one teaching's adoption is another's rejection, and in order to survey 百教 (*hyakkyō*, a hundred teachings) and to clarify that they boil down to the same thing, you need to have a very elevated viewpoint and look down over them. Thus in this kind of philosophical (哲學上ノ, *tetsugaku jō no*) argument you have to argue about both 物理 (*butsuri*, nature of things) and 心理 (*shinri*, nature of mind), but while arguing about them together, you must not confound them.

百一新論 (*Hyakuichi shinron*) means 'New Essay on One Hundred as One', and 'one hundred' appears also in the title of his 百學連環 (*Hyakugaku renkan*), whose literal meaning is 'One hundred learnings/sciences cycle'. That is to say, this work was intended as an 'Encyclopedia', *Enkyklios paideia* in Greek.[22] In this work he contrasts Common Science (普通學, *futsūgaku*), like History, Geography, Literature, and Mathematics, with Particular Science (殊別學, *shubetsugaku*), which consists of Intellectual Science (心理上學, *shinrijōgaku*) and Physical Science (物理上學, *butsurijōgaku*), and regards Intellectual Science as consisting of three disciplines, Theology (神理學, *shinrigaku*), Philosophy (哲學, *tetsugaku*), and Politics & Law (政事法律, *seiji hōritsu*).[23] His evaluation of Philosophy is very high. At the beginning of the part entitled 'Philosophy 哲學' he says as follows, after explaining the etymology of philosophy:[24]

> Some people call 哲學 [glossed as ヒロソヒー *hirosohī*, philosophy] by the name of 理學 (Cn. *lixue*, Jp. *rigaku*) or 窮理學 (*kyūrigaku*).[25]
>
> The person who called this 學 (*gaku*, learning/science) ヒロソヒー (*hirosohī*) was Pythagoras, and the name comes from adoring (愛し, *aishi*) and loving (希ひ, *negai*) 賢 (*ken*, wise), and wishing oneself to become 賢.

[22] Ōkubo (ed.) (1981), 11 and 41. I referred to two passages, because there are two sets of 百學連環 (*Hyakugaku renkan*), both of which are notes taken by NAGAMI Yutaka (永見裕, 1839-1902), Nishi's disciple and son-in-law. They are somewhat different, and in my translation I consulted both of them.

[23] Ōkubo (ed.) (1981), 111.

[24] Ōkubo (ed.) (1981), 145-146.

[25] Concerning the use of 理學, 窮理 and some other words like 愛知學 (*aichigaku*) to represent philosophy in China and Japan, with the earliest cases by missionaries in both countries, and concerning the use and establishment of 哲學 in China, and also the preference of 理學 to 哲學 by 中江兆民 (NAKAE Chōmin) and 三宅雪嶺 (MIYAKE Setsurei), cf. Saitō (1977) 327-331, 345-348; Yamamuro (1988); Chen (2011).

> Later on there appeared people who engaged in this 學 (*gaku*) and who called themselves 'Sophists', implying that they have become 賢者 (*kenja*, wise people) so as to be able to teach (學ふ, *manabu*) this subject, being actually 'Sophists' [glossed as 僞學者, *nisegakusha* (impostors of learning/ science)]. However, there was a person called Socrates in Greece, and he was content with engaging in what is called ヒロソヒー (*hirosohī*), and continued to do so.
>
> Because ヒロソヒー (*hirosohī*) means 聖希天 賢希聖 士希賢,[26] to quote from 周茂叔 (Zhou Maoshu), it would be possible to translate ヒロソヒー (*hirosohī*) literally and say 希賢學 (*kikengaku*, learning/science of loving wisdom).
>
> In England they use ヒロソヒー (*hirosohī*) in various senses; thus, to call 格物學 (*kakubutsugaku*), they use the name of 'Natural Philosophy' or 'Philosophy of Mechanical',[27] though this is only in England.
>
> The definition of ヒロソヒー (*hirosohī*) is 'Philosophy is the science of sciences (也學上諸學)',[28] meaning 'science (學) standing over (上たる, *uetaru*) the sciences (諸學, *shogaku*)'.

Here, in spite of his reference to Socrates, philosophy is no longer simple Socratic love or pursuit of wisdom driven by the awareness of ignorance.

It is noteworthy that when Nishi refers to Socrates in *Hyakugaku renkan*, he no longer mentions Confucius, as he did in the fragmentary draft for his lecture in 1862 (文久 2). He wants to separate philosophy from Confucianism. Although he refers here to the possibility of translating philosophy as 理學 (Cn. *lixue*, Jp. *rigaku*), 窮理學 (*kyūrigaku*), or 希賢學 (*kikengaku*), he refers to them just to reject them. The same attitude is observable in his 生性發蘊 (*Seisei hatsuun*, 1873, 明治 6),[29] where he adds a note to the word 哲學 (*tetsugaku*). In this note after explaining the etymology of philosophy he elucidates its meaning by referring to 士希賢 as he did

[26] Jp. *seikiken kenkisei shikiken*, meaning 'Sacred loves Heaven, Wise loves Sacredness, Gentleman loves Wisdom'. These words come from 通書 (*Tongshu*) of Zhou Maoshu.

[27] 'Natural Philosophy' and 'Philosophy of Mechanical' are Nishi's own expressions.

[28] The English sentence 'Philosophy is the science of sciences', glossed as 也學上諸學, is Nishi's own.

[29] This essay consists of his summary of 性理ノ學 (*seirinogaku*, psychology) and the explanation of Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte (塺胡斯, 坤度), based on George Henry Lewes, *Biographical History of Philosophy*, and *Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences*, including his translation from these two works.

so in *Hyakugaku renkan*, and says that although this subject, which deals especially with 理 (*ri*, principle), can be translated as 理學理論 (*rigakuriron*), he translates it as 哲學, evading the misleading translation and separating it from the Eastern Confucianism.[30] Of course even after these works he now and then employs, for example, 理學 in his writings, but it is just to explain the meaning of 哲學 by relating it to Chinese tradition.

理學 (*rigaku*) is a word that has a complicated background. Although it was used in the tradition of Confucianism, especially in Neo-Confucianism, it was also employed to designate the newly introduced study of Western sciences.[31] For example, the introductory note of volume 1 of 気海観瀾廣義 (*Kikaikanran kōgi*) by KAWAMOTO Kōmin (川本幸民, 1810-71), which is based upon the translation of such works as Johannes Buijs, *Natuurkundig Schoolboek*, begins with the following remark:

> ヒシカ (*hisika*, physica) is ナチュールキュンデ (*Nachuurkunde* [Natuurkunde]) in Dutch, and our predecessors translated it as 理學 (*rigaku*). It is the 學 (*gaku*, learning/science) that exhausts (窮ムル, *kiwamuru*) 理 (*ri*, principle) of 天地萬物 (*tenchi bambutsu*, all things in heaven and earth).

There were people who regarded the Western 窮理學 (*kyūrigaku*) or Natuurkunde as mundane. In their attempt to set Confucianism as the proper location of the genuine 窮理學, they chose 理學 (*rigaku*) as the translation of philosophy, arguing for the superiority of the pursuit of the Eastern 理 (*ri*, principle) over the Western 理 (*ri*).[32] For example, NAKAE Chōmin (中江兆民, 1847-1901), a political theorist who introduced the thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau in Japan, continued to use 理學. He published in 1886 (明治 19) two books, whose title contains 理學, that is to say, 理學沿革史 (*Rigaku enkakushi*), which was his translation of A. Fouillée, *Histoire de la Philosophie* (1879, 2nd ed.), and 理學鉤玄 (*Rigaku kōgen*). In the latter, at the very beginning of Chapter 1,[33] he says that although it is possible to translate it as 哲學 (*tetsugaku*), he rather follows 易經窮理 (*ekikyō kyūri*) and translates it as 理學.

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[30] Ōkubo (ed.) (1960) 31. On Nishi's attitude to 理 (Cn. *li*, Jp. *ri*) in Neo-Confucianism, see also Lin (2013).
[31] Yamamuro (1988); also cf. Watanabe (2008) 29-30.
[32] Cf. Yamamuro (1988) 469: Watanabe (2008) 30.
[33] Chapter 1 is entitled 理學 [glossed as フィロソフィー (*phirosophī*)] ノ意義並ニ旨趣 (*rigaku no igi narabini shishu*, the meaning of philosophy and its contents).

However, even Nakae came to employ 哲學 (*tetsugaku*) at the end of his life. In 一年有半 (*Ichinen yūhan*), which means 'one and a half years', the remainder of his life suggested by his doctor, he says as follows:[34]

> There has been no 哲學 in Japan, MOTOORI Norinaga (本居宣長, 1730-1801) and HIRATA Atsutane (平田篤胤, 1776-1843) being mere archaeologists with no understanding of the 天地性命の理 (*tenchi seimei no ri*, the principle of the nature of heaven and earth), ITŌ Jinsai (伊東仁斎, 1627-1705) and OGYŪ Sorai (荻生徂徠, 1666-1728) being mere philologists, and some original Buddhist monks being religious figures, not genuine philosophers. As to people today, although KATŌ Hiroyuki and INOUE Tetsujirō (井上哲次郎, 1855-1944) profess to be 哲學家 (*tetsugakuka*, philosophers) and are regarded as such by people in general, they actually do nothing but introduce the doctrines they have learnt from the West.

Although Nakae and Nishi were different in their appreciation of the traditional Chinese and Japanese wisdom in comparison with the Western wisdom, they had in common the attitude to regard 哲學 (*tetsugaku*) as some elevated learning, in whose new wineskin something marvelous and profound should be put. This common attitude made them drop 希 (*ki*, love) from 希哲學 (*kitetsugaku*, learning/science of loving wisdom), turning philosophy, whose literal meaning is 'loving wisdom', into 哲學 (*tetsugaku*, learning/science of wisdom), a far cry from the modesty of Socrates, who steadfastly remained a 'philosopher' (a person loving wisdom). Some may regard it as a deterioration into the pride of the Sophists, and others as an elevation to 'the science of sciences'. However it may be, we can say that philosophy was destined to lose the topmost part 希 (love), when Nishi added to its essential body, 希哲 (*kitetsu*, love of wisdom), an extraneous element, 學 (*gaku*, learning/science), which seems incompatible with 希 (love) as it is understood, for example, in Plato's *Symposium* (200a-204c).

In the second section (學術技藝, *gakujutsu gigei*, science and arts) of the Introduction (總論, *sōron*) of *Hyakugaku renkan*, Nishi comments on the character 學 (*gaku*, learning/science) as follows:

[34] The work was published in September of 1901 (明治 34), about three months before his death. The following is a summary translation.

> The character 學 (*gaku*) is in its nature originally a verb, 道を學ふ (*michi wo manabu*, learn the way), … thus representing action, and rarely employed as a noun, for which the character 道 (Cn. *dao, tao*, Jp. *michi, dō*, way, road) is mainly used. The character 學 used to mean 'a master's teaching a child', the shape of 學 representing 'a master's guarding and teaching a child'.[35] In ancient China they employed two characters 道藝 (*dōgei*, way-art), and later used 術 (*jutsu*, skill), which comes from 行 of 'goes (行く, *iku*) the way (道)'. 學 and 道 belong to the same group (and the character 術 belongs to the same group as 藝 (*gei*)), …[36]

Whether Nishi's etymology of 學 (*gaku*, learning/science) is correct or not, it is certain that what Nishi and others tried to find in philosophy was some established learning/science (*gaku*), and when Nishi decided on the translation of philosophy as 哲學 (*tetsugaku*), he was thinking of philosophy as the way (道, *michi*), or the art (術, *jutsu*), or the learning/science (學, *gaku*), to be reached as the result of investigation, rather than as the love of wisdom (*philosophia*), which consists in the very act of investigation.

3. 哲學 (*Tetsugaku*) and the University

It may be interesting and instructive here to compare Latin America and Japan, located on the opposite sides of the globe, but equally distant from Portugal and Spain, the most powerful countries at the time when both regions were first exposed to Western philosophy. It was around 1550 that Jesuit missionaries arrived in each region and tried to teach Christianity. However, the ways each region went on after that were different. Latin America was colonized and conquerors founded schools and openly taught philosophy there.

In Japan the Portuguese first arrived in 1543 (at the island of Tanegashima), followed in 1549 by Francis Xavier, who tried to teach Christianity as the first Jesuit missionary. The spread of Christianity would have been accompanied by the spread of philosophical ideas. However, a series of events shut off that possibility: the edict expelling missionaries (1587) by TOYOTOMI Hideyoshi (豊臣秀吉, 1536/7-98); persecutions that followed it, including the execution of twenty six Catholics (1597);

[35] The lower part 子 stands for a child.
[36] Ōkubo (ed.) (1981) 12 and 42.

the Shimabara Rebellion (島原の乱, 1637) and its suppression; and finally *Sakoku* (鎖国, Policy of National Seclusion, 1639-1854). Only a small door remained open as an entry point for practical sciences at Hirado (平戸) in Nagasaki, where Holland was allowed to trade with Japan.

It was the arrival of Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry (1794-1858) with the Black Ships (黒船) in 1853 (嘉永 6) that forced Japan to stop the seclusion policy. Shocked by the advancement of Western technologies, the Tokugawa Shogunate immediately decided to enlarge its small office of translation (established in 1811, 文化 8) into 洋學所 (*Yōgakusho*, Institute for Western Studies) in 1855 (安政 2). In the next year (1856, 安政 3) it started to expand *Yōgakusho*, renaming it 蕃書調所 (*Bansho shirabesho*, Institute for the Study of Western Documents), and it became a centre of learning after its opening in January, 1857 (安政 4), with 191 Shogunate-related students, two professors and several people to assist them, including KAWAMOTO Kōmin. It was further strengthened in May with the addition of three assistants, including Nishi and Tsuda. The name 希哲學 (*kitetsugaku*) must have been born through the friendship of these two talented scholars at *Bansho shirabesho*, which was virtually a university-like institute, where research as well as translation of Western texts was intensively conducted.[37]

As was mentioned above, the kind of philosophy Nishi put most emphasis on was the positivist philosophy of Auguste Comte, which sought to achieve order and progress on the basis of scientific developments. In Latin America too, around the same time Comte's philosophy, which was totally different from the kind of philosophy taught during the colonization period, was introduced and became influential, as is clear from the flag of Brazil officially adopted in 1889, with a white equatorial band containing the motto 'Ordem e Progresso', which was inspired by Comte's positivism slogan, 'L'amour pour principe et l'ordre pour base, le progrès pour but'.

Philosophy as the pursuit of wisdom is closely related with education, which in turn is related with politics, especially in countries trying to achieve order and progress, making use of philosophy. The people who got involved in 明六社 (*Meirokusha*) and 東京學士會院 (*Tokyo gakushikaiin*) were also deeply involved in politics at that time.[38] For their purpose of modernizing Japan, the mere pursuit of wisdom was not enough. They needed such teaching as might enable Japan to emulate Western countries. They tried to educate Japanese young people through

[37] Asō (1942) 21-26, 45-48.
[38] Asō (1942) 7-8.

what they had learnt from the West. Fukuzawa engaged in teaching in a 蘭學塾 (*Rangakujuku*, Dutch Learning School) in 1858 (安政 5), and, in order to enlighten young people further, developed it into 慶應義塾 (*Keiōgijuku*), so named because it was opened in 慶應 (*Keiō*) 4 (1868), and it later became Keio University. When Tokyo University was opened in 1877 (明治 10), with the offspring of *Bansho shirabesho* constituting part of it, Katō became its superintendent, and he borrowed the coinages of Nishi, and thus established 哲學 (*tetsugaku*, philosophy), 心理學 (*shinrigaku*, psychology), and 論理學 (*ronrigaku*, logic) as the names of the subjects to be taught at university.[39] When Tokyo University published in 1881 (明治 14) *the Dictionary of Philosophy* under the title of 哲學字彙 (*Tetsugaku jii*), 'philosophy' and 'philosopher' were given the names 哲學 (*tetsugaku*) and 哲學士 (*tetsugakushi*) as their equivalents.[40] 哲學 was also used for 経験哲學 (*keiken tetsugaku* = Empirical Philosophy), 獨斷哲學 (*dokudan tetsugaku* = Dogmatic Philosophy), and 實験哲學 (*jikken tetsugaku* = Positive Philosophy). However, 理學 (*rigaku*) was also still in use to represent philosophy, as we can see in 批評理學 (*hihyō rigaku*) for Critical Philosophy, 實踐理學 (*jissen rigaku*) for Practical Philosophy, and 懷疑理學 (*kaigi rigaku*) for Sceptical Philosophy.

The term 哲學 (Cn. *zhexue*, Jp. *tetsugaku*) entered the Chinese lexicon from the curriculum of Tokyo University. 日本新政考 (Cn. *Riben xinzheng kao*, Jp. *Nihon shinsei kō*, 1888) by 顧厚焜 (Gu Houkun), and 東遊日記 (Jp. *Tōyū nikki*, 1894) by 黃慶澄 (Huang Qingcheng) mention 哲學. But it must have been especially 日本國志 (Cn. *Riben guoshi*, Jp. *Nihon kokushi*), 40 volumes, by 黃遵憲 (Huang Zunxian, 1848-1905) that was decisive. When Huang worked as a clerk at the first Chinese Legation in Japan, for 4 years from November of 1877 (明治 10), which was the very year when Tokyo University was opened, he collected materials and wrote notes for this voluminous work. He completed its 40 volumes in May, 1887, and had the first print made in 1890, with the official publication appearing in 1895.[41] Volume 32 of 日本國志 deals with the studies of Chinese classics (漢學, *kangaku*) and of Western learning (西學, *seigaku*) in Japan, and talks about the introduction of *seigaku* into Japan, including the study abroad of Tsuda and Nishi in Holland, and the study of 哲學 at Tokyo University.[42]

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[39] Asō (1942) 315-317. 哲學 (*tetsugaku*) as a subject had another name 道義學 (*dōgigaku*), probably because the term 哲學 was still unfamiliar to many people. Nishi himself employed 道義學 to represent ethics, not philosophy.

[40] *Tetsugaku jii* (1881) 66-67.

[41] Cf. Zhang (1999) 183, 234 n.1.

[42] Cf. Huang (1898), vol. 32, 17-18.

This was how 哲學 came to be employed to represent philosophy throughout East Asia.[43]

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[43] Cf. Bian (2008) 146; Kōsaka (2008) 160.

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Philosophy and Higher Education in Japan

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Abstract: *Universities do not stay the same; they accommodate the society along with value systems. Philosophy, which once considered to be an indispensable component of university as the cornerstone of liberal art, is under threat of expulsion as universities face to business-oriented reform and budget cut. This paper aims to propose tentative answers to the following questions: What roles should philosophy play in the current situation of higher education in Japan? How should the philosophy community in Japan contribute to the social roles of the academic field?*

The current situation of higher education

Higher education (HE) is undergoing drastic change driven by technological development and global economy. Business and industry strongly demand internationalization and practical training of HE institutions. Humanities and social sciences, often accused of not meeting such demands, are put under strong pressure by cuts to their budgets. This paper will overview the current trends of HE in Japan and in the world, and then consider what roles philosophy community in Japan should play, both within itself, and in terms of its contribution to the social roles of the academic field in general.

As HE institutions in Japan are parts of our society, any discussion of their future must involve forecast for society in general in the global context. We first assume that all parties wish to improve our society through higher education. We all want everybody to be happy. We hope for a fully just society that satisfies the conditions of public responsibility and accountability. We assume that we share external restraints that condition the trajectories of contemporary Japanese society: for example, in the present decade, shrinking educational budgets, decrease of population and increase of the HE entrance rate, and global competition in the recruitment of excellent students and researchers-to-be; in the coming decades, global development with conflicts over limited resources such as water, more jobs

done by machines, and a glowing shift in population toward the elderly, due to increased longevity through advances in medical technology. It is worth mentioning that, despite the declining numbers of young people, one forecast claims that the HE entrance rate in the world will drastically increase[1] as more affordable due to open and online HE educational systems.

We also assume that most current HE institutions are established according to Wilhelm von Humboldt's idea of the university in terms of *Bildung*, characterized by the following three principles: unity of research and education, autonomy of academia with independent decision systems, and freedom of learning. The border between professional and vocational schools and traditional Humboldtian universities is now blurred. In fact, there exist successful programs of humanities and social sciences in HE institutions under a non-Humboldtian model. For instance, MIT has focused on applied sciences rather than liberal arts. However, it hosts an excellent department of philosophy, which has been combined with linguistics since its establishment. The department offers courses in traditional areas of philosophy such as metaphysics, ethics, and history of philosophy, while it encourages students to conduct interdisciplinary research in mathematics, computer science, and psychology. Such a mixture of pure and applied fields is observed not only in MIT but also in other philosophy departments in the United States, where the belief is prevalent that those with interdisciplinary backgrounds are in a stronger position to gain placement in a shrinking job market even after obtaining a Ph.D. degree. It nevertheless must be emphasized that their academic standards are kept high even in terms of preparedness for traditional academic training.

In fact, all parties concerning the HE issues propose their own future model of university under the name of Humboldtian ideals with different emphases. The more conservative groups reject any reform to the original ideals. The nineteenth-century ideas of general learning and cultural training are immutable and time-proof; they offer the basic framework for students in the twenty-first century to nurture attitudes and skills toward life-long learning. Reading classical literatures and in-class discussion continue to occupy the central position in HE education. The reformers claim: The old-fashioned idea has become obsolete. Students nowadays need up-to-date skills and knowledge to prepare for our drastically changing society, such as training in modern academic tools and devices (such as ICT, or information

[1] Online, Open and Flexible Higher Education for Future We Want. From Statements to Action: Equity, Access, and Quality Learning Outcomes. (9-11 June 2015, UNESCO, Paris) https://iite.unesco.org/files/news/639206/Paris%20Message%2013%2007%202015%20Final.pdf (Last accessed: January 17, 2017)

and communication technology) and diverse work experience. The table below summarizes how each party respond to pressure toward change from industry and government.

	Conservative	Reform
Academic-oriented (Humboldtian)	Keep: General learning in liberal art + specialized departments	Accommodation for modernized academic tools
Business-oriented (Non-Humboldtian)	Professional/ vocational schools	Practical courses in universities, such as project-based learning in developing countries

Table 1: Contrast among attitudes to tertiary education

Another trend of the HE educational methodology is the shift from teaching to learning. Assuming specific knowledge becomes obsolete very fast, students need skills of life-long self-learning. The one-directional lecture style of knowledge transfer does not fit the assumption. Reading and discussion skills are more demanded than before. Alleged insufficiency in these skills among incoming students of HE institutions in Japan became the driver of reform in university entrance examinations and in the contents of the national curriculum. Short essays are preferred to multiple-choice; group interviews are strongly recommended in spite of personnel costs. The implementation of reform is still under watch, but HE admission with the new style of university entrance examinations may drastically change the learning styles of successful candidates.

Points of contrasts between conservative and reformative parties on HE are (1) topics and contents, (2) learning methods and devices, (3) teaching styles, and (4) course structure. They may propose some educational contents in common, although often with different emphases. For example, all troops recommend language education; conservative groups prefer Shakespeare[2], for example, while application-oriented groups may rather appreciate intensive project-based-learning (PBL) in developing countries. Mathematics is strongly recommended for students in science and engineering majors as well as economics, sociology, and psychology,

[2] It might be inadequate stereotyping to mention Shakespeare as representative content of English courses in HE. In fact, Faculty members in charge of English classes in Japanese HE institutions belong to several communities: English literature, English-related linguistics, teaching English as second language (TESL), area studies, and other humanities and social sciences. Those from different communities often have totally different training histories so that their value systems vary. Those from TESL may prefer PBL.

which heavily rely on statistics and other areas of mathematics. Humanities and social sciences adopt scientific methods of investigations of their own traditional issues as well as technological supports. For example, philosophers of mind should collaborate with brain scientists; historians and archaeologists must refer to radiocarbon dating; and literature researchers should entertain big data and character recognition technology.

Few will deny that the environment of research and education has changed with ICT. Even philosophers, no matter which positions on education they have, read and publish articles and books online, routinely communicate via emails and short message services, and even publish their lectures and other academic outputs on YouTube. Some international academic conferences have begun to go online to accept video presentations. Goals of HE thus include equipping the next generation with knowledge and skills to survive in such an environment, although educational contents might be kept the same.

People are almost unanimous as regards the use of ICT for research, but differ on the educational uses of ICT in class. Students use smart phones to collect information in and out of classroom. Should lecturers allow them to read classical texts through smart phones in class if they are available free online? As it reduces learning costs, why not? Those who hesitate to introduce ICT in class may claim that smart phones might divert students' focus from class content; they just play around online while they sit in class. It is a question of teaching style: if in-class tasks are regularly assigned and checked on site, students have less chance to surf irrelevant online information. Large-sized classes, however, may not allow such on-site check-up processes. Such a teaching style requires smaller classes or online courses, both of which need more instructors and thus increase personnel costs. In other words, students pay less for information but more for learning environment in such cases.

The HE community is not unanimous on the evidence of the effectiveness of various educational methods and contents, even though educational practitioners and researchers have devoted considerable efforts to establish such evidence. It is almost impossible to conduct rigorous experiments with comparison groups in any educational process. Long-term observation is also difficult. Experiences in other countries may be irrelevant due to different social systems. Even in a single social system, evaluation of skills and knowledge in the changing context is almost impossible; still, the next generation must be ready to learn throughout their life to prepare for continuous changes. What will be long-lasting knowledge and skills? What goals should their graduation be tied to, to equip them with skills to survive in

a technologically shifting society? Which methods are best? Are they feasible in the current schools or HE institutions? The main issue is thus about competing value systems. Young generations should be equipped with ambivalent skills to surf on waves of multiple value systems to instantly judge according to the very adequate one at each moment, and to keep personality for responsibility and accountability.

Now we progress our argument according to the following reading of the Humboldtian idea: an environmental model of university educational services. Educational service should enhance personal growth with external stimuli which continuously adjust a student's directions of growth. Stimuli do not consist just of what are in the curriculum, but include interactions among students and the university community. Admission policy is thus important as it shows its own design of the student body. Some universities emphasize uniformity of the student body, while others put significance on diversity. Educational infrastructure is also essential: such as libraries, ICT services, as well as lifelines such as water supply, food, and electricity. Some universities offer the opportunity to live in a dormitory.

Such services should be comprehensive. A partial adoption may not work functionally without customized coordination for each student. For example, courses, online or offline, are essential components of higher education, but they need to be combined into a service system with quizzes, feedback in terms of paper comments and grades, and discussion sessions with other participants.

But Humboldtian HE also has a downside. First, its enormous and ever-increasing costs. ICT drastically raises infrastructure costs of HE institutions. University libraries struggle with the financial burden of keeping journal contracts. Active learning programs require extra personnel costs for on-site facilitators. These cost pressures leads to the trends in higher education throughout the world: decrease of tenured faculty members and reliance on part-time lecturers and online graders; closure of departments of humanities and social sciences, which are accused of being unable to meet public demands. It seems impossible to keep the traditional style of higher education.

Some universities have already begun restructuring liberal arts, claiming that such a change meets students' needs by enhancing employability. Project-based learning (PBL) study-abroad programs for a couple of weeks are substituted for courses of reading classics of English literature, to ask students to experience real workplace. Students majoring in science and engineering are encouraged to take so-called "liberal art courses" to obtain a wider perspective, which turns out to mean

listening to guest lectures by business and industry figures! Universities increase the numbers of courses taught in English to promote themselves as providers of international education.

Such a restructuring of liberal arts programs to business-oriented training in HE institutions is led by the Japanese government, which pursues the agenda of transforming the education system through preferential distribution of budgets towards compliant institutions. Moreover, the Tobitate program of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) urges students to go abroad with the financial support of the business and industry communities. Students with an orientation toward global business are likely to be awarded while purely academic-oriented students are often discouraged under a highly competitive environment.

The second downside of the Humboldtian HE is an increase in the HE entrance rate, or the popularization of HE in periods of high economic growth in each country. This has transformed students' expectations, as well as what is expected of them. The majority of current students do not hope to be connected to the academic world after graduation from their undergraduate program. Many do not even have in mind the idea that they are going into academia when they enter a university. For them, it is just a continuation of high school, where they are allowed to simply focus on what they are given. In other words, they are not well prepared for HE, but once they are accepted, it is the responsibility of HE institutions to lead them to live under the ideas of HE. Basic academic skill courses are designed to meet their demands.

HE institutions in Japan have already suffered from the popularization issue. In fact, it is more severe here than in other countries, for at least the following two reasons. First, HE admission in Japan differs from countries in North America and Europe, in that it does not guarantee preparedness for college through achievement tests or certification equivalent to SAT, baccalaureate, or Abitur programs. Skills and knowledge of freshmen vary by HE institutions in Japan, but research suggests the domestic average is below the global average. Second, retrieving up-to-date knowledge in the global community requires more language skills for Japanese students than students of other developed countries, while incoming students to HE on average do not equip themselves with the required skills enough.

For example, let us examine the average English language skills of new incoming students of humanities and social sciences at Nihon University[3]. The reported average scores of the English standardized examination (ELPA) are equivalent to the TOEIC 390-400 range, the expected scores of first- or second-year high school students[4]. Considering that TOEIC 740-820 range, or equivalent to IELTS score 6 or TOEFL iBT 60-78, is considered to be the minimal language requirement to fully understand college-level courses in English-speaking countries, most students in Japanese HE institutions are not well prepared to attend courses taught in English. In fact, the very same fact is used to justify the global-business-oriented transformation of HE and the introduction of English-taught courses as language training. Of course, poorly prepared students learn less from courses taught in English, as their language skills often do not meet the minimal standard to fully understand such courses at a college-level.

Those who object to English-taught courses in Japanese HE rely on a widespread belief that abundant translations of academic literatures in European languages to Japanese have allowed HE institutions in Japan to teach almost every subject in Japanese. This belief does not stand any more, however. Publishers often refuse to issue expensive academic books, as the budgets of university libraries shrink and the cost of e-journals booms. Moreover, students get less financial support from their families, while "governmental scholarship" is in fact a student loan. Some students cannot afford expensive textbooks[5] or their own personal computer[6]. They prefer reasonably priced textbooks or even free material to reduce their costs for learning environment. In such a situation, up-to-date academic contents may not be fully covered by Japanese books, and college preparedness of students will be more critical in Japanese HE than now. Reading skills in foreign

[3] Kumada et als. (2015) English Proficiency Improvements in 1st Year University Students during 2014 : An Analysis Using a Placement Test. Nihon Daigaku Bunri-gakubu Kenkyu Kiyou (Bulletin of School of Liberal Arts, Nihon University) (90), 131-142, 2015. http://www.chs.nihon-u.ac.jp/institute/human/kiyou/90/8.pdf (Last accessed on January 13, 2017) It is the university with the largest student population in Japan and completion for admission surpasses the average, as the deviation value of successful candidates suggests.

[4] MEXT (2016) Heisei 26 nendo Eigo-ryoku Chousa Kekka (koukou san-nensei) no Sokuho (平成 27 年度英語力調査結果（高校 3 年生）の速報) March 26, 2016. http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/shotou/117/shiryo/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2016/05/24/1368985_7_1.pdf (Last accessed: January 6, 2017)

[5] It is not common for university bookstores in Japan to buy back and sell used textbooks.

[6] Most students use smart phones to write assignments or watch assigned videos.

languages[7] will be more essential for every academic field. Academic publishers should keep up trends of the world as early after their admission as possible.

As civilian budgets shrink, the military research budget is now on focus. It brings up debate of so-called dual-use issues. Outcomes of academic research can be applied to military purposes, even though its original goal has nothing to do with such goals. It is not just in science, technology, engineering, and medical (STEM) fields but also in humanities and social sciences. The languages and cultures of specific areas are essential geopolitical knowledge. Some universities, including the University of Tokyo, have instructed their members not to apply for military research programs, however. Some academic societies publish guidelines for dual-use research. The Philosophical Association of Japan may well consider its social position on such issues and should publish a guideline as philosophers may play indispensable roles in dual-use programs as ethical evaluation of purposes and methods of research is critical in selecting dual-use applications. The dual-use issues may distort liberal arts itself as humanities and social science can be "Intellectual safe place" where every member can speak up without feeling threatened. Philosophy may play an essential role to guarantee the point in education.

The environmental model of HE may be changed, however, with cost reduction via massive open online courses (MOOCs). Tuitions and fees of MOOCs or other open universities are far smaller than real universities so that such distant education systems attract students in countries suffering severe economic problems. For example, The National Distance Education University (UNED) in Spain has 205,000 students,[8] with most students entering just after high school graduation. The Open University Japan has about 90,000 students[9]. Such distant education systems will be associated with flexible learning: no (or little) need of classrooms or other facilities in a single campus. Students learn by themselves and need to commit themselves to keep up with the curriculum to obtain a degree. In the case of MOOCs, the learning environment will go online as a whole. It will annihilate the current discussion whether students may use smart phones in class; they choose their own device to accommodate their situation. Learning becomes ubiquitous.

[7] English language courses in secondary education institutions in Japan have shifted foci from grammar and reading to listening and speaking. The current national curriculum of English for secondary education covers less knowledge of English grammar than the curriculum under which current HE faculty members experienced.
[8] http://portal.uned.es/portal/page?_pageid=93,24305391&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL
[9] http://www.ouj.ac.jp/hp/gaiyo/who.html

MOOCs polarize instructors, however. A small number of "star" instructors broadcast courses, while most become part-time invisible supports with a relatively small income. Teaching-only contracts will be prevalent. HE institutions will also be polarized; those which train researchers-to-be and the others which concentrate on education. The shift in the job market to part-time teaching jobs may discourage young scholars.

In short, "collapse of decency" represents the current situation in HE. It was widely believed that college graduates would get decent jobs; HE instructors are respectable; and it is appropriate to enjoy cultural activities such as reading classics and history, examine arts and music on the basis of a wide knowledge of cultural backgrounds. HE does not play any such social role any more, however. HE should be available to everybody, no matter of social status.

University and Philosophy in Japan

Now we turn to the following three interrelating questions. What philosophy should be offered in the current context of HE with shrinking budgets and intense demands from society? What roles should philosophy play in the current situation of HE in Japan? How should the philosophy community in Japan contribute to the social roles of the academic field?

If unity of research and teaching is respected and teaching needs to be shaped for the future, research should also be changed. Moreover, if philosophy departments cannot afford to hire enough teaching staff to cover all the traditional fields, the departmental structure should adapt to meet students' educational needs.

There seem to be two directions philosophy departments can take to cope with the situation. The first is that a wider coverage of specializations within philosophy may be realized by the institutionalization of audit student status and credit transfers among universities. This would be possible in areas where many HE institutes reside such as the greater Tokyo area and Kwansai; faculty members play the coordinator role to advise students to audit adequate courses from multiple universities according to their interests and skills. In this case, each faculty member may keep their own research coverage as is, to proceed into deep consideration and analysis on the sacrifice of their coordinator workload. This option is not possible, however, in most areas in Japan, where HE institutions are dispersed. Even in metropolitan areas, where the first option seems to be realizable, HE institutions

may not keep doing so for long. The coordinator job is not possible without knowledge of the research community itself. It requires too many tedious trivialities to meet students' demands. There is no systematic and sustainable personnel system to assign adequate person to such jobs.

The other, which is not ideal but affordable, is to modify the coverage areas of each faculty member to fit students' demands and needs. Of course, this has a limit; nobody can do everything. Worse, students' demands may not be adequate for themselves. They may want quick skills and tips to survive, but these easy ways will not support them in the long term.

That is the very point that philosophers should focus on. Humanities and social science, if rightly instructed, offer foundational knowledge and basic skills of argument evaluation, which are essential for long-term learning. The contents, while incredibly interesting by themselves in researchers' eyes, do not matter for students for short-term purposes; those "boring and useless" contents are however a key to learn the learning methods. We can learn and experience the external world through the combination of contents and conceptual framework. That is what to loudly claim out of research communities in humanities and social science. Philosophy is the cornerstone of the function of learning methods of learning themselves.

Thus there is a third direction: contents may stay the same but should be presented with new emphases. Metaphysics and epistemology are now hot real-world issues in connections with artificial intelligence. Ethics, aesthetics, political philosophy, and philosophy of law find new cases to design new ethical guidelines and to meet social demands. The history of philosophy offers reference points even in topic-based discussion sessions on practical topics such as social inequalities or natural resource issues, but emphasize the texts are contemporary of themselves. All philosophers in history have worked to understand the world on the basis of the knowledge extant at the time, which turns out to involve implicit assumptions of philosophical theories. These must be clarified before applying philosophical theories to the issues of our contemporary topics. Applications of philosophy without such consideration of social demands can be totally inadequate.

Evaluation of arguments is one of the main goals of traditional logic education. The significance of such a skill increases in the internet age, as the amount of information published online, both in text and video formats, explodes. Coverage of traditional logic is not enough, however. The notion of validity and other concepts of deductive logic are still useful, but survival in the information society demands more skills. Educational contents of informal logic should be

extended to include knowledge of real-time communication and characterizations of media as well as scientific uses of induction and abduction. Texts from historically accumulated literatures of philosophy are treasures of training samples, which our current common sense often does not work to understand, but we need to tackle them with logical reading skills and logical skills of evaluation of arguments on the basis of a knowledge of historical backgrounds. Logical skills of evaluating arguments are essential in applied philosophy. Detection of implicit assumptions, which requires deep understanding of background information behind arguments, is one of the most desired skills in the age of information.

Those basic skills of philosophy also serve as an introduction to research skills, which researchers devote themselves to cultivating for life. Equipment of learning skills is a core of the Humboldtian idea of the unity of research and education; it should not be misread as identifying HE institutions with researcher training centers, however. Although a significant role of HE institutions is to nurture future faculty members and researchers, we cannot stand the current regressive production of researchers any more. Philosophers of the next generation should gain the skills and knowledge to explore uncharted territories with foundational knowledge of existing philosophical theories and philosophical methods. Future philosophers will be able to compete against non-philosophers if they arm themselves with interdisciplinary skills and knowledge. The current philosophers should support their training via reading classical texts and writing and speaking logically. Academic associations of philosophy and related areas must underwrite such training of future philosophers. The Philosophical Association of Japan must lead the movements toward original research.

Accommodation of modernized research tools is necessary to design the curriculum of philosophy education as well as scholarship of learning and teaching. Languages, reflective skills and attitudes, rhetoric, and logic (both deductive and inductive), are the core components of a skill framework, while the history of philosophy and current research attempts offer contents. Both complement each other; none is dispensable. In addition, fields of training must include both young philosophers with non-philosophers. They should not withdraw in a narrow specialization if they want to survive under social demands. They need to know how to talk with researchers of other fields and professionals out of academia as well as citizens.

Another urgent issue in Japan is to build intellectual safe places. Philosophers can be role models in our society to establish an environment without discrimination, sexual harassment, and political pressures. Imbalance of educational opportunities due to financial situations should be mitigated.

Philosophy for children, for example, must be focused on social consequences. The Education Endowment Foundation (2016)[10] reports that learning philosophy improves mathematical and linguistic skills in children as well as their meta-cognition. The movie *Just a Beginning*, a documentary of philosophy for children in Paris, should be read in the context of social disparity as a long-term social experiment in a financially and socially challenged area, where residents include more immigrants than other areas, examining whether it may adjust social polarization. Another consequence of the EEF research is that philosophy in elementary and secondary education might enforce differences in academic achievements among social classes if it is given mainly to children from relatively rich families.

Philosophers need to watch connections to secondary education in addition to HE. Universities may assign evaluation questions of argument evaluation as a part of philosophy as writing topics of entrance examination. Such contents are to be covered in "Logical Japanese (Ronri Kokugo)" in the next national curriculum as well as in "Citizenship education (Kokyo)." Philosophers should encourage educators to learn philosophy to instil argument evaluation skills into society.

The Philosophical Association of Japan should promote diversity not only for its members but also for society to ask its members to behave well to construct intellectual safe place around them.

Philosophy is alive. It always focuses on contemporary issues on the shoulder of the giant of historical accumulation of trial-and-errors of philosophical considerations. Hide Ishiguro in personal discussion once pointed out the educational design of philosophy in Oxford University. The department of philosophy in Oxford offers an M. Phil. Degree. The degree is respected more than Doctor of Philosophy in Oxford as well as other doctoral degrees. The M.Phil. represents Ryle's ideal of philosophy in higher education. He emphasizes original

[10] Education Endowment Foundation (2016) *Philosophy for Children,* Project report. https://educationendowmentfoundation.org.uk/public/files/Support/Campaigns/Evaluation_Reports/EEF_Project_Report_PhilosophyForChildren.pdf (Last accessed: January 5, 2017. Cf. Project URL https://educationendowmentfoundation.org.uk/our-work/projects/philosophy-for-children)

research, which is considered to surpass philological studies which leads to the doctoral degree. The author believes Ryle's ideals of the M. Phil. program reflect his foresight on the roles of philosophy in universities in order to produce philosophers of younger generations courageous enough to keep up with the rapid changes of our society.

Readers might ask: what resources do we need, both financial and in terms of personnel, to adapt the change? My answer: nothing other than what we have now in hand or less. Current universities are just like Neurath's boat on the rapidly changing world with no secure foundations nor any immune system against social criticism. We, like sailors, must modify ourselves to survive in the world of post-truth.

Acknowledgement

Professor Hide Ishiguro told me Ryle's original ideas toward establishment of M.Phil. in the department of philosophy, Oxford University, according to her own experiences. The project is partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant 16H03338.

Editorial Statement

Beginning in 1951, the Philosophical Association of Japan (PAJ) started its annual journal 哲学 *Tetsugaku, Philosophy*. Indeed, the sixty-eighth issue has just been published. Each issue of the journal contains some 20 articles on various topics in philosophy, most of them written in Japanese. Although we believe that the quality of the articles is consistent with an international standard, it is regrettable that they can hardly be read outside of Japan due to the language barrier. The journal allows English, German and French papers, but scholars and students in Japan find it better to contribute their works in these languages to foreign journals. Thus, for a long time now our Philosophical Association has stood in need of an independent journal especially designed for an international audience. In 2015 a committee of the PAJ appointed the Editorial Board for this new international journal, *Tetsugaku: International Journal of the Philosophical Association of Japan*. The committee decided to publish it on the website in the Spring of each year.

For this first issue, we have selected three articles by PAJ members, which are written in English, French and German, respectively. Also, in the winter of 2015 we circulated call for papers for the Special Theme, "Philosophy and the University." We are happy to receive many submissions from in and outside Japan and were able to finally select seven excellent papers. In addition to these, we invited special contributions, in order to make the philosophical activities in Japan better known in the world. The first issue presents, then, an article by our current President and one by his predecessor.

During the editorial process, several scholars from abroad gave us valuable advice. In addition, Dr. Andrew J. Mason, an independent scholar living in Japan, kindly offered his help in giving the authors comments on style. We appreciate their kind support.

The Special Theme for the second issue is "Philosophy and Translation". We hope that our international journal will encourage philosophical activities and dialogue between Japan and the world.

1 April 2017

Editors of *Tetsugaku: International Journal of the Philosophical Association of Japan*

Call for papers: *Tetsugaku,* Vol.2, 2018
Special theme: Philosophy and translation

The history of philosophy, East and West, is inseparable from questions of translation. The issues of translation range from its literal, conventional sense of interlinguistic conversion, to a much broader, cross-cultural and intracultural endeavour. Translation can also function between academic disciplines. Across this broad range, the scope of translation opens diverse paths in the crossing of borders. Translation can be seen as a window through which to reconsider the task of philosophy today. We can also use different prepositions to mark different aspects of the juncture between philosophy and translation: philosophy of translation, philosophy in translation, philosophy as translation.

Philosophical papers reflecting on translation in relation to the following sub-themes are welcome:

- Historical examination of philosophy and translation
- Linguistic analysis of translation
- Translation in relation to particular philosophical approaches (analytical, continental, pragmatist, etc.)
- Translation as an intralinguistic issue (translation as internal to the nature of language)
- Translation and the substance of comparative philosophy
- Translation as related to cross-cultural communication
- Philosophy, translation and human transformation
- Translation and the crossing of philosophical divides (for example, the continental and the analytical)
- Political implications of philosophy and translation
- Translation, the internationalization of higher education and the role of philosophy

[Deadline: 30 September 2017]

To submit your paper, please read carefully our "Guidelines for Contributors" on our website. (http://philosophy-japan.org/en/international_journal/guideline/)