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Introduction

UEHARA Mayuko
Chief Editor of *Tetsugaku*

Volume 3 of the journal *Tetsugaku* is a special issue on "Japanese Philosophy" (*Nihon tetsugaku* 日本哲学). Until today, the Philosophical Association of Japan (日本哲学会) has not functioned as a space that was inclusive of scholars working within the field of "Japanese philosophy". There appear to be scholars living abroad who misunderstand this association as a home for scholars applying themselves to the field of Japanese philosophy. It is my understanding, however, that the research activities of scholars who specialize in Western philosophy occupy the central position within this association rather than the activities of those involved in the field of Japanese philosophy. I believe that, in this sense, the present special issue can provide a fitting opportunity for introducing the latest information on their activities to the members of this association, among others.

In the inaugural and second volumes of this journal, the essays contained within the section "Philosophical Activities in Japan" have presented the current state of domestic philosophical research. However for this issue we have changed the section name to "Japanese Philosophy in the World", to better convey the current state of research in Japanese philosophy. Two eminent scholars have contributed their essays to this section: emeritus professors John C. Maraldo and Thomas P. Kasulis, each of whom has been instrumental in pushing the field forward. We also have one report jointly written by the Editor-in-Chief of the *Journal of Japanese Philosophy* and the President of the International Association of Japanese Philosophy, and another by the President of the European Network of Japanese Philosophy. These reports help to convey the extent to which research in Japanese philosophy has developed in recent years.

This trend in Japanese philosophy within international circles is reflected in the present issue. A specialist journal focusing on this field did not exist until ten years ago. Today, there is now a global network of Japanese philosophy scholars, based in institutions such as the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture, the University of Hildesheim, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Sun Yat-sen University, the State University of Campina (Brazil), and the National Autonomous University of Mexico, not to mention the aforesaid associations and journals. This

development is one of the aspects of the organic internationalization of Japanese philosophy, and its positive results are on display here in this third special feature for *Tetsugaku*.

The finally selected ten essays were almost entirely written by young scholars from Taiwan, Japan, Brazil, France and Germany, who are making their debut on the international stage of Japanese philosophy.

As the "Table of Contents" shows, theme sections have not been provided. The editors made this decision following the understanding that some of the subjects contained within these essays frequently cross over the limits of any clearly defined category, intersecting with one another. Nevertheless, I would like to attempt to briefly outline here what we may think of as the major themes that the authors have taken up.

First, we find that the problem of how we are to define "Japanese philosophy" occupies an important position within the papers contained in this volume. Alongside the two essays by J. C. Maraldo and T. P. Kasulis for "Japanese Philosophy in the World", some of the special feature papers claim that it is necessary for us to radically probe the meaning and the identity of "philosophy", rather than simply accepting a Eurocentric view based on a particular Greek tradition. If we consider the findings of our contributors, we can appreciate that modern Japanese philosophy, as established alongside the translation of the term "philosophy" (*tetsugaku*)—and no one would refute that this is particularly the case with Kyoto school philosophy—has in a certain sense functioned to sever the stream of thinking that stretches from before the modern period up until the post-war period. In other words, the recognition of Japanese philosophy in the modern period actually worked to create the discourse that no philosophy exists in pre-modern Japan. We can observe among our contributors an attitude to liberate Japanese philosophy from the fixed manner in which it has heretofore been related to western philosophy and pre-modern Japanese traditions. It is their hope that the scholarship called "Japanese philosophy" may have a new role to play within the world. Perhaps this effort to re-define Japanese philosophy may help to directly instigate a reconsideration of philosophy in general among the members of the Philosophical Association of Japan.

Another subject in this volume is Kyoto school philosophy, which all the authors integrate into the subject of redefining Japanese philosophy. Here, our readers will encounter two new approaches to this problem. One approach is research into the still unexplored field of "The Kyoto School's Influence on Taiwanese Philosophy under Japanese Rule (1895-1945)". Another approach is the

suggestion to situate Kyoto school philosophy within a project to re-consider the discourse of philosophical modernism. The proposal is that we may search for an answer to the overcoming of modernity by investigating the contributions that the Kyoto school has made to modern Western philosophy.

Besides the above consideration, this volume also provides six monographs dealing with specific philosophers: Miki Kiyoshi, Nishida Kitarō (two pieces), Tanabe Hajime, Kuki Shūzō (two pieces), and Ōnishi Hajime. As well as papers that examine foundational themes and ideas of these philosophers—for example, Miki's concept of imagination, Kuki's metaphysics conceived from the view point of the contingency, and Nishida's understanding of the relation between the religious and the secular—we also have three challenging articles that delve into the theories of time advanced by Nishida, Tanabe and Kuki respectively, offering a suitable opportunity for comparison. Finally, our special feature ends with a paper which takes up for examination some of the philosophers of the Meiji period, such as Ōnishi Hajime, while inquiring into "the Role of Aesthetics in Assessing Religion Cross-Culturally".

In summary, here we have a harmonious weaving together of a diverse range of subjects, resulting in an original anthology that differs in style and content from already published numbers of the JJP and the EJJP, or other collections of essays on Japanese philosophy. I would like to offer my deepest gratitude to the authors, to those individuals both within and without the Philosophical Association of Japan who offered words of advice for the editing of *Tetsugaku*, and also, to Tsuda Shiori, who has gone to great efforts to help with the editing process.

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Japanese Philosophy in the World

Defining Japanese Philosophy in the Making: A New Proposal

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University of North Florida, Emeritus

"Is there any real philosophy in Japan?" a friend of mine once asked. And so I wondered, how does defining philosophy confine it? How has it broken out of its confinement and appeared in various lands? And how does the work of Nishida Kitarō contribute to the momentum of philosophy? These are the questions that lie intertwined, mostly beneath the surface, in my collection of essays titled *Japanese Philosophy in the Making: Crossing Paths with Nishida*.[1] There I focused on Japan in its encounters with European thought, but my own encounters have left me convinced that the identities we call Japan, Europe, and philosophy are as shifting as they are settled, almost as if they are floating signifiers looking for a fixed designation. What has remained constant is my fascination with the landscape of thinking outlined in the small number of texts I have studied. I have enjoyed clear vistas opened by venturing into that thought, and just as often struggled to untangle the briar patches in which I found myself. Instead of pursuing a bird's-eye view that would orient the various essays into a single-themed work, I found myself following different tracks that might give me a ground-level view, a perspective on a few features within a vast landscape. Along the way, the questions that kept coming up were the questions of how philosophy gets defined, how it has traversed time and place, how it has been conveyed by the thought of Nishida, for example, and how we can continue to translate it.

I think it fair to say that the essays I published in that volume answered these questions implicitly at best, more by way of example than by explicit argument. The prologue, reprinted here, was intended to provide an entry way. And the first thing to say is that my questions seem to presuppose the universal occurrence of something called philosophy, and so a word about that presumption is in order.

[1] Chisokudō Publications, 2017. The present article is a revised version of the Prologue to that book, reprinted here with permission.

The circle of defining philosophy

What, then, is philosophy? The question seems to ask for a definition that one could write in a dictionary. Such a definition would state what makes philosophy what it is; it would specify the "whatness" or quiddity of philosophy, and would describe it as distinct from other things. It would determine this essence by distinguishing the essential features of philosophy from the accidental, contingent, or alterable characteristics that may accompany the appearance of philosophy wherever and however it has appeared. The definition would identify an unchangeable core, without which any of its appearances would not really be philosophy. We might find such an essence in the Greek origins of philosophy, in the ancient distinction between *mythos* and *logos*, that is, between the ritual language of the initiated and the practice of reasoned words or the search for unifying reasons and underlying principles. Philosophy's true beginning, then, would be an *arché* or principle that articulates a necessary, logical origin and not merely a historical one. Philosophy's definition would then be necessary and universal, not parochial or time-bound.

To define the essence we might also look directly at the word, *philosophia*: love of wisdom, of course—but in practice a love that springs from a sense of wonder or astonishment (*thaumazein* in Greek), and so a love that is more a yearning *eros* than a settled *philia*, and a wisdom that is more a relentless quest than an unmoving awe. The quest as we see it in Parmenides originated when philosophy separated from its mother *mythos*, heard her voice, the voice of the gods, as distinct from its own, and began to question the sayings of the gods. Philosophy developed a voice, a *logos*, so deep and yet so overarching that it was soon able to speak for all other voices and account for all matters spoken about, able to give more shallow or limited accounts their proper place and name, *mythology*, for example. Philosophy's accounting became categorizing, determining not only the different parts of the one world but the different manners in which those parts are apprehended.

After philosophy gave birth to the sciences and they began to take on an identity of their own, vying with philosophy, philosophy called itself their queen mother. This overarching science, to be sure, had been hydra-headed all along, its voice sometimes a chorus and sometimes a discord, thriving on dialogue and debate and the kind of questioning that marked its earliest years, issuing eventually in multiple identity crises and doubts about its foundations, its pedigree, and its difference. For all its inner discord, however, philosophy has never ceased its self-questioning. In the last hundred years, philosophy's quest to know itself is as much a

mark of what it is as anything else. In three decades of teaching students—many with no background in the subject—I found it useful to define philosophy as the critical investigation of deeply perplexing questions: what is the best way to live, what is true and how can we best know it, and what are our obligations to one another? For those with advanced training in the subject, one of those deeply perplexing questions is the very definition of philosophy.

This entire reflection, of course, tells us little if anything about what exactly philosophy is. It hardly gives us a definitive statement, although it suggests some qualities often taken to delimit philosophy from other human endeavors: critical, fundamental, logical, systematic. More importantly, this sort of reflection indicates just how distinctively Greek and "philosophical" is the very quest for a definition of philosophy. Essence versus accidental features, underlying reasons versus capricious causes, origins and principles versus offspring and incidents, the name *philosophy* versus the various *ologies*, categories versus chaotic arrangements; persistent questioning, discursive dialogue, and disputations about difference and identity—are all expressions specifically if not exclusively of a Greek-European heritage. We cannot escape this hermeneutical circle when we so attempt to define philosophy, a Greek term treated in a Greek way. We can, however, employ the practice of questioning to seek other ways to determine the purview of philosophy. If the quest for a lexical or generic definition of philosophy is circular and remains within the confines of a Greek origin, we need not stay within those confines. Indeed we cannot if we are to understand the need today to reconsider defining philosophy.

Controversies about a name and a domain

But why reconsider defining philosophy at all? The reason is simple: a counterclaim to the name *philosophy* has become more and more prevalent. *Philosophy* today is used to designate traditions of thought that arose independently of the Greco-European provenance usually assigned it. The name *Indian philosophy* meets almost no resistance today, but whether Chinese thought should be called philosophy is a matter of controversy. Even more controversial is the question whether pre-modern Japanese thought counts as philosophy—not to speak of the worldviews of past non-literate cultures. If such controversy is "merely academic", we do well to recall that it has at least two practical consequences. First, it examines prejudices—as philosophy has always done—and addresses the charge that

predominant education is unwisely Eurocentric. It concerns a core of our education in a global era and affects the general reading public as well as university students. Secondly, and linked to the first consequence, the controversy is a matter of career choice and livelihood for many people. When university departments determine which fields should be covered and who gets hired to teach them, the stakes are especially high for those trained in "non-Western" intellectual traditions.

The first essay in my collection rehearsed some reasons to confine the name *philosophy* to thought with a Greco-European heritage. I countered those reasons with others discernable in that same tradition. But we should not think it is only Western philosophers who refused to find philosophy in non-Western traditions. There have been numerous Japanese philosophers who have done so as well. The second essay in the collection summarized the relevant history. In short, when the word *philosophia* and the discipline it designated in the 1860s and 70s entered Japan, it met with a good deal of controversy and consternation. Several attempts were made to translate philosophical terms and to comprehend the sense of what it means to philosophize. Indeed, if perplexity itself counts as an origin of philosophical thinking, as the Greeks suggested, then the perplexity over the meaning and scope of *philosophia* can be said to originate modern philosophy in Japan. As is well known, the translation of the word was eventually settled as *tetsugaku* 哲学, a novel compound of two Chinese characters with Confucian overtones. The same sinographs are now used for *philosophy* in China and Korea as well, and these two nations also have had their own controversies about this word and whether it should be applied to traditional thought before the influx of Western academic philosophy. To give but one example, in the 1920s the Korean Lee Kwan-Yong (1891–1933) attempted to replace 哲学 (*cheolhak* in Korean) with a word meaning something like the "science of essences"—and he did so in part because, as a scholar in a nation colonized by Japan, he wanted to resist a term that the Japanese had introduced.

In the 1880s, when the first university and first philosophy department in Japan were established, some professors favored an older Confucian term, *rigaku* 理学, roughly the study of principles and patterns. One professor, Inoue Tetsujirō, continued to write books on the philosophy (*tetsugaku*) of Japanese Confucian schools of thought, but most others limited philosophy to the study of Western texts—a practice that continues to this day. In 1901, Nakae Chōmin, a prominent intellectual outside the academy, made the famous comment that echoes to this day: there is "no such thing as philosophy in Japan". He directed this remark at both Japan's past thinkers and the "sycophant" philosophy professors then at the

University of Tokyo. Thus, in the wake of the controversy over a name and a domain, philosophers in Japan are notably self-conscious about the scope of their discipline.

What counts as "Japanese philosophy"?

What then is the meaning and scope of the term *Nihon tetsugaku*, "Japanese philosophy"? In the past, upon descriptive reflection on how the term has been used, I detected four distinct meanings of the term.[2] After giving a brief summary of the four historical senses, I want to propose yet another way to understand and invigorate "Japanese philosophy".

First, following critics of the Meiji-era (1968–1912) who rejected the notion that Japan had any philosophy of its own, *Japanese philosophy* simply designates philosophy conducted in a European key by Japanese scholars. These include professional philosophers in academic institutions who engage with the texts of Plato, Kant, James, Bergson, Heidegger, Derrida, R. Rorty, and other Western philosophers and who add their own critiques and refinements as they do so. They can be as "original" as any other philosopher composing in the same key, and as such there is nothing peculiarly "Japanese" about what they do. In short, Japanese philosophy in this first sense means simply philosophy of a Greco-European vintage distilled by people who happen to be Japanese. With few exceptions, such philosophers do not regularly analyze or cite texts from earlier traditions in Japan; and even where they do, there is no claim that these indigenous sources qualify as "philosophical". The methods and the themes of philosophy are thought to be solely Western in origin.

Secondly, at the other extreme, *Japanese philosophy* refers to classical Japanese thinking as it was formulated prior to the introduction of the European term and the discipline it designated. As long as this thought deals with ultimate reality or the most general causes and principles of things, it is considered philosophical. Japanese philosophy in this sense may be shown to derive from or relate to Chinese thought, but it is not informed by European philosophy. This is how Inoue Tetsujirō used the term *Japanese philosophy* a hundred years ago when he claimed to have

[2] "Defining Philosophy in the Making" (2004), offers my first attempt to delineate the four senses. The summary here is taken from in Heisig, Kasulis & Maraldo, eds., *Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2011), 17–21.

discovered philosophy in pre-modern Japanese Confucian schools of thought, and argued that their concern with fundamental questions was on a par with that of Western philosophers.

A third sense of *Japanese philosophy* acknowledges that philosophical methods and themes are principally Western in origin, but insists that they can also be applied to pre-modern, pre-westernized, Japanese thinking. People who practice Japanese philosophy in this sense understand it primarily as an endeavor to reconstruct, explicate or analyze certain themes and problems that are recognizably philosophical when viewed from today's vantage point. Works that deal with Dōgen's philosophy of being and time, or with Kūkai's philosophy of language, are examples of this third meaning. Granted, it takes some practice to identify the philosophical import of pre-modern writings and engage them in the light of modern philosophical terms and methods. Even where engagement takes the form of a more or less explicit dialogue between Anglo-European-style philosophy and pre-modern Japanese texts, modern philosophical assumptions and methods often remain decisive. A small number of philosophers in Japan allow for the kind of balanced dialogue where the critique is allowed to run in both directions. These thinkers not only read traditional Japanese texts in light of modern philosophy; they also use pre-modern concepts and distinctions to illuminate contemporary Western philosophy. They propose alternative ways to solve modern or contemporary philosophical problems. Whether these endeavors unearth philosophy retrospectively, or go further to use that thought as a resource for current philosophical practice, the aim of these philosophers is inclusion: making the Japanese tradition part of an emerging, broader tradition of philosophy. To give only two examples: Ōmori Shōzō (1921–1997) reexamined the relation between words and objects by reinterpreting the ancient theory of *kotodama*, the spirit of words. Yuasa Yasuo (1925–2005) reinterpreted the body-mind problem in the light of Japanese Buddhist texts. Japanese philosophy in this third sense, then, means traditional and contemporary Japanese thought as brought to bear on present-day philosophizing.

A fourth sense of *Japanese philosophy* concentrates on those qualities that explicitly set it off from non-Japanese philosophy. The term then designates thinking that is not only relatively autonomous and innovative, but also demonstrates the "distinctive Eastern or Japanese originality" that Shimomura Toratarō and others found in the achievement of the most celebrated of twentieth-century philosophers, Nishida Kitarō.[3] Insofar as this approach highlights the contributions to the field that

[3] Shimomura Toratarō 下村寅太郎, 『西田幾多郎：人と思想』 [Nishida Kitarō: The

are uniquely Japanese, it has been criticized as an instance of inverted orientalism—an appraisal weighted in favor of "things Japanese", stereotyping differences from things non-Japanese, and minimizing the importance of historical variants. Be that as it may, Japanese philosophy in this sense indicates an explicit attempt to create a critical but original Japanese counterpart to modern Anglo-American-European philosophy. In terms of the politics of defining philosophy, the challenge is to avoid two dangers: forms of cultural imperialism that impose inappropriate categories on other cultures, and forms of cultural arrogance that assume an achievement like philosophy belongs to the West alone.

Justifications for each of these four senses have one thing in common: they are all self-conscious responses to an historical encounter with Anglo-European traditions that claimed *philosophy* for themselves. As such they reflect a particularly Japanese problematic. Objections to these four uses are apparent as well. The first sense, which restricts *Japanese philosophy* to Anglo-American-European philosophy as it is carried out in Japan, places too severe a limit on *nihon tetsugaku*. It ignores the fact that philosophy has always undergone development under the influence of "non-philosophical" traditions. The second sense—traditional Japanese thought that treats sufficiently fundamental questions—tends to drift away from critical awareness of its own reconstructive nature. The fourth sense, which limits Japanese philosophy to original contributions of a distinctively Japanese character, easily collapses into a myopic neglect of the conditions that allow innovation and distinctive difference.

In contrast, the third sense of *Japanese philosophy* acknowledges the Greco-European heritage of the *philosophia* brought to Japan but also recognizes the enrichments made possible by incorporating Asian sources and resources. It understands philosophy as a continuation of the radical questioning that has always been the hallmark of its self-understanding. At the same time, the drawback to the third sense is that it does not provide specific criteria to predetermine which texts should count as philosophical. I am convinced that we cannot draw up a catalogue of criteria for what is to count as philosophy before we examine the texts themselves. Philosophy has never been a field of inquiry whose methods and subject matter are already decided. If there is a defining characteristic to philosophy through the ages and across cultures, surely it is the habit of interrogating given definitions.

Person and His Thought] (Tokyo: Tōkai Daigaku Shuppankai. 1977), 201. For other references to Nishida's distinctive "originality", see my essay "Tradition, Textuality, and the Trans-lation of Philosophy: the Case of Japan", in Steven Heine and Charles Fu, eds., *Japan In Traditional and Postmodern Perspectives* (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1995), 228.

What sense of *Japanese philosophy* should prevail, then, in educating the public about this field? Recently, some scholars have suggested a distinction that might help to resolve this problem. *Japanese philosophy* need not be the same as *philosophy in Japan. Philosophy in Japan* not only avoids ethnocentric connotations; it also seems more balanced and inclusive. It designates what philosophers in Japan do and have done regardless of the provenance of their interests and methods. Thus it includes Japanese philosophers who work solely in the areas of phenomenology, or analytic philosophy, or philosophy of science, or historical and constructive studies of Western philosophers and traditions, to name but a few fields.[4] We editors of *Japanese Philosophy: a Sourcebook* chose not to include philosophers who focused solely on Western-derived problems or thinkers. In some subfields such as ethics and phenomenology, such philosophers were comparatively well represented elsewhere, and other collections are gradually covering lacunae in other recognized subfields.[5] But the seemingly broader term "philosophy in Japan" does not by itself resolve the issue, for it does not allow one to determine who should be considered a *philosopher* or what writings count as *philosophical*—particularly in pre-Meiji Japan before the introduction of the term *tetsugaku.* Recent work has confirmed that the appellations "Japanese philosophy"

[4] This is the premise of one collection on post-war philosophers in Japan: Hans Peter Liederbach, ed., *Philosophie im gegenwärtigen Japan* (Munich: Iudicium Verlag, 2017).

[5] In secondary literature, one of the most comprehensive collections in scope, including essays on premodern thinkers and traditions as well as contemporary issues, fields, and academic philosophers, is *The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Philosophy*, ed. Bret W. Davis (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). *The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Contemporary Japanese Philosophy*, ed. Michiko Yusa (London and New York, 2017) includes essays on social and political thought, aesthetics, gender and life, etc., as well as individual thinkers. Thomas P. Kasulis, *Engaging Japanese Philosophy* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2018) offers fresh interpretations of seminal thinkers from Prince Shōtoku to Watsuji Tetsurō. The series *Tetsugaku Companions to Japanese Philosophy*, forthcoming with Springer Verlag, will include volumes on *Japanese Ethics and Technology* and *Phenomenology and Japanese Philosophy*. The collection of essays, *Begriff und Bild der modernen japanischen Philosophie*, eds Raji C. Steineck, Elena Louisa Lange & Paulus Kaufmann (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog, 2014), simply organizes all "philosophical currents" in Japan through the lens of Western movements. Collections focusing on Japanese contributions to phenomenology continue; forthcoming with Springer Verlag is *New Phenomenological Studies in Japan*, eds. Nicolas de Warren and Shigeru Taguchi. Notably, to the best of my knowledge there are no collections of Japanese contributions to analytic philosophy.

and "philosophy in Japan" both remain contentious.[6] My interest is not to settle the issue but rather to encourage thoughtful inclusion of Japanese sources in philosophical education today.

THE NEW PROPOSAL TO EXPAND "JAPANESE PHILOSOPHY"

I would like to take the discussion one step further. What if we were to be even more expansive in our definitions of Japanese philosophy? What if we were to take to heart what philosophers in Japan do today when they engage with texts and problems of predominantly Western vintage? Just as they contribute to the expansion of Western-derived fields, we students of Japanese philosophy—however we conceive it—can expand that field by going beyond the straightforward translation and explication of texts in Japanese, whether in their own terms or in more interpretive language. We can take traditionally Japanese texts, insights, and methods in new directions and offer analyses that advance fields, such as phenomenology and environmental ethics that are practiced worldwide today. In fact, several philosophers, both Japanese and non-Japanese nationals, are already doing just that. I propose that we recognize the very endeavor to engage and apply Japanese texts as an extension of Japanese philosophy. *Japanese philosophy* can then include work in non-Japanese languages done by non-Japanese natives,[7] just as North American and British and Japanese philosophers can practice "continental" philosophy, and just as European philosophers are now said to be doing American philosophy in their adaptations of pragmatism.

In this sense, I have come to understand Japanese philosophy as an ongoing, creative endeavor—as *philosophy in the making.* Indeed, for me this phrase

[6] The most complete and incisive account to date is that by Bret W. Davis, "Introduction: What is Japanese Philosophy?" in *The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Philosophy.* One recent analogy centered on the very contentiousness of the terms is *Concepts of Philosophy in Asia and the Islamic World, Vol. 1: China and Japan*, eds. Raji C. Steineck, Ralph Weber, Elena Louisa Lange and Robert H. Gassmann (Leiden: Brill Rodopi, 2018). Its section on Japan includes some essays that discuss the political implications of "Japanese philosophy" and others that, in a recognizably current style of philosophical argumentation, argue alternatively for and against the inclusion of a particular thinker (such as Kūkai or Dōgen) under the rubric of "philosophy".

[7] Comments by Michiko Yusa on the interculturality of Japanese philosophy today implicitly agree with this proposal and suggest that Japanese philosophy is not confined to geographical location, nationality, or culture. See her Introduction to *The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Contemporary Japanese Philosophy*, pp. 1 & 9.

describes all philosophical investigation—historical studies as well as pathbreaking new work—in as much as it remains work in progress, subject to reappraisal and reformation—to rethinking. *Philosophy in the making* particularly describes the way that one incontestably Japanese philosopher, Nishida Kitarō, conceived the practice of philosophers of all traditions. I think it was also the way he understood what he himself was doing. One of his favorite refrains, "from the created to the creating", easily applies to his own work—to the way he moved out of his sources, in both European and Asian languages, and ventured into original thought. Moreover, Nishida continually rethought and rewrote his own work; over and over again he took what he had created and fashioned it anew. Perhaps the streams of repeated formulations we read did lend some continuity to seemingly discontinuous discussions. What is clear is that Nishida never thought of his work as finished; it continually emerged as a philosophy in the making. In like manner, our engagement with it continues to remake "Nishida philosophy".

How is philosophy—Japanese or otherwise—transmitted?[8]

While *Japanese philosophy* in the proposed new sense is not confined to the Japanese language, and Nishida's philosophy cannot be limited to discourse in his language, I am nevertheless convinced that philosophy is inseparable from language. It may be that a profound silence, beyond language, is at the root of genuine discourse, as Ueda Shizuteru advocates, but then such silence must give rise to speaking and writing if philosophy is to emerge. I suggest that we take the frequently noted connection between thought and language one step further. Philosophy, I submit, is inseparable from translation. I do not mean that language is a translation of thought, as Plato and his translator Schleiermacher suggested; nor that internal thought is a translation of social language, as Lev Vygotsky and others proposed. I mean that philosophy has depended and still depends upon the multiplicity of languages and translation between them.

[8] Here I adapt material first presented in John C. Maraldo, "Tradition, Textuality, and the Trans-lation of Philosophy: the Case of Japan", 225–43. A revised version, presented at the conference on "Japanese philosophy in translation—linguistic, cultural and systematic themes", at the University of Hildesheim, Germany, Nov. 25, 2015, benefited from comments by the organizer, Ralf Müller, and the other participants. Rolf Elberfeld, *Sprache und Sprachen: Eine philosophische Grundorientierung* (Munich: Verlag Karl Alber, 2012: 312–364), further elucidates the relations among philosophy, translation, and pragmatics.

Insofar as philosophizing is a cultural practice, it necessarily involves transmission and transmutation through time and through multiple languages. To put it more concisely, philosophical discourse occurs via the *trans-lation* of texts, spoken and written. I use this hyphenated term to designate not only the transference of texts from one natural language to another, but also the *transformation* of textually embedded problems, methods and terminologies both across and within natural languages. The trans-lation of philosophy is both an inter-lingual and an intra-lingual transmission, and it entails the formation of textual traditions. This "trans-lation" constitutes a *sine qua non* for the practice of philosophizing.

Trans-lation not only transmits texts; it can also transform the language into which texts are transmitted, as the second essay in my collection tried to demonstrate. And this transformation can in turn transform the culture in which that language predominates. On a broad scale, trans-lation is obviously not confined to the bounds of the discipline we call philosophy; it encompasses the world of literature and science, of culture as a whole. Thus the notion of trans-lation supports the study called *cultural translation*, which examines translation between languages in the context of translation between cultures.[9] It is also consonant with the idea of *cultural transfer*, proposed by the historians Michel Espagne, Michael Werner and Wolfgang Schmale, that explains why transfers among cultural regions arise prior to rigid national identities and demonstrates how a history first becomes "European" (or "Japanese" for that matter).[10] That idea in turn advances the notion of *cultural mobility* that expresses the fluidity of cultures and cultural identities.[11] Trans-lation is a way that cultures flow through time.

Translated texts, too, are fluid in nature.[12] But the transference/translation of philosophical texts is particularly instructive, because the practice of philosophizing

[9] Peter Burke and R. Po-chia Hsia, *Cultural Translation in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

[10] "Cultural transfer research makes the rigid, linearly delimited, and strictly systemic elements of each cultural phenomenon permeable, thereby revealing the hybrid and composite nature of cultural phenomena". Wolfgang Schmale, "Cultural Transfer", *European History Online* 2012, http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/theories-and-methods/cultural-transfer

[11] Stephen Greenblatt, ed. *Cultural Mobility: A Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2012).

[12] An extreme example of the fluidity of texts, and its cultural consequences, is material examined in David Mervart, "The Republic of Letters Comes to Nagasaki: Record of a Translator's Struggle", *TransCultural Studies* 2. http://heiup.uni-heidelberg.de/journals/index.php/transcultural/article/view/22765/17228 2015. An announcement identifies the text in question as "a French-Jesuit report on the Russo-Qing

has always included close attention to language usage. The case of the Japanese appropriation of Western philosophical texts during the Meiji era is especially illuminating, for it changed the way that Japanese intellectuals viewed past Japanese traditions and forged new ones. Sometimes they envisioned the lineages of thought that had formed their language and thinking as part of one greater tradition. This is what Inoue Enryō did in the 1880s when he presented Confucius, Buddha, Socrates and Kant as the four great sages of the single tradition of philosophy. Other scholars sharply divided Asian intellectual traditions from the newly introduced Western philosophy and began to practice thinking in a new idiom.

In both cases, traditions were identified and defined retrospectively, from a juncture in the present, as I have argued previously. *Bushidō* or the Way of the Warrior is one prominent example, but this sort of retroactive construction is also evident for the traditions we now call Shinto and Japanese Buddhism. Trans-lation also forms and informs traditions as they go forward. And the forward movement into the future can involve the transformation of the source culture. This is what is occurring in today's appropriation of East Asian intellectual traditions in predominantly European cultures.

Nishida Kitarō was a consummate trans-lator of philosophy. He reworked his sources, both European and Asian, into his own language and continued all his life to refine his positions. He is renowned for inventing new terms that challenge his readers' comprehension, but more prevalent was his way of transforming received ideas and problems. His trans-lation of "pure experience", the phrase for which he is best known, is a case in point. He did not simply translate the expression from William James and then place it within a systematic development. He completely changed the context of the notion and its analogues in Western thinkers. The new context defined pure experience—and its later transmutations like "enactive intuition" (行為的直観)—as a pathway to understand all reality. Without explicit reflection on the problem of translation, Nishida's philosophy continued to trans-late Western philosophy and transform previous Japanese thinking in two ways: it went beyond an attempt to translate and faithfully present the thoughts of others, and it kept returning to and reformulating the issues under discussion. That transformative endeavor was Nishida's "experience". Later in my collection I noted that, after four decades of Meiji thinkers surveying the landscape of philosophy and defining

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diplomatic encounter from 1689 in its various embodiments and uses, retranslated via Dutch into Japanese in 1805, [that] by the early nineteenth century acquired a new life in the context of the rethinking of the world order by many Japanese scholars and officials alike".

myriads of terms, Nishida's return to experience must have seemed like a breath of fresh air to Japanese readers.

Trans-lation is perhaps most pronounced when it is least obvious, when texts come to sound natural and no longer seem like translated texts. Trans-lation in this respect presented me with a serious challenge. With regard to making sense of Nishida in English, it meant that my discussions and translations of Nishida's philosophy should ideally not be so close to his own terminology that they lapse into mere jargon, or sound like some "Nishida-speak" that is intelligible only to specialists. Yet I knew I could not begin by using language that is already "natural" to native English speakers or trained philosophers. A long period of trans-lation might make this kind of naturalization possible. Translations in the meantime will need to communicate well enough to transform the thinking and the language of readers.

And in the meantime I hope that educators in philosophy all over the world will consider my new proposal.

Three Phases in the Western Study of Japanese Philosophy

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The western study of Japanese philosophy can be divided into three phases. The first phase, rather truncated and sporadic, ran through the end of the Pacific War. It demands little attention except as an explanation for how certain misunderstandings about Japanese philosophy arose in the West (and in Japan as well). The second phase began in the postwar period and continues in many respects up to today. I will argue that, to a great extent, it responds to major misunderstandings arising from the first phase. The third phase is still nascent. It not only continues the work of correcting false assumptions left over from Phase II, but is also beginning to explore new roles for Japanese philosophy in a global context. I have presented such a view in my most recent work, *Engaging Japanese Philosophy* (EJP), published in 2018. EJP maintains that we should not be fixated on how well Japanese philosophy fits established models of western philosophy. Instead we should explore how Japanese philosophy can challenge our assumptions about what philosophizing is and how it should proceed today. The last part of this article will summarize key ideas from that book as representing Phase III concerns.

Phase I: Not So Close Encounters

The focused western study of Japanese philosophy is a twentieth-century, indeed an especially postwar, phenomenon. That is what I call Phase II in the evolution of the discipline. To understand that scholarship and its context, however, a few brief remarks about Phase I and its legacy of false assumptions will set the stage.

In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, European Roman Catholic missionaries were the western pioneers in the analysis of Japanese ideas, but that was in service of Christian dogmatics and the hope of proselytizing. The first task was acquiring fluency in the Japanese language and creating glossaries for translation. Using that foundation, priests studied primarily Buddhist philosophy (intellectually dominant in Japan at the time) for the purpose of debating Buddhist

intellectuals in order to appeal to the higher echelons of Japanese society as part of a top-down conversion strategy. Politics doomed that strategy. Yet it was also clear that the philosophical issues of the priests trained in scholasticism's analysis of creation theory, theodicy, original sin, and redemptive history did not mesh with the Buddhist monks' concerns about karma, enlightenment, and delusion.[1]

The Tokugawa closure policy obstructed further western access to Japanese philosophical ideas until the latter half of the nineteenth century, but at that point the Meiji government was endorsing a newly minted State Shintō ideology as the official doctrine of the state. Consequently, when western intellectuals with their classical (and often Protestant) training inquired of Japanese officials about the "foundational texts" of their country's values and thought, they were directed to texts relevant to the government's agenda. Hence, among the earliest translations of major Japanese texts were William George Aston's translation of *Nihongi* in 1898 and Basil Hall Chamberlain's *Kojiki* in 1906. That left western readers with the false impression that those texts played a philosophical role in Japan comparable to, say, that of the *Upaniṡāds* in India or *Analects* in China. Japanese Buddhist or Confucian texts would have been better parallels, but the political and social situation obscured their role in Japanese culture to the neophyte western interpreters.

In the late Meiji period the state was suspicious of Buddhism, making it a target of both state sanctions and public harassment. So westerners easily missed its philosophical contributions to Japanese culture. Even the English-language writings of Suzuki Daisetsu 鈴木大拙 (D. T. Suzuki) had limited impact in the West until after the Pacific War.[2] That left Confucianism as the likely site of premodern Japanese philosophy. Seeking the historical roots of Japanese ethics, Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎 placed his primary emphasis for his National Morality theories on his concocted, romanticized theory of *bushidō.* For a more philosophical grounding,

[1] For example, Christian theology focuses on cosmogony and teleological history, a rare concern in Buddhist thought. Japanese Buddhist philosophy has shown more interest in source (*hon* 本) than origin (*gen* 元), the latter being more a Shintō emphasis, going back at least to Kitabatake Chikafusa 北畠親房 (1293–1354) *Collection on the Beginnings of Beginnings* (*Gengenshū* 元元集). There we find perhaps Japan's first argument that what is historically prior is necessarily also ontologically and axiologically superior.

[2] I discuss the shifts in the impact of Suzuki's English-language works on the West, especially on the United States, from the beginning to the end of the twentieth century in my article "Reading D. T. Suzuki Today", *The Eastern Buddhist* 38.1&2 (2007): 41–57.

though, he had also written a three-volume study on Edo-period Confucianism.[3] That interpretation was a major resource for Robert Cornell Armstrong's *Light from Asia: Studies in Japanese Confucianism* (1914), one of the first notable western works to follow Inoue in speaking of premodern Japan as having a developed *philosophical* tradition.

In summation: the first phase of western studies of Japanese philosophy was erratic, idiosyncratic, and often inaccurate.[4] That problematic nature of Phase I scholarship helped set the agenda for the next stage of western scholarship in the postwar period.

Phase II: Postwar Correctives

Phase I left the western reader with four false assumptions about Japanese philosophy that would be addressed in Phase II, starting in the 1950s and continuing in many respects up to today. Those problematic premises can be summarized as follows:

> **False assumption 1.** *Japanese culture lacks philosophical thinking.* In 1967 Charles A. Moore edited three anthologies of essays collected from a series of East-West Philosophers Conferences held in Honolulu from 1939 to 1964: *The Indian Mind*, *The Chinese Mind*, and *The Japanese Mind*. The titles of his editor's essays for each volume suggest the western view of the traditions at the time: "The Comprehensive Indian Mind", "The Humanistic Chinese Mind", and "The Enigmatic Japanese Mind". Japanese thinkers helped foster that image of being philosophically inscrutable. D. T. Suzuki spoke of the Japanese as "nonrational" and "ante-scientific"; Nakamura Hajime 中村元 as

[3] *Philosophy of the Japanese Wang Yangming School* (日本陽明学派の哲学, 1900), *Philosophy of the Japanese Classicist (Confucian) School* (日本古学派の哲学, 1902), and *Philosophy of the Japanese Zhu Xi School* (日本朱子学派の哲学, 1905).

[4] For example, Anesaki Masaharu's thorough review of *Light from Asia* points out multitudinous errors and distortions, especially its lack of appreciation for the Japanese neo-Confucian emphasis on the psychological and pedagogical teachings in relation to ethical development. Anesaki attributes some problems to Inoue himself, but also shows how Armstrong often perverts Inoue in support of a Christian agenda. See *Harvard Theological Review*, v8 n.4 (Oct 1915): 563–571. Other reviewers pointed out that Armstrong, despite his claims, made no analysis of what was *Japanese* about Japanese Confucianism in the Edo period.

"phenomenalistic" rather than "logical"; and even the Nobel physicist Yukawa Hideki 湯川秀樹 spoke of Japanese as being "unfit for abstract thinking". Those claims were being made, it should be remembered, when Japan was already becoming a world leader in optics, electronics, ship-building, computers, and automotive engineering. So the paradox ran deep.

False assumption 2. *To the extent it has philosophy, Japan either borrowed it from the West since the Meiji period or it created a hybrid modern philosophy developed from that borrowing mixed with some traditional ideas and values.* This premise assumes that premodern Japanese thought was not "philosophical". The Japanese themselves have debated this issue since minting the neologism *tetsugaku* in the Meiji period to refer to the philosophies newly introduced from the West.[5] The erroneous premise accrued greater esteem when Kuwaki Gen'yoku 桑木嚴翼 (1874–1946) succeeded Inoue Tetsujirō as chair of the Tokyo university philosophy department in 1914. He steered the curriculum completely toward western philosophy or, as he liked to call it, "pure philosophy", the so-called De-Kan-Sho of Descartes-Kant-Schopenhauer.

Kuwaki undermined Inoue's inclination to consider *tetsugaku* as including at least aspects of the Asian tradition by not only excluding Japanese thought from the Tōdai philosophy department (as Inoue himself had done, relegating it to cultural studies in ethics, aesthetics, and history of thought), but also by placing Indian and Chinese philosophy in their own programs. That bias against Japanese philosophy's being treated as "philosophy" at Tōdai persevered into the postwar period, even affecting the department and, by extension, the Japanese philosophical academy at large today.[6]

[5] See the discussion by John C. Maraldo and Nakajima Takahiro in James W. Heisig, Thomas P. Kasulis, and John C. Maraldo (eds.), *Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2011), 553–82.

[6] See my *Engaging Japanese Philosophy* (2018) 544–5 and 578–80 for further discussion of this issue. It is also worth mentioning the practical value in Kuwaki's exclusivism inasmuch as the University of Tokyo lay in the shadows of the political, religious, and ideological centers of State Shintō. He might have wanted to keep philosophy free of associations with Shintō's rivals, Buddhism and Confucianism, fearing censorship or government retaliation. In the postwar context, on the other hand, philosophers may have wanted to follow the lead of intellectuals like Maruyama Masao 丸山真男 who wanted to distance themselves from Inoue's wartime blending of Confucian values with the Way of the warrior (*bushidō* 武士道) and National Morality (*kokumin dōtoku* 国民道徳).

False Assumption 3. *To the extent there was philosophy in premodern Japan it was a set of individual themes and ideas by solitary thinkers without a clear trajectory of progress in arguments or opposing theoretical positions.* The implication is that premodern Japanese thinkers can be understood in isolation and ahistorically. One apparently need not take their ideas as responses to an ongoing sequence of themes and theories spanning decades or even centuries. The historical and social contextualization of Japanese philosophers is, consequently, left to intellectual historians who tend to see them as representatives of ideological movements without considering their contributions as creative theorists.

Another implication of assumption #3 is that ideas from China, Korea, or the West are the principal agents of change in Japanese philosophy. That interpretation often overlooks how change can arise from trajectories of thought internal to Japan that mine those foreign resources when they serve already developing needs. Put in Hegelian terms, one could say, the false assumption is that the historical development of Japanese philosophy has had no discernible "*Logik*" driving it.

The tenacity of this (misleading) assumption has prevailed partly because Japanese scholars themselves have avoided writing comprehensive histories of Japanese philosophy. There is no work comparable to, say, Fung Yu-lan's *History of Chinese Philosophy* (original 1931, English translation 1937) or Surendranath Dasgupta's *History of Indian Philosophy* (1922), texts well regarded in the West as well as in their home countries.[7] This is perhaps not surprising since the study of Japanese philosophy has been distributed across several disciplines in the Japanese university including ethics, aesthetics, Indian and Buddhist Studies, history of Japanese ideas, and so forth. Thus, within Japan the study of Japanese philosophy is an interdepartmental and interdisciplinary study, a situation unlike that of any other country's treatment of its own tradition. The interdepartmental diffusion of Japanese philosophy in Japan may be a cultural *cause* for not producing histories of Japanese philosophy, but that is hardly a philosophical *reason* for not having them. The lack of scholarly histories

[7] Nakamura Hajime's 1967 *History of the Development of Japanese Thought A.D.* 592–1868 is about the only exception in English for premodern Japanese thought. It is quite short, however, and despite its value is really more a collection of seven essays rather than a comprehensive work. For the modern period it simply refers the reader to Piovesana's *Contemporary Japanese Philosophical Thought* mentioned later in this essay.

of Japanese philosophy does not mean Japanese philosophy does not have a history.

False Assumption 4. *Modern Japanese philosophy signals a rupture from the past so strong that to understand modern Japanese philosophy, one need not study premodern Japanese philosophy.* If Kuwaki bears the blame for being a major impetus behind the idea that the only philosophy in Japan is western philosophy, Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎 is a perpetrator of the idea that modern Japanese philosophy need not reference nor draw on premodern Japanese philosophy. However much Asian philosophy might have been his inspiration, Nishida (except toward the end of his life) made few explicit references to premodern Japanese thinkers in his major published writings. That is, his *style of writing* helped fuel the misperception that to understand him, you needed to know Fichte, Kant, Hegel, Natorp, James, Aristotle, and a host of other western philosophers, but not necessarily any premodern Japanese philosophers, indeed only a few Asian thinkers at all, if even that. Later I will explain how I address this problem in EJP.

Phase II of the study of Japanese philosophy in the West has been an assault to varying degrees on those four false assumptions. As for disproving the first, for identifying a philosophical tradition in Japan, the focus was initially on where the proof was the most obvious. Specifically, it was relatively easy to debunk the claim that Japan totally lacks philosophy since so much of modern Japanese thought draws on and interacts with western philosophy. For this point, the pioneering work in English was Gino K. Piovesana's *Contemporary Japanese Philosophical Thought* published in 1969. It became a template for understanding modern Japanese philosophy in the West for many years.

Although Piovesana's classic was rather broad in scope, the immediately subsequent western work focused more narrowly on Nishida and the Kyoto School as well as, to a much lesser extent, a few other key figures like Watsuji Tetsurō 和辻哲郎. Before Piovesana's book, UNESCO had already supported the translations of Nishida's *Zen no kenkyū* (translated as A *Study of Good*) in 1960 and Watsuji's *Fūdo* in 1961 (translated originally as *A Climate*). After that slow start in the 1960s, however, Japanese philosophical writings have been translated into western languages at an exponential rate. So much so, books and essays from the Kyoto

School alone now number over four hundred.[8] Meanwhile hundreds more of the writings by modern non-Kyoto School figures have been translated as well. The sheer bulk of that output has dispelled the notion that there is no philosophical activity in Japan, at least in the modern period. What of premodern Japan?

Postwar Japan became a western ally as East Asia's model for a successful capitalist democracy. As a result, the western attitude toward Japan shifted from suspicion to appreciative curiosity about its culture and traditions, especially the arts and literature, but also the spiritual traditions, particularly Buddhism.[9] The 1930s English writings of Suzuki Daisetsu (better known to the West as D. T. Suzuki) were reprinted by major U.S. and British publishers. Western readers accepted his purported direct link between Japanese aesthetics and Zen Buddhism without critical reflection and the "Zen boom" in the West was underway, eventually affecting even Japan. That popularity led to an explosion in Buddhist, not just Zen, studies in the West. That study of Japanese Buddhism was initially buddhological, that is, philological and historical rather than philosophical. That would begin to change in the mid-1970s, however.

As the interest in modern Japanese philosophy increased, western scholars noted that unlike Nishida, some seminal modern Japanese philosophers had taken an explicit interest in premodern thinkers. Not only was there the early example of Inoue Tetsujirō's writings on Edo Confucian philosophy and the classification of global philosophies by Inoue Enryō 井上円了 but in 1926 Watsuji Tetsurō had written a groundbreaking work on Dōgen, *Shamon Dōgen.* Even within the Kyoto School, Tanabe Hajime 田辺元, Miki Kiyoshi 三木清, Takeuchi Yoshinori 武内義範, and Nishitani Keiji 西谷啓治 all diverged from Nishida in writing major philosophical appreciations of premodern thinkers like Dōgen and Shinran. Those efforts encouraged western philosophers with Buddhist and Japanese language training to follow suit.

The philosophical study of Dōgen presents an excellent example. In the late 1970s westerners began to analyze Dōgen at least partially through the lens of western philosophical categories: Hee-jin Kim's *Dōgen Kigen: Mystical Realist* (1975) and my 1975 Yale dissertation in philosophy *Action Performs Man: On Becoming a Person in Japanese Zen Person* (revised as the book, *Zen Action/Zen*

[8] For a near up-to-date list, see the posting on the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture website: https://nirc.nanzan-u.ac.jp/en/files/2018/10/Kyoto-School-translations.pdf.

[9] Somewhat naively, many westerners had associated Japan's militarism, *bushidō* value system, and National Morality with Shintō and Confucianism, but considered Buddhism more or less innocent.

Person, 1981) are early examples. This opened the door to more explicit thematic comparisons between Dōgen and specific western philosophers such as Steven Heine's *Existential and Ontological Dimensions of Time in Heidegger and Dōgen* (1985), David Edward Shaner's *The Bodymind Experience in Japanese Buddhism: A Phenomenological Perspective of Kūkai and Dōgen* (1985), and Rolf Elberfeld's 2004 *Phänomenologie der Zeit im Buddhismus: Methoden interkulturellen Philosophierens*. Accompanying this rising interest in Dōgen, there are now multiple complete English translations of *Shōbōgenzō,* including two especially good ones: the English translation of the modern Japanese translation of Gudo Wafu Nishijima, *The True Dharma Eye Treasury* and Tanahashi Kazuaki's (ed.) *Treasury of the True Dharma Eye* (2010). Similar projects have occurred with other premodern philosophers like Shinran, Kūkai, and various Confucian thinkers.

As translations have multiplied, western philosophical readers have been able to read and philosophically evaluate Japan's major premodern texts for themselves, aided by a growing number of philosophical works thematic in approach. A few examples chosen from among many include Dennis Hirota's 2006 work on Shinran, *Asura's Harp: Engagement with Language as Buddhist Path;* an excellent German translation and commentary on selections from Dōgen's *Shōbōgenzō* co-authored in 2006 by Ōhashi Ryōsuke and Rolf Elberfeld as *Shōbōgenzō: Ausgewählte Schriften. Anders Philosophieren aus dem Zen*; Shingen Takagi and Thomas Eijō Dreitlein's *Kūkai on the Philosophy of Language* (2010); Dennis Gira's 1985 *Le sens de la conversion dans l'enseignement de Shinran*; and John A. Tucker's translation and commentary (2006) *Ogyū Sorai's Philosophical Masterworks*.

The most striking publication along these lines has been *Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook* (JPS) in 2011, edited by James W. Heisig, Thomas P. Kasulis, and John C. Maraldo. With the aid of several dozen translators from around the world, JPS is 1340 pages of selected readings from over a hundred philosophical writers spanning the entire history of Japanese philosophy from Shōtoku's *Constitution* to the turn of the twenty-first century. It includes a glossary of key terms with a concordance of their occurrences, a detailed bibliography of original sources as well as references to further translations, and a "Thematic Index" that allows themes to be investigated in ways truer to Japanese than the typical western categories. For example, if readers wish to research "epistemology" in Japanese philosophy, the Index directs them to the Thematic Index section on "comprehending reality". There readers find references to such subheadings as

"meditation, rectifying the mind, stages of knowing, esoteric knowing, divination, scholarly knowing", and the "teacher-student relation" as well as the expected western epistemology-related categories like "truth, doubt, reason, logic, scientific knowing", and so forth.

In light of such developments, since the 1990s the term "Japanese philosophy" has increasingly been assumed in the West to include the premodern as well as modern traditions. As evidence of that change, the two most comprehensive and widely used encyclopedias of philosophy published in the West today, *The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (1998) and *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (an online encyclopedia continuously updated since 1995), both recognize in their entries that Japanese philosophy includes premodern as well as modern thinkers. So does the latest edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. In fact, that recognition seems to be more clearly the case in the West than in Japan where "Japanese philosophy" (*nihon tetsugaku* 日本哲学) is often still assumed to refer only to the modern period.

In short: by the end of the twentieth century, the western study of Japanese philosophy had refuted the first two of the erroneous assumptions of Phase I by proving there is philosophy in Japan and it did not begin with imported western thought. We also find in the latter years of Phase II initial efforts at addressing the errors in the final two assumptions—that there is no development of themes and arguments in the history of Japanese philosophy and that modern Japanese philosophy can be understood independently of the premodern. This has been mainly through comparisons between modern and premodern Japanese philosophers. Two early examples include Shigenori Nagatomo's *Attunement through the Body* (1992) with its innovative theory of the body that blends the modern somatic theories of Ichikawa Hiroshi 市川浩 and Yuasa Yasuo 湯浅泰雄 with the classic philosophy of Dōgen followed by Gereon Kopf's *Beyond Personal Identity: Dōgen, Nishida, and a Phenomenology of No-self* (2001).

Such comparisons alone do not completely refute assumptions #3 and #4, however, as they show only that connections can be made between the premodern and modern. To fully refute those assumptions, we need to show actual *continuity* between the premodern and modern. As a central part of the agenda for western scholarship, this suggests the point where Phase II opens into Phase III.

Phase III: Finding Connections

In organizing JPS we editors wanted to highlight how ideas developed over the centuries and the controversies that spawned their evolution. We discovered the philosophically most sophisticated and astute arguments often occurred within, rather than across, traditions. Thus, Buddhist-Shintō or Buddhist-Confucian controversies were often more polemical or even *ad hominem* by nature, whereas arguments within, say, the Pure Land tradition about the metaphysical nature of Amida or the psychology of faith were often more nuanced and sophisticated. Moreover, the same themes persisted in shifting forms from medieval times up through the twentieth century. In the Kamakura period, for example, the limits of reason might be posed in contrast to the assumptions of Tendai comprehensiveness, but in the twentieth century in contrast to scientism. Similarly within Zen there were persistent issues about thinking, meaning, and agency. Or in Confucianism about the nature of textuality, interpretation, tradition, the justification of ethical principles, and authority. Thus, we organized the bulk of JPS by traditions, juxtaposing the texts within each tradition in historical sequence from origins up to the present.

That historical approach by tradition highlighted progress in the analysis of themes and arguments across time, thereby disproving assumption #3. For example, writers like Kiyozawa Manshi 清沢満之, Soga Ryōjin 曽我量深, and Yasuda Rijin 安田理深 were decidedly modern philosophers, well-trained in western thought, but they were also addressing themes and continuing lines of argument tracing back to Shinran and Hōnen. The same could be said for Hisamatsu Shin'ichi 久松真一 and medieval Rinzai Zen or Ueda Kenji 上田賢治 and medieval Watarai Shintō or late Edo-period *kokugaku.*

Although JPS made a strong case for the historical continuity of themes and arguments, it did not directly address assumption #4, however. That was because JPS followed a convention of considering modern Japanese philosophy (what the book calls the "modern academic tradition") as a discrete lineage in the newly formed secular universities parallel to those of traditional Buddhism, Shintō, and Confucianism. So the continuities between the modern philosophers and the premodern philosophies were not always fully visible. To expose those connections and demonstrate how assumption #4 is misleading, a continuous history that cuts across traditions from ancient times to the near present would be necessary.

That was a main goal in my writing *Engaging Japanese Philosophy: A Short History (EJP*) in 2018. EPS signals a new initiative in the field and envisions avenues for its future. First, it treats Japanese philosophy as a continuous philosophical

heritage from the time of Shōtoku Taishi to the present, making it comparable to histories of philosophies from both the West and other Asian countries. In doing so it builds on JPS, even including in its page margins references to relevant page numbers from JPS so the two texts can be companion volumes. Yet, inasmuch as EJP, unlike JPS, follows a chronology across traditions it adds a further dimension to our understanding of the modern Japanese philosophers.

Consider the case of Nishida. I point out that his argument for the "logic of the sentential predicate" over that of the "logic of the sentential subject" allies him with a sequence of language theories tracing back to Motoori Norinaga and eventually to the *waka*-theory of Fujiwara Teika. Similarly, his account of the performative intuition (*kōiteki chokkan* 行為的直観) for explaining knowing-acting without a discrete ego-agent is akin to Kūkai's esoteric formulation of "[reality-buddha] enters me/I enter [reality-buddha]" (*nyūga ganyū* 入我我入). Or consider his "field of absolute nothing" (*zettai mu no basho* 絶対無の場所) which is the source both of self and object as well as of I and other, but which eludes definition as either. That bears some resemblance to Shinran's *jinen hōni* 自然法爾, the reality that underlies the dynamic between *jiriki* 自力 and *tariki* 他力 and the agentless activity that remains when *shinjin* 信心 overcomes the distinction between self and Amida. Finally, we find Nishida's use of his logic to relegate the *basho* of empiricism by enveloping it within the *basho* of idealism and then enveloping that within the discursively inexpressible *basho* of absolute nothing. The structure of that enterprise parallels Kūkai's theory of the ten mindsets (*jūjūshinron* 十住心論) which subordinates the materialism of hedonism to the analysis of sensations in Hīnayāna Buddhism. Those perception-based mindsets are then subordinated within the mentalistic mindsets of exoteric Mahāyāna Buddhism. Then Kūkai's system subordinates all that under the discursively inexpressive mindset of esoteric Shingon Buddhism which is known only through the experience of *nyūga ganyū*. As I mentioned earlier, Nishida does not mention those premodern predecessors. Indeed I wonder if he even consciously knew or thought about them.

Yet philosophical ideas form part of one's cultural heritage. When an American sports coach speaks of a player's "potential", he or she does not have to think about or even know the Aristotelian source of the idea of *potential*. I suspect that when Nishida uses *western* philosophical ideas, he is thinking *about* them explicitly and so he cites them. But when he draws on Asian or specifically premodern Japanese philosophical ideas, he engages them implicitly insofar as they have been incorporated into the sinews of his bodymind activity in his daily cultural

life. He lives and thinks *through* them not about them. Those continuities with tradition that were not explicitly cited in his writings were perhaps sighted by his students in his personal behavior and ways of teaching. That might explain why so many of them like Nishitani, Miki, Takeuchi, and Ueda chose to write explicitly about premodern Japanese philosophers.

The approach of EJP and its ability to draw out such connections to the past with modern thinkers refute the fourth and last of the erroneous assumptions inherited from Phase I of the western study of Japanese philosophy. The rest of my comments about Phase III will take us beyond that corrective project to the prospective one of envisioning where the study of Japanese philosophy may take us henceforth. One of those prospects—a special emphasis in the concluding argument of EJP—relates to metaphilosophy: rediscovering the true nature and purpose of philosophizing itself.

EJP rejects the Japanist notion of there being an essential quality that makes Japanese philosophy "Japanese". Instead it follows Wittgenstein's suggestion (*Philosophical Investigations* §67) of seeking *family resemblances* among most Japanese philosophers that make them seem more kindred spirits to each other than members of other philosophical families. Of course, as with real families, there are non-Japanese people who as philosophers may sometimes resemble the Japanese family members more than do some native-born Japanese who are philosophers. That is to be expected and the book points out such exceptions or outliers.

Some characteristics to examine in looking for resemblances include whether relations are assumed to be internal or external, whether the body and mind (or the affective and intellectual) are originally bifurcated or only abstractions out of an originally unified field, whether psychophysical praxis plays a role in the methodology for acquiring knowledge, whether the parts contain the pattern of the whole (in a holographic or recursive manner), whether knowledge transforms both the knower and the known in some way, and so forth.[10] The broadest commonality found among most Japanese philosophers is their privileging engaged knowing over detached knowing, the last point on which I will focus because of its metaphilosophical implications.

[10] Much of the analysis here builds on distinctions originating in my 1998 Gilbert Ryle Lectures published as *Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference* (2002). Those lectures are not specifically about Japan, but are a general exploration of how any culture's understanding of relations will affect its approach to epistemology, analysis/argument, metaphysics, aesthetics, ethics, and politics.

Most Japanese philosophers have assumed the relation between knower and known is an interactive conjunction between the two rather than a bridge connecting the disjunction between what is in the knower's mind with the known which stands outside it. The Japanese philosopher is thus more likely someone who tries to fathom reality by working within it rather than someone who tries to understand it by standing apart from it. In other words, the Japanese philosopher's project more often involves personal engagement than impersonal detachment. This distinction is by no means unique to Japan, of course.[11] Yet, one of the recurring points of family resemblance among Japanese philosophers is the stress on engagement rather than detachment (again with the caveat that there are exceptions).

When they first encountered western philosophy in the form of utilitarianism, positivism, Kantianism, and German idealism, many leading Japanese intellectuals in the Meiji period sensed the difference between those enterprises and what had occurred in Japan up to then. In deciding what to call "philosophers", they chose not to use a traditional term like *tetsujin* 哲人 ("wise person") which might resonate well with the original Greek sense of "lover of wisdom", but instead to coin a new word *tetsugakusha* 哲学者 ("a scholar of wisdom" or "wisdom-ologist"). In so doing, the Japanese were distinguishing two species of understanding and two forms of philosophizing or—to use Wittgenstein's analogy—two families of philosophers.

One philosophical family aspires to a scholarly ("scientific") detachment that mutes personal affect with the aim of reflecting external affairs as they exist independently of human ideation. Such an understanding is the goal of the *Wissenschaften* that define departments in the academy alongside philosophy. The *tetsugakusha* belong to the family of sociologists, botanists, mathematicians, drama critics, and philologists.

On the other hand, we have the engaged-knowing family of philosophers (what for convenience I am calling the *tetsujin,* although such sagely masters go by a variety of names in their respective traditions). The *tetsujin* aspire to an understanding that personally engages reality, transforming themselves and reality

[11] In stressing the distinction between detachment and engagement, I am not claiming the Japanese are unique. Consider this passage from Henri Bergson written in 1903: "Philosophers, in spite of their apparent divergencies, agree in distinguishing two profoundly different ways of knowing a thing. The first implies that we move round the object; the second that we enter into it. . .". Henri Bergson, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Thomas A. Goudge (tr.). (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955), 21. Although a Frenchman, Bergson more resembled the family of Japanese philosophers than some philosophers today who are Japanese by birth who more resemble the family of western philosophers in their work.

together into a coherent and harmonious whole. The *tetsugakusha* might mistake the *tetsujin* for being mere technicians. Like a technician the *tetsujin* are rigorously disciplined in their early training by a master, (so are symbolic logicians for that matter), but eventually they go outside fixed templates and regimens to respond creatively to what-is. There is a profound difference between knowing how to throw a pot and being a master potter. When engaged understanding prevails, the knower and known collaborate in an act of innovation rather than simple discovery.

Tetsujin have their family resemblance not to sociologists who study societies but to architects and social workers who transform societies from within; not to botanists who study flowers but to *ikebana* flower arrangers who work together with flowers to create something new; not with pure mathematicians but with engineers and designers who use CAD and CGI to engage, analyze, and create; not with drama critics but with playwrights; not with philologists who study about words but with poets who discover or create words by working with them. For the *tetsugakusha*, philosophy bridges the philosopher's connection with reality; for the *tetsujin*, on the other hand, philosophy is the Way the philosopher and reality are engaged with each other and transform each other. For the *tetsugakusha* philosophy is a link the self creates to understand the world; for the *tetsujin* philosophy is a masterwork created from the mutual engagement between self and world.

That is not to say engaged knowing is superior to detached knowing, that the *tetsujin* is the true model of the philosopher and the *tetsugakusha* the sham. We undoubtedly need both families. Maybe intermarriage is even possible. The lament of EJP is that the western paradigms of the Enlightenment, the structure of the modern university around its silos of *Wissenschaften,* and the increasingly popular model of education as a delivery system of prepackaged bits of knowledge have all but eradicated the other way of knowing. We are left with a world Socrates would see as a world of sophists with no true philosophers. Gone are the respect for the bodymind praxis of learning from a master through emulation, the creativity that can arise only when affect and intellect work together in disciplined bodymind unity, the sensitivity of using words to open vistas rather than delineate boundaries and exclude possibilities.

Because of Japan's comparatively late encounter with Enlightenment thinking, because of its geographical isolation from even the Asian mainland, because of its prehistorical animistic sensitivities preserved through the centuries by esoteric Buddhist theory-praxis and Shintō, the engagement paradigm of traditional Japanese philosophy can be a resource for rekindling some of what has been lost.

Yet because of circumstances already mentioned, postwar philosophers in Japan are often the most blind to that resource within their own culture. So Phase III of the western study of Japanese philosophy may include the western discovery in Japanese philosophy of what its own tradition of philosophy has almost lost and the Japanese tradition is about to lose. Therefore, at least in the immediate future, the destiny of Japanese philosophy may be in the hands of its foreign interpreters. The Arabs preserved Aristotelian philosophy and it was later rediscovered by the West. Perhaps the West can help preserve the philosophies of Kūkai, Dōgen, Shinran, Sorai, and Norinaga so they can be rediscovered by Japan.

Report: Tracing the Tracks of the Journal of Japanese Philosophy & the International Association of Japanese Philosophy

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1. A New Stage for the Evolution of Japanese Philosophy in the 21st Century

When did the research of Japanese philosophy start? In this case, let us here confine "Japanese Philosophy" to that which is considered a modern product after the beginning of the Meiji era. Translation of Nishida Kitarō's works, for instance, was initiated during the 1930s in Germany and the 1950s in the U.S. It is undeniable that the philosophy of the Kyoto School, which attained its zenith in the 1930s, is a symbol of Japanese philosophy. After World War II, however it fell into decline, so that it continues to live only in obscurity within the history of philosophy in Japan. Since the 1990s—the fiftieth anniversary of Nishida Kitarō's death was commemorated in 1995, and in the same year the department named "Japanese philosophy" was established in Kyoto University—more research of Nishida philosophy and the Kyoto school has begun to appear in Japan. In parallel, a handful of philosophers in North America came to translate and study Japanese philosophy within the academic world filled with stubborn prejudice against non-Western philosophy. The field of Japanese philosophy even in Japan at that time remained not well known, but the situation was changing.

With the opening of the 21st century, the research community of Japanese philosophy has certainly been expanding worldwide. Within this context the *Journal of Japanese Philosophy* (JJP), a peer reviewed journal, was founded in 2011. The breakthrough project of its publication was initiated by the strenuous efforts of Kevin Lam and Ching-yuen Cheung and developed with strong support from the State University of New York Press to publish its inaugural issue in 2013. This is the first international medium specializing in Japanese philosophy and accessible for all scholars of this field. The international editorial team of JJP includes John

Krummel as assistant editor and Curtis Rigsby from the United States, Lam and Cheung from Hong Kong, and myself as editor-in-chief from Japan, and was joined by two more members, Leah Kalmanson from the United States in 2014 and Anton Luis Sevilla from the Philippines in 2016. The editors encourage enthusiastically veteran scholars as well as newcomers from different backgrounds in language, culture, or career, to contribute articles proposing different approaches (interdisciplinary research and monographs) and different themes.

JJP's quality has been acknowledged to become a part of Project MUSE soon after the appearance of its first issue. The contents of the five volumes which have already been published are as follows.

Volume 1 (2013)
Uehara Mayuko *Introduction*
Fujita Masakatsu, translated by Bret W. Davis *The Significance of Japanese Philosophy*
John C. Maraldo *Japanese Philosophy as a Lens on Greco European Thought*
Bret W. Davis *Opening Up the West: Toward Dialogue with Japanese Philosophy*
Graham Parkes *Kūkai and Dōgen as Exemplars of Ecological Engagement*
Lin Shaoyang *Japanese Postmodern Philosophy's Turn to Historicity*
Leah Kalmanson Book Review: *McCarthy, Erin. Ethics Embodied: Rethinking Selfhood through Continental, Japanese, and Feminist Philosophies*

Volume 2 (2014)
TAKADA Yasunari *Opening Remark: Against the Grain of Reductio ad Japonicum*
YUSA Michiko *Parsing the Topos and Dusting the Mirror: A Radical Internalization of "Basho-Topos"*
Laura Specker SULLIVAN *The Self-Contradictory Identity of the Personal Self: Nishida's Argument against Kantian Pure Practical Reason*
AKITOMI Katsuya *On the Possibility of Discussing Technology from the Standpoint of Nishitani Keiji's Religious Philosophy*
Raquel Bouso GARCIA *Arakawa and Gins's Nonplace: An Approach from an Apophatic Aesthetic*s
Anton Luis SEVILLA *Watsuji's Balancing Act: Changes in his Understanding of Individuality and Totality from 1937 to 1949*

Bradley Douglas PARK Book Review: *Bret W. Davis, Brian Schroeder, and Jason M. Wirth, Editors. Japanese and Continental Philosophy: Conversations with the Kyoto School*

Volume 3 (2015)
James W. HEISIG *Tanabe Hajime's Elusive Pursuit of Art and Aesthetics*
Shigenori NAGATOMO *Dōgen's "Do No Evil" as Nonproduction of Evil": An Achievement and Its Micro-Macrocosmic Correlativity*
Rein RAUD *Casting off the Bonds of Karma: Watsuji, Shinran, and Dōgen on the Problem of Free Will*
SUHARA Eiji *Is Shōmyō Nembutsu Magic? Reconsidering Shinran's Nembutsu Debate in Japanese Scholarship from a Multidimensional Perspective*
MITSUHARA Takeshi *Nishida and Husserl between 1911 and 1917*
Steve ODIN Book Review: *Cunningham, Eric. Hallucinating the End of History: Nishida, Zen, and the Psychedelic Eschaton*

Volume 4 (2017): "Special Issue on Karatani Kōjin"
The Editorial Team *Introduction: Special Issue on Karatani Kōjin*
KARATANI Kōjin, translated by Cheung Ching-yuen *Two Types of Mobility*
KOBAYASHI Toshiaki, translated by John W. Krummel *The Shifting Other in Karatani Kōjin's Philosophy*
Joel WAINWRIGHT *The Spatial Structure of World History*
UEMURA Tadao *The Documents of a Great Defeat: Karatani Kōjin Immediately Prior to His "Turn"*
Kanishka GOONEWARDENA *Theory and Politics in Karatani Kōjin's The Structure of World History*
Rika DUNLAP *Hope without the Future: Zen Buddhist Hope in Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō*
Ralf MÜLLER Conference Report: *Japanese Philosophy in a New Key*

Volume 5 (2018)
NOE Keiichi *The Great Earthquake Disaster and the Japanese View of Nature*
John A. TUCKER *Japanese Philosophy after Fukushima: Generative Force, Nationalism, and the Global Environmental Imperative*
Maximilian Gregor HEPACH *A Phenomenology of Weather and Qi*

POON Man Wai Carol *Reading Japanese Philosophy through Parasyte: The Paradox of Coexistence*
SHYU Shing Ching *Special Report on National Taiwan University's "Japanese Studies Series"*
Matthew FUJIMOTO Book review: *John W. M. Krummel's Nishida Kitarō's Chiasmastic Chorology: Place of Dialectic, Dialectic of Place*

In 2014, the International Association of Japanese Philosophy (IAJP) was founded, and became an affiliate society of the American Philosophical Association (APA) (see John Krummel, "2. Other Activities of the IAJP"). The IAJP held its first independent, international conference "Opening up Japanese Philosophy: The Kyoto School and After" at Kyushu University, Nishijin Plaza (Fukuoka City, Japan), October 7 to 9. In 2017, the IAJP held its second independent conference "International Conference on Globalizing Japanese Philosophy: From East Asia to The World" at National Taiwan Normal University (Taipei, Taiwan), July 28 to 29. The third conference, "The Future of International Philosophy", was organized during the two days of August 17–18 within the XXIVX World Congress of Philosophy during August 13–20 (Beijing, China). On this occasion, having become a member of the International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP), our annual meeting thus took place at the Congress under the WCP category of "Society Sessions".

U. M.

2. Other Activities of the IAJP: Affiliation with the American Philosophical Association

The International Association of Japanese Philosophy (IAJP)（国際日本哲学会）is an organization dedicated to promoting Japanese philosophy in its various aspects and dimensions. The group was conceived by the editors of the *Journal of Japanese Philosophy* (published by SUNY Press) and the board of directors include members residing and teaching in Japan, China, and the US. The purpose is to promote the field of Japanese philosophy by providing a space for scholars of the field to present, exchange, and publish their scholarship.

The IAJP became affiliated in 2014 with the Eastern Conference of the American Philosophical Association as a group member. The APA is the largest philosophical organization in North America and is divided into three Conferences: Eastern, Central, and Pacific, each of which holds its own annual conference. The IAJP held its first meeting in North America at the APA's Eastern Division Meeting in December 2014 and since then it has been holding panel sessions at the annual meeting at the APA Eastern Conference. In 2018 IAJP also started holding panel sessions at the Central and Pacific Conferences of the APA.

For each of these meetings, the IAJP has sent out a call-for-papers announcement to receive abstracts in advance of potential participants. The IAJP then selects suitable presentations. On some occasions but not always, the IAJP has sent out a call for papers dealing with a specific topic in order to form panels on that topic. The Eastern Division IAJP sessions have been organized by Leah Kalmanson (Drake University) and John Krummel (Hobart and William Smith Colleges). The Central Division sessions were organized by Kevin Taylor (University of Memphis) and Xiaofei Tu (Appalachian State University). And the Pacific Division sessions are being organized by Rika Dunlap (Seattle University). The participants have always included scholars from a variety of places and institutions. The IAJP panels at the APA meetings have been as follows:

111th APA Eastern Division Meeting, Philadelphia, PA, December 2014:

- Panel 1: What is Japanese Philosophy?:
    - Chair: John Krummel (Hobart and William Smith Colleges)
    - John Krummel (HWS): "Philosophy and Japanese Philosophy in the World"
    - Curtis Rigsby (University of Guam): "Japanese Philosophy: Beyond the Analytic-Continental Divide"
    - Leah Kalmanson (Drake University): "What is *Tetsugaku*?: Japanese Negotiations with the Philosophy-Religion-Pagan Paradigm via Western Colonialism"
    - Ralf Mueller (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany/Kyoto University): "Japanese Philosophy—Historiographical or Systematic Specifics?"
    - Bret Davis (Loyola University Maryland): "What is (Japanese) Philosophy?"
- Panel 2: Topics in Japanese Philosophy:

  - Chair: Leah Kalmanson (Drake University)
  - Mitsuyo Toyoda (Tokyo Institute of Technology): "Overcoming Catastrophic Experiences: The Power of Philosophical Dialogue in Schools in Sendai"
  - Takushi Odagiri (Duke University/University of Iowa): "Biopolitics of World History: Karatani's Recent Works"
  - Raquel Bouso (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain): "Topological Thinking in a Global and Deterritorialized World"
  - James Mark Shields (Bucknell University): "Toward the Creative Nothing: Revisiting Japanese Buddhist-Anarchist Thought"
  - Shigenori Nagatomo (Temple University): "Nishida's Theory of Acting-Intuition"

112th APA Eastern Division Meeting, Washington, DC, January 2016:

- Panel 1: Nishida and Watsuji:
  - Chair: John Krummel (Hobart and William Smith Colleges)
  - Yingjin Xu (Fudan University, China): "What if Wittgenstein Could Speak Japanese or Even Read Nishida?"
  - Graham Mayeda (University of Ottawa, Canada): "The Philosopher and the Aesthete: The Similarities and Differences between the Approach of Kuki and Nishida to Religious Experience"
  - Yuko Ishihara (University of Copenhagen): "Limits of Transcendental Inquiry: The Turn Towards Place in Heidegger and Nishida"
  - Carolyn Culbertson (Florida Gulf Coast University): "The Genuine Possibility of Being-with: Watsuji, Heidegger, and the Primacy of Betweenness"
  - James McRae (Westminster College): "Watsuji Tetsurō and the Unified Theory of Ethics"
  - Steve Bein (University of Dayton): "Does Climate Change Threaten Being-in-the-World?: a Watsujian and Greimassian Analysis"
  - Maki Sato (University of Tokyo): "In Between Universalism and Particularism"
- Panel 2: Topics in Japanese Philosophy: Ancient to Contemporary:
  - Chair: John Krummel (Hobart and William Smith Colleges)

- Tomoko Iwasawa (Reitaku University, Japan): "The Japanese Kami and Sense of the Sacred"
- John Tucker (East Carolina University): "*Jin* in Tokugawa Confucianism"
- Curtis Rigsby (University of Guam): "Being and Nothingness in Japan and Beyond"
- Anton Luis Sevilla (Kyushu University): "The Educational Possibilities of the Kyoto School of Philosophy"
- Takeshi Morisato (University of Leuven): "Metanoesis in Japanese Philosophy: A Way to the Open Community of World Philosophies"

113th APA Eastern Division Meeting, Baltimore, Maryland, January 2017:

- Panel: Environmental Philosophy (special session on the book *Japanese Environmental Philosophy* edited by J. Baird Callicot and James McRae):
  - Chair: John Krummel (Hobart and William Smith Colleges)
  - James McRae (Westminster College): "Mutual Flourishing: Japanese Environmental Philosophy and the Current Ecological Crisis"
  - Leah Kalmanson (Drake University): "Pure Land Ecology: Taking the Supernatural Seriously in Environmental Philosophy"
  - Yu Inutsuka (University of Tokyo): "Sensation, Betweenness, Rhythms: Watsuji's Environmental Philosophy and Ethics in Conversation with Heidegger"
  - John W.M. Krummel (Hobart and William Smith Colleges): comment & questions

114th APA Eastern Division Meeting, Savannah, Georgia, January 2018:

- Panel: Comparative East Asian Philosophy: Philosophical Dialogues between East Asian Traditions
  - Andrew Lambert (CUNY College of Staten Island): "Japan from the Viewpoint of Contemporary Chinese Scholars: Li Zehou on the Japanese Tradition"
  - Sarah Mattice (University of North Florida): "Re-Presenting the Canons: Chinese and Japanese Women in the Story of Philosophical Traditions"

115th APA Central Division Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, February 2018:

- Panel: Japanese Philosophy in Comparative Perspectives:
    - Stephen Lofts (Western University): "Hiromatsu and Cassirer: A Comparison"
    - Dennis Strombach (Temple University): "Nishida's Philosophical Resistance: The Inversion of Western Conceptions of Religion"
    - Johnathan Flowers (Southern Illinois University): "Reconsidering *mono no aware* through Confucian Aesthetics"
    - Graham Mayeda (University of Ottawa): "Space, Culture and Human Relationships: A Philosophical Analysis of Watsuji Tetsurō's *Pilgrimages to the Ancient Temples in Nara* (*Koji Junrei*)"

92nd APA Pacific Division Meeting, San Diego, California, March 2018:

- Panel: Topics:
    - Chair: Rika Dunlap (Seattle University)
    - Rika Dunlap (Seattle University): "Buddhist Dialetheism and the Status of Nature in Dōgen's *Shōbōgenzō*"
    - Kyle Peters (University of Chicago): "Rethinking Collectivity in Modern Japanese Aesthetics: Nakai Masakazu and the Small Collective"

115th APA Eastern Division Meeting, New York City, New York, January 2019:

- Panel 1: Topics: Language and Body, and Kyoto School Philosophy
    - Chair: John W.M. Krummel (Hobart and William Smith Colleges)
    - Zhang Ligeng (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences): "Are Japanese Ideophones a Kind of Synaesthesia?"
    - Ralf Müller (Hildesheim University): "Japanese Philosophy as Translation"
    - Maki Sato (University of Tokyo) and Jonathan McKinney (University of Cincinnati): "In the Quest of the Place of Kokoro"
    - Dennis Stromback (Temple University): "Nishida on the Notion of the Secular"
    - Richard Stone (Hokkaido University): "The True Self and the I-Novel: Re-Reading An Inquiry into the Good in the Context of Early Modern Japanese Literature"
    - Steve Bein (University of Dayton) and James McRae (Westminser College): "Gorillas in the Midst (of an Ethical Conundrum)"

- Panel 2: Japanese Buddhist Philosophy:
    - Chair: John W.M. Krummel, Hobart and William Smith Colleges
    - Victor Forte (Albright College): "Saichō: Founding Patriarch of Japanese Buddhism"
    - Ralf Müller (Hildesheim University): "The Philosophical Reception of Japanese Buddhism after 1868"
    - Steve Bein (University of Dayton): "Watsuji Tetsurō: Accidental Buddhist?"

116th APA Central Division Meeting, Denver, Colorado, February 2019:

- Panel: Topics:
    - Kevin Taylor (University of Memphis): "*Mottainai* and the Plurality of Buddhist Mindfulness"
    - Xiaofei Tu (Appalachian State University): "D.T. Suzuki's Zen Philosophy and Translation Theory"
    - Junichi Tanaka (Otani University): "The Concept of Religious Mind and Ideal Society in Modern Japanese Buddhism: From the Standpoint of Pure Land Buddhism and 'Hokekyō' Buddhism"
    - Johnathan Flowers (Worcester State University): "Reconceiving *Mono no Aware* as an Aesthetics of Experience"

In addition to these meetings within the APA, the IAJP has been holding international conferences outside of North America but in October of 2019, it will hold its first international conference within the US in Honolulu, Hawaii. The IAJP plans to continue holding sessions annually at the Eastern, Central, and Pacific Division Meetings of the APA within North America.

J. K.

Bericht zum fünfjährigen Bestehen des *European Network of Japanese Philosophy* (ENOJP)

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Abstract: *Report about the five years of existence of the European Network of Japanese Philosophy (ENOJP)*

In September 2014 a group of nine young researchers founded the European Network of Japanese Philosophy with the twofold aim to support and connect like-minded scholars, who thrive on pursuing their interest in Japanese Philosophy on an academic level and to overall increase interest and awareness of Japanese Philosophy in the European languages.

Since its formal foundation, the network has put its emphasis on bringing together junior and senior scholars in the field and support their international and interdisciplinary exchange of research in Japan, the USA, and the European countries. The network centered their ambition especially on the support of the personal publication of translations and thematic articles in the field of Japanese Philosophy through their annual Journal European Journal of Japanese Philosophy (EJJP) as well as the organization of a yearly conference.

The present report thrives on giving a brief account of the significant milestones of the network since its foundation, recalls the accomplishments of the last five years and provides an outlook on the forthcoming anniversary event.

Im September 2014 wurde von einer neunköpfigen Gruppe junger Wissenschaftler das *European Network of Japanese Philosophy* gegründet mit dem Zweck, junge Wissenschaftler, die ihr Interesse an der japanischen Philosophie verfolgen und wissenschaftlich betreiben wollen, zu vernetzen und die Vermittlung der japanischen Philosophie in den europäischen Sprachen zu fördern.

Das Netzwerk hat seit seiner Gründung seinen Hauptschwerpunkt auf eine Zusammenführung der älteren und jüngeren Forschergenerationen sowie den interdisziplinären und internationalen wissenschaftlichen Austausch zwischen Japan und Europa gelegt. Dies wurde insbesondere durch die Förderung von Publikationen thematisch relevanter Aufsätze und Übersetzungen sowie die Durchführung einer

jährlich stattfindenden Konferenz erreicht. Der vorliegende Bericht wird in knapper Form die wichtigsten Stationen des Netzwerkes seit seiner Gründung darstellen, das Erreichte der vergangenen fünf Jahren in Erinnerung rufen und einen Ausblick auf die nächste Veranstaltung geben.

1. Gründungszeit und erste Begegnungen in Barcelona.

Wenn wir 2014 an Philosophieinstitute oder andere philosophische Forschungszentren im europäischen Raum dachten, an denen ein junger Wissenschaftler mit Schwerpunkt japanischer Philosophie gut aufgehoben war, dann wären uns die Universität Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, INALCO in Paris, die Tallinn-Universität in Estland, die Universität Zürich in der Schweiz und die Universität Hildesheim in Deutschland eingefallen. Zumindest innerhalb des Fachs Philosophie galt die japanische Philosophie außerhalb dieser wenigen Institute eher als ein Hobby denn eine ernstzunehmende Wissenschaft, und eine steile wissenschaftliche Karriere mit einer Promotion über bekanntere japanische Philosophen, wie Nishida Kitarō oder Suzuki Daisetzu, war nahezu ausgeschlossen. Bemerkenswerterweise interessierten sich dennoch immer mehr Studenten und junge Wissenschaftler aus den angrenzenden Disziplinen, wie der komparatistischen und interkulturellen Philosophie, für die japanische Philosophie. Das zunehmende Interesse spiegelte sich aber 2014 weder in den Curricula der philosophischen Institute noch in öffentlichen Veranstaltungen an den Universitäten noch in wissenschaftlichen Publikationen wider, sondern war in vielen Fällen eine Angelegenheit, die jeder junge Forscher vereinzelt im stillen Kämmerlein betreiben musste. Ein zunächst virtuelles Netzwerk von jungen Wissenschaftlern aus der eigenen Generation war deshalb für die Gründer des ENOJP damals ein erster wichtiger Schritt, vor dem Hintergrund, dass die Kommunikation der Gründungsmittglieder im ersten Jahr vor der formalen Gründung ausschließlich per E-Mail vonstattenging und viele sich nicht persönlich kannten. Dies sollte sich jedoch nach der formalen Gründung, die im September 2014 in Hildesheim mit nur 9 Unterzeichnerunterschriften stattfand, schnell ändern. Nachdem juristisch festgestellt worden war, dass es sich bei dem Netzwerk um einen Verein handelt, der der ausschließlich und unmittelbar gemeinnützige Zwecke verfolgt, trug es nun auch den Zusatz e. V. —das „European Network of Japanese Philosophy e. V.“ war geboren.

Die wenigen Gründer beschlossen alsbald, Studenten, Doktoranden, den wissenschaftlichen Mittelbau und Professoren gleichermaßen zu kontaktieren und ein generationenübergreifendes Netzwerk zu etablieren, in dem sich Junior- und Seniorwissenschaftler miteinander austauschen konnten. Nach den ersten 30 Neumitgliedern und viel Zuspruch von Professoren aus Europa, Japan und den USA, war man sich sicher, dass man zusammen wesentlich mehr erreichen könnte, wenn man nicht allein eine virtuelle wissenschaftliche Plattform bliebe. Nur etwas mehr als ein Jahr nach der Gründung, im Dezember 2015, fand in Barcelona das erste offizielle Treffen mit fast 60 Präsentationen und 80 Teilnehmern in einer ausgesprochen freundschaftlichen und zugleich ernsthaften wissenschaftlichen Atmosphäre statt. [1]

2. Chisokudō Publications und European Journal of Japanese Philosophy (EJJP)

Schon im Vorfeld der Konferenz wurde an Möglichkeiten gearbeitet, einen Teil der präsentierten Themen nachträglich in einem Band zu veröffentlichen. Verlag und Publikationsform standen im Sommer 2015 noch nicht fest, wohl aber, dass es sich um ein durch Experten begutachtetes („peer-reviewed“) und vor allem mehrsprachiges Journal handeln musste. Die gesteigerten Bemühungen um ein multilinguales und wissenschaftlich hochwertiges Journal, das noch vor der zweiten Konferenz in Brüssel würde erscheinen können, führten gegen alle Widerstände und trotz vieler Rückschläge schließlich zum pünktlichen Erscheinen der ersten Ausgabe des *European Journal of Japanese Philosophy* (EJJP) und der Gründung des Verlagsunternehmens *Chisokudō Publications A Publisher for Thinkers & Philosophers*, das die Veröffentlichung des Journals übernehmen sollte. Seit der ersten Konferenz wird jedes Jahr im Spätsommer das EJJP noch vor dem nächsten jährlichen Treffen herausgegeben. Somit ist das Journal als wissenschaftliches Organ des Netzwerkes auf die regelmäßig durchgeführten Tagungen zeitlich und inhaltlich abgestimmt. Um der selbst eingeforderten Mehrstimmigkeit und Mehrsprachigkeit eines europäischen Journals gerecht zu werden, erschienen in der

[1] Informationen zu allen vier Konferenzen, Stand: 10. März, 2019 finden sich unter https://enojp.org/conferences/.

EJJP bisher Übersetzungen und thematische Beiträge zur japanischen Philosophie in sieben verschiedenen europäischen Sprachen und auf Japanisch.[2]

3. Von Hildesheim nach Barcelona, Brüssel, Paris und zurück

Nach der formalen Gründung des Vereins in Hildesheim war die erste Konferenz an der Universität Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona die eigentliche Gründungsveranstaltung, und viele der alten und neu hinzugekommenen Mitglieder lernten sich hier zum ersten Mal kennen. An drei Tagen gab es 57 Einzelpräsentationen und sprachen drei geladenen Hauptredner. Geladen waren Rein Raud (Tallinn University), Frédéric Girard (École française d'Extrême-Orient) und Bernard Stevens (Université catholique de Louvain).[3] Insgesamt war die Vielzahl der vorgetragenen Themen selbst für die Veranstalter überraschend, die sich, wie auch viele andere Teilnehmer, darin einig waren, dass das Themenfeld der japanischen Philosophie zum ersten Mal auf einer öffentlich zugänglichen Konferenz aus dem von den Wissenschaften geschnürten engen Korsett, nur ein Interessengebiet für Liebhaber des Zen-Buddhismus oder der Kyōto-Schule zu sein, befreit und in größerer Vielfalt besprochen und erfahren werden können.

Die zweite Tagung fand im Dezember des darauffolgenden Jahres an der Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB) in Brüssel statt. Ziel dieser Konferenz war die weitere Förderung der zuvor in Barcelona zutage getretenen thematischen Vielfalt des Forschungsfeldes. Das bereits im Vorfeld erkennbare Interesse und der Diskussionsbedarf machten eine Ausweitung der Veranstaltung notwendig. Die Zahl der Teilnehmer aus aller Welt war auf über 100 angewachsen, und es wurden insgesamt 92 Präsentationen von Vertretern aus 68 Universitäten gegeben. Die Höhepunkte der Tagung waren die Vorträge der drei geladenen Redner James W. Heisig (Nanzan University), Raji Steineck (Universität Zürich) und Kuroda Akinobu (Université de Strasbourg) und ein zu Beginn am runden Tisch geführtes Gespräch zur gegenwärtigen Lage der japanischen Philosophie in der Wissenschaft. Die gesamte Konferenz war offizieller Teil der Feier zum 150. Jubiläum der Freundschaft zwischen Belgien und Japan, sodass auch Besucher jenseits des wissenschaftlichen Bereichs erwartet wurden. Der runde Tisch, die gehaltenen

[2] Chisokudō Publications offizielle Internetseite, Stand: 10. März, 2019, http://chisokudopublications.blogspot.com/.

[3] Das Programm der ersten Konferenz ist auf Englisch als Kindle Edition weltweit und kostenfrei auf Amazon verfügbar.

Reden und viele Einzelvorträge wurden auf Video aufgezeichnet, von denen etliche auf dem offiziellen YouTube-Kanal des ENOJP zu sehen sind.[4]

Vom dritten bis vierten November 2017 konnte das European Network of Japanese Philosophy seine dritte Jahreskonferenz in Paris und somit im Herzen der europäischen komparativen Philosophie abhalten. Mit der Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne und dem Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales (INALCO) waren diesmal zwei, für das Feld der komparativen Philosophie bedeutende Institutionen Gastgeber des Netzwerkes. Es gab zwei spezielle Workshops: einen zu Ōmori Shōzō und einen zweiten zu komparativen Philosophie, 17 Panels mit 54 Präsentationen und drei geladene Hauptredner: Michael Lucken (INALCO), John C. Maraldo (University of North Florida) und Emmanuel Lozerand (INALCO). Ein besonderer thematischer Fokus lag auf dem interdisziplinären Austausch zwischen der japanischen Philosophie und der europäischen komparativen Philosophie. Wie auch auf der ersten Konferenz in Barcelona und auf der folgenden in Brüssel konnte auch dieses Mal auf Eintrittsgelder verzichtet werden. Der freie Einlass für jedermann ist spätestens seit dieser dritten Konferenz Teil der Politik und Philosophie der ENOJP. Denn gerade weil das Netzwerk auch die junge und die noch kommende Generation von Forschern mit einbeziehen möchte, versucht es die Aufwandskosten möglichst niedrig zu halten.

Im Jahr 2018 kehrte das European Network of Japanese Philosophy wieder an den Ort zurück, an dem es vier Jahre zuvor ins Leben gerufen worden war, und veranstaltete seine Konferenz vom fünften bis achten September 2018 auf der Domäne, dem historischen Teil der Universität Hildesheim. Für die vierte Konferenz des ENOJP mit dem Titel „Übergänge—Transitions—移り渉り: Crossing the Boundaries in Japanese Philosophy“ wurde zum ersten Mal ein thematischer Schwerpunkt bestimmt, der die Teilnehmer zwar nicht dazu verpflichten, aber sie dazu ermutigen sollte, Beiträge zu „Formen des Übergangs“ im Kontext der japanischen Philosophie einzureichen. „[Betont werden sollte] die Möglichkeit des interdisziplinären Übergangs zwischen der Philosophie und anderen Feldern menschlichen Wissens und Handelns in Wissenschaft und Kunst, sowie die Bedeutung eines „Denkens im Übergang“, das sich in Auseinandersetzung mit verschiedenen aktuellen Debatten wandelt und erneuert“. [5] Höhepunkte der Konferenz waren die drei geladenen Hauptrednerinnen Monika Kirloskar-Steinbach

[4] https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC75seW3Jym4k1SVdOTM43eA.
[5] Siehe die offizielle Internetseite zur Konferenz, Stand: 10. März, 2019, https://enojp4.wordpress.com/conference-theme/.

(Universität Konstanz), Mayuko Uehara (Kyōto University) und Yōko Arisaka (Universität Hildesheim), eine Diskussion am runden Tisch zum Thema „Transitions between Zen and Philosophy“ und zwei parallel laufende Workshops zum Schwerpunktthema „Transforming the Bodymind: Towards a Phenomenology of *Ki* and *Kata*“ und „Übersetzung und Überlieferung von Philosophie nach Japan seit der Meiji-Zeit (1868–1912)“.[6]

Die kommende, für Ende August 2019 geplante Jubiläumskonferenz zur Feier des fünfjährigen Bestehens des European Network of Japanese Philosophy wird an der Nanzan Universität in Nagoya stattfinden und in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture (NIRC) organisiert werden. Das Thema der Konferenz ist „Philosophy and Beauty“ oder „美の哲学・哲学の美“. Auch dieses Mal wird es inspirierende Keynotes und mehrere spezialisierte Workshops zum Thema der Konferenz und anderen Themen geben. Darüber hinaus werden auch mehrere Vorführungen und Sonderveranstaltungen angeboten werden, wie z. B. eine, in der eine Kalligrafie-Performance vorgeführt wird, eine Veranstaltung zum Teeweg (japanische Teezeremonie) sowie ein Unterricht zur japanischen Philosophie der speziell für die Schüler einer Mittelschule durchgeführt wird, um auch den Jüngeren den Wert und die Vielfalt der japanischen Philosophie zu vermitteln. Der aktuelle Call for Papers kann auf der offiziellen Internetseite der Konferenz oder der Internetseite der ENOJP eingesehen werden.[7]

[6] Ebd.
[7] Offizielle Seite der Konferenz, Stand 10. März, 2019, https://nirc.nanzan-u.ac.jp/en/enojp-2019/.

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Toward a Redefinition of Japanese Philosophy[1]

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Abstract: *This paper reconsiders the implications of "Japanese philosophy". Works of Nishida Kitaro and the Kyoto school are often considered the most prominent in Japanese philosophy. However, this image is misleading of the efforts of most Japanese philosophers of the last 150 years. In fact, the philosophical style of Nishida and his followers is uncommon, and the majority of Japanese thinkers adopt different approaches to the discipline of philosophy. It is thus appropriate to imbue the term Japanese philosophy with a more expansive meaning that includes the practices of Japanese philosophers other than Nishida and the Kyoto school.*

The first section of this paper interprets Nishida and the Kyoto school as embodiments of a Japanese version of philosophical modernism. Two different models presented by Robert Pippin and Peter Osborne are discussed to better understand this term. According to both the models, Nishida's Zen no Kenkyu *incorporates distinctive features of philosophical modernism. This suggests that it is not entirely necessary to consider Nishida and the Kyoto school as the exclusive paradigm of Japanese philosophy. The second section presents two broad forms or methodologies adopted by most Japanese scholars: interpretation of classical texts and critical thinking. Although are not generally mentioned as representative of Japanese philosophy, both have historical roots in pre-modern Japanese traditions. In particular, the interpretation of classical texts had reached elevated levels of sophistication in the methodological sense by the beginning of the 19th century. Ogyu Sorai and Motoori Norinaga are the two main contributors to this type of philosophical expression. In contrast, critical thinkers could find their precursor in Tominaga Nakamoto, a severe critic of Buddhist thoughts in the 18th century. The third section thus concludes that Japanese philosophy should include not only modernism but also interpretation of classics and critical thinking.*

Introduction

[1] This article is supported by JSPS [17H02260]. I also appreciate Okubo Noriko's suggestion on some facts about Ogyu Sorai and Motoori Norinaga.

The Japanese word *tetsugaku* [philosophy] itself clearly implies that the intellectual activity it names originated in the Ancient Greek world and was developed mainly in Europe. Awareness of this historical fact led to the creation of the word *tetsugaku* at the end of the 19th century as a translation of *philosophy, Philosophie, philosophie* in major European languages. Thus, *tetsugaku* does not have a Japanese origin, but was imported and adopted from somewhere else.

The adoption of philosophy can be considered in the context of the formation of the modern Japanese nation state, begun in the second half of the 19th century. That is, philosophy in Japan began as a subject in the modern university system, a required educational institution for a modern nation state. This means that philosophy was not a result of an autonomous or inherent development of Japanese society and culture but was part of its reaction to the radical changes brought by the globalizing international circumstances of the middle of the 19th century. This has historically led philosophy in Japan to follow such leading countries as France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States. People outside philosophy as well as philosophers themselves have repeatedly raised the question of whether there is a Japanese philosophy. This is the more poignant in that having an original philosophy is considered a quasi-requirement for membership in the group of developed countries.[2]

The Kyoto School, and Nishida Kitaro above all, is recognized as the most prominent representative of Japanese philosophy. Nishida's name functions as a sufficient response to those questioning Japanese philosophy. His originality consists in his assimilation of the Western tradition of philosophy into existing Japanese ways of thought, such as Zen Buddhism. Today, Nishida is still considered a proof of the existence of Japanese philosophy, although other names have been added to his, in recognition of their creation of an original and comprehensive system on the grounds of a fundamental principle.

However, most philosophical investigators, not only today but also through for the last 150 years, do not engage in producing anything like the philosophy of the Kyoto school. One explanation that is often given is that the majority simply lacks the talent to create a new philosophy that possesses originality, and only very few, exceptional philosophers achieve such heights. However, this explanation does not explain what Japanese philosophy has been doing instead. The majority has

[2] I have argued that these features are common for countries in Latin America (Nakano 2017).

simply not worked in that direction at all. While they praise what the Kyoto school has produced, most consider its style not to be their own, and they have aimed at different goals. It would therefore be misleading to consider Nishida, the Kyoto school, and those who created an original and comprehensive system on the basis of a novel principle, as the sole representative of Japanese philosophy or the sole model for it to follow.

In this paper, (1) I show, that it is possible to interpret the Nishida-model of philosophy as a Japanese version of philosophical modernism. Additionally, I believe that modernism is one of three main streams in the history of modern Japanese philosophical development. (2) I tentatively call the other two "interpretation of classical texts" and "critical thinking". These two streams of actual philosophical thinking, as will be developed in this paper, have their methodological roots in the pre-modern Edo era, at the latest in the first half of the 19th century. Then, finally, (3) I propose imagining a map of Japanese philosophy constituted by these three streams (modernism, interpretation, and critical thinking). A consequence of this perspective is that integration of some forms of intellectual activities which are sometimes excluded from *tetsugaku* into the map is necessary.

1. Nishida as a Philosophical Modernist

Nishida and his successors in the Kyoto school were not satisfied with merely reading and understanding the texts of past philosophers. Rather, they set themselves the task of grasping an original fundamental principle to develop a novel, comprehensive philosophical system to compete with or even overmaster past philosophical systems, like those of Descartes, Kant, and Hegel etc. Nishida, in his *Zen no Kenkyu*, explains everything, including cognition, volition, reality, morality, and religion using the unique principle of pure experience. This orientation toward comprehensiveness and systematicity seems to be at odds from the general tendency of contemporary Japanese thinkers today. Instead, scholars appear to prefer more accurate specification and precise formulation of arguments to the grandeur and magnificence of a proposed cosmic vision.

I interpret Nishida and the Kyoto school as embodying a Japanese version of philosophical modernism; to interpret this term, I refer to two models: Pippin 1999 and Osborne 2010. Here, I do not judge which model is more accurate. Instead, I

consider how Nishida's *Zen no Kenkyu* bears distinctive features of modernism, in both assessments.

From Pippin's perspective, philosophical modernism works to complete what Kant began, by radicalizing it. This project is the quest for the autonomy and self-determination of human subject. Kant's successors, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger in particular, radicalized this principle to realize what Kant did not complete because of his "strict dualism between spontaneity and receptivity" (Pippin 1997, 11). Nishida intended to surpass this Kantian (or Cartesian) dualism between subject and object, adopting the principle of pure experience, which would be genuine self-determination. After the publication of his *Zen no Kenkyu*, Nishida develops a more radical principle self-consciousness, comparing this idea to Fichte's *Tathandlung* (1987, 22). Fichte's idea is in turn his radicalized version of Kant's transcendental apperception. Nishida intended to reach a deeper layer of self-consciousness than Kant appreciated. Nishida can thus be seen as a philosophical modernist, according to Pippin's formulation.

Osborne responded by criticizing Pippin for failing to distinguish modernism from modernity. This failure has its consequence in Pippin's idea that Kant was the first modernist in philosophy (Pippin 1999, 11; 45–50). According to Osborne, Kant, like Descartes, was a modern philosopher because he developed his thought as "a self-grounding new beginning" or a "break with the authority of a new historical beginning" (Osborne 2010, 395). He (nor Descartes) is not a modernist because he was committed to non-temporal universal rationality and did not affirm "ongoing production of philosophical novelty" (ibid.). Osborne pointed out that "the logic of self-transcendence dictates that it too transcends its own inaugural forms" (Osborne 2010, 396). In short, modernism affirms the production of novelty itself, creating a negation of the past to essentially renew the historical present. It is evident that Nishida can be characterized as a modernist in this sense too. He intended to overcome the horizon of the modern subject-object dualism through, first, the principle of pure experience, then self-consciousness, followed by nothingness. Each time he reached a deeper structure of our experience and consciousness, such that each new principle negated the previous one, a more radical point of view. This literally is the practice of an ongoing affirmation of novelty.

Therefore, we can consider Nishida and his followers to be the Japanese representatives of philosophical modernism. Nishida confronted the same problem as his contemporary European post-Kantian philosophers, and his achievement may have been qualitatively equivalent to that of any European philosopher from the

beginning of the 20th century. Not only did develop a comprehensive philosophical system on the ground of a fundamental principle, but he did it by assimilating a Japanese traditional worldview to a Western philosophical context. On this point as well, Nishida and his followers intended to add novelty to the philosophical conversation ongoing in the West. Nishida showed that Japanese culture could produce an original contribution to philosophy on a universal level.

It is not likely that Nishida and the Kyoto school are the only Japanese representatives of modernism in philosophy. As Osborne shows, modernism can be distinguished in its transcendental and its empirical senses (Osborne 2010, 393). Modernism in the transcendental sense denotes the ongoing affirmation of novelty and has an implied temporal structure; that is, it exhibits a future-oriented negation of the past through the present. By contrast, modernism in the empirical sense indicates multiple concrete, historically particular forms of modernist practice. Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Adorno, as well as perhaps Deleuze, Derrida, and others, were all philosophical modernists.[3] Nishida and the Kyoto school were Japanese philosophical modernists, but others have also existed, like Hiromatsu Wataru and Omori Shozo. The debate titled "Overcoming the Modern" also shows characteristics of the philosophical modernism described so far. There are different representatives of Japanese modernism in philosophy.

It is important to note that Japanese philosophy is not only modernist. Rather, over the past 150 years, most Japanese philosophers have been engaged in something different from the development of a novel comprehensive philosophical system, based on a fundamental principle. For several decades, many scholars expressed the perspective that such system construction is what philosophers should do. The implication has been that the majority did not do it because they could not, for lack of talent, but everyone should have intended to produce a philosophical system. However, now, at the beginning of the 21st century, few scholars are continuing to produce any sort of original system to explain everything. Although many scholars appreciate the achievements of the earlier Japanese philosophers mentioned here; they are intentionally engaged in a different type of intellectual activities.

[3] Here I do not enter into the discussion whether the post-modern and post-modernism are essentially different from the modern and modernism or are simply a continuation of the latter.

2. Methodological Origins of the Two Main Streams of Japanese Philosophy

Today, Japanese scholars of *tetsugaku* can, very roughly speaking, be divided in two streams. There are those who study one portion or another of the history of Western philosophy, from the ancient Greeks up to the 20th century. They interpret what past philosophers wrote and reconstruct the history of philosophy. Another type of scholar tends to deny the philosophical significance of reading and understanding past philosophical texts as an activity in itself. They state instead that philosophy consists in the inquiry into problems, the formulation of questions, and the critical examination of different types of argument, instead of the endless analysis of texts written by others. I call tentatively the former group of scholars "interpreters of classical texts" and the latter "critical thinkers".

Neither of these two types of scholar are usually called representatives of Japanese philosophy. This is strange because most Japanese scholars of philosophy are engaged in either of these two groups of activities. It is true, first, that their products are more specific than the products of modernism's great system-builders, and therefore, they do not tend to attract the attention of most people. Second, interpretation and critical thinking do not appear to be something especially Japanese, and this may be why such activities are not recognized as representing the substantial content of Japanese philosophy. Nevertheless, I believe, these two streams maintain continuity with pre-modern forms of thinking from the Edo period. This continuity concerns methodology.[4] A recognition of the roots of the present may bring us to an understanding of the meaning of the present and to evaluate it in a different perspective.

i. Interpretation of Classical Texts

Over the course 18th century, the methodology of the interpretation of classical texts reached a high pinnacle of sophistication, thanks to two great thinkers: Ogyu Sorai and Motoori Norinaga. The former rejected his contemporary mainstream thinking *shushi gaku*, which followed the doctrines of Zhu Xi, the influential Chinese neo-Confucian of the 12th century. Sorai recommended, similarly to Ito Jinsai, reading the original classical text, such as Liujing or the Analects, directly. He denominated

[4] In this article, I use the term "methodology" in a broad sense, which includes attitude toward a problem, manner of developing and expressing a thought.

this methodology *kobunji gaku*. He stressed the importance of confronting classical texts without the bias of prejudices formed in later times by other interpreters. Sorai's general policy on reading the classical texts can be deduced, even though it is not systematically expressed but only in fragments, from the *Tomonsho*, which collects his correspondence with his samurai pupil Mizuno Motoakira (Genrou). On his part, Norinaga rejected Confucianism in general and advocated a return to Japanese classical texts such as the *Tale of Genji*, one of the greatest Japanese novels, written by a noblewoman in the 11th century, and *Kojiki*, a Japanese mythology edited in the 8th century. In addition to changing his canonical texts from Chinese to Japanese, he also refined study methodologies for these classical works.[5] The *Uiyamabumi*, written in 1797, that is, immediately after he completed his masterpiece *Kojiki-den*, is a brief summary of his methodology of the classic studies.

Few scholars working in *tetsugaku* would now admit continuity with Sorai or Norinaga, even if only in methodology. For contemporary researchers, European hermeneutics represents a much more familiar perspective. However, university education in philosophy is frequently grounded in the form of the seminar where the teacher and students read philosophical texts line by line, with minute and careful attention. This concrete practice in daily seminars is not always justified with the use of hermeneutic theories, but it maintains a continuity with the practices of the anterior generations and is thus tied to pre-modern traditions.[6] Maeda noted that *kaidoku* [group reading] was established by the Jinsai and Sorai school (Maeda 2012, Chap.2). Supposedly, in the Meiji and Taisho eras, i.e., in the earlier period of adopting philosophy from abroad, the continuity was too obvious to discuss. Following that, at the beginning of the Showa era (1926), Muraoka Noritsugu showed that the philology of the German Augst Boeckh (1785–1867) had much in common with Norinaga's (1730–1801) methodology (Muraoka 2006, 15). In the following, I roughly and briefly give the main points of the methodologies of Sorai and Norinaga against the backdrop of the contemporary interpretation of classical texts in Japan.

First, reading canonical texts is an attempt to recognize universal truth from the past, called *michi* [way / path], that is valid also for the present (Sorai Zenshu, 472; Norinaga Zenshu, 9). Sorai expresses that *seijin* [the sacred ancients] know everything, from the past to the future; if this were not so, it would not be called

[5] For the influence of Sorai to Norinaga and the methodological continuity between them, see: Maruyama 1952, 160–74; Yoshikawa 1975, 306.

[6] For discussion of the pre-modern tradition as a root of contemporary readings classical texts in seminars, see Maeda 2012.

seijin (Sorai Zenshu, 475). This is, of course, tautology: *seijin* know everything because they are *seijin*, that is, sacred men. No other ground is shown for the proposition that *seijin*'s thought, as expressed in the classics, is true. In other words, Sorai does not justify or argue for the validity of *seijin*'s thought. On the contrary, the starting point of any investigation is the assertion that *seijin* tells the truth. This is indeed a fundamental presupposition, without which no meaningful reading can begin. Norinaga, for his part, does not explain why the Japanese classics, rather than the Confucian ones, express the truth, but he only asserts it (Norinaga Zenshu, 9–11).

This attitude is often confused by the critical thinkers discussed below with irrational and feudalistic authoritarianism. This, however, is only an appearance. Sorai and Norinaga should be understood as practicing the methodologically Davidsonian principle of charity to draw something meaningful from the texts they are working on. Without supposing that the target text contains something that can be positively and rationally understandable, we cannot begin to interpret it sincerely. Sorai and Norinaga's assertion of the truth of the classical texts is a methodological presupposition for productive interpretation.[7]

In fact, both thinkers criticize scholars who judge texts hastily, using only their personal, limited perspective. According to Sorai, *seijin*'s truth (*michi*) is too large to capture by one person's limited point of view (Sorai Zenshu, 477). When we judge it, we frequently just determine a limited amount of content, using our prejudice, and consequently, we fail to comprehend what it is telling us. This is natural, because the content that is to learn from the text transcends or is outside of our actual perspective. Modern readers would say that this is not necessarily because what is old is superior and the products of the present are inferior but simply because the ancient perspective is different than ours. It is possible to interpret Sorai says as saying the same thing, only using pre-modern vocabularies.

We can understand Norinaga's criticism against *karagokoro* in the same way: *karagokoro* literally means Chinese spirit. While it is undeniable that Norinaga inclines toward xenophobia, his criticism is not a mere reflection of his personal stubbornness but instead relies on historical and social observations on the structure of Japanese way of studying. In this context, *karagokoro* does not in the first place have anything to do with nationality but rather indicates a sophistic attitude, which puts morally approved or politically correct reasoning before natural authentic

[7] Obviously, there are many topics to discuss about the concept of "michi" in Sorai and Norinaga, which I cannot enter in this simplified description here. Concerning "michi" in Norinaga and its difference from Sorai, see Sagara 2011, Chap. 3.

passions and affections (Norinaga Zenshu, 47–8). That is, this criticism is directed at the widespread habit of Japanese scholars to underestimate the real way of being in the Husserlian lifeworld, on behalf of a theoretical worldview adopted from abroad, such as that of *shushi gaku*. Norinaga works to rehabilitate the Japanese form of the lifeworld by reading the Japanese classics without using the mediation of the Chinese theoretical value system. *Karagokoro* is, therefore, a projection of a valid theoretical view onto a text written a thousand years previously. It is the largest obstacle to learning something actually valid, beyond the transition of time.

In reading classical texts, to be sure, personal prejudices must be destroyed, as well as normal values and sometimes even the publicly approved worldviews of the present day. Confronting the text while keeping oneself open to other minds beyond one's personal understanding is crucial. Thinking critically as an independent subject sometimes disturbs that. We must methodologically suspend our own subjectivity and entrust it to the author of the text that we wish to understand, playing the role of a medium who transmits content from the past to colleagues in the present. Interpreters should not say "I think that ...", but "the Other thinks through me that ...". The subject of thinking is not set on the reader him- or herself but the author of the text. The text is merely a collection of material signs, and these signs do not literally think, and the only person who thinks is the reader. Nevertheless, as a matter of methodological attitude, the reader must not give a space to what he personally thinks but only to what the author thinks, independently of whether the reader likes it or not. This does not mean that the reader does not think at all. On the contrary, he or she must think a great deal, and even critically, but in a different sense from the independent subject. An interpreter of classical texts thinks critically but on behalf of the Other, that is, *seijin* or the ancient author of the canonical text. The reader behaves passively in relation to the text to comprehend it as something beyond his personal prejudice. When Sorai and Norinaga asserted that the truth of the text is without justification, they were recommending this type of methodological attitude.

Then, Sorai and Norinaga can be understood to have established a strict distinction between the primary text and the secondary literature. They were extremely critical and cautious with the interpretations of other scholars, while presupposing the truth of the primary text, without giving a justification. The secondary literature is not considered source of truth but at most as a reference to be consulted as we are struggling to access the truth. Therefore, for these two thinkers, to treat Zhu Xi's interpretation of the classical texts as source of the truth would be a

crucial methodological error. The scholar must, they thought, decisively confront the primary text and treat secondary literature as merely secondary, that is, only as tools that are used to access the original goal.

In their concrete manner of reading the texts, Sorai and Norinaga attained a highly refined insight. That is, their management of language shows an extraordinary strictness and systematic thoroughness. Sorai highlighted the importance of inferring the meaning of ancient writing from other texts in the same period, instead of relying on posterior commentaries (Sorai Zenshu, 469). He radicalized his policy to the extent that he renounced the common Japanese way of reading Chinese writings as though they were written in Japanese. Sorai worked to understand the Chinese classics, studying them directly in ancient Chinese, even without help of posterior Chinese commentaries. He criticized such posterior commentators as Zhu Xi for founding their understanding of ancient Chinese on their knowledge of modern Chinese. The meaning of each character and each word, he considered, should be understood only in its proper context.

Norinaga exhibits a similar perspective. His main difference from Sorai is limited to only the object of reading: he did not recognize the ancient Chinese canonical texts as classics worthy of study but only the Japanese classics. A strictness in comprehension of the language in situ and a tremendous effort to understand the texts as given were shared between Sorai and Norinaga. The ancient Japanese in *Kojiki* remained obscure for scholars preceding him. This is because, first, those scholars assigned a more prominent place to *Nihon Shoki*, another collection of Japanese mythology, because of its accordance with Chinese worldview, while almost entirely ignoring *Kojiki* which was written in Japanese and thus reflects the ancient Japanese worldview more directly. Second, to make matters worse, the Japanese of *Kojiki* was written with borrowed Chinese characters, as was inevitable due to the lack of a system of Japanese writing in 712, when *Kojiki* was compiled. Norinaga was almost the first scholar who managed to identify the pronunciation of this text, letter by letter, with few critical errors. This contribution was so great that scholars today still frequently cite his commentary.

Norinaga also stressed the importance of understanding each word in its context, instead of pursuing its meaning in isolation. He wrote that the meaning in use is much more relevant than the etymology of a word, although many scholars do pay close attention to the history of words (Norinaga Zenshu, 16). He clearly understood that words change their meanings in different contexts, meaning that they must be understood in relation to other words in the text or with reference to

other texts of the same period. His masterpiece, *Kojikiden*, a commentary on *Kojiki*, is full of references to other ancient texts, made to identify the way to pronounce and to understand each word in *Kojiki*.

Sorai and Norinaga did not believe that language was limited to expressing only clear awareness, distinct recognition, and conscious thinking; nor did they think that we can learn only theoretical knowledge that is not rooted in an unconscious, habitual way of being in the lifeworld. Sorai struggled to re-appropriate the total form of being that *seijin* teaches through reading the classics (Sorai Zenshu, 471–2). "Rei, gaku, kei, sei" [coutesy, music, punishment, and government] are not theories or knowledge but rather bodily and habitual practices proper to different occasions. They are indispensable ethical grounds for knowledge, morality, and even national politics. The goal of reading the classics is not a theoretical knowledge but re-appropriation of the true ethical grounds at the time of *seijin*, which we access through language.

Norinaga explained the same process theoretically. He supposed an agreement among language, practice, and mentality both in each person and in each era of a region (Uiyamabumi, 17–8). Men and women have different manners of speaking, acting, and thinking. Moderate and stubborn people do show a similar difference. In the same way, the ancient people spoke, behaved, and felt in different way from the scholar's contemporaries. In this way, Norinaga tried to grasp the totality and integrity of human beings, and setting these as an object of learning. The problem with this is that we only have texts that were constituted in language: we cannot touch the practices or minds of the ancient people or observe them directly. For this reason, linguistic strictness and accuracy are highly important, but the target of learning is not theoretical knowledge expressed through language, instead being the ancient form of being as a whole.

After all, however, the question may arise: what assurance do we have that we have reached of the truth of ancient people? How can we be confident that the ancient way is understandable or still valid today? Here, it should be noted that Sorai and Norinaga did not recommend that everything that is ancient should be applied to the present day. Sorai in *Gakusoku* noted that "therefore, if we understand well the ancient and have criteria, know the present and incorporate it, and distinguish and observe the difference and change of each era, then it will be easy to have a perfect insight into human habits and beings" (Sorai Zenshu, 76–7). He did not call for the application of ancient things to the present day without any consideration of differences in times. *Michi* must be obtained through the interpretation of the

canonical texts. The result of interpretation is not literally the same as ancient thought but rather is a kind of transformation, a creation of something that is valid and applicable even today.

Norinaga also appreciated the differences among periods and did not insist on applying directly every ancient thing to the present. Regarding Japanese poems, he accused those who insisted that writing should always be in the ancient style, without taking into consideration contemporary styles. According to him, these people did not distinguish between what does and what does not change with the times (Norinaga Zenshu, 21–5). Therefore, when he claimed to understand ancient things, he presupposed a difference between the ancient and the contemporary. His intention is to recognize what is valid and applicable beyond the transition of time through the interpretation of ancient texts, in a creative process.

Sorai and Norinaga's methods of interpreting the Classics were not primitive or pre-modern in the pejorative sense. On the contrary, they were equivalent to what is practiced and taught in university seminars in the present day. In other words, contemporary hermeneutic methodology was established more than 200 years ago, before modernization. During modernization, beginning 150 years ago, Japanese scholars added great works of the Western philosophy into their repertoire of texts worth reading. Thus, the change from the pre-modern to the modern period was in a sense not essential. Japanese interpreters have continued to pursue the same methodology through the last two or three centuries.

ii. Critical Thinking

However, pre-modern Japanese scholars did not only interpret classical texts. There was quite a different group of scholars, whom I called "critical thinkers" above. They did not recognize the validity of transferring one's subjectivity to the author of the text but rather insisted on maintaining autonomous thinking. They expressed their own intellectual positions in the form "I think that ..." instead of "the Other thinks through me that ...". Where interpretation begins with the assertion of the truth of the text, critical thinking does not accept such unjustified truth-postulation. Critical thinkers may discuss Buddhism, Confucianism, or Shintoism with references to ancient texts, but they do not refrain from criticizing such texts from an independent point of view. For them, only one horizon of truth exists, and the ancient and contemporary thought are compared there directly, using the same

criteria under equal qualifications for candidates of the truth. In contrast to the interpreters, they do not accept that there can be different forms of actualizing the truth in different periods and societies. There is, in this conception, only one universal stage for the truth.

Tominaga Nakamoto may be the most prominent thinker of this type. He criticizes those interpreters who directly apply the contents of past texts to the present (Tominaga 1966, 550–1). Instead, the social and historical context for past texts differed from ours, requiring special adjustment to one's perspective. For this reason, it is difficult to apply the classics to the present. He does not consider it important to study the past itself, but to write, speak, eat, dress, and live in the present manner, to practice the good in conformity with the morality of the present (Tominaga 1966, 552–3). He does not entirely deny that studying classical texts can be significant, but his primary interest is clearly the present. Where the content of a text contradicts something in the present, he has no hesitation in discarding it.

His masterpieace, *Shutsujokougo*, published in 1745, is a detailed critical examination of Buddhist thought. Nakamoto's knowledge of and insight into Buddhist teachings were so deep and rich that Norinaga, for example, took space in his *Tamakatsuma* to praise his work explicitly (Norinaga Zenshu, 244). His criticism is primarily directed to Buddhist scholars working on interpreting different classical texts to make them compatible and coherent with each other. Nakamoto held that such an approach does not provide good results: contradictions naturally remain among these texts because they were written by different authors in different circumstances in different eras. Here, he presented his *kajo* [addition] theory, according to which each thinker, despite borrowing the authority of the most ancient name, tries to add something new to the inherited teaching of the previous generations (Tominaga 1973, 43–8). Thus, a Buddhist classical text from a later period differs from earlier tradition because of its originality. Therefore, the teachings inevitably differ more and more from the originals. It is in vain to try to understand all classical texts and reconcile them. Nakamoto generalized his theory to Confucianism and Kokugaku, relativizing every canonical text as a divergence from previous tradition through the addition of its portion of originality (Tominaga 1966, 556–8).

Nakamoto's achievements have been recognized by modern scholars. Nakamura Hajime considered Nakamoto greater than Sorai or Norinaga (Nakamura 1965, 202–5). He praised Nakamoto's radical criticism, which directed at almost all the main streams of Oriental thought, including Kokugaku, Confucianism, and

Buddhism, by contrasting with Sorai and Norinaga, who did not apply their criticism to *michi*. Nakamoto was not committed to any specific thought or religion, while Sorai and Norinaga did accept certain types of thinking as authorities. Kato Shuichi interpreted Nakamoto's *kajo* theory as a radicalization of Sorai's methodology (Kato 1972, 19). Sorai too confronted the text with an objective, historical, and positivistic attitude, without putting forward his own moral point of view. However, according to Kato, Sorai was not radical enough and did not treat classical texts sufficiently objectively. Instead, he gave Confucian teachings an exceptional, transcendent status. Nakamoto, for his part, applied his *kajo* theory universally and uniformly without giving credit any particular ideology. I consider that Nakamura and Kato both misunderstood the methodology followed by Sorai and Norinaga as omitting a necessary degree of criticism, which I note above. In any case, it is important here that Nakamoto was prominent, critical, independent thinker of the pre-modern Japan.

3. Toward a Redefinition of Japanese Philosophy

Last, I reconsider the meaning of *tetsugaku*. Today, this word includes the interpretation of Western classical texts, Western-style critical thinking, and, of course, modernism; however, it tends to omit the interpretation of Oriental classical texts, that is, studies of Indian Buddhism and Chinese and Japanese thought. I claim that there should be a word to cover all these activities, to indicate that all of these are engaged in an essentially similar intellectual activity, against the same historical backdrop.

Some possible misunderstandings may appear. First, interpreters of Western texts may not appreciate their indebtedness to Japanese pre-modern scholars such as Sorai and Norinaga. Nevertheless, their work is continuous with theirs in term of methodology. Second, interpreters of Western texts may consider that those working with Oriental classical texts have nothing to do with them. However, they have intellectual interests in common not only with Western philosophers, but also with scholars of Oriental thought.

Third, where interpreters and critical thinkers are categorized as *tetsugakusha* [philosophers], the methodological gap tends to be omitted. In practice, the confusion of methodologies should be avoided because this erases the strengths of each type. There is no need for any scholar to be royal to only one methodology through his or her whole life; rather, one should distinguish between methodologies.

For interpreters, to treat a primary text critically would prevent them from being open to the Other; but for a critical thinker, there is no privileged primary text. To consider the secondary literature as a source of truth would place us in the same category as those who were criticized by Sorai and Norinaga. Interpretation and critical thinking are methodologically different manners of thought, represented by the perspectives "the Other thinks through me that ..." and "I think that ...". There is no question here of which is superior. Each has its own proper strength, and there are always good interpreters and bad ones, just as with critical thinking. Lack of recognition of this methodological difference has often caused misunderstandings: it is as if, for example, reading a classical text was not in itself doing philosophy, postulating the truth of a text meant a lack of rationality, and there was nothing applicable to the present day in ancient texts.[8]

Thus, I conclude that in modern Japan, three types of philosophy have been predominant: interpretation of classical texts, critical thinking, and modernism. Among these three, the last is almost exclusively taken to represent Japanese philosophy. However, it would be more precise to interpret it instead as an exceptional and transient phenomenon in the history of the reception of philosophy in modern Japan. The fact that modernism is considered as the model for Japanese philosophy hinders philosophers from re-appropriating their proper roots and settling their future on the adequate soil. Beginning before modernization and continuing to the present, most scholars have been engaged either in interpretation or critical thinking. These two streams have always been in competition and have mutually improved each other through a not always friendly rivalry. We should recognize the entire field of these intellectual activities as Japanese philosophy.

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[8] These misunderstandings may be negative legacy of the modernism-oriented understanding of philosophy. It is important therefore to re-evaluate the philosophical productivity of interpretation of the classical texts especially in non-Western regions, not only Japan but also, for example, China. For example, Gardner (1998) describes it with regard to the history of Chinese Confucian commentaries. I appreciate the suggestion in this point provided by the anonymous referee of this article.

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The Kyoto School's Influence on Taiwanese Philosophy under Japanese Rule (1895-1945)

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Abstract: *While Formosa has a robust Confucianism tradition dating back to the 17th century, modern philosophy did not occur until the colonization of Japan in 1895. This paper aims to examine this less studied area of philosophy and its genealogical relation to the Kyoto School. To this end, we first offer a brief review of the early development of Taiwanese philosophy, followed by a survey of Japanese philosophers' influence on Formosan thinkers. The Taihoku Imperial University's (Taipei Imperial University) heritage stemming from the Kyoto School is also explored. Moreover, we carefully look into the theory of Hwang Chin-Sui (黃 金穗 1915–1967), a Tanabe Hajime's supervisee, which serves as a window into the philosophical connection between Taiwan and Japan. We argue that the pre-war Taiwanese philosophy has a tight relationship to Japanese philosophy in the early 20th century.*

1. Introduction: Taiwanese philosophy under Japan's rule

If we define modern philosophy in Asia as a systematic methodology for reasoning and thinking that is imported from the West, then *philosophy in Taiwan* was a consequence of the modernization that occurred during Japanese rule (1895−1945). During that time, philosophy in Taiwan was impacted by both trends of Western thought (e.g., Marxism, pragmatism, and Heideggerian philosophy) and the international context (e.g., the October Revolution, the Korean independence movement, and Woodrow Wilson's self-determination). In tandem with the rise of Taiwanese identity and public opinion regarding the building of Taiwanese culture in the 1920s, *Taiwanese philosophy* gradually emerged through a creative transformation from European-American philosophy, becoming a local philosophical response to global issues, such as human existence, religious reform,

and the political philosophy of the colonized world. Taiwanese philosophy thus constituted a reflection on both Japanese and Chinese traditions (Hung & Gao 2018).

The first Taiwanese philosophers are those who received a modern education as established by the Meiji government and its Taiwan Sōtokufu (i.e., the office of the Governor General). Although Lí Tshun-sing (李春生, 1838−1924), a Presbyterian merchant in Taipei, had written several books reconciling the disputes between Christianity and Confucianism since the late 19th century, the first serious philosophical work was completed by Lin Mosei (林 茂生, 1887−1947). Lin graduated from the Tokyo Imperial University and published "On Wang Yangming's liang-zhi" (王陽明の良知説) in *East Asia Studies* (『東亜研究』) in 1916. In his paper, Lin compared the concept of liang-zhi with Descartes' and Kant's respective notions of rationality. This approach was first employed by Inoue Tetsujirō and Kanie Yoshimaru and also used by China's New Confucianists after 1921 (Huang 2016). Due to Lin's creative transformation of Wang Yangming's thought in terms of Western philosophy, his paper has been widely recognized as the first work in Taiwanese philosophy.

Unlike Lin, who grew up in the era of the Qing Empire, many Taiwanese philosophers were born in the Japanese era. They were bilingual, speaking Hokkienese (or Hakka) and Japanese. They then learned German and English as academic languages. Many of them did not know how to speak Mandarin Chinese until the end of WWII. Mandarin thus was the fifth language of these first-generation philosophers. This complexity of language affected both their ways of thinking and research focus. At least 22 active philosophers have been identified. Thirteen of them were educated in universities in Japan, 8 studied in Europe and America and 4 received PhD degrees. Only 2 were female and they were extraordinary in that era. When categorizing the philosophers by their genealogical relation, they can be divided roughly into four groups (Hung 2016). namely, German philosophy, American pragmatism, Christian philosophy, and modern Sinology.[1]

The first and dominant field was Germany philosophy. Many works are about Hegel's philosophy, including Yang Hsing-ting's (楊 杏庭, 1909−1987) "Infinite Negation and Creativity" (無限否定と創造性, 1934), Hung Yao-Hsün's (洪 耀勳, 1903−1986) "The Philosophy of Tragedy" (悲劇の哲学, 1934), and Chen Shao-Hsing's (陳 紹馨, 1906−1966) "On Hegel's civil society" (ヘーグルに於け

[1] In fact, pre-war Taiwanese philosophy also involved a series of thought resistances of the 1920s and it was a systematic response to cultural and political crises during this period, kown as the Sit-chûn Movement (Hung, forthcoming).

る市民社会論の成立, 1935). After *Being and Time* was published in 1927, Heidegger's philosophy became popular; Tseng Tien-tsung's (曾 天從, 1910−2007) *A Preliminary Study of the Existential Philosophy* (『現実学序説』, 1934) and N̂g Chiong-hui's (黃 彰輝, 1914−1988) "Disturbed Morality" (不安の倫理, 1935) were published. At that time, Marxism was also popular. Instead of absorbing that tradition indirectly through Japan, Liu Ming dian (劉 明電, 1901−1978) studied at Heidelberg University and Humboldt University of Berlin and chose Marx's philosophy as the subject for his thesis. Liu later returned to Taiwan and helped peasants protest against Japan's agricultural policy. He was arrested, imprisoned, and released in 1935.

American pragmatism was another influential field. As Lin Mosei pursued his PhD studies at Columbia under John Dewey's supervision, he employed in his thesis a pragmatist view of education to criticize Japan's assimilation. Pragmatism later spread throughout Taiwan when Lin became a public figure and professor at Taihoku College of Commerce (1930) and at Tainan Technical College (1931). Likewise, Liao Wen Kwei (廖 文奎, 1905−1952) studied in Chicago with pragmatist E. A. Burtt (1892−1989) to explore the dispute among idealism, realism, and pragmatism in his MA thesis. Liao was then instructed by James Tufts (1862−1942) and G. H. Mead (1863−1931). In 1933, a London publisher (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd.) published his PhD thesis with a new title *Individual and the Community*, under the series of *International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method*, along with authors such as Russell, Wittgenstein, Jung, and Piaget. Likewise, Su Shiang-Yeu (蘇 薌雨, 1902−1986) attended Peking University during Dewey's visit to China (1919−1921), and his views were affected by pragmatism sympathizers such as Hu Shih (胡 適, 1891−1962) and Jin Yuelin (金 岳霖, 1895−1984).

Christian philosophy, systematically introduced by Scottish Presbyterianism, was also popular in Taiwan at that time. In 1907, Lí Tshun-sing published *After Huxley's Evolution and Ethics* to criticize the widespread evolutionary view. Later, Taiwan's Presbyterian churches sponsored many youths studying theology and philosophy abroad. Starting from the 1910s, for example, Chou tsai chi (周 再賜, 1888−1969) went to the University of Chicago; Kuo mashi (郭 馬西, 1892−1966) went to Auburn Theological Seminary and Columbia University; and Tsai Ai Chih (蔡 愛智, 1911−19??) went to Doshisha University and the University of Chicago. Among them, Wu CK's (吳 振坤, 1913−1988) philosophical view of religion was also affected by Seiichi Hatano (波多野 精一, 1877−1950). Wu attended Yale

University after studying philosophy at Kyoto Imperial University. Likewise, N̂g Chiong-hui (黃 彰輝, 1914−1988) majored in philosophy at Tokyo Imperial University and published several articles on Hegel. N̂g then enrolled in Westminster College Cambridge in 1938 and taught Asian Languages at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in 1943. N̂g was also an advocate of contextual theology (i.e., an approach to interpreting scripture in terms of cultural context), and later, he was a diaspora leader of the Taiwanese independence movement (台湾人民自決運動) in North America.

Finally, modern Sinology (including Confucianism and Chinese Buddhism) was also a favored field. Lin Qiu-wu (林 秋梧, 1903−1934) published a series of articles discussing the problems of Buddhist theology and practice since the 1920s. Kuo Ming-kun (郭 明坤, 1908−1943) and Chang Dong-fang (張 冬芳, 1917−1968) majored in Asian philosophy at Waseda University and the University of Tokyo, respectively. Tiu Chhim-chhè (張 深切, 1904−1965) was an activist who was arrested for plotting a revolt against Japan in 1931. Tiu then studied Marxism and Confucianism while in prison. After Japan's surrender, Tiu published *A Study on Confucian Philosophy* (孔子哲学研究) exploring the causality between Confucianism and the decline of Chinese civilization. Due to its politically incorrect views, this book was later banned by Chiang's Chinese nationalist regime in 1954.

In short, these four areas constitute the main fields of philosophy in Taiwan under Japan's rule, and they also provide valuable input to Taiwanese philosophy to this day (Hung & Deng 2018).

2. Influence of Japanese philosophy and the Kyoto School

Although Taiwan has a long tradition of Confucianism dating back to the pre-Qing era, modern philosophical methodology was introduced to Taiwan through Japan's educational institutions. While many Taiwanese intellectuals studied either Eastern or Western philosophy at the old imperial university system in mainland Japan, genealogically, their philosophical approaches can often be traced back to certain Japanese philosophers (Hung & Deng, 2018).

For example, before Lin Mosei went to Columbia, his early thought was inspired by Inoue Tetsujirō (井上 哲次郎) at Tokyo Imperial University. According to Huang (2016), Inoue's influence was two-fold. First, Inoue is one of the leading

scholars of Yōmeigaku (陽明学)[2] in the Meiji period, which rejected the ideology of Edo's Shushigaku (朱子学) and was viewed as a reformist that catalyzed a series of revolutions in the Bakumatsu period (幕末). Lin also chose Yōmeigaku as his dissertation topic and aimed to develop Taiwanese culture when he was inaugurated as the chair of the Taiwanese Student Union (東京高砂青年會) in 1915. As Inoue particularly admired Kant's philosophy, Kant's idea of rationality was also the focus of Lin's early study, although Lin criticized Kant's idea for being dogmatic when compared to the notion of ryōchi (良知) in Yōmeigaku.

Another example is Chen Shao-Hsing (陳 紹馨, 1906−1966), a pre-war social philosopher taught by sociologist Shinmei Masamichi (新明 正道, 1898−1984) at Tohoku Imperial University. Chen's study centered on the concept of civil society, and he published reviews on Hegel's (ヘーグルに於ける市民社会論の成立) and Adam Ferguson's (アダム．ファーグスンの市民社会論) theories on civil society. Chen's research on social philosophy was stopped by the political atmosphere of post-war Chiang Kai-shek's autocracy. Chen later went to Princeton and then returned to Taiwan as a demographer. When Chen passed away in 1966, Shimame stated in a eulogy that if Chen had stayed and pursued his academic career in Japan, he would have been the forerunner of Japanese sociology along with Daidō Yasujirō (大道 安次郎, 1903−1987) (Cheung 2016).

In addition, Lin Qiu-wu (林 秋梧, 1903−1934), often called a "revolutionist monk", evangelized Buddhist teachings in Korea, China, Japan and Taiwan. Lin was well known for his extension of Marx's criticism of Christianity to condemn the capitalization of Buddhist groups in Asia in the 1920s. However, few have known that his Buddhism was also influenced by Nukariya Kaiten (忽滑谷 快天) during his study at Komazawa University. According to Yen (2016), Lin's holism view of Buddha (一仏) is the cornerstone of his philosophy, which was developed from Nukariya's monotheism-like view of believing in only one Buddha.

Additionally, some Taiwanese philosophers who graduated from Kyoto Imperial University maintained a close relationship to the scholars of the Kyoto School. For instance, Hwang Chin-Sui (黃 金穗, 1915–1967), the pioneer of formal logic in post-war Taiwan, was Tanabe Hajime's student. Tanabe was a philosopher of mathematics and published *The Study of Mathematic Philosophy* (『数理哲学研究』) in 1925. Hwang also majored in both philosophy and mathematics. Although his philosophical view was closer to that of Nishida, Hwang's BA thesis was

[2]Yōmeigaku is a Japanese philosophical school of Neo-Confucianism that emphasizes the role of mind in gaining supreme principles of knowledge.

supervised by Tanabe, which was later published as "About Everydayness: An essay on Phenomenology" (日常性について—現象学的試論) by the Philosophical Association of Kyoto in 1939. In this article, Hwang analyzed the basis of everydayness by employing Nishida's notions, such as place (場所), mediation (媒介者), and self-identity (自己同一).

Likewise, Cheng Fa-Yu (鄭 發育, 1916–1996), one of the founders of experimental psychology in post-war Taiwan, was Nishida Kitarō's student. Cheng translated Nishida's *An Inquiry into the Good* (『善の研究』) into Chinese in 1984. Nishida's grandson, Nishida Ikuhiko (西田 幾久彦), also wrote to Cheng concerning the world value of his grandfather's book in 1982. Additionally, Wu CK (吳 振坤, 1913−1988), a Taiwanese reverend and theology professor, was influenced by Hatano Seiichi, although Wu had not been taught by Hatano during his study at Kyoto University. Wu also translated Hatano's *Philosophy of Religion* (『宗教哲學』) into Chinese in 1963. Tseng T'ien-ts'ung (曾 天從, 1910−2007) was an esteemed professor of continental philosophy at the National Taiwan University. Tseng's thought was influenced by Kuwaki Genyoku (桑木 厳翼). Kuwaki not only endorsed Tseng's entry to the graduate school of Tokyo Imperial University but also wrote a recommendation preface to his seminal monograph *On the Theory of Truth* (『真理原理論』) published in Tokyo in 1937.

Another example of the connection between Taiwanese philosophers and scholars of the Kyoto School is Hung Yao-hsün (洪 耀勳, 1903−1986). Hung is a key figure in the *Sit-chûn movement* of Taiwanese philosophy.[3] According to Liao (2016), Hung's thinking of the relationship between his theory of truth and existential philosophy (実存哲学) shared the same spirit with Miki Kiyoshi's (三木清) dialectic view between knowledge truth and existence truth. Additionally, Hung appealed to Watsuji Tetsurō's (和辻 哲郎) philosophy to construct his own theory. Hung graduated from Tokyo Imperial University before Watsuji moved there in 1934. Although Hung had never been taught by Watsuji, his theory on cultural subjectivity was influenced by Watsuji's *Fudo*.

All these examples show that although Japan's colonization and assimilation were often their targets of criticism, Taiwanese philosophers were under the influence of Japanese philosophers, especially those from the Kyoto School.

[3] The Sit-chûn movement is a philosophical trend that became a resistance in thought against assimilation, ending up as the building block of Taiwan's cultural subjectivity under Japanese rule (Hung 2016).

3. Taipei imperial University and the Kyoto school[4]

Taihoku Imperial University (TIU, 1928–1945)—the predecessor to today's National Taiwan University—was the 2nd colonial imperial university founded in 1928 by the Empire of Japan.[5] In accord with the empire's expanding policy, TIU was considered a research center for knowledge of Southeast Asia.[6]

The TIU contains five main colleges, including the *Faculty of Literature and Politics*, the *Faculty of Science*, the *Faculty of Engineering*, the *Faculty of Agriculture* and the *Faculty of Medicine*. Pre-university programs as well as graduate programs were also available to students.[7] Each college had various departments operating in the form of "lectures". The members of a *lecture* consisted of a professor, assistant professors, assistants, instructors and office employees. Each *lecture* received independent research funding, offices and labs.[8]

Under the Faculty of Literature and Politics (文政学部), the *department of philosophy* consisted of five *lectures*. They are (1) lecture in philosophy and history of philosophy, (2) lecture in Eastern ethics and Western ethics, (3) lecture in Eastern philosophy, (4) lecture in psychology and (5) lecture in pedagogy and history of pedagogy. The above five *lectures* conducted major disciplines, including *Western philosophy*, *Ethics*, *Eastern philosophy*, *Psychology* and *Pedagogy,* respectively.[9]

Many prominent positions in the philosophy department were occupied by scholars of the Kyoto school. In 1928, the philosophy department opened with only

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[4] This particular section benefited greatly from our friend Gao Jun-He for sorting important leads out of numerous information regarding the history of the TIU.

[5] The first colonial imperial university was Keijō Imperial University (1924–1946) in Seoul, Korea.

[6] As the first Chief of TIU, Shidehara Hiroshi (幣原 坦, 1870–1953) declared: "The establishment of TIU aims at developing a research on South China and Southeast Asia centered on Taiwan by utilizing the geographical and human conditions of Taiwan". Shidehara Hiroshi, "Academic Values of Taiwan", *Taiwan Times* (1926, Dec). See also Li Dong-Hua, *A Study of the Early History of National Taiwan University, 1945–1950* (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2014): 1.

[7] TIU offered a three-year pre-university course for high school students beginning in 1941.

[8] Regarding the organization of TIU, see "Imperial university mandate no. 12", (1919, Feb) in *An Overview of Taihoku Imperial University* (1928): 12–14. See also Matsumoto Takashi (松本 巍), Kuai Tong-Lin (蒯通林) trans., *History of Taihoku Imperial University* (Taipei: Kuai Tong-Lin, 1960)

[9] See "Taihoku university lecture mandate" and "Taihoku university gakubu regulations" in *An Overview of Taihoku Imperial University*: 20–22; 46–51.

five faculty members, three of them were graduates from Kyoto Imperial University, namely, Mutai Risaku (務台 理作, 1890–1974), Sera Kazuo (世良 壽男, 1888–1973) and Danno Yasutarō (淡野 安太郎, 1902–1967). Mutai Risaku and Sera Kazuo were students of Nishida.[10] They were both professors, each conducting a *lecture* called "lecture on philosophy and history of philosophy" and "lecture on Eastern ethics and Western ethics", respectively. Danno Yasutarō worked alongside Mutai as an instructor in Western philosophy and was promoted to assistant professor in 1930. Yanagida Kenjūrō (柳田 謙十郎, 1893–1983) and Okano Tomejirō (岡野　留次郎, 1891–1979) were recruited as assistant professor and professor, respectively.[11] They were also graduates from Kyoto Imperial University and both majored in philosophy. The former joined TIU in 1929 lecturing on ethics. The latter, a student of Nishida, filled the vacancy of a professor left by the transfer of Mutai in 1935. In short, these five faculty members were connected to Nishida directly or indirectly. A detailed list of departmental members from 1928 to 1945 is listed in Table 1.

Lecture	Name	Tenure / Job title	Remarks
Philosophy and history of philosophy	Mutai Risaku 務臺 理作	1928-1931 / Professor (Co-chair) 1932-1934 / Professor (Chair)	transferred to Tokyo Bunri University in 1935.
	Okano Tomejirō 岡野 留次郎	1935-1945 / Professor (Chair)	Dean of the Faculty of Literature and Politics (1942.3-1944)
	Danno Yasutarō 淡野 安太郎	1928-1929 / Lecturer 1930-1945 / Assistant Professor	
	Hung Yao-Hsün 洪 耀勳	1929-1932 / office employee 1933-1939 / Assistant	
Eastern ethics and Western ethics	Sera Kazuo 世良 壽男	1928-1945 / Professor (Chair)	Dean of the Faculty of Literature and Politics (1944-1945)
	Yanagida Kenjūrō 柳田 謙十郎	1929-1941 / Assistant Professor	retired in 1941.
	Tanaka Hiroshi	1942-1945 / Assistant Professor	Joined TIU after

[10] Mutai Risaku and Sera Kazuo helped with the revision process of the manuscript of *An Inquiry into the Good* (1921); Mutai also helped revising the manuscript of *Meditations and Experiences* (1922).

[11] Yanagida Kenjūrō was strongly influenced by Nishida. Works of Yanagida include *Nishida's philosophy as the philosophy of practice* (實踐哲學としての西田哲學, Tokyo: Kobundō, 1939); *The system of Nishida's philosophy* (西田哲学体系, Tokyo: Tokyo Shuppansha, 1946–1949).

	田中熙		Yanagida Kenjūrō's retirement.
Pedagogy and history of pedagogy	Kondō Toshiji 近藤 壽治	1928-1934 / Professor (Co-chair, also co-chair of Lecture in philosophy and history of philosophy)	transferred in 1935.
	Itō Yūten 伊藤 猷典	1929-1936 / Professor (Co-chair) 1937-1945 / Professor (Chair)	
	Fukushima Shigeichi 福島 重一	1929-1945 / Assistant Professor	
	Okada Yuzuru 岡田 謙	1930-1942 / Lecturer	retired in 1942.
	Himeoka Tsutomu 姬岡 勤	1943-1945 / Lecturer	
	Wakatsuki Michitaka 若槻 道隆	1930 / Lecturer	
Eastern philosophy	Imamura Kandō 今村 完道	1929-1930 / Professor (Chair) 1931-1937 / Professor (Chair, also co-chair of Lecture in Eastern ethics and Western ethics) 1938-1945 / Professor (Chair)	Specialized in Buddhism. Dean of the Faculty of Literature and Politics (1934.6-1937.6)
	Gotō Toshimizu 後藤 俊瑞	1929-1945 / Assistant Professor	Specialized in Shushigaku.
Psychology	Linuma Ryūen 飯沼 龍遠	1929-1939 / Professor (Chair)	Retired in 1940.
	Rikimaru Ji-Yen 力丸 慈圓	1929-1939 / Assistant Professor 1940-1945 / Professor	
	Fujisawa Shigeru 藤澤 茆	1928-1940 / Assistant 1941-1945 / Assistant Professor	1941: promoted from assistant to assistant professor.

Table 1 The staff members of the department of philosophy at the TIU (1928-1945) [12]

Taiwanese philosopher Hung Yao-Hsün was also a faculty member of TIU since 1929. Graduating from Tokyo Imperial University in 1928, Hung first joined the "lecture in philosophy and history of philosophy" as an office employee and was promoted to assistant in 1933.[13] He was the only Taiwanese scholar who got

[12] See *An Overview of Taihoku Imperial University.*
[13] See "List of Staff members" of 1929 and 1933 in *An Overview of Taihoku Imperial University*.

published in *tetsugakuka kenkyū nenpō* (『哲学科研究年報』).[14] However, while many Japanese graduates from the Tokyo Imperial University immediately became assistant professors at the TIU (e.g., 中村 哲 1912-2003), due to Hung's Taiwanese identity, Hung was never promoted during his service at the department (1929–1939). He later transferred to the Japanese occupied Peking University and Peking Normal University in China and taught there until the end of the war.

In 1946, TIU was renamed National Taiwan University (NTU). Taiwanese philosopher Hwang Chin-Sui graduated from Kyoto Imperial University in 1939 and joined the department of philosophy of NTU after WWII. Having his BA thesis completed under the supervision of Tanabe, having direct access to Nishida's lectures and having been deeply influenced by them, Huang was naturally considered the first successor of the Kyoto school in Taiwan.

In conclusion, scholars of the Kyoto School formed a crucial part of the philosophy department of TIU, suggesting the undeniable influence of the Kyoto School in the TIU.

4. Hwang Chin-Sui's thought

In this section, we focus on Hwang Chin-Sui's thought to present the result of a Taiwanese scholar pursuing his philosophical queries under the influence of the Kyoto school.[15]

In "About Everydayness: An essay on Phenomenology", Hwang (1939) strives to delineate a structure of the ordinary world in which we live and the ways in which people relate to the world around them.[16] He begins his paper by analyzing the phenomenon of "this one day", an attempt that indicates his great concern regarding concrete human existence. For Huang, the ordinary world is real and transcendental in equal measure. It is real for we are able to move around and act; it

[14] See *Taihoku Teikoku Daigaku bunsei gakubu tetsugakuka kenkyū nenpō,* no. 5 (1938): 193–337.

[15] After his BA thesis, Hwang set off his academic journey focusing on logic instead of phenomenology. See Hwang, "Protological Operations", *Bulletin of the College of Liberal Arts, National Taiwan University*, vol. 13 (Dec., 1964): 443–462; "Formal Structure", *Bulletin of the College of Liberal Arts, National Taiwan University*, vol. 14 (Nov., 1965): 471–490; "Theses on 'Logical Manifold'", *Bulletin of the College of Liberal Arts, National Taiwan University,* vol. 15 (Aug., 1966): 469–491.

[16] This paper was a part of Hwang's long lost BA thesis. See *Tetsugaku Kenkyū (Journal of Philosophical Studies),* no. 279 (1939): 1–32.

is transcendental for there is an underlying absolute substratum. He explores individual existence in terms of self-consciousness and sustainability. The former fulfills the need of a philosopher; the latter meets the need of an ordinary man. Hwang proposes the idea of the deep night world as the substratum of everything including "ordinary intelligence". The deep night world refers to a state of deep sleep of all conscious beings that manifests a halt of human ordinary activities. We further explain Hwang's thoughts in terms of the role of the body (Section 4.1), implications of the deep night world (4.2), and the unity of absolute contradictory ideas (4.3).

4.1 The role of the body

The body was brought in to mediate the world of consciousness and the deep night world. Hwang (1939) uses the idea of the body to build a prototype of the ordinary world in which the body itself is mediated within a system of household and a system of transportation and workplace. Generally, temporal and spatial characters are ascribed to mind and body respectively. Hwang depicts the body temporally by connecting various events of a discontinuous household system—the recurrence of a body in the household system constitutes a temporal process. As shown below, the body connects a person to different aspects of the ordinary world. Hwang further theorizes the projection of the body to different places as "pure ordinary self-consciousness" and "pure ordinary world".



Fig. Hwang's (1939) scope of the pure ordinary self (left) and that of the pure ordinary world (right).

Hwang's intent of building a formal structure of ordinary world centered on the body leads us to conclude that the irrational underlies human existence. Moreover, the body connects the ordinary world to the deep night world. During daytime, a person moves around through his or her body; during nighttime, a person sleeps through their body. Mobility and restfulness/stillness are characteristics of the ordinary world and the deep night world.[17] We have seen to what extent the body functions as a mediation; at this point, we need to explicate what Hwang meant by body in his paper. First, a body is a constituent of pure ordinary self—by living in a house—that subsumes everything possessed by the person, including clothing and makeup. Hwang describes the pure ordinary self as "a small galaxy of personal possessions"; body is not only one of them but the core of the galaxy as well.

> When heard of ordinary self, we shall not think of the body directly. The image of self is not naked. Not only the body is a private possesion of mine, so as things that surrounded me. Therefore, I named it the basis of the ordinary self, meaning a small galaxy of personal possessions centred the body. This is a small galaxy that corresponds to the prototype of the body, [the former] subsuming and accompanying it [the latter]. (Hwang: p. 7)

By the attachment to personal possessions, the idea of the body is individualized. The individualized body is further contextualized into the transportation system and workplace. Hwang's idea of the body indicates his recognition of individual diversity as well as social context. Second, the body is a dynamic unified whole (*Gestalt*) of human existence that encompasses the mind.[18] The mind is bound to ignorance of itself due to its unavoidable involvement into a subject-object relation.

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[17] The body not only has a mobility that suggests it is more than just an object but it also projects itself into a private residential world and a public occupational world. The body is a mediation that endows things in a world with meaning.

[18] *Gestalt* was originally a psychological term from Gestalt theory that developed in the early 19th century. The Gestaltists opposed the reduction of mental life to atomic sensation. They then proposed the idea of "wholes" and "structures", and claimed that these "wholes" or "Gestalts" contained a figure/ground structure. Therefore, the whole/Gestalt could not be broken down into elements. The figure-ground concept is central to Maurice Merleau-Ponty in explaining everything, as is form/matter to Aristotle and the conception of the *a priori* to Kant. The ground in the figure-ground relationship reminds us of the place in Nishida's logic of place. Though the resemblance between ground and place is worth exploring, it is beyond the scope of this chapter. See George J. Marshall, *A Guide to Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception*. Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 2008: 234–237.

In contrast, the body has direct access upon its own activities. One acts through one's body to cook, eat, rest and interact with others; it is the performer of life and the source of living. Despite a dialectical analysis of consciousness as "ordinary intelligence" in order to afford the mind an absolute accessibility to knowledge, Hwang's focus on the notion of deep night indicates the body subsumes and mediates activities of the mind.[19]

4.2 Implications of the deep night world

Hwang (1939) proposed a pure matter world of deep night that is absolutely devoid of mental activities. The theme of the deep night world is *sleeping,* wherein consciousness is suspended.[20] Hwang maintains that sleeping is essential to living and to philosophical discourse, he says,

> I could not agree that discourses on sleeping are not philosophical for we reason philosophy as a result of absolute consciousness. We discuss the rhythm of life, why not sleeping? Sleeping is the immediate root of the rhythm of life. (Hwang, p. 22)

Conscious being restores its energy and invigorates its dynamic wholeness in a process of sleeping, which constitutes the deep night world. The deep night world is basically static and still, yet it envelopes a flow of energy within it. Hwang describes the deep night world as a big circle that contains numerous circles that are connected by the flow that fill the gaps in between these circles. The static circle refers to the shutdown of consciousness of the ordinary self; the flow of energy refers to the romantic and erotic self that is emancipated from the ordinary self.[21] Hwang named the latter *the world of gap,* which is where absolute freedom happens. Absolute freedom becomes possible with the absence of the constrained ordinary

[19] See Gao Jun-He, Chang Feng-Bin, "A Meditator of Pure Forms: the Phenomenology of Everydayness and Taiwanese localization movement of Hwang Chin-Sui" in Hung, T. -W. (ed.) (2016). *Existential Engagement: Philosophy in Taiwan, the Japanese Era*. Academia Sinica & Linking Publishing: 292–295.

[20] Hwang declares "sleeping is the complete absolute subject of the deep night world". His idea of subjectifying sleeping is based on a painting by Spanish surrealist artist Salvador Dali, titled "Sleep".

[21] Though only mentioned once in his paper, "sexuality" stands out as an essential element that represents the irrational.

self. In other words, absolute freedom is related to the body. The world of gap serves as a bridge between ordinary selves. Therefore, every conscious being is essentially supported by the same energetic source and is not an isolated mind.

The tension between mind/body remains in the deep night world at some point. The mind is intrinsically urged to think, the body naturally falls into deep sleep. In a world that prohibits consciousness, the residues of consciousness eventually vanish in the comforting rhythm of sleeping. If this is not the case, the restless mind ends up in a mental extremization that is destructive to the energy restoring process. Hwang concludes his incredibly sophisticated discussion about "this one day" —the present—in a relatively simple phrase: (a better way of living) is to preserve our energies and spirit for the future. This can be construed as the present in which we live intertwined with the past while forming the future. The reflective power conflicts with the sustaining power. The deep night world serves the purpose of preserving a person's sustaining power by putting consciousness on hold, thereby allowing the dynamic self-reinvigorating process to function effectively.

4.3 The unity of absolute contradictory ideas

Hwang (1939) appeals to several philosophical ideas from Nishida, Robert Louis Stevenson, Arthur Rimbaud, Bergson and Hegel. A Hegelian dialectic is ubiquitous in the works of Nishida and Tanabe, as well as Hwang. In what follows, we focus on the accessibility of Hwang's Hegelian dialectical account of self-consciousness and the deep night world. According to Hwang, self-consciousness is both aware and unaware of the ordinary world; the deep night world is both static and dynamic. Huang analyses four different level of self-consciousness in a dialectical way to finally achieve a self that is real and transcendental. As in the case of the deep night world, it is a world that serves as the absolute substratum of the ordinary world. In its stillness encompasses a live sustaining sleeping process that at a certain point bears an awakening activity of the self-consciousness that contradicts the law of the deep night world (which prohibits everything and at the same time defines everything). To illustrate the accessibility of Huang's account of the unity of contradictory ideas, in what follows this section introduces the Mobius band. Let us consider a pair of contradictory ideas as the opposite spheres of a strip of paper—the sole connection of the opposite spheres is that they are on the back of the other (which means they are literally opposite). Now hold one end of the strip of paper

and do a 180 degree rotation to the other end and joint both ends, a Mobius band with a single sphere is thereby completed. By turning a strip of paper into a Mobius band, the clear-cut opposite spheres blend into one—two independent spheres that is absolutely separated as in the shape of a strip get to meet each other and form a circular whole by means of a simple twist. The Mobius band illustrates the accessibility of Hwang's dialectical discussion that aims to transcend the boundary of contradictory ideas.[22]

In addition to the application of a dialectical method, Hwang's pure ordinary self-consciousness resembles Nishida's *jikaku*, which refers to "self-awareness" or "self-consciousness" and is the essence of Nishida's philosophy. Nishida uses the term *place* (basho) as a new philosophical terminology to elaborate where physical objects and mental acts occur. Though enveloping both physical objects and mental acts, Nishida understands *place* as a special type of consciousness that is beyond the polar dichotomy of mind and matter. The logic of place explains that consciousness constitutes an ultimate living reality without resorting to any particular individual. The place of *absolute nothingness* is nothing yet it encompasses everything.[23] The contradiction we found here is supposed to be dissolved given Nishida's Asian-based cultural insight into seeing "the form of the formless".[24]

Despite its mutually implicating nature of mind and matter, the logic of place is not immune to Tanabe's opposition to the idea of a derivative world.[25] The natural world and the individuals who inhibit it are not products of consciousness. Considering Hwang account of the deep night world, we could say that Hwang departs from Nishida and is in agreement with Tanabe on this point.

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[22] Only with a rotation of 180 degree will the original front and back sphere join and form a new single sphere that consists of the two. In other words, if we form a circle with the strip of paper without the twist, the opposition of the front and back sphere remains. The latter resembles a strict deductive way of constructing an argument, the former resembles a dialectical way of developing an argument in which the conclusion is bound to mean more than the premises do—new meaning is thereby created.

[23] See Nishida, "Basho", *Complete works of Nishida* vol. 4 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2003).

[24] See Nishida, "A preface to from the actor to the seer", [Hataraku mono kara miru mono e] *Complete works of Nishida* vol. 3 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2003): 253.

[25] Aside from the issue of ending up in a deritative world, Tanabe also criticizes Nishida's account of absolute nothingness as consciousness for consciousness would not be nothingness but rather being, thereby deprived of a dialectical conversion where the death and resurrection of the self happens. See Tanabe, "Clarifying the Meaning of the Logic of Species",[*Shu no ronri no imi o akiraka ni su*] *Collected works of Tanabe Hajime* vol. 6 (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1963).

In conclusion, Hwang's thought is significantly influenced by the Kyoto School as well as German idealism. His work is intertwined with philosophical dialectics and poetic imaginations that are somewhat difficult to decipher. However, as a 24-year-old he clearly expresses his attempt to answer the question of "how should we live?" by contemplating the ordinary world in which we live in, using philosophical terminologies he learnt from Nishida and Tanabe to delineate a highly abstract structure of the world. Contrast to the complexity of his discussion, the answer he proposed—to preserve our energies and spirit for the future – is rather obvious yet insightful.

5. Conclusions and further questions

To summarize, this paper aims to clarify the less studied area of Taiwanese Philosophy under Japanese rule and its genealogical relation to the Kyoto School. Section 1 contains a brief review of the early philosophical development under Japan's rule. Section 2 explores the influence of Japanese philosophy on Formosan thinkers and Section 3 explains Taihoku Imperial University's heritage stemming from the Kyoto School. Moreover, Section 4 carefully examines Hwang Chin-Sui's thought, serving as a window into the philosophical connection between Taiwan and Japan.

To conclude, while Formosa has a robust Confucianism tradition dating back to the 17th century, modern philosophy did not begin until the colonization of Japan in 1895. Although Japan's cultural assimilation (i.e., Japanization) in tandem with its modernization were often the criticizing targets of Taiwanese intellects, Taiwanese philosophers were under the influence of Japanese philosophers, especially those from the Kyoto School. However, later, as the pressure of Japanization increased, the inhabitants' awareness of self/other emerged, finally leading to the Sit-chûn movement of Taiwanese philosophy (台湾哲学の実存運動).—a rebellion in thought against, as well as a creative transformation of, Japanese and Chinese philosophies (Hung 2016). In other words, while Taiwan inherits a dual tradition from China and Japan, philosophers in the 1920s seek to find a third way out. Thus, we may say that it was Japanization which gave birth to the Taiwanization of philosophy in the 1920s.

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Ex oriente lux?
The Kyoto School and the Problem of Philosophical Modernism

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Abstract: *An influential strand in current research on Japanese philosophy rests on the assumption that Western philosophy has reached an impasse, accompanied by a sense of exhaustion, which it can overcome only by a radical transformation, that is by opening up to insights generated by the tradition of Japanese thought, especially by the Kyoto school commencing with Nishida Kitarō. While I deeply sympathize with the purpose behind this assumption, that is the project of fostering cross-cultural philosophical dialogue, I disagree with its theoretical presuppositions, namely Heidegger's and Nishitani's critique of philosophical modernism. To corroborate my disagreement, I provide a critical examination of Heidegger's concept of "History of Being" and its appropriation by Nishitani and his disciples, before I offer an alternative view on the possible significance of Kyoto school philosophy for the project of cross-cultural dialogue in the context of philosophical modernism. When engaging in this project, I argue, we would be ill-advised to ignore the conceptual resources we find in German Idealism, particularly in Hegel. My argument concludes not that Western philosophy has reached an impasse, but rather that there is a sense of exhaustion in engaging with this philosophy on the side of those who propose its radical transformation.*

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An influential strand in current research on Japanese philosophy rests on the assumption that Western philosophy has reached an impasse it can overcome only by a radical transformation, that is by opening up to insights generated by the tradition of Japanese thought, especially by the so-called Kyoto school commencing with Nishida Kitarō.[1] This assumption reflects a diagnosis, which is widely shared in

[1] Cf. *inter alia* Davis et al. (eds.), *Japanese and Continental Philosophy: Conversations with the Kyoto School*; Berque, *Milieu et identité humaine. Notes pour un dépassement de la*

recent trends in cultural studies and modernity discourse. As early as in 1995, Mike Featherstone noted, "the end of Western modernity is in sight, the West has 'peaked' with an accompanying sense of exhaustion". And he goes on:

> "But there is no sense of exhaustion in East Asia and other parts of the world which are pursuing their own national and civilizational blend of modernity. Hence it may be more propitious to speak of modernities rather than of modernity".[2]

Featherstone appears to be one of the earliest proponents of "multiple modernities", a concept that has come to the fore at the beginning of the new millennium[3] and which since then has sparked a lively debate in social sciences and cultural studies.[4] This has lead to the somewhat inflationary coinage of new terms like "entangled modernities", "alternative modernities", "hybrid modernities", and so forth.

For some of those embracing Zen and Kyoto school philosophy, in Western philosophy, that "sense of exhaustion" materializes in the stubborn, yet ultimately fruitless insistence on defining the very subject matter of philosophy, its concepts, methods, language, and its overall logic of discourse. (And, of course, this vein of criticism has a history that also goes back to Nietzsche, Heidegger and those post-structuralist authors following their dissatisfactions with Western modernity. I will come back to these connections later.) This, too, mirrors a discourse that has come to the fore in the social sciences several years earlier. There,

> "the problem of modernity is increasingly discussed on a meta-level [...] Therefore, the accent shifts from determining the essence of modernity to an inquiry into narrations of modernity, and there are emerging struggles about the interpretation of the concept of modernity".[5]

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modernité. This line of research originates in, and further develops, insights generated since the late 1980's. Precisely because this line of research has shaped the image of Japanese philosophy in the West in a one-sided problematic way, it has been vigorously attacked by Steineck et al., *Begriff und Bild der japanischen Philosophie*. See also Paul, *Philosophie in Japan. Von den Anfängen bis zur Heian-Zeit. Eine kritische Untersuchung.* For an overview of what is involved here, cf. Liederbach, "Philosophie im gegenwärtigen Japan: eine Problemskizze".

[2] Featherstone, *Undoing Culture*, 83–84.

[3] Eisenstadt, *Multiple Modernities.*

[4] Cf. the lucid discussion in: Schwinn, "Gibt es eine multiple Moderne?".

[5] Willems et al., *Moderne und Religion*, 13 (my translation).

Similarly, in the field of Japanese philosophy, we observe a shift from day-to-day-business, that is the interpretation of texts, their translation and historical and systematic treatment to a discussion on a meta-level, where struggles about the interpretation of the very concept of philosophy are taking place.[6]

The motivation for these struggles is aptly characterized by Rolf Elberfeld, who writes:

> "Today, at the beginning of the 21st Century, another fundamental turn in the history of philosophy is taking place. It is not clear yet what it means that Chinese, Japanese, Arabic, and other languages have become the medium of *current philosophy*".[7]

[6] An anecdote might illustrate what is at stake here. In his talk at a recent conference on Japanese philosophy in Hildesheim, Raji Steineck (University of Zurich) made the perfectly reasonable proposal to be cautious when assigning the label "philosophical" to texts in the Japanese tradition which were obviously not meant to be philosophical texts at all. The text in question was Dōgen's *Uji* (Being-Time), which since the days of Tanabe Hajime has been used to foster a specific philosophical agenda, that is to develop an ontological alternative to, speaking with Heidegger, the Western metaphysics of presence. While rhetorical and lexical analysis of *Uji* as well as its historical background evince that this text was not meant to develop a philosophical argument on being, time, and their relation, but rather to strengthen the faith of Dōgen's disciples at Eihei-ji temple in the teachings of the Buddha, the discussion following Steineck's talk quickly turned into a debate on the nature of philosophy itself. Who has the authority, it was asked, to distinguish philosophical from non-philosophical texts? In an impatient rejoinder, Rein Raud (University of Tallinn), who was the main addressee of Steineck's proposal, asserted the inevitability for Western philosophy to follow the example of other disciplines like art-history and literary studies, which in the course of the last five or so decades have come to recognize the fact that the achievements of formerly marginalized non-Western cultures are in principal of equal value in comparison to their Western counterparts. With respect to philosophy, this amounts to the following claim: Since a text needs not to be intentionally philosophical and has not to follow a specific argumentative style to be philosophically significant (a point, Steineck would, under certain conditions, agree with), we have to expand the corpus of so-called philosophical texts significantly, which would eventually lead to a transformation of philosophy itself (here, I suppose, Steineck would hesitate to agree, and rightly so). The ultimate claim is that Western philosophy no longer has the authority for defining its very subject matter. But, then, who has?

[7] Elberfeld, *Philosophieren in einer globalisierten Welt*, 132 (my translation).

This observation, which mirrors insights generated by postcolonial discourse in cultural and social studies and aims at recognizing marginalized traditions, is accompanied by the following claim: "Precisely by questioning (*Hinterfragen*) the fundamental principles of the great philosophies since the early-modern age, there can be opened up virulent possibilities of critique".[8]

This point is well made. However, I argue to decouple it from those sweeping claims about the historical fate of Western modernity we so often encounter in the relevant research literature. While it remains worthwhile to contemplate the significance of Nietzsche's and Heidegger's dissatisfactions for rethinking the modern project—mainly the notions of cognitive and practical self-determination, arguably the two most prominent of its aspirations—one should be careful not to throw away the baby with the bathwater.

From the very beginning of modern Japanese philosophy, that is, since Nishida's *Inquiry into the Good* (1911), these notions, mediated by the reception of German Idealism, have attracted considerable attention; one cannot even begin to form a comprehensive view on Kyoto school philosophy without taking into account the massive impact of Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel during its formative stage. While the critical appropriation of German Idealism by Kyoto school philosophers could provide what John Maraldo has called "a lens on Greco-European thought",[9] the importance of this hermeneutical project for a reassessment of philosophical modernism is not yet sufficiently appreciated.[10] The trenchant critique of the ontological and ethical foundations of modern subjectivity and autonomy we find in Nishida and Tanabe as well as in Kuki and Watsuji deserve creative adaptation in order to open a conversation on their significance for the philosophical discourse of modernity. We are not done with German Idealism's take on the core issues of

[8] Ibid., 162 (my translation). While I agree with Elberfeld that there is something to be learnt from philosophical achievements of so-called marginalized cultures, I doubt that Nishitani Keiji's criticism of Cartesianism, which he refers to in this context, is a good example. (Elberfeld refers to the German translation of Nishitani's 『宗教とは何か』, *Was ist Religion*, 55 sqq.) For one thing, it can be doubted whether one is doing justice to Descartes when contrasting his methodological doubt with the religious-existential doubt in Zen. For another, and more importantly, Nishitani's claim is resting on assumptions deriving from Heidegger's critique of philosophical modernism, which in itself is anything but convincing, since it espouses an overgeneralized, monolithic view of the history of Western philosophy. I will expand on this point in the next section of my paper.

[9] Maraldo, *Japanese Philosophy in the Making 1*, 21.

[10] A notable exception is: Mine, "Zu den Möglichkeiten der 'Logik des Ortes' in Nishidas Philosophie am Leitfaden seiner Kant-Kritik".

philosophical modernism as we are not done with their critical appropriations in Japan. In recent research, however, these critical appropriations appear to be taken for granted; far from being seized as an opportunity for questioning, refining and further developing these insights, they are forming the mere contingent background for attempts to do away with the modern project in general. For many of these attempts applies what Robert Pippin has aptly stated with respect to post-structuralist discourse on this plane, namely that

> "in many such older and newer debates the way objections are posed, positions characterized, narratives narrated and so forth involve what are by now a large number of conventional readings and very settled, accepted histories, and these are almost all inaccurate and misleading about the original modern options. There are straw men, vague shadows, distorted portraits, and potted narrations everywhere in such debates".[11]

Many of the recent claims on the significance of Japanese philosophy are based on such standard views on the modern project. That is, we find lots of what Terry Pinkard, with respect to Hegel scholarship in the Western tradition, has denounced as "lazy interpretations".[12] A brief glance at two treatments of Hegel's philosophy of history in current research on Japanese philosophy will corroborate this point.

Hegel is taken to be "in many ways the godfather of Eurocentrism", whose "grand narrative of the self-alienation and self-recovery of Spirit provides a most cunning justification for a Eurocentristic teleological account of world history";[13] Hegel, we are told, who championed "a single 'world history' which derives from a principle of uniformity" has to be abandoned towards "a history of 'worldly worlds' which in itself is structured polycentrically" as proposed by Nishida.[14] These standard views on Hegel's philosophy of history can be seriously challenged. All depends on how "self-alienation and self-recovery of spirit" is to be understood. As a more careful reading reveals, taking into account Hegel's conception of "infinite ends" makes the accusation of a historical teleology based on a principle of uniformity in Hegel look much less convincing.[15] Such a reading would also open

[11] Pippin, *Modernism as a Philosophical Problem,* xiii.
[12] Pinkard, *Does History Make Sense?*, 2.
[13] Davis, "Dialogue and Appropriation", 43.
[14] Elberfeld, *Kitarô Nishida*, 213 (my translation).
[15] Pinkard, *Does History Make Sense?,* 39–49.

up possibilities to properly contextualize Hegel's philosophy of history within his project of a practical philosophy, which is indispensable for assessing his take on the problem of philosophical modernism. Although it remains questionable whether the dimension of Eurocentrism really is "less pernicious than is commonly assumed",[16] the point that, according to Hegel, each culture is "an end in itself and calls for its own transcendence (including Europe)"[17] is well made; it opens the possibility for acknowledging different path dependent realizations of cognitive and practical autonomy. Ultimately, the question is not so much what Hegel got wrong about non-Western cultures, deplorable as this may be, but rather what his flawed account reveals

> "about the problems inherent in any collective enterprise that either takes something like the 'moral' to be equivalent to 'actually existing social rules' or which takes its own collective project to be simply unintelligible and thus available only the mystical".[18]

In the final section of this paper, I will make some suggestions on how such a nuanced interpretation of Hegel's claim about "infinite ends" could contribute to contextualizing the Kyoto school within the discourse of philosophical modernism.

So, my concern with the demands for critically interrogating the modern project is not that this is meant to pose a challenge to Western philosophy; it is rather their theoretical presuppositions, particularly the rather complex historico-philosophical conception underlying such interrogations I am concerned with. This is not only about hermeneutical accuracy; more importantly, relying on Heidegger's narrative forces one to choose between two seemingly straightforward alternatives —buying into the *singulare tantum* notion of modernity, or doing away with the notion of modernity for good—and, thus, forecloses the possibility of taking on board the concept of multiple modernities, which, as I believe, would open up new and, as I hope, fruitful perspectives on Kyoto School philosophy.

In the following, I will sketch out Heidegger's narrative of Western metaphysics, provide a critical discussion of its appropriation in Japanese philosophy (section 2), and offer an alternative view on the possible significance of the Kyoto school within the philosophical discourse of modernity (section 3).

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[16] Buchwalter, "Is Hegel's Philosophy of History Eurocentric?", 252.
[17] Pinkard, *Does History Make Sense?*, 198.
[18] Ibid., 67.

2

The overgeneralized, monolithic view of Western philosophy noted above reflects a motive introduced by Martin Heidegger, which has become influential in recent research on Japanese philosophy. Heidegger had, as it is well known, accused the whole of the Western tradition of philosophy to suffer from what he called "forgetfulness of Being" (*Seinsvergessenheit*). For Heidegger, there is an almost necessary connection between philosophy's quest for beings (not for Being itself) since the days of Plato, medieval theology, conceptions of mental representation in early modern philosophy, Kant's transcendental turn, nineteenth century materialism, nihilism, and the technology driven late modern age—all of these epochs representing distinct stages in a process of increasing forgetfulness of Being. From this angle, the differences between determinate positions within this process become secondary issues. While Heidegger concedes differences in the intensity of forgetfulness of being, his verdict on the metaphysical tradition as a whole cannot be mistaken: Metaphysics is only the "prelude"[19] for what he calls "the other beginning". That is to say, within the "history of being" (*Seinsgeschichte*), Western metaphysics represents the time-span between the "first beginning" (*erster Anfang*) in Ancient Greek thought and the "other beginning" (*anderer Anfang*) that still has to come. What commences with the other beginning is no longer the matter of philosophy but rather that of an entirely new mode of thought, which Heidegger simply calls "thinking" (*Denken*). This "thinking", we are told, is to be articulated not by philosophers, but by poets like Hölderlin and Trakl.[20]

It is not difficult to see how such views on the philosophical tradition of the West have been taken up by Heidegger's disciples in Kyoto, most notably by Nishitani Keiji, who, during a sojourn in Freiburg studied with Heidegger and attended the famous Nietzsche-lectures, Heidegger held from 1937 to 1939. My point is not so much that these views might have fueled the critique of modernity,

[19] Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, 174: ". . . was sich in der Geschichte der Metaphysik ereignet hat: das Vorspiel des Er-eignisses selbst als der Wesung des Seyns".
[20] For Heidegger's notion of "history of being" cf. Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie,* 167-224. See also the lucid discussion by Günter Figal who eloquently argues for a nuanced interpretation of this notion as well as of Heidegger's general stance towards metaphysics, and who concludes that, "for Heidegger, there is no 'post-metaphysical' thinking". (Figal, "Verwindung der Metaphysik", 459; my translation.)

Nishitani expressed in that infamous colloquium on "Overcoming Modernity",[21] although this critique informs much of Nishitani's later views on modern Western culture and thought. More important in this context is that Nishitani's treatment of philosophical modernism functions as a link which connects Heidegger with Ueda and his disciples in Japan and abroad. Nishitani sets the scene when, in a sweeping account, he narrates the history of modern Western thought in terms of nihilism, and when he hints at the possibility of overcoming nihilism by means of a "fundamental and sudden change" (*tenkan*), the reason for which cannot be accounted for, since "there is no reason that can be thought of, and a ground that should be cannot be thought of".[22]

These claims are echoed by Nishitani's disciple, Ueda Shizuteru. Ueda holds that "European philosophy must be deconstructed and perhaps even pass through what Heidegger calls the end of philosophy to another beginning from which it can undergo a transformative turn to world philosophy".[23] Only then, philosophy can live up to its task. "What is needed today is a world brought together by the fruits of mutual critique and mutual supplementation between different traditions",[24] since, as Ueda hopes,

> "[c]ontact between different traditions promises to help shed light on shared fundamental structures of human existence, and it will encourage new ways

[21] 西谷『「近代の超克」私論』.

[22] 西谷『宗教とは何か』, 254. 「このやうなニヒリズムの極限に至って初めて、そこに大きな根本的転換が生起する。[...] 我々はそれについて何故と問ふことは出来ない。それには考へ得られるべき理由はあり得ず、またあり得べき根拠は考えられない。」

[23] Ueda, "Contribution to Dialogue with the Kyoto School", 21. Here, a qualification is necessary. Neither Heidegger, nor Nishitani and Ueda wish to proclaim the beginning of a new historical epoch. Rather, the fundamental and sudden change Nishitani mentions (or Heidegger's *Ereignis*), is to hint at the possibility of a radically different mode of comportment that eventually will bring about a change in our relatedness to the world, beings, and others—all of this taking place *within* the situation of modern technology and nihilism, not in an imagined time *after* modernity. Nevertheless, these suggestions are 'post-metaphysical', in that they aim at suspending the modern regime of thought in favor of a new, *gelassen* mode of thinking. Here, the problem of dogmatism emerges, since it is unclear how one is to rationally justify these 'groundless' transformations. I come back to this in a minute. (For the ethical implications of this problem cf. Nishitani, *The I-Thou Relation in Zen-Buddhism.* See also Liederbach, *Between the Ontological and the Ontic: Nishitani Keiji and the Problem of Encounter*.)

[24] Ueda, "Contribution to Dialogue with the Kyoto School", 22.

> of bringing to awareness the understandings of the world and the self found in our various manners of being-in-the-world".[25]

While I deeply sympathize with this claim, I do not share the underlying assumption for engaging in this project, as long as this means to set up straw men, to draw distorted pictures and to narrate potted narratives, and, ultimately, to throw away the baby with the bathwater. I am also skeptical whether what we need in order to engage in this project is to "give birth to new world-philosophical principles".[26] Finally, I am not so sure whether the hermeneutical situation which calls for what Heidegger once had called "the unavoidable conversation with the East-Asian world",[27] is grasped correctly when subsumed under the heading of "nihilism". How is it to be understood that Nietzsche "has helped to expose the roots of modern Western—and increasingly, global—nihilism",[28] and what does it tell us about our current situation?

Indeed, the historically unprecedented situation of late modern, technology driven mass consumer societies requires philosophical explanation; the shift of norms, the loss of meaning, the atomization of societies, and the breaking up of family life—all those dissatisfactions with modernity addressed by its critics since Rousseau are, in fact, linked to the emergence of new modes of self-understanding and, at the same time, of new scientific, aesthetic, and moral ways of coping with the world, which first came to the fore in early modern European thought. To be sure, philosophy has to account for that. However, vacuuming up these very different problems into the one notion of "nihilism" can neither give credit to their complexity, nor can it account for the, again, complex set of conditions that lead to the emergence of Western modernity in the first place. Here, a fine-grained account is called for, more in the line of Charles Taylor's work[29] than in the line of Heidegger and his followers. On the basis of such a fine-grained account, the assertion that there could (and, in fact, had to) be an ending of modernity becomes implausible. The point in question is, whether there is a way out of this "dialectics of enlightenment" (Adorno's and Horkheimer's phrase) or, which amounts to the same, whether the narration of modernity reaches its climax not at some end but on its way.

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[25] Ibid., 20.
[26] Ibid., 30.
[27] Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, 43: "das unausweichliche Gespräch mit der ostasiatischen Welt" (my translation).
[28] Davis, "Nishitani after Nietzsche", 96.
[29] Cf. *inter alia:* Taylor, *Sources of the Self.*

As Robert Pippin has convincingly shown, the dissatisfactions with modernity can never be soothed: "thinking of it as prompting a resolution is already a misreading of modernity's perpetual dissatisfactions".[30] It could be argued that the criticism that attended the modern project since its inauguration, reveals an inherent ambiguity in modernity itself, which is famously rendered in Hegel's reading of Diderot's *Rameau's Nephew,* to whom he attributes the "speech of this disorientation, which is so clear to itself".[31] Hegel wants to suggest here that the very rationality that drives the "cultural formation" (*Bildung*, a notion, which, in those days, had a determinate positive ring) of the modern epoch, gives rise to the most subtle forms of "alienation",[32] for which there is no ultimate cure, since the understanding at work here establishes a second reality of semblance (*Schein*) which is difficult to see through. Hence, Pippin's conclusive prognosis is: "unending modernity".[33] If it is true that after Kant's transcendental turn, the various anti-modern appeals, be they traditionalist, religious, historicist or whatever, "look less like discoveries or realizations, and more like how we come, at some moment in time, to construe ourselves or the cosmos",[34] that is, if it is true that the articulations of the dissatisfactions with modernity give evidence to "the unavoidable role of a spontaneous self-determination even in self-limiting and self-effacing activities",[35] then Nishitani's claim that the "fundamental and sudden change" cannot be accounted for by reason, loses much of its credibility. Putting our hopes in an "other beginning" after the end of modernity

> "would not only return us to an an-archic or unprincipled world of differences, plurality, and heteronomy celebrated in some postmodern thought, but also a world of conflict, war rather than play, and those who profess to 'speak' for what cannot be 'said' (a role as problematic as it is in those who speak for 'what our community believes', 'who we are', what 'problems' we need to work on, as well as for spokesmen for the ontological happening.)"[36]

[30] Pippin, *Modernism as a Philosophical Problem*, 178.
[31] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 304. Cf. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, 387: "Rede dieser sich selbst klaren Verwirrung".
[32] Cf. Bubner, "Rousseau, Hegel und die Dialektik der Aufklärung".
[33] Pippin, *Modernism as a Philosophical Problem*, 160.
[34] Ibid., 176.
[35] Ibid., 176.
[36] Ibid., 163.

Ultimately, in the "other beginning", we would find ourselves in a situation similar to that one which had called for Kant's transcendental turn in the first place.

3

How, then, could the project of a "mutual critique and mutual supplementation between different traditions" be pursued? What would be its purpose?

Since I cannot possibly treat this project here in even a remotely satisfying way, I will restrict myself to putting forward a set of undefended (but, as I think, defensible) theses on the underlying assumptions of this project.

(i) The philosophically significant part of the multiple modernity thesis depends on the acknowledgement of culture-specific "moral orders".[37] The encounter with Western modernity has forced non-Western societies to rework their traditional moral orders and fuse them with modern Western ideas. Strictly speaking, multiple modernities are culturally inflected variations of Western modernity. Hence, a cross-cultural dialogue becomes possible. (Put differently, the moral orders entertained in multiple modernities are neither to be mistaken for a plurality of mutually exclusive conceptual schemes, nor are they mere repetitions of Western modernity.)

(ii) Moral orders are best understood in a Hegelian fashion as path dependent "shapes of spirit", or "forms of life". Human subjects entertain and sustain their social space of reasons, and thus aim at fulfilling their desire for a reconciled world. Hence, the reasons, human subjects act on, are to be conceived of as achievements, as results of joint commitments. The path dependency of how these spaces of reasons are entertained and sustained accounts for the differences between them.

(iii) Among the ideas appropriated by non-Western modernizing societies, the idea of freedom as self-determination stands out, for it is the core-idea of Western modernity and the most difficult one to fuse with traditional ideas.

(iv) There is a logic of how the idea of self-determination is realized in each culture, but there is no logic that would encompass these multiple logics. Hegel's account of world-history, although it allows for accommodating the idea of

[37] Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries*, 3–22.

> culture-specific logics of realizing the idea of self-determination, had to fail because it was meant to develop such an all-encompassing logic.[38]

Obviously, before engaging in (i) to (iv), a good deal of preparatory work needs to be done, mainly, as proposed above, to initiate a conversation between philosophical modernisms, in particular German Idealism and the Kyoto school. John Maraldo has put forward a useful maxim to be employed for this kind of work: "Instead of assuming that Nishida and 'Kyoto School' thinkers mean something fundamentally different than 'Western' philosophers", he says, "it would be more fruitful to consider them together and investigate their notions [...] in detail".[39] In the following, I wish to develop some rough ideas of what shape these preparatory work could take when following Maraldo's maxim.

To begin with, once one shook off the fetters of the mono-thematic narrative of "modern Western—and increasingly, global—nihilism", one is free to acknowledge the modern condition as it really is. Western modernity has gone global and has forced non-Western cultures into processes of modernization, which, on a deeper lever, are, as it has turned out, anything but homogeneous.[40] "Multiple modernities" is a reality that is emerging on the horizon of the beginning of the 21st Century. Hence, as a concept, it ought to be integrated into the philosophical discourse of modernity.[41] Therefore, acknowledging the empirical fact that non-Western modernizing societies strive for the appropriation and realization of the core ideas of Western modernity: freedom, equality, and justice,[42] does not entail an assertion of a hegemonic Western modernism.[43] However, it does entail the acknowledgement that each of these societies pursues its determinate way of realizing these ideas. That is to say, the discourse of modernity itself has to be pluralized. Once we have acknowledged the reality of multiple modernities, it no longer makes sense to pit various forms of religious, traditionalist, anti-modernist thought against an imagined hegemonic Western philosophical modernism. If it is true that any attempt at "overcoming modernity" means nothing else than

[38] I am following Pinkard's conclusion; cf. Pinkard, *Does History Make Sense?,* 140–168.
[39] John C. Maraldo, *Japanese Philosophy in the Making I*, 116–117.
[40] Cf. Befu, "Globalization theory from the Bottom Up: Japan's Contribution".
[41] Charles Taylor makes this point in: Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries.*
[42] Cf. Welzel, *Freedom Rising.*
[43] As a closer look on Western modernity reveals, culturally distinct, path dependent trajectories of appropriation and ramification of modern ideas in different societies have led to a plurality of modernities even within the West; with respect to the idea of equality cf. Rosanvallon, *The Society of Equals.*

introducing some kind of dogmatism that would make the reemergence of transcendental reflection inevitable, the various readings of Kyoto School philosophy as ushering in an "other beginning" become futile. Putting to rest such readings, means to free oneself for engaging Kyoto School philosophy as contributor to the modern project, not as its undertaker. That is, it would enable us to acknowledge the path dependent, culturally inflected shape, Kyoto School philosophy has given to philosophical modernism. Here, I believe, lies the significance of Ueda's call for "mutual critique and supplementation of different traditions".

While, in philosophy, examples for such an enterprise are rarely found (the case of Leibniz notwithstanding), the situation is different in the realm of arts and in other areas. Consider how Van Gogh was inspired by traditional Japanese painting, how Debussy adopted principles of composing techniques in Gamelan music, and how Andō Tadao's concrete buildings—which are in themselves examples for mutual critique and supplementation[44]—are appropriated in Western architecture. Or take the example of civic engagement: Gandhi introduced the practice of non-violent protest to the West and, thus, reminded political activists in Europe and the United States of their Christian roots. These are just a few, particularly well-known examples for the intricate relationships between multiple modernities.

For philosophy, similar cases are still to be made. The question to be asked is this: What have Kyoto School philosophers to contribute to the discourse of philosophical modernism? That is, how can they help us in enhancing our understanding not only of the *aporiai* of the modern project, but also of its aspirations?

As proposed above, revisiting Kyoto School philosophers' engagement with German Idealism might help us to answer such questions. Kant and Hegel scholarship has made tremendous progress in the last couple of decades, the results of which form a stark contrast to the conclusions, Kyoto School philosophers arrived at. While in the days of Nishida et al., much of the discussion on idealism was informed by Neo-Kantianism,[45] the situation is very different today. What could have hardly been expected a century ago, namely that, for instance, Nishida's notion of "enactive intuition" (行為的直観) arguably shows similarities with Hegel's

[44] Cf. Figal, *Ando. Architektur Raum Moderne.*
[45] Cf. 板橋『西田哲学の論理と方法：徹底的批評主義とは何か』.

conception of minded agency,[46] should be no longer surprising today. Hence, the contributions Nishida could make to current debates on, say, the role of conceptual activity in our everyday-coping with the world,[47] merit attention. A similar case can be made for Watsuji's reading of Hegel. Watsuji's understanding of *Geist* (spirit) is hardly in sync with recent efforts to come to grips with this notion. Therefore, it is fascinating to see how the interpretations by Pinkard, Pippin, and Larmore are overlapping with conclusions, Watsuji drew from his (albeit outdated) critique of Hegel.[48] Furthermore, reassessing Watsuji's encounter with Hegel opens the possibility for situating his ethical thought within the context of debates on ethical universalism vs. particularism and other problems in practical philosophy.[49]

Since Nishida et al. could not but discuss problems like consciousness, the autonomous self, the relation between receptivity and spontaneity, and others against the backdrop of their specific hermeneutical situation, what they came up with were culturally inflected accounts of these 'modern' issues. Therefore, when Nishida's philosophy of nothingness is associated with Zen-Buddhism, or Watsuji's ethical thought with Confucianism and primitive Buddhism, this indicates that their findings are as contingently path dependent as are the modern historical developments they attend. Hence, they are to be considered as contributions to inquiries into problems central to philosophical modernism, not as its overcoming. (Again, this is neither to suggest the homogenization of thought, nor does it mean that pre-modern thought of any given culture is philosophically irrelevant or, even worse, unintelligible. It does mean, however, that there are decisive differences in what each culture allows itself to understand, which, in turn, is reflected in the plurality of trajectories of the modernization of thought.)

Giving a voice to Kyoto School philosophers does not suggest that one should expect them to offer ultimate answers or final solutions for problems like those mentioned above. It does mean, however, that they can open up new perspectives on them; acknowledging different perspectives on the core notions of

[46] Cf., for instance, Hegel's treatment of a skilled person's agency in § 66 of the *Encyclopedia Logic* (Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I*, 156–157) and Nishida's accounts of "acts of artistic production" (芸術的創造作用) and "embodied comprehension" (身体的に把握すること) in 『直接に与えられたもの』, 50–51 and 『行為的直観』, 309 respectively.

[47] Cf. Schear (ed.), *Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World.*

[48] Cf. Liederbach, "Watsuji's Reading of Hegel".

[49] Sevilla, *Watsuji Tetsurô's Global Ethics of Emptiness: A Contemporary Look at a Modern Japanese Philosopher*, has argued that in Watsuji, we can find building blocks for an ethics that lives up to our present situation.

the modern project would help us to grasp these notions in a more comprehensive way. Lucy Schultz's observation that,

> "With the Kyoto scholars as Hegel's conversation partners, the nature of dialectic and the movement of spirit in self-consciousness becomes clearer than it could have been had it been treated exclusively within the European and American context",[50]

applies also to the problem discussed here. That is, a multi-perspective approach will contribute to our understanding of philosophical modernism as a whole in that it challenges well established narratives and deep-seated philosophical beliefs by providing a Japanese "lens on Greco-European thought" (to make use of John Maraldo's pithy phrase again).

I have argued that a good deal of the program sketched out above would have to be carried out by referring to the conceptual resources we find in Hegel's philosophy, even though it might lead to relativizing, at least to some extent, the very concept of Western modernity, which Hegel in his narrative so passionately defended. This will certainly not turn out to be a straightforward story like the one being told in Meßkirch and Kyoto; instead we will have to deal with the messy intricacies involved in the reception and ramification of modern ideas in Japan. Might it not, after all, be the case not that Western philosophy has reached an impasse, but rather that there is a "a sense of exhaustion" in engaging with this philosophy on the side of those who propose a "transition" from philosophy to — where?

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[50] Schultz, "Review of Peter Suares, *The Kyoto School's Takeover of Hegel*", 224.

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Fichtes produktive Einbildungskraft und Mikis Logik der Einbildungskraft[1]

TAMADA Ryutaro
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Abstract: *MIKI Kiyoshi 三木清 (1897–1945) ist ein Philosoph der Kyoto-Schule. Seit den Tagen als Jungakademiker bis zu seinen späteren Jahren schrieb er viele Aufsätze unter Einfluß von Fichtes Philosophie. Was für eine Rolle spielte Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre in seinem Denken? In diesem Beitrag beschränken wir uns auf die Betrachtung der Wissenschaftslehre Fichtes aus der Sicht von Miki. Um sein Verständnis von Fichtes Philosophie zu untersuchen, möchte ich das o. g. Problem erläutern.*

Wie Miki sich auf die Philosophie von Fichte bezog, war nicht unbedingt unkritisch. Während er Fichtes Philosophie analysiert, hat er eine kritische Haltung, die aus seinen eigenen Gedanken abstammt. Kiyoshi Miki nahm drei philosophische Begriffe von Fichte kritisch an. Das waren »intellektuelle Anschauung«, »produktive Einbildungskraft« und »Tathandlung«. In diesem Beitrag wollen wir unsere Aufmerksamkeit ganz besonders den o. g. Begriffen schenken.

Wo muss Philosophie ihren Ausgangspunkt nehmen? Der Ausgangspunkt der Philosophie ist nicht ein theoretischer und grundlegender Begriff, wie »intellektuelle Anschauung«, »produktive Einbildungskraft« und »Tathandlung«, sondern ein praktischer und grundlegender Begriff, wie »Streben« oder »Trieb«. Miki zielte auf die Erhellung des praktischen Wesens der Menschenexistenz. Durch die von mir angesprochene Gedankenbasis von Miki versuche ich die konstruktive Rolle von Fichtes Philosophie, die dort ins Spiel kommen, zu betrachten.

Einleitung

[1] Dieses Papier basiert auf meiner Forschungspräsentation beim 24. Weltkongress der Philosophie (Chinas Nationales Kongresszentrum, 2018). Ich danke recht herzlich Herrn Professor Dr. David Bartosch von der Beijinger Fremdsprachenuniversität für die bedeutungsvolle Kommentare.

MIKI Kiyoshi 三木清 (1897–1945) ist ein Philosoph der Kyoto-Schule. Seit den Tagen als Jungakademiker bis zu seinen späteren Jahren schrieb er viele Aufsätze, insbesondere *Die Logik der Einbildungskraft* 構想力の論理 (1st. 1939, 2nd. 1946), unter Einfluß von Fichtes Philosophie. Was für eine Rolle spielte Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre in seinem Denken? In diesem Beitrag beschränken wir uns auf die Betrachtung der Wissenschaftslehre Fichtes aus der Sicht von Miki. Um sein Verständnis von Fichtes Philosophie zu untersuchen, möchte ich das o. g. Problem erläutern.

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Was ist die Logik, die in der Grundlage der Philosophie gesetzt werden sollte? Welches geistige Tun des vernünftigen Wesens sollte die Logik sein? Kiyoshi Miki hatte ein grundlegendes Interesse an diesem Problem. Es ist eine der wichtigsten Fragen in Mikis Philosophie. Ich betrachte den Ausgangspunkt von Kiyoshi Mikis Gedanken zu Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre.

Miki kritisierte die drei o. g. Begriffe; »intellektuelle Anschauung«, »produktive Einbildungskraft«, »Tathandlung«. Nun stellen sich hierbei zwei Fragen.
1. Welche neuen Akzente setzte Miki mit seiner Kritik?
2. Inwiefern hat Fichtes Philosophie zur Formung seiner Gedanken beigetragen?

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1. Intelligibler Charakter des menschlichen Geistes

Zuerst weist Miki auf »den intelligiblen Charakter« des menschlichen Geistes in Fichtes Philosophie hin. Erstens möchte ich untersuchen, wie Miki den Begriff, intelligibler Charakter aus seiner Sicht zu interpretieren versuchte.

In dem Artikel *Problem der Individualität* (1922, in *Problemen des historischen Idealismus* 史的観念論の諸問題 (1929)), betrachtete Miki intelligibler Charakter des menschlichen Geistes, während er auf die Religionstheorie von Fichte *Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben, oder auch die Religionslehre* (1806) Bezug nahm. Jeder Mensch ist ein unvollständig Seiendes und mit seiner Vernunft ein endliches und vergängliches Wesen. Wenn er eine vollkommene Natur inne hätte, dann würde er seine »Individualität« verlieren.[2] Miki versteht unter Fichtes Idee »Unsere Welt ist das versinnlichte Material unserer Pflicht«.[3] in *Über den Grund unsers Glaubens an eine Göttliche Weltregierung* (1798), dass der empirische Charakter die Verkörperung des intelligiblen Charakters ist. Intelligibler Charakter kann als die Essenz des Individuums sowie als Ansatz desselben erkannt werden. Das ist eine Idee, die wir durch unsere Taten in der Erfahrungswelt wahrnehmen sollten. Daher ist es für uns als ein vernünftiges Wesen von großer Bedeutung, dass wir uns unserer eigenen Pflicht durch das reale Ich bewußt sind. In diesem Sinn ist die Pflicht konkret und individuell. Deshalb ist es von großer Bedeutung, dass Fichte Kants kategorischen Imperativ mit anderen Formulierungen wie »Erfülle jedesmal deine Bestimmung« oder »Handle nach deinem Gewissen«[4]auszudrücken versuchte. Das übersinnliche Sein ist der Ursprung unserer eigenen Bestimmung, wobei diese Bestimmung sich für alle Ewigkeit in Form von Handlungen, die je nach Individuum einzigartig und konkret sind, entfaltet. Wir, als vernünftiges Wesen, müssen unsere ideale Individualität durch die sinnliche Individualität vervollständigen. Daher betrachtete Fichte, Mikis Meinung nach, intelligibler Charakter des menschlichen Geistes als »den individuellen Charakter seiner höheren Bestimmung«.[5]

Mikis Verständnis von Fichtes Philosophie ist wie folgt: der Standpunkt der Unendlichkeit des menschlichen Geistes erfasst auch die Position der Endlichkeit des menschlichen Geistes. Das heißt, der menschliche Geist scheint, die unendliche Weisheit in der Natur zu berühren, wobei die Erfahrung der Natur endlich ist. Der menschliche Geist zielt auf unendliche Ausbreitung seiner Aktivitäten und das Streben nach Idealen hin, aber die Entwicklung der Handlungen wird dazu auf eine

[2] *Kiyoshi Mikis sämtliche Werke* 三木清全集, Bd. 2., Iwanami-shoten, S. 144
[3] *J. G. Fichte-Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,* I/5, S. 353.
[4] *Ebd.,* I/5, S. 141, S. 146.
[5] *Kiyoshi Mikis sämtliche Werke,* Bd. 2., S. 146f.

Bestrebung beschränkt. Ich muss sagen, dass intelligibler Charakter hier auf ein Ideal beschränkt wird. In Fichtes Philosophie ist der menschliche Geist endlich-unendlich oder unendlich-endlich, während des Erhaltens der beiden Seiten, bleibt er beim endlichen Geist.

In dem Artikel *Problem der Individualität* betrachtet Miki weiterhin die »Verbindung intelligibler Charakter und Gott« und die »Verbindung intelligibler Charakter und Idee des Menschen« an Aufmerksamkeit von Fichte gegenüber dem Unterschied »das Ich, als intellectueller Anschauung, von welchem die Wissenschaftslehre ausgeht« und »das Ich, als Idee, mit welchem sie schliesst« in *Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre* (1797).[6] Wir können die »Verbindung intelligibler Charakter und Gott« als die »Verbindungen des Ganzen und des Teils« betrachten, weil intelligibler Charakter »Selbst-Einschränkung« des unendlichen Inhalt Gottes ist. Gott als das Ganze kommt teilweise in jedem individuellen Geist durch sich selbst heraus. Abgehängt von jedem persönlichen Standpunkt, als intelligibler Charakter, drückt jedes Individuum einen Teil Gottes aus. »Verbindung des Ganzen und des Teils« als »Verbindung intelligibler Charakter und Gott« sind als »Verbindung des Ganzen und des Teils« als »Verbindung intelligibler Charakter und Idee des Menschen« geeignet. Gott und die Idee des Menschen lassen sich unterscheiden. Individueller Geist oder intelligibler Charakter als der Teil überträgt diese zwei Ganzen. Miki sagt: »Die Verbindung von Gott und Idee des Menschen wird auf die gleiche Weise wie Fichtes Verbindungen »das Ich als intellektuelle Anschauung und das Ich als Idee«, gedacht«. Und das Ich als Persönlicher Geist oder intelligibler Charakter überträgt diese zwei o. g. Komponenten. Das Ich als intellektuelle Anschauung ist der Ausgangspunkt jeder Persönlichkeit, etwas, was zu einer wirklichen Erfahrung unverbunden ist, und etwas, was noch nicht in der Entfernung der Zeit auf Persönlichkeit beschränkt wird. Das Ich als Idee ist ein begrenzender Punkt jeder Persönlichkeit, wohin es von der Persönlichkeit zurückkommen soll, und der ideale Zustand der wirklichen Erfahrung in der Zeit. Deshalb müssen Gott und die Idee des Menschen wie folgt unterschieden werden: Gott ist rein Gott selbst.

Die Idee des Menschen ist die Idee von Gott. Es wird eine Geschichte erzählt, während diese Idee sich zu einer Persönlichkeit entwickelt, und sich dadurch darstellt. Und das Ich als ein individueller Geist oder intelligibler Charakter

[6] *J. G. Fichte-Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,* I/4, S.265.

überträgt diese zwei Komponenten. Es trägt in sich sowohl die Persönlichkeit als auch deren Geschichte.[7]

Mikis Verständnis von Fichtes Philosophie ist wie folgt: Der Standpunkt der Unendlichkeit des menschlichen Geistes erfasst auch die Position der Endlichkeit des menschlichen Geistes. Es ist ein Standpunkt, definitiv Gott und die Idee des Menschen zu unterscheiden. Die Identifikation von Gott und der Idee des Menschen wird auf das Handeln eines Menschen beschränkt. Die Identifikation sollte auf den menschlichen Geist gerichtet werden. Der menschliche Geist strebt auf die Identifikation von Gott und der Idee des Menschen hin. Diese Bestrebung zeigt eine ewige Entwicklung. In dem Standpunkt der Unendlichkeit des menschlichen Geistes wird nicht die Identifikation vervollständigt, da der menschliche Geist beim endlichen Geist bleibt. Wobei sich Miki auf die Praktikabilität des Ich von Fichte in dem Artikel *Marxismus und Materialismus* (1927, in *Materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung und zeitgenössische Bedeutung* 唯物史観と現代の意義 (1928)) konzentriert. Fichte leitet die Welt der Sinnlichkeit aus den praktischen Grundregeln des Ichs ab. Aber nach der Meinung von Fichte entspricht Praxis auf der ganzen Linie der intelligiblen Handlung. Praxis fordert zwangsläufig und im Wesentlichen, dass die Praktizierenden sich von der Gegenwart unterscheiden und eine unabhängige Existenz sein sollten. Um sein praktisches Wesen zu zeigen, erfordert das Ich etwas, was kein Ich ist, um einen Widerstand zu überwinden. Auf diese Weise kann kein leerer Schatten in seiner Existenz sein, so lange sich ein Mensch praktisch in die Wirklichkeit verwickeln lässt. Aber Praxis ist auf der ganzen Linie mit der intelligiblen Handlung gleichzusetzen. Fichtes Meinung nach verliert das Nicht-Ich als der Widerstand seinen ideologischen Charakter nicht.[8]

Fichte bezeichnet seine Lehre als »Real-Idealismus« oder »Ideal-Realismus«.[9] In diesem Zusammenhang betont Miki die Seite des Idealismus im »Real-Idealismus« oder »Ideal-Realismus«, um Fichtes Lehre darzustellen. Nach dem Miki sich vom Marxismus abgewendet hatte, stärkte sich Mikis Interesse vom Ich der Idee zum Ich als die intellektuelle Anschauung. Idealismus ist die Lehre, die lediglich über die Idee des Ichs nachdenkt. Transzendentaler Realismus ist die Lehre,

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[7] *Kiyoshi Mikis sämtliche Werke,* Bd. 2., S. 149f. Wie im Folgenden gezeigt wird, war die Philosophie der Geschichte mit der Logos-Pathos Theorie und der Logik der Einbildungskraft befürwortet. Vgl. Ryutaro Tamada, *Welcher Charakter hat das gegenwärtige Zeitalter?—Kritik zu Fichte von Kiyoshi Miki, NISHIDA Philosophie-Gesellschafts Jahresausgabe* 西田哲学会年報, Bd. 11, 2015, pp.92–107.

[8] *Kiyoshi Mikis sämtliche Werke,* Bd. 3., S. 46.

[9] *J. G. Fichte-Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,* I/2, S. 412.

die lediglich über den Gegenstand der Idee nachdenkt. Fichte will beide Ansichten in seiner Wissenschaftslehre verbinden. Fichte ergriff dieses in »das Geschäft der schaffenden Einbildungskraft«.[10] Aus der Perspektive »das Geschäft der schaffenden Einbildungskraft« von Fichte, will ich hauptsächlich Mikis Auslegung dazu, in *der Logik der Einbildungskraft* untersuchen.

2. Die Bestimmung der produktiven Einbildungskraft von Miki

Miki erwähnt die intellektuelle Anschauung im Artikel *Die Struktur der Erkenntnistheorie* (1929, in *Ideenmorphologie* 観念形態論 (1931)). Er schenkte seine Aufmerksamkeit dem Unterschied zwischen Kants und Fichtes Philosophie. Da Kant vom Standpunkt der Endlichkeit der Menschenexistenz ausgeht, ist er empfänglich für die menschliche Sinnlichkeit. Wenn ein Mensch vergänglich ist, kann das menschliche Denken auf »intuitivem Verstand« oder »intellektueller Anschauung« basieren. Das kann selbst den Inhalt der Erkenntnisproduzieren. Das führt zur Erkenntnis. Miki versteht, dass die Wissenschaftslehre von Fichte den Standpunkt der Menschenexistenz annimmt, der sich von Kants Philosophie unterscheidet. Fichtes Standpunkt kann den Konstruktivismus von Kant gründlich hervorheben.[11]

Weiterhin vertieft Miki sich in Überlegungen über den Standpunkt von Fichtes intellektueller Anschauung im Artikel *Erkenntnistheorie* (1930, in *Wissenphilosophie* 知識哲学 (1942)). Das Ich von Kant sollte nicht mit Gott identifiziert werden. Im Standpunkt von Kant Philosophie ist der Gegenstand der menschlichen Erkenntnis nur die Erfahrung und die Erkenntnis von »Ding an sich« ist für uns unmöglich. Die Form der menschlichen Erkenntnis gehört zu freiwilliger Tätigkeit im Denken. Aber das kann nicht selbst den Inhalt der Erkenntnis produzieren. Denken gehört vielmehr zur Intuition. Die Erkenntnis ist Synthese der Formen und des Inhalts. Die Intuition des vernünftigen Wesens ist empfänglich und sinnlich. Dagegen wird der Inhalt der Erkenntnis bei einer Intuition, die nicht empfänglich ist, produziert. Aber es muss gesagt werden, dass der Gegenstand so einer Intuition das »Ding an sich« ist. Kant nannte diese Fähigkeit »intellektuelle Anschauung« oder »intuitiver Verstand«. Solch eine Vereinigung von Sinnlichkeit und Verstand wird nicht vom Menschen aufgenommen, weil Sinnlichkeit und

[10] *J. G. Fichte-Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,* I/2, S. 414.
[11] *Kiyoshi Mikis sämtliche Werke,* Bd. 3., S. 422.

Verstand als Erkenntniskraft beim Menschen geteilt sind. Diese intellektuelle Anschauung ist eine von Gott. Miki vertritt die Auffassung, dass in dieser »intellektuellen Anschauung« die gemeinsamen und verborgenen Wurzeln von Sinnlichkeit und Verstand existieren. Kants Philosophie hat Gott zutiefst verinnerlicht und der Mensch trägt in sich Intelligenz und Sinnlichkeit. Die Philosophie von Fichte ordnete die Position Gottes dem Menschen zu und verstand Gott als absolutes Ich. Deshalb konnte in Fichtes Philosophie das Problem »des Dinges an sich« lösen. Fichtes Philosophie ist die Philosophie intellektueller Anschauung oder intuitiven Verstandes.[12]

Nach Miki vertrat Kant den Standpunkt von der Endlichkeit des menschlichen Geistes aber Fichte vertrat die Theorie der Unendlichkeit des menschlichen Geistes. Die Überprüfung, ob Mikis Verständnis von Fichtes Philosophie zutrifft, sollte sehr detailliert durchgeführt werden. Diesen Punkt verschiebe ich und will jetzt Mikis Verständnis von Fichtes Philosophie zu dem Begriff der »produktiven Einbildungskraft« in *die Logik der Einbildungskraft* Teil 20 »Erfahrung« (1943, Zeitschrift *Gedanke* 思想 Ankündigung) untersuchen.

Miki betrachtet die Bedeutung des Begriffes der »produktiven Einbildungskraft« in *Die Logik der Einbildungskraft* von Verbindung mit intuitivem Verstande wie folgt: intuitiver Verstand ist die Vereinigung von Intuition und Verstand, die im beschränkten menschlichen Standpunkt geteilt werden. Nach Kants Auslegung gibt die Intuition den Inhalt von der Erkenntnis und der Verstand gibt die Form von der Erkenntnis und beide werden geteilt. In anderen Worten ist Intuition »sinnlich« und Inhalt wird von Außen zu unserem Verstand getragen. Aber der intuitive Verstand produziert sich selbst diesen Inhalt. Wie über diese Vereinigung von Intuition und Verstand nachgedacht wird? Was für eine Antwort es auf diese Frage gibt? Dazu erinnert sich Miki an die Position der Einbildungskraft in Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre. [13] Miki bestimmt den Begriff der »produktiven Einbildungskraft« von Fichte in *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* wie folgt: Das Ich setzt sich für sich. Dagegen ist das gesetzte Nicht-Ich ein Objekt eher Ding an sich. Ein Objekt gibt es nur dem Subjekt gegenüber. Das Subjekt ist nur im Unterschied mit dem Objekt möglich. Das Ich setzt sich indirekt auf Objekt oder Subjekt. In diesem indirekten Setzen werden Subjekt und Objekt entgegengesetzt. Das Objekt resultiert aus der subjektiven Verneinung. Das Subjekt wird von objektiver Verneinung gesetzt. Durch subjektive Verneinung beschränkt sich das Ich

[12] *Ebd.,* Bd. 4., S. 48f.
[13] *Ebd.,* Bd. 8., S. 474.

auf seine Tätigkeit in sich selbst und wird Passiv. Das Ich muss diese Passivität mit dem Objekt als realer Grund in Verbindung bringen. Die unabhängige Vorstellung der Realität des Nicht-Ichs aus »Ich muss auftreten«. Miki nennt das indirektes Setzen, das Vorstellen oder das Einbilden.[14]

Fichtes Standpunkt der Wissenschaftslehre nach, ist das Nicht-Ich nicht als passiver realer Grund ins Ich gesetzt. Das Nicht-Ich gilt lediglich als Vorstellung oder Einbildung für den realen Grund. Das Nicht-Ich ist kein Ding an sich. Das Nicht-Ich ist realer Grund als notwendige Vorstellung des Ichs. Das Ich produziert notwendigerweise diese Vorstellung von sich selbst.

Das indirekte Setzen muss als Fähigkeit, Vorstellung zu produzieren, bestimmt werden. Nach Miki ist das die produktive Einbildungskraft von Fichte.[15]

Weiter untersucht Miki die Bedeutung des Begriffs der »produktiven Einbildungskraft« wie folgt: Das theoretische Ich fordert mit vollkommener Spontaneität, dass die Tätigkeit im Ich mit dem Objekt in Verbindung gebracht wird. Mit anderen Worten wird die Tätigkeit in diesem Ich zur gleichen Zeit beschränkt und ist unabhängig. Unabhängig zu sein heißt, dass diese Tätigkeit im Ich von niemandem beschränkt wird. Eher werden alle Sachen, von der Tätigkeit in diesem Ich beschränkt und gesetzt. Daher ist die unabhängige Tätigkeit im Ich notwendigerweise produktiv. Alle Dinge sind Produkte dieser Tätigkeit des Ichs. Beschränkt bedeutet hier, dass diese Tätigkeit im Ich einen Gegenstand haben muss, der auf diese eine Wirkung ausübt. Diese Tätigkeit des Ichs ist in der Hinsicht objektiv, indem sie ein Objekt hat. Dadurch, dass das Produkt der Tätigkeit im Ich zum gleichen Zeitpunkt Objekt der Tätigkeit in diesem Ich ist, wird die Forderung dieses theoretischen Ichs ermöglicht.[16] Wie sollten wir über diesen Punkt nachdenken?

Nach Miki erscheint das Objekt für das Ich als ein anderes Produkt. Daher muss die Tätigkeit im Ich die Tätigkeit sein, die das Produkt vom Ich selbst in Form anderer Produkte darstellt. Dies ist erst möglich, wenn wir eine unbewusste Produktionstätigkeit im Ich annehmen. Nach Miki kann mein Produkt als andere Produkte erscheinen, wenn ich meine Tätigkeit nicht über die unbewusste Produktionstätigkeit reflektiere und nichts von unbewusster Produktionstätigkeit weiß. Mit anderen Worten kann nur in unbewusster Produktionstätigkeit im Ich ein Produkt vom Ich selbst als andere Produkte erscheinen. Miki denkt, dass diese

[14] *Ebd.,* Bd. 8., S. 474f.
[15] *Ebd.,* Bd. 8., S. 475.
[16] *Ebd.,* Bd. 8., S. 475f.

unbewusste Produktionstätigkeit im Ich nichts anderes als produktive Einbildungskraft ist.[17]

Nach Miki liegt diese unbewusste Produktionstätigkeit als produktive Einbildungskraft im Grund des Bewusstseins und ist Bedingung der Möglichkeit des Bewusstseins. Das Bewusstsein schafft in sich die Voraussetzung für unbewusste Produktionstätigkeit in der produktiven Einbildungskraft. Das Bewusstsein wird dadurch ermöglicht. Weil das Bewusstsein erst durch die Reflektion der eigenen Tätigkeit, möglich wird, ist sich die Tätigkeit, die dieses Bewusstsein in Reflektion für die Tätigkeit in sich selbst produziert, nicht bewusst sein. Diese unbewusste Produktionstätigkeit ist produktive Einbildungskraft, die Bedingung des Bewusstseins ist. Deshalb ist diese produktive Einbildungskraft die Bedingung des theoretischen Ichs. Der Ausdruck theoretische Ichs heißt, dass das Ich sich selbst setzt, beschränkt durch das Nicht-Ich. Nach Miki ist das eine Handlung der produktiven Einbildungskraft. Es ist ungenügend, dass die Handlung Einbildungskraft genannt wird. Diese unbewusste Produktionstätigkeit als produktive Einbildungskraft muss für sich sein. Das Ich muss sich dieser Tätigkeit bewusst sein.[18]

Miki sagte, dass »intellektuelle Anschauung« oder »intuitiver Verstand« unmöglich zu sein scheint, ohne auf Einbildungskraft zu basieren. Nach Miki ist die Logik der Einbildungskraft, die er vorschlägt, anders als die Logik der intellektuellen Anschauung oder des intuitiven Verstandes. Die Philosophie der intellektuellen Anschauung ist im Grunde ein System der Theologie. Die Theologie der Logik der Vernunft ist formeller als die Logik der Einbildungskraft, die er vorschlägt. Mikis Logik der Einbildungskraft befindet sich in der Mitte zwischen der Logik des Verstandes und der Logik der Vernunft und ist die grundlegende Logik.

3. Mikis Gedanke, der vom Standpunkt des Triebes ausgesehen

Miki nimmt an, dass der wesentliche Ausgangspunkt der Philosophie von Fichte formell ist, und daher kritisiert er die Gedanken von Fichte. Aus einem betrachtenden Standpunkt scheint Miki, den Ausgangspunkt seiner Philosophie zu zeigen. Der kritische Standpunkt zu Fichtes Philosophie entsteht in Mikis Kritik des

[17] *Ebd.,* Bd. 8., S. 476.
[18] *Ebd.,* Bd. 8., S. 476f.

Begriffs von Tathandlung. Hier will ich Mikis Verstehen von Fichtes Philosophie von diesem Gesichtspunkt aus untersuchen.

Miki kritisiert die Überlegungen über den Standpunkt von Fichtes Tathandlung im Artikel *Begriff der Geschichte—Ein Kapitel der historischen Philosophie* (1931, in *Historische Philosophie* 歴史哲学 (1932)). Miki besteht hier auf dem Standpunkt »die Geschichte als die Tatsache«. Das ist anders als der Standpunkt des Ichs von Kant und der Tathandlung von Fichte. Durch das rein und praktisch Werden des Ichs von Kant ist die Tathandlung von Fichte zu erzielen, so Miki. Aber die Geschichte ist keine reine Tat, sondern eher Praxis, die mit Sinnlichem und Körperlichem verbunden ist. Die Geschichte ist nicht Tathandlung, sondern Tatsache. Die Geschichte bedeutet hier die Tat, die objektiver als die Handlung ist, und bedeutet auch die Sache, die objektiver als die Tat ist. In der Geschichte hat die Tat die Bedeutung der Sache. Eine Tat werde mit Sinnliches und Körperliches verbunden. In der Tat, die der Grund der Geschichte ist, hat eine Tat prompt die Bedeutung der Sache, und ist somit eine Tatsache. Die Sache hat auch wieder die Bedeutung von der Tat, und ist eine »*Tat*-sache«. Keine setzt die andere voraus. Eine Tat und eine Sache sind ein und das Selbe.[19]

Wenn wir diesen Standpunkt der Tatsache einnehmen, bekommt der Begriff des praktischen Niveaus, das etwas Sinnliches und Körperliches einschließt, eine wichtige Bedeutung. Wie hat Miki den praktischen Begriff des Triebes begriffen? Aus so einem praktischen Standpunkt, scheint mir der Begriff der produktiven Einbildungskraft für Mikis Begriff des Triebes geeignet zu sein. Ich will dieses, was ein Teil des Studiums von Mikis späteren Jahren ist, untersuchen.

Miki schrieb über menschlichen Trieb in seiner posthumen Arbeit *Philosophische Anthropologie* 哲学的人間学 (unfertig, 1933–37) folgendes. Man sagt »menschlich-tierischer Trieb«, aber dieser Ausdruck ist nicht geeignet. Der Mensch hat keinen »tierischen Trieb« und hat nur »menschlichen Trieb«. Der menschliche Trieb ist dämonisch, und wird personifiziert. Grundsätzlich ist der Mensch eine Art Tier, aber er ist auch gleichzeitig etwas jenseits des Tieres. Ein Mensch ist dieses »Medium« und man muss sagen, dass der menschliche Trieb eine

[19] *Ebd.,* Bd. 6., S. 32ff. Laut Fichte, ist der Ausgangspunkt der Fichteschen Wissenschaftslehre das reine Subjekt, das Selbstbewusstsein, oder das Ich. Das »Ich bin« ist für Philosophen allerdings keinesfalls eine bloße Gegebenheit. Es ist nur als Tätiges, frei Selbsttätiges. Das Ich ist keine Tatsache, es ist vor allem Tathandlung. Den Tatsachen gehen prinzipiell immer die Tathandlungen voraus. Die Tatsachen sind Resultate von Handlungen. Letztlich bestimmt nicht die Sache die Handlung, sondern diese bestimmt die Sache. Vgl. *J. G. Fichte-Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,* I/2 S.255–264.

solche Funktion besitzt. Es gehört zu grundlegender Erfahrung in unserem Wirklichkeitsleben, dass ein Mensch »Medium« ist. »Die verschiedenen Arten von Philosophie sind nur theoretische Auslegung dieser wesentlichen Erfahrung«.[20] Der Standpunkt, um dem Trieb die Bestimmtheit eines Mediums oder einer Mitte zu geben, scheint bei Fichte gleich zu sein.

Weiter schrieb Miki über den menschlichen Trieb in *Eine Einführung zu Philosophie* 哲学入門 (1940) wie folgt. Etwas Ausdrückendes erinnert sich an unsere Tat. Tat und Ausdruck sind ähnlich. Ein Subjekt steht einem anderen Subjekt als etwas Ausdrückendes gegenüber. Die Relation der Tat ist die Relation des Ausdruckes. Ausdruck bedeutet, dass Subjekt und Objekt ein und das Selbe sind. Wir werden wirklich subjektiv, indem wir bloße Subjektivität bestreiten. Dies hat die Bedeutung der Transzendenz. Etwas im Ausdruck ausgedrücktes muss nicht nur Immanenz, sondern Transzendenz oder Idee sein. Die menschliche Existenz gibt es an der Stelle, wo etwas durch Transzendenz vermittelt wird, ist wahre Immanenz des Ichs. Aber es bedeutet nicht nur, dass die Ausdruckshandlung von der Vernunft (Logos) verursacht wird, sondern auch dass es etwas Dämonisches oder großes Pathos (Gefühl) geben muss, das in der Wurzel unserer Ausdruckshandlung ist. Etwas Dämonisches ist wie etwas Sinnliches auf Unendlichkeit. Ein Mensch ist wie Transzendenz nicht nur in Vernunft, sondern auch in all seiner Existenz. Es gibt einen dämonischen unendlichen Trieb in der Weltwurzel. Dieses Pathos ist keine Einschränkung aber die Ausdruckshandlung ist eine beschränkende Handlung. Deshalb muss die Idee von diesem Pathos getragen werden. Die Absicht, die das unendliche Sehnen nach einer Begrenzung oder einer Idee in sich haben muss, ist nichts anderes als das Streben nach einer Idee. Idee in diesem Ausdruck ist etwas, was aus dem Pathos geboren ist. Also, es ist nicht etwas Abstraktes und Rationales, sondern etwas Emotionales und Rationales. Es ist nicht einfach etwas Objektives, sondern etwas Objektives und Subjektives. Die Idee wird von einer Tat gesehen. Sie kommt nicht vor der Geschichte, sondern erscheint in der Geschichte. Etwas wirkliche Historisches ist nicht nur etwas Historisches, sondern auch die Einheit von etwas Historischem und etwas jenseits der Geschichte.[21]

Der Standpunkt, wo nach es im Trieb unendliches Streben gibt, ist dem Gedanken Fichtes gleich. Die Einsicht, dass etwas wirklich Historisches die Einheit von etwas Historischem und etwas jenseits der Geschichte ist, ist geeignet für Fichtes Denkweise. Diese Denkweise beobachtet etwas vom einheitlichen und

[20] *Kiyoshi Mikis sämtliche Werke,* Bd. 18., S. 131f.
[21] *Ebd.,* Bd. 7., S. 163ff.

grundlegenden Standpunkt aus, wie der Urtrieb um den reinen Trieb und Naturtrieb zu vereinheitlichen. Wenn ich auf diese Weise Mikis Bestimmung zum Begriff des Triebes ansehe, versuche ich den Aspekt zwischen Trieb und produktiver Einbildungskraft zu erklären. Die produktive Einbildungskraft ist ein theoretischer Begriff und der Trieb ist ein praktischer Begriff. Das Erste ist eine Handlung der Stufen des Bewußtseins oder der Vorstellung, und das Letzte ist eine Handlung der Stufen des Ausdruckes oder der Taten. Produktive Einbildungskraft bedeutet die Seite der Produktion von der Idee und der Handlung des Bewusstseins für sich. Trieb ist die Seite der Produktion von der Idee und des endlosen Strebens zu einer Idee.

Nachwort

Mikis Gedanken und Fichtes Gedanken unterscheiden sich nur oberflächlich, nähern sich jedoch im wesentlichen an. Mikis Überlegungen über den Unterschied von Kant und Fichte in *Eine Einführung zu Philosophie* scheint nicht als Kritik dazu, sondern ist als eine Haltung zur Neubewertung für Fichtes Philosophie zu betrachten. Fichte versteht einen Menschen als etwas Unendliches auf dem Standpunkt von Gott. Aber nach Kants Standpunkt ist Sinnlichkeit empfänglich und nimmt menschliche Endlichkeit an. Wenn, laut Fichte, ein Mensch unendlich ist, kann unser Denken »intuitiver Verstand« oder »intellektuelle Anschauung« von Kant sein, den Inhalt und die Form der Erkenntnis durch sich selbst produzieren. Nach Miki vertritt Fichte diesen Standpunkt. Aber Mikis Standpunkt ist nicht der von Fichte oder Kant. Der Standpunkt von Miki ist wie folgt. Ein Mensch ist nicht endlich. Da ein Mensch nicht bloß beschränkt ist, kann er die Wahrheit erkennen. Wahrheit befreit einen Menschen von Endlichkeit. In diesem Sinn ist ein Mensch unendlich und endlich zur gleichen Zeit.[22] Wie in Teil 1 dieses Artikels gezeigt wurde, ist dies auch Fichtes Standpunkt. Auf diese Art scheint sich Mikis Gedanke, nach seiner marxistischen Periode und in seinen späteren Jahren, oberflächlich von Fichtes Gedanke zu unterscheiden, ist jedoch im wesentlichen ähnlich.

Warum wird angenommen, dass Mikis und Fichtes Gedanken sich im wesentlichen annähern? Miki betrachtet den Ausgangspunkt seiner Philosophie in *Philosophienotizbuch* 哲学ノート (1941, im 1939 die Serie *Intelligenz* 知性) wie folgt. Der Ausgangspunkt unserer Philosophie ist ein praktischer Mensch. Praxis

[22] *Ebd.,* Bd. 7., S. 93f.

heißt dass ein unabhängiges Wesen mit einem anderen unabhängigen Wesen in Verbindung gebracht wird. Der Mensch, der eine Tat begeht, hat einen Körper. Was bedeutet, dass es ein Ding gibt? Es bedeutet, dass es ein Ding nicht nur außerhalb des Bewusstseins, sondern auch außerhalb eines Körpers geben muss. Auf diese Weise ist das Ding unabhängig. Dass wir etwas machen, heißt dass eine unabhängige Sache außerhalb unseres Physischen entsteht. Die Unabhängigkeit des Individuums ist eine Voraussetzung für Praxis. Aber wenn wir eine Tat vollbringen, dann gibt es uns immer auf der Welt. Das Subjekt, über das außerhalb irgendeiner Welt nachgedacht wird, ist kein praktisches Subjekt. Ein Mensch, der eine Tat begeht, ist immer ein bestimmter Mensch auf der Welt, in der Natur, und besonders in der Gesellschaft. Der praktische Mensch ist ein gesellschaftlicher Mensch. Wenn wir einen praktischen Standpunkt annehmen, dann ist es nach Miki die klarste Tatsache, dass ein Individuum zum gleichen Zeitpunkt unabhängig und gesellschaftlich ist. Aber dies wird in der Philosophie am häufigsten vergessen.[23] Mikis Probleminteresse an menschlicher Leiblichkeit und Gesellschaftlichkeit scheint den gleichen Pfad wie Fichtes praktisches Probleminteresse zu gehen, weil Fichte die Theorie des Naturrechts und der Sittenlehre, auf das Prinzip der Wissenschaftslehre basierend, entwickelte. Miki wollte die Originalität seiner Philosophie zeigen. Deshalb untersuchte er verschiedene Philosophien. Als Ergebnis scheint er Fichtes praktischer Philosophie näher zu kommen. Das Interesse am Problem des besonderen menschlichen Triebes war grundlegend für seine Philosophie. Sein Interesse am Bewußtsein der Sünde, die ein Mensch nicht vermeiden kann, führt ihn dazu im menschlichen Trieb etwas Dämonisches, zu begreifen.

Miki erwägt das Problem, was für eine Bedeutung das Bewusstsein der Sünde hat in seinen posthumen Werken *Shinran* 親鸞 (unfertig, 1943–45).[24] Das Bewusstsein der Sünde bedeutet das Selbstbewusstsein von Ki 機.[25] Ki ist das

[23] *Ebd.,* Bd. 10., S. 459f.

[24] Shinran 親鸞 (1173–1263) war ein buddhistischer Mönch, der am turbulenten Ende der Heian-Zeit in Kyoto geboren wurde. Er lebte während der Kamakura-Periode. Shinran war ein Schüler von Honen 法然 (1133–1212) und der Gründer der Jodo Shinshu-Sekte.

[25] Ki 機 bedeutet hier das Bewusstsein, dass ich eine Person bin, die durch die Lehren Buddhas erleichtert werden muss. Der Ausgangspunkt der Überlegungen von Miki gilt immer für die tägliche grundlegende Erfahrung im menschlichen Leben. Diese fußen auf dem historischen Bewusstsein und dem Bewusstsein der schlechten Person in *Shinran*. Vgl. Ryutaro Tamada, *Kiyoshi Mikis Konvertierung, Menschenontologie* 人間存在論 Bd. 22,

Menschenwesen, aus dem das Selbstbewusstsein kam. Wenn ich die Existenz als das selbstbewusste Wesen definiere, dann bin ich nichts als eine menschliche Existenz mit Ki. Als ein

Ganzes kenne ich mich nicht, wenn ich mich im Selbstbewusstsein kenne. In diesem Fall muss es eine Teilung des Ichs, das bewusst ist, und des Ichs, das bekannt wurde, geben. Das Ich, das geteilt wurde, muss nicht allgemein, sondern partiell sein.

In diesem Fall könnte man sagen, dass das Ich, welches in der Subjektivität und Objektivität nicht geteilt ist, als unbewusstes oder selbst-unbewusstes Ich gesehen werden kann und großer als das selbstbewusste Ich ist. Miki behauptete, dass das praktische und tierische Ich großer als das intellektuelle und menschliche Ich sei.[26]

Mikis Überlegungen in seinen späteren Jahren scheinen basierend auf eine Prüfung von Fichtes Philosophie entwickelt worden zu sein. Können wir daraus den Gedanken des Bösen von Kant und Fichte, etwas, was dämonisch ist, lesen? Vielleicht ist eine ausführliche Prüfung dieses Problems notwendig. Aber es weist auf die Größe der Rolle hin, die Fichtes Philosophie für Mikis Gedankenformung hatte. Miki versuchte neue Gedankengänge basierend auf Fichtes und Kants Philosophie zu entwickeln.

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Nishida on the Problem of the Religious and the Secular

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Abstract: *Nishida Kitarō's view of religion (shūkyō 宗教), as both an epistemological standpoint and as an ontological category, can be read as a form of resistance against the totalizing functions of the secular as theorized within European modernity. Unlike European modernity, which positioned religion on the side of delusion and superstition, Nishida believes that the defining logic of religion, a logic of affirmation* qua *negation, constitutes the structure of historical creativity, and therefore, a necessary vector for personal and cultural transformation. What I will show in this paper is how Nishida problematizes the European notion of the secular as a universal category by putting forth a view of the global world that depends on the logic of religion for its development. Nishida argues that secularization within European history seeks to transcend religious traditions and heritages and to shift the historical world in the direction of scientific rationality. But in the drift towards secularism, as Nishida argues, is the foreclosure of religion as a mode of inquiry that could otherwise bring the particulars of the historical world into what he calls a 'world-historical standpoint' (*sekaishiteki tachiba *世界史的立場)—a global world where this is a proliferation of cultural, ethnic, and individual differences that exist dialogically, without any consolidated core or center. The implication of Nishida's critique of the secular standpoint is that if religion remains subordinate to the secular in a global world, then there is no possibility for this unity-in-diversity, there is only the de facto universalization of European categories and logic, which can set the stage for another cycle of European colonialism.*

Introduction

The intellectual pressures of the secular within European modernity to discard religion in favor of purer scientific accounts of historical reality affected how Nishida would view the development of a global world. Not unlike Kant and Hegel,

who sought to resist the totalizing functions of the secular by making room for religion in the modern period, Nishida also would seek to manage the tensions of the secular-religion divide, but more in the service of re-asserting religion as a logic that structures the formation of what he calls the "world-historical standpoint" (*sekaishiteki tachiba* 世界史的立場). It is true that while Nishida did not have all that much to say about what we call the secular or about how it fits into the dialectics of historical life, in Nishida's "The Logic of Place and the Religious Worldview" (1945) (*Bashoteki ronri to shūkyōteki sekaikan* 場所的論理と宗教的世界観),[1] one can find a few passages where he begins to think about the problem of the secular as a universal category or a universal standpoint. The argument that is advanced in *Bashoteki ronri to shūkyōteki sekaikan* is that a celebration of the secular carries within itself an intellectual foundation of rationality that has this tendency to reify itself, and therefore universalize its own standpoint, while negating religion and thus deny an opportunity for the cultures, races, or ethnicities of the historical world to realize their own self-contradictory identity and to assert themselves on a global scale. In other words, Nishida's argues against a universalization of the secular because a world-historical formation based on a secular standpoint would foreclose religion as a logic that could liberate each cultural particular from its own parochialism and to move the historical world toward a more inclusive, pluralistic, and cosmopolitan space.

Nishida's Influence: The Hegelian Resistance to the Religion-Secular Binary

The way Nishida formulates the problem of the secular-religion binary can be traced back to Hegel—who, not unlike Nishida, did not think of the age of Enlightenment as the pinnacle of creative and intellectual thought. In fact, Hegel saw the Enlightenment period as far too extreme in its projection of religion, because it held a crude representation of religious consciousness. What Hegel argued was that the Enlightenment thinkers instead relegated faith to the image of a cult following superstitious and magical rituals to invoke the presence of a divine. Within the context of Enlightenment rationality, religious belief was viewed as the opposite of reason, and as such, thought of as something that must be driven out of

[1] Nishida Kitarō, *Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious Worldview*, trans. David Dilworth (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii, 1987).

the collective consciousness.[2] Therefore, the committed effort to fix the errors and self-delusion of religious consciousness, if anything, exemplifies the arrogance and hostility of Enlightenment rationality. Here, Hegel points to how the notion of absolute freedom, as manifested in Robespierre's fury of destruction within the French Revolution, represents the vulgarity and violence of an ahistorical and abstract reason that misunderstands itself.[3]

Hegel conceded that the Enlightenment critique of religious belief was not completely unfounded though either. The practice of faith within religious consciousness has indeed failed to provide external evidence for much of its beliefs, and so if faith results in putting too much trust in some doctrine or creed, then the power of religious beliefs crumble in the face of any empirical evidence that contradicts its worldview.[4] But how does Hegel continue the spin of the dialectic if both religious belief and Enlightenment rationality are not sufficient in themselves to move towards a higher synthesis? Hegel reasoned that in order to reach the absolute one must sublate the opposing contradictions into a new level of thought that incorporates aspects of the other. This means that reconciliation between opposing contradictions is possible only by saving certain ideals of each opposing consciousness. Thus, in terms of overcoming the religion-secular divide, Hegel believed that the ideals of the French Revolution—liberty, equality, and fraternity—can only be recuperated if reason is situated within the frame of God. The same is true on the other end as well: religious consciousness can be rescued from the assault of reason if it were to adopt a more philosophical outlook.[5] Since Hegel rejected Aristotle's law of non-contradiction, the goal of the dialectic becomes not so much a negation of one form over another, to avoid being challenged on grounds of being a contradictory form, but rather a unification of the opposites in a way that captures the 'missing relata' in each sphere of thought. In order to each the end of the dialectic then, Hegel's logical synthesis via 'negativity of negativity' becomes the content that was masked in the representation of the other.

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[2] G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. AV Miller (New York City, NY: Oxford University Press, 1977), 329–330.
[3] Jürgen Stolzenberg, "Hegel's Critique of the Enlightenment in 'The Struggle of the Enlightenment with Superstition'", in *The Blackwell Guide to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, ed. Kenneth Westphal (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 204.
[4] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 337–338, 577–578.
[5] Ibid., 348–349.

But why does each structure of consciousness fall short in constituting the totality of spirit? Or why does each consciousness conceal some aspect of reality? The answer Hegel provided was in the notion of alienation. While the engine of creative development resides in the experience of alienation, if there is too much, self-deception takes place. In fact, Hegel argued that the self-deception of the Enlightenment emerges in its casting of religion as a foreign consciousness: in its characterization of reason, the Enlightenment fools itself into thinking that it is autonomous from the delusion of religious faith instead of realizing that it is its inverted mirror image. As Hegel explains:

> . . . here Enlightenment is foolish; faith regards it as not knowing what it is saying, and not understanding the real facts when it talks about priestly deception and deluding the people. It talks about this as if by some hocus-pocus of conjuring priests consciousness had been palmed off with something absolutely *alien* and '*other*' to it in place of its own essence. . . [6]

What Hegel is suggesting here is that to overcome this self-deception, the Enlightenment itself must recognize its own relationship to religion—not as an expression of antagonism but as an expression of each consciousness subsuming the other. God is not separate from the world, but conceived as immanent within the world, revealing itself within nature and history.[7]

Hegel's attempt to overcome the secular-religious divide tells us a little bit about the philosophical terminology Nishida was playing with, given the influence Hegel had on Nishida's dialectical thought. One serious difference between the dialectics deployed by both Hegel and Nishida that needs to be pointed out here is that Nishida would convert Hegel's dialectical method from a process of temporalized synthesis that moves into a higher, elevated form of self-awareness to a process of affirmation *qua* negation where the interrelations of autonomous opposites determine themselves through mutual self-negation—a system of logic Nishida scholars now call "place dialectics". Thus, the absolute for Nishida is not a linear totality that moves beyond opposing determinations by subsuming them, as it is for Hegel, but a process of infinite deepening among all the opposing expressions in relationship—as a kind of "dialectical unity-in-opposition" if you will. In view of this difference in the dialectical formation, one is able to see that Nishida does

[6] Ibid., 335.
[7] Frederick Beiser, *Hegel* (New York and London: Routledge, 2005), 142–146.

not agree with Hegel's push to "unite" reason and religion in the movement towards a more self-aware history, because such a configuration fails to consider the place that structures the infinite self-contradictions comprising the process of historical creativity. Like Hegel, Nishida would situate all creative formations—artistic, moral, or rational—within a God that is the ground of all reality, but the movement towards self-awareness in the "unity" of self and God does not consist of a scaffolding made up of stools that allows one to peek through the eyes of God, it is a return to the primordial awareness of self *qua* God as a contradictory identity through the very act of uncovering oneself as living and dying as God, and vice versa. In this regard, Nishida would claim that Hegel's dialectical logic does not go far enough in rendering a historical reality that is constituted through the act of self-negation. The overcoming of the problem of the secular-religion divide then is not a problem of "historical necessity", where progress depends on sublating opposites to obtain a view of reality that is free from rational errors, thus accepting the rational base of the secular as the end point in the dialectic.[8] The problem is one of "existential necessity", where seeing and thinking reality as clearly as possible depends on seeing oneself as an absolute contradictory form. Now how Nishida problematizes the secular as a universal category and seeks to overcome the binary through this dialectical logic is what I will discuss next.

Nishida Critique of Secular Standpoint

To get a sense of how Nishida problematizes the secular standpoint, we must clarify his notion of religion. Throughout his early writings, as well as into the middle years, Nishida referenced religion as a logic of awareness that is more concrete than scientific objectivity because it has greater immediacy to the real. It is no coincidence then, as Nishida would suggest, that the logic of self-awareness embodies the same logic that articulates the dialectical structure of historical reality—what Nishida would describe in his later years as the 'logic of absolute contradictory identity'. In Nishida's last major writing though, this view of religion as both an epistemological standpoint and an ontological category becomes crystallized, where God becomes framed as this incarnated logic of contradictory self-identity expressed in and as historical life. Here, Nishida is referring to God

[8] Espen Hammer, "Hegel as a Theorist of Secularization", in *Hegel Bulletin* 34, 2 (2013): 223–224.

not as an absolute being that transcends the universe, as found in much of Christianity, but rather as a dialectical relationship between a dynamic ultimate and the spiritual events that reaches the soul of the particular. What this means is that God expresses itself in the everyday life, as part of the experienced reality, and that the particular, as a subject living and dying in the historical world, "always encounters the absolute as the paradox of God himself—as the self-negation of the absolute One".[9] To put it another way, there is a point of convergence within the infinite depth of religious awareness where there is no distinction between self and God living and dying. Within this context one can see how Nishida positions religion as not so much a confession of faith or belief in a divine being or beings, especially since God, as a kind of metaphor for the dynamic structure of historical life, can never transcend the world, because God is always an expression of the world-in-becoming. Hence Nishida would say that God is "neither theism, nor deism, neither spiritualism nor naturalism; it is historical",[10] and that "the more the self is a consciously active individual, the more it faces God".[11]

For Nishida, God, as an incarnated logic of contradictory self-identity, means that the realization of self *qua* God works in the manner of absolute negation. This is because a true absolute cannot be anything other than that which contain its own self-negation. If an absolute merely transcends the relative, or merely negates relative nothingness, then it is not a true absolute. Such an absolute becomes only an abstraction. But if God relates to itself in the form of self-contradiction, then the negation of this relative nothingness opens one up to the place of absolute nothing, a place of self-seeing or self-mirroring that brings forth more self-awareness of the historical world, because "God must possess negation within himself in order to express himself".[12] The point of structuring religion as an epistemological and ontological logic of contradictory identity instantiates Nishida's justification for deploying religion as a proper critique. That is to say, if religion is paradoxical in structure, then Kant's object-logic or Aristotle's grammatical subject fall short in being able to grasp and clarify the transformative logic of affirmation *qua* negation that is articulated in the principles of religion. The central task within generating a philosophical standpoint, as Nishida believes, is to begin from a stance that places the logic of religion as the structural and existential foundation for all historical

[9] Nishida Kitarō, *Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious* Worldview, 95.
[10] James Heisig, *Philosophers of Nothingness* (Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 102.
[11] Nishida Kitarō, *Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious Worldview,* 95.
[12] Ibid., 71.

creativity—only at that point is it clear that divorcing religion from any facet of historical life is not only problematic, but an impossibility.

Nishida's logic of historical creativity not only refers to the creative formations of the world in the intellectual and artistic sense, but to the religiosity of the historical world as well. Nishida suggests as such when he says, "insofar as the self is a historical reality born from the historical world, acting in the historical world, and dying to the historical world, it must be religious. We should speak in this way in respect of the ground of the self".[13] On one hand, Nishida is resisting a compartmentalization of society and religion and/or history and religion, because "every historically crystallized society begins from a religious ground",[14] and so "every historical epoch is religious in its ground",[15] but on the other hand, Nishida is also clarifying the "ontological relationship" between society and religion, because in one aspect of things, religion should be understood as part of everything humans do. But not everything can be described as religious as such, because while everyone is implaced in the world of the absolute, as part of the creative expression(s) of God, not all actions are reducible or leads to what Nishida describes as religious experience or religious awareness. The deepest of the religious forms, as Nishida describes it, arises more in the awareness of historical life as this practice of self-negation. In other words, self-determination always begins from one's action-intuition implaced in the social historical world; and while all insight into one's formation of self-awareness is to some extent religious, because the ground of historical creativity is an expression of the absolute spirit, it is not necessarily the deepest form of uncovering the religiosity of the historical world. Rather, the deepest religious insight one can have derives more from what Nishida calls 'inverse correspondence'—this relational revealment of self and God through mutual self-negation, where God is realized only in the death of the ego, or in the death of the self. What Zen calls "seeing into one's true nature" is part of this confrontation with God *qua* this awareness of selflessness, and it is in this mutual self-negation of self and God where there is a transformation of the self and an uncovering of religion in historical life.[16]

But how does this relate to the problem of the secular standpoint? The context in which the term secularism first arises within Nishida's *Bashoteki ronri to*

[13] Ibid., 109.
[14] Ibid., 116.
[15] Ibid., 98.
[16] John Krummel. "The Originary Wherein: Heidegger and Nishida on 'the Sacred' and 'the Religious,'" in *Research in Phenomenology* 40, 3 (2010): 394.

shūkyōteki sekaikan was in a discussion around Western modernity and its vision of a global world. According to Nishida, modern European culture identified secularization as a form of progress, and within the process of secularization, there was a re-casting of the national, racial, and cultural identity within Europe. But what this seems to mean for Nishida is that the process of secularization demanded a renunciation of old religious traditions, in favor of moving towards a universalization of scientific discourse as the ideal mode of inquiry for shaping the intellectual landscape of the global world. Nishida writes:

> In the dawn of history, the human world was predominantly spatial. The races existed in spatial contemporaneity, or merely side by side, as it were. The world of the absolute present, dormant in its temporal axis, was not self-transforming and the human world was not yet world-historical. . . . In that instance, the old worlds lose their specific traditions, become anti-individual, abstractly universal, anti-religious, and scientific. We see this process of secularization in the "progress" of modern European culture. As an absolute's affirmation through its own negation, such a negative moment contributes to the direction of the world's transformation.[17]

As argued here, the secularization that took root in European modernity sets the stage to view the world in an abstract universal language that uses scientific discourse to positions itself against religion—a point Nishida also discusses earlier in the essay:

> Indeed, some philosophers even pride themselves in taking a contrary position. Religion, they say, is unscientific and illogical, or at most something subjectively mystical. . . .Religion, we are told, is a kind of narcotic. . . .However, even though I do not consider myself competent to speak about religion to others, I cannot follow those who say they do not understand religion because it is unscientific and illogical.[18]

Nishida is claiming that while Western secularism had thought of itself as having 'transcended', progressed, or moved beyond its own particular historical determination in the shift towards a global world, the reality is that Western

[17] Nishida Kitarō, *Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious Worldview,* 117.
[18] Ibid., 47–48.

secularism is just a superficial realization, because it is merely a particular assuming itself to be a universal. In this regard, there is nothing truly special about Western secularism, because it is only a historical particular, among many others.

The other point that Nishida is making here is that leaving tradition and religion on the shelves of history become an act of determination that masks one's own religious history. This is because while the old world (here, meaning religious traditions) that did form part of the modern European world was negated in the secular formation, it never stopped playing a role in its constitution, since underlying the secular standpoint is the logic of religion as its structural foundation. Nishida writes: "But the absolute does not transcend the relative. . . . And therefore the negation of the old worlds is included within the historical world's self-formative development".[19] That is, Nishida argues that if the basis of all creative formations within historical reality is religion, then the secular as well reproduces the religious structure grounding the historical world. To put it another way, while modern European culture has told the story to itself that it had generated a scientific culture in order to overcome its primitive or religious past, what is ultimately obscured in this story is how science itself, as another creative formation in the world, is actually religious in its foundation. As Nishida writes:

> But the world of science is still a human product, even as a form of the historical world's self-negation. Therefore science is also a form of culture. . . . In religious language, it is the fact that God sees himself through his own self-negation. In this sense the world of science may also be said to be religious. Kepler's astronomy, for example, is said to have been religious in inspiration.[20]

But while science is religion, religion is not exclusively science. This is because there is a self-deception that underlies the desire for transcendence within the scientific pursuit, because "from the abstractly theoretical standpoint of scientific discourse, God possesses himself through self-negation", and so "we can also speak, in Hegel's terms, of the world of the spirit that is alienated from itself".[21] In other words, the alienation baked into the mythology of the secular, in the story that it

[19] Ibid., 117–118.
[20] Ibid., 118.
[21] Ibid., 118.

tells itself that it has overcome the problem of religion, functions as this self-deception, because it disguises the place from which science emerges.

But in the very disguising of this ground is where the heart of the problem begins to emerge, because the logic of religion, as a necessary mode for personal and cultural transformation, remains invisible in this narrative. According to Nishida, a more historically aware world order is one where the content of God's own self-affirmation becomes uncovered through self-negation, where there is a mutual revealment of culture and religion to the point of knowing that a "true culture must be religious and [a] true religion must be cultural".[22] Here, Nishida is not suggesting a conflation of culture and religion, where both melt into each other as such, leaving no distinctions behind, nor is this a frame that secretly prioritizes one category over the other, where religion negates culture or where culture negates religion, leaving one of the categories in a privileged position. Instead, one can read this relationship within Nishida's logic of religion, this logic that confers the self-realization of cultural history from within the standpoint of religious awareness as an absolutely contradictory identity. In other words, as the basis of cultural realization that can move each particular towards a world-historical standpoint is religion as the self-contradictory logic of affirmation *qua* negation, immanence *qua* transcendence, and/or one *qua* many, because in order to arrive at a more self-aware view of itself in the historical world, one must express themselves culturally through the religious standpoint of self-negation, and not allow for a singular religion to negate culture, like the way Hegel's philosophy allowed for a slippage of the Christian view of God to operate as the ontological structure of history.[23]

Keep in mind that in this movement towards a world-historical standpoint, Nishida argues that it is not the nation-states themselves that must take the lead, but rather the multiplicity of cultures that make up the historical world.[24] In fact, as early as in *Zen no Kenkyu* (1911) (善の研究), Nishida puts forth the case that the nation-state is not the final goal of a particular's historical and ethical mission, but is rather a transitional development, until something greater is realized.[25] Therefore, the nation-state is merely a vehicle for a cultural particular to realize, articulate, and express its "true personality"—or, rather, its "ethical mission" in the global world. It is clear from this stance then, unlike the secular view that discourages religion from participating in the affairs of the nation-state, the logic of religion should

[22] Ibid., 118.
[23] In fact, Hegel believed that Christianity, in particular, represents the highest form of religious awareness. Robert Stern, Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 191.
[24] Feenberg, "Experience and Culture: Nishida's Path 'To the Things Themselves'", 41.
[25] Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎, *Zen no Kenkyu* 善の研究 (Nagoya 名古屋: Chisokudō Publications, 2016), 140–141.

inform and structure the moral politics of the nation-state as it transitions towards a global world. In this regard, Nishida positions the operations of the nation-state within the structural logic of religion. While a distinction must be made between a nation-state and religion because a nation-state alone cannot liberate its own citizens, in the end though, the nation-state must act in accordance to the logic of religion, functioning only as the moral figurehead of its citizens. As Nishida writes:

> Each nation is a world that contains the self-expression of the absolute within itself. . . . In this sense, the nation is religious. The form of the historical world's self-formation that is religious in its ground is that of the nation. Yet I do not say that the nation itself is the absolute. The nation is the fountainhead of morality, but not of religion. As the nation is a form of the absolute's own self-formation, our moral actions must reflect a national character; but the nation does not save our souls. The true nation has its ground in the religious. A religious person, in his moral behavior, must naturally be a citizen of a nation as something historically formative. And yet the two standpoints must always be distinguished as well. If they are not, the pure development of each, religion and morality, will be obstructed, regressing into the "medieval" identity of the two.[26]

Nishida is suggesting that the logic of religion embeds the public sphere by framing and shaping the moral sensibility of a particular culture through the guide of the nation-state. But a culture that seeks to fully realize itself morally is one that self-negates, which is why in the end a "true nation has its ground in the religious".

Finally, Nishida warns not to return to a view of religion from the standpoint of rationality, which has historically relegated religion as a vector for self and moral transformation. This is because, if a modern, global world negates religion in favor of a secular standpoint, then humanity, the world, and so on, is at risk of losing a "true self" within the entire process. Nishida writes:

> When mankind, however, maximizes the human standpoint in a non-religious form, in a purely secular fashion, the result is that the world negates itself, and mankind loses itself. This has been the trend of European culture since the Renaissance, and the reason that such a thing as the decline and fall of the West has been proclaimed.[27]

[26] Nishida, *Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious Worldview*, 122.
[27] Ibid., 119.

But what is particularly concerning Nishida here is the universalization of the secular standpoint, of the "non-religious form", because it leaves no room for the development of a "true culture"—meaning, a culture that encourages its own historical self-awakening. In the same paragraph, Nishida writes:

> When the world loses itself and the human beings come to forget God, mankind becomes boundlessly individual and selfish. The world then becomes mere play or struggle, and the possibility of a true culture is undermined. The condition of mere secular culture ultimately loses all sense of true culture.[28]

This raises issues for the future: that is, if religion is foreclosed and the secular is universalized, then there is no road to a "global culture", or a formation of cultures that form what Nishida calls a "world-historical standpoint" (*sekaishiteki tachiba* 世界史的立場). This is because the resuscitation of reason at the expense of the logic of religion embodies the risk of reifying the self and world as objects outside each other. The "world then becomes mere play or struggle" because, from the standpoint of this subject-object binary, the world becomes viewed as something that conflicts with the self vis-à-vis something that the self is co-immanent with. Instead of self-negation operating as the point of departure into one's self-awareness, a secular culture starts from the position of cathection, where the atomized self (the particular) is converted into an object that must be protected from the struggle of existence. The world from this viewpoint becomes seen as a world of conflict, a world of "rational competition". In short, there is a creative loss in the universalization of the secular, because instead of truly learning from one another, the self reifies itself and the culture it belongs to, and then begins to privilege its own standpoint above all else.

By no means should one interpret Nishida as a reactionary, nor a romantic, inviting a return to the Middle Ages, because of his friendly posturing towards religion. In fact, Nishida argues that while history is cyclical by nature, the creative formations of the historical world cannot repeat themselves in any objective way, and so every arising historical moment is a new creation. Contemporarily speaking then, since the modern period is unique and particular, in that its development had arose of the Middle Ages out of historical necessity, there is no reason to advocate

[28] Ibid.

for anything other than for the creation of a new cultural direction in the world to come. As Nishida writes:

> It is not possible to return to the standpoint of medieval culture; nor can medieval culture be the factor that saves modern culture. A new cultural direction has now to be sought. A new mankind must be born. . . . In other words, we advance in the direction that sees God as self-negation. But to move in a merely immanent human direction would again result in the world's losing itself and mankind's negating itself. I thus maintain that we must proceed by the logic of absolutely contradictory identity—that is, of transcending immanently. This immanent transcendence is the road to a new global culture.[29]

Instead, Nishida is hoping that the global world aims to "advance in the direction that sees God as self-negation," where historical life sees the foundation of the real as immanently transcendent and as inherently self-contradictory. Only then can the particulars of a historical reality are able to truly realize itself as part of a world that is less parochial than what came before, a global world, if you will, where each particular seeks to carry out its own ethical mission, so that a world-system of mutual differences and co-relativity can be found and maintained.

Conclusion: Religion in the Global World

What I tried to show in this paper was how Nishida seeks to resist secularization as a universal standpoint or universal category by deploying the logic of religion as the structural basis for a global world. When Nishida was motivated to search for a logic of historical creativity that transcends the particulars of East and West—in order to dissolve the East-West dichotomy, the task was to locate a deeper and broader ground of logic that could operate as the source for all creative forms and beings of historical reality. This logic (of *topos*), what Nishida would eventually call the logic of *basho* (場所), would be resistant to reification and thus immune to any attempt at building a hierarchy of cultures. This is why the scientific standpoint, as part of the secular formation, cannot be viewed as an inherently superior mode of realization, because the logic of *basho* gives other traditional and cultural values

[29] Ibid., 120.

a non-subordinate place within intellectual history.[30] Without the logic of *basho* functioning as the structural logic of all things, beings, and forms, the tendency would then be to universalize one's own cultural and intellectual particular. This is what happened with the history of the Western particular, a point Nishida discusses rather briefly in the essay "The Problem of Japanese Culture" (1938) (*Nihon Bunka no Mondai* 日本文化の問題):

> European culture, deriving from a Greek culture which was intellectual and theoretical in character and dedicated to an inquiry into true fact, has a great theoretical structure behind it, on the basis of which European scholars criticize different cultures and frictions among the various cultures for several thousand years, a certain theoretical archetype has been developed, which Europeans consider the one and only cultural archetype. On this basis they conceive of stages of cultural development, in terms of which Oriental culture is seen as still lingering in an undeveloped stage. Oriental culture must, if developed, become identical with the Occidental one, they believe. Even such a great thinker as Hegel shared this view. But I think a problem arises here.[31]

The implication here is that a cultural hierarchy begins when one assumes a universal where there is only a particular. In the case of the Western standpoint, the Orient was subordinated to Western cultural history because of the Western particular thinking of itself as "the one and only cultural archetype".

As a concluding thought, I want to show how Nishida's critique of the secular standpoint helps us understand what a logic of colonialism or a logic of imperialism might look like in the historical world. Thus far, I tried to argue in this paper that Nishida's problematization of the secular is in part an attempt to save the concept of religion from being swallowed up by Western logic. But what is implied in this insertion of religion as the basis for a global world (*sekaiteki sekai* 世界的世界) is that the ethical mission of a particularity, in order for it to realize a deeper historical identity, must be motivated to resist the reproduction of cultural, racial, and intellectual exclusion. Otherwise, any imposition of a universal onto a particular already puts forth the beginning of a new colonial order. In other words, since all cultures are historical and particularized, a global world founded on a

[30] Salja Graupe, "The Locus of Science and its Place in Japanese Culture: Nishida on the Relationship of Science and Culture," in *Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy* 6, ed. James Heisig (Nagoya: Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture, 2006), Kindle edition, 2103.
[31] Nishida Kitarō, "The Problem of Japanese Culture", in *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, ed. Ryusaku Tsunoda, Donald Keene, and William Theodore de Bary and trans. Masao Abe (New York City: Columbia University Press, 1958).

universalization of a particular represents a mission to colonialize, because it serves as an event of a singular that negates the other, instead of advancing as a process of mutual self-negation. This is where we see how Nishida argues for how a world of philosophical, ethnic, and cultural diversity, as a kind of inclusion of differentiation, can only really exist as the outcome of particulars realizing their own self-contradictory identities, because the historical world becomes less superficially realized only when each particular seeks to realize themselves via negating themselves. The negation of oneself is not just a renunciation of the desire to dominate the entire political scene, it is a negation of the other's desire for imperialism and aggression in the world. The nuances of this point can be seen in Nishida's discussion of the co-prosperity sphere:

> It [co-prosperity sphere] is definitely not imperialism. For it to be a co-prosperity sphere, everyone in the sphere must be satisfied. If [Japan] arbitrarily decided on the nature of the sphere and if it coerced the other members, that would violate the free will of all the regions [including Japan]. That would not be a co-prosperity sphere. If it were a true co-prosperity sphere, others would ask Japan to create it for them. If that is not the case, we cannot talk of a Holy War.[32]

The implication of Nishida's discussion here is that if the principle of self-negation is followed all the way through within each particular, then there is no need for anyone to stifle the desire to assert dominance anyways. Ultimately, the ethical mission of a particular is really to maintain a consistent openness in the encounter of the other, an openness that is dialogical and transformative, with an aim to warn against any form of dogmatism that may creep into one's initial position.[33] Thus, as Christopher Goto-Jones tell us, Nishida believes that one must always begin with critique instead of forcing a particular to be universalized, and so in this sense, any movement towards a global awakening depends on a cultural transformation that is more evolutionary vis-à-vis revolutionary.[34]

Here, one can see that Nishida's idea of a global world is based on the realization of the cooperative inter-relationships between particular worlds

[32] Christopher Goto-Jones, "Ethics and Politics in the Early Nishida: Reconsidering Zen no Kenkyu," Philosophy East and West 53, 4 (2003): 529.

[33] Nishida's notion of '*basho*' is operative here—that the un-delimited place of existence and activity of self-negation also serves as the foundation of global co-existence and the process of de-totalization. That mutual self-negation between each region, ethnicity, and nationality is located within this groundless ground of affirmation *qua* negation—the mark of religious character as Nishida reminds us. John Krummel, *Nishida Kitarō's Chiasmatic Chorology: Place of Dialectic, Dialectic of Place* (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2015), 218–221.

[34] Christopher-Goto Jones, *Political Philosophy in Japan: Nishida, the Kyoto School, and Co-Prosperity*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 92–94.

(*tokushuteki sekai* 特殊的世界) or co-prosperity worlds in a way that acts to preclude absolute closure, colonialism, and/or the domination of others.[35] This is because Nishida believes that it is necessary that at the base of the world-historical standpoint is a world-of-worlds, where each particular (*qua* nationality, ethnicity, race, individual) exists as its own center at every point, realizing itself in order to meet the needs of all.[36] From this vantage point then, Nishida's philosophical viewpoint is about possibility, because it is in part a vision about what a future world would look like if there were alternative views or logics of historical creativity that are irreducible to the secular modernity of the West. This is because the secular standpoint is just one standpoint among many other standpoints—alongside the various religions of the world for instance—in the drift towards shaping the philosophical and cultural contours of the global world. Now if Nishida is correct about the problem of the secular as a universal category, then any real dialogue that could be enacted on a global scale would become an impossibility, because of the historical inclination within the secular to characterize religion as a 'pre-scientific' or 'unscientific' category. What becomes smuggled in through the secular standpoint as a result is Western logic as a prioritized frame of thought. If this bears any implication on a logic of colonialism, then the idea is that even the secular standpoint carries the tendency to reify and universalize itself within itself, creating another encounter of a colonial order, because it does not emphasize self-negation enough to the point of absolute self-contradiction. In this sense, if there is to be a proper global world that is without a colonial impulse, then there must be a reclaiming of religion and religious awareness as a logic of contradictory identity as part of the trajectory of historical awareness, as opposed to discarding it.

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[35] Krummel, *Nishida Kitarō's Chiasmatic Chorology: Place of Dialectic, Dialect of Place*, 223.

[36] Goto-Jones, "Ethics and Politics in the Early Nishida: Reconsidering Zen no Kenkyu," 527.

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Nishida Kitarō's Philosophy of Time: With a Focus on Self-Determination of Eternal Now

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Abstract: *This paper examines Nishida Kitarō's philosophy of time, with a focus on his notion, "self-determination of eternal now" posited in* The Self-Aware Determination of Nothingness *(1932). While influenced by several European philosophers, the uniqueness of Nishida's philosophy of time should not be overlooked.*

The originality of Nishida's theory of time can be summarized in two points. Firstly, it expounds the nature of time in the existentially deepest ("true" in Nishida's usage) "pure experience", which is synonymous with "fact". According to Nishida, it is a kind of Zen experience to which he also refers with the term "moment" that stands for "the true self-determination of the eternal now". It is the point of present that concentrates past knowledge and future predictions into itself, thereby eradicating our ideas and concepts that are constructed by the past and the future. This allows us to contact things or oneself "anew". Nishida highlights the "present" because he regards pure experience as the deepest experience of our existence.

Secondly, Nishida's theory of time explains our personal continuity or self-identity with the concept "continuity of discontinuities". Nishida refers to the otherness of past and future, personal others with the term "thou", that is "discontinuous" to the present I. Self-identity can be regarded as an internal dialogue between the past I and the present I, and as the present I's leap into the future I. This self-configuration is of course mediated by a multitude of personal others. Nishida expresses self-identity (continuity) as it is mediated by various "discontinuities". Nishida highlights the present, due to the temporal nature of our encounter with various kinds of "thou", which renews ourselves in the "present".

Nishida's emphasis on the "present" stands in contrast to Heidegger's emphasis on the future. Nishida highlights the "present" in order to establish the ontology of the renewing and regenerating self, which is mediated by various kinds of others.

Introduction

This paper examines Nishida Kitarō's philosophy of time, focusing on his notion "self-determination of the eternal now (永遠の今の自己限定 *eien-no-ima-no-jikogentei*)" as seen in his collection of nine essays in *The Self-Aware Determination of Nothingness* (1932). Nishida undoubtedly changed some aspects of his philosophy of time after the publication of the said collection. However, the further evolution of Nishida's thought will demand a separate treatise. For the purposes of this paper I will focus on *The Self-Aware Determination of Nothingness*, since it is here that we find Nishida's earliest and most explicit views that form the core of his philosophy of time.

Nishida explicates time from the ontology of self. Even though his theory of time was influenced by several European philosophers, especially by St. Augustine, Eckhart and Kierkegaard, the uniqueness of his original philosophy of time should not be overlooked. Unlike Heidegger, who emphasize the future, Nishida highlights the importance of the present.

In section 1, I will elaborate on Nishida's fundamental notion of "the self-determination of now" in reference to his interest in the philosophy of St. Augustine. Nishida refers to the deepest existential ("true" 真の *shin-no* in Nishida's usage) state with the term "moment (瞬間 *shunkan*)" or "fact (事実 *jijitsu*)". In section 2, I will clarify the meaning of the deepest existential state by interpreting the relationship between Eckhart's philosophy and Nishida's notion "pure experience" in his maiden work *An Inquiry into Good* (1911). In section 3, I will explain Nishida's remark about self-identity on the basis of his theory of time, which he characterizes with the phrase "continuity of discontinuities (非連続の連続 *hirenzoku-no-renzoku*)". Based on the above considerations, in section 4, I will attempt at shedding light on Nishida's criticism of Heidegger's immensely significant temporal theory of the self. In the concluding section, I will explain why and how Nishida emphasizes the present moment.

Thus far, researchers of Nishida's philosophy have already focused on the concepts of "the eternal now" and "moment",[1] and there is also comparative

[1] See Kobayashi, *Open the Way for Nishida's Philosophy: On the "Eternal Now"* and Leonardi, "Time and Eternal Now in the Philosophy of Nishida Kitarō".

literature on Nishida and Heidegger.[2] However, it has remained somewhat of a mystery as to what relates Nishida's concepts of "moment" and "fact", and how the two correspond to another key concept in Nishida's philosophy, *i.e.* "continuity of discontinuities". This paper attempts to augment Nishida scholarship on these two accounts by reexamining Nishida philosophy of time in comparison to that of Heidegger's.

1 The Basic Notion of "the Self-determination of eternal now"

The seeds of Nishida's notion of the "self-determination of eternal now" were already sown in *An Inquiry into Good*. In this book, Nishida follows St. Augustine by referring to the "unifying force" of various conscious phenomena with the term "eternal now". "As St. Augustine said, because God created time and transcends it, God is in the eternal now". （1, 147[3]） In a celebrated passage of the *Confessions*, St. Augustine writes:

> What is by now evident and clear is that neither future nor past exists, and it is inexact language to speak of three times—past, present, and future. Perhaps it would be exact to say: there are three times, a present of things past, a present of things present, a present of things to come. In the soul there are three aspects of time, and I do not see them anywhere else. The present considering the past is the memory, the present considering the present is immediate awareness, the present considering the future is expectation. [4]

Although the "now" is flowing we are conscious of its flow. The "now" that sees this flow can be regarded as eternity. However, this eternity is not to be confused with the casual sense of eternity that merely transcends time; it is an eternity that remains ever present. Nishida refers to the "unified force" with the term "God". "God—the foundation of reality as discussed above—must be the foundation of the

[2] See Ohashi, Section 3–2 "Nishida and Heidegger" in *The World of Nishida's Philosophy: Or the Turn of Philosophy*.
[3] All references to Nishida are from *the Complete Works of Kitarō Nishida* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2002–2009). The references are given in the text in brackets with the volume number, followed by the page number. I used Masao Abe and Christopher Ives' translation of *An Inquiry into Good*, with some modifications.
[4] Augustine, *Confessions*, 235.

facts of direct experience, the foundation of our phenomena of consciousness." (1, 144)

Nishida revisits St. Augustine's views in *The Self-aware Determination of Nothingness*, which was published 11 years after that of *An Inquiry into Good.* In the third essay of this book ("Regarding my notion of the self-aware determination of absolute nothingness") Nishida writes:

> As St. Augustine said, the past is the present of the past, the future is the present of the future, the present is the present of the present. . . . In this way, the present determines the present and the future as the self-determination of eternal now. (5, 105)

In this text, Nishida rephrases the "unifying force" with one of his most important concepts "the place of absolute nothing (絶対無の場所 *zettai-mu-no-basho*)", a concept that he started to use since *From That Which Acts to That Which Sees* (1927). The concept does not juxtapose subjective consciousness with its object but refers to the entire "field of consciousness", which contains every instance of the phenomena of consciousness that are bifurcated into subject and object. "Absolute nothingness", in turn, is another expression for the temporal concept of "eternal present". Thus, in the eighth essay ("I and Thou") he writes:

> All realities [all beings すべて実在的なるもの *subete-jitsuzaitekina-mono*] are located within time. Time should be considered the fundamental form of realities［beings 実在 *jitsuzai*］. The inner world as well as the outer world should be considered within the form of time, insofar as they are real. Time can be regarded as the self-determination of the present, *i.e.* the self-determination of eternal now. (5, 267)

To paraphrase the above, Nishida's "self-determination of eternal now" acts as the form that contains all cognitions about realities (*i.e.* beings), which should be considered from the perspective of the present self (*i.e.* the eternal now).

2 "Moment" or "Fact" as the existentially deepest "pure experience"

Nishida uses the term "moment" for discussing about the existentially deepest "self-determination of eternal now". This term comes from Kierkegaard's works *The*

Concept of Anxiety (1844) and *Philosophical Fragment* (1844). Like Kierkegaard, it bears the meaning of existential "decision" from the perspective of time. In the sixth essay ("Self-love, other-love and dialectics") he writes:

> We are always in contact with the past, not with the moment, and, as such, are washed away by causation. It is only when we decide to put our whole self at stake that we can touch upon the authentic moment. (5, 228)

For Nishida, the "moment" refers not only to an instance (*i.e.* a fleeting moment as often seen in usual Japanese usage) but to a *decisive* moment, in which we are not washed away by causation and can determine our action with free will. Within the "moment", "paradoxically, it is the future that determines the past". (5, 228)

However, the moment is not limited to instances of existential decision. Nishida contemplates on the concept of "moment" in reference to the phrase "fullness of time" as seen in Meister Eckhart's sermons. In his fourth essay ("Self-Determination of Eternal Now") Nishida writes:

> St. Paul said that "in the fullness of time, God sent his son into the world." (Galatian Letter 4.4) When someone asked Augustine what is the fullness of time, he answered that it is extinction of time. . . . However, Meister Eckhart said that "there is another meaning of the fullness of time. It is also the moment that can draw the affairs already occurred (the past) and the affairs that will occur (the future) in thousands of years into itself." The fullness of time is [the authentic determination of] the eternal now, within which we can presently see and hear things, we can know all things within God [i.e. eternal now in Nishida's philosophy]. （Meister Eckhart, "The Fullness of Time" [Von der Vollendung der Zeit][5]）. . . . The eternal now (nunc aeternum) refers to the point of present in which infinite past and infinite future vanishes. God is creating the world now like on the days of genesis. In the eternal now, time constantly begins anew. （5, 143–144）

[5] I believe that the correct title of Eckhart's work that Nishida mentioned is "Von der Erfüllung", given that he mentions it in another passage of the essay. I searched for the book in Nishida's archive in the library of Department of Letters in Kyoto University. The book that Nishida most probably referenced is *Meister Eckeharts Schriften und Predigten Bd.1*.

This “moment” as “the fullness of time” refers to the point of present that draws all instances of the past and future into itself, that is, towards a concentration of past knowledge and future prediction. Furthermore, it is the moment in which our preconceptions or frameworks that we construct regarding the past and future vanish, allowing us to get in touch with things or with oneself “anew”. “God sent his son into the world” is the mythologized metaphor of this moment.

Nishida refers to the “content of moment” with the term “fact”. In his third essay, Nishida writes:

> The fact exists here as the self-determination of moment. . . . For example, it does not mean that “the bird” files but that the fact “the bird flies” exists. . . . What I call the “fact” itself exists. Not in the sense of existing within the subject or in the object, but as the content of the self-determination of eternal now by seeing itself directly and by expressing itself in words. . . . In my philosophy, the now that determines itself is . . . the now in which time begins eternally anew. (5, 132–3)

Nishida illustrates this “fact” with the phrase “the bird flies”. This phrase does not mean that “the bird” is the agent that flies, but rather that there is a totality of the fact prior to the subject-object bifurcation. According to Nishida, “the real intention of Mahayana Buddhism is to experience the ground of this fact radically, to contact the true-fact [真実 *shinjitsu*] step by step”. (5, 122) This expression is reminiscent of the famous 13th century Japanese monk D*ō*gen’s phrase “the edge of sky is infinite no matter how far birds fly” (鳥そらをとぶに、とぶといへどもそらのきはなし *tori sora wo tobuni tobu toiedomo sorano kiwa nashi*) in *Shōbōgenzō (Treasury of the True Dharma Eye)*. Because of Nishida’s allusion to Mahayana Buddhism and this supporting evidence, we might arrive at an interpretation where Nishida expresses this simple perception as a kind of Zen experience, which breaks one’s preconceptions and “worldly desires” (煩悩 *bon-nou*), *i.e.* one’s distorted egoism.

The expressions “moment”, “fact” and “[to] presently see and hear things” are highly reminiscent of “pure experience”, a core concept in Nishida’s *An Inquiry into Good*, which he used synonymously with the expressions “moment (刹那 *setsuna:* a synonym of *shun-kan*)” and “a fact just as it is”:

> To experience means to know a fact just as it is, to know in accordance with a fact by completely relinquishing one's own fabrications. What we usually refer to as experience is adulterated with some sort of thought, so by pure I am referring to the state of experience just as it is without the least addition of deliberative discrimination. The moment of seeing a color or hearing a sound, for example, is prior not only to the thought that the color or sound is the activity of an external object or that one is sensing it, but also, to the judgement of what the color or sound might be. . . . When one directly experiences one's own state of consciousness, there is not yet a subject or an object, and knowing and its object are completely united. This is the most refined type of experience. . . . A truly pure experience has no meaning whatsoever; it is simply a present consciousness of a fact just as it is. (1, 9)

Pure experience refers to a "fact just as it is" in the form of experience that transcends the subject-object bifurcation. It is not a usual experience that "is adulterated with some sort of thought." Since it is "prior to judgement", it seems to be a vague and unconscious kind of experience. However, as Nishida insists, the "purity of pure experience" derives not from such vagueness nor from "the experience's being simple, unanalyzable, or instantaneous but from the strict unity of concrete consciousness". (1, 11) Thus, we can interpret this concept as standing for an experience that breaks the totality of "meaning[s]" constructed by one's past experiences as it converges into a present activity. According to Nishida, we are said to be in a state of pure experience when we are completely immersed in listening to or playing music, or, for instance, when we lose ourselves in a painting. For this reason, Nishida also characterizes this kind of experience as "the union of subject and object".

This characterization bears religious connotations. Nishida claims that when we "exterminate our false self and, upon dying of our worldly desires, gain new life", "we can we truly reach the realm of the union of subject and object, which is the ultimate meaning of religion, morality, and art. Christianity calls this event rebirth, and Buddhism calls it enlightenment [見性 *kensho*]". (1, 134) It is above all in religious experience that we go through a "transformation of the self and the reformation of life" while "perceiving our relativity and finitude" and yearning "to attain eternal, true life". (1, 135) In short, our preconceived framework breaks down in the ultimate mode of experience as we attain "the deepest internal rebirth (die innerste Geburt)". (1, 141) Nishida illustrates this point with St. Paul's expression

"It is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me". (Galatians 2:20.) Moreover, Nishida insists that his notion of "God" (*i.e.* "unifying force") is like Eckhart's "Godhead (Gottheit)". (1, 148)

Let us return to Nishida's passage on Eckhart in *The Self-aware Determination of Nothingness*: "the fullness of time is [the "true" (most existentially deepest) determination of] the eternal now, within which we can presently see and hear things, we can know all things within God". Should we look up the contemporary German rendition of Eckhart's original text it reads: "in the eternal now, the soul feels all things anew and fresh at the present (Jetzt der Ewigkeit, wo die Seele in Gott alle Dinge neu und frisch und gegenwärtig gewahrt[6])". Thus, the expression "we can presently see and hear things" is Nishida's original supplement, which we cannot find in the original text. On the one hand, Nishida interpretation of Eckhart's "fullness of time" is influenced by his earlier writings on pure experience as the ultimate form of experience, which presupposes the existential decision. In this ultimate form, we grasp reality in its depths and experience "the deepest internal birth" in which "time begins eternally anew". On the other hand, Nishida's usage of the term "fact" is no longer characteristic of "the union of subject and object" as it was in *An Inquiry into Good*. In *Self-aware Determination of Nothingness* Nishida starts to emphasize the otherness of "fact" by referring to it with the term "thou". In his eighth essay, he writes:

> We cannot think of the fact as the self-determination of the mere one individual. Radical solipsism, when pursued to its extreme, does not present us with the true fact [真の事実 *shin-no-jijitsu*]. . . . Thus, in the ground of one's personal self, there should be a "thou". The world of fact begins with the encountering and conversation between I and thou. (5, 317)

"Thou" does not only mean "the other" in the sense of *other person* but includes everything that one encounters in "fact" or "moment". "Thou" is defined as the absolute other that cannot be subsumed under concepts: "I and thou are the absolutely other for one another. There are no universals subsuming both". (5, 297) It is also "the absolute other that makes I as I possible". (5, 323) Thus, in his next book *The Fundamental Problem of Philosophy: The World of Action* (1934), Nishida writes that "when have an encounter by way of absolute negation, everything including mountains, rivers, trees and stones come to bear the meaning of

[6] Eckhart, *op. cit.*, 52.

thou". （6, 46） He refers to the self-awareness that mediates "thou" with the terms "action" or "dialectic", which stand for the encountering and conversation between "I and thou". In *The Self-aware Determination of Nothingness*, "self-awareness" does not express "the union of self and other" (5, 307) but rather a way of "seeing the absolute other within the self [*i.e.* absolute nothingness or eternal now]" and "seeing the self within absolute otherness" (5, 308)

Thus, we can conclude that Nishida refers to the existentially deepest "pure experience" with the term "fact", which translates into "moment" (*i.e.* the ultimate "self-determination of eternal now") in his theory of time.

3 Continuity of discontinuities

Nishida's concept of "fact" certainly refers to "religious experience in the deepest sense". (5, 122) It would thus seem that Nishida's "self-determination of eternal now" is a kind of theory of time that pertains exclusively to the experience of enlightenment in Zen practice. Yet, Nishida insists that his theory of time ranges over all kinds of experiences. In particular, it accounts for personal continuity, *i.e.* self-identity.

Time is considered from the present, from the perspective of the eternal now. As we have already seen, the past is the past of the present and the future is the future of the present. However, on the other hand, time consists in an irreversible flow, as it "vanishes and regenerates in each instance". (5, 267) In this sense, the absence of past and future from the present constitutes the other for the present. Remarkably, with the term "thou" Nishida refers not only to the otherness of human beings and entities as encountered in the "fact", but also to temporal notions of past and future. This line of thought is exemplified in the ninth essay ("On the Philosophy of Life"):

> The life of our true personal self is not an internal duration but the continuity of discontinuities. Each moment in time is independent and free from the other. . . . Therefore, from the perspective of the present 'I', the 'I' of yesterday and the 'I' of tomorrow are also 'thou'. Nay, every moment must be regarded as such. (5, 339)

Nishida criticized the idea that human identity can be regarded as an "internal duration" or mere continuity. "The present self does not determine the present self completely, and vice versa". (5, 171) Thus, the past self and the present self are "discontinuous" even though they constitute continuity. The past is the absolute other for the present insofar as it remains unchangeable. Although events of the past have borne an unconscious influence on us, we are unable to recollect the past in its entirety. Some joyous or distressful events may well be marked as significant for our lives, but most of the others are neglected and forgotten. Thus, for Nishida, our personal continuity or identity should be regarded as a "meaningful union" (5, 268), which is constituted by a "dialogue with oneself within the soul (*ibid.* this phrase comes from Plato, *Sophist* 263E)". Strictly speaking, when we recall of past events, the past does not exist as the present, but as the present of the past. Recollections of the past cannot be the repetition of past as it is, but a new formulation of the past. We recall the past from the present perspective and by doing so become aware of ourselves. Thus, even though past events cannot be altered once they have occurred, we have the ability to change the "meaning" of the past. "The continuity of discontinuities" entails the transformation of one's identity through a dialogue between the person who I am and the person who I used to be within the recesses of the present self (*i.e.* within the place of absolute nothingness).

One of the most important aspects about the transformation of the past's meaning is the relationship between my present and future selves. In *Intuition and Reflection within Self-awareness* (1917; published 15 years prior to *The Self-aware determination of Nothingness*) Nishida writes:

> In teleological causation, past is the means of present and future. We can change the meaning of past by progressing into the future. . . . [In *De Profundis*,] Oscar Wilde said that although the Greeks believed that gods could not alter the past, Christ taught that even a sinner could do so with ease. When the prodigal son dropped to his knees and cried before his father, he turned the sins and anguish of his past into the most beautiful and sacred thing. (2, 199)

In general, it is said that even our mistakes could become the springboard to success when our lives have a goal, but in despair our lives will collapse. However, the ability to change the meaning of the past can, at times, lead us to conceal and

suppress past troubles due to our desire to justify ourselves. In any case, the consciousness of future configures the meaning of past and present.

Furthermore, for Nishida, even future bears the meaning of "thou". Ordinarily we do not see the future as the other. However, in cases of an examination for a job, a bet, a financial investment etc., the future could appear as the unpredictable other. When we put our lives at stake, we take all the knowledge and information gained throughout the past into consideration and plunge into the "future". Nishida expresses such an experience as "plunging from point to point". This experience "bears the meaning of a leap (飛躍 *hiyaku*) that we can see in volitional activity". (5, 209) Therefore, we become aware of our personal continuities by leaping into who we will be, while remaining in a dialogue between who we are and who we used to be.

However, personal continuity or self-identity cannot be maintained internally in our minds; the perspectives of an actual other person (the "thou") play an important role in the constitution of self-identity. No matter how much we can secure our identities internally, either by repenting in solitude or by simply changing the meaning of the past in our minds, we cannot change the way the other perceives our past. The other's perspective can intervene and reject our private attempts at maintaining "teleological" continuity. Therefore, personal identity is constituted not only by an inner but also by a social dialogue.

Thus, Nishida rejects any attempts to regard personal identity as a mere actualization of inner potential, which is arguably the case in the development of biological organisms. On the one hand, our human personality could be regarded as the development of our potential innate characteristics and skills. In *An Inquiry into Good*, Nishida does regard consciousness as the development of "potential power" and likens it "the seed of a plant". (1, 22) On the other hand, however, this development should be determined *through* dialogue with the other persons. Because of that, Nishida agrees with Aristotle in that for human beings, "actuality (*energeia*) is prior to potentiality (*dynamis*); only man generates man" (5, 251 This phrase comes from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* 1049b20–) According to Nishida's interpretation, this expression means that the self is generated from its potentiality *by* the present actuality of "I and thou". For example, someone becomes "cultured by the cultured [in education]". (Aristotle *Metaphysics* 1049b26) Our personality is configured from its potential through conversation and action with other persons. We become aware of ourselves in "the eternal now (the direct present of self)" by

narrating ourselves to others as well as to ourselves in a manner that is characteristic of the "continuity of discontinuities".

In short, Nishida's theory of time, which is based on the concept of "the self-determination of the eternal now", is a concrete theory that captures the transformation of self-identity as "the continuity of discontinuities".

4 Nishida's Criticism of Heidegger

To clarify Nishida's uniqueness, I want to compare his theory of time with that of Heidegger's, since Nishida explicates his thought by a critique of Heidegger. Both philosophers are similar in that they construct an ontology of the self and think of time as the fundamental problem. Moreover, Nishida's concept of "the self-determination of the eternal now" can arguably be expressed by Heidegger's concept of "temporality (Zeitlichkeit)".

Unfortunately, Nishida's understanding of Heidegger is somewhat inadequate, since he does not realize that Heidegger's most important topic is "the question of Being in general." What's more, in contrast to Heidegger who avoids to usage of Hegelian logic due to its formality and its unsuitability for analyzing human existence, Nishida makes explicit use of Hegelian logic without understanding the significance of Heidegger's position. However, should we try to understand Nishida's intention carefully, we could discover that Nishida's criticism of Heidegger is valid.

In *Time and Being* [*Sein und Zeit*] *(*1926), Heidegger discusses the priority of "future" in human time. According to Heidegger, human being (Dasein) is unique in relation to its own "possibility". Moreover "possibility" is understood in the *future*-tense. "Dasein is always its possibility". (SZ42[7]) There are two reasons why Dasein's prioritizes the "future".

Firstly, human beings construct the possible "horizons" of cognition. Dasein encounters various beings in the world, namely "innerworldly beings" (innerweltliches Seiende). In daily life, these beings are understood as useful things, that is "things at hand" (Zuhandenes). For example, a hammer is usually understood as a tool to be used "in order to" (um-zu) strike nails "in order to" build a house.

[7] The references to Heidegger are given in the text in brackets followed by the page number of the original text（Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1963). Italics are in the original.

There is no single useful thing, since the usefulness of a thing belongs to a "referential totality" (Verweisungsganzheit). When we understand beings, we always "disclose" or "open" the "world" or "horizon" as a "referential totality". This disclosure of "horizons" is based on Dasein's relationship to its "possibility". The world is the possible "horizon" of understanding something.

Secondly, as Heidegger argued, human beings can live in the mode of "authenticity" by attaining or choosing themselves in awareness of their own death, which is "the own most, nonrelational, certain, and, as such, indefinite and insuperable possibility of Dasein". (SZ263) Dasein understands itself in terms of its world. We always live in the mode of inauthenticity that is imbedded in "they (das Man)". However, when we become aware of ourselves in "anticipation (Vorlaufen)" of this possibility of death, it is possible for us to become authentic. Thus, it is evident why Heidegger prioritizes the future in terms of "anticipation".

In reference to Kierkegaard, Heidegger refers to the authentic present in "anticipation" with the term "moment (Augenblick)". Heidegger shares the concept of "moment" with Nishida. However, unlike Nishida, Heidegger says:

> In enumerating the ecstasies [past, present, future] we have always mentioned the future first. . . . Primordial and authentic temporality temporalizes itself out of the authentic future, and in such a way that, futurally having-been, it first arouses the present. *The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future*. (SZ329)

On the one hand, Nishida agrees with Heidegger's notion of the "anticipation for death". Nishida writes in his *System of Universals in Self-awareness* (1930), where he refers to Heidegger for the first time: "We have our own goal within the boundary of death. We live towards death". (4, 233–4) However, on the other hand, Nishida criticizes Heidegger for overemphasizing the aspect of future. In the third essay of *The Self-Aware Determination of Nothingness*, Nishida writes:

> The world of understanding (Verstehen) in Heidegger's philosophy is the mere world of possible time without present. (5,130)

> Although [my usage of the word] "fact" can be deemed similar to Heidegger's Being in the sense that both refer to a state that transcends

> subject-object dichotomy, Heidegger's Being [here, it refers to Dasein] does not see itself factually. （5,132）

For Nishida, Heidegger's world is "the mere world of possible time without present" and Dasein "does not see itself factually". This is because the "fact" is not only the determined present in future tense, but in connection with "thou". which lies beyond meaning and preconceived framework, or the "horizon" of "understanding" in Heidegger's terminology. According to Nishida, Heidegger does not discuss reality beyond the horizon. For him, the self (Dasein) does not consist in a mere relation to its own future-tensed "possibility", but in that which fundamentally mediates the "the absolute other". Dasein can avoid "falling" to "them" through "anticipation", whereby one can become aware of oneself "futurally". In contrast, through the experience of "fact", the self can become aware of itself anew and ultimately experiences "the deepest internal rebirth". Nishida criticizes Heidegger in his letter to Watsuji Tetsurō on 8th February in 1930 with the following: "In Heidegger's philosophy, there is a place where one dies, but not the place where one will be [re]born". (20,382)

Furthermore, Nishida also criticizes Heidegger in reference to "thou" and "the continuity of discontinuities". In the eighth essay, Nishida writes:

> [Heidegger's] (the) notion of the "accessible (zugänglich)" [beings] and "understanding (Verstehen)" [of beings] could be considered from the standpoint of the personal self-awareness, which sees the absolute other within the recesses of the self. I am I as I see thou, thou is thou as thou sees me. From this we can conceive of conversation as the continuity of absolute discontinuities . . . . (5,316)

The above passage is difficult to understand. The word "accessible (zugänglich)" is a term that Heidegger uses in *Being and Time*, for example in the passage: "If we say that beings 'have meaning', this signifies that they have become accessible *in their being*". (SZ324). However, we can comprehend Nishida's criticism if we consider the "understanding" of beings or the "accessible" way to beings not from Heidegger's standpoint, which overemphasizes "possibility" or "future", but from Nishida's standpoint of "the eternal now", which mediates various kinds of "thou".

Heidegger refers to our continuity with the term "the stretches [Erstreckung] of Dasein between birth and death" (SZ374) or "the constancy [Ständigkeit] of the self". (SZ375) Dasein undertakes "having-been (Gewesenheit)" as past from the "future (Zukunft)". "Dasein can *be* authentically having-been only because it is futural. In a certain sense, having-been arises from the future". (SZ326) However, for Nishida, Heidegger misses the otherness of past and future, namely the incomprehensibility of the past and the unpredictability of the future. Although Heidegger explicates the being with other in "they", he does not discuss personal others as the essential condition for the constitution of the self. Should we take the otherness of past, future and personal others into consideration, we could express the constancy of the self with the term "continuity of discontinuities". The self becomes aware of itself anew through "action" by mediating the personal "thou".

In short, Nishida criticizes Heidegger for ignoring the other beyond horizon of understanding and thereby misses the significance of the present. Since Nishida admits the significance of future in human existence, his philosophy is not incompatible with Heidegger's. However, from Nishida's standpoint, the authentic way of Dasein does not arise from the future but also from the present dialogue between I and thou.

Conclusion

Nishida refers to the time of the self with the term "self-determination of eternal now", *i.e.* direct and present consciousness. The originality of Nishida's theory of time can be summarized in two points.

Firstly, Nishida's theory of time expounds the nature of time in the existentially deepest "pure experience", which is synonymous with "fact". According to Nishida, it is a kind of Zen experience to which he also refers with the term "moment" that stands for the true self-determination of the eternal now. It is the point of present that concentrates past knowledge and future predictions into itself, thereby eradicating our ideas and concepts that are constructed by the past and the future. This allows us to contact things or oneself "anew". Nishida highlights the "present" because he regards pure experience as the deepest experience of our existence.

Secondly, Nishida's theory of time explains our personal continuity or self-identity. Nishida refers to the otherness of past and future, personal others with the

term “thou”, that is “discontinuous” to the present I. Self-identity can be regarded as an internal dialogue between the past I and the present I, and as the present I’s leap into the future I. This self-configuration is of course mediated by a multitude of personal others. Nishida expresses self-identity (continuity) as it is mediated by various “discontinuities” with the concept “continuity of discontinuities”. Nishida highlights the present, due to the temporal nature of our encounter with various kinds of “thou”, which renews ourselves in the “present”.

Nishida’s emphasis on the “present” stands in contrast to Heidegger’s emphasis on the future. Nishida highlights the “present” in order to establish the ontology of the renewing and regenerating self, which is mediated by various kinds of others. This is revealed in his criticism of Heidegger. He criticizes Heidegger for overemphasizing the future and for not taking pure experience (i.e. “fact”) or others (i.e. “thou”) that are beyond the horizon of understanding into consideration.

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The Irreversibility of Time and the Momentary Present as a "Cut"
—Tanabe Hajime's philosophy of time —

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Abstract: *The keywords which characterizes Tanabe's philosophy of time are irreversibility and the "cut". While he holds a present-centralist view of time as do Nishida Kitarō and Kuki Shūzō, Tanabe's view occupies a unique position in that he focuses on the problem of the irreversibility of time. Generally speaking, it is believed that the ground of the irreversibility lies in the immovability of the past. However, Tanabe claims this belief is derived from an assumption that time should be observed, and if we try to capture time from the perspective of action, it will become clear that the element of the future makes time irreversible. In other words, the intention to realize something through actions manifests an undesirable reality as the unchangeable past, whether we are aware of it or not. Yet this idea is too inclined to the future, failing to acknowledge that the present always includes the possibility and impossibility of realization equally. Tanabe's* Philosophy as Metanoetics *has the intent of thoroughly investigating such a problem of the impossibility of action with the conception metanoesis (repentance or penitence). In this book, the present is interpreted as the very point where the conversional awareness called "death-and-resurrection" arises and also as the instant for the reason that the disappearance of the old self and the emergence of the new self are completely simultaneous in that awareness. When considering eschatology in Christianity, he links this momentary present with the notion of "cut" that originated in Richard Dedekind's use of the term. As Dedekind aimed to understand the continuity of real numbers by the "creation" of an irrational number defined as a "cut", Tanabe asserts that the momentary present is a "cut" that makes it possible for time to flow. Since such a present also has the meaning of death, the flowing of time is considered to be irreversible.*

Introduction

The problem of time is one of the main concerns in modern Japanese Philosophy. The thinkers who should be mentioned as being puzzled about the essence of time first of all are Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945) and Kuki Shūzō (1888–1941). In spite of different styles of thinking, their philosophies of time have remarkable similarities. They both hold a present-centralist view of time and the view that the eternal dimension is superimposed upon the present. Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962) is another philosopher whose philosophy of time shares these characteristics. Yet his view has not been discussed as frequently as Nishida’s or Kuki’s theories. It is true that Tanabe’s philosophy of time is less conspicuous than that of Nishida’s or Kuki’s.[1] However, this does not mean that Tanabe’s philosophy of time is inferior. While there is the common intention to grasp something eternal at the foundation of *this* present, Tanabe’s idea occupies an original position that is not identical with that of Nishida nor Kuki. Tanabe focuses on the problem of irreversibility of time, which is not actively pursued in Nishida’s philosophy of time, and is entirely denied in Kuki’s theory of recurrent time (回帰的時間) . This means that he pays attention to the difference of phase between the past and the future, which tends to be overlooked when trying to ground time in the present. Such a conception turns Tanabe toward examining the way the present itself is regarded as the center of temporality. When adopting present-centralism, one is faced with the question of how to describe the characteristic of the present that cannot be put on the same level as the past and the future while always existing between the two. Tanabe is not satisfied with the answer that the present is the eternal at the same time. His position is that the present should be understood as a “cut” (切断). This is the central claim of his philosophy of time.

1. Bergson and Tanabe

As is well known, Tanabe started his career as a philosopher under a decisive influence from Nishida’s philosophy. When Tanabe uses its key concepts such as “pure experience”(純粋経験) and “intuition”(直観), he is quite aware of the affinity of these with Bergson’s “pure duration”. Tanabe maintains the position that time is an essential component of reality and the temporal must be sharply distinguished

[1] For the discussion of Tanabe’s philosophy of time from another perspective, see Taguchi, Shigeru (2015).

from the spatial. In this sense, Bergson's idea determines the fundamental framework of Tanabe's thought about time.

What I would like to emphasize here is not so much this closeness of Tanabe's position to Bergson's as the many differences. First, there is a difference in that Tanabe tries to absorb the ideas of mathematical continuity, which Bergson regards as the blending of spatiality with time and therefore eliminates. In this respect, Tanabe identifies with Bertrand Russell (1872–1970),[2] who criticized Bergson (2/564–565),[3] For Tanabe, mathematical continuity is considered to be more than just dealing with aggregates of static points. He says,

> The logic through which we think about the continuity in today's mathematics is not the ordinary understanding of logic. It is the reasoning logic that idealizes the dynamic principle connecting the whole and objectifies the irrational as the basis of the rational toward limits(1/468).

According to Tanabe, the concept of the cut, which German mathematician Richard Dedekind (1831–1916) used in defining irrational numbers, is a typical example of such logic, and "the dynamic element which idealizes the dynamic principle" (Ibid.).

Secondly, what is more important is the fact that the cut is interpreted as the instant (瞬間), as is already suggested above. For example, Tanabe says in *Introduction to Philosophy, the Third Added Explanation—Philosophy of Religion and Ethics* (『哲学入門－補説第三 宗教哲学・倫理学』, 1952),

> The negative transformation and circulative development of history reciprocally occurs at the instant as present. This momentary present, which means (Dedekind's) cut that sections and joints history, is the transformative point where the eternity of absolute nothingness, through penetrating into time, mediates time and at the same time is mediated by it (11/532–533).

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[2] Russell criticizes Bergson in "The Philosophy of Bergson" [1912] and *Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy* [1914]. Tanabe agrees with Russell that Bergson pays no attention to the philosophical possibilities of mathematical considerations of continuity.

[3] *Tanabe Hajime Zenjyū [Complete works of Tanabe Hajime]* (Tokyo: Chikuma-Shobō, 1963–1964), 15vols., cited in the text, followed by volume and page. All italics and brackets are my own.

At this point, the difference between Tanabe and Bergson becomes distinct because Bergson disapproves of the very idea of instant. Bergson asserts that “the indivisibility of motion implies, then, the impossibility of real instants”.[4] Discussing Zeno’s paradoxes and the Bergson’s comments on it, Tanabe says “while space is infinitely indivisible and the way we walk is considered as the set of infinite points, time is a discontinuous and indivisible unity” (11/81). It will be obvious that what is meant by “a discontinuous and indivisible unity” is different in Tanabe and Bergson. For Bergson, the indivisibility of time refers to the flow itself in which we can never cause some rift. In Tanabe’s opinion, on the contrary, it means the indivisible entity as an element of time because he regards the momentary present as the fundament of the temporality. In fact, he rephrases such unity as “the instant” which “lurks between motion and rest—being in no time at all” in Plato’s *Parmenides*.[5] To borrow Kierkegaard’s words, it is “the atom of eternity”.[6]

No matter how Plato or Kierkegaard understand the relationship between the instant transcending time and the flowing of time, the question arises concerning the way time can be "constituted" from the instant which is by no means divisible insofar as it is regarded as the ground of time. What is “constituted” from some of the indivisibles would be merely a straight line not time itself even if we could treat the indivisible as something existent. Therefore, the meaning of the “constitution” must be considered in a completely different manner from the aggregate of parts.

2. The Irreversibility of Time and the Present

As is mentioned above, Tanabe’s philosophy of time aims to separate something spatial from the nature of time and purify time into genuine fluidity. It is because of such a basic perspective of time that, in the article titled “Eternity・History・Action(「永遠・歴史・行為」,1940)”, he criticizes the key concept of Nishida’s

[4] Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, trans. by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. and New York: The Macmillan Company, 1912, p.249.
[5] Plato, *Parmenides*, trans. by R. E. Allen, *Plato’s Parmenides*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983, p.43(156d).
[6] Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Anxiety*, trans. by Reider Thomte, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980, p.88.

theory of time, “the self-determination of eternal now”, for leading to the spatialization of time (7/122–123).

Nishida focuses on Augustine’s thought in *Confessions* when thinking about the nature of time. According to Augustine, the reality of three aspects of time (the past, the present and the future), which are always exposed to the danger of being brought to nothing, take root in the awareness or consciousness of the present. What is characteristic of Nishida is that he finds in the centrality of the present the function of its subsuming (包む) the past, the present and the future. It is nothing but “the self-determination of eternal now”.[7]

However, we cannot overlook the fact that Tanabe also, like Augustine and Nishida, regards the eternal negating of the process of time as the transcendent basis of time. In fact, Tanabe acknowledges that the nature of time implies some spatiality as long as eternity is such basis (7/118). Yet it does not follow that Tanabe’s criticism of Nishida or Augustine is wrong and meaningless. He thinks that “ eternity recovers the temporality through making time reversible and manifests its meaning precisely in accordance with the form of time”(7/119) and therefore that the present as eternity must be the concept by which we can understand the undeniable fact that time never flows conversely insofar as such present is considered as the ground of time. In this sense, Tanabe’s philosophy of time has the original meaning in spite of many similarities to Nishida’s idea. The penetration or falling of eternity into time (in Nishida’s phrase “the self-determination of eternal now”), according to Tanabe, must be the emergence of the fact that time flows irreversibly. From such viewpoint, Tanabe says;

> The determination of the indifference of eternity to time [by Nishida and Augustine] brings about extremely dangerous results. For, according to it, such eternity denies the unidirectionality of time passing from past to future, so-called the irreversibility of time, and, instead of that, makes it possible for time to flow from future to past as well as to flow from past to future. Obviously it is nothing but denying temporality, or more positively speaking, spatializing time (7/118).

[7] However, Nishida also emphasizes the function of the present as the instant. It must be noted, therefore, that Tanabe’s criticism is not fair in that he ignores that point.

We can find a solution to the above-mentioned question here. Namely, if we can explain the irreversibility of time by the momentary present that transcends flowing time, time will be regarded as “constituted” from something indivisible. In this sense, it is exactly through the phenomenon of the irreversible flow of time that the momentary present, that is, eternity, manifests itself as the ground of time. To use Tanabe’s terminology, it is the returning (*gensō* 還相) of eternity into time itself, which is named “historicist temporal ontology (歴史主義的時間存在論)” (7/121).

Generally speaking, we understand the irreversibility of time as a matter of course that needs no explanation because it seems that the past is the already decided fact and it cannot be changed. In this case, time is represented as something that gradually accumulates from the past toward the tip of the present. However, when we adopt present-centralism, such an image becomes inconsistent with the accumulation of time since present-centralism holds that the reality of the past lies only in present memories and the past exist nowhere in itself. Here there is a mutually exclusive relationship between past-determinism and present-centralism.

To summarize Tanabe’s idea in advance, we could point out three characteristics; first, the performative or active understanding of three aspects of time, second, the higher dimensionality of the future, and finally, the present as the transformative point where the past and the future confront and at the same time mediate each other.

Tanabe’s dissatisfaction with Nishida and Augustine arises from their understanding of the relation between the past and the future. In Nishida as well as Augustine, from Tanabe’s point of view, the past as memories and the future as expectations are paralleled in the present without any internal relationship (7/121). However, if we intend to capture the truth of time from the perspective of action, Tanabe claims, it becomes clear that the memories and the expectations reciprocally mediate one another. First of all, expectations are impossible without taking actions into consideration, because of the original meaning of “the mental preparedness for actions(行為的なる心構)”(7/125); the actions performed together with their expected consequences necessarily depend upon memories. Simply put, expectations presuppose memories. In Tanabe’s words, “the future is realized on the ground that we combine a present action with past memories, and expect or anticipate the results that the former causes through the mediation of the latter” (7/124–125) . It is precisely owing to present actions implying the direction toward the future that memories themselves can come into existence. He says, “as long as the past is brought into consciousness through memories, it is already accompanied by the

moment of the future which negates the past", and "[memories] cannot be realized as the past without including the moment of the future" (7/136). In this case, memories are mediated by expectations.

Though the past and the future are complementary, Tanabe claims that the future exists in a higher dimension than the past. To be in the higher dimension means that the former is a more mediated existence than the latter. According to Tanabe, the reality of the future consists only in the ceaseless agency negating the past in some way. In contrast, the past, unlike the future, does not show the character of negative mediation as such. Although the past is essentially existence mediated by the future, we don't usually realize the fact. Rather, it appears to us as an immediate and fixed existence which we cannot change by any means. Such ambiguous characteristic of the past can be understood only from the perspective of the action in the present. Indeed, it is only through the future that the past can reveal its own nature, but before that the past exists as "something immediate that is opposed to actions and must be negated by them" (7/134) in the first place. Without such opposition, Tanabe thinks, there would be no action and therefore no present. While the future can come into existence only through the present actions, the past emerges as something external to actions and their presupposition when they are being performed. The irreversibility of time is based on this asymmetric relationship between the past and the future, in other words, on the fact that the nature of the mediation in the past remains potential to active present. Conversely, it follows that the irreversibility rests on the higher dimensionality of the future. Tanabe says;

> From here [that is, the higher dimensionality of the future] comes the irreversibility and uni-directionality of time flowing from the past to the future and not from the future to the past. Since the higher dimensionality of the future means mediation, the future can make the lower dimension of the past its mediation, but the past cannot make the higher dimension of future its mediation in a direct way (7/127–128).

Since the present is exactly the point where all actions are being performed, it is also the point of such asymmetrical, mutual mediation between the past and the future. The present is said to have the meaning of eternity because of some kind of spatiality which makes the past and the future correlated, but in spite of that it does not follow that, like Nishida, the present is considered to be the place (場所) which

subsumes the two. At the active present, memories change their meanings in the light of expectations, and at the same time the expectations embody themselves on the basis of memories. Taking into consideration such circular movement in which the present always functions as the proceeding center, according to Tanabe’s thought, we should represent the present not as just a point but rather as a transformative point where the flow oriented toward the past and that oriented toward the future conflict with each other. For this reason, Tanabe symbolizes the present as the center of vortex.[8]

3. Metanoesis and the Past

In spite of some of the philosophical possibilities Tanabe’s perspective seems to have, there are still several problems left unsolved. The first problem is that he is inclined to explain the immediacy of the past by relating it to the continuous and potential reality of memories (7/136). Secondly, it can be pointed out that Tanabe’s present-centrism is slightly incongruous with the notion of the higher dimensionality of the future, Tanabe’s philosophy of time having two centers as it were.

We can find the solution to these problems in *Philosophy as Metanoetics* (『懺悔道としての哲学』, 1946), which is the starting point of Tanabe’s philosophy after the war. Through coining the word “Metanoetics”, he advocates a transrational philosophy of Other-power, but it is impossible to give a full picture of it here. It is enough to pay attention to the fact that he discusses action in relation to the impossibility of its realization. Tanabe ventures to take the standpoint of Other-power (他力) instead of relying upon self-power (自力). Taking into consideration his assertion that Other-power is always linked with self-power, it would be more accurate to say that he deals with the whole structure of the possibility and impossibility of the realization of action.

“Metanoesis” (penitence or repentance) has the underlying tone of regret for past actions. However, it means not mere resignation to our powerlessness but “breaking-through” (*Durchbruch*) (9/19).[9] It is the radical transformation of our existence, which is named “death-and-resurrection” (死復活). The present is located at the point where the thorough collapse of the old self and the emergence of the

[8] For Tanabe’s understanding of time as a vortex, see Gōda, Masato & Sugimura, Yasuhiko (2012a) and Gōda, Masato (2012b).
[9] Tanabe Hajime, *Philosophy as Metanoetics*, trans. by Takeuchi Yoshinori with Valdo Viglielmo and James W. Heisig, London: University of California Press, 1986, p.4.

new self occur simultaneously. This is fundamentally different from the former assertion that the present is nothing but where actions are being performed. On the contrary, at this present there arises the self-awareness that a conversion has been caused by something outside of the self, plainly speaking, the awareness of the self-incompetence and the awareness of being finite. Therefore, the present consciousness is also said to be a faith (信) in Other-power. He says;

> Here, witness is mediated by the action of metanoesis as the past opening up to the future, so that an orientation to future rebirth becomes implicit in the metanoetic transformation of the past and faith comes to birth in a present consciousness of the change that has taken place in witness, a self-consciousness based on absolute Other-power (9/227–228).[10]

Compared to this, the present awareness he spoke of before should be judged as the awareness of the confirmation of self-ability, which is observed merely from the side of the possibility of realization or from the future, based upon the continuous and identical self. In this sense, the present could be regarded as illuminated in the light of hope. Indeed, he mentions a kind of hope in *Philosophy as Metanoetics*, but it must be noticed that it has contradictory characteristics. That is, hope never appears through individuals always retaining their self-identity without any rupture or collapse, and it exists completely outside of self-power. Nevertheless it makes possible the re-birth of the self and the self-awareness called "metanoesis".

It also means that the present here always implies some darkness at the same time. "Suffering arises within a relative being because it is driven into a desperate cul-de-sac by the conflict between the consciousness of past *karma* (unavoidable guilt) and the consciousness of the aspiration for future emancipation from guilt. It is this suffering that characterize present consciousness as anxiety" (9/35). [11] If we attempt to grasp time on the basis of action, which can be understood as *poiesis* or production bringing something into existence in a broader sense, we must consider the present where realization and non-realization are constantly diverging. Tanabe's "metanoetics" is the standpoint which combines the problem of the non-realization

[10] Ibid., p. 248–249.
[11] Ibid., p. 24.

of action with the essential structure of the finite self from the perspective of religious philosophy.[12]

The understanding of the present as the conversional or transformative point called “metanoesis” or “death-and-resurrection” makes it clear that the relation of the future to the present means that of the “future witness”[13]to the present faith. Besides, on the basis of this, the mutual mediation between the past and the future which circles around the central present comes to be reconsidered in a different way.

According to Tanabe, the regretful past is essentially characterized as contingent. “The past, therefore, must embrace part of our being that we are entirely incompetent to dispose of and can only acknowledge as our destiny. This is the contingency of the past (9/70)”.[14] In regretting, we encounter “the fact that what might possibly not have existed now exists”, which he calls “the primordial contingency (原始的偶然性) “ in the sense that such fact cannot be explained by any universal principles and “must be recognized as being simply because it is” (9/69). [15] Why is the past regarded not as necessity but as contingency although it always has the character of immovability and unchangeability. The reason is that, he asserts, the element of the future, in other words, the consciousness that it “might possibly not have existed” has already penetrated into the past. Thinking of the future as freedom, he states as follows;

> Contingency is brought to self-consciousness only when it is mediated by freedom. The same holds for temporal modality of the past, since it is only through the mediation of a free “pro-ject” into the future that the modality of the past comes to consciousness (9/72).[16]

The past appears as contingency, which is not the reality that we must resign ourselves to but the one that we should repent, only when we oppose another converse possibility against the fact that has already occurred. The solidity and steadfastness of the past are neither because of a reality that the past would possess in nature, nor because of the potentiality of memories.

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[12] However, we must not overlook the fact that Tanabe already mentions the concept of metanoesis (懺悔) in “Eternity・History・Action” (7/119).
[13] Tanabe Hajime, *Philosophy as Metanoetics*, p. 249.
[14] Ibid., p. 65.
[15] Ibid., p. 64.
[16] Ibid., p. 67.

Put in the context of "metanoesis", regret or repentance means, on one hand, grieving over the past events that we can never change, but on the other hand, we cannot repent what we have done without some consciousness that hopes for a possibility different from the reality that happened. Such attitude toward the past moves us to act further in another way, building up the relation in which future freedom is made possible by past contingency. It is here that the ground of the irreversibility of time lies, which means that "time is determined by the past and breaks through this determination toward the future" (9/75).[17] Bearing in mind Augustine and Nishida, Tanabe still maintains as follows; "Time is never horizontal; it is always sloped. Unless its process is so conceived, it cannot be called time" (9/74–75).[18]

4. Eschatology and the "Cut"

However, Tanabe does not use the concept of "cut" here. Though it has already become an important term in his philosophy, it is not linked with the problem of time[19]. Then, when does he come to comprehend the idea of a "cut" as the central conception of his theory of time? It is not until around 1947 or 48, when he struggled the problem of eschatology in *the Dialectic of Christianity* (『キリスト教の弁証』, 1949).

The notion of an instant has played a crucial role in Tanabe's philosophy of time , but it is only after *Philosophy as Metanoetics* that he comes to compare it to a "cut". It is partly because of the influence of Kierkegaard's idea that an instant is "an atom of eternity", but it is mainly because Tanabe finds the present to be the locus where the fundamental conversion of existence occurs. As is shown above, there is no temporal medium or interposition between the disappearance of the old self and the appearance of the new self. Rather, transformative change is called the self-

[17] Ibid., p. 69.
[18] Ibid.
[19] We assume that it is in the late 1930s when Tanabe introduced the idea of "the self-negativity of the species (種の自己否定性)" into his theory of "logic of species (種の論理)" that the "cut" itself (not the "cut" understood as the instant) becomes the important concept in Tanabe's thought. For this, see Takehana, Yōsuke (2015). As is shown below, what makes Tanabe connect the "cut" with the problem of time is eschatology. However, it can be said that the "cut" is potentially related to his philosophy of time before he speaks of eschatology if we consider that in his thought the "cut" illustrates a dynamic structure of the individual which has its real existence in the aspect of the present.

awareness of "death-and-resurrection". Just like the relation between the front and back of a coin, negation as the death of the self and affirmation as the rebirth of the self are completely simultaneous.

Yet Tanabe's thought after *Metanoetics* was not directly oriented toward examining the essential structure of an instant in a more concretely manner. His philosophical interest at that time centered on reconsidering the meaning of community from the perspective of religious philosophy. *The Dialectic of Christianity* is the result of such efforts. Struggling with the Christian question of what is the end time led him to understand the instant as something more than a mere indivisible part of time or some sort of incarnation of eternity. That is the concept of the "cut".

In my opinion, what gives Tanabe an opportunity to introduce this idea into his philosophy of time is the thought of Karl Barth (1886–1968). In *the Epistle to the Romans* (*Der Römerbrief*), Barth understands Jesus as the end of time, and says; "as Christ, Jesus is the plane which lies beyond our comprehension. The plane which is known to us, He intersects [durchschneiden] vertically, from above".[20] In the Resurrection of Jesus, according to Barth, the two planes, that is, the unknown world and this world, touch each other in the way that "[the former] touches it (the latter) as a tangent touches a circle, that is, without touching it".[21] Taking these parts into consideration, Tanabe understands Barth's thought as "touching without touching which means the creative joint through cutting"(10/72). It is here that Tanabe refers to the "cut" for the first time in the context of the theory of time. We can infer that when he sees Barth using the word "schneiden" or "durchschneiden" (intersect or cut through), he is immediately aware of the similarity with Dedekind's idea. To use Tanabe's phrase, both ideas mean "the paradox of joining through cutting" (13/345).

As is well known, eschatology was one of central problems in 20th century theology. Tanabe has an existential interpretation of eschatology under the influence of Barth and Rudolf Bultmann (1884–1976). The characteristic of his understanding is the assertion that the end is considered as the very event at "this now self". Simply put, the self is "a terminal existence (終末的存在) " (10/116). Instead of existing in the future, the end is every present, which means the ground of the self. By way of such existentialist understanding of the end time, the "cut" becomes the most important concept in his philosophy of time. This is evident where Tanabe uses the

[20] Karl Barth, *The Epistle to the Romans,* trans. by Edwyn C. Hoskyns, London: Oxford University Press, 1933, pp. 29–30
[21] Ibid., p.30.

idea of the cut joint, which originally refers to the essence of Jesus in Barth, in order to conceptualize the present as the possibility of continuity.

The momentary present must be understood as a “cut”. This is Tanabe’s original insight. Compared with it, the understanding of the instant as the indivisible or the atom seems to be still something negative which does not reach the affirmative definition. Nishida would use “the continuity of the discontinuity (非連続の連続)”, but its definition is tautological.

Connecting the concept of the “cut” with the problem of the end, one can properly express the simultaneousness of disappearance and emergence without which the notion of the momentary present would be impossible. The property of disappearance is indispensable in order that temporal continuity is totally distinguished from mathematical and spatial continuity. Time must fade away. However, just disappearing would not make time real. In order for disappearance to be real, paradoxically, there must be emergence. Does time disappear first and then emerge as new? It is impossible that there is some passage of time between the disappearance and the emergence. If some time passes, there would exist a state between the disappearance and the emergence and one falls into an infinite regression. If we try to avoid such difficulty, one of the possible choices is acknowledging the reality of an instant where the disappearance and the emergence live together, as Plato and Kierkegaard thought. In Tanabe’s idea, the overlap of the two totally opposed events is neither a paradox nor a contradiction, but a “cut”.

Simply put, the cut (Schnitt in German) in mathematics is to partition numbers into two sets A and B so that all numbers of A are less than all numbers of B. If a unique number is defined by such partition, that is, by a cut, there is no gap between A and B and the two sets are continuous. To use a number line representation, continuum means that a boundary surface made by cutting a number line is necessarily included either in A or in B. Suppose that the system of numbers is made complete by using the rational numbers. If this assumption were true, every number would be determined by cuts in which the boundary surface as the determined number is included in either of the two sets. Actually, however, there arise the cuts which have no boundary surface. In this case, we can cut off a number line without touching any rational numbers. Because rational numbers are dense in a number line, in other words, we can divide off a line indefinitely, there can be the cuts in which A contains no greatest element and at the same time B contains no smallest element. Such cuts have many gaps everywhere. Therefore, we must abandon the assumption that all numbers can be understood as rational number, and

conceive the numbers different from the rational number anew. These are nothing but irrational numbers. This is the outline of Dedekind's idea although it is not strict mathematically.

Tanabe comprehends such idea of the cut derived from Dedekind in the two opposite meanings. Namely, the "cut" means the beginning and the end or the creation and the destruction of the temporal continuity. The disappearance of time that occurs at every instant is expressed by the side of the "cut" as the end. The "cut" divides off the given continuity and destroys it each time it is newly born. In this sense, we are always faced with the end of time. Yet Dedekind's "cut" means, as is mentioned above, just the partition of numbers into two sets and therefore it does not include such negation of continuity. Furthermore, Tanabe's understanding of the "cut" as the cutt*ing* or the practice of the "cut" has no relation to Dedekind's thought.

Seen from the perspective of emergence, which is the other meaning of the "cut", however, Tanabe's idea is closer to that of Dedekind. Dedekind's aim is to define irrational numbers by the conception of the cut and, on the basis of this, to show the continuity of real numbers. Namely, the continuity is demonstrated through the cut. To "create [erschaffen]"[22] irrational numbers in Dedekind, from Tanabe's viewpoint, means to create every momentary present. Tanabe states "the present as a 'cut' must be equivalent to an irrational number" (13/348). In addition, just as the becoming of irrational numbers leads to the demonstration of the continuity of real numbers, the becoming of each present makes time continuous for Tanabe. Since Tanabe regards the temporality as the fundamental condition for historical reality, there emerges the structure of the present as eternity ceaselessly penetrating into history and laying the basis for it. This notion of the manifestation of eternity into history is what he calls "historicism".

Yet it must be noted again that the present as "cut" is composed of disappearance in addition to emergence in order for the continuity to be the continuity *of time.* In this sense, the present comes into existence only through being cut, or more accurately, through cutting itself. The reason why Tanabe discusses the negativity of nothingness, or the dynamism of action, in explaining the meaning of the "cut" is that he tries to emphasize the simultaneousness of "creation" and extinction. For Tanabe, therefore, Dedekind's cut is not the momentary present itself but the best representation of the transformative structure of the present. To use

[22] Richard Dedekind, *Stetigkeit und irrationale Zahlen*, Braunschweig: Friedr. Vieweg & Sohn, 1912, S.14.

Tanabe's own words, "the 'cut' is none other than a symbol which self-negative nothingness has for the agent of action" (12/321).

The possibility of time on the basis of the instant created by a "cut" means that the present mediates the past and the future. According to Tanabe, it does not mean that the transcendent present encompasses the past and the future as in Nishida. The two aspects of time are connected by the nothingness the "cut" brings about, in Tanabe's words, by "the knife of nothingness" which "has no thickness" (12/321). Such a momentary present is called "the time-between structure of the present" (現在の中間時的構造). Paying attention to Albert Schweitzer's belief that the ethics of Jesus are interim-ethics which are only valid until the arrival of the end,[23] Tanabe ascribes a similar position to the structure of the present itself. That is, "the time-between structure of the present" means the doubleness of the present which includes "already" and "not yet". He says;

> The time-between does not mean the mere medium between the past and the future, but the creative cut which acts as the negative transformation of absolute nothingness. Such a cut is made active through absolutely negating identical time and throwing it into the depth of eschatological nothingness and emerging in the crisis as the discontinuity in the present negated by eschatological time (10/113).

It is evident that the time constantly born on the basis of the "cut" is irreversible, because, according to Tanabe, time is always coming to an end and starting anew. To express it metaphorically, we never step into the same flow of time. The close link between the end and the "cut" brings to the temporal structure asymmetry, which enables time to be irreversible.

In order for the end to be a genuine end in the first place, the state of the end would have to be permanent (although it cannot be said that it is permanent if time is over). Yet insofar as the present as a "cut" is the end and at the same time the beginning of time, the end itself has not come yet. As is discussed in *Metanoetics*, what brings about every beginning is the act called Other-power that transcends the self. Therefore we have no choices but to believe in and expect the next beginning that makes time continuous. This means, at the same time, that such an expected beginning may not arrive. If it does not, the real end reveals itself. In this sense, the future takes on the character of uncertainty. In "Ontology of Life or Dialectic of

[23] See Albert Schweitzwer, *The Mystery of the Kingdom of God*, 1914.

Death”(「生の存在学か死の弁証法か」, 1962) Tanabe states that time unlike space is asymmetric and irreversible and says that “time participates in eternity which has no beginning and no birth in the direction of the past but, on the contrary, retains the possibility of the end and the uncertainty of its arrival instead of having no end and no mortality in the direction of the future” (13/534–535). The uncertainty of the future that does not guarantee even the next rebirth leads to a renewed valuing of the past precisely at this present awareness. In other words, we are constantly living new lives through the mediation of the future. Here emerges, we could think, the mediation from the future and the irreversibility of time in a different way than before because it is the problem of death that gives reality to such end and irreversible time. For Tanabe, the future is no longer what we can realize through actions as he thought in “ Eternity・History・Action”, but something unknown and indefinite constantly exposed to death.

If we consider the concept of death in relation to a double meaning of the “cut” we have seen above, death will have two implications: death in the “cutting” present and death as uncertain future. In this case, Tanabe emphasizes death in the former sense. For the awareness of death named “eschatological conversion” (13/543) can never arise in total death. This awareness extends through the possibility of a complete death and is incessantly exposed to it. This fact forgotten, Tanabe believes, death transmutes itself into “the notion of limit which represents its mere possibility” (13/528) as in Heidegger. Yet it would be possible to object that death to be realized is never death itself. In order to judge in what sense death at the “cutting” present could be considered as real, we need to take into account the problem of the dead spoken of in Tanabe’s later years. This is something which I will leave for future consideration.

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The Present of Difference and the Present of Identity
Kuki's Conception of Time

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Abstract: *Kuki Shūzō's oeuvre is characterized by tensions between insistence on what is phenomenologically "given" to consciousness and the principle of identity, from which derives his speculative philosophy. The principle of identity is mainly represented by the metaphysics of the eternal return of the same, of which temporality is the "eternal present", i.e. the present of identity. The "given concrete" is embodied by the contingent encounter common to different individuals, of which temporality is the present of the encounter, i.e. the present of difference. This paper aims to show the originality of Kuki's phenomenology of the present, i.e. of the contingent encounter, which is his genuine first philosophy and which is prior to his speculative philosophy based on the principle of identity, from which derive the idea of the present of identity, the definition of contingency as "negation of necessity", and the "metaphysical point of view" on contingency as possibility. However, despite this primacy of his phenomenology and the ambivalence between the present of difference and the present of identity in his thought, Kuki eventually deepened the present of identity in his speculative and existential philosophy of destiny based on the idea of the "assimilation" of others towards the identity of the I. By explaining how Kuki implicitly systematizes the tension between these two presents, this paper thus also insists on the crucial importance of the principle of identity in Kuki's thought, on which the secondary literature in Japanese and European languages does not focus.*

Introduction

Kuki Shūzō's oeuvre is characterized by tensions between an insistence on the principle of identity and the "given concrete" (与えられた具体).[1] Deployed by

[1] 『九鬼周造全集』[Collected works of Kuki Shūzō] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, 1981–1982), 12 vols [KSZ for short]. KSZ 1, 7.

Kuki against the idea of an abstract universal, the given concrete is phenomenologically embodied by the contingent encounter common to different individuals, of which temporality is the present of the encounter, i.e. the present of difference. The logic of identity is principally represented by the metaphysics of the eternal return of the same, of which temporality is the "eternal present", i.e. the present of identity. Although the present of any particular encounter is always different from the present of another encounter, i.e. from what occurred in the past and from what will occur in the future, the idea of the eternal return of the same implies by definition the repetition of an identical thing. This idea of the eternal return is therefore a pure application of the principle of identity in the cosmological field, whereby a present thing has already existed identically in the past, and will also exist identically in the future: that is why it can be called the "eternal present". Indeed, the idea of the eternal return is a characteristic of metaphysics which stands beyond what is given to consciousness, whereas the phenomenological consciousness, which examines, in contrast, what is given to itself as consciousness, cannot know whether what is currently given to itself is identical to what existed in a previous life or to what will exist in a future life.

The main concerns of this paper are to show two things: firstly, the originality of Kuki's phenomenology of the present, and, secondly, the manner in which Kuki implicitly systematizes this tension between the present of difference and the present of identity.

The Present as Temporality of Contingency, i.e. of Encounter

According to Kuki, the "temporality of contingency is the *present*, of which the scheme is the 'now'",[2] because "the contingent is the encounter in the present".[3] More precisely, this encounter occurs "here and now", *hic et nunc*:

> Contingency in the most basic sense lies in the crossing between two or more than two causal series, and it is accomplished in the "here and now" (*hic et*

[2] KSZ 2, 209.
[3] KSZ 2, 210.

> *nunc*). It is determined by the spatial "here" and the temporal "now".[4] Contingency. . . refers to the individual and each individual event.[5]

The individual implies contingency, i.e. *hic et nunc* encounter, because the individual appears only by encounter with others. Phenomenologically, it is not the individual which is originary, but the encounter.[6] The encounter between two individuals occurs in a present *moment*, but also in a particular place, because the simultaneity of the encounter implies space, in this case the spatiality of *this place*: it is only in a particular and concrete moment and place that an encounter occurs. Kuki calls this "simultaneous contingency".[7]

The encounter is the moment of the now which breaks the horizontal continuity of time, i.e. the intentionality of consciousness aiming at the horizon of possibility, of future. The contingent strikes my consciousness which constitutes time: "what is hoped in the future is not the contingent. The contingent must be what is affected only in actuality [現在性に於いてのみ触発されるもの]".[8] There is no *constitution* of phenomenon by the subject, but a simple "affection", a simple contact, a simple touch [触], between consciousness and a mere given: in short, it is a mere encounter. We also notice that the word "contact" has etymologically the same meaning as "contingency": the Latin word *contactus* derives from *contingo*, composed by *con-*, "with", and *tango*, "touch". The contingent present that Kuki talks about is not an abstract mathematical point criticized by some philosophers of time, but the moment of "contact", i.e. the moment of "encounter" between a given and consciousness. This is why, according to Kuki, "the contingent in general is what creates oneself [*sōzō sareru* 創造される] in actuality".[9] His point is that the contingent, which is not constituted by the subject, appears to consciousness by creating itself spontaneously as an encounter. Regarding the idea of the creation in the present, Kuki seems to be inspired by Husserlian idea of the "originary

[4] KSZ 2, 135.
[5] KSZ 2, 301.
[6] See Simon Ebersolt シモン・エベルソルト,「与えられるものとしての偶然—九鬼偶然論の現象学的解釈の試み」[The Contingent as Given. An Essay of Phenomenological Interpretation of Kuki's Theory of Contingency],『理想』[The Ideal] 698 (March 2017): 116-28. We problematize the phenomenological significations of Kuki's idea of "phenomenon" and "given" as contingent encounter, on which the secondary literature in Japanese and European languages does not focus.
[7] KSZ 2, 128.
[8] KSZ 2, 210 (emphasis added).
[9] Ibid.

impression" (*Urimpression*), which he presents in a lecture on phenomenology.[10] The originary impression, defined as "new now" (*neue Jetzt*), "originary creation" (*Urschöpfung*, which Kuki translated by *gen-sōzō* 原創造), "is not born as something produced", but rather is *genesis spontanea*, "originary generation" (*Urzeugung*).[11] It is "the absolute non-modified, the originary source of all consciousness and of all subsequent beings".[12] Kuki adds that it "is not what has been produced in consciousness", but "something completely new".[13] However, Husserl does not deal with contingency or encounter in those passages. It is Kuki who, by translating *genesis spontanea* as *gūzen hassei* 偶然発生 (contingent generation), discovered, within the creativity of the originary impression of the present, the phenomenon of contingency, i.e. of encounter. In Kuki's thought, the originary impression necessarily implies the phenomenon of encounter (or "contact", "affection") between a mere given and consciousness. Let us also note that, in those passages, neither Kuki nor Husserl precisely define the concept of creation, but we can be sure that they do not consider it as a creation by the will of a subject (Abrahamic God's ex nihilo creation, Platonician demiurge's production, or Artist's *poiesis*). Creation seems to be merely considered as something new, a new appearance. And, in Kuki's thought, it is the phenomenon of encounter as such (and not an almighty subject) which is creative. In other words, it is not the one (the subject), but the two, i.e. the phenomenon of encounter between a mere given and consciousness, which is originary, creative.

Therefore, in *The Problem of Contingency*, Kuki asserts the following on the same page:

1) "[T]he *contingent* in general is what *creates* oneself in actuality".

2) "[T]he contingent is the *encounter in the present*".

3) "[W]hat makes the original contingent contingent lies in the actuality which appears as contingent at the moment of the *given* 'now' [原始偶然が偶然たる所以は与えられた「いま」の瞬間に偶然する現在性に存する]".[14]

Even the "original contingent", which is often considered a mere metaphysical idea by some researchers,[15] is fundamentally a phenomenon which

[10] Edmund Husserl, *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins* (Halle a.d.S.: Max Niemeyer, 1928), 451; quoted in KSZ 10, 160.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid., 423; KSZ 10, 159–160.
[13] KSZ 10, 161.
[14] KSZ 2, 210.

appears in the 'now'. In "What is Anthropology?" (1938) and "The Emotion of Surprise and Contingency" (1939), Kuki asserts that "the fact itself actually given is nothing but the original contingent"[16] and even talks about the "given original contingent".[17] The contingent, or the encounter, is "given" to consciousness as it "creates oneself" in the present, as it appears spontaneously as contingent. In other words, *the contingent gives itself*.

It is at this present moment that there is an intuition, *sōshiteki ni ataerareru chokkan* 創始的に与えられる直観 ("intuition originally giving itself"), which is Kuki's translation of Husserlian *originär gebende Anschauung*.[18] *Gebende*, which derives from the present participle of the verb *geben* (to give), was translated in an active sense by recent translators: *ataeru hataraki o suru* 与える働きをする[19] or *ataeru* 与える.[20] Why did Kuki not translate *gebende* by *ataeru*, of which the active sense is more obvious than *ataerareru*? The ending *reru/rareru* れる/られる may signify possibility, passivity and spontaneity (in Japanese *jihatsusei* 自発性), but it is spontaneity which best expresses the tension between the intuitionist and transcendental aspects of Husserlian phenomenology.[21] The characteristic *originär gebende* of intuition describes the reflexive aspect of what "offers itself" (*sich darbietet*) or "gives itself" (*sich gibt*)[22] to consciousness which receives it *at the same time*, *hic et nunc*. Through the intuition of what gives itself, consciousness is

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[15] For example Hashimoto Takashi 橋本崇,「シェリングと九鬼周造」[Schelling and Kuki Shūzō], in Sakabe Megumi 坂部恵, Washida Kiyokazu 鷲田清一 and Fujita Masakatsu 藤田正勝, eds.,『九鬼周造の世界』 [Kuki Shūzō's World] (Kyoto: Mineruva Shobō ミネルヴァ書房, 2002), 245–64.

[16] KSZ 3, 48.

[17] KSZ 3, 172.

[18] Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie* (Halle a.d.S.: Max Niemeyer, 1913) [*Ideen I* for short], 43; Kuki's translation in KSZ X, p. 13; KSZ III, p. 92.

[19] Watanabe Jirō 渡辺二郎 in Husserl, 『イデーン』 [*Ideen*] I-I (Tokyo: Misuzu shobō みすず書房, 1979), 117 ; Sakakibara Tetsuya 榊原哲也 in『現象学事典』[Dictionary of Phenomenology] (Tokyo: Kōbun-dō 弘文堂, 1994), 427.

[20] Sugimura Yasuhiko 杉村靖彦 in Jean Greisch,『『存在と時間』講義』[Lectures on *Being and Time*] (Tokyo: Hōsei Daigaku shuppan-kyoku 法政大学出版局, 2007), 60.

[21] For more details, see Ebersolt,「与えられるものとしての偶然ー九鬼偶然論の現象学的解釈の試み」, 118–119. See also Paul Ricœur's comments in Husserl, *Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie et une philosophie phénoménologique pures* (Paris: Gallimard, 1950), 78, n. 1; 14, n. 6–7.

[22] Husserl, *Ideen I*, 43.

simultaneously passive and active: passive because it leaves what gives itself to give itself; active because it receives by giving it meaning.

As it is descriptive of the fact which does *itself* by itself, without a deliberate act of a subject-agent, spontaneity is close to the function of a reflexive verb which describes both the passivity and the activity of the grammatical subject. *Ataerareru* as spontaneity expresses *at the same time* the passivity and the activity of the intuition, whereas *ataeru*, for which recent translators opted, has no passive nuance. The spontaneity of the *-rareru* form allowed Kuki to describe a phenomenon which is neither the Kantian phenomenon, i.e. an object "constituted by the subject of knowledge",[23] nor an object prior to a subject which would simply be submitted to it, but a phenomenon where a given and a consciousness encounter each other in intuition.

It is possible to understand Kuki's translation of *originär* in the same way. Nowadays, this notion is translated by *genteki ni* 原的に[24] or *hongenteki ni* 本原的に,[25] i.e. by characters which mean "source", "beginning", "origin". Kuki translates *originär* by the neologism of *sōshiteki ni* 創始的に, which implies the idea of "beginning" (創 and 始), but also the idea of "build for the first time" (創).[26] The originality of Kuki's translation therefore lies in this idea of *creation* (in Japanese, *sōzō* 創造), which means that the intuition gives itself spontaneously like a first creation, when "what gives itself originally [*sōshiteki ni*]",[27] "what creates oneself [*sōzō sareru*] in actuality",[28] i.e. the given contingent, offers itself *hic et nunc* to consciousness like a first creation, at the beginning (without its constitution by the categories of the "subject of knowledge").

Our interpretation of this translation of Husserlian intuition is not arbitrary and is not unrelated to Kuki's phenomenology of the temporality of contingency. The originary character of the intuition of contingent phenomenon is clearly asserted by Kuki even in *The Problem of Contingency*:

[23] KSZ 10, 12.
[24] Watanabe in Husserl,『イデーン』 I-I, 117 ; Sugimura in Greisch, 『『存在と時間』講義』, 60.
[25] Sakakibara in『現象学事典』, 427.
[26] 『新漢語林』[The New Wood of *kango*] (Tokyo: Taishū-kan shoten 大修館書店, 2004–2008).
[27] Husserl, *Ideen I*, 43 ; Kuki's translation in KSZ 10, 13.
[28] KSZ 2, 210.

> If we intuit [直観する] things in the flesh and originary, it is not contingency as negation of necessity which is lived, neither is it contingency in relation to the possibility which is understood. The original radical and primary fact is the fact of seeing straightforwardly the contingent as real in the present. Then, secondarily, it can be thought the cases where we see obliquely the future possible [未来的な可能] as orientation towards the future, and the cases where we see obliquely the passed necessary [過去的な必然] as persistency from the past.[29]

For Kuki, it is "intuition", i.e. the fact of "seeing straightforwardly" the contingent in the present, "in the flesh and originary", which is the "original radical and primary fact". Contingency "as negation of necessity" and contingency "in relation to possibility" are only "secondary". Using the ideas of *modus rectus* and *modus obliquus* in Franz Brentano and Oskar Becker,[30] Kuki asserts that it is from the position of the actual real, "straightforwardly" seen, that we "obliquely" see a possible future or a passed necessary: it is only after having intuited the contingent given, i.e. after having encountered the given *hic et nunc*, that we "obliquely" see contingency as the possibility and negation of necessity (which are traditional definitions of contingency in modal logic), or that we move towards a possible future or that we remain committed to a necessary past. It is only "in the field of logic, which has already left the immediacy of concrete experience [体験], that contingency is defined as negation of necessity, or the correlate of possibility".[31] These logical definitions are only ("oblique" and "secondary") derivatives of "intuition", i.e. of "immediacy of concrete experience" as ("straightforward" and "primary") encounter.

Throughout Kuki's entire philosophy of contingency there is an ambivalence between the phenomenological and logical aspects. Contingency as a given encounter and contingency as the *possibility* of *not* being are found to coexist. Yet, we see here that Kuki asserts explicitly the originary, primary character of the concretely given intuition in contrast to the idea of contingency as the logical negation of necessity or as a correlate of possibility. A phenomenology of the contingent encounter is clearly the *genuine first philosophy of Kuki*, i.e. prior to his

[29] KSZ 2, 211–12.
[30] Franz Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, ed. Oskar Kraus (Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1925), vol. 2, 225 ; Oskar Becker, « Zur Logik der Modalitäten », *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, no. 11 (1930): 539.
[31] KSZ 2, 212.

"speculative philosophy", which from he derives the definition of contingency as the "negation of necessity"[32] and the "metaphysical point of view" on contingency as possibility. The contingent encounter in the present is the way by which all phenomena appear. It is the unconditioned principle of all phenomena, the phenomenality of all phenomena.[33]

From the point of view of history of philosophy, the privilege of the present can also be found in Augustinian and Husserlian philosophies of time, to which Kuki makes reference.[34] Augustine explains that "neither the future, nor the past exist" *as such*, but that there is only the "present of the past" (i.e. memory, *memoria*), the "present of the present" (i.e. intuition, *contuitus*) and the "present of the future" (i.e. expectation, *expectatio*), which "exist in our spirit"[35] in the present. It is only by recalling in the present in our spirit that the past exists and it is only by expecting in the present in our spirit that the future exists. In Husserl, the "originary impression" happens in the "now",[36] which expands itself in a depth ever more remote. "Retention" is an expanded present, which holds in the present the recent past as if the past still belonged to the present, and "protention" is a present expectation of a near future which is hence already present. The originality of Kuki consists in discovering the immediacy of the lived experience of the present in the phenomenon of the contingent encounter between two individuals, a topic that is absent from Augustine's and Husserl's works. According to Augustine, the object of the attention "elapses at one point" (*in puncto praeterit*), "but the attention stays" (*sed tamen perdurat attentio*).[37] Husserl seeks to ground the temporality of intentional experiences on what he calls the "absolute flow of consciousness, constitutive of time".[38] The present in Kuki's thought is not a present which stays, i.e. the present of consciousness which stays, but the moment of the "contact", the moment of the

[32] Contrary to Obama Yoshinobu's interpretation, which insists on the centrality of this definition: Obama Yoshinobu 小浜善信,『九鬼周造の哲学—漂泊の魂』[Kuki Shūzō's Philosophy: The Wandering Soul] (Kyoto: Shōwa-dō 昭和堂, 2006), 4.
[33] For more details, see Simon Ebersolt, *Contingence et communauté. Kuki Shûzô, philosophe japonais* (PhD diss., Inalco, 2017; forthcoming from Paris, Vrin), Part 3, Chapter 1. Concerning phenomenology and first philosophy, see Jean-Luc Marion, "Phénoménologie de la donation et philosophie première", in *De surcroît. Études sur les phénomènes saturés* (Paris, PUF, 2010), 1–36.
[34] KSZ 10, 152–157; KSZ 11, 132-134; KSZ 4, 12.
[35] Augustine, *Confessiones*, Book 11, Chapter 20.
[36] Husserl, *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*, 451.
[37] Augustine, *Confessiones*, Book 11, Chapter 28.
[38] Husserl, *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*, 428.

"encounter" between the given and consciousness, which is neither sovereign nor merely passive.

Articulation between Contingency and the Eternal Return of the Same

In his paper titled "Metaphysical Time" (1931), Kuki articulates his ideas of contingency and the eternal return of the same. He writes: "the periodic metaphysical time is the temporal form of contingency".[39] Kuki justifies this idea from two points of view; the theoretical and the practical.

Firstly, from a theoretical point of view, contingency can be interpreted as an eternal present. According to Kuki, the eternal present "has no relation neither with the future nor with the past", i.e. it "has no horizon neither of the future nor of the past". [40] Therefore, it is possible to phenomenologically interpret the "eternal present" as the moment of the contingent encounter insofar as it is the moment where the horizons of future and past are broken by the encounter. Like the moment of the contingent encounter, the phenomenon of the "eternal present", i.e. the "present" of the eternal return of the same, is characterized by a "discontinuity between moments [契機]".[41]

The phenomenological articulation between contingency and the eternal present can be seen in another passage (a lecture on Heidegger in 1931–1932), where Kuki refers to Nishida:

> The new now dismembers relentlessly the old now. Therefore, by stressing what is new, we can talk about the death of each moment and the birth of each moment. Moreover, as the present is a point without extent and time endures [持続], we can say that the essence of time is the continuity of discontinuity [非連続の連続].[42]

"Duration" embodies the "continuity" of time. The Japanese word *jizoku* 持続 is a reference to Bergson's concept of duration. The "new now", that Kuki also called "contingent generation" (*genesis spontanea*, 偶然発生) in the same passage,

[39] KSZ 3, 195.
[40] KSZ 3, 193.
[41] KSZ 3, 192. Cf. *Propos sur le temps* [written in French], KSZ 1, 291: "*discontinuité* des éléments".
[42] KSZ 10, 161.

embodies the idea of "discontinuity", because it is "without extent", i.e. it neither has a horizon neither of the future or of the past; each birth of a moment and each death of a moment embodies "discontinuity". Therefore, time as a whole is the intersection between continuity and discontinuity. In other words, time is the "continuity of discontinuity", an idea which had earlier appeared in Nishida's work, in particular in "The Temporal and the Intemporal" (1931), to which Kuki makes reference in the same passage. The "continuity of discontinuity", according to Nishida, is a concept which synthesizes his theories of time and alterity, i.e. the "self-determination of the eternal now" (永遠の今の自己限定) and the "I and Thou" (私と汝).[43] The "I" as the place of absolute nothing is, from a temporal point of view, an "eternal now", i.e. a present of consciousness which determines the past and the future as a unifying force which remains at the bottom of the relentless stream of the phenomenona of consciousness. This now is called "eternal" not because it is supratemporal, but merely because it differs from the succession of 'nows' specific to spatialized time (t 0, t 1, t 2, etc.). The continuity of discontinuity points out each moment of breaks in the continuity of experience where the "I", by the phenomenon of encounter, is "in contact" (接する)[44] with the "Thou" in the "eternal now". The "Thou", as an "absolute other" (絶対の他), appears immediately *in me* (私に於いて) as a field of consciousness, and therefore splits apart this I which forms himself continually. However, at the same time it makes the I anew, i.e. makes it reborn. The continuity of discontinuity is therefore a self which, in each moment, in front of multiple others, dismembers itself by conversing with the past and renews itself by projecting into the future.[45]

However, the most explicit theoretical articulation between contingency and the eternal return can be found in the second part of *The Problem of Contingency* (1935):

> We can think that periodic metaphysical time, like transmigration, is a successive contingent, i.e. a single [単一の] simultaneous contingent which

[43] See Kobayashi Toshiaki 小林敏明,『西田哲学を開くー〈永遠の今〉をめぐって』[Open up Nishida's Philosophy: Around the Question of the "Eternal Now"] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2013), 97-142; Ōta Hironobu 太田裕信,『西田幾多郎の行為の哲学』[The Philosophy of Action in Nishida Kitarō] (PhD diss., Kyoto University, 2016), 53–54, 65.

[44] 『西田幾多郎全集』 [Collected works of Nishida Kitarō] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1965–1966), 19 vols [NKZ for short]. NKZ 6, 433.

[45] NKZ VI, 236, 256–257. See also NKZ VI, 264–265, 268; NKZ VI, p. 343.

> comes to existence according to identity [同一性をもって] by repeating itself an infinite number of times again and again (πάλιν καὶ πάλιν) (see Kuki, "Metaphysical time"). The successive contingent is in fact the periodic contingent [回帰的偶然].[46]

As seen above, the "simultaneous contingent" is the phenomenon of the *hic et nunc* encounter between two individuals. The "successive contingent", Kuki writes, "takes the form of a simple repetition of an identical [同一の] simultaneous contingent. And it is in the fact that the same simultaneous contingent is offered [提供される] by repetition that the contingency of the successive contingent makes a particular impression on us".[47] Kuki thinks about events which recur in the linear time. For example, an individual leaves on a journey on the 4th of the month. He goes by train on the platform number 4. He gets in the number 4 carriage. There are 4 passengers in this carriage.[48] This succession of 4 is contingent. The successive contingency consists in the fact that an event, i.e. a unique encounter (here, between the traveller and the number 4), which negates the principle of identity whereby A=A, precisely recurs according to the principle of identity. Kuki applies this scheme to the idea of the eternal return of the same: the "periodic metaphysical time" would be a "successive contingent", renamed on occasion "periodic contingent".

However, is this application not purely formal, i.e. abstract from any content? Even if there is a symbolic repetition of the number 4, all the encounters are distinct from each other. Moreover, this symbolic identity is not reducible to the repetition of a strictly identical event from the point of view of content. Why did Kuki strive to reduce the eternal return of the same to contingency, in particular to a "periodic" contingency which "recurs" merely symbolically?

Actually, there is a practical background in Kuki's thought which explicates this problematic theoretical reduction. From a practical point of view, it is in a development on what Kuki calls the "meaning of human life" that he articulates his phenomenology of contingency and his cosmology of the eternal return of the same: *it is the moment where the contingent given is considered as a destiny which articulates these two aspects of his philosophy.*

[46] KSZ 2, 132.
[47] KSZ 2, 129.
[48] KSZ 2, 130–131.

According to Kuki, the moral challenge is to forcefully assert the contingent given in the moment of the encounter. In *The Problem of Contingency*, Kuki uses the notion of "existentiality" (実存性) in a passage on the connection between the contingent and destiny: "When the contingent acquires a fundamental and completely personal meaning for human existentiality, the contingent is called destiny [運命]".[49] But what does it mean to "acquire a fundamental and completely personal meaning"? A few pages further on, Kuki asserts that in "destiny in the most basic sense" "one engulfs oneself in contingency [自己を偶然生の中に沈没し] by awakening to oneself with fervour [情熱的自覚], and, hence fundamentally draws upon oneself" [自己を原本的に活かす]. It is not unusual, moreover, for the contingent as destiny to be understood as the eternal present of the periodic metaphysical time".[50] As we can see from the above, there is a general connection between the existence of *amor fati* and the idea of the eternal present, and this demonstrates the 'existential weight' of the speculative theory of the eternal return of the same. By a "fervent self-awakening" specific to the existence of *amor fati*, I consider the contingency of the originary given, the moment of the encounter, as a destiny, an eternal return.

This existential "fervent self-awakening" which connects contingency, destiny, and the eternal return, is based on the logical principle of identity; that is of necessity. In other words, it is a *logicisation* of the contingent, as we can see in the conclusion of *The Problem of Contingency*, in a passage on the meaning of the "theoretical existentiality". As it is a key moment of the connection between the existence of *amor fati* and speculative logic in Kuki's philosophy, I will quote at length:

> The radical meaning of a theoretical system, which gives order and unity to experience, lies in the fact that it seizes the contingency of others, assimilates [同化], and interiorizes [内面化] it in its concreteness towards the identity of the one [一者の同一性]. True judgment should have the task of the interiorization of the contingent on the basis of the contingency of facts in the correlation of the contingent-necessary. The principle of identity [同一律], which is the fundamental principle of thought, is nothing more than the principle of interiorization. "A is A" merely means "me, I am me" [我は我である]. The fundamental meaning of judgment should consist in the fact

[49] KSZ 2, 224.
[50] KSZ 2, 235.

> that it deepens the "Thou" encountered in the "I". It is the idea of judgment which concretely identifies [同一化] the external "Thou" towards the internal identity of the "I". But this should not aim at an empty identity in an Eleatic abstract universality. The interiorization by the principle of identity should be a concrete interiorization limited by the contingency of the "Thou" encountered as a fact. . . . The mere identification, the mere necessitation, by denying any "Thou", any contingency, guides to acosmism [無宇宙論]. The ideal that the theoretical knowledge should attain should not be the mere necessity. It should be the "necessary-contingent" which enjoys fully [満喫] the contingent and which is saturated [飽和] with contingency.[51]

Let us note that this general scheme of theoretical knowledge, i.e. the identification of others within the "I", seems to be inspired by Émile Meyerson. In a lecture where Kuki presents the work of the French epistemologist, he says that "explaining" consists in "identifying" (同一化, *identifier*).[52] Moreover, when "reason conquers the non-rationality [of the given real], the world will return into nothingness, because reason is the faculty which tends, by its very nature, "towards the pure unity, i.e. the vacuum (空虚), i.e. *acosmisme* (無宇宙論)".[53] As is the case for the Eleatics, reason or thought which is based only on the principle of identity and therefore is limited to positing the identity of the one (i.e. its necessity) denies others, any encounter (i.e. any contingency). That is to say, it makes impossible the existence of a world. Such "mere identification", "mere necessitation", tends towards "acosmism". As a philosopher of contingency, of encounter, Kuki rejects the "Eleatic abstract universality". Nevertheless, the principle of identity remains significant in his speculative and existential thought. This is a characteristic of Kuki's philosophy on which researchers have not focused upon to date. More broadly, the crucial importance of the principle of identity within his thought has been overlooked.[54]

The existential affirmation of the contingent by necessitation goes hand in hand with the theoretical scheme of necessitation. In the last paragraph of the conclusion of the book, Kuki states that "the meaning of action in *praxis*" lies in the

[51] KSZ 2, 256–257.
[52] KSZ 8, 207 (in Japanese and French).
[53] KSZ 8, 210 (in French and Japanese).
[54] Even Furukawa Yūji 古川雄嗣, who dealt with the notion of destiny in Kuki's philosophy:『偶然と運命—九鬼周造の倫理学』[Contingent and Destiny: Kuki Shūzō's Ethics] (Kyoto: Nakanishiya shuppan ナカニシヤ出版, 2015).

"fact of assimilating and interiorizing the 'thou' of intersubjective sociality towards the concrete identity of the 'I' who exists".[55] I as-similate others in the I. In others words, others become *similar* to me. When I interiorise or assimilate others in accordance with the principle of identity, i.e. of necessity, I and others become one. This signifies that the contingent becomes a "necessary-contingent". Let us note that the notions of "assimilate" (from *similis*, "same") and *dōka* 同化 (同 signifies "same") have exactly the same meaning: "to make the same".

The scheme of interiorisation, of assimilation, based on the principle of identity, can also be found in the connection between contingency, destiny, and the eternal return of the same. As Kuki says, "by identity of repetition, [the periodic contingent, i.e. the eternal return] takes the modality of the 'necessity of contingency', and has moreover the perspective of coming close to the concept of destiny".[56] In other words, by a "fervent self-awakening" based on the principle of identity, I consider the contingent encounter as something *identical* to an event as it appeared in another life, i.e. as something predestined (destiny), a repetition of the same (eternal return of the same, eternal present). I "assimilate" the difference which appears in the present of encounter with others to an event I experienced in another life. It is a converted perspective due to the principal of identity. I convert the difference into the same, i.e. the present of difference into the present of identity. Therefore, the moment of *difference* between individuals becomes the moment of repetition of the same, where "the I recognizes himself with a trembling surprise",[57] i.e. the moment of *identity*. It is not a matter of surprise at the difference given by the contingent encounter, but a surprise at the identity. There is a repetition of an identity by the "recognition" of the "I" of another life. By this assimilation, I and others become "one body" (一体) in destiny.[58] By this assimilation which ensures the conversion of the present of difference into the present of identity, Kuki implicitly systematizes the tension between these two presents.

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[55] KSZ 2, 259.
[56] KSZ 2, 132.
[57] KSZ 1, 288.
[58] Kuki's nostalgia for the identity of the body is also expressed along with the idea of destiny. In "Rhyme in Japanese Poetry" (KSZ 5, 280 ; KSZ 4, 231), Kuki mentions "the metaphysical demand of recollecting the figure where, in a previous life, one was *one body* when one is faced with the mysterious destiny of love in this fleeting world" (浮世の恋の不思議な運命に前世で一体であった姿を想起しようとする形而上的要求). In an essay entitled "Contingent and Destiny" (KSZ 5, 34), he asserts that "the human being must love his own destiny and become *one body* with destiny".

Conclusion

In conclusion, we can assert that, despite the ambivalence between the present of difference and the present of identity in his philosophy, Kuki eventually deepened the present of identity by way of the idea of the existential assimilation of others towards the identity of the I. In other words, Kuki eventually leans towards the present of identity.

However, it is also possible to deepen the way of the present of difference. This is in fact the approach Kuki takes in his genuine first philosophy, but did not deploy in his practical philosophy. This way would not be a *praxis* of an individual existence (of the "I"), but a *praxis* of *community*. As seen above, here, the present can be interpreted as an "eternal present" insofar as it is a break with the horizons of the past and of the future. However, we must not forget that this break occurs by way of the originary phenomenon of encounter, which is *common* to several individuals, but also *common* to individuals and to a more general context (milieu, people, society). Individuals and context have *memories*, i.e. a dimension of the past, but also *impetus* towards the future, and the break of the present occurs only with memory and impetus. A philosophy of present should not be a pure presentism of encounter between ephemeral individuals who merely assimilate others towards the identity of the "I", but *a philosophy of memory and impetus of community*.

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Kuki Shūzō's Redefinition of Metaphysics Through Contingency

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Abstract: *In this paper, we interpret the Japanese philosopher Kuki Shūzō's* The Problem of Contingency (偶然性の問題)*, focusing on the understanding of contingency as a strategic means to acquire a metaphysical way of doing philosophy. Kuki defines contingency as the negation of necessity and, thus contingency breaks what he considers to be necessity's main feature: identity. This negation of necessity by contingency will follow all the modalities Kuki attributes to necessity (categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive), giving birth to contingent counterparts to each of them. Furthermore, Kuki associates necessity to the being and contingency to nothingness. Considering metaphysics the kind of inquiry that goes beyond the being, that is, beyond necessity, Kuki argues for the proximity between contingency and metaphysics. As contingency negates identity itself, the metaphysical way of doing philosophy can be understood as one which main concern is difference, that is, what does not resolve itself in an identity. However, it does not mean that difference completely lacks identity or necessity, instead difference points toward a complex relationship in which the being is penetrated by nothingness and nothingness is on the way to being. The way of philosophizing based upon difference bears in mind this complexity between the being and nothingness, allowing one to deal with what comes out from the chance encounters that we face. For Kuki, chance encounters are brought about by contingency, there where what could be or not be is still unclear and everything that happens is a surprise. Surprise is a fundamental element for metaphysics, as Kuki understands it, because it will be, rather than identity and the being, the first impulse toward philosophizing.*

Introduction

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Some scholars have described classical Japanese philosophy as an anti-metaphysical thought, stressing this feature as a distinguishing mark of Japanese philosophy. One example is Kato Shuichi, who writes:

> "Probably the reason that Japanese culture as a whole has maintained close contact with the realities of everyday life is that the Japanese people have always disliked leaving the real physical world behind them and ascending into the ethereal realms of metaphysics".[2]

Also, the philosopher Sakabe Megumi:

> ". . . in Japanese thought there is neither the category of Cartesian substance nor any kind of rigid dualism . . . . Perhaps in Japan, in order to remain faithful to traditional thought, there is no need either to 'reverse Platonism' or to 'reexamine the metaphysics of presence, the onto-theo-teological metaphysics'".[3]

This point of view regarding Japanese philosophy has dramatically changed with the advent of modern Japanese philosophy, especially within the circle of the Kyoto School. I would like to give as one example of the metaphysical concerns of modern Japanese philosophy Uehara Mayuko's interpretation of the concept of *basho* (場所) in Nishida Kitarō's thought as a "translation" or "reinterpretation" of the Aristotelian concept of *hypokeimenon*, which is the root of the metaphysical discussions concerned with the problems of the essence and the subject.[4] In more general terms, philosophers of the Kyoto School attempted to overcome what they considered the metaphysical elements of Western philosophy as, for instance, Tanabe Hajime's metanoetics that aimed to transcend speculative philosophy toward

[2] Shuichi Kato, *A History of Japanese Literature: The First Thousand Years*, trans. David Chibbett (Tokyo, New York, and San Francisco: Kodansha International, 1979), p. 2.
[3] Megumi Sakabe, "Mask and Shadow in Japanese Culture: Implicit Ontology in Japanese Thought", in *Modern Japanese Aesthetics: A Reader*, ed. and trans. Michele Marra (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1999), p. 247.
[4] Mayuko Uehara, "La tâche du traducteur en philosophie dans le Japon moderne", in *Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy 3: Origins and Possibilities*, ed. M. Uehara and J. Heisig (Nagoya: Nanzan Institute for Religion & Culture, 2008), pp. 277–294.

a transformative praxis or Nishitani Keiji's focus on the non-dualism of the religious experience of nothingness.

Kuki Shūzō, by his turn, apart from the Kyoto School, takes another path toward the topic of metaphysics, since his philosophy is an unusual encounter between the European continental schools of thought from the beginning of the last century and the intellectual, mostly artistic and poetic, productions of Japan. In this milieu, we find Kuki's main philosophical work *The Problem of Contingency* (偶然性の問題) (1935). A work that employs a somehow analytical approach to the philosophical problem of contingency and, at the same time, affirms that this very question belongs to the realms of metaphysics. This claim brought to his whole philosophical effort a profound contradiction, since he clearly states, in many other writings, that his methodology follows Heidegger's phenomenological-hermeneutical analysis of existence and Bergson's philosophy of life closely. This contradiction led Fujinaka Masayoshi to interrogate, in an article dedicated to Kuki's existential metaphysics,

> "taking Kuki's theory of contingency as his very existential philosophy, why does not Kuki employ an existential analysis? How is it possible to explain the gap between Kuki's idea of an existential philosophy methodology and the fulfillment of his existential philosophy?"[5]

Fujinaka's answer to his inquiry is that Kuki had to distance himself from Heidegger's existential analysis due to divergences regarding their different concepts of time. Fujinaka's interpretation is a correct one. However, it is so only if we take Kuki's concern regarding contingency as a thematic one.

In this paper, I intend to argue that Kuki's philosophy of contingency does not have contingency as the theme of its investigation. Rather than be about contingency, it is about how, following the flow of contingency, we can disclosure a way of doing philosophy, a way of philosophizing that builds a philosophical attitude. Then, through and by contingency's strategy, the questions of nothingness and difference are shown in a renewed light. This way of philosophizing will come to be a redefinition of metaphysics.

[5] Masayoshi Fujinaka, "Kuki Testugaku ni okeru Keijijōgakuteki Jitsuzon no Mondai", *Shisō* 668, no.2 (1980), p. 74, my translation.

Negating Necessity; Affirming Contingency

It is indispensable for Kuki to begin his *The Problem of Contingency* with a straightforward reference to necessity in his definition of contingency: "Contingency is the negation of necessity".[6] This definition, by itself, does not say much unless we pay attention to the emphasis put on *negation*. Following, Kuki polishes his definition of necessity bringing to it an Aristotelian tone: ". . . it [necessity] has within itself the reason for its existence, that a given thing itself preserves itself precisely as it is given. Self-preservation or self-identity is a matter of self-preserving itself at all costs".[7] Self-preservation of its own essence through necessity has no other meaning than identity to itself. In the end, Kuki, making use of a fortuitous Japanese idiom, defines necessity as "that which is necessarily as such" (必ず然か有ること)[8]. Therefore, we realize that necessity *affirms* itself in three ways: identity, preservation and the being.

Contingency as the negation of necessity could be wrongly conceived as which finds itself out of necessity's sphere of identity, preservation and the being. In a certain sense, Kuki would agree with the previous affirmation, that is, contingency is outside identity, preservation, and the being. However, it is outside as something that *is not* identity, preservation, and the being. Here, we have to take some lines to understand the implications of such a definition inside Kuki's philosophy.

I think that the definition of contingency as the negation of necessity could be better understood by looking at the structure of the Japanese language. The Japanese language strictly ends with a verb, and to construct the negative form it is added the plain negative form ない (*nai*) at the end of the verb. This plain negative form can function as an adjective or as a noun. As a noun, it is written with the Chinese character 無い (*nai* or *mu*) which meaning is "nothingness". Thus, reading Kuki by his language, we could better understand what he meant by "contingency is the negation of necessity": contingency is what *does not have* (*is empty of*) identity, preservation, and the being, rather than what is not identity, preservation, and the being. This distinction is important for us speakers of Western languages that, due to our predicate logic, could be easily misled in taking the negation on the following terms: "contingency, not being identity" *is* its opposite (difference), "not being preservation" *is* its opposite (destruction) and "not being the being" *is* its opposite

[6] Shūzō Kuki, *Gūzensei no Mondai* (Tokyo: Iwanami Bunko, 2012), p. 13, my translation.
[7] Ibid., 17; James W. Heisig, Thomas P. Kasulis and John C. Maraldo, ed., *Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011), p. 832.
[8] Kuki, *Gūzensei*, p. 16, my translation.

(non-existence). Rather, contingency, by *not having* necessity, is not merely its opposite, as if necessity and contingency, having strict borderlines, would not relate to each other unless through tension, opposing each other and never coming together, blending, mixing because they would run into a contradiction. It is such understanding that allows Kuki to define contingency as "meaning that which is by chance as such, contingency is that within itself existence does not have enough foundation, that is, an existence that includes negation (否定), that could not be (or be nothing) (無いことのできる)".[9]

Kuki leaves behind at the very beginning a "hard" opposition, "black and white" kind of thought by defining necessity and contingency placing both in a gray area where the most fixated thing we have is contingency's definition as negation. Even if we had necessity firmly rooted in identity, preservation and the being, it would be threatened all the time by its negation's shadow, by the *possibility* of its necessary features being engulfed by nothingness.

Thanks to these ambiguous definitions of contingency and necessity, Kuki can go on to a more systematic analysis of both, giving to each one the same modalities: to the categorical necessity (定言的必然) corresponds the categorical contingency (定言的偶然); to the hypothetical necessity (仮説的必然) corresponds the hypothetical contingency (仮説的偶然); to the disjunctive necessity (離接的必然) corresponds the disjunctive contingency (離接的偶然).[10]

Furthermore, I would like to associate each one of these modalities with one of the features of necessity that I have pointed out, with contingency negating these features according to the modality to which each one belongs. Therefore, identity is associated with categorical necessity, preservation is associated with hypothetical necessity and, finally, the being is associated with disjunctive necessity.

Categorical Necessity and Contingency

Let us start by briefly exploring the categorical necessity and contingency. Categorical necessity and contingency belong to the field of classical logic that is conducted by identity. As Kuki defines it, categorical necessity is the identification between the concept and the essential feature (distinguishing mark), that is, the

[9] Ibid., p. 13, my translation.

[10] According to Obama Yoshinobu, who wrote the explanatory notes for the Iwanami Bunko edition of Kuki's *Gūzensei no Mondai*, Kuki had in mind Kant's transcendental dialectics when he divided necessity and contingency in these three modalities. Kuki, *Gūzensei*, p. 296.

identity shown between the concept (subject) A and an essential attribute (predication) B: A is B. "The essential features are characterized by the fact that if they were negated the concept itself would be negated. For the constitutive content of the concept and the totality of essential attributes form an identity".[11]

What is vital to this way of doing philosophy is the universal determination, that is, a concept that would be identified with a shared attribute belonging to all the members that fall under such a concept. Using Kuki's example; "all clovers have three leaves"; the concept "clover" is essentially identified to the predicate "having three leaves". The negation breaks this logical identity: "not all clovers have three leaves", that is, some do not have three leaves. Here the *question* of the particular and the universal appears. We are dealing here with the exceptionality of a particular that does not fall under the universal, the rule. If we take the side of necessity in this case, we would be willing to do philosophy thinking that contingency is merely a rare, particular occurrence that does not interfere directly in the identity between the concept and its predicate. Kuki names this the "fixed and static" (固定的静的) concept.[12]

Contingency puts at risk this stability by bringing into the stage contingency's dynamicity that problematizes the logical identity (necessity). It is important to stress that Kuki is not invalidating predicate logic as if it was wrong. Instead, he is pointing out that by prioritizing logic and identity over *difference*—that belongs to the particular—we inevitably incur in a fixed and static philosophical doing that ignores and puts aside the dynamics of problematizing, inevitably bringing serious questions. For instance, when we think huge philosophical questions as, for example, that of the human being.[13] Tanaka Kyūbun writes the following about this question:

> "The true 'general concept' for the human beings must not be a 'fixed and static' one, rather it has to be a continually transforming 'dynamic and

[11] Kuki, *Gūzensei*, p. 23; Heisig, Kasulis, and Maraldo, *Japanese Philosophy*, 832.
[12] Kuki, *Gūzensei*, p. 46.
[13] Kuki, in the lines of a *tanka*, expresses such question:

How many years have I spent
Lamenting to myself
This body of mine-
As difficult to grasp
As a category?

Shūzō Kuki, "Sonnets from Paris," in *Kuki Shūzō: A Philosopher's Poetry and Poetics*, ed. and trans. Michael F. Marra (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004), p. 92, poem 128.

> generative' one that envelops and always pays attention to the human contingencies that are the exceptional 'particulars'".[14]

However, necessity does not easily give up. *For* "this" particular to be as such outside the concept it *should* have fallen under, there *must* have been some *necessary reason*. As "The Positivist" says in the humorous poem written by Kuki, titled "Yellow Face", to explain the reason why Asians have a yellow face:

> It seems that our ancestors
> Somehow overate
> Pumpkins and tangerines.
> Maybe they also drank too much
> Of the Yellow River and the Yellow Sea.[15]

From the field of logic, we enter into the field of reason and experience of the hypothetical necessity and contingency, where the priority is preservation.

Hypothetical Necessity and Contingency

Kuki attributes three modalities to the hypothetical necessity: rational, causal, and teleological. They appear to explain that categorical contingencies are, in fact, necessary; there must have been a reason for an exceptional particular to exist. Expressing logically this particular, we would have: "A is because of B", or "if B, therefore A". The logical conclusion is that to a particular to be as such, not adapting itself to its concept, there must have been a *necessary reason* behind it. This conclusion that belongs to the rational hypothetical necessity can be proven by two means: empirically and teleologically. Thus, the rational modality of the hypothetical necessity and contingency (as much as the categorical necessity and contingency) belongs to logic, but the other two modes move to the field of experience with the goal of proving the logic of rational hypothetical necessity.

The hypothetical necessity is based on the preservation of a chain of events that are necessarily linked, thus preserving this chain's identity. For example, "using

[14] Kyūbun Tanaka, *Kuki Shūzō: Gūzen to Shizen* (Tokyo: Pericansha, 2001), p. 120, my translation.
[15] Shūzō Kuki, "Yellow Face", in *Kuki Shūzō: A Philosopher's Poetry and Poetics*, p. 56, lines 18–22.

a microphone, the voice is amplified"; there is here a necessary connection between "using a microphone" and "the voice is amplified"; in the same fashion, there is a necessary connection in "for amplifying the voice, a microphone must be used". The difference between these two chains of events is that the first example belongs to the causal hypothetical necessity, because a necessary effect follows a cause, while the second one is a chain in which a defined end follows the necessary means for achieving or realizing such an end; this last one is the teleological hypothetical necessity.

The hypothetical contingency comes into the stage when, as we have already noticed, this necessary chain is negated. Therefore, hypothetical contingency expresses itself by negating the maxim "if B, therefore A", replacing it by "despite B, not A" or "despite B, therefore C". Kuki names these two expressions of hypothetical contingency, respectively, "negative" and "positive". Furthermore, it is attributed to each modality of the hypothetical contingency one of these expressions. Thus, we have positive and negative causal hypothetical contingency, positive and negative rational hypothetical contingency and positive and negative teleological hypothetical contingency.

The main point of negative contingency expressions is the absence of one of the elements of the logical statement; for example, when neither the cause or the effect of a causal chain is known, or when they cannot be defined, whereas in the positive hypothetical contingencies which the cause of an effect (in the case of a causal hypothetical contingency) is different from the one expected from that chain.

> It is because only the lack of a single phenomenon's [logical] antecedent is grasped that we can call the negative contingency an *absolute* contingency. It is because the relationship between two or more phenomena has been determined as contingent that we can say that, in the positive contingency, it is a *relative* contingency. . . . Nevertheless, we need to call attention to one thing: any negative absolute contingency has, after all at its roots, the positive relative contingency. . . . In fact, because a contingency that completely lacks a positive direction is unthinkable, for example when this positive direction is not consciously grasped, there must have a positivity somehow. If any kind of positivity—or even a property that have to be noticed in another way—is not perceived we cannot say that it is a true

> contingency. In this sense, we can say that all contingencies are positive relative contingencies.[16]

There are two crucial notions for us in the above citation: *relativity* and *positivity*. To think a contingent philosophical (metaphysical) doing is essential to break down the *preservation* of identity in a necessary chain of events and, also, claim that this rupture is *positive*. The Japanese word we translate as "preservation" consists of the junction of two verbs, 保つ (*tamotsu*) and 持つ (*motsu*), used to say, respectively, "to protect, to preserve" and "to hold, to have a thing with one", as we find on the *Shogakukan Progressive Japanese-English Dictionary*.

Something that protects itself near itself is what avoids any relationship unless it is with oneself, that preserves, at any costs, its *being* near itself against what is *other of itself*. Relativity, which precondition is having a relationship with what is not itself, obstructs any preservation, any holding itself near itself. Bearing this in mind, Kuki not only calls all hypothetical contingency "relative contingency", but also relates this relativity to the *chance encounter* (邂逅) that, by its turn, will become the core meaning of all and any contingency: "The chance encounter of two independent events", "the chance encounter of two independent dualities".[17]

Because these dualities are independent—as the positive contingencies that lack any hypothetical relationship, but in contrast open other kinds of relationships—, they engender events that negate the proposition "if B, therefore A", events that *affirm through negation* the proposition "despite B, then C or D or Z (but not A)". According to Kuki, an "absolute contingency"—a contingency that lacks the positive relativity of contingency entirely—does not exist, because nothing happens out of nothing. At the same time, the reasons, causes and/or ends of such events cannot be absolutely and decisively calculated, since encounters—and they are always by chance—are impossible to be *fore*seen *before*hand as well as what will come from them. In this way, relativity (what encounters will happen?; which independent dualities will meet?), as well as positivity (what will come from that?; what will we have to deal with?) are surprises for us.

The positive relative contingency points us to a way of philosophizing that could be summarized as follow. The negation of identity's preservation feature puts

[16] Kuki, *Gūzensei*, pp. 128–129, my translation.
[17] Ibid., p. 134.

us in a relationship with the otherness that comes to us in chance encounters, making us think what will come from that moment of the encounter—the here and now.[18]

In defense of necessity, we could still claim that to the chance encounters precede other encounters that could be defined, attributing necessity to the encounters we face in the here and now. This persistent determination of the previous reasons, causes, and ends that have generated the present, only seemingly contingent, could go on until the primordial event, the ultimate reason, cause, and/or end of all after-events. As it is well known in the Western philosophy, immortalized by the Aristotelian metaphysics, this ultimate cause is the First Immovable Mover. Nevertheless, Kuki sought the counterpart for the Aristotelian First Immovable Mover on the pages of Schelling, the so-called "Primordial Contingency" (*Urzufall*): what *without* (無ㇾ) reason, cause or end puts in *movement* all other encounters.[19]

For that reason, Kuki will not only name his last contingency's modality disjunctive contingency, but also metaphysical contingency. Because, in opposition to Aristotle's First Immoveable Mover, a totality enclosed within itself, not necessarily needing anything of other, Schelling's Primordial Contingency, precisely because it lacks any enclosing inside itself brings within itself the disjunction of the parts, that is, "despite being B, it could be A or C". It is blended into the option (part) that becomes (comes to be) the option of *not being*, the option that withdraws itself to nothingness. In this way, leaving the logical (categorical necessity and contingency) and empirical (hypothetical necessity and contingency) fields looking for the ultimate reason, cause, and/or end, Kuki enters into the field of metaphysics. However, bringing into metaphysics the question of the nonbeing and nothingness, Kuki redefines metaphysics as a *way of philosophizing*.

Metaphysical Contingency

[18] Kuki's philosophy prioritizes the temporality of the present, encompassing in it the spatiality of the here. It is out of the scope of our present investigation to deal with the specificities of Kuki's view on temporality. However, as the question of temporality have an important role within his philosophy, we need to clarify, in regard to the "now and here" of the contingent encounter that, apart from the past and the future, the present emphasizes the concrete particularity of this *particular* moment at this *particular* place, building the ground for an encounter that has not happened before (past) and could not happen again (future).

[19] Kuki's use of Schelling's "primordial contingency" is discussed in more details in Fujita's recent work on Kuki's philosophy. Masakatsu Fujita. *Kuki Shūzō: Risei to Jōnetsu no Hazamani Tatsu "Kotoba" no Tetsugaku*. (Tokyo: Métier, 2016), pp. 127–131.

On the first pages of his work, Kuki informs us that the question of contingency is a metaphysical one.

> In contingency, existence confronts nothingness. So, the core meaning of metaphysics lies in going beyond existence toward nothingness, going beyond the physical toward the metaphysical. Assuredly, metaphysics deals with the problem of actual existence. However, actual existence originally becomes a problem only in relation to nonexistence. Existence as it forms the problem of metaphysics is an existence that is enveloped by nonexistence, by nothingness. This is what differentiates metaphysics or philosophy in its primary sense from the other disciplines. . . . . Insofar as the problem of contingency cannot be separated from the question of nothingness, it is strictly a metaphysical question.[20]

Nothingness is what goes beyond the physical, beyond the being; what is meta-physical. Nothingness is not about the absolute nonbeing (as the Kyoto School or, in another sense, the Western metaphysics could make us believe); instead it is about what "partly" is not. Moreover, it is precisely there where disjunctive contingency touches. This dealing with the parts opposes the disjunctive necessity: the whole presumes nothing but itself, an identity enclosed in itself, while the parts presume other parts that *could* be or not be. This "could" brings two more elements into the discussion: possibility and impossibility.

We can summarize the relationships between those four elements established by Kuki as follows: in one hand, necessity and contingency relate to each other regarding reality; on the other hand, possibility and impossibility relate to each other regarding unreality—what is possible did not have occurred yet; what is impossible, will not occur, they are both outside reality. However, necessity and possibility come to relate themselves to the being, that is, the more something is possible, the more it will come to necessarily be. Finally, contingency and impossibility relate to each other through nothingness, that is, something that is impossible would not and cannot become, but when something near impossible actually becomes, it is regarded as a surprise, as a rare event, in short, as a contingency.

Then, we can tie up our discussion so far by saying: in the face of the wholeness of an *identity* that *preserves* the *being* of necessity, contingency's

[20] Kuki, *Gūzensei*, pp. 13–14; Heisig, Kasulis and Maraldo, *Japanese Philosophy*, pp. 830–831.

disjunction *happens*, becomes, but it is a reality pregnant with nothingness; an event that is more nothingness than being. In Kuki's words: "Through contingency, nothingness deeply penetrates the being. In this extent, contingency is a fragile existence. Contingency is merely a feeble existence tied only to 'this place' and 'this instant'".[21]

We can inquire further into this relationship between contingency and (im)possibility that left us with nothing, just to hear from Kuki that "it is because the problem is thrown unsolved 'before us' that contingency stirs the exciting feeling of surprise. . . Possibility and contingency, having this problematizing feature, bring a strong dynamic feeling of excitement and tension".[22]

Here we find the parts for a metaphysical way of doing philosophy in which metaphysics itself is redefined. Let us pay attention to three points in Kuki's quotation: surprise, problem, and dynamicity. Contingency, having nothingness as its background, negates necessity's stability, *problematizing* a statement constructed as "A is B", showing that "A could be not B". In this way, we are led to consider that "A is or is not B, is or is not C" and so forth. Thereby we move dynamically stimulating our thinking toward non-stable ways, constantly breaking such stabilities as "A is B" by adding beside (the) "being" the negation "not"—"A is not B". The feeling of surprise is born from the breaking of identity, preservation, and the being in the hands of problematizing and dynamism. Kuki describes the surprise that follows the almost impossible, almost no happening of contingency as:

> "Surprise—the feeling tantamount to contingency—, in the instant of the present when a possible disjunctive option is acknowledged, is a metaphysical sentiment attached to the absolute reason of this acknowledgment . . . . Philosophy is, in fact, born from the surprise in the face of contingency".[23]

In Kuki's terms, to metaphysically philosophize is to take surprise, the feeling born from contingency, as its starting point and therefore philosophize close to almost nothing. Kuki is not the only one claiming this philosophical position.

In a special issue of *Alter: Revue de Phénoménologie* dedicated to the topic of surprise we find, among others, an article by Jean-Luc Marion that has many

[21] Kuki, *Gūzensei*, p. 271, my translation.
[22] Ibid., pp. 234–235, my translation.
[23] Ibid., pp. 235–236.

similarities to Kuki's surprising way of philosophizing. Coming from an argument claiming that surprise "takes us", Marion points out that it is precisely because what arrives as surprise cannot be foreseen as an object that surprise makes possible a comprehension beyond metaphysics or science; one that he calls philosophical.

> It may be a definitive ignorance or, most often, a temporary one that will fade away when the astonishment yields to the recognition of the objects there where, at first, only events have appeared. In this sense, the progress of the sciences is measured at the expense of surprise's death. However, a high epistemological price is paid: we have to admit that we only know what we understand—that is, precisely the object—, and those objects would enrich our science only on the express condition of never admitting that they are unknown. Concerning metaphysics, we would not admit which withdraws itself from anticipation. However, surprise excludes anticipation, because surprise claims arriving, delivery as its norm. At the risk of simplifying (but, in the end, we must always end by simplifying), surprise makes philosophy possible but turns metaphysics impossible.[24]

This position would explain Kuki's claim for a metaphysics that is not "lonely" or scientifically, but instead radically philosophical; a metaphysics based upon contingency and surprise that let the event itself gives the rules, methods and/or approach fit to its own "showing". Such metaphysics (or metaphysical doing) has to resist at any costs necessity's urge to identify this surprising phenomenon to an object; it has to resist explaining its appearance through the preservation of a causal chain of events that would root it in *a priori* categories; and also it has to resist the anticipation of its being claiming that this phenomenon is and could not not-be. In these terms, it seems that Kuki and Marion (and following them us) are proposing an irresponsible way of philosophizing, one that by putting everything in the hands of contingency *negates* knowledge and its precision, everything comes to be relative, far away from the truth. Against these representations, Marion has to say:

[24] Jean-Luc Marion. "Remarques sur la surprise, la méprise et la déprise", *Alter: Revue de Phénoménologie*, p. 24, (2016), URL = http://journals.openedition.org/alter/410: §6, my translation.

> How could this non-knowledge of mere "faces" and "images" be conceived? How its imprecisions remain strong enough to impose an astonishment that "stones" us? The answer doesn't seem questionable in the eyes of Descartes: the thing, even badly or not known, immobilizes and freezes me in astonishment because, without any theoretical status, but in another way perhaps even more powerful, the thing that arrives *presents itself* (". . . it has been presented by itself. . .", ". . . they have been presented by themselves. . ."). These terms, extremely rare to be found under Descartes' pen, don't mean little: the thing certainly comes to be present, however not because the *mens* imposes to the thing its conditions of presentification led, derived and conditioned by presence, in its *a priori* as much as in its forms, as such as in a regular (and methodical) theoretical situation; rather because the thing imposes to the *mens* (and thus taking it by surprise) the emergence of its own presence, because it gives itself and agrees under its own requirements. In this way, surprise, through its lack, sets the thing free from any theoretical horizon allowing it to present itself. The thing, in this situation of surprise, is authorized to phenomenalize itself.[25]

Hence, we can realize that a metaphysical way of doing philosophy is not an irresponsible one that negates knowledge, instead it is a responsible way of doing so, one that respects and welcomes (here we have a topic dear to Derrida, under the name of hospitality) the way in which the thing, the phenomenon presents itself to us without imposing, and by thus violently imposing, an identity that it is not its own. Here is the reason why Kuki insists on the co-dependence between contingency and nothingness. At the moment when contingency comes to be, surprise arrives, and then a thing that cannot be rendered by the theoretical framework of necessity presents itself as something beyond that framework that is already there, that already has its being; something that is beyond the being (and beyond the ways in which we are used to dealing with it) could only be nothingness. Following this metaphysical, contingent way of philosophizing we linger on the nothingness embed in things, letting them present themselves in their own terms, always trying to break necessity and the theoretical situation imposing identity.

Our approach to Kuki's investigation on contingency could seem a little out of place since the works of scholars like Graham Mayeda and, more recently, Furukawa Yuji place it alongside ethics. In this sense, for them, the "Conclusion" of

[25] Ibid., §12, my translation.

The Problem of Contingency plays a central role. The research of Obama Yoshinobu, by its turn, takes the question of temporality and existence running through Kuki's philosophy as an axis for his interpretation of contingency. In this way, our own effort is an attempt of placing *The Problem of Contingency* inside the discussion of, on one side, the methodological concerns we find in Kuki's works and, on the other, the formalism that takes place in his investigations that deal with literature and poetry. Methodology, that is, the way of philosophizing appeared in his previous work, *The Structure of "Iki"* in the form of a hermeneutics of the ethnic being, a method that, we consider, has failed in achieving its goal. *The Problem of Contingency* is, in this regard, an answer to this failure by seeking a more appropriated philosophical method. Kuki's subsequent works on poetry take contingency into the very form of the poems, explaining it as "a system of pure linguistic contingencies" in which rhyme "has a philosophical beauty".

A Surprising Conclusion

Finally, Kuki coins the concept of "Metaphysical Absolute", calling it also "The Contingent-Necessary One". This last one, by its turn, seeks for the concreteness of an existence invaded by nothingness and of nothingness on the way to being beyond the abstraction of the absolute necessity (identity, preservation and the being) and the emptiness of the absolute nothingness. In this way, the "Metaphysical Absolute", as a direction to philosophize, points toward a difference that is not seen anymore as the opposition between two elements tightly enclosed in themselves, colliding against each other without mixing, rather a difference, paradoxically, indistinguishable, that is, unable to be clearly defined in its outline and essences. What gives the first impulse to this philosophical *pathos* is contingency's differential surprise (驚異). Kuki summarizes this philosophical doing as:

> "The absolute one is 'The Contingent-Necessary One' because, at the same time, the absolute one is the absolute being and it is also the absolute nothingness. Contingency—that exists even having the possibility of not existing—is nothing else than a bound existence that dangerously takes its ground on the borderline between nothingness and the being".[26]

[26] Kuki, *Gūzensei*, p. 268, my translation.

For Kuki, to metaphysically philosophize is to stay together with contingency on the dangerous borderline between the being and nothingness. This philosophical attitude takes difference as its polestar, dynamically moving from the being to nothingness; from nothingness to the being, having as its raw material, not identity but the absence of it, always surprises us, fueling our questions.

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Seeing is believing?
—The role of aesthetics in assessing religion cross-culturally

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Abstract: *The opinion that Japanese religion was rather "spiritual" or "superstitious" has, albeit being reproached for its Eurocentric basis, reached noteworthy spread and tempted scientific explanations. Yet, aside from dogmatic or structural differences to monotheistic religions, a major reason for the aforementioned impression may be that experiencing religion in Japan mismatches the religious experience familiar to the non-Japanese observer. This personal, immediate, aesthetic experience has been excluded from argumentation for its subjective inclination. It is argued, though, that our judgment always settles between discursive knowledge and aesthetic experience, both influencing each other.*

This paper will trace the inversion of the discourse on Japanese religion from Ōnishi Hajime's diagnosis that Japanese religious tradition was insufficient for the establishment of national art, up to Richard B. Pilgrim's claim of a 'religio-aesthetic tradition of Japan'. It is then argued that this gradual acknowledgement of the aesthetic dimension in religious experience can be beneficial for cross-cultural understanding since it provides access for religious outsiders and since aesthetic subjectivity can itself become a basis for objective statements if it is recognized as inevitable basis for descriptive categories.

If you ask Google for "Japanese religion", you will soon stumble upon catchy phrases like: "Japan: the most religious atheist country" (Coslett 2015) or "Japanese are rather spiritual than religious" (Japan Today 2013). Certainly, those statements are all moderated in the course of the articles by adding scientific facts and statistic findings, as if to show that they are not *merely* subjective assessments. Still, many personal experiences seem to sustain the view that whatever there is between colorful lucky charms, dressed up Jizō statues, and votive tablets in anime style is *less serious* or *less solemn—less religious*—than religion in Europe. Surely, some statistics well known by now seem to prove that Japanese individuals tend to assign

themselves to various persuasions.[1] But one reason why Japanese religion may seem more accessible (and thus less exclusive) could lie in the typical shrine structure with its openness and wood-based architecture. It can evoke a warm and welcoming atmosphere, compared to dark stone churches with marble and gold interior; even more so thanks to the prominent position of Zen meditation, Shrine prayer and tea ceremony within "Japanese culture experience" tourism.

The following elaborations are not meant to discuss the exoticized nature of such statements.[2] If we ask what makes them appear unacademic compared to what we would expect from a proper scientific review, we may rather find that we wanted such statements to bracket out subjective aesthetic experiences as to gain an objective, neutral view. However, it should be discussed if this "out-bracketing" is the right thing to do.

Since, when looking at another culture's expressions and traditions, we are immediately and intuitively judging. As seemingly rational concepts like 'religion' are equally tinged by aesthetic qualities, we are expecting some invisible, felt quality with religious things, and when it is missing we tend not to apply the concept. That is to say that, when judging, we are oriented by two sides: our aesthetic impression negotiates with our discursive knowledge.[3] No matter how much we may ultimately learn about Japanese culture, our aesthetic impression remains. It will guide and color our academic assessment. Thus, I argue that we should ignore aesthetics as little as possible.

By looking at how aesthetics obtained a decisive role in making Japanese religion approachable for non-Japanese, this paper wants to shed light on the shared nature of aesthetic and religious experience. Although one must be aware of the share taken by the Nihonjinron in the case of Japan, it is argued that the discourse about Japanese religion is paradigmatic for a general potential of aesthetic perception of foreign cultures.

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[1] The current data as for 2017 can be retrieved from the Statistics Bureau (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications):
http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/nenkan/66nenkan/1431–26.htm.

[2] Research on the connection between exoticism, aesthetics and Japanese national identity can be found in Hijiya-Kirschnereit (1988; 2013), Iida (2002), Pekar (2003), or Yoshioka (2013).

[3] By 'discursive knowledge', I do not (only) mean conscious, explicit knowledge but principally that which has always already been said when referring to Japan in a particular language and context. It can be made explicit but usually is not.

Spiritual Japan or: How to judge religion?

Let's have a closer look at the two hooks our impression of Japanese religion is hanging on: the discursive and the aesthetic side. I will start by tracing the discursive development that transformed a rhetoric of inferiority into the claim of Japan's exemplary aesthetic syncretism.

It is surely not the case that Japanese religion appeared different because there had not been any reflection about 'belief' or 'spirituality' before the import of the term 'religion' in the 19th century. It has been shown convincingly that different layers of the meaning 'religion' carries today have been considered in Japan before the 19th century and that the selection of the now common term *shūkyō* 宗教 had domestic reasons, too, instead of being mainly imposed by Western politics (cf. Krämer 2013). However, the import of Western ideas of 'religion' initiated endeavors to profile the image of Japanese religion, finally leading to the thesis that the best way to understand its exceptionality was by perceiving it in aesthetic terms.

Ōnishi Hajime, Okakura Kakuzō, Yanagi Sōetsu: from the insufficiency of Japanese religion towards Teaism and the piety in a commoner's tea bowl

In the Meiji era, the translation of concepts like 'religion', 'art', or 'philosophy' marked the beginning of an academic dispute about whether Japan could offer those cultural accomplishments or if it would have to import not just the concept but also the content.

Within these quarrels, Ōnishi Hajime 大西祝 (1864–1900), a Protestant believer who studied and taught philosophy, psychology, ethics, logics, and aesthetics, published a quite courageous diagnosis about Japan's state of the arts. In his article *There is no religion in waka* (*waka ni shūkyō nashi* 和歌に宗教無し, 1887), he argues that the religious traditions of Japan, namely Shintō and Buddhism, were not a sufficient base for 'national art' (Ōnishi 2014b). He does concentrate on poetics here, but he broadens the argument elsewhere (Marra 1999, 80f.).

Japanese art, Ōnishi argues, was lacking sublimity, grandeur, profundity, and above all subjective consciousness. Shintō belief led to a concentration on the worldly and trivial, and reduced poetic expression to short-life pathos. Buddhism, by contrast, intensified negative emotions, reiterating the lament about the world's transience and the nothingness of meaning (Marra 1999, 87). Both influences

coming together, the poetic "I" ended up being of transient character, leaving everything to the traditional canon of forms and allusions (Kaneda 1976, 25). He ends by suggesting that the introduction of Christianity could perhaps cure this shortcoming, if it was thoroughly screened, criticized and "japanificated" (Ōnishi 2014b, 21f.).

Ōnishi knew well that the European concept of art was based on metaphysical values like beauty, solemnity, or holiness and that Christianity could convey these ideas and provide the epistemological basis for an understanding of art (Kaneda 1976, 25). Then again, one should hesitate to see a Christian believer denouncing indigenous traditions, as Ōnishi highly appreciated the richness of Japanese traditions.[4] Knowing that Japanese art was only praised inside Japan because of the esteem it got from a Western audience, his goal was to find better reasons to do so and to be honest about the potentials of Japanese tradition (Watanabe 2001, 102f.). In *Are the Japanese rich in aesthetic sensibility*? (*nihonjin ha bijutsushin ni tomeru ka* 日本人は美術心に富める乎, 1888), for example, he finds that the 'art' Japan was admired for was mainly crafts, art in the mere sense of technique (Ōnishi 2014a). In a hierarchy of art forms, which he builds on the level of ideas expressed in them, those arts must rank comparably low (Aizawa 2004, 68). In other words, he assumed that Japanese religiosity would remain unseen if it was not expressed in an aesthetic way intelligible for the world.

Ōnishi could not have foreseen that discourse developments after him would lead Japan into a cultural nationalism in which the idea would flourish that Japan's syncretism provided an ideally suited basis for art. Today, we even find Günter Seubold writing in his introduction to *Aesthetics of Zen-Buddhism*:

> "If you can call Zen a 'religion' at all, then an 'experience religion'. . . . What else should Zen be if not aesthetics? Zen is aesthetics per se, the archetype of aesthetics: perception, and only perception, but in its most comprehensive sense, in front of the background of non-perception, non-experience". (Seubold 2011, 7)

Before it was possible to argue this way, the concepts of 'religion' and 'aesthetics', like Ōnishi used them, must have underwent major changes. To claim the disclosing effect of aesthetics for Japanese religion, the aesthetic experience had to be detached

[4] For example, Ōnishi admired Kagawa Kageaki, an Edo era poet who strengthened the role of the poet's subjectivity in poetry (Kaneda 1976, 59–61).

from a narrow understanding of 'art'. Facilitated by the romantic longing for the East that strongly influenced the 19th century outlook on Japan, Japanese affirmation of the emotional and the immediate seemed attractive as a cure for the rationalism and nihilism in European modernity (Hijiya-Kirschnereit 2013, 235). Such attraction made it possible for Okakura Kakuzō 岡倉覚三 (or Tenshin 天心, 1863–1913) to demand Japan's extraordinary role in conserving the cultural traditions of Asia. Karatani Kōjin alleges that "his position was that of a modernist and a colonialist" (Karatani 1998, 157). He criticizes that Okakura adopted the stance of Orientalist aestheticism that fancies itself to treat the Oriental other with "respect", venerating its native beauty but looking down on it as a mere object of scientific analysis (Karatani 1998, 147).[5] Okakura's insistence on art as the most remarkable achievement of Japan's tradition fits well in this schema (cf. Karatani 1998, 155).

For Okakura, Japanese arts revealed that artistry, religion and everyday life were intertwined, their entanglement being the point wherein the actual timeless identity of Japan was to be found (Okakura 1903, 6–10) (Clark 2005, 10f.). He argued against Hegel's dialectical structure of history that, instead of a logical synthesis, Japanese culture worked like a peaceful juxtaposition, an aesthetic reconciliation. Already in the Ashikaga period (1394–1868), Neo-Confucianism had synthesized Taoist, Buddhist, and Confucian thought to create the 'Asian consciousness' that was no thing of the past, but instead still living within the art of Japan (Tanaka 1994, 32f., 34f.).

Okakura's famous *Book of Tea*, published first in English in 1906, was dedicated to promoting Japan's syncretism—then aptly called "Teaism"—based on the tea ceremony as its paradigmatic expression. The cult of tea, first practiced in China and then brought to Japan together with Buddhism, was perfected in Japan (Okakura 1923, 3f.). Okakura designs the tea ceremony as a kind of ritual or communion when he writes: "Tea with us became more than an idealization of the form of drinking; it is a religion of the art of life" (Okakura 1923, 43). He explicitly sees Teaism as a form of art and art as a substitute or equivalent of religion:

> "Nothing is more hallowing than the union of kindred spirits in art. At the moment of meeting, the art lover transcends himself. . . . It is thus that art becomes akin to religion and ennobles mankind". (Okakura 1923, 111)

[5] Karatani's critique is shared by Yoshioka Hiroshi, who traces Japan's "self-colonization" until the present day (Yoshioka 2013, 8–10).

We can see Okakura's Teaism as an attempt to counter the exoticism Japan was facing with the most unlikely choice: with its own aestheticism.[6] The remarkable standing this move acquired in the following years is evident in the following quote:

> "[T]he phrase 'Zen and tea are one' [indicates] how tightly Zen and the tea ceremony were bound together—probably the first time in world history that art appreciation and religious thinking were so intimately interfused". (Yanagi 2017a, 138)

This statement, building a bridge between Okakura's ideology of tea and the 'religio-aesthetic tradition' proverbial in the late 20th century, was uttered by Yanagi Sōetsu (or Muneyoshi 柳宗悦, 1889–1961) in 1957. Continuing the national culture movement initiated by Okakura and others, Yanagi invented the term *Mingei* 民芸, folk craft, to promote the beauty and meaningfulness of products made by common people. While he is occasionally reproached for the same politically inspired aestheticism as Okakura (Karatani 1998, 153), his revaluation of crafts does not only seize on contemporary trends in the West like the arts and crafts movement in England, but also demonstrates how collective identity in Japan could be reasoned from arts. Hence, his understanding of art counters the notion of an individual genius creating art with art emerging from an ingenious folk's tradition and belief (Otabe 2008, 45–48). In *What is Folk Craft*? (1933) he draws a far-reaching parallel between believing and crafting which he sticks to throughout his work:

> "Some Buddhist sects believe that all people will achieve salvation in the Pure Land regardless of merit […]. In the same way, all folk artisans, regardless of their lack of academic knowledge concerning their craft, are still capable of producing works of merit. They work as if this were the natural thing to do; . . . they give birth to beauty as if this were the natural thing to do. They have entered the way of salvation through unconscious faith." (Yanagi 2017b, 84)

As not an individual's work but products of *tariki* 他力, other power, these crafts would partake in Buddha-nature and thus carry 'true beauty' in them (Porcu 2007,

[6] Later, researchers began to stress the insight into the general aesthetic constitution of human life provided by the tea ceremony. See for example Jennifer Anderson's account: "Even those who participate in the most abbreviated of tea rituals and lack any knowledge of its symbol system sense that it fulfils deep human needs". (Anderson 1987, 495)

59–61). But who would be able to appreciate it? To explain the relation of production and reception, Yanagi conceived of an anthropology that connects humans and their vessels of daily use: As man designs his environment, the things in daily use naturally acquire this life's aura (Otabe 2008). While the humble and altruistic nature of such vessels could thus be projected back on the moral constitution of its producer, an equally untainted attitude is required by its user. Here Yanagi refers back to the tea ceremony, writing in *Thoughts about the tea ceremony*: "Using the right vessel at the right place in the right moment leads naturally back to dharma" (cited after Otabe 2008, 57). Aesthetic sensibility opens the way to dharma, piety the way to creation. Thus handicrafts, those inferior arts Ōnishi disregarded for their lack of idealistic content, become filled with religious sincerity, their simplicity being an expression of the aesthetic ideals of the tea ceremony.

To summarize, we may say that up until Yanagi it was successfully advocated that there are certain aesthetic values that permeate Japanese culture and society, that they are inspired by Japanese syncretism, and that they are morally superior to the West. While this discursive shift forms the legacy of the 1930s cultural nationalism, it also introduces a rejection of Western categories; a rejection that would finally clear a space for negotiation beyond Western hermeneutical hegemony and Japanese particularism

20th century accounts on the religio-aesthetic Japan

In the course of the 20th century, it became an established gesture of the so-called Nihonjinron to link back expressive elements of Japanese culture to allegedly religious foundations. Even after the war and Japan's capitulation, aesthetics held its ground in the identity of the hereafter pacifist nation (Iida 2002, 5f.). These postwar decades saw the connection between Japanese aesthetics, morality, and religiosity stressed more than ever and engendered a series of now classical accounts of Japanese culture (Hijiya-Kirschnereit 2013, 242). Two of them shall be quickly introduced to show how they paved the way for a revaluation of aesthetic categories and their experiential content as an approach to Japanese culture.

Yet before that, it is important to note that even these valuable accounts verge on the same argumentative basis as does the Nihonjinron, strengthening an experiential value specific to Japan. This paper, too, sets out from the observation that individual impressions vary significantly between cultural settings. The

Nihonjinron, however, tends to explain these differences by genetics or a hypostatized, timeless essence of Japanese culture.[7] It thus proceeds in a reductionist fashion and draws a hermeneutical wall around everything Japanese when declaring its fundamental unintelligibility for non-Japanese observers. As not to fall back into the trap of hermetic mystification, the aim of any study on Japanese culture can no longer be to illuminate "the essence of Japaneseness", but to account for the variability, porosity, and context specific determination of every culture. If we acknowledge the instructional quality of aesthetic experience, we risk subscribing to the narrative of Japan's exceptionality. Against this I contend that Japan is no exception but a case study for how sensual-corporeal experiences guide us into the disclosure of a cultural context.

The following examples show how aesthetic notions can help structuring and thus unclosing Japanese culture if they hint at an experiential value that transcends imposed classifications. Both *Ma* and *kire* are religious as well as aesthetic, artistic and moral properties of temporal and spatial arrangements.

I already hinted at Richard B. Pilgrim's dictum about the 'religio-aesthetic tradition' of Japan wherein "artistic form and aesthetic sensibility become synonymous with religious form and religious (or spiritual) sensibility" (Pilgrim 1977, 287). He argues that without relying on an idea of the transcendental, this belief worships the realm of the visible for its soteriological potentials. However, an integral part thereof is paying special attention to the "invisible" gaps and empty spaces in between, to *ma* 間. Pilgrim presents the paradigm of *ma* as a cornerstone not just of Japanese religion, but also of its social thinking and, of course, its aesthetics (Pilgrim 1986, 257). Corresponding to the moment of no-action in Noh theatre and the Buddhist concept of no-mind (*mu-shin*) as well as to the blank parts (*yohaku*) in ink painting and calligraphy, *ma* represents a 'pregnant nothingness' that does not wait to be filled by action, but which is the very substrate of action. A visitor to a Japanese shrine precinct might recognize an empty square fenced off by *shimenawa*, holy threads woven from rice straw and decorated with thunderbolt shaped white paper foldings (*shide*). Those are spaces "thought (or designed) to be

[7] A classical and instructive, yet polemic study on the main topoi of the Nihonjinron was elaborated by (Dale 1986). A more differentiated account can be found in (Hijiya-Kirschnereit 1988). Heise (1989) shows the embeddedness of the Nihonjinron in the cross-cultural setting. Mishima (2003) draws the connection between aestheticization in the cultural nationalism of the 1930s and the pre-political idea of 'nation' that persists until today.

open, cleared out, and pure in anticipation of the coming and going of kami" (Pilgrim 1986, 262).

Pilgrim also mentions the Taoist perception of a simple vessel whose positive potential of being used (*yang*) is only possible thanks to its inward void (*yin*) (Pilgrim 1986, 264f.). Just like Yanagi, Pilgrim insists that *ma* is not just a category of outer, but also of inner design:

> "The word ['ma'] carries both objective and subjective meaning; that is, ma is not only 'something' within objective, descriptive reality but also signifies particular modes of experience". (Pilgrim 1986, 256)

Although Pilgrim uses the terms 'aesthetic' or 'religious', his observations reveal them to be incongruous with Japanese culture.

Another incongruousness is tackled by Ōhashi Ryōsuke who found the Western concept of nature unfit to describe the original Japanese understanding of it. He sets out from the idea of *kire* (切れ, cut). At their beginning, Shintō Shrines were nothing more than those empty spaces of *ma*, "holy" in their emptiness. However, by *cutting out* a part of the natural environment, men did the first *kire* and intensified the surrounding nature in its being. The act of cutting created the distance that made nature an object of reverence (Ōhashi 2014, 27–35). But, instead of keeping nature in an objective distance like in the European intellectual history, the 'cut' was perfected by 'continuity'. *Kiretsuzuki* (cut-continuity, 切れ続き) was to become the aesthetic expression for the belief that nothing is originally isolated or cut off but is only cut out to become integrated again. Within men, the creative will to create and individualize struggles with the will to integrate and be embedded in nature. *Kire* is just the specific conceptual—and aesthetic—form this general struggle has taken on in Japan (cf. Ōhashi 2014, 17–25). Here its unfolding further progressed as an element of behavior, perception, and design until today. *Kire* can still be found as a stylized pattern of exercise (型, *kata*) of Noh theatre, in *ikebana* (生け花, arranging flowers), *kendo* (剣道, the way of the sword), or tea ceremony, never losing its religious tint but acquiring more and more social implications (Ōhashi 2014, 95–122).

Instead of following artificial borderlines such as the one between 'religion' and 'aesthetics', it seems more fruitful to follow threads like those of *kire* or *ma* to organize and make sense of Japanese culture. Since I am refuting the idea of an essence of Japanese culture, it is not my aim to judge these accounts to be right or

wrong. Rather, it seems important to ask if they are helpful and if they can be taken to a more general level of cross-cultural perception. Can such approaches help to develop equitable methods for imparting cultural knowledge? Can they help to overcome axiomatic limitations? The thesis is that, indeed, taking our aesthetic impressions seriously can result in depicting the other in a way more honest to its own structure and to our emotional layout.

Aesthetics in religious experience: How descriptive concepts gain meaning

Normally, when researchers try to be objective and to give scientifically justified judgements, their aesthetic impression is something to be cancelled out, in the best case to be de-subjectivized as object of analysis. Yet, I am suggesting that aesthetics is more than a paraphrase or emotional supplement to research because every study of culture is experience-based in a sense. There are two reasons to argue this point: First, the aesthetic experience is an essential part of the religious—as of any cultural—experience. And second, aesthetic experience constitutes the matter out of which conceptual meaning is made.

As for the first reason, according to the sociologist Omar McRoberts, who wrote about the Christian religious life in the US, one central element of the religious experience is the shared experience of beauty. He notes:

> "Through my ethnographic encounters with people in many churches, I came to understand beauty as a key part of religious experience and religious communities partly as spaces where people generate and appreciate certain kinds of beauty". (McRoberts 2004, 198)

When beauty is one goal of shared religious experience, an increased aesthetic attention is demanded from each participant, letting other sensual perceptions come to the fore to generate a comprehensive impression. McRoberts continues:

> "The feeling of a hard wooden pew, smoothed by decades of use, pressing uncompromisingly against the sitting bones and spine, and the very cadence of an order of service must be considered as much a part of religious experience as any sort of Divine intoxication". (McRoberts 2004, 199)

The position of the observer does not have to be that of a member of the religious group, but that of a participant in an aesthetic event: Any researcher who is working on culture must decide either to become an "insider" to the loss of his "objectivity" or to stay an "outsider" and miss the insider's view. Even as an outsider, he will still be able to share the aesthetic experience. Here, sharing indicates more than describing. It means that the investigator is receiving something that enables him to approach his object of research apart from category testing. As a non-Japanese or a non-believer, we might never have insider knowledge. We are thrown back on perceiving the "visible" or "sensible" elements. Yet, if we realize that even within the group of believers, religiosity is communicated by visibility and shared experiences, we can make it our academic attitude to build on this ground.

Speaking of "insider" and "outsider" may sound as if there were any strict classifications to make. Quite the contrary: what counts as 'in' or 'out' is only decided "on the spot"; i.e. only if confronted with something external, the internal begins to work as such. This holds true for someone working on his "own" culture, too, since he has to obtain a self-distance for the sake of making any statement that claims objectivity (cf. Yoshioka 2013, 9).

The question where "inside" changes into "outside" is especially crucial in cross-cultural comparison since the comparing researcher might find himself trapped between being an informant or an observer. For this very reason, Takahashi Teruaki suggests setting the researcher himself as a point of comparison. He thus hopes to overcome the constraint that every cross-cultural comparison has to be justified either as genealogical or typological. Since comparing begins in the head of the individual, he must be urged to reflect on the reasons that made him compare, thereby revealing prejudices as well as sensations. Takahashi defends the individual experience as heuristics, hoping to yield an enrichment of comparative parameters (Takahashi 2016). The necessity for this arises from the bias caused by incongruous terminologies. Because culture is "sense-making", it is itself something to be understood instead of being explained. In this respect, cultural comparison and with it cultural analysis in general are a hermeneutical endeavor. And vice versa, every hermeneutical endeavor must face the challenge of the inevitably cultural nature of our understanding (Brenner 1999, 21).

Insofar, the study of religion shows a problem inherent in all fields of cultural studies: If we wanted to understand it like an insider—religion or culture, respectively—we would have to convert to a different mindset (the "metaphysical infrastructure", like McRoberts puts it (2004, 196)), which seems to diminish our,

the researcher's, *objectivity*. It would do so as long as we insist that objectivity means an experience methodologically disengaged from personal impression; or that objectivity is gained by converting impression into data through alignment with external evidence and measurements.

But is not this understanding of "objectivity" to be rebuilt? Only because we are eschewing the insider's view, we must not wholly exclude subjective impressions. Granting a central significance to the sensual experience of the investigator does not give way to vagueness or undecidedness, but is a way to foster the investigator's standpoint (Caspar, Knatz, and Otabe 2011, 13f.). While categories and definitions that determine our knowledge have been dismantled in postmodernism, we can still strive to strengthen the subjective positioning, eventually regaining a viable sense of objectivity. Strengthened subjectivity engenders an operative kind of objectivity, which is no longer an a priori positing, but a temporary stance.

> "Objectivity, then"*, like McRoberts states,* "is not merely about achieving and holding the proper analytical distance from the phenomenon one studies; rather, the objective stance accommodates intimate experience. . . . [Empathy and objectivity] appear in dialectical tension as a methodological heuristic [that] clears a space". (McRoberts 2004, 202)

Alternately allowing ourselves to be aesthetically attracted (resp. repelled) by another culture's expressions "clears a space" of negotiation wherein our familiar categories are addressed or rejected. This is not just a legitimate way to establish cross-cultural dialogue starting from inside our heads. If we disengage objectivity from transcendental sources, it can still be maintained as a function of intersubjectivity. Within the individual, objectivity is then achieved as a stance of being an insider and an observer at the same time.

Building on the ground of aesthetics has ramifications also for how the meaning of our descriptive categories evolves in the first place. The philosopher of language Mark Johnson stresses the observation that "the meaning of something is its relations, actual and potential, to other qualities, things, events, and experiences" (Johnson 2007, 256). Hence, the meaning we attach to concepts like 'religion' has grown out of situational knowledge, memory, and experience. Such experiences are aesthetic in that they are marked by a certain *quality*. Mark Johnson refers to John Dewey's pragmatist account:

> "Experiences come whole, pervaded by unifying qualities that demarcate them within the flux of our lives. If we want to find meaning, or the basis for meaning, we must therefore start with the qualitative unity that Dewey described. The demarcating pervasive quality is, at first, unanalyzed, but it is the basis for subsequent analysis, thought, and development. . . . It is not wrong to say that we experience objects, properties, and relations, but it is wrong to say that these are primary in experience. What are primary are pervasive qualities of situations, within which we subsequently discriminate objects, properties, and relations". (Johnson 2007, 75)

Not only is our religious experience partly constituted by aesthetic perception but also our descriptive categories are built upon the sum of such experiences and their qualities. Our sensual perception is guided by our knowledge just like our knowledge is informed by our sensual experiences. Thus, it seems illogical to expect that we would be able to judge a new experience, f.ex. the encounter with another culture's 'religious' expressions, from a purely intellectual standpoint. The quality of this new situation will finally decide over the intellectual evaluations we even consider. In other words, our aesthetic experience is the very ground from which both our meaningful construction of categories and our assessment of culture originates.

Since the rationalism in Enlightenment, we have placed too much confidence in directly assessing a situation or observation intellectually using categories seemingly given to us a priori. Yet, after these have been deconstructed, we should find ways to assure ourselves again of what is primary in our perception of the world. The danger of losing objectivity could, as suggested, be turned around if we changed our expectations of the scientific stance in investigation. Objectivity is only "lost" if we stick to previous understandings, not if we acknowledge the aesthetic share even within our objective standards. The greatest danger we are facing is the loss of the richness and magnificence of cultural diversity within a too narrow terminology of Western origin. Understanding happens as a mutual alignment, not as a one-sided transformation. The researcher who dares to leave his scientific distance and to explore the aesthetic foundation of what he is studying will finally be much more suited to disclose the culture he studies to his audience.

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Articles

Gadamers Plato
Zum universalen Aspekt des Hermeneutischen

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Abstract: *Im Hauptwerk Wahrheit und Methode (1960) hat Gadamer sein Konzept zur philosophischen Hermeneutik weitgehend ausgearbeitet. Es bleibt jedoch noch offen, aus welchem Zusammenhang das Konzept entworfen und im vollen Umfang weiterentwickelt worden ist. Die Frage nach der Herkunft seines hermeneutischen Konzeptes führt zu einem Knotenpunkt, in dem sich Gadamers Interpretationen zu Plato und sein Entwurf der philosophischen Hermeneutik miteinander verknüpfen. Im vorliegenden Beitrag geht es darum, den Knotenpunkt darzustellen und damit den philosophischen Ursprung seiner Hermeneutik zu erläutern. Für Gadamer kam es hauptsächlich darauf an, die Erfahrungsweise des Schönen aufzuklären. Nach Plato lässt sich das Schöne eng mit dem Guten verbinden. Diese einzigartige Beziehung zwischen den beiden nahm bei Gadamer allmählich Form an und führte letzten Endes zum ›universalen Aspekt der Hermeneutik‹. Bereits in Platos dialektische Ethik (1931) hat er mittels der phänomenologischen Interpretation zum ›Philebos‹ die engste Verknüpfung zwischen Ethik und Ästhetik herausgefunden. Sie entstand dadurch, dass er die platonische Ethik sozusagen ›ästhetisiert‹ und weiter hiermit den universalen Aspekt des Hermeneutischen eröffnet hat. Der universale Charakter desselben basiert auf dem gesamten Horizont der Erfahrungen, der das Sein des Ästhetischen und das des Ethischen aufgrund seiner metaphysischen und ontologischen Affinität umfasst. Diese ursprüngliche Affinität des Seins kommt als der Knotenpunkt zwischen den beiden Bereichen zum Tragen. Sie ist das Kardinalprinzip, aus dem Gadamer seine philosophische Hermeneutik im vollen Umfang entwickelt hat. Die Auslegung der platonischen Metaphysik spielte also für seine philosophische Hermeneutik eine entscheidende Rolle.*

1. Vorwort: Zur Bedeutung von Geschichte und Tradition in Gadamers philosophischer Hermeneutik

Eine Geschichte ist für Gadamer keine bloße Sammlung von vergangenen Ereignissen, die sich im Lauf der Zeit aufgehäuft haben. Seine grundlegende Position der ›philosophischen Hermeneutik‹ in seinem Hauptwerk *Wahrheit und Methode* (1960) besteht weder aus dem einfachen Rückgriff auf verschiedene ideologische Positionen, die jeweils durch die Texte angetroffen werden, noch aus der bloßen Wiederherstellung der Vergangenheit auf die Gegenwart. Sie besteht grundsätzlich in derjenigen ständigen Wechselbeziehung zwischen Gegenwart und Vergangenheit, der das ›wirkungsgeschichtliche‹ Bewusstsein zugrunde liegt. Die Geschichte sowie Tradition bedeuten für Gadamer keine zeitliche Diskontinuität, in der die Objektivität der Erkenntnis beeinträchtigt und die Gültigkeit der Auslegung behindert wird. Sie sind vielmehr die notwendigen Bedingungen dafür, dass die Erkenntnis bzw. die Auslegung erst in Wahrheit möglich ist. Ohne solch einen zeitlichen Abstand wäre es nämlich unmöglich, die hermeneutische Beziehung zwischen Gegenwart und Vergangenheit zu bewahren. Denn *nur* in dieser Beziehung geschieht die Wahrheit.

Gadamer versteht die Geschichte und Tradition als den Ort der gedanklichen Schöpfung und entwickelt daraus seinen eigenen Gedankengang. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass sein Verständnis zur Geschichte bzw. Tradition selbst bereits eine *Philosophie* ist. Es weicht nämlich grundsätzlich von einer historischen Interpretation der Vergangenheit ab. Das Anfangsstadium seiner Hermeneutik ist seine philosophischen Interpretationen von Plato. Gadamer hat als hellenistischer Forscher seine Beiträge zum Verständnis griechischer Philosophie[1] nicht wenig veröffentlicht. Diese philologischen Arbeiten haben die Grundlage für seine philosophischen Untersuchungen gebildet. Die beiden sind daher für ihn sehr eng verbunden. Aufgrund seiner philologischen und philosophischen Forschung hat er seine Idee der philosophischen Hermeneutik konsequent entwickelt.[2] Beispielsweise wird der Dialog mit Texten einerseits als

[1] Zum Beispiel ist besonders eine Festschrift für Gadamer zum 60. Geburtstag seiner Leistung der griechischen Philosophie gewidmet. Vgl. Dieter Henrich, Walter Schulz, Karl-Heinz Volkmann-Schluck, (Herg.), *Die Gegenwart der Griechen im neueren Denken: Festschrift für Hans-Georg Gadamer zum 60. Geburtstag*, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1960. Zu den wichtigsten Forschungsbeiträgen zum Denken Gadamers von Plato, insbesondere im Hinblick auf sein Verständnis des ›Philebos‹ vgl. auch Christopher Gill, François Renaud (eds.), *Hermeneutic Philosophy and Plato: Gadamer's Response to the Philebus*, Studies in Ancient Philosophy 10, Sankt Augstin: Academia Verlag, 2010.

[2] Vgl. H.-G. Gadamer, *Platos dialektische Ethik: Phänomenologische Interpretation zum Philebos*, in: *Gesammelte Werke 5: Griechische Philosophie I* (=GW), Tübingen: J. B. C.

Lektüre innerhalb der abendländischen Tradition der Philosophie, andererseits zugleich im tiefen Reflexionsbewusstsein geführt, um sich besonders an der Gegenwart zu orientieren. Für Gadamer ist der Dialog mit Texten selbst schon eine *Philosophie*.

Zuerst stellt sich folgende Frage: Wie hat Gadamer die platonischen Dialoge sowie die Idee seiner dialektischen Ethik verstanden? Daraus folgt die zweite Frage: In welchem Punkt lässt sich seine Auslegung zu Plato mit seinem Entwurf der philosophischen Hermeneutik gedanklich verknüpfen? Diese Verknüpfung, anders formuliert, der Knotenpunkt zwischen den beiden schafft die Grundlage für sein jeweiliges Verständnis zum Guten und dem Schönen, um dessen Erfahrungsweise es für Gadamer hauptsächlich ging. Diese Verknüpfung nahm bei ihm allmählich Form an und führte letzten Endes zum ›universalen Aspekt der Hermeneutik‹. Im zweiten Abschnitt werde ich auf die einigen Untersuchungen zur philosophischen Bedeutung des ›Dialogs‹ sowie auf die innere einheitliche Beziehung zwischen Ethik und Ästhetik innerhalb der Interpretation Gadamers zum ›Philebos‹ eingehen. Dann wird im dritten Abschnitt versucht, diese einzigartige Beziehung im Vergleich mit dem Standpunkt der philosophischen Hermeneutik in *Wahrheit und Methode*, nämlich im Zusammenhang mit der Ästhetik bzw. dem Humanismus, rekonstruierend aufzuklären. Im vierten Abschnitt ist die Rede von dem universalen Aspekt der Hermeneutik, der auf der Ontologie als der allgemeinen Metaphysik basiert. Schließlich zeigt sich das Gesamtbild der philosophischen Hermeneutik Gadamers, wobei sich das ›Hermeneutische‹ erst herausstellt.

2. Gadamers Deutung zum Werk von Plato

2.1. Platonischer-sokratischer Dialog und dialektische Ethik

Gadamer hat im Hauptwerk *Wahrheit und Methode* die Ontologie Heideggers übernommen und ist anlässlich der Veröffentlichung dieser Schrift eine der Hauptfiguren der Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert geworden. Er führte seine Marke ›Philosophische Hermeneutik‹. Bereits in der früheren Phase seines Denkens

Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1999, S. 3–163 (=1931, *Platos dialektische Ethik: Phänomenologische Interpretation zum Philebos*, Leipzig: Felix Meiner Verlag).

befasste er sich mit der Problematik der Dialektik Hegels,[3] weil er sich seit seinem Studium an der Universität Marburg für die dialektische Philosophie stark interessierte. Darüber hinaus hat ihn auch die Philosophie Platos interessiert, weil ihm Plato mit der engsten Verknüpfung zwischen dem philologischen und dem philosophischen Denken den richtigen Weg für seine Gedankenbildung gebahnt hat. Während Heidegger damals in Anlehnung an Aristoteles[4] seinen Gedankenweg wesentlich bestimmt hat, hat sich Gadamer auf Plato stützt. Gadamer hat in seiner Habilitation *Platos dialektische Ethik: Phänomenologische Interpretation zum Philebos* (1931) mithilfe von der Phänomenologie als *Leitfaden* die bemerkenswerte Interpretation geliefert, um sowohl die philosophische Bedeutung des Dialogs als auch das dialektische Wesen der Wissenschaft (bes. der Ethik) aufzuklären. Heidegger deutet das ›Phänomen‹ (φαινόμενον) als das „Sich-zeigende" im ursprünglichen Sinne und den ›Logos‹ (λόγος) als „das Sich-an-ihm-zeigende".[5] Dieser Idee der Phänomenologie Heideggers entsprechend hat Gadamer versucht, die eigentliche Erfahrungsweise des Wissens im platonischen Dialog aufzudecken.

Gadamer versteht die Textinterpretation als Dialog mit Texten und sieht sie stets als Erfahrung des Logos selbst an. Für ihn ist die philosophische Deutung zum Werk Platos von der Erläuterung der Bedeutung dessen nie zu trennen, was Platos Philosophie als ›Dialog‹, d. h. ›indirekte Überlieferung‹ hat. Er hat nämlich die Überlegenheit des Dialogs als solches gegen einfach direkte literarische Form darin anerkannt, dass „die literarisch gestalteten Dialoge ein eigenes Ganzes von Rede sind".[6] Um diese Überlegenheit handelt es sich bei ihm als hermeneutisches Problem nicht nur in dem Sinne, dass das Ganze von Rede aus dem Dialog im Grunde besteht,

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[3] Vgl. H.-G. Gadamer, *Hegles Dialektik. Fünf hermeneutische Studien*, in Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), S. 5. Zum konkreten Sachverhalt dieser Arbeit vgl. auch id., „Hegel und die antike Dialektik", in: *Gesammelte Werke 3*: *Neuere Philosophie I* (=GW), Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1987, S. 5–28.

[4] Vgl. Martin Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles* (1922), Günter Neumann (Herg.), Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun, 2003. Es ist schon eine bekannte Tatsache, dass diese Schrift als ‚Natorps Bericht' die Grundlage für die Berufung Heideggers nach Marburg wurde, die im Sommer 1923 erfolgte, und dass sich Gadamer damit entschieden hat, bei Heidegger zu studieren. Hierzu vgl. H.-G. Gadamer, *Philosophische Lehrjahre. Eine Rückschau*, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977, S. 23f. Zur konkreteren Beschreibung davon vgl. auch id., Heideggers ‚theologische' Jugendschrift, in: Martin Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles*, S. 76–86.

[5] Vgl. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 7. Aufl., Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2001 [1927], S. 30ff.

[6] H.-G. Gadamer, Platos ungeschriebene Dialektik, in: *Gesammelte Werke 6: Griechische Philosophie II* (=GW)*,* Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), S. 129–153, bes. S. 132.

sondern auch, dass es als unabschließbares Ganzes, d. h. das für Interpretationen *offene* Ganze ist. Die unabschließbare Offenheit, die zur Form des Dialogs gehört, deutet weiter auf folgenden Punkt hin: Sie schließt bei seiner Interpretation von Plato weder die Möglichkeit seiner systematischen Deutung noch die eindeutige Feststellung der platonischen Lehre aus.[7] Hierbei wird also die prinzipielle bzw. hermeneutische Überlegenheit der Offenheit der Interpretation gegenüber dem Relativismus immer wieder neu vergegenwärtigt.

Das Hauptanliegen der Interpretation Gadamers zu Plato ist es, nicht einen im Dialog von Sokrates bloß geredeten Sachverhalt zu klären, sondern aus dem Dialog die innere Bewegung des Logos selbst herauszunehmen. Das heißt mit anderen Worten die Miterfahrung der Bewegung des Logos selbst, indem man sich im inneren Spielraum der Rede verweilt. Dabei gilt es für Gadamer, dass der Dialog, der sich als eigenes Ganzes in der Offenheit zeigt, die Seinsweise des Logos selbst verkörpert. Dies entsteht dadurch, dass uns der Logos die Erscheinungen des Wissens nicht von außen her betrachten, sondern von innen her mit erfahren lässt. Die Seinsweise des Logos selbst bildet prinzipiell auch die Idee der dialektischen Ethik derart, dass sie als die Idee des Guten mithilfe von der Verständigung des Wissens im Dialog geschieht.[8] In seinem Beitrag *Platos ungeschriebene Dialektik* (1968), der als eine neue Arbeit *Platos dialektische Ethik* ergänzend erweitert wurde, betont Gadamer nochmals den Punkt folgendermaßen: „Aber der philosophische Gegenstand ist nicht wie der der Erfahrungswissenschaft gegeben, sondern er wird immer erst und immer aufs neue aufgebaut, wenn man ihn denkend zu vollziehen versucht“. [9] Darin scheint es mir eben bemerkenswert zu sein, dass er in der technischen und pragmatischen Hinsicht der modernen Wissenschaften noch die Möglichkeit der platonisch-dialogischen Ethik sieht. Die Ethik in ›Philebos‹ ist zwar seiner Ansicht nach kein Gegenstand zur Erkenntnis der Wahrheit, die jedoch naiv den Naturwissenschaften zugrunde liegt. Doch sie bleibt immer noch ein ›Gegenstand von Denken‹ selbst, weil man durch die Beziehung *an sich* zwischen Denken und Gegenstand auf das Wissen des Logos eingehen kann. Hierin funktioniert die Offenheit durch den Dialog als ein ontologischer Begriff in entscheidender Weise. Dies kommt dadurch zu Stande, dass sich die *sachliche*

[7] Vgl. *Ibid*., GW6, S. 130.

[8] Hierzu vgl. Donatella Di Cesare, Zwischen Onoma und Logos: Platon, Gadamer und die dialektische Bewegung der Sprache, in: Günter Figar, Jean Grondin und Dennis J. Schmidt (Herg.), *Hermeneutische Wege: Hans-Georg Gadamer zum Hundertsten*, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 2000, S. 107–128.

[9] H.-G. Gadamer, *Platos ungeschriebene Dialektik*, GW6, S. 132.

Auffassung zum Gegenstand durch den Dialog ermöglichen lässt. Dabei wird jede moderne Denkweise, wie z. B. das Subjekt-Objekt-Schema, aufgehoben. So sieht Gadamer die Bedeutung der dialektischen Ethik gerade darin, dass in ihr die einheitliche Beziehung zwischen ›Wissen‹ und ›Logos‹ als die Idee der Verständigung durch den Dialog erscheint. Für die dialektische Ethik ist also das Wissen gerade die Beziehung zum Logos selbst, insofern sich die Idee der Verständigung selbst zugleich in der solchen Zirkelstruktur des Wissens und des Logos verkörpert.

2.2. Logos als ›Relation‹ im Dialektike (διαλεκτική) in ›Philebos‹

Dabei nimmt Gadamer seine eigene Interpretationsstellung zum Problem der Methexis (μέθεξις) ein. Dieses Problem heißt das der Teilhabe der vielen Dinge an dem einen Eidos. Um das Problem aufzulösen, stützt sich Plato in ›Philebos‹ auf die Untersuchung zum Gegensatz zwischen Lust und Unlust, wie noch Einheit und Vielheit, dem Begrenzten und dem Unbegrenzten. Auf diese Weise hat er die Dialektik zum ersten Mal in ›Phaidros‹ eingeführt und weiter in ›Sophistes‹ und ›Politikos‹ die Synagoge (συναγωγή) und die Dihairesis (διαίρεσις) mit vielen Beispielen konkret erläutert.[10] Wie das Eine zugleich Vieles in Rede selbst sein kann, ist allerdings nicht einfach zu verstehen. Die Dialektik bestimmt zwar von Anfang bis Ende das Denken von Plato, aber sie wurde nicht eindeutig gebraucht. Nach Gadamer besteht sie darin, „*die Seinsweise von ›Mischung‹*“[11] als „die Fixierung des μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρου τε καὶ τοῦ ἑνός“[12] herauszuheben. Im Gegensatz zur Kritik an dem Hedonismus im früheren Dialog ›Gorgias‹ hat Plato absichtlich die Dialektik in ›Philebos‹ eingeführt. Der Hauptzweck dieser Einführung der Dialektik liegt darin, die gesamte Wirklichkeit in folgende vier Gattungen einzuteilen: das Begrenzte, das Unbegrenzte, das aus beiden Gemischte und die Ursache der Mischung. Dabei gilt es für Gadamer, dass sich eine Kongenialität der Erkenntnis des Guten bzw. des Logos zeigt. Dies entsteht dadurch, dass die Problematik zur Relativität der

[10] Zum methodologischen Unterschied der Dialektik zwischen ›Philebos‹ und ›Sophistes‹ oder ›Politikos‹ vgl. Donald Davidson, Gadamer and Plato's *Philebus*, in: *The Philosophy Of Hans-Georg Gadamer*, edited by Lewis Edwin Hahn, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1997, S.421–432, bes., S. 424f.

[11] H.-G. Gadamer, *Platos dialektische Ethik*, GW5, S, 94.

[12] H.-G. Gadamer, *Platos ungeschriebene Dialektik*, GW6, S. 139; Plato, *Platonis Opera*, recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit, Ioannes Burnet, tomvs II, New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, 16E.

Sinneswahrnehmung hier mithilfe von der Dihairesis in die vier Gattungen über ein dualistisches Schema von Einheit und Zweiheit (oder Vielheit) hinaus „*anders*“ eingestellt wird.[13] Bedeutsam ist für ihn außerdem, dass hier die Seinsweise des Guten als ›Mischung‹—oder die bezeichnet Gadamer oft auch als ›Mitte‹ in demselben Sinne—aufgefasst wird. Anderes formuliert, wird die Rede selbst als Vielheit von Einheit (oder Einheit von Vielheit), d.h. als Wesen des Logos[14] verstanden.

Die Rede zum Ding trifft zwar auf das Ding an sich nicht unmittelbar zu. Doch kommt es eben darauf an, dass sie sich in der Relation mit ihm öffnet. Diese Offenheit der Relation ist für Gadamer von hermeneutischer Bedeutung, um die ontologische Funktion des Logos zu verstehen:

> „Nur in der Verflechtung von Selbigkeit und Verschiedenheit ist jedwede Aussage überhaupt möglich. In ihr wird etwas, was als es selbst mit sich selbst identisch ist, mit etwas anderem verknüpft, ohne durch diese Verschiedenheit von anderem seine eigene Selbigkeit zu verlieren. Als die Struktur des Logos lässt sich also die Mischung von Sein mit solchen logischen Bestandteilen, wenn auch metaphorisch, gut verstehen“.[15]

Das ist der Punkt, von dem aus Gadamer oben den Logos ›Mischung‹ oder ›Mitte‹ nennen kann. Für ihn ist also der Logos diejenige Relation, die als das „Mit-Sein“ der einen Idee mit der anderen oder das „Zusammen-Da-Sein“ erscheint.[16] Das Wort ›Zusammen‹ heißt hier, dass das Eine als Vieles, aber zugleich auch als die *Relation* ›da ist‹. Die Erkenntnis des Guten wird also als Offenheit der Relation aufgefasst. In dieser Hinsicht identifiziert Gadamer die Erscheinung des Guten mit der des Seins. Dazu hat er auch es als haltlos herausgestellt, die Idee als absolutes Eines aufzufassen. Zwar ist unsere menschliche Erkenntnis der Idee bzw. des Logos begrenzt. Aber Gadamer schätzt diese Begrenztheit unserer menschlichen Erkenntnis als ontologischen ›Horizont‹ durchaus positiv, weil sie erst in ihm möglich ist. Wenn nicht von etwas Sinnlichem, sondern von dem Guten als etwas Intelligiblem geredet wird, bedeutet es also keine negative Beschränkung, dass es als Vieles aufgefasst werden muss, wenn es in verschiedener Beziehung wahrgenommen wird. Für die dialektische Ethik ist also der Logos vielmehr von

[13] H.-G. Gadamer, *Platos dialektische Ethik*, GW5, S. 71.
[14] Vgl. H.-G. Gadamer, *Platos ungeschriebene Dialektik*, GW6, S. 143.
[15] *Ibid*., GW6, S. 144.
[16] *Ibid*., GW6, S. 148.

überlegener Bedeutung, insofern er die Offenheit der menschlichen Erkenntnis für das Wissen bewährt.

Von diesem Standpunkt Gadamers aus gesehen, ist es also eine ungerechte Denkweise, dass man das Gute—das Eine—als absolute Idee ansieht und den Standpunkt der menschlichen Erkenntnis auf den des Gottes überträgt, um zur Erkenntnis des Guten erreichen zu können. Denn diese verkehrte Denkweise macht die eigentliche Relation des Seins zum Logos unmöglich. Sie meint nach Gadamer „die Erblast des Platonismus“,[17] aus der die herrschende Entwicklung der modernen Wissenschaften durch die Begriffe von ›Technik‹ oder ›Methode‹ usw. entstammt. Die Konzeption von ›Sinnlichkeit‹ und ›Verstand‹, ja sogar von ›Subjekt‹ und ›Objekt‹ folgt aus dem Gegensatz zwischen ›Idee‹ und ›Erscheinung‹. Doch sie wurde aus dem Bann der technisierten Zivilisationsgesellschaft seit langem belastet. Gegenüber dem solchen herrschenden Rahmen der modernen Denkweisen sieht Gadamer noch im platonischen Dialog einen Vorteil, die Erscheinung des Guten in der eigentlichen Relation zwischen Wissen und Logos verstehen zu können. Und dieses Verstehen wird nach Plato nur im Rahmen der Seinsweise des menschlichen Denkens geführt. Das wäre ein großes Vermächtnis von Plato.

Nach diesem Verständnis Gadamers liegt es nahe, dass seine Interpretation die platonische Ethik sozusagen ›ästhetisiert‹, weil er hier das Gute mit dem Schönen in ontologischer Hinsicht gleichzusetzen scheint.[18] Gadamer sieht die Erfahrung des Guten, wie wir schon oben gesehen haben, als die ›Mischung‹ oder ›Mitte‹ zwischen Idee und Erscheinung an. Dabei wird die Vermittlung zwischen den beiden als ontologische Funktion aufgefasst, die auch auf die Erfahrung der Liebe zum Schönen wie in ›Phaidros‹ zutrifft. Gadamer verleiht durch die platonische Dialektik dem Menschen eine Fähigkeit, Mannigfaltigkeit der Erfahrung zum selbigen Eines zusammenzusehen. Dies bedeutet nun also, dass er einerseits die platonische Ethik als die Fortführung zur praktischen Philosophie versteht[19] und

[17] H.-G. Gadamer, Anschauung und Anschaulichkeit, in: *Gesammelte Werke 8: Ästhetik und Poetik I Kunst als Aussage* (=GW), Tübingen: J. B. C. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1993 [1982], S. 189–205, bes., S. 191.

[18] Zur Einsicht dieser ›Ästhetisierung‹ (aestheticize) vgl. Robert Dostal, Gadamer’s Platonism and the *Philebus*. The Significance of the *Philebus* for Gadamer’s Thought, in: Hermeneutik Philosophy and Plato: *Gadamer’s Response to the Philebus*, Studies in Ancient Philosophy 10, Sankt Augstin: Academia Verlag, 2010, S. 23–41.

[19] Hierzu vgl. Petra Plieger, *Sprache im Gespräch: Studien zum hermeneutischen Sprachverständnis bei Hans-Georg Gadamer*, S. 62ff. Zum Verständnis der Relation zwischen Plato und Aristoteles in Gadamer vgl. auch Thomas Gutschker, *Aristotelische*

andererseits ihre ontologische Affinität zwischen dem Ethischen und dem Ästhetischen heraushebt. Diesem Verständnis nach lässt es sich offenbaren, dass eine gewisse *versteckte* Absicht bezüglich der Verknüpfung ebenso zwischen Idee und Erscheinung wie Ethik und Ästhetik in Gadamers Interpretation zum ›Philebos‹ liegt. Gadamers Überlegungen, dass der Logos als Relation verstanden wird und die Endlichkeit des Menschen als eine ontologisch notwendige Bedingung der Erfahrung angesehen wird, werden als die Problematik des Schönen in *Wahrheit und Methode* weiter fortgeführt. Und in dieser Schrift eröffnet sich der universale Bereich der hermeneutischen Erfahrung.[20]

3. Ein Motiv der philosophischen Hermeneutik und ihre Kunstlehre

3.1. Gadamers Kritik an Kant und die Tradition des Humanismus

Gadamer behält diesen Standpunkt der Interpretation von Plato folgerichtig auch in *Wahrheit und Methode*. Denn der Entwurf der philosophischen Hermeneutik setzt die einheitliche Beziehung zwischen dem Ästhetischen und dem Ethischen grundsätzlich voraus. Das wird dadurch deutlich, dass Gadamer besonders im ersten Teil in *Wahrheit und Methode* die Kritik an Kants Ästhetik geführt und die rationale Erkenntnistheorie des Schönen grundsätzlich zu überwinden versucht. Der Versuch beruht einerseits auf der Bestimmung der Zeitlichkeit des Daseins in *Sein und Zeit*, in der die Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins geschieht. Andererseits stützt sich dieser Versuch auf die „neue Konzeption“ in *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* (1935/36), wo Heidegger sie gegenüber den bisherigen metaphysischen Begriffen entworfen hat.[21] Und indem Gadamer die von ihm übergenommene Einsicht nicht nur auf die

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Diskurse: Aristoteles in der politischen Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart: Verlag J.B. Metzler, 2002, S. 189–254, bes., S. 203–206.

[20] Joseff Marc Philippe Lamontagne betont auch in seinem Beitrag, dass die enge *Verknüpfung*, die bei Plato zwischen der *Idee* des Schönen und der des Guten behauptet wurde, gerade die Endlichkeit des menschlichen Anspruchs auf Sichwissen in der Seinsweise des Schönen darstellt, welche sich das Gute reflektierend *nach Gadamer* wieder in der Sprache ergibt. Hierzu vgl. id., *Das Werden im Wissen: Entwicklungsgeschichtliche Ausdeutung der philosophischen Hermeneutik Gadamers*, Würzburg: Verlag Königshausen & Neumann GmbH, 2012, bes., S. 98.

[21] Siehe auch H.-G. Gadamer, Die Wahrheit des Kunstwerks, in: *Gesammelete Werke 3: Neuere Philosophie I* (=GW)*,* Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1987, S. 249–261, bes., S. 252f.

Problematik der Ästhetik, sondern auch die der Historik anwendet, versucht er die Aporie des Historismus in seinem eigenen Ansatz der Hermeneutik aufzulösen. Diesem Punkt dient seine eigene Begriffsbildung ›Horizontverschmerzung‹ in entscheidender Weise.

Um die Aporie der Erfahrung im Objektivismus zu vermeiden, wird die Subjektivität des Verstehens der Sprache selbst erteilt. Dadurch wird der Sprache erst die eigentliche Aufgabe des *Verstehens* gegeben, Inhalte des Denkens im Logos verfügbar zu machen. Um den Zweck zu erfüllen, erklärt Gadamer die Struktur des reflexiven Sich-Wissens des Verstehens. Sie bedeutet, dass in diesem faktischen Fortgang desselben die Bewegtheit seines eigenen Horizontes selbst für sich ausgelegt wird. Für Gadamer geht es nicht um die Objektivität des Verstehens, sondern die jeweilige Bewegtheit desselben. Aus diesem Grunde wird von ihm die ontologische Zirkelstruktur des Verstehens mit Recht entdeckt, und die Endlichkeit des Verstehens als der vorausliegende Horizont der Erfahrung angesehen. In dieser Hinsicht ist besonders die Problematik des Ästhetischen von entscheidender Bedeutung, falls er die Ontologie des Verstehens entwickelt.

Bedeutsam ist außerdem, dass er trotzdem im Gegensatz zu Heidegger die Rehabilitierung des Humanismus neben der Kritik an der modernen Ästhetik versucht.[22] In der gesamten Diskussion im ersten Teil in *Wahrheit und Methode* soll dieser Versuch mit der Absicht folgerichtig entwickelt werden, den herrschenden Denkrahmen der Moderne hermeneutisch aufzulösen. Um das genug zu vollziehen, ist nicht nur die Ontologie, sondern auch der Humanismus nötig. Doch ist es für Gadamer gerade die *Ästhetik*, die den Versuch schon seit langem versteckt hat. „Wenn wir das Unzureichende einer solchen Selbstinterpretation der Geisteswissenschaften erweisen und ihnen angemessenere Möglichkeiten eröffnen wollen, werden wir daher den Weg über die Probleme der *Ästhetik* gehen müssen".[23] Damit meint Gadamer, dass durch Kants transzendentale Fragestellung zur methodischen Eigenart der Geisteswissenschaft ihre Legitimation im Grunde

[22] Zur Beziehung zwischen Hermeneutik und Humanismus vgl. Jean Grondin, *Source of Hermeneutics*, Albany: State University of New York Press, S. 111–141. Dort scheint es mir besonders wichtig, dass Grondin hinsichtlich des Verständnisses Gadamers über den Humanismus auf einen ideologischen Unterschied zwischen Gadamer und Heidegger hinweist. Siehe auch *ibid*., bes., S. 119ff; id., Gadamer on Humanism, in: *The Philosophy Of Hans-Georg Gadamer*, edited by Lewis Edwin Hahn, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1997, pp. 157–170.

[23] H.-G. Gadamer, *Hermeneutik I: Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik*, in: *Gesammelete Werke 1* (=GW), Tübingen: J. B. C. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1999, S. 47.

verloren ging. In der modernen Ästhetik beschränken sich die ästhetischen Begriffe auf die Rationalisierung, doch sie würde eigentlich der Tradition des Humanismus angehören. Es handelt sich bei Gadamer darum, diese Begriffe von der modernen Ästhetik besonders nach Kant um die Wiederherstellung des eigenen Wahrheitsanspruchs der Geisteswissenschaften willen zu befreien. Das ist ein Grundmotiv in *Wahrheit und Methode*, von dem aus Gadamer seinen Ausgang nimmt.

Hierin ist es für uns besonders relevant, dass er gegenüber dem seit Decartes wissenschaftlichen Methodenprinzip die Gültigkeit des ›Wahrscheinlichen‹ (sensus commnis) gegen das ›Wahre‹ hervorhebt. Seine Absicht hier ist es gerade, der Reduzierung des Begriffs *Wahrheit* nur auf die Rationalität den eigentlichen Gebrauch des Verstandes überhaupt entgegenzusetzen. Damit hält er in seiner Hermeneutik die Überlegenheit der praktischen Vernunft gegen die theoretische fest. Diese Position teilt auch der große Humanist Giambattista Vico. Er hat die Notwendigkeit der alten *Topica* gegen die *Critica* des Cartesianismus in *De nostri temporis studiorum ratione* (1709) betont.[24] Hier ist es eben für uns bemerkenswert, dass Gadamer den Zusammenhang des Begriffsgegensatzes von *sophia* und *phronēsis*, die Aristoteles ausgearbeitet hat, auch in der Tradition des Humanismus findet. Was Gadamer in seinem Entwurf des ersten Teils begreifen wollte, ist kein Maßstab für die Bestimmung des Unterschiedes zwischen der Entwicklung der Naturwissenschaften und der Tradition der Rhetorik im Humanismus. Vielmehr wollte er eben im Spannungsfeld zwischen den beiden diejenige Beziehung der beiden selbst begreifen, in der die wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis erst in Wahrheit gebildet werden soll. Hier geht es also für ihn nicht um die Ausarbeitung der Methodologie der Geisteswissenschaften gegen die modernen Naturwissenschaften, sondern darum, was der Methodologie vorausliegt und sie zu ihrem Teile möglich macht, aufzudecken und bewusst zu machen.[25] In dieser Hinsicht stellt er die Bedeutung des Wahrscheinlichen wieder heraus, das schon vom Maßstab des Wissens in den modernen rationalen Wissenschaften ausgeschlossen wurde. Daher gilt es, das Motiv der Rehabilitierung der Tradition des Humanismus im Hintergrund der Kritik an der modernen Ästhetik nicht aus den Augen zu verlieren, wenn man

[24] Vgl. Giambattista Vico, De nostri temporis studiorum ratione (1709), in: *Opere di Giambattista Vico*, Vol. I, Leipzig: Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1970, S. 205.
[25] Vgl. H.-G. Gadamer, Vorwort zur 2. Auflage (1965), in: *Gesammelte Werke* (=GW), Bd. 2: Hermeneutik II: Wahrheit und Methode Ergänzungen Register, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1986, S. 439.

sich die systematische Bedeutung des ersten Teils und die Beziehung zwischen Ästhetik und Hermeneutik überlegt.

3.2. Die Bedeutung der Metaphysik des Schönen in *Wahrheit und Methode*

Im letzten Abschnitt des dritten Teils in *Wahrheit und Methode* hebt Gadamer ausdrücklich hervor, dass wir nun ganz nah am metaphysischen Begriff der Schönheit stehen.[26] Die Hermeneutik hat nähmlich in seiner eigenen Entwicklung die ›ontologische Wendung‹ genommen. Bezüglich des Verhältnisses zwischen Ästhetik und Hermeneutik meinte er, dass wir den Weg wieder einschlagen können, zur philosophischen Betrachtung über die Schönheit im metaphysischen Sinne zurückzukehren. Dies war dadurch möglich, dass der Rahmen der konventionellen rationalen Ästhetik insbesondere aufgrund der Ontologie im heideggerischen Sinne überwunden worden ist. Gegenüber dem Laufe des 19. Jahrhunderts des Begriffs des Schönen richtet Gadamer seine Aufmerksamkeit darauf, dass der Begriff des Schönen bekanntlich ehedem als universaler metaphysischer Begriff verstanden wurde. Innerhalb der Metaphysik, d. h. der allgemeinen Lehre vom Sein, hatte der Begriff des Schönen eine Funktion, die sich keineswegs auf das Ästhetische im engeren Sinne beschränken lässt.[27] Sein Rückgang auf Plato zeigt uns nicht nur seine eigentliche Denkweise über das Schöne, sondern auch seine Grundauffassung zur Hermeneutik, dass der alte Begriff des Schönen auch in der umfassenden Hermeneutik verwendet werden kann, wie sie aus der Kritik an dem Methodologismus der Geisteswissenschaften entstand.[28] Damit versucht Gadamer in der Grundlegung der allgemeinen Aspekt der Hermeneutik im letzten Abschnitt, seine eigene grundsätzliche Aufgabe—eigene Rechtfertigung der *Wahrheit* in den Geisteswissenschaften—noch wieder im Zusammenhang mit dem Schönen zu erfüllen. Im Zusammenhang mit dem ›Hermeneutischen‹ deutet dies weiter auch darauf hin, dass Gadamer eine völlig andere Genealogie als moderne rationalistische Ästhetik verfolgt. Seine größte Absicht im letzten Abschnitt liegt daher eben darin, sich mit der platonischen Metaphysik des Schönen zu befassen.[29] „Der Rückgang

[26] H.-G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, GW1, S. 481.
[27] *Ibid.*
[28] *Ibid.*
[29] Zur Bedeutung dieser gesamten Struktur des *Wahrheit und Methode*, insbesondere der Bedeutung des Schönen im Hinblick auf den universalen Aspekt der Hermeneutik vgl. Joseff Marc Philippe Lamontagne, *Das Werden im Wissen: Entwicklungsgeschichtliche Ausdeutung der philosophischen Hermeneutik Gadamers*, bes., S. 97–106.

auf Plato läßt vielmehr noch eine ganz andere Seite am Phänomen des Schönen kenntlich werden, und diese ist es, die uns für unsere hermeneutische Fragestellung interessiert".[30]

Im dritten Abschnitt erklärt Gadamer zunächst einen *Vorzug des Schönen* gegenüber dem Guten anhand des Dialogs ›Phaidros‹: „Offenbar ist es die Auszeichnung des Schönen gegenüber dem Guten, dass es sich von sich selbst her darstellt, sich in seinem Sein unmittelbar einleuchtend macht".[31] „Es ist ›Idee‹, ganz gewiß, d. h. es gehört einer Ordnung des Seins an, die sich als ein in sich Beständiges über das Dahinfluten der Erscheinung erhebt".[32] Aus den Zitaten liegt es nun nahe, dass Gadamer die wichtigste ontologische Funktion, nämlich die der *Vermittlung* zwischen Idee und Erscheinung heraushebt. Dazu hat er immer wieder aufmerksam auf einen Zusammenhang zwischen dem Schönen und der Liebe in ›Phaidros‹ gemacht. In ›Phaidros‹ erklärt Plato die Erfahrung der Liebe und des Schönen, indem er in der Form eines großen Mythos die Bestimmung des Menschen, seine Begrenztheit gegenüber dem Göttlichen schildert. Damit zeichnet Gadamer die Schönheit derart aus, dass sie im Unterschied zum Guten *unmittelbar* unsere Wahrnehmung *ansprechen* kann. „Denn »der Schönheit allein ist dies zuteil geworden, daß sie das am meisten Hervorleuchtende (*ekphanestaton*) und Liebenswerte ist«".[33] Daher ist es für Gadamer das Schöne, das nicht nur die Idee an sich, sondern auch die *Vermittlung* selbst als selber einleuchtend und hervorleuchtend ist, besser formuliert, das das Bedürfnis nach dem intelligiblen Sein als die Liebe in der Erscheinung fördert.

In dieser Hinsicht ist es uns von entscheidender Bedeutung, dass Gadamer es besonders in Bezug auf die Problematik der Methexis versteht, dass das Schöne die ontologische Begrifffsfunktion der Vermittlung besitzt. „Die Idee des Schönen ist wahrhaft anwesend in dem, was schön ist, ungeteilt und ganz. Am Beispiel des Schönen läßt sich daher die ›Parousie‹ des Eidos, die Plato meint, einleuchtend machen und gegenüber den logischen Schwierigkeiten der Teilhabe des ›Werdens‹ an ›Sein‹ die Evidenz der Sache aufbieten".[34] Bereits in *Platos dialektische Ethik* hat Gadamer analysiert, dass solche Theorie der Dialektik in ›Phaidros‹ den ursprünglichen Vollzugsmodus der Verständigung expliziert hat.[35] Die Teilhabe des

[30] H.-G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, GW1, S. 481.
[31] *Ibid.*, GW1, S. 485.
[32] *Ibid.*, GW1, S. 491.
[33] Plato, *Phaidros*, 250d7; H.-G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, GW1, S. 485.
[34] H.-G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, GW1, S. 485.
[35] H.-G. Gadamer, *Platos dialektische Ethik*, GW5, S. 61–66, bes., S. 61f.

›Werdens‹ an ›Sein‹ ist also für ihn sowohl ein Grundmodell der Verständigung als auch eine Art von der Auflösung des Problems der Methexis, worin das Sein des Schönen als der Abglanz von der Idee im Sichtbaren erscheint. In dieser Erfahrung des Schönen gilt es entscheidend, dass hier der Hiat zwischen Sinnlichem und Ideellem durch die Dialektik geschlossen ist.

4. Ontologische Affinität zwischen dem Schönen und dem Verstehen

4.1. Lichtmetaphorik in *Wahrheit und Methode*

In der ontologischen Erfahrung des Schönen, die zwischen Idee und Erscheinung vermittelt, sieht Gadamer einen allgemeinen Zusammenhang mit der Erfahrung des *Verstehens*. In dieser Hinsicht spielt für ihn die Lichtmetaphorik, die der Ideenlehre Platos entstammt, eine hervorragende Rolle, um das ›Hermeneutische‹, als was sowohl das Sprachliche als auch das Schöne umfassen soll, aufzudecken.

> „Scheinen aber heißt: auf etwas scheinen und so an dem, worauf der Schein fällt, selber zum Erscheinen kommen. Schönheit hat die Seinsweise des *Lichtes*“.[36]

Gadamer hat in seiner Interpretation zum ›Phaidros‹ die ontologische Funktion des Schönen ausfindig gemacht und weiter sie in dieser Stelle als „Seinsweise des *Lichtes*“ erläutert. Das Licht lässt anderes sichtbar sein, indem es sich selber zur Erscheinung bringt, wie die Sprache in ihr selbst anderes ›einleuchtend‹ machen lässt, indem sie sich selber zur Darstellung bringt. „Das Licht, in dem sich nicht nur das Sichtbare, sondern auch der intelligible Bereich artikuliert, ist nicht das Licht der Sonne, sondern das Licht des Geistes, des *Nous*“.[37] Aus dieser Stelle lässt sich erkennen, dass Gadamer die Erfahrungsweise des Schönen als des Lichtes, das nicht nur selber erscheint, sondern auch andere *vermittelt*, im Zusammenhang mit der sprachlichen Verständigung auffasst. Daher können das Licht und die Sprache in einen allgemeinen und ontologischen Zusammenhang gebracht werden: „Im Gebrauch von Worten ist das anschaulich Gegebene nicht als Einzelfall eines

[36] H.-G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, GW1, S. 486.
[37] *Ibid.*, GW1, S. 486f.

Allgemeinen verfügbar gemacht, sondern im Gesagten selber gegenwärtig geworden —so wie die Idee des Schönen in dem, was schön ist, gegenwärtig ist".[38]

In dieser Hinsicht ist es für uns besonders wichtig, dass Gadamer auch in der Tradition der Rhetorik steht, wenn er sich auf diesen Zusammenhang stützt. Wir haben schon oben gesehen, dass er den Vorzug des Schönen gegenüber dem Guten derart versteht, dass das Schöne sich selber unmittelbar in seinem Sein einleuchtend macht. Unter dem Ausdruck ›ein-*leuchtend*‹ versteht Gadamer die *Lichtmetaphorik*, d. h. seinen *metaphorischen* Sinn, wie das ›Wahr-*scheinliche*‹ im Latein *verisimilie* die Entsprechung hat.[39] In *Wahrheit und Methode* hat Gadamer eine sprachliche Idee des Gemeinsinnes (sensus communis) bei Vico mit der Idee des Verstehens in seiner Hermeneutik verknüpft.[40] Dort hat er die rhetorische Grundlage des Verstehens, die sich auf das Wahrscheinliche (sensus communis) berufen soll, gegenüber dem Wahren im naturwissenschaftlichen Methodenprinzip seit Descartes zu rechtfertigen versucht. Sein Vermächtnis war für Gadamer die Grundlage dafür, unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Rhetorik den Begriff des Wahrscheinlichen zu begründen. Dabei gilt es, dass hier das Verstehen sich selbst als das zeigt, was etwas in seinem Sein selbst einleuchtend macht, ohne sich wissenschaftlich als *Wahrheit* zu erweisen. Für ihn ist die Lichtmetaphorik daher systematisch relevant. Dank ihr verknüpfen sich nämlich die ontologische Einsicht und die humanistische miteinander, sodass die Kohärenz zwischen dem Verstehen und dem Schönen besteht.

4.2. Der universale Aspekt des Hermeneutischen

Aus dieser Verknüpfung ergibt sich nun nach Gadamer das ›Hermeneutische‹, das etwas Sinnliches und Intelligibles im Grunde umfasst. Von dem Standpunkt der philosophischen Hermeneutik aus gesehen, stehen sowohl die Erfahrung des Schönen als die des Verstehens ursprünglich auf derselben Grundlage. „*Die Ästhetik muß in der Hermeneutik aufgehen*",[41] so hat Gadamer deshalb in *Wahrheit und Methode* erwähnen können, weil er diese gemeinsame Grundlage im allgemeinen Aspekt des ›Hermeneutischen‹ schon herausgefunden hätte. In diesem Punkt lässt sich nun erkennen, dass in diesem „*Aufgehen*" die Verknüpfung zwischen Ästhetik

[38] *Ibid.*, GW1, S. 493.
[39] *Ibid*., GW1, S. 26.
[40] Hierzu vgl. Donald Phillip Verene, Gadamer and Vico on Sensus Communis and the Tradition of humane Knowledge, in: *The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer*, Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.), Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1997, S. 137–155.
[41] H.-G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, GW1, S. 170.

und Ethik für den Entwurf der philosophischen Hermeneutik unerlässlich vorausgesetzt wird. Ein Schwerpunkt im Verständnis Gadamers von platonischer Ethik liegt darin, dass er die Erscheinung des Logos in der Idee der Verständigung durch den Dialog begründet hat. Dabei hat er in die Denkweise der modernen Wissenschaften als der „Erblast des Platonismus“ zu geraten vermieden und den Plato davon befreit, indem Gadamer das Gute als die Offenheit der Relation dort verstanden hat. Dadurch hat er diesen spekulativen Charakter des Logos in *Wahrheit und Methode* übernommen, um zur Verallgemeinerung der hermeneutischen Probleme zu dienen, anders formuliert, alle historische, ästhetische und ethische Vorgänge mit dem Logos erfahren zu lassen. Um diese Struktur der Erfahrungen genug in Wahrheit zu rechtfertigen, hat zunächst die Aufgabe des Rückgangs auf platonische Metaphysik als eine dringende Angelegenheit in *Wahrheit und Methode* gestellt werden müssen. Dieser Rückgang ist über das Erkenntnisschema der modernen Wissenschaften hinaus ausgeführt worden, das die eigentliche Beziehung zwischen dem Schönen und dem Logos vergessen hat. *Etwas*, das sich einseitig auf das Sein des Intelligibles (d.i. des Ethischen) oder auf das Sein des Sinnlichen (d.i. des Ästhetischen) keineswegs reduzieren lässt, ist gerade das Sein des ›Hermeneutischen‹, i.e. ein Subjekt der Hermeneutik, die auf ihrer Einbeziehung in die Ästhetik besteht, sofern sie das Sein des Schönen in beiden Beziehungen erfragt.

Fazit

Als Fazit können wir festhalten, dass das Streben nach dem Hermeneutischen im Entwurf Gadamers ursprünglich aus seinen Interpretationen zum Werk von Plato entstammt, weil das selbst für ihn seit langem den Vollzug der *Philosophie* verkörpert hat. Dabei hat Gadamer die philosophische Bedeutung des Dialogs als die Bewegtheit der Interpretation selbst in ihrer Offenheit analysiert und damit entdeckt, dass die einheitliche Beziehung zwischen Wissen und Logos durch die Dialektik erscheint. In seiner Interpretation von Plato wird die Idee des Guten als die Mischung oder Mitte verstanden, sodass die Begrenztheit oder die Endlichkeit der Menschen doch zum Erkenntnis positiv zu bestimmen ist. Dabei liegt der Schwerpunkt des Verständnisses Gadamers in der Gleichsetzung des Guten mit dem Schönen innerhalb seiner Interpretation zum ›Philebos‹, womit die platonische Ethik ästhetisiert wird. In der Tat scheint Gadamer zwar einerseits in *Wahrheit und Methode* auf Aristoteles zu beruhen, aber andererseits muss es in dem Fall nicht

vergessen werden, dass die Gleichsetzung der beiden grundsätzlich auch von der Interpretation von Plato getragen ist. In dieser Hinsicht spielte die phänomenologische Interpretation zum ›Philebos‹, insbesondere das damit entwickelte Verständnis der Dialektik, in der Entwicklung von Gadamers Philosophie eine herausragende Rolle.

Zweitens können wir nun festhalten, dass die Deutung Gadamers zum Werk von Plato völlig zur Aufdeckung des ›Hermeneutischen‹ beiträgt, insofern Gadamer den Begriffsfunktion der ›Ästhetisierung‹ folgerichtig auch in *Wahrheit und Methode* behält und weiter entwickelt. Dabei war es besonders wichtig, das Motiv der Rehabilitierung der Tradition des Humanismus im Hintergrund der Kritik an der modernen Ästhetik nicht aus den Augen zu verlieren. Denn hier ist die humanistische Einsicht an der Verallgemeinerung der hermeneutischen Problematik in großem Maße beteiligt. Und indem sie sich zugleich mit der ontologischen Einsicht am engsten verknüpft, lässt sich die metaphysische Affinität zwischen dem Schönen und dem Verstehen erkennen. Dabei liegt dieser Affinität die Leistung jener Ästhetisierung grundsätzlich zugrunde, in der sich der allgemeine Aspekt des ›Hermeneutischen‹ eröffnet. Damit hat Gadamer ästhetische Phänomene im eigentlichen Sinne hermeneutisch verstehen können, dass sie keineswegs in das Erkenntnisschema der modernen Wissenschaften in eingeschränkter Weise reduziert werden. Es ist also für ihn eine unrechte sekundäre Abstraktion im modernen ästhetischen Bewusstsein, die das Ästhetische von dem ursprünglichen Zusammenhang mit dem *Verstehen* ausschließen wollte. Demgegenüber hat Gadamer seit langem unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Hermeneutischen gestrebt, diesen Zusammenhang wieder nach der Dialektik Platos aufzubauen.

Critique of Previous Comprehensive Studies of Self-referential Paradoxes

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Abstract: *The fact that it produces a paradox implies the possibility that a theory or a thought is not entirely rational. At the same time, the possible resolution of paradoxes suggests candidates for the conditions that may make theories or thoughts consistent. Many scholars have investigated paradoxes to find their solutions. The primary approach to a paradox is to consider each solution in turn (the one-by-one approach); studies using this approach have resulted in many diverse solutions, but it is limited by serious problems. Hence, I will adopt another approach, termed here as the comprehensive approach, to consider a general solution or solutions to all paradoxes. Here the focus will be on self-referential paradoxes. A self-referential paradox indicates a paradox that occurs when the subject of a proposition is in part the proposition itself. Further, some paradoxes are not self-referential but seem to be. To preserve the appearances of our intuition of a self-reference, I introduce a categorization of self-references into two types (with two corresponding types of accompanying paradoxes): the first is a narrow self-reference, that is, precisely a reference to itself (this matches the existing characterization). The other type is a broad self-reference or a reference to a group or groups containing itself.*

In this paper, first, I will examine the works of three figures, Bertrand Russell; Graham Priest; and Martin Pleitz, who take a comprehensive approach: considering the general conditions for self-referential paradoxes, analyzing them, and suggesting general solutions for them. Their conclusions are valuable to a certain extent, but their works are limited to addressing only narrow self-referential paradoxes. In this paper, I will exhibit two broad self-referential paradoxes that cannot be accounted for by these works.

0. Introduction

Paradox is, as Sainsbury mentions, “an apparently unacceptable conclusion derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable premises”.[1] The existence of paradox implies that our theories or thoughts may not be rational. At the same time, solution(s) to paradoxes can suggest candidates for conditions for our theories or thoughts to be rational. This is why study of paradox is significant.

Among various paradoxes, I concentrate in this paper on self-referential paradoxes. First, I review previous studies from the “comprehensive approach” (explained below) to self-referential paradoxes. Then, we see that such studies cannot cover some self-referential paradoxes.

1. Preliminaries

Before approaching the main subject, let me explain what I address here and how I do so.

1.1 Characterization of Self-Referential Paradoxes

In this paper about self-referential paradoxes, I characterize them as paradoxes caused by referring to themselves or groups that contain themselves. As you may know, a self-referential paradox is characterized usually as “a paradox caused by referring to itself”, or self-reference is characterized only as “reference to itself”. There are, however, paradoxes that actually do not refer to themselves, but seem to be self-referential (see section 3). In general, two attitudes can be taken toward what is not X in terms of existing criteria, but seems X-like. The first option is to judge it as not X; this attitude is important for conducting strict studies about X. The second is to suggest new criteria that fit our intuition better; this way, we may discover new information about (or at least related to) X. Their fruits differ, but both attitudes are important. In this paper I adopt the latter attitude, and hence, I adopt the characterization above of self-referential paradox. Further, let us call a reference to itself and groups that contain itself, respectively, the “narrow self-reference” and the

[1] Sainsbury, R.M. (2009), *Paradoxes*, Cambridge University Press, p. 3.

"broad self-reference", and let us define "narrow self-referential paradox" and "broad self-referential paradox" accordingly.[2]

1.2 Two Approaches to Paradoxes

The mainstream approach to paradoxes (including self-referential paradoxes) is to consider each solution(s) for each paradox. Let us call this approach the "one-by-one approach." True, this approach has produced various results, and it has two serious problems. First, the approach inclines to be ad hoc. Conceivably, then, when a new paradox is found, it cannot be solved by previously existing solutions. The second and crucial reason is that one solution to a paradox may be incompatible with other solution(s) to different paradox(es). This means that solutions may work at most for our particular theories or thoughts, but not for whole ones; thus, such solutions cannot be helpful for making our whole theories or thoughts rational. Finding a compatible set of solutions to each paradox seems to dissolve this problem. However, a new solution to a new paradox is not guaranteed to be compatible with an existing set of solutions to existing paradoxes.

There is yet another approach to paradoxes, called the "comprehensive approach", which attempts to find general solution(s) to all paradoxes, not individual solutions to individual paradoxes. In adopting this approach, you do not have to fear occurrences of new paradoxes because the solution is general to all paradoxes, so it should solve an emerging paradox if the solution is truly general. Moreover, you do not have to fear the incompatibility of each solution because the solution is, again, a general solution to all paradoxes, so it cannot be incompatible with a solution to another paradox. I adopt this approach to self-referential paradoxes.

You may doubt the comprehensive approach even to only self-referential paradoxes because this approach requires two premises: "all self-referential paradoxes have the same conditions", and "the conditions are essential for such paradoxes appearing". You may cast doubt on them, and, at least, F. Ramsey should oppose this idea. He divides self-referential paradoxes into two groups, A and B.

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[2] There is a paradox that is self-referential paradox-like, but seems to be neither a narrow nor a broad self-referential paradox; it is Yablo's paradox in Yablo, S. (1993), "Paradox without self-reference", *Analysis*. Because of this paradox, you may think my characterization cannot save our intuition about self-reference. But this paradox is in fact a narrow self-referential paradox. See Priest, G. (1997), "Yablo's Paradox", *Analysis*; and Beall, J.C. (2001), "Is Yablo's paradox non-circular?", *Analysis*.

> Group A consists of contradictions which, were no provision made against them, would occur in a logical or mathematical terms, ... But the contradictions of Group B are not purely logical and cannot be stated in logical terms alone; for they all contain some reference to thought, language, or symbolism, which are not formal but empirical terms. So they may be due not to faulty logic or mathematics, but to faulty ideas concerning thought and language.[3]

Thus Ramsey should think it not the case that "condition(s) of all self-referential paradoxes is the same". Hence, he and his followers should not admit the comprehensive approach to self-referential paradoxes. The reply to this idea is, however, not difficult. As Priest[4] states, Ramsey's distinction is superficial. His interest is what notions or vocabulary appear in the paradox, but it does not matter what conditions the paradox has. Therefore, such objection is not crucial.

2. Previous Studies

In this section, we examine previous studies about (narrow) self-referential paradoxes from the comprehensive approach. I concentrate especially on three figures: B. Russell (1905), G. Priest (2002), and M. Pleitz (2014). Other comprehensive studies address self-referential paradoxes, but only these three explicitly show conditions of self-referential paradoxes and suggest treatments by analyzing these conditions.

First of all, we examine work by Russell, a pioneer of this approach (section 2.1). The second figure is Priest, who shows more generalized conditions than Russell's (section 2.2). A certain self-referential paradox is a candidate for a counterexample of his work, so next, we check whether it is genuinely a counterexample (section 2.3). Then we see that the more general structure introduced by Pleitz can cover Curry's paradox (section 2.4).

2.1. Russell's Generalization

[3] Ramsey, F.P. (1978), *Foundations: Essays in Philosophy, Logic, Mathematics and Economics*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, p. 171.
[4] Priest, G. (2002), *Beyond the Limits of Thoughts*, Oxford University Press, p. 153.

Russell (1905) investigates some paradoxes related to transfinite numbers and detects that their essence is related not to mathematics, but to logic. I omit minute explanations of these paradoxes due to limited space. Here what matters is that they are self-referential paradoxes. Russell shows the general conditions of these paradoxes,[5] and Priest formalizes them to show them in a strict way.[6] However, Priest's formalization can be expressed in an even stricter way and a more refined manner, as I show in this paper.

Given property φ and function δ:
(1) $\exists\Omega(\Omega=\{y:\varphi(y)\}$
(2) $\forall x(x\subseteq\Omega\rightarrow\neg(\delta(x)\in x))$
(3) $\forall x(x\subseteq\Omega\rightarrow\delta(x)\in\Omega)$

Let us call these general conditions "Russell's Schema", following Priest. When these conditions are satisfied, contradiction is derived as follows: By (2) and (3),

$$\Omega\subseteq\Omega\rightarrow\neg(\delta(\Omega)\in\Omega)$$

and

$$\Omega\subseteq\Omega\rightarrow\delta(\Omega)\in\Omega$$

hold. Obviously, Ω itself is a subset of Ω; that is, $\Omega\subseteq\Omega$ holds. Hence, by *modus ponens*, both

$$\neg(\delta(\Omega)\in\Omega)$$

and

$$\delta(\Omega)\in\Omega$$

hold. Therefore, we can obtain a contradictory conclusion

$$\neg(\delta(\Omega)\in\Omega)\wedge\delta(\Omega)\in\Omega.$$

Needless to say, all paradoxes that Russell (1905) mentioned satisfy all three conditions of Russell's Schema.[7]

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[5] Russell, B. (2014), "On some difficulties in the theory of transfinite numbers and order types" in *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell,* volume 5, Routledge, p. 35.
[6] Priest, G. (2002), p. 129.
[7] By the way, Russell shows his solution, the theory of types, in other places: Russell, B. (1908) "Mathematical Logic as based on the Theory of Types", *American Journal of Mathematics*, Vol. 30, pp. 222–262. I omit his solution in this paper because it is not so compatible with our usages of ordinary languages. His solution may work well for mathematical paradoxes, but some self-referential paradoxes occur with our usual usage of language (see section 3).

2.2. Priest's Conditions and Solution

Russell's Schema works well for paradoxes he mentioned; however, it does not work well for some self-referential paradoxes. One such paradox is the most famous, the Liar paradox,[8] which occurs in the liar sentence φ, "φ is not true". To cover such paradoxes, Priest introduces more general conditions than Russell by generalizing them. Priest shows his conditions (the "Inclosure Schema")[9]; however, the conditions can be expressed in a stricter way. Hence, I refine his notations and show the refined Inlocure Schema. Needless to say, my refinement does not change the essence of Priest's formalization, only addressing the Inclosure Schema in a more logical manner.

Given properties φ and ψ, and function δ,
(1) $\exists\Omega(\Omega=\{y:\varphi(y)\}\wedge\psi(\Omega))$
(2) $\forall x(x\subseteq\Omega\wedge\psi(x)\rightarrow\neg(\delta(x)\in x))$
(3) $\forall x(x\subseteq\Omega\wedge\psi(x)\rightarrow\delta(x)\in\Omega)$

When these conditions are satisfied, we can also obtain a contradictory conclusion. By (2) and (3),

$$\Omega\subseteq\Omega\wedge\psi(\Omega)\rightarrow\neg(\delta(\Omega)\in\Omega)$$

and

$$\Omega\subseteq\Omega\wedge\psi(\Omega)\rightarrow\delta(\Omega)\in\Omega$$

are derived. By (1), $\psi(\Omega)$ holds. Because $\Omega\subseteq\Omega$ holds as mentioned, $\Omega\subseteq\Omega\wedge\psi(\Omega)$ holds. Therefore, both

$$\neg(\delta(\Omega)\in\Omega)$$

and

$$\delta(\Omega)\in\Omega$$

hold by *modus ponens*; that is, again, contradiction

$$\neg(\delta(\Omega)\in\Omega)\wedge\delta(\Omega)\in\Omega$$

is derived. Priest calls paradoxes satisfying these conditions (and causing this contradictory conclusion) "inclosure paradoxes".

We can easily confirm that the Inclosure Schema is more general than Russell's Schema, or, in other words, the latter is just a special case of the former.

[8] Due to space limitations, I omit how some paradoxes are not covered by Russell's schema. See Priest (2002, pp. 143–144).
[9] Priest (2002), p. 134.

When a trivial property is chosen for ψ, ψ(Ω), and ψ(x) (for any *x*) trivially hold; then descriptions about ψ in the Inclosure Schema can be dismissed. When we omit such descriptions, we can obtain Russell's Schema.

Priest thinks one solution works sufficiently for all inclosure paradoxes—the "dialetheic" solution. Dialetheism is a philosophical position asserting that some contradictions are true.[10] That is, a solution Priest suggests can be expressed as "to accept a contradictory conclusion". To justify accepting contradictions, almost all dialetheists adopt a special logical system called "paraconsistent logic". Paraconsistent logic refers to a logical system in which the Law of Explosion

$$\alpha \wedge \neg\alpha \vdash \beta$$

does not hold. This law can be paraphrased as "if there is a contradiction, every sentence can be derived". This problem, "everything can be derived", is called triviality.[11] In a logical system in which the Law of Explosion holds—actually, it holds in most usual logics, like classical logic and intuitionistic logic—if there is only one contradiction, we cannot avoid falling into triviality, so contradiction is extremely harmful in such logics. On the other hand, if we adopt paraconsistent logic, triviality does not follow just from contradictions; paraconsistent logic makes contradictions harmless.

Let us see if formally, the Liar paradox can be solved by paraconsistent logic. The Liar paradox is caused by the liar sentence φ "this sentence is false", expressed as

$$\varphi := \neg \mathrm{Tr}[\varphi]$$

("Tr" is a truth predicate). Now, a contradictory conclusion is derived as follows:

$$\dfrac{\varphi \vee \neg\varphi \qquad \dfrac{\dfrac{[\varphi]_1}{\mathbf{Tr}\lceil\varphi\rceil}\,\mathrm{TS} \quad \dfrac{[\varphi]_1}{\neg\mathbf{Tr}\lceil\varphi\rceil}\,\mathrm{def.}}{\mathbf{Tr}\lceil\varphi\rceil \wedge \neg\mathbf{Tr}\lceil\varphi\rceil}\,\wedge I \qquad \dfrac{\dfrac{\dfrac{[\neg\varphi]_2}{\neg\neg\mathbf{Tr}\lceil\varphi\rceil}\,\mathrm{def.}}{\mathbf{Tr}\lceil\varphi\rceil}\,DNE \quad \dfrac{[\neg\varphi]_2}{\neg\mathbf{Tr}\lceil\varphi\rceil}\,\mathrm{TS}}{\mathbf{Tr}\lceil\varphi\rceil \wedge \neg\mathbf{Tr}\lceil\varphi\rceil}\,\wedge I}{\mathbf{Tr}\lceil\varphi\rceil \wedge \neg\mathbf{Tr}\lceil\varphi\rceil}\,\vee I$$

[10] Apparently this position is very weird and unacceptable, but Priest himself tries to defend it. See Priest, G. (1998), "What is so Bad about Contradictions?", *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 95, pp. 410¬426.

[11] There is a claim, called trivialism, that everything (every sentence) is true. For trivialists, triviality is not problematic. I will not consider this peculiar position in this paper. If you are interested in trivialism, see Kabay, P. (2008), *A Defense of Trivialism*, Ph.D. thesis, University of Melbourne.

(TS means T-Schema, and DNE means the rule of double negation elimination $\neg\neg\alpha \vdash \alpha$). Paraconsistent logic makes contradictions harmless, as I said. Hence, the Liar paradox, whose conclusion is a contradiction, can be solved by it.

2.3. Counterexample of Priest's Diagnosis

Paraconsistent logic seems to work well for all self-referential paradoxes because contradiction turns out to be innocuous. There is, however, a self-referential paradox whose conclusion is not a contradiction. This is Curry's paradox. Consider the Curry sentence φ, "if φ is true, then the moon is made of cheese". Suppose φ is true; that is, it is true that if φ is true, then the moon is made of cheese. Because both "φ is true" and "if φ is true, then the moon is made of cheese" hold, and we can obtain "the moon is made of cheese" by *modus ponens*. We inferred "the moon is made of cheese" by supposing "φ is true". This means that we proved "if φ is true, then the moon is made of cheese"; that is, we proved the sentence φ. Again, because φ is true (please note that it is now not a supposition, but proven fact), and "if φ is true, then the moon is made of cheese" is true (because of the truth of φ), we can derive "the moon is made of cheese" by *modus ponens*! In the same way, we can derive an arbitrary sentence, and we fall into triviality.

Let us see how this paradox causes triviality. The Curry sentence can be formalized as

$$\varphi := \mathrm{Tr}\lceil\varphi\rceil \rightarrow \psi$$

(ψ is an arbitrary sentence, like "the moon is made of cheese".) Now, ψ is derived as follows:

$$\dfrac{\dfrac{\dfrac{\dfrac{\varphi \rightarrow \varphi}{\varphi \rightarrow (\mathbf{Tr}\lceil\varphi\rceil \rightarrow \psi)}\,\text{def.}}{\mathbf{Tr}\lceil\varphi\rceil \rightarrow (\mathbf{Tr}\lceil\varphi\rceil \rightarrow \psi)}\,\text{TS}}{\mathbf{Tr}\lceil\varphi\rceil \rightarrow \psi}\,\text{Contraction} \qquad \dfrac{\dfrac{\dfrac{\dfrac{\varphi \rightarrow \varphi}{\varphi \rightarrow (\mathbf{Tr}\lceil\varphi\rceil \rightarrow \psi)}\,\text{def.}}{\mathbf{Tr}\lceil\varphi\rceil \rightarrow (\mathbf{Tr}\lceil\varphi\rceil \rightarrow \psi)}\,\text{TS}}{\mathbf{Tr}\lceil\varphi\rceil \rightarrow \psi}\,\text{Contraction}}{\mathbf{Tr}\lceil\varphi\rceil}\,\text{def.}}{\psi}\,{\rightarrow}E$$

In the case of inclosure paradoxes, their conclusions are contradictions. Paraconsistent logic separates contradiction from triviality, and hence, contradiction turns out to be harmless. In the case of Curry's paradox, however, its conclusion, triviality, is derived not through contradiction, but directly. So paraconsistent logic does not seem to work for this paradox.

How does Priest himself consider this paradox? In fact, he thinks it possible to consider it an inclosure paradox.

> For each paradox of this kind [= Curry's paradox], we can form a new paradox by replacing ¬α uniformly with α→β, where β is an arbitrary formula; or, more simply, with α→⊥, where ⊥ is some logical constant entailing everything.[12]

> If [→] is a material conditional then, in most logics, α→⊥ is logically equivalent to ¬α, and so [Curry's paradox] is essentially the same as [inclosure paradoxes]. If, on the other hand, → is a non-material conditional ⋯, then α→⊥ and ¬α are quite different notions. . . . In this case, [Curry's paradox] belong[s] to a quite different family [than inclosure paradoxes].[13]

Priest's idea can be paraphrased as follows: Curry's paradox is counted as an inclosure paradox (and therefore, it can be solved by paraconsistent logic) if (i) you consider ⊥ a logical constant entailing everything, and (ii) you define ¬α as α→⊥. Curry's paradox is not otherwise counted as an inclosure paradox. To check this, let us compare an inclosure paradox, the Liar paradox, to Curry's paradox. As above, the liar sentence and the Curry sentence are formalized as

$$\varphi := \neg \mathrm{Tr}[\varphi]$$

and

$$\varphi := \mathrm{Tr}[\varphi] \rightarrow \psi$$

respectively. When we accept (i), the Curry sentence is formalized as

$$\varphi := \mathrm{Tr}[\varphi] \rightarrow \bot.$$

When we accept (ii), the liar sentence is

$$\varphi := \mathrm{Tr}[\varphi] \rightarrow \bot$$

too. Now, formalization of Curry's paradox is the same as that of the Liar paradox. Therefore, we conclude that Curry's paradox can be counted as an inclosure paradox when you accept both (i) and (ii).

Both (i) and (ii) seem plausible. In my opinion, however, accepting both of them is impossible if you want to solve Curry's paradox by paraconsistent logic. As mentioned, the Law of Explosion $\alpha \wedge \neg\alpha \vdash \beta$ does not hold in paraconsistent logic. This law can be resolved into two parts:

[12] Priest (2002), p. 168.
[13] Priest (2002), p. 169.

(a) $\alpha \wedge \neg\alpha \vdash \perp$
(b) $\perp \vdash \beta$.

Thus, to adopt paraconsistent logic—to reject the Law of Explosion—you should discard either (a) or (b). My diagnosis is that accepting both (i) and (ii) and discarding either (a) or (b) are incompatible. First, it is obvious that (i) and (b) are the same; both say that everything can be derived from $\perp$. Second, when you admit (ii), (a) is derived as follows. Suppose that (ii) holds. Then $\alpha \wedge \neg\alpha$ is equal to $\alpha \wedge (\alpha \rightarrow \perp)$. Because $\perp$ is derived from α and $\alpha \rightarrow \perp$,[14] it holds that $\alpha \wedge (\alpha \rightarrow \perp) \vdash \perp$; that is, (a) holds.

When you consider Curry's paradox an inclosure paradox—when you adopt (i) and (ii)—you should give up adopting paraconsistent logic—you cannot discard both (a) and (b); then you cannot use paraconsistent logic to solve any self-referential paradoxes (including Curry's paradox). When you do not consider Curry's paradox an inclosure paradox, it cannot be solved with a solution for inclosure paradoxes; that is, paraconsistent logic does not work for this paradox. In either case, another solution(s) than paraconsistent logic is required for Curry's paradox.

2.4. Pleitz's Structure and Solution

The last figure, Martin Pleitz, takes notice of this problematic paradox. He devises conditions that can cover both inclosure paradoxes and Curry's paradox[15] by modifying the Inclosure Schema. His structure, the Curry Schema, is as follows.

> Let φ and ψ be predicates and δ a function. Then the following threefold condition holds:
> (1) $\exists\Omega(\Omega=\{x|\varphi(y)\} \wedge \psi(\Omega))$
> (2) $\forall x(x \subseteq \Omega \wedge \psi(x) \rightarrow (\delta(x) \in x \rightarrow p))$
> (3) $\forall x(x \subseteq \Omega \wedge \psi(x) \rightarrow \delta(x) \in \Omega)$[16]

[14] In logical systems that do not admit *modus ponens*, this inference is invalid; I do not, however, take such systems into account because *modus* ponens is one of the most important rules of inference.
[15] It is not clear that he originally intended to consider conditions for both inclosure paradoxes and Curry's paradox; for him, his work is just for Curry's paradox, but it can cover both paradoxes.
[16] Pleitz, M. (2014), "Curry's Paradox and the Inclosure Schema", https://www.academia.edu/13030660, p. 9.

In (2), "*p*" refers to an arbitrary sentence. Now, let us see again the Inclosure Schema for comparison:

> Given properties φ and ψ and a function δ,
> (1) $\exists\Omega(\Omega=\{y:\varphi(y)\}\wedge\psi(\Omega))$
> (2) $\forall x(x\subseteq\Omega\wedge\psi(x)\rightarrow\neg(\delta(x)\in x))$
> (3) $\forall x(x\subseteq\Omega\wedge\psi(x)\rightarrow\delta(x)\in\Omega)$

We can easily observe that the Curry Schema is more general than the Inclosure Schema. The difference between them lies just in the second condition. As I mentioned, p in the consequent of the Curry Schema's second condition refers to an arbitrary one; that is, *p* can refer to ⊥. This means

$$\forall x(x\subseteq\Omega\wedge\psi(x)\rightarrow(\delta(x)\in x\rightarrow\bot))$$

is a special case of the Curry Schema's second condition. Moreover, the consequent of the Inclosure Schema's second condition $\neg(\delta(x)\in x)$ can be expressed as $\delta(x)\in x\rightarrow\bot$[17]; that is, the Inclosure Schema's second condition can be expressed as

$$\forall x(x\subseteq\Omega\wedge\psi(x)\rightarrow(\delta(x)\in x\rightarrow\bot));$$

this is the same as the formula above, so we can conclude that this is the special case of the Curry Schema's second condition.

In the case of Russell's Schema and the Inclosure Schema, their conclusion

$$\neg(\delta(\Omega)\in\Omega)\wedge\delta(\Omega)\in\Omega$$

is a contradiction; on the other hand, when the Curry's Schema's conditions are satisfied, triviality is derived. By (2) and (3),

$$\Omega\subseteq\Omega\wedge\psi(\Omega)\rightarrow(\delta(\Omega)\in\Omega\rightarrow p))$$

and

$$\Omega\subseteq\Omega\wedge\psi(\Omega)\rightarrow\delta(\Omega)\in\Omega$$

hold. $\Omega\subseteq\Omega$ holds, and by (1), $\psi(\Omega)$ holds too; so $\Omega\subseteq\Omega\wedge\psi(\Omega)$ holds. Therefore both

$$\delta(\Omega)\in\Omega\rightarrow p$$

and

$$\delta(\Omega)\in\Omega$$

hold. Therefore, by modus ponens, we can derive *p*; because p refers to anything, we fall into triviality.

[17] It holds that $\neg(\delta(x)\in x)$ is equal to $(\delta(x)\in x\rightarrow\bot)$ only when you define $\neg A$ as $A\rightarrow\bot$. Because this definition of negation is the most familiar, I do not here consider cases in which this equation does not hold.

Then, how can paradoxes covered by the Curry Schema be solved? Pleitz's suggestion is to adopt contraction-free logic,[18][19] a logical system without a rule, called contraction:

$\alpha\rightarrow(\alpha\rightarrow\beta) \vdash \alpha\rightarrow\beta$.

This rule holds in many usual logics, including classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and even some paraconsistent logics. Contraction does not appear explicitly in the argument above, but Pleitz finds the rule hidden in the argument[20] and shows that the conclusion should not be derived without contraction. Hence, contraction-free logic works well as a solution to paradoxes covered by the Curry Schema. In fact, in the proof of Curry's paradox, the contraction rule is used twice.

$$\dfrac{\dfrac{\dfrac{\dfrac{\varphi\rightarrow\varphi}{\varphi\rightarrow(\mathbf{Tr}\ulcorner\varphi\urcorner\rightarrow\psi)}\,\text{def.}}{\mathbf{Tr}\ulcorner\varphi\urcorner\rightarrow(\mathbf{Tr}\ulcorner\varphi\urcorner\rightarrow\psi)}\,\text{TS}}{\mathbf{Tr}\ulcorner\varphi\urcorner\rightarrow\psi}\,\text{Contraction} \qquad \dfrac{\dfrac{\dfrac{\dfrac{\varphi\rightarrow\varphi}{\varphi\rightarrow(\mathbf{Tr}\ulcorner\varphi\urcorner\rightarrow\psi)}\,\text{def.}}{\mathbf{Tr}\ulcorner\varphi\urcorner\rightarrow(\mathbf{Tr}\ulcorner\varphi\urcorner\rightarrow\psi)}\,\text{TS}}{\mathbf{Tr}\ulcorner\varphi\urcorner\rightarrow\psi}\,\text{Contraction}}{\mathbf{Tr}\ulcorner\varphi\urcorner}\,\text{def.}}{\psi}\,\rightarrow E$$

3. Paradoxes Excluded from Previous Works

In this brief summary of existing comprehensive studies of self-referential paradoxes, in considering their general conditions, we observed two solutions, paraconsistent logic and contraction-free logic. If they can solve every self-referential paradox, it follows that existing general conditions can cover every self-referential paradox. As mentioned, however, their work cannot solve some self-referential paradoxes. In this paper, I introduce two examples, the Ineffability paradox and the modified Berry's paradox.

3.1 Ineffability Paradox

[18] Pleitz's (2014) original suggestion is not contraction-free logic but contraction-free paraconsistent logic, although paraconsistency is redundant. In the autumn of 2017, I talked with Pleitz, and he admitted it.

[19] As mentioned, Priest suggests dialetheism for philosophical solution of inclosure paradoxes (adopting paraconsistent logic is the logical solution or logical interpretation of dialetheism); however Pleitz shows only the logical solution.

[20] To make use of the contraction visible, he investigates a modified version of the Curry Schema (pp. 11–12, 2014), which is essentially the same as the original Curry Schema.

3.1.1. What is the Ineffability Paradox?

The Ineffability paradox (the paradox of ineffability) is related to the profound and obscure notion "ineffability", usually meaning the impossibility of describing or expressing something. Many philosophers and religious figures in the East and West have mentioned this notion. In negative theology, it is said that God is ineffable. Lao Zi, one of the most influential thinkers in ancient China, says that the genuine Dao (Tao; 道) is ineffable. Conversion, enlightenment, qualia, and sense-data can be counted as ineffable too. On the other hand, the well-known Ineffability paradox occurs from mentioning ineffable thing(s). Once you state that x is ineffable (let us call such a statement an "ineffability statement"), x is expressed by "is ineffable". This means that x is not ineffable now; therefore, the contradictory conclusion "x is ineffable and x is not ineffable" is derived.

3.1.2. Is It a Self-referential Paradox?

You may hesitate to consider this paradox self-referential according to two doubts: "whether it is a paradox" and "whether it is a self-referential paradox".

3.1.2.1. Whether It Is a Paradox

One of the most apparently famous paradoxes is the Epimenides paradox. The Cretan philosopher Epimenides says, "All Cretans are liars". From his statement, it seems that the contradictory conclusion "All Cretans are liars, but one Cretan (that is, Epimenides) speaks truth" is derived. However, the Epimenides paradox is not in fact a paradox. If you suppose his statement is false, such a contradiction does not appear. You may think that the Ineffability paradox is not a paradox in the same sense. If you suppose the ineffability statement is false, the contradiction above does not appear.

This idea is true, but it is highly difficult philosophically to reject all ineffability statements. To deny "*x* is ineffable", for every *x*, you should insist that everything is effable. As Andre Kukla[21] argues, we are restricted epistemologically, so there should be some things we cannot recognize. We cannot mention such things, so they are ineffable. Therefore, some ineffability statements should be true.

[21] Kukla. A, (2005), *Ineffability and Philosophy,* Routledge, pp. 53–58.

3.1.2.2. Whether It Is a Self-referential Paradox

Even if you adopt the Ineffability paradox as a paradox, there is another question: Is it a self-referential paradox? Let us compare this paradox with the Liar paradox. The liar sentence φ says "φ is not true"; this φ refers to the sentence φ itself. On the other hand, the ineffability statement says, "*x* is ineffable"; here is no reference to the statement itself.

True, in the Ineffability paradox, there is no such self-reference. Also true, however, is that this paradox apparently seems to be a self-referential paradox (at least for some people). "*x* is ineffable" (let us name the sentence p) implies "*x* is not ineffable" (¬*p*); or, you may say *p* means ¬*p*. It is naïve, but not weird to think the Ineffability paradox is self-reference paradox-like.

I count as self-reference the reference to groups that contain itself—I suggested the new characterization of self-reference, or "broad self-reference", to preserve this intuition. In fact, the Ineffability paradox is a broad self-referential paradox. Let us check; "*x* is ineffable" implies that it does not hold "*x* is ineffable", "*x* is white", "*x* is fluffy", and so on. "is ineffable" implies rejection of any expression about *x*; that is, "is ineffable" refers to negations of any expression about *x*, including "*x* is ineffable".[22]

3.1.3. How It Slips from Existing Works

It seems that this paradox can be solved by existing solutions, especially by paraconsistent logic, because its conclusion is a contradiction. In fact, however, this paradox involves a more difficult problem that cannot be solved by either paraconsistent logic or contraction-free logic. The problem is that we can derive a negation of an arbitrary sentence. Because this problem is not triviality in a strict sense, but is similar to it, I call it "moderate triviality".

Moderate triviality is derived as follows: suppose that x is ineffable. Now *x* should not be expressed by any expression; that is, any expression should not hold if it is attributed to *x*. "Any expression" includes "*x* is P or Kyoto is in Japan". It follows that neither "*x* is P" nor "Kyoto is in Japan" holds; hence, it is not the case

[22] From it, we can say that broad self-reference is related to quantifier; but please note that not every paradox related to a quantifier is a broad self-referential paradox. Cf. Yablo's paradox (a narrow self-referential paradox).

that Kyoto is in Japan. In the same way, for any sentence ψ, we can derive that it is not the case that ψ.

Moderate triviality can be derived another way. Suppose that x is ineffable. Then *x* should not be expressed by any expression, including "if x is P, then ψ" (for example, "if *x* is omnipotence, evil does not exist"). Now, let us choose "is equal to itself" for P; that is, "if *x* is equal to itself, ψ" does not hold. But it holds that anything is equal to itself, including *x*. That means ψ does not hold.

Let us see these arguments formally; for this, first of all, let us formalize the notion of ineffability. That x is ineffable can be interpreted as that no expression can be attributed to x. One of the simplest formalizations of this interpretation that *x* is ineffable (¬Ef(x)) is

$$\neg \mathrm{Ef}(x) :\Leftrightarrow \forall P(\neg P(x)).^{23}$$

As mentioned, one conclusion of the Ineffability paradox is contradiction, as follows:

$$\dfrac{\dfrac{\dfrac{\neg \mathbf{Ef}(x)}{\forall P(\neg P(x))}\ \text{def.}}{\neg\neg \mathbf{Ef}(x)}\ \forall E \qquad \neg \mathbf{Ef}(x)}{\textbf{Contradiction!}}$$

At the same time, however, we can check that another conclusion of it is moderate triviality.

$$\dfrac{\dfrac{\dfrac{\dfrac{\neg \mathbf{Ef}(x)}{\forall P(\neg P(x))}\ \text{def.}}{\neg(\varphi(x) \vee \psi)}\ \forall E}{\neg\varphi(x) \wedge \neg\psi}\ \text{DeMorgan}}{\neg\psi}\ \wedge E$$

$$\dfrac{\dfrac{\dfrac{\neg \mathbf{Ef}(x)}{\forall P(\neg P(x))}\ \text{def.}}{\neg(x = x \to \psi)}\ \forall E \qquad \dfrac{[\psi]_v}{x = x \to \psi}\ \text{Weakening}}{\dfrac{\bot}{\neg\psi}\ \to I_v}\ \to E$$

Importantly, (1) the conclusion is not a contradiction, but moderate triviality, ¬ψ; (2) in these arguments, we do not use contraction. These two facts imply that neither paraconsistent logic, nor contraction-free logic is helpful.

3.2 Berry's Paradox

[23] This is my formalization, but you may think there are other interpretations and formalizations of ineffability. This paper, however, does not intend to cover all interpretations and formalizations of ineffability and check whether all such formalizations fall into moderate triviality but check whether a certain formalization can be a counterexample of existing studies.

Berry's paradox (or the Berry paradox) is caused by expressions like "the smallest positive real number not expressed by under 58 letters". There are only finite expressions that consist of fewer than 58 letters because there are only 26 letters in the English alphabet and 10 letters in Arabic figures. On the other hand, there are infinitely many positive real numbers. Hence, there should be a smallest positive real number not expressed by under 58 letters. Let us call this number x. The expression "the smallest positive real number not expressed by under 58 letters", however, consists of 57 letters, so it is derived that x is and is not the smallest positive real number not expressed by under 58 letters.

3.2.1. Modified Berry's Paradox

Let us modify this paradox. Consider the expression "not expressed by under 10,000 letters". Because there are only finite expressions that consist of fewer than 10,000 letters (for the same reason as above), and there are infinitely many things in the world (at least the total number of real numbers is infinite), there should be things that satisfy the expression above. Suppose x satisfies this expression. Because this expression consists of 34 letters, it is derived that x is expressed by under 10,000 letters. Hence, again, we fall into a contradictory conclusion that x is and is not expressed by under 10,000 letters. Let us call this version the "modified Berry's paradox".

3.2.2. Is It a Self-referential Paradox?

You may also hesitate to treat this paradox as self-referential according to the same two points as in the case of the Ineffability paradox, but such doubt can be ignored for the same reasons.

Firstly, this paradox can disappear by insisting that there is no object not expressed by under 10,000 letters. We observed that it is difficult to deny something not expressed. How much more difficult to deny something not expressed by under 10,000 words!

Next, let us check its self-reference. Again, it is not a narrow self-reference, but a broad one. "X is not expressed by under 10,000 words" implies that it does not hold "x is not expressed by under 10000 words", "x is a prime number" and so on.

"Is not expressed by under 10,000 words" refers to negation of any expression less than 10,000 words about x (including "is not expressed by under 10,000 words").

3.2.3. How It Slips from Existing Works

It seems again that the modified Berry's paradox can be solved by paraconsistent logic because its conclusion is a contradiction. This paradox is also, however, concerned with another problem besides contradiction. The problem is in fact not moderate triviality, which occurs in the Ineffability paradox, but is almost the same as moderate triviality. This problem occurs as follows: x, which satisfies "not expressed by under 10,000 letters" should not be expressed by an expression like "x is a prime number" or "Kyoto is in Japan" because this expression consists of 31 letters. It follows that neither "x is a prime number" nor "Kyoto is in Japan" holds; that is, it is not the case that Kyoto is in Japan. Or, when x satisfies the property above, x should not be expressed as "if x is equal to itself, Kyoto is in Japan", which consists of 32 letters. It is not the case that if *x* is equal to itself, Kyoto is in Japan, but everything, including *x*, is equal to itself, so we derive the conclusion that it is not the case that Kyoto is in Japan. In this way, for any sentence ψ that consists of not so many letters, we can derive negation of sentence ψ; we can derive that it is not the case that ψ. True, if ψ consists of over 10,000 letters, a disjunction/conditional of ψ and some sentence that contains *x* should consist of over 10,000 letters. In such case, it does not hold that *x* should not be expressed by the disjunctive/conditional sentence; hence ¬ψ is not derived. Also true, however, is that this is not very important. First of all, almost all sentences in ordinary life consist of fewer than 10,000 letters. Moreover, you can modify the paradox to an extreme case like, "not expressed by under 1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 letters". Anyway, although it is true that the modified Berry's paradox does not involve moderate triviality itself, no doubt the paradox does involve a problem that closely resembles moderate triviality (this problem can be called "weak moderate triviality" if you want).

Let us prove weak moderate triviality formally. That *x* is not expressed by under 10,000 letters means that for every expression φ, if φ consists of under 10,000 letters, it does not hold that φ. So "x is not expressed by under 10,000 letters ($\neg Ex_{10000}(x)$)" can be formalized as

$\neg Ex_{10000}(x) := \forall P(P \in \Gamma \rightarrow \neg P(x))$

(Γ means “consists of under 10,000 letters”). The modified Berry’s paradox can cause a contradictory conclusion on the one hand.

$$\dfrac{\dfrac{\dfrac{\dfrac{\neg\mathbf{Ex}_{10000}(x)}{\forall P(P \in \Gamma \to \neg P(x))}\ \text{def.}}{\neg\mathbf{Ex}_{10000}(x) \in \Gamma \to \neg\neg\mathbf{Ex}_{10000}(x)}\ \forall E \qquad \neg\mathbf{Ex}_{10000}(x) \in \Gamma}{\neg\neg\mathbf{Ex}_{10000}(x)}\ \to E \qquad \neg\mathbf{Ex}_{10000}(x)}{\textbf{Contradiction!}}\ \to E$$

On the other hand, however, weak moderate triviality is also derived as follows:

$$\dfrac{\dfrac{\dfrac{\dfrac{\dfrac{\neg\mathbf{Ex}_{10000}(x)}{\forall P(P \in \Gamma \to \neg P(x))}\ \text{def.}}{(\varphi(x) \vee \psi) \in \Gamma \to \neg(\varphi(x) \vee \psi)}\ \forall E \qquad (\varphi(x) \vee \psi) \in \Gamma}{\neg(\varphi(x) \vee \psi)}\ \to E}{\neg\varphi(x) \wedge \neg\psi}\ \text{De Morgan}}{\neg\psi}\ \wedge E$$

$$\dfrac{\dfrac{\dfrac{\dfrac{\neg\mathbf{Ex}_{10000}(x)}{\forall P(P \in \Gamma \to \neg P(x))}\ \text{def.}}{(x = x \to \psi) \in \Gamma \to \neg(x = x \to \psi)}\ \forall E \qquad (x = x \to \psi) \in \Gamma}{\neg(x = x \to \psi)}\ \to E \qquad \dfrac{[\psi]_v}{x = x \to \psi}\ \text{Weakening}}{\dfrac{\bot}{\neg\psi}\ \to I_v}\ \to E$$

(Again, please note that this ψ is not arbitrary, but almost arbitrary). Because the conclusion is not contradiction, but moderate triviality, paraconsistent logic does not work well. And because we do not use contraction, contraction-free logic is also not helpful.

4. Conclusion

In this paper, we saw the brief summary of studies about self-referential paradoxes from the comprehensive approach by constructing their general structure, and observed that the Ineffability paradox and the modified Berry’s paradox slip from these results. It does not follow, however, that the comprehensive approach is hopeless. It just means that such studies are concerned only with narrow self-referential paradoxes, but these two paradoxes are broad self-referential paradoxes.

It may be not so bad to concentrate only on narrow self-referential paradoxes and ignore broad self-referential paradoxes. As I said, however, our intuition says broad self-referential paradoxes are self-referential paradox-like. Hence, I recommend you consider such paradoxes as self-referential.

Then, how should a comprehensive study of (both) self-referential paradoxes be conducted? My suggestion is (1) to find general conditions of broad self-referential paradoxes, and (2) to combine them with general conditions of narrow self-referential paradoxes. Then we can obtain genuine general conditions of self-referential paradoxes and find genuine general solution(s) to them.

Call for papers for *Tetsugaku* Vol.4, 2020 Spring

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