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I Special Theme: Philosophy of Care

How to Care with Words:
Perspectives from Clinical Philosophy and Philosophical Dialogue

NAKAOKA Narifumi
Philosophical Counseling Oncolo

Abstract*: Clinical philosophy began by self-consciously acknowledging that at its core lies nothing other than the philosophy of care. While clinical philosophy incorporates a huge diversity of approaches to care, a diversity that cannot be fully treated here, allow me to offer a brief introduction to the ideas of clinical philosophy, as multifaceted and ever in the making as it still is.*

1. Harmful care?: Initial questions for clinical philosophy

In 1998, we chose the title "Clinical philosophy" for the modified Chair of Ethics in the Graduate School of Letters at Osaka University. Over time and for various reasons, we had come to focus on medical care and education as our field study. From there, we began introducing to nursing researchers, healthcare workers, and care workers modes of philosophical dialogue from Europe—specifically, philosophical cafés and Socratic Dialogue—in order to investigate issues pertaining to care generally and medical care specifically. Below, I want to introduce some episodes from the more than 20 years that has passed since the inception of clinical philosophy. This essay is very much embedded in what I have learned from these experiences. From a methodological viewpoint, it should be added, I am myself involved in the clinical philosophical movement. By attempting to clarify its position in the world today, I practice a style of clinical philosophy that contrasts with what Shimizu Tetsuro once described as the role of philosophers vis-à-vis healthcare workers in healthcare settings: a mere "describer".[1]

In my view, clinical philosophy cannot be discussed without dealing with its "history", without a process of "recollection" that leads us back to its founding. Yet, to call this *my* "narrative" would mean to let go, all too easily, of clinical philosophy's

[1] See the pioneer work, Shimizu Tetsuro, 清水哲郎『医療現場に臨む哲学』[*Iryo Genba ni Nozomu Tetsugaku*. *Philosophia Medicinae*] (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo. 1997). Our lively discussions with Shimizu were significantly encouraged by the contributions of Mr. Nishikawa, himself *both* a philosopher and a nurse.

claim to universality. Instead, "recollection" must involve the Hegelian meaning of *Erinnerung*: the internalization of what has happened that reconstructs "memory" in its own specific way.[2]

"What is the essence of care?" was one of the main questions in the initial discussions among the members of clinical philosophy. Nursing researchers tended to mention the significance of empathy, not only for nursing practice, but also for human care in general. One day, however, Mr. Nishikawa, a male nurse with many years of clinical experience in psychiatry and dialysis as well as working in a nursing home, challenged them saying, "Empathy? A beautiful word! But sometimes care can't avoid harming the concerned. Does it make sense to talk about 'harmful care'?" While Mr. Nishikawa himself did not make this connection, he could have pointed out that the term "care" can imply something cunning or even dangerous; we can say, for instance, "The detective took care of the spy", meaning that the spy was killed or incapacitated. "Care", therefore, does not always mean caring or benign acts. On this point, it is worth referencing Heidegger's concept of *Sorge,* which he associates, though does not identify, with the Latin word *cura* or "care". Heidegger's *Being and Time*, a groundbreaking work published in 1927, has been considered by many to offer to healthcare workers a wealth of philosophically suggestive ideas. Giving due attention to Heidegger's ontological-existential claims, one is sure to find modes of thinking highly attractive to application in the healthcare setting. For one thing, his concept of *Sorge*, or care, is as philosophically broad-minded as it is practically insightful. We human beings, as Being-in-the-world, always care about both the things and people around us. Heidegger distinguishes "care about things" (*Besorgen*) from "care about humans" (*Fürsorge*), or "(concernful) solicitude".[3] Such care about other human beings, in turn, has two possibilities: *einspringen*, or "leaping in", and *vorausspringen*, or "leaping ahead".[4] This distinction is of great interest to those who aim to be of true assistance to others. While "leaping in" can make the recipient of care *dependent* on

[2] See my contributions to: Homma Naoki/ Nakaoka Narifumi (ed.), 本間直樹/中岡成文編『ドキュメント 臨床哲学』[*Document Rinsho Tetsugaku*](Osaka Daigaku Shuppankai, 2010), especially p.3. I agree with my co-editor Homma when he says: 'The "document" style, or the method of imitating it, does not mean fact-finding or nostalgic gestures. It is a fictional and reflective practice that demands an attitude of telling everything to the future, even though it is present'. (p. xv.)

[3] Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 9. Auflage, Tübingen, 1967, 121.

[4] Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 122. It reminds me an anecdote I heard many years ago: A rehab staff member was taught by a peer supporter for ALS patients that providing something convenient to a patient was only for the convenience of the medical staff and actually undermined the patient's potential. How shocking the realization was!

assistance, "leaping ahead" can *give care back* to the recipient instead of taking it from him or her. To mention another fruitful suggestion, Heidegger points out the significance of the dead to family members and friends, using the German dual concept of the dead: der *Gestorbene* and der *Verstorbene*. The former signifies only the dead person, while the latter is the object of human love and respect. In no way, however, was his task in *Being and Time* to characterize the peculiarity of "death" as the "griefwork" of the bereaved family, nor was his interest directed to exploring a better possibility of care for the surviving family. While I acknowledge the philosophical validity of the ontological difference and the priority of the ontological to the ontic in this work, as a clinical philosopher, I would have liked to see an alternative approach to the average way of dying and death, one alternative to the transcending—and rather heroic—concept of *Sein zum Tode*.

As evincing a new wave of philosophy, clinical philosophers have, through their interaction with people of various fields, brought into question the authority of the philosophical tradition as well as the expertise of philosophers. Washida Kiyokazu, my colleague and the founder of clinical philosophy, was eager in those days to philosophically explore the essence of care, but would reflect on a graduate student who, attending a meeting of nurses, was asked sternly, "What kind of expert are you? What kind of professional are you here?" To this, the student was at a loss for words. Then, the students seemed to gradually overcome the confusion and started to move on to independently, without pretense of any expertise.[5]

Along with this criticism of expertise, there was a criticism of the political naiveté of clinical philosophy. For example, the act of questioning the "essence" of care among care workers veils a politics that covers over the poor working environment in the field of healthcare.[6] Looking back from my present point of view, we should have countered by pointing out that power in the field of care is more complex than a "poor working environment". Indeed, lurking behind the question, "What kind of expert are you?" lies the pride of the nurses, confident that, "We are, of course, nursing professionals". Whether such pride could be felicitous with the attitude of clarifying and tackling the power structures within the healthcare field is yet to be seen.

2. Is a robot capable of care?

[5] *Document Rinsho Tetsugaku*, vii. ix.
[6] *Document Rinsho Tetsugaku*, vii.

Since the inauguration of clinical philosophy in 1998, there has been a Friday-evening seminar open to citizens (including healthcare professionals) interested in clinical philosophy. At the first seminar, Mr. Washida talked about the "phenomenology of illness" and requested that nursing-related participants give presentations on their direct experience about illness. In response, Ms. Takeda made a presentation entitled "What is a holistic view of patients?" in the second session, and Ms. Nihei gave a presentation entitled "My thoughts on alcoholism and the lives of patients" in the third.

The Friday-evening seminar in 1998 was, in this way, almost totally focused on "care". The seminar stimulated heated, and sometimes awkward, discussions between philosophy researchers and nurses. The philosophy researchers present were there not only to learn from those with experience in nursing, but to contribute to the discussions. For instance, there was the suggestion that the essence of care might include a relationship of "co-presence", that is, a relationship wherein, for example, a novice nurse takes "care" of a psychotic patient simply by sitting at his or her side. Or there was the suggestion that "care too is a desire", a suggestion that focused on the aspirational motivations and dynamics of caring agents, which, while certainly altruistic, are not without the demands of self-actualization and the unique pitfalls implicated therein.

The search for how philosophy and nursing should come together, learn from one another, and thereby jointly shape "clinical philosophy" caused some frustration and conflict. A symbol of such frustration and conflict appears in the case of the "robot remark", which transpired in the second year of clinical philosophy.[7] Nursing researcher Nishimura Yumi was invited one evening to give a presentation at the Friday seminar and reported on her interview with a certain "Nurse A", who was responsible for patients in persistent vegetative states. Nurse A believed that, despite many physicians' skepticism, her line of sight could once in a while become "entangled" with that of the patients, which would imply that communication with someone in a "vegetative" state was somehow possible. This interview was the highlight of Nishimura's phenomenological study, *Speaking Body*, which was published soon afterwards[8] and became a bridge between nursing and philosophy.

The Q&A session after the presentation gradually heated up. Graduate student Horie Tsuyoshi asked the nurses, "What if the patient lying over there on the bed, the

[7] *Document Rinsho Tetsugaku*, 12.

[8] Nishimura Yumi, 西村ユミ『語りかける身体――看護ケアの現象学』[*Katarikakeru Shintai. Kangokea no Genshogaku*] (Yumiru Shuppan. 2001).

patient you are nursing, were in fact a robot? Would that make a difference for nursing?" I remember him saying something about the "self-motion of care" or the "hypothesis that we may be caring for a precision machine", all the while believing that this machine is a human. Horie was, in fact, so impressed by Nishimura's presentation that he believed, based on his knowledge of systems theory, to have discovered something of great theoretical potential in primary nursing. Yet, his seemingly inhumane assumption—one probably inspired by the well-known skepticism of Descartes's second meditation about the apparently human figures beyond his window—caused annoyed reaction from both philosophy students and, more vehemently, the nurses present.

Horie later explained the intention of his "robot comment" as follows. On that evening, he heard Ms. Nihei say, "As I see the behavior of the person in front of me, I can construct care on the spot, I can nurse in my mind", and thought, "This is autopoiesis in nursing! From the perspective of self-actuated nursing, nurses act as if the unconscious patient is communicating with them. That is exactly what communication is".[9]

It remains an open question whether his vision of autopoietic nursing care as "operational closure"[10] is persuasive and promising or not grounded in nursing practice. Yet what's clear is that those who gathered for the seminar on clinical philosophy, whether their backgrounds were in philosophy or in nursing, did not divide into camps, but rather reflected on their respective discipline and, over the course of the encounter, contemplated the theoretical potential of the other side. This opened up, or at least suggested, a theoretical and practical soil for care common to both sides. Mr. Nishikawa, who, having studied philosophy with Washida prior to becoming a nurse, embodied a fusion of both sides. Moved by Nurse A's appeal in Nishimura's presentation, he commented that the premise itself—that nurses care for those who have the ability to understand—should be reconsidered. He then added a rather challenging comment: while it is good to respect the patient's self-determination, it is problematic to rely too heavily on what the patient has expressed. When a patient asks to be allowed to die or to stop dialysis, for example, ordinary nursing can only respond with empathy or love. Here, Nishikawa wishes to introduce "thinking", which he calls the "philosophical turn of clinical nursing" that corresponds to the "clinical turn of philosophy" on philosophers' side.[11]

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[9] *Document Rinsho Tetsugaku*, 25.
[10] *Document Rinsho Tetsugaku*, 25.
[11] *Document Rinsho Tetsugaku*, 19.

In this way, both Horie and Nishikawa revealed somewhat unusual aspects of the way nursing care should communicate with patients. Although their questions were about whether nursing settings could include possible cases of taking care of robots, it led to the question of whether robots could take care of human patients. It offered, in other words, a new perspective on the current trend of introducing AI into medicine.

3. Letting yourself be pulled in—A middle voice approach in caring fields

Clinical philosophical activities include implementing or participating in dialogues in an indirect encounter with the problems occurring in the various fields. In this way, we come to touch the site indirectly. Some graduate students seemed to interpret the practice of the philosophical dialogue as clinical philosophy per se.[12]

When we meet various people in dialogue, listen to the worries that people are having in the field, think about these problems together, and try to find words for them, manners of expressing these issues, both familiar and surprising, appear to simply crop up. I have witnessed this for myself and not once. One could say that it is precisely in these moments of dialogue that clinical philosophy takes place. We are, in such moments, occupying *ourselves*, engaging *ourselves* in the field.

Usually, such participation or engagement is considered to be “active”. The decision to participate was my own and, in that sense, I was not passive. I do not, however, intentionally cause the results that occur there. Rather, I listen to other people’s words, get involved, and pull myself in a direction that I did not necessarily intend or anticipate. I have thus been stimulated and have my thoughts pulled in that direction. That phenomenon lies somewhere between activity and passivity.

Or again: While listening to the words of the people in the field, I am stimulated and find myself listening to my own words as they appear. And then come your next words, spinning out. In consideration of what is happening in such a chain of events as a whole, we would like to conjure up the, originally grammatical, term *middle voice*, an inflected form of verbs unique to some ancient languages such as ancient Greek, where the subject of the verb cannot be categorized as either agent or patient. Modern languages such as English or French have no middle voice, but rely

[12] Nakaoka Narifumi, 中岡成文「臨床哲学の〈引き込まれ〉――自己変容論として」[Rinsho Tetsugaku no <Hikikomare>. Jikohenyo Ron toshite] in *Shinran Kyogaku*, vol. 104 (March 2015, 79–102).

instead on *reflexive verbs*, like "occupy oneself". It is interesting to note—and I believe it is of no little significance for philosophical inquiry—that some human activities and phenomena can most appropriately be described or explained with reference to the middle voice.[13]

Let me give yet another example from clinical philosophy. Washida's *The Power of Listening*[14] is a veritable manifesto of clinical philosophy and since its publication in 1999, the attitude of listening—sheer listening—has been very important to clinical philosophy, even regarded as *the* basis of clinical philosophy itself. Is it really possible, however, to *just* listen, simply and earnestly? Say I silently sit in a waiting posture. It is not very likely that this will make it any easier for my interlocutor to open themselves up to me. Suffice it to say, in order to be in a position to really listen to the other, various conditions must first be fulfilled. Therefore, listening is neither merely active nor merely passive, but can only be implemented in a middle voice approach. A similar situation of "getting involved" in order to "draw out" occurs in educational settings. When and how does a child's spontaneity arise? Spontaneity does not follow from our telling them to be free and to grow. On the one hand, direct help and support may well encourage the child to grow; but, on the other, the helper may often need to persuade him- or herself to *wait* for the child's change in direction (surely enduring a period of some anxiety).[15] When we say education and nurturing, it feels like other people, such as parents and teachers, are active, and not the child. But isn't it possible to think, rather, that the surroundings help the child "grow up" (intransitive)? In a similar way, perhaps, the medical community also values the self-care of the parties concerned in the middle voice image of "health": for the traditional idea of healthcare (*yojo* 養生), which we will deal with below, is also considered to belong to the middle voice approach.

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[13] See my discussion about "The subject which transforms in the process—Thinking beyond passive and active" in: Nakaoka Narifumi, Klinische Philosophie als Erfahrungskritik, in: Hans Peter Liederbach (Hrsg.), Philosophie im gegenwärtigen Japan, IUDICIUM Verlag, 2017, 94–123, specifically 114–123.

[14] Washida Kiyokazu, 鷲田清一『聴くことの力ー臨床哲学試論』[*Kikukoto no Chikara. Rinsho Tetsugaku Shiron*] (Hankyu Communications, 1999).

[15] Creating a Buddha statue from natural stones or tiny pieces of wood from the field is perhaps a middle voice invitation, beckoning the imagination of the sculptor, rather than a result of his active intention; with the Buddha statue being created and the sculptor himself transforming, religiousness is formed as a result. See Nakaoka Narifumi, 中岡成文『試練と成熟ー自己変容の哲学』[*Shiren to Seijuku. Jikohenyo no Tetsugaku*](Osaka Daigaku Shuppankai, 2012), 53–54.

To expand on the above question of listening, we can ask ourselves the further question, who is it you are listening to? Certainly, I'm listening to that person out there; I want to hear that person's words. But *who* is that person? He or she is in front of you, but whose word is it that comes out? Is it really that person's words? Or, possibly, was it forced out due to some sort of role expectation? In any case, the entity that is formed there can be considered as a big self (a big subject that is separated from the individual); or rather, the place of the relationship itself can be called one Self.

4. Individuals and Relations—Interactive Entity

Since 2016, I have been regularly hosting *philosophical dialogues* for the patients and families dealing with cancer or intractable diseases, as well as for medical professionals. These dialogues are based on the principles of clinical philosophy and are conducted in cooperation and consultation with many physicians and nurses. The following comments focus on the perspective of *end-of-life care*, which will become important in organizing and facilitating the dialogues, especially with *advance care planning* (ACP) in mind.

Especially when considering the reality, dynamism, and effectiveness of care or interpersonal assistance, it seems insufficient to consider individual actions in isolation, that is, only in terms of individual involvement (activity). We could say this is the limit of the individualistic view. It is, instead, concepts of *shared decision making* (SDM) or *relational autonomy* that are now being proposed in medical and other settings.

SDM is a type of patient-participatory medicine that involves more specific focus on the role of the patient in the patient-physician relationship. In informed choice, patients are expected to make informed decisions, but in SDM patients make such decisions based on their own preferences (values and beliefs). From a slightly different perspective, we could think of SDM as "a model of shared decision making where both patient and provider contribute to the decision" in contrast to "a patient delegating a decision to the health care provider". In any case, the patient is considered *responsible* to take part in the decision, although "patients who have just received a serious diagnosis and feel vulnerable may not want the responsibility of being involved in decision making".[16] In my view, this is especially the case with many

[16] Betty Chewning et al., "Patient preferences for shared decisions: A systematic review", Patient Educ Couns. (2012 Jan, 86 (1), 9–18).

Japanese who are really in need of medical or nursing care but cannot narrow down their preferences, who actually don't know what they want. Such people are likely to get empowered from a decision coaching that develops patients' skills.[17]

SDM is considered by some to include an *interprofessional shared decision making model* (IP-SDM) "designed by an interprofessional team to broaden the perspective of shared decision making beyond the patient-practitioner dyad". This model "is based on a detailed theory analysis of SDM models, key IP concepts from a systematic review, and a stepwise consensus-building exercise".[18] While it is important from the patient perspective, at the *micro* or individual level, to "take the necessary time to work through a structured process to make an informed, preference-sensitive decision while interacting with one or more health care professionals and family members", the deliberation among those involved is to be complemented by the *macro* level perspective of broader healthcare policies and social contexts.

Whereas SDM tries to maintain and promote the worth and dignity of the individual patient in his or her situatedness—that is, in his or her concrete relationships with loved ones or healthcare workers—some theorists observe a kind of separateness here, and so propose a new model of the caring relationship based on the *relational self*.[19] In order for human beings to think and make judgments about things and situations related to themselves, the existence of others is indispensable. Others are necessary even for clarifying or making decisions about one's own self-identity. Autonomy is cultivated through constructive relationships. The concept of relational autonomy may be understood and welcomed most by a Japanese physician or nurse working with patients in the final stage of life, because, despite the obvious need of such patients for help in the decision-making process, healthcare professionals hesitate to intervene for fear of "violating" the patient's right to self-determination. This is a natural consideration in Japan, where individuals are not always free to state their preferences, *caring* rather about the intentions and conveniences of their family and the medical staff, where prognosis is not always announced to a 19-year-old cancer patient due to the parents' opposition.[20] The whole triad of patient, family and healthcare provider could benefit from a workable—not only theoretically convenient—concept of relational autonomy. Or perhaps, we should move on—as

[17] See, for instance: https://decisionaid.ohri.ca/coaching.html.
[18] See: https://decisionaid.ohri.ca/ip-sdm.html.
[19] See among others: Jennifer Nedelsky, *Law's Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law*
(Oxford University Press, 2013).
[20] This was a case presented at a meeting of clinical ethics that I attended.

does Nedelsky[21]—to talk about the structuring or *restructuring of the relations*, since "relationships are not necessarily benign".[22] Instead of sticking to the assumptive boundaries of self, we could deal with them flexibly to creatively jump into interaction with others. This fits well, if I may add, with the concept of clinical philosophy.

In cases of advanced dementia, it is even more urgent to work out a relational autonomy model among the concerned person himself or herself, the family members, and healthcare providers or care workers who take care of the person. Such a model would be important not only for medical institutions, but also for nursing homes and other welfare facilities.—Supporting a patient's fragile sense of self and autonomy demands that close dialogue, consultation, and feedback take place among those who are close to and who care about the patient; it demands, in other words, the kinds of communicative interaction and reflection that have proven more challenging in the pandemic situation.[23] While trying to keep the ego's boundaries is a problem, it is certainly difficult to talk to people with advanced dementia who do not have the socially expected sense of self-identity, or who are not consistent in memory or in their claims or demands; it is even more difficult to care for them. One does not know exactly to "whom" one is speaking or for "whom" one is caring. When you become old and "senile", your rights are not diminished and you are still considered an autonomous person, but the substance of autonomy moves significantly in the temporal process, with physical and mental weakness. Those who are aware that they are actually living that weakness will say—even to people who are already feeling a decline—"Young people wouldn't understand", half giving up and half blaming. Sure, it's not easy for the younger generation to understand physical weakness and the associated phenomena of one's mind and energy, but if you're willing to take care, you'll want to try to understand. The self-assertion of those who feel themselves weak can be an expression or part of autonomy, no matter how much it may seem to the carers to be biased and at odds with reality. Many—young—academic oriented philosophers might think, "Well, that's none of our business!" But I would consider that the empowerment—as precisely the business of clinical philosophers.

5. Self Care in the Coming Age—Why and How

[21] Nedelsky, *ibid.*, particularly chap. 8.
[22] So is titled a section in Nedelsky's book.
[23] It should be noted that my discussions about health care in this essay often apply to care in the welfare area as well.

As I became ever more aware of my own aging, the traditional idea of healthcare (*yojo* 養生) came to be an important theme for me as a clinical philosopher living in an East Asian culture. My research on this theme culminated in a book for the general public.[24] The historical character and potential of *yojo* thought can be divided into the following four aspects.[25]

First is its aspect of cultural communication. *Yojo* thought in the Edo period can be defined as "the product of health-themed cultural communication between the creator and the recipient of culture in an ethnic group".[26] There was "compatibility" between the ruling class, such as aristocrats and rulers, and the common class, as to whether they are the creators or recipients of culture. This might provide an interesting point of contact to some healthcare proposals of today, which I will introduce later. Anyway, let's keep in mind that, in contrast to our modern healthcare tools, the only tools at the disposal of Kaibara Ekiken's (貝原益軒) time were personal attention and traditional medicine.

Second is its aspect of social adaptation. It is not surprising that the ideology of *yojo*, like other beliefs and values, was defined or influenced by social, political and economic factors. Ekiken's ideas of "enduring" (忍ぶ), "abstaining" (慎む), and "satisfying with a small amount" (少で満足する) were suitable for the low-growth and regulatory era of the early Edo period. He forbids frequent bathing for the economic reason that the skin becomes open, causing one to lose precious "*ki*" (気) with sweat.

Third is its aspect of behavior adjustment or self-construction. Approaching the issue from a slightly different angle than social adaptation, one could cite Foucault's discussion of "the care for self" (*le souci de soi*)[27] in ancient Greece and Rome, where he conceives of the practice of regimen or healthcare as a policy that constitutes oneself as a subject who gives proper consideration to one's body. In both China and Japan, the mind is the master of the body. Ekiken gives voice to this point, saying that, since the mind is the lord of the world, it should be kept quiet and peaceful. This offers us some suggestions for how we should control ourselves in our modern,

[24] Nakaoka Narifumi, 中岡成文『養生訓問答ーほんとうの「すこやかさ」とは』[*Yojo-kun Mondo. Honto no Sukoyakasa towa*] (Puneuma Sha, 2015).

[25] The four aspects are organized by adding the perspective of Schipperges (footnote 29) to the discussion in Takizawa Toshiyuki 瀧澤利行『養生論の思想』[*Yojo-ron no Shiso*] (Seori Shobo 2003).

[26] Takizawa Toshiyuki, *Yojo-ron no Shiso*, 4–5.

[27] Michel Foucault, *Histoire de la sexualité* 3: *Le souci de soi,* Édition Gallimard, 1984.

medicalized society. Self-control today faces the difficult task of processing a very large amount of information about one's health (for example, genetic information). In the days of Ekiken, the body was, so to speak, a black box. Today, a person with, say, a late-onset genetic disease has a difficult life plan because the time to "know" about the disease and the time to "get sick" are different. It is also possible to demand "the right not to know" and so control yourself by intentionally blocking out information. Genetic information and genetic networks go beyond the boundaries of individuals. Considering this, Ekiken's view of the body may offer something suggestive.—According to him, "the human body is based on the parents, and starts from heaven and earth. My body is not my property because it was born and nurtured by the grace of heaven and earth as well as of parents". [28] This idea may go beyond Ekiken's ancient Confucian ideology and lead to a new view of physical and mental health based on the human network that runs through the cosmos and microcosm.

Fourth, then, is the aspect of cosmic order or *salus communis*. From this aspect we might be able to re-evaluate the view of the ancients who thought of the cosmos and *oikonomia* as where humans can live and overlook. Isn't it just as necessary for us to comport ourselves according to a good life order through a certain "style"? Health promotion in daily life is linked to the structure of a given society, to the leading values of given cultural and social classes. On the other hand, health and illness are most certainly "basic experiences" belonging to each individual: for it is a fact that we will each have no choice but to deal with these personally and at any time. In medieval Europe, one was expected to live with three perspectives: (1) personal well-being or *salus privata*, (2) public well-being or *salus publica*, and (3) joint well-being or *salus communis*, which mediates (1) and (2).[29]

If we turn our eyes to modern Japan, one of the leading R&D healthcare projects today, "Suggestions from healthcare on the ever-changing self through introspection and dialogue" (「内省と対話によって変容し続ける自己」に関するヘルスケアからの提案),[30] suggests a value shift from the now standard model of problem-solving care, which is based on a causal relationship model with control and governance to "make-ends-meet" style and "moderate" care based on relationship change. As the project asks how stakeholders receive and organize information in today's or near-future healthcare societies and how they interact with others, they are

[28] The opening sentences of Ekiken's long selling health book『養生訓』[*Yojo-kun*], originally published in 1712.
[29] H.Schipperges, *Gesundheit und Gesellschaft. Ein historisch-kritisches Panorama*, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2003, S. 27.
[30] https://www.jst.go.jp/ristex/hite/community/project000080.html

considered to have the conflictive sides of vulnerabilities and growth potential. A new expert model is foreseen to arise following the introduction of medical AI. Medical experts will find themselves in the role of receiving the emotions of their clients, emotions that spring up in response to information technology; they will become interpreters of medical information or perhaps something like an "emotion terminal" that could *generate meaning* in those emotions. Intriguing! We are, however, yet to see whether our modern society is really mature enough to follow this self-care centered model of self-transformation that is mediated by "introspection and dialogue", and whether we could possibly recruit AI robots as our colleagues in this process.

6. How to Empower Transformation: In and Out

It is not only the client or care receiver who needs to be cared for. The caregiver, being a weak, sensitive, and perplexed creature himself or herself, also needs to receive care. If their pride allows them, sometimes healthcare providers or care workers consider counseling; if not, they may turn toward self-care or to their friends for dialogue. This is why clinical philosophy has, from the beginning, focused on the goal of "caring for the caregiver". All human beings are dependent on others to take care of themselves while they live. It will be of benefit to the caregiver, in caring for others, to sometimes reflect on his or her own way of life or to participate in philosophical dialogues.

Self-communication is another theme that continues to be a focus of my interest. Communication is usually thought of as the act of my "self" having contact with other people. This is certainly true. But since the self is such a complicated thing, I would be bound for trouble if I were to neglect organizing my inner life before or during "communication" with others. With so many parts of ourselves that remain opaque, we often, or even usually, misunderstand ourselves. We may work too hard when we should stop. As a result, we get sick. For this reason, I would like to stress the significance of self-communication, especially that through various wisdoms of life, such as improving the "ventilation" within myself. Such "ventilation" does not entail making transparent everything opaque within me. Such a task is by no means even possible. But it's okay for there to be various parts of yourself that remain, unexpectedly, hidden. Successful self-communication cannot attempt to cast light on everything, but remains content with achieving a kind of balance between what is opened up and what remains closed—with, in other words, good ventilation.

Of course, self-communication does not oppose interpersonal communication or philosophical dialogue. To the contrary, an intensive and fruitful dialogue usually presupposes that each participant engages in careful introspection and self-communication inside and outside of the dialogue. Philosophical dialogue with patients with cancer and other intractable diseases, in which I have been involved mainly in Osaka and Tokyo,[31] helps them to sort out their experiences and reconstruct their lives. The help or care offered here is not, to put it in Heideggerian terms, directed at taking over or removing the person's *Sorge* (concern), but giving it back to the person as something to be truly cared for.[32] This type of help or care can be compared with the "leaping ahead" in one's existential possibility, as described by Heidegger;[33] yet, during the philosophical dialogue it occurs in a less existentialist way. The good outcomes that we somewhat expect yet cannot control arise from mutual trust among participants; they occur more fluidly and contingently in the process of dialogue, less in the decidedness of each participant or the leadership of the facilitator.

I would like to conclude this article with the story of an engineer, Mr. Hisazumi, who became a patient of the intractable disease ALS. For people living with advanced ALS, means of communication become increasingly limited. As they lose the ability to speak, they communicate through a transparent dial, if their interlocutor is within sight, or through IT devices, if their interlocutor is at a distance. For the dial to appropriately facilitate communication, they must, first, select a model that suits them, and, second, have an aid (a family member or helper), that can correctly read the letters that their eyes are directed to, an aid who can construct the intended message and finally transmit the message to the audience. Anyone who has witnessed this procedure will find it to be very demanding.

Now, while healthy people use their hands to operate IT equipment, especially for communication, advanced ALS patients resort to the parts of body still capable of movement. It could be a toe or even a cheek muscle. Mr. Hisazumi continues to devise and manufacture special "switches" for his clients to operate IT equipment and other devices, despite his own increasing physical difficulty due to ALS. He is a peer supporter who helps other ALS patients to improve their communication environment. His engineering spirit knows neither bound nor compromise. He talks to students who volunteer to make devices for patients and the disabled. If he sees that they are only

[31] We call it "oncolo café", *oncolo* suggesting oncology. See our website: https://oncolocafe.com/en/

[32] In this respect, the oncolo café sessions can be described as both group care and self-care.

[33] Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 122.

focused on keeping up with the schedule, if the students lack the motivation to fix flaws in the product, to improve its usability, and to make the users as satisfied as possible, he scolds them: “Have you no greed (*yoku* 欲)?” The lesson is a hard one, but the students learn little by little, sometimes on the verge of tears, sometimes on the brink of anger.

An educator’s gentleness is not necessarily an attitude of care. It can also be caring, even more caring, to scold a student, drawing out his or her “greed”. This attitude toward educating dovetails with Mr. Hisazumi’s own attitude toward life. He says wryly, “Only greed leads to hope”.

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Empathy in Nursing: A Phenomenological Intervention

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Abstract: *Today, many philosophers write on topics of contemporary interest, such as emerging technologies, scientific advancements, or major political events. However, many of these reflections, while philosophically valuable, fail to contribute to those who may benefit the most from them. In this article, we discuss our own experience of engaging with nursing researchers and practicing nurses. By drawing on the field of philosophical phenomenology, we intervene in a longstanding debate over the meaning of "empathy" in nursing, which has important implications for nursing research, training, and practice. However, our intention is not only to introduce and discuss this philosophical intervention. Rather, we present this intervention as a model for how philosophers might successfully engage with the field of nursing, and perhaps with other fields as well, with the aim of effecting positive change in research or practice. The article proceeds in five parts. First, we introduce the problem of conceptual clarity in nursing and explain why many nursing concepts are still in need of refinement. Second, we discuss the origins of the concept of empathy in nursing and outline the challenges associated with borrowing theory from other fields. Third, we explain how nurses tend to conceptualize empathy today, drawing upon the psychological distinction between cognitive and emotional empathy. Fourth, we discuss our intervention in this debate and explain how we attempt to resolve existing conceptual confusions by developing the concept of empathy from the ground up. Fifth, we conclude by briefly reflecting upon some of the challenges of interdisciplinary engagement and providing some recommendations based upon our own experience.*

Introduction

Today, many philosophers write on topics of contemporary interest, such as emerging technologies, scientific advancements, or major political events. However, many of these reflections, while philosophically valuable, fail to contribute to those who may benefit the most from them. In some cases, this is simply because the philosophical

work is published in a venue that it not widely read by people outside of philosophy, including those involved in the events or practices discussed in the work. In other cases, the work itself is written in an inaccessible manner, perhaps because of unfamiliar jargon, the style of argumentation, or an overreliance on broad abstractions rather than concrete examples.

Philosophers should, of course, have the freedom to develop ideas and engage in debates that may be of interest only to those already embedded in their field of research. But many philosophers who write on contemporary issues do aspire to have an impact upon the world outside of philosophy and even the world outside of academia. How one's work can have this kind of impact is, however, a challenging question. Traditional philosophical training tends not to focus, for instance, on the challenges of engaging in genuinely interdisciplinary research, much less on the challenges of effectively engaging with people outside of academia.

In this article, we discuss our own experience of engaging with nursing researchers and practicing nurses. By drawing on the field of philosophical phenomenology, we intervene in a longstanding debate over the meaning of "empathy" in nursing, which has important implications for nursing research, training, and practice. However, our intention is not only to introduce and discuss this philosophical intervention. Rather, we present this intervention as a model for how philosophers might successfully engage with the field of nursing, and perhaps with other fields as well, with the aim of effecting positive change in research or practice.

The article proceeds in five parts. First, we introduce the problem of conceptual clarity in nursing and explain why many nursing concepts are still in need of refinement. Second, we discuss the origins of the concept of empathy in nursing and outline the challenges associated with borrowing theory from other fields. Third, we explain how nurses tend to conceptualize empathy today, drawing upon the psychological distinction between cognitive and emotional empathy. Fourth, we discuss our intervention in this debate and explain how we attempt to resolve existing conceptual confusions by developing the concept of empathy from the ground up. Fifth, we conclude by briefly reflecting upon some of the challenges of interdisciplinary engagement and providing some recommendations based upon our own experience.

1. The Problem of Conceptual Clarity in Nursing

Before intervening in an existing conceptual debate, it is essential to familiarize oneself with the history of the field, including how the field's conceptual frameworks originated and how they are used today. Without this knowledge, it is impossible to determine whether or how a philosophical concept might be of value to the field in question.

Modern nursing, understood as the professional practice of caring for those who are ill, has a history dating back to the 1800s. However, nursing as an academic discipline has a considerably shorter history, with university departments of nursing first created in the 1960s. As a new research field, nursing had to quickly establish its disciplinary identity. It wasn't immediately clear, however, where exactly nursing fit within the broader university structure. Initially, it might seem that nursing stands squarely within the fields of biomedical research. However, the concerns that dominated the profession of nursing differed in key respects from the concerns of, for instance, biology or organic chemistry. Nursing researchers were fundamentally concerned with what it meant to be a nurse and how to effectively interact with and care for their patients. As Mark Risjord explains, already "In the 1940s and 1950s, nursing education had supplemented the physician's biological knowledge with psychology and sociology. Nursing knowledge had thus grown beyond the boundaries of medical knowledge, but there was, as yet, little that nurses could call their own" (Risjord 2010, 15). In the decades that followed, nurses sought to establish a distinct theoretical foundation for their own discipline. However, at least in the initial stages, nurses still aimed to model their research on traditional approaches in the sciences. Dorothy Johnson (1959) and Rozella Schlotfeld (1960), for instance, argued that nursing as a research field should be able to develop its theoretical foundations independently of nursing as a practice. As a result, nursing research was not understood as a mere response to practical issues in the field. Rather, it was free to establish its own aims, which would in turn shape and influence nursing as a practice (Risjord 2010, 15). In opposition to this view, several nursing scholars argued that nursing practice should be the primary guide to research. Because practicing nurses are experts in their own right, they are capable of identifying practical problems that researchers should further investigate and attempt to resolve (Risjord 2010, 15–16).

Despite this initial pushback, nursing scholarship, for the most part, continued to prioritize theory over practice. In the 1970s and 80s, however, an increasing number of nursing scholars expressed their frustrations with the fact that nursing theory failed to provide any concrete guidance for nursing practice (see, e.g., Hardy 1978; Miller 1985). They argued that a relevance gap had emerged between

theory and practice. Jean Watson (1981) as well as Janice Swanson and Carole Chenitz (1982) argued that this gap emerged because nursing continued to model itself on the quantitative approaches of the natural sciences, which failed to resonate with the everyday practices of nursing (Risjord 2010, 28). They suggested that nursing should instead draw upon the qualitative approaches pioneered in the social sciences. While the social sciences had already had some influence on the theoretical foundations of nursing, this new focus on qualitative methods pushed nursing further in this direction.[1]

This turn toward the social sciences certainly increased the relevance of nursing research for nursing practice. However, some nursing scholars also questioned whether nursing should be borrowing theoretical foundations from other disciplines in the first place. Would it not be better for nurses to develop their own theoretical foundations from scratch—theoretical foundations that were tailor-made to the field of nursing?

One of the main motivations for this move is that the longstanding practice of borrowing theories from other disciplines produced what we might call conceptual heterogeneity. As Janice Morse and her colleagues explain, early phases of a new scientific field, such as nursing, are often ripe with conceptual confusion. On the one hand, "similar theoretical explanations often compete for preferred acceptance, while allied concepts vie to account for the same phenomenon", producing a situation in which different concepts are used with similar and overlapping meanings (Morse et al. 1996, 254). On the other hand, "one concept may have several definitions; and in some cases, these various meanings may be implicit, unrecognized by researchers and clinicians, resulting in a lack of clarity that makes nursing a soft science—or at least softer than is desirable" (Morse et al. 1996, 254). This lack of conceptual clarity undermines scientific research, including the potential for such research to effectively guide or influence practice.

In response to these conceptual confusions, a considerable amount of intellectual labor has been devoted to adapting, refining, and applying concepts to the field of nursing. This intellectual work is typically achieved through what nurses call "concept analysis" (which differs from the philosophical approach called "conceptual analysis"). Nurses employ a variety of methods for concept analysis. Regardless of the method, however, the primary aim is to bring a concept to "maturity". An immature concept is one that is poorly defined, often because the boundaries of the

[1] For a more detailed overview of the history of nursing as a science, see Risjord (2010 Chs. 1 and 2).

concept have not been adequately articulated, resulting in substantial overlap with other concepts. Through various methods of analysis, researchers attempt to develop and delineate a concept, ideally to a point where it is measurable or can be reliably used in scientific studies or in clinical practice. In some cases, this is achieved by constructing a model case to which the concept can be legitimately applied, then reviewing apparently related or otherwise illegitimate cases that help refine the meaning of the concept.[2] Other approaches rely on extensive analyses of how the concept has been used in the existing literature. And still others may examine how the concept is used in measurement tools or in clinical applications, or even how practitioners describe the concept in qualitative interviews.

Concept analysis was especially popular in the 1980s and 90s. Throughout this period, we find analyses of key concepts that are central to the nursing profession, such as caring, coping, dignity, empathy, grief, health, hope, privacy, and suffering. Most of these concepts were borrowed from other disciplines and then, in some cases, modified or adapted for use in nursing. Morse and her colleagues argue, however, that many of these analyses were overly simplistic. The descriptions and definitions produced by various methods of concept analysis did little to advance nursing knowledge (Morse et al. 1996, 225). In our opinion, these analyses often provide an excellent overview of the diversity of definitions associated with what at first appeared to be a coherent concept. But few of these analyses manage to develop or refine the concepts in a meaningful and lasting way.

2. The Origins of Empathy in Nursing

After this general overview of how nursing's concepts originated and developed, we are now able to identify a key concept in nursing that might benefit from philosophical clarification. Because of its central and longstanding role in the field of nursing, we have decided to focus on the concept of empathy as a potential target.

Nurses, by and large, agree that empathy is key to effective nursing practice. But, even today, there's no consensus on how to define it. The term is used in a variety of ways in the nursing literature, referring to a range of perceptual, cognitive, affective, and behavioral phenomena. As used within this literature, the concept often overlaps with related terms, such as sympathy, care, or compassion. Because of this lack of

[2] For more detailed accounts of this approach, which are called Wilsonian or Wilson-derived methods, see Wilson (1963), Walker and Avant (2018), and Rodgers (2000).

consensus, empathy, as used within nursing, remains an immature or partially developed concept.

Like most concepts in nursing, empathy was originally borrowed from other disciplines. One of the original influences on nursing's conceptualization of empathy came from Carl Rogers' work on therapeutic empathy. Rogers, a well-known psychotherapist, was invited to give the keynote address at the American Nurses Association in 1957. In his address, he introduced his concept of therapeutic empathy, which he initially defined in an overly simplistic way: "To sense the client's world as if it were your own, but without ever losing the 'as if' quality—this is empathy" (Rogers 1957, 99). However, he soon elaborated the concept as follows:

> The state of empathy, or being empathic, is to perceive the internal frame of reference of another with accuracy and with the emotional components and meanings which pertain hitherto as if one were the person, but without ever losing the 'as if' condition. Thus it means to sense the hurt or the pleasure of another as he senses it and to perceive the causes thereof as he perceives them, but without ever losing the recognition that it is *as if* I were hurt or pleased and so forth. If this 'as if' quality is lost, then the state is one of identification. (Rogers 1959, 3:210–11)

Here, we see Rogers specify his concept of empathy in a bit more detail and begin to differentiate it from related concepts—in this case, the concept of identification. Over his career, Rogers reworked his concept of empathy and, at times, became critical of his early definitions. However, it was his early conceptualization that initially had a major influence on nursing.

Despite the initial positive uptake of Rogers' work, some nursing scholars eventually became critical of his concept of empathy, in part because it originated in an outside discipline. Morse and her colleagues, for example, argued that Rogers' concept of therapeutic empathy was specifically developed to help understand the relationship between a psychotherapist and her client. This kind of relationship differs in important respects from the relationship that a nurse is supposed to develop with her patient. For instance, while it's important for the nurse to understand a patient's experience, such as how they feel about a recent diagnosis or an upcoming procedure, she may not need to develop the kind of rapport that facilitates a successful psychotherapeutic intervention. Considering this, Morse and her colleagues recommended that nurses devote more energy to developing their own unique

theoretical foundations and concepts, rather than borrowing concepts from other disciplines that are often an imperfect fit for nursing:

> Nursing as a profession is perhaps more unique than we have previously recognized, and this uniqueness has both advantages and disadvantages. One of the disadvantages is that we must develop our own practice (including our own interventions) cautiously and wisely rather than mimicking the therapeutic strategies of other professions. Conversely, the development of unique nursing theory and practical knowledge must be considered an advantage and essential as we develop as a distinct discipline. (Morse et al. 1992, 279)

Borrowing theory from other disciplines may appear to be a productive shortcut to establishing the conceptual foundations of a new field. However, such adaptations come with the risk that the theory or its concepts simply aren't a good fit, either because they refer to an irrelevant phenomenon or because they characterize this phenomenon in an unproductive way.

We think that Morse and her colleagues' concern is germane, but that it needs to be qualified. Not all disciplines develop their concepts in the same way. When nurses adapted Rogers' concept of therapeutic empathy, they took the concept from another applied discipline: psychotherapy. Because Rogers developed his concept with the aim of better understanding the relationship between psychotherapist and client, he didn't necessarily intend his conceptualization of empathy to be broadly generalizable. If his concept of therapeutic empathy functions well in other disciplines, this is, in a sense, accidental.

But this problem holds only for applied disciplines. Consider, for instance, the concepts developed in philosophy or theoretical psychology. Concepts developed in these more theoretical disciplines tend to be generalizable. The psychological concept of short-term memory, for instance, isn't intended to clarify what it's like for a particular kind of person to remember (e.g., what it's like for a waiter to remember an order). Rather, the concept is meant to identify a general feature of human experience, which is characteristic of all human beings. These fields often develop concepts that are meant to help us better understand general aspects of human existence, rather than particular issues or situations that apply only to some subset of the population.

Considering this, nursing scholars have at least two conceptual strategies: (1) Develop concepts from scratch that consider the distinctive or even unique aspects of nursing; (2) adapt broadly generalizable concepts from more theoretical disciplines.

3. Empathy in Nursing Today

By and large, it seems that nursing scholars have opted for the second strategy. Most concepts in nursing are still adapted from other fields. But today these concepts tend to be derived from theoretical rather than applied fields. We consider this to be a positive development. But adapting concepts from theoretical fields has its own risks that we need to consider. There is certainly less reason to be concerned over whether these concepts will apply to a particular field since they are intended to be broadly generalizable. However, one needs to be certain that the generalizable concept accurately characterizes the phenomenon that it is intended to help us understand. If the concept mischaracterizes the phenomenon, then it may provide an inadequate or misleading foundation when adapted by more applied disciplines.

This is precisely our concern with the concept of empathy as used in contemporary nursing. Today, nursing scholars tend to rely on a key conceptual distinction that they borrowed from psychology. This is the distinction between cognitive and emotional empathy. Cognitive empathy is defined as the ability to understand the other's experience through higher-level intellectual processes, such as imaginative perspective taking, critical thinking, or inference. In the nursing literature, it's sometimes referred to as "state" or "clinical" empathy (although these terms are sometimes used with a slightly different meaning). This concept of empathy has received particular attention in the literature on nurse education since it is often assumed that cognitive empathy is a learned skill that can be trained or developed.

This is contrasted with emotional empathy, which is typically characterized as the innate capacity to understand the other by sharing their emotional experience. Some nurse scholars suggest that this kind of empathy might also be trained (e.g., Alligood and May 2000), but this is a minority position. However, the inability to train emotional empathy is not the main reason that nurses typically appeal more to cognitive than to emotional empathy. The primary concern is that, if emotional empathy produces understanding only by sharing the other's feelings, then this may eventually become overwhelming in the clinical setting and lead to burnout. The

emotional toll, for instance, of understanding a patient's distress by taking on the feeling yourself may outweigh any benefits.

This criticism of emotional empathy extends beyond the field of nursing. The psychologist Paul Bloom argues that, in the field of health care, patients want to be treated by clinicians who understand them through cognitive empathy but aren't overwhelmed by emotional empathy. He says,

> As I write this, an older relative of mine who has cancer is going back and forth to hospitals and rehabilitation centers. I've watched him interact with doctors and learned what he thinks of them. He values doctors who take the time to listen to him and develop an understanding of his situation; he benefits from this sort of cognitive empathy. But emotional empathy is more complicated. He gets the most from doctors who *don't* feel as he does, who are calm when he is anxious, confident when he is uncertain. (Bloom 2014)

Considering the opposition to emotional empathy in nursing and psychology, it may seem that the conceptual confusion that plagued the nursing literature throughout the 1980s and 90s is largely resolved: Emotional empathy should be avoided in nursing practice whereas cognitive empathy should be trained and developed so that nurses can better understand and care for their patients.

In our view, however, the distinction between cognitive and emotional empathy rests on a misunderstanding about how we initially come to know or understand another person. It is certainly the case that we can cognitively understand another by using techniques such as imaginative perspective taking. And there might be cases where feeling as someone else feels helps us better understand them. However, both cognitive and emotional empathy rely on a more fundamental empathic capacity, which has been articulated in considerable detail by philosophical phenomenologists.

4. A Philosophical Intervention

How do we come to know and understand others in face-to-face encounters? On the proposal currently under consideration, either by using intellectual processes that rely on imagination, reason, and inference, or by affectively sharing the other's mental states. If, however, we turn to phenomenologists such as Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein,

and Max Scheler, who were among the first to develop a proper philosophical account of empathy at the beginning of the 20th century, they all offer a different answer. On their view, empathy at its most basic—in the following called *basic empathy*—is a perceptually based form of interpersonal understanding, one that more complex and indirect forms presuppose and rely on. This is why they often used the term "empathy" interchangeably with terms such as "other-experience" or even "other-perception" (Husserl [1931] 1960; Scheler [1923] 2008). As Scheler famously writes,

> [W]e certainly believe ourselves to be directly acquainted with another person's joy in his laughter, with his sorrow and pain in his tears, with his shame in his blushing, with his entreaty in his outstretched hands, with his love in his look of affection, with his rage in the gnashing of his teeth, with his threats in the clenching of his fist, and with the tenor of his thoughts in the sound of his words. If anyone tells me that this is not 'perception', for it cannot be so, in view of the fact that a perception is simply a 'complex of physical sensations', and that there is certainly no sensation of another person's mind nor any stimulus from such a source, I would beg him to turn aside from such questionable theories and address himself to the phenomenological facts. (Scheler [1923] 2008, 260)

On their view, one can obtain an acquaintance with the other's experiential life in the empathic face-to-face encounter that is direct and immediate (Fernandez and Zahavi 2020b).

Here is a concrete example: If you notice a patient suddenly tense her muscles and start hyperventilating when you are about to give her an injection, you immediately perceive the patient as being afraid of the needle. Under normal circumstances, you don't need to infer such experience from the precise configuration of the other's facial muscles, posture, or breathing pattern, nor do you need to engage in some elaborate process of imaginative perspective taking where you attempt to put yourself in the patient's shoes to conclude that she must be afraid. At the same time, you didn't need to share her fear of the needle to perceive the patient's fear. Rather, we simply perceive bodily movements and gestures as expressive of desires, intentions, emotions, attitudes, and so on. It's only in cases where we perceive the meaning of someone's expressive behavior as ambiguous, or we otherwise have some reason to doubt our immediate understanding, that we turn to other cognitive or emotional techniques for making sense of others. Empathy, according to the

phenomenologists, gives us the experiencing other directly, non-inferentially, as present here and now (Stein [1917] 1989, 7). But there will always and by necessity remain a difference between that which I am aware of when I empathize with the other and that which the other is experiencing. Empathy is consequently *not* about me having the same mental state, feeling, sensation, or embodied response as another, but rather about me being experientially acquainted with an experience that is *not* my own. Empathy targets foreign experiences without eliminating their otherness. In empathy, I am confronted with the presence of an experience that I am not living through myself. To empathically grasp another's fear is not to be fearful oneself, but to recognize the joy as belonging to the other. This is why phenomenologists have standardly rejected proposals according to which empathy should entail that the other's experience is literally transmitted to me or require me to undergo the same kind of experience that I observe in the other. Following on our example above, when I perceive the patient as afraid, I perceive the fear *in her*. I may, in reaction to her subjective state, become afraid, surprised, or concerned; but it's not my feeling that provides me with an understanding of the other. We only feel the way that we do because we already understand the other as being in a particular state.

In reply to claims made by both Bloom and some nursing researchers (e.g., Morse et al. 1992) that empathy can hinder clinical care because the sharing of the patient's affective states might be overwhelming and lead to burnout, one might consequently argue that the very identification of empathy with affective sharing is based on a misunderstanding. This, at least, would be the view of the phenomenologists. Empathy, correctly understood, is an immediate, intuitive perception of the other's mental state, which does not require that one share this state. Nurses should not, therefore, be wary of relying on this kind of intuitive empathic understanding.

Providing an alternative conceptualization of empathy is, however, only the first stage in our philosophical intervention. As we mentioned above, one of the challenges of borrowing concepts from more theoretical disciplines is that it may not be immediately apparent how they can be usefully applied to a new field. This is certainly the case with the concept of basic empathy. If empathy is as basic as the phenomenologists claim, isn't it then something that nurses not only already use in their daily interactions with colleagues, patients, and family members, but also something so fundamental and automatic that it is entirely outside of their control? If a nurse cannot help but experience his patient through basic empathy, then why do we need to say anything about it at all?

We argue that empathy might be direct, immediate, and automatic, but is still something that can be obstructed or facilitated in a variety of ways. And it is precisely this possibility of obstructing basic empathy that nurses should be concerned with in their clinical practice. Consider again the fact that we can employ different strategies when trying to understand others. To take a concrete example, imagine a situation where you must care for a patient who has become paralyzed as a result of a traffic accident. To offer proper care, you need some understanding of how the patient is coping with his new life-situation. How can you obtain that understanding? One option is to draw on theoretical knowledge. Being deprived of your mobility is likely to limit your ability to satisfy your wants and desires and will also force you to reassess your life goals, all of which is likely to decrease your quality of life and make you distressed if not depressed. Another possibility is to use your imagination and attempt to put oneself in the other's position. By imagining what it would be like for me to be paralyzed, I might come to appreciate what it must be like for you. But to seek to understand the other on the basis of prior theoretical knowledge or by imaginative perspective taking risks violating or doing away with the other's perspective altogether. Imaginative perspective taking, in particular, risks being an imposition of one's own view upon the other; it might in the end be nothing but an attempt to constitute the other through projection and fantasy. This danger is well illustrated by what has become known as the *disability paradox* (Albrecht and Devlieger 1999). Although external observers often judge individuals with serious and persistent disabilities to live an undesirable or even miserable life, when asked, those very individuals often report that they experience a good or excellent quality of life. Against this background, the clinical relevance of basic empathy, or of what might be termed empathic openness, should be obvious.

Perhaps some might object to this and argue that the only way we can truly understand others is by having (or by having had) the same kind of experiences that they do. To truly understand what it is like for a woman to give birth, for example, one must have given birth oneself. But is that always an advantage? Imagine having had an easy birth, and then witnessing a woman who is in a lot of pain because of a difficult birth. Will the fact that one has given birth oneself necessarily make one more appreciative of her experiences, or might it on the contrary make it more difficult to grasp what it is like for her, since one might be inclined to generalize from one's own case and therefore assume that it is probably not as hard as it seems? None of this is to deny that imagining what it must be like for the other, i.e., engaging in imaginative perspective taking, might occasionally help one appreciate someone else's experience.

But the imaginative exercise supplements the more basic understanding of them that you already achieved through your empathic perception. More comprehensive accounts of both classical and contemporary phenomenological analyses of empathy can be found in Husserl ([1931] 1960), Scheler ([1923] 2008), Stein ([1917] 1989), and Zahavi (2010; 2011; 2014; 2017; 2019). But, for now, let us emphasize that the direct and immediate character of basic empathy doesn't entail any claim regarding its infallibility. Basic empathy is fallible. Indeed, just as you can be mistaken about an object that you perceive, you can be mistaken about a person that you empathize with. In the case of misperception, it wouldn't be right to say that you didn't have a perception at all. Rather, you simply had an inaccurate perception, which is likely to be corrected by other perceptions that you have of the same object. In much the same way, you can have an inaccurate empathic understanding of the other, which may be corrected as you continue to engage with them.

In light of this understanding of basic empathy—including both its immediate access to the other and its potential for fallibility—what actions might a nurse take if she finds herself unable to accurately understand her patient? Rather than, for instance, trying to imagine her way into the patient's perspective, she might instead solicit the patient's self-narrative, asking questions that prompt the patient to provide more detail or explain their experience in a new way. As a form of encounter that preserves and respects the other's otherness, basic empathy lets the clinician approach the other with the requisite attitude of humility; there is still much that they do not understand. A central task of the nurse is not to imagine what it must be like to be the patient, but to attend to and help the patient find a voice of their own, where they can express and articulate their point of view.

5. Reflections on Applied Phenomenology

What should one take away from this philosophical intervention? How might other philosophers successfully intervene in debates in other fields, including fields that are fundamentally oriented toward various kinds of practice? While there are certainly aspects of our philosophical intervention that are unique to the field of nursing and the debates that we engaged in, we would like to close by reflecting on some of the more generalizable aspects of our approach.

First, one should consider how each discipline has obtained and refined its key concepts. In our case, this task was not as difficult as it might be when engaging

with other disciplines. Nursing, as a field of academic research, has a relatively short history, so it is comparatively easy to identify when concepts entered the field and where they originated from. Other fields, especially those with considerably longer histories, may pose a greater challenge. One may, for instance, need to turn to the history of ideas to identify the origin and development of a key concept in a scientific field. While this kind of work may seem needlessly laborious when one's aim is to engage in a contemporary debate, we believe that understanding how and why particular concepts came into use is key to developing an effective philosophical intervention. Without knowing where these concepts came from and why they were needed, one risks repeating problems that may have been addressed in the history of the field. In our case, it was helpful to find that nurses had become warry of borrowing concepts from other disciplines due to a concern about a lack of fit. This motivated us to clarify the differences between borrowing concepts from applied fields and from theoretical fields, which was key to supporting our integration of philosophical concepts into nursing.

Second, one should consider how a discipline uses its concepts in practice. Concepts that are integral to research aren't always used in the same way by practitioners. If one attempts to effect change in practice by engaging only with how concepts are used in research, the intervention is less likely to succeed. In the case of nursing, for instance, the relevance gap gave us reason to be skeptical about whether the empathy debates in nursing scholarship had any effect on how practicing nurses engaged with their patients. However, we found that the literature on empathy education and training in nursing largely echoed the concerns expressed in the scholarly debates. Some articles, for instance, stressed that the ongoing conceptual confusion over the meaning of empathy in nursing was a major obstacle to the design, implementation, and evaluation of empathy training in nursing programs (see, e.g., Brunero, Lamont, and Coates 2010; Williams and Stickley 2010). This gave us reason to believe that further clarifying the meaning of empathy might have positive effects on training and practice (Fernandez and Zahavi 2020a).

Third, and finally, one should demonstrate how abstract concepts can be applied by using concrete examples. As we explained above, theoretical and philosophical concepts should, in principle, be generalizable. In practice, however, it is not always apparent how such concepts apply to a particular domain. One doesn't necessarily need to provide overly detailed examples to illustrate the applicability of a concept. Even relatively simple examples can go a long way toward demonstrating such applicability, so long as they resonate with the audience and help them see how

the concept gears into the relevant context. In our case, we demonstrated how the phenomenological concept of basic empathy and empathic openness assuages concerns associated with emotional empathy (i.e., that the clinician might become overwhelmed by the patient's feelings) and avoids shortcomings associated with cognitive empathy (i.e., that the clinician may project their own experiences on to the patient). By providing clear examples of how empathic openness may facilitate engagements between clinicians and patients in clinical encounters, we offer a starting point for both nursing scholars and practicing nurses to further explore how they might put such a concept to use.

Philosophy is often characterized as one of the most abstract academic disciplines, with little relevance to everyday life or concrete practices. Since its inception, however, phenomenology has been a source of inspiration for empirical science and the world beyond academic philosophy. Its non-philosophical relevance has been part of its enduring appeal and arguably also what has made it so attractive to many different disciplines, including that of nursing (Zahavi 2020; Zahavi and Martiny 2019). In recent years, however, philosophers from many different traditions have become increasingly interested in contemporary issues across a variety of topics and fields. To make sure that our intellectual labor does not go to waste, we should continue to reflect on how philosophy can engage in relations of mutual enlightenment with other disciplines and practices.

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Care as an Affective Value Response: Exploring a Modern Catholic Approach to the Philosophy of Care[1]

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***Abstract**: Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889–1977), a student of Edmund Husserl and Adolf Reinach, a younger colleague of Max Scheler, and a vocal opponent of the Nazis, was a well-known figure among the early circles of phenomenology in Munich and Göttingen. After his exile to the U.S. in 1940, he became better known in his adopted land as a Catholic thinker. Sister Marie Simone Roach (1922–2016) was a highly influential nurse and a care theorist famous for her proposal of the 6Cs of nursing, now adopted as part of an official code for the standard of care by the Department of Health in England. In this paper, I will explore a modern Catholic approach to the philosophy of care, using some of the ideas about love developed by Hildebrand, inspired by Roach's references to him in her theory of care.*

In the first section, I will introduce two of the central elements of love proposed by Hildebrand: intentio benevolentiae *and* intentio unionis. *In the second section, I will analyze Hildebrand's concept of self-transcendence, focusing on his distinction between two types of dedication: self-donation and self-sacrifice. In the third section, I will explore the idea of human dignity as a value of a person demanding our care, using Hildebrand's idea of the general beauty of an individual as well as his analyses of dignity and reverence.*

The purpose of the paper is to suggest a way in which a Catholic ethics of the fundamental value of a person and one's appropriate response to it can be rationally understood, rather than dogmatically declared, providing a theoretical foundation for the Catholic practice of care as well as contributing to a genuine philosophical understanding of caring in general.

Introduction

[1] I would like to thank everyone who has commented on the previous versions of this paper, especially Toshiro Terada, my teacher, and Riku Yokoyama, my friend and colleague, as well as anonymous reviewers for *Tetsugaku*, for their encouragement and helpful suggestions.

The purpose of this paper is to explore a modern Catholic approach to the philosophy of care based on suggestions of Sister Marie Simone Roach (1922–2016), inspired by Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889–1977), in order to provide a theoretical foundation for the practice of care among a great number of professionals, such as nurses and caregivers at nursing homes, as well as teachers and others who work for social institutions of the Church, adhering to its tradition and teachings. Roach was a highly influential Catholic nursing expert and care theorist who propounded the famed 6Cs of nursing, which have recently been adopted as the official standard of conduct by the Department of Health in England (Bradshaw 2015). In her influential *Caring—the Human Mode of Being* (2002), Roach relies on the concepts of value response and transcendence developed by Hildebrand, a significant contributor to early phenomenology. Hildebrand was known in the English-speaking world as a Catholic thinker; however, his work in phenomenology, especially his insightful account of values and valuing, is currently receiving much attention.[2] In her account, Roach mainly makes use of Hildebrand's earlier work *Christian Ethics* (1953); thus, in this paper, I develop and expand her theory of caring—care as an affective value response—with reference to Hildebrand's more extensive discussions of relevant concepts in his later tome, *Das Wesen der Liebe* (1971), recently translated as *The Nature of Love* (2009).

As I shall demonstrate below, Roach, by following Hildebrand and understanding caring as an affective value response, opens up a promising discourse concerning what may be called a "phenomenology of the dignity of human persons",

[2] Hildebrand started his career as a philosopher in Munich and Göttingen as a part of the early circles of phenomenologists. As one of the beloved doctoral students of Edmund Husserl, he published two essays in the *Annals for Philosophical and Phenomenological Research* and was considered, along with Edith Stein and Martin Heidegger, one of the most promising young philosophers by his friend Max Scheler (Schuhmann 1992; Scheler 1973, 312). He was forced to exile in the U.S., however, after active political engagement against the Nazis in Austria through publication of a magazine highly critical of the totalitarian regime. In the U.S. Hildebrand worked as a professor of philosophy at Fordham University and had been seen by the public prominently as a Catholic thinker and a writer. Although he has thus been almost forgotten as a phenomenologist, there has been a recent surge of attention to Hildebrand in the English speaking world. The circle of his former students and their associates in the Hildebrand Project has been holding conferences and publishing English translations of his works, including his *magnum opus, The Nature of Love*, in 2009, involving such prominent figures as Roger Scruton and John Finnis. Notably, there is an entry about Hildebrand in a newly published Routledge Handbook about emotion (Müller 2020). In addition, Hildebrand's account of love is also increasingly attracting attention in his native Germany (Enders 2018).

in an attempt to understand human caring as experienced by those who *perceive* dignity in the human beings they care for, rather than just *inferring* the presence of such value from a dogma. The doctrine of the dignity of human persons—the teaching that human persons are absolutely valuable and thus demand corresponding treatment—is not only one of the cornerstones of the Catholic social teaching that defines and shapes the professional guidelines of numerous social institutions of the Church; it is also the principle that serves as a guide for many individuals in their vocation, regardless of their religious beliefs.[3] It is my view that we can learn about human dignity and caring through Roach, one of its most experienced practitioners and insightful theorists, and Hildebrand, a master phenomenologist of love and an inspiration for Roach.

In the first section, I will briefly explain the basic elements of Hildebrand's theory of love, *intentio benevolentiae* and *intentio unionis*. In the second section, I will examine self-transcendence and dedication, the aspects of love discussed by Hildebrand that Roach adopted for her theory of care. Finally, in the third section, I will discuss the issue of the fundamental value of the person, that is, human dignity, as the general beauty of an individual found in all human beings.[4]

1. *Intentio Benevolentiae* and *Intentio Unionis*

[3] The following is stated in the *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church*: "A just society can become a reality only when it is based on the respect of the transcendent dignity of the human person" (Pontifical Council of Justice and Peace, §132). In the Code of Ethics and Code of Conduct for Caritas Internationalis, an umbrella organization for Catholic social institutions all over the world, the importance of human dignity is thus highlighted: "Human dignity and the social nature of the human person are the foundation and inspiration for a moral vision of society . . . " (Caritas Internationalis, 2014). Note that there are a tremendous number of people employed in Caritas organizations worldwide, and many of them are non-Catholic and non-Christian; however, they are still expected to follow such Codes. In Germany alone, there were 693,082 employees in 2018, about 195,925 more than the number of employees of the U.S. Postal Service in the same year (Caritas Germany 2020; United States Postal Service 2021). For the centrality of human dignity in the value structure of nursing in general, see Erikkson (1997, 71–73).

[4] Burgos (2018) considers Hildebrand as belonging to the personalist tradition, along with his fellow philosophers with Catholic inclination, such as Max Scheler and Edith Stein. Personalism was an alternative to the atomistic individualism and totalistic communism of the age, influenced by Christian and Jewish religious traditions, as well as Kantianism, relating itself to phenomenology, existentialism and neo-Thomism. (Burgos 2018, 1−25, 123–124, 225).

According to Hildebrand, love is an affective value response. First, love is a value response in that it is elicited by value that inheres in the beloved. "It is essential for every kind of love that the beloved person stands before me as precious, beautiful, lovable" (i.e., "objectively worthy of being loved") (Hildebrand 1971, 33; Hildebrand 2009, 17). Second, love is a value response that is affective, like veneration, enthusiasm, and admiration, because it belongs to the realm of the heart, which he considers to be the affective part of the soul; the beauty of the beloved affectively touches the lover—the lover is, for example, delighted by it and affectively moved by it (Hildebrand 1971, 65–68, 74–77; Hildebrand 2009, 41–43, 48–50). Thus, in another work, *The Heart*, Hildebrand claims that "love is essentially a voice of the heart" (Hildebrand 2007, 67). "The lover wants to pour his love into the heart of the beloved, he wants to affect his heart, to fill it with happiness; and only then will he feel that he has really reached the beloved, his very self" (Hildebrand 2007, 67). In addition, according to Hildebrand, love is the most affective value response, in that it engages one's whole person, as explained below.

Love is an emotion, but it differs from merely being affected by something; rather, it is essentially intentional. More concretely, love is more than just an emotion in that it involves the following two types of intentionality: *intentio benevolentiae* (IB), which seeks to benefit another, and *intentio unionis* (IU), which seeks union with another.[5] IB and IU serve as key concepts in Hildebrand's analysis of love in *The Nature of Love*, in which he explores various forms of love, from conjugal love to love of one's neighbor.

IB "consists in the desire to make the other happy; it is above all else a real interest in the happiness, the well-being and the salvation of the other" (Hildebrand 1971, 5; Hildebrand 2009, 51). It is "a certain goodness toward the other, the breath of goodness", which "confers happiness giving the other a unique and indeed irreplaceable gift (Hildebrand 1971, 79-80; Hildebrand 2009, 51-52). Moreover, it is "a gift of full of goodness, a stream of goodness surrounding the other, a spiritual embrace of the other with goodness", which involves "deep solidarity", "deep interest in and concern for their well-being", and "making their well-being our own concern (Hildebrand 1971, 80; Hildebrand 2009, 52). IB is a source of solidarity among people because it puts them into a "we" relationship with other people, since it consists of sharing interests for the sake of each other.

[5] For brief descriptions of both IB & IU, see Hildebrand (1971, 77–80); Hildebrand (2009, 50–52). For a more detailed account, see Hildebrand (1971, 169–198); Hildebrand (2009, 123–146) for IU and Hildebrand (1971, 199–240); Hildebrand (2009, 147-180) for IB.

IU aims at the unification of two persons—especially of their hearts—through mutual dedication. According to Hildebrand, "if . . . the heart of the beloved is filled to the brim with longing for one, with joy in one's presence, with the desire for spiritual union with one, then the lover feels content. He feels that he possesses the soul of the beloved" (Hildebrand 2007, 67–68). Mutual love, which deepens through love and the return of love, is a wellspring of a more profound sort of happiness. Mutual love is based on an I-Thou relationship and thus is essentially a relationship between two persons, which is distinct from a subject-object relationship. Further, it is at the same time a relationship between a heart and another heart, involving more of the affective region of a person rather than the rational or volitional regions.

2. Transcendence and Dedication: Self-donation and Self-sacrifice

(a) Transcendence and dedication

According to Roach, Hildebrand's concepts of transcendence and dedication help one understand the nature of professional nursing care (Roach 2002). Roach refers to a fundamental insight proposed by Hildebrand in a brief passage in his earlier work, *Christian Ethics* (Hildebrand 1953). Roach quotes Hildebrand:

> The difference between an appetite or an urge and a value response clearly reveals the essential immanence of the first and the transcendence of the second. . . . There is a yawning abyss between the nurse who ministers to us with care because she wants to appease her motherly instincts and the nurse who surrounds us with all possible attention and care because of her love of neighbor and her real sympathy for our suffering and needs. (Roach 2002, 126–127)[6]

As Roach points out, Hildebrand's theory of value starkly contrasts with subjectivism. Something has value not because I value it; rather, I value something because it has value (Roach 2002, 125). Here, I will not go into the general debate between value subjectivism and objectivism. Following Hildebrand, what Roach emphasizes is that value lies not in my feeling of self-satisfaction; rather, there is a factual difference between feeling good or feeling content and responding to value: "the value about or

[6] Hildebrand 1953, 220.

for which I care is not in my self-satisfaction per se but in that for which I care" (Roach 2002, 125).

Here, Roach is referring to the famous distinction, made by Hildebrand in his *Ethics*, between responding to the merely subjectively satisfying and value response.[7] As another example, there is a clear distinction between someone who goes to save another's life so as to fulfil an urge for adventure and someone who does so in order to rescue that person (Hildebrand 1953, 220).[8] "In all immanent trends to unfold our nature, our attitude has the character of self-affirmation; whereas in every value-response our attitude has the basic feature of self-donation" (Hildebrand 1953, 230–231). It is the "capacity to *transcend* the frame of immanent trends" that is the capacity of the value response "to grasp things important-in-themselves, to be able to be affected by them, and to be motivated by them in [one's] responses" (Hildebrand 1953, 231).

Of course, this does not deny that such a response can involve other wishes and urges. As Hildebrand explains:

> What matters in these cases is not whether there exists such an urge or not, but what underlies our action, the motivation for it. The character of value-response in our helping a person in a dangerous situation is not disturbed by the fact that we have an urge for unfolding our energies in this direction. The presence of such an urge does not, as such, frustrate our transcendent value-response if only our intervention is motivated by a value and not by a striving to fulfill or appease our urge or appetite. (Hildebrand 1953, 220 fn. 26)

It is not wrong for a nurse to have a "motherly" urge to help her patients as long as it is not her motivation, which can happen, in my opinion, for example, in the absence of the overriding intentionality of care. Consequently, caring for someone else is primarily for the sake of that person; in this sense, caring is transcendent, since it goes

[7] Hildebrand does not discuss this point in detail in Hildebrand (1971) and merely indicates his discussion in Hildebrand (1953) to the reader (Hildebrand 1971, 31–32; Hildebrand 2009, 15–17). Another example Hildebrand discusses in *Ethics* is the following:

> There is an essential and decisive difference between a priest for whom preaching is the realization of oratorical talent, an occasion to unfold this gift, and a priest for whom preaching is motivated by the desire to spread the word of God and to serve the eternal welfare of his brethren. (Hildebrand 1953, 220)

[8] This may strike readers as an odd example; I suggest that perhaps Hildebrand was thinking about a situation in World War I, in which many young Germans were quite enthusiastically involved.

beyond our own concerns, although, of course, we also derive personal satisfaction from it.

Roach does not explore Hildebrand's philosophy in much further detail, partly because Hildebrand's theory of love is still underdeveloped in the work Roach cites. Hildebrand later develops his theory and presents it in a more detailed manner in his *magnum opus*, *The Nature of Love* (*Das Wesen der Liebe*); however, the work remained untranslated into English until very recently, so it was probably not easily accessible to Roach. Thus, in the following, I would like to look at Hildebrand's discussion of transcendence and dedication in his *Liebe* to fill in the necessary details of an insightful observation made by Roach.

According to Hildebrand, "the specific mark of love is . . . the character of self-donation [dedication ("Hingabecharakter")], indeed its transcendence" (Hildebrand 1971, 33; Hildebrand 2009, 17). Hildebrand calls "dedication" ("Hingabe") a response to a subject of value through recognizing its value in a way that transcends any benefit to oneself (Hildebrand 1971, 33; Hildebrand 2009, 17). This is a key concept in Hildebrand's theory of love, as he declares in the very conclusion of the tome that when we want to analyze the essence of love properly, we need to differentiate the three forms of dedication corresponding to three different types of love: self-donation (in natural love), self-sacrifice (in love of neighbor), and religious-devotion (in *caritas*) (Hildebrand 1971, 486–487; Hildebrand 2009, 373–374).

Before I discuss different types of dedication further, I would like to make an important note regarding terminology. Since there is much confusion regarding the translation of "Hingabe" into English, I will proceed as follows.[9] I call the type of dedication associated here with natural love "self-donation", as a translation of the expression "Selbstschenkung". Note that I use this word exclusively to mean this specific type of dedication, while the English edition also uses it as a translation of "Hingabe". Second, I call the type of dedication associated with love of neighbor "self-sacrifice". This is my proposed translation of "Selbsthingabe", which is distinct from "Selbstschenkung". As we shall see, this means the temporal silencing of the self rather than its abandonment. Finally, the third kind of dedication, which I shall call "religious devotion", is associated with the love of God, or *caritas*. Although I will not discuss "religious devotion" in this paper due to its theological nature, I note

[9] For self-donation, see Hildebrand (1971, 80–82); Hildebrand (2009, 52–54), for self-transcendence, see Hildebrand (1971, 267–293); Hildebrand (2009, 200–220). For neighbor-love, see Hildebrand (1971, 81 fn. 25, 276–280): Hildebrand (2009, 53 fn. 4, 208–210).

that Hildebrand holds that there is a significant difference between love of neighbor and *caritas* in terms of their different natures of dedication, as well as in numerous other aspects.

(b) Self-donation and self-sacrifice

Dedication in natural love is called "self-donation" ("Selbstschenkung"). Hildebrand describes this by using the term "enthronement", which means placing the beloved at the center of the realm of self-concern, which Hildebrand calls "Eigenleben".[10] I shall call it "Own-life" in this paper. This indicates that the welfare of the beloved correlates with that of the lover—in more traditional language, the beloved becomes an "alter Ego" (Hildebrand 1971, 219; Hildebrand 2009, 162).[11] Hildebrand writes:

> I *make a gift* as it were of my subjectivity [Own-life] to the beloved person. Rather than stepping out of my subjectivity [Own-life], or crossing over it as I do in pure value-response, I unfold my subjectivity [Own-life] in a unique way in and through this self-gift. We can express this giving of my subjectivity [Own-life] and the incomparable self-donation [dedication] that goes with it by saying that I make the beloved person the "lord" of my subjectivity [Own-life]; his or her subjectivity [Own-life] becomes mine insofar as my happiness depends on his or hers. (Hildebrand 1977, 293; Hildebrand 2009, 220)

This gift of self involves essentially IU, which is itself "an irreplaceable gift for the beloved person" (Hildebrand 1971, 180; Hildebrand 2009, 131). A typical example of this is an ideally Catholic conjugal love of mutual self-giving, in which a husband and a wife serve each other. Thus, natural love is not self-sacrifice; one does not say: "I want to marry you only for the sake of your happiness, so that you might be happy—my own happiness is not important" (Hildebrand 1971, 191; Hildebrand 2009, 139).

In the case of love of neighbor, however, there is no such personal and intimate self-donation. Of course, the neighbor is a subject of our concern in love of neighbor. However, the neighbor still appears as just a neighbor. Hildebrand writes: "The moment of 'for the other' is eminently present in loving my neighbor; in being moved by love of neighbor I can be deeply moved by the pain of my neighbor and can be

[10] The English version sometimes keeps the German term and sometimes uses "subjectivity" (cf. Hildebrand 2007, 200 fn. 1).

[11] ". . . since I love him he becomes an *alter ego*, but not an extension of my ego. My participation in his life is a consequence of love and not the basis of love" (Hildebrand 1971, 219; Hildebrand 2009, 162).

filled with compassion for him, and yet this "for him" does not belong to my subjectivity [Own-life] . . ." (Hildebrand 1971, 277 fn. 83; Hildebrand 2009, 208 fn. 4). "The moment of 'for the other', proper to all categories of love, shows itself differently in love of neighbor" (Hildebrand 1971, 277 fn. 83; Hildebrand 2009, 208–209 fn. 4). The neighbor is loved *qua* neighbor, so the neighbor does not occupy a personal space at the center of our concern, our Own-life. Thus, Hildebrand also describes it as stepping out of our Own-life. He writes:

> In contrast to a friend, brother, or a spouse, a neighbor does not reach into my subjectivity [Own-life], and this despite the fact that in loving a neighbor I share in his life in an ultimate way. For my neighbor as neighbor is not a source of happiness for me; in contrast to all other categories of love my happiness is not thematic in my relation to my neighbor. Thus in love of neighbor I step out of my subjectivity [Own-life] in a specific way. (Hildebrand 1971, 277 fn. 83; Hildebrand 2009, 208–209 fn. 4).

A neighbor can move our heart as a subject of charity; however, this only occurs temporarily, and the neighbor remains a neighbor. This seems reasonable, since, in Hildebrand's framework, once a neighbor occupies a special place in us, the neighbor has already become our friend and thus has become a subject of natural love.

Hildebrand insists that dedication is not self-abandonment, although Roach uses the term (Roach 2002, 126); it is simply a temporal state in which a neighbor occupies one's mind as the thematic subject. He writes:

> I am by no means abandoning my subjectivity [Own-life], or losing interest in it, or dying to it. What is meant is only that the well-being of my neighbor, on which I am focused in loving him or her, has as such no relation to my subjectivity [Own-life]. Thus my subjectivity [Own-life] in no way ceases to exist. (Hildebrand 1971, 279; Hildebrand 2009, 210)

Thus, what characterizes love of neighbor is self-sacrifice ("Selbsthingabe") rather than self-donation ("Selbstschenkung"). Hildebrand writes: "there is in true love of neighbor an element of self-donation [self-sacrifice ("Selbsthingabe")], which we can see in the ardent interest for the well-being of the other, in the stream of goodness

directed to the other, in the full thematicity of the neighbor" (Hildebrand 1971, 81 fn. 25; Hildebrand 2009, 53 fn. 4).

Love of neighbor is therefore more strongly associated with IB, with elements like "the flowing goodness, the readiness to sacrifice, the unique taking seriously of the other, the committing of oneself to the other" (Hildebrand 1971, 81 fn. 25; Hildebrand 2009, 53 fn. 4). However, love of neighbor is not completely free of IU, since without it, love of neighbor cannot be said to be love. In love of neighbor, IU aims at a union in "the Kingdom of Christ", that is, more secularly phrased, in the community of good "neighbors" (Hildebrand 1971, 277 fn. 83; Hildebrand 2009, 139). "Here too a return of love is desired, but here this means that I desire that my neighbor approaches me in the attitude of love of neighbor, or to say it better, that the love of neighbor reigns in his heart" (Hildebrand 1971, 277 fn. 83; Hildebrand 2009, 139). In this sense, we hope that our practice kindles a love of neighbor in our neighbor so that we can be unified in this way.

What about care? What kind of dedication is required in it? Is it more similar to self-donation, as in the cases of natural love, such as familial love and friendship love? Or is it more like love of neighbor, involving a stepping out of Own-life?

Perhaps there is no definitive answer to these questions, as care is multifarious, practiced by people with different motives and interests toward people with different roles and needs, although caring itself is "*the* human mode of being", according to Roach. As she writes elsewhere:

> The manner in which caring is expressed by a mother or father of family, by a doctor for patients, by a lawyer for clients, by an engineer for a specific project, by a housekeeper for domestic detail, differs; that one is caring, however, does not derive from a specific occupational or professional role. Caring is, as it were, the call to be human. One cares in a variety of ways; that we care is what we share as human beings. (Roach 1997, 15)

Caring can be professional or private, willing or unwilling, short-term or long-term, familial or institutional, friendly or hostile, receptive or unreceptive. In this sense, caring is as diverse as human relationships themselves and thus is also a dynamic process, especially considering its intersubjective aspects. Consequently, the need for

recognizing the individuality of each case of caring should be noted, and there should be a separate discussion for each individual type of caring.[12]

Now, despite its manifold nature, there is something that is common to all forms of a certain kind of caring, that is, the special way we see the human being as someone demanding our care just by virtue of being human. Both Roach and Hildebrand believe that it is the human dignity that inheres in human beings that demands and elicits our love of neighbor, our care for the human person in general. Many nurses agree with them; indeed, dignity is considered one of the foundational values of nursing theory. As one of its leading theorists, Katie Eriksson writes: "Human dignity is connected to the most fundamental value of caring, that is, to unprejudiciously confirm the patient's absolute dignity as a human being", which is "grounded in one's humanity" (Eriksson 1997, 71). In the next section, I shall explain why such people may experience all human persons as deserving our care, using some of the ideas provided by Hildebrand.

3. Human Dignity—The General Beauty of an Individual in All?

According to Hildebrand, a person has two important roles to play in love: the subject of love and the cause (motivation) of love. He writes:

> Love always refers to an individual and unique person as this individual being . . . . Although it is the beauty of this individual that wounds my heart, in the act of love I am entirely directed to the person himself and in fact to the whole person. After all, I do not love the beauty of this person but the person himself . . . . We have to distinguish between that which motivates our love

[12] Is there anything that can be said that is specific to professional care by nurses? Roach may think that neither self-donation nor self-sacrifice fully apply. A patient is not part of our Own-life; however, it is also not exactly the case that one goes completely out of Own-life, since, as Roach says, a nurse can find her work fulfilling (Roach 2002, 127). In professional care, the welfare of the patient becomes part of the concern of the caring person because it is legitimately a part of self-fulfillment for the practitioner, while selflessness, in terms of self-abandonment, is not proper. Perhaps we can suggest that a nurse needs to have a place for her patient in the realm of her personal concern, not only as her patient, but as someone she cares for. While a nurse is not likely to think that she is responsible for the general welfare of the patient, she may be in some way concerned with it. There is something disturbing about a nurse who is completely indifferent to the welfare of a patient in other aspects, such as the death of the patient's child, even though the child is not her patient.

> and that to which our love refers. (Hildebrand 1971, 104; Hildebrand 2009, 72).

Hildebrand claims that the subject of love is not the general beauty of love, which awakens one's love in the beloved, but the person *per se*. Beauty draws a lover to the beloved, but what is loved is not the beauty but the person. This is clear when we remember, as discussed in the first section of this paper, that according to Hildebrand, IB and IU, which comprise the essence of love, are both directed toward a person as an individual.

Also, Hildebrand holds that it is the general beauty of an individual (the beauty of a person as a whole) that is responsible for awakening love in us.[13]

> In the love for a friend and even more in a spousal love, we see with particular clarity the central place of this value, the preciousness of this unique individuality. What grounds and engenders our love for the other person is the beauty and preciousness of this unique personality as a whole. (Hildebrand 1971, 41; Hildebrand 2009, 23)

It is the value of the whole individual person that elicits and legitimates our love as a value response to the person. Hildebrand writes: "The individuality of the whole personality stands before us as precious and beautiful; only in this way can the person awaken love in us" (Hildebrand 1971, 41; Hildebrand 2009, 23).

A person with such a general beauty may also be beautiful in terms of virtues such as wisdom and courage. It appears, however, that the beauty of an individual somehow transcends the beauty of the aggregation of such virtues in the sense that the appeal of general beauty is not exhaustible through describing objective personality features. Hildebrand writes:

> . . . love has to do with the overall beauty and preciousness of this individuality, which is a fundamental value datum; and while this value is nourished by many vital, spiritual, and moral values, it can never be completely analyzed into these nor can it be directly formulated as these can be. The overall beauty of this individuality is not able to be classified. (Hildebrand 1971, 40–41; Hildebrand 2009, 22–23)

[13] For the general beauty of an individual, see Hildebrand (1971, 40–41, 400–401), Hildebrand (2009, 21–24, 302).

Hildebrand points out that when we contemplate an individual, the beauty of the whole person, rather than that of his or her particular features as distinct parts, shines through, revealing the person as a precious individual worthy of love. This is why it is difficult to explain why we love someone, why "we cannot indicate the value qualities that motivate our love in the same way that we can indicate them in explaining, say, our esteem for another person" (Hildebrand 1971, 40; Hildebrand 2009, 22). Thus, we often simply say "because thou art thou" (Seifert 2015, 31).

When we apply this theory of the general beauty of an individual to care theory, the following problem arises. In the context of professional caring, such as nursing and elderly care, caregivers do not always have opportunities to become close to those for whom they care. However, if caring is also an affective value response, caregivers should be able to find beauty and its underlying value in the subject of care.

Hildebrand holds that in love of neighbor, we respond to the ontological value of a person as a being created in the image of God (Hildebrand 1971, 358; Hildebrand 2009, 269). Roach, similarly, believes that the value we respond to is the dignity of the human being as God's image (Roach 2002, 8). It is too hasty to dismiss these claims by saying that Hildebrand and Roach are here just stating their religious beliefs, which do not deserve further attention from philosophers; in my view, it is precisely here that they are making important observations as to how we should understand our experience of human dignity.[14]

[14] For a good discussion of human dignity and Catholicism, see Rosen (2018, especially 90–104). Rosen points to the significance of the Catholic influence on the legislation of the German constitution after World War II and offers an insightful comparison between Catholicism and Kantianism. Rosen claims that in the Catholic conception of dignity, human freedom is not seen as an absolute source of value, as some Kantians seem to think (although they think that human freedom can be restricted by the freedom of others via our rationality). Throughout his discussions, Rosen refers to John Paul II as a central figure who espouses the concept without mentioning (and perhaps also without noticing) that Karol Józef Wojtyła (later John Paul II) was a philosophy professor and phenomenologist who wrote his dissertation "on the possibility of grounding a Christian ethic on the ethical system developed by Max Scheler" (The Holy See 2014). Scheler, a close friend of Hildebrand, holds a view of dignity that is diametrically opposed to Kant's "formalism", which, in his opinion, depersonalizes human persons through its fixation on its rationalistic conception (Zachary 2014). Scheler seeks the ground of dignity through phenomenology and finds it in "the absolute value of the individual person given in the act of love, an act that reveals the other as a wholly unique and irreplaceable person" (Zachary 2014, 269). Hildebrand and Roach, along with John Paul II (and thereby the Magisterium of the Church), seem to follow a similar line.

To begin with, Roach believes that such an experience of human dignity is a fundamental attitude, common to all human beings. More broadly understood, caring is "grounded in an attitude of *religio* before all creation", especially such an attitude to human persons (Roach 2002, 3). Roach refers to the idea of *religio* in the work of Hildebrand, explains it in terms of "reverence for all of creation", and opposes it to "the reductionist, mechanistic paradigm that has shaped modern Western culture" (Roach 2002, 108). According to Roach, however, the feeling of *religio* that is specific to human dignity is not something that is unique to certain religions such as Christianity; rather, it is universally rooted in our common humanity: "Respect for human life has foundations in the natural awareness of the sacred in the customs of peoples, as well as enshrined in faith traditions" (Roach 2002, 19).

Upon closer examination, we find that Hildebrand is also making an interesting phenomenological observation: "Every love of neighbor necessarily has the *consciousness* of the ontological dignity of one's neighbor, *of the beauty* that he has apart from his particular individuality and cannot lose as long as he lives" (Hildebrand 1971, 358; Hildebrand 2009, 269, my italics). Elsewhere, he describes "the ontological value of a person" as "the value which a human person possesses as such" (Hildebrand 1953, 131). This value demands a corresponding value response; to "respond in the right way" to "our neighbor" is "due" "to the dignity of our neighbor as a human being" (Hildebrand 1953, 189). This dignity—this beauty—of the beloved is something that is intuitively given, since the beauty is directly (intuitively) perceived, according to Hildebrand, as given. In his value epistemology, "perception is more than mere sense perception" (Hildebrand 1960, 172). For example, "when we hear the Fourth Symphony of Beethoven we perceive not only the tones but also the melody, harmonies, the entire structure of the symphony; above all, we perceive its beauty" (Hildebrand 1960, 172). Thus, he also says in his discussion of love: "the object unfolds in its qualitative character before my mind, in contrast to the mere understanding of the concept" (Hildebrand 1971, 77; Hildebrand 2009, 50).

We have seen that Hildebrand thinks that human dignity inheres in our being created in the image of God (*imago dei*); perhaps, then, we can say that we all appear "beautiful" because we are, in a certain way, similar to God, who is, by definition, ultimately beautiful. Hildebrand seems to think that this has something to do with our rationality, freedom, and immortality, which make it possible for us to commit spiritual and moral acts (Hildebrand 1953, 130–132, 141). Note that it is not that each of these human characteristics or their aggregation is perceived as a being with dignity—as beautiful—in a human being; rather, each individual human person

appears beautiful—is perceived with dignity—as a whole being, by virtue of having these characteristics. Again, it is the object itself and its beauty that are perceived in a given value perception, according to Hildebrand. Further, it is also important to note here that Hildebrand is not making a dogmatic assertion. Like Roach, he claims that "we do not need to start from God in order to grasp . . . the dignity of man" (Hildebrand 1953, 162–163).[15] Finally, according to Hildebrand, human dignity calls for "our respect and love", or for our "respect, reverence, and gentleness" (Hildebrand 1953, 131, 361).

Based on these discussions, I would like to propose an approach to human dignity in the spirit of both Hildebrand and Roach. Perhaps our intentionality—"our personalistic attitude" (as Husserl called it) (Moran 2009, 93)—toward persons we are called to care for is such that we find dignifying beauty in all individuals. Respect for human dignity is thus broadly understood as a kind of reverence, which Hildebrand understands as "a response to the general value of being as such, to the dignity which all being . . . possess, to the value of the . . . ultimate 'positivity' of being" (Hildebrand 2016, 36). Thus, "Only the person who possesses reverence is capable of real enthusiasm, of joy in so far as it is motivated by values, *true love*, and obedience" (Hildebrand 2016, my italics).

Of course, we do not always *see* others as beautiful, radiating human dignity. Hildebrand says that, for example, a thief "may be blind to the value of justice and to the offense against human dignity" (Hildebrand 1953, 406). Further, such concealment of human dignity may be something that is much more prevalent in our lives, especially since we live in an age in which the pragmatic viewpoint is overly emphasized.[16] We are often closed to values of others due to our self-centeredness (Hildebrand 2016, 36).[17] For example, a "concupiscent man" is "interested in the world only as a means in procuring pleasure for himself" (Hildebrand 2016, 37). For such a person, "the world is sealed, silent, stripped of all mystery, deprived of all depth, flat and limited to one dimension" (Hildebrand 2016, 36).

How can we then overcome such deprivation and develop our reverence for human beings, for their dignity? Such a lack seems to be prevalent in the modern world. As Hildebrand writes:

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[15] Full-fledged charity, however, requires loving God, according to Hildebrand (Hildebrand 1953, 458; Cf. Hildebrand 1971, 358–360; Hildebrand 2009, 270–271).

[16] I discuss how we can become blind to human dignity in an article comparing Hildebrand with J. David Velleman (Kikuchi 2020, 116–120).

[17] Hildebrand 2016, 36. Note that this work is an English translation of a German work published much earlier, in 1933.

> The attitude of reverence is especially opposed to all pragmatic conduct. The contrary of a reverent attitude toward being results when everything is considered only as a means, as an instrument for subjective and fortuitous aims, when all is used as a coin for which something can be exchanged; when nothing is taken seriously for its own sake . . . . (Hildebrand 2016, 43)

In my view, nurses are better situated to be reverent toward human dignity because, as Hildebrand points out, "the value of a human being reveals itself to our mind in certain situations in a specifically drastic manner", "for instance, when someone is tortured and injured, or when his life is in danger" (Hildebrand 1953, 101). However, nurses are often under strong pressure from difficult work environments, stress-inducing patients and colleagues, and the mechanized worldview of medicine. (Physicians are under even stronger pressure, I assume, in the sense that they are almost forced to see patients from the medical perspective, at least most of the time.)

Hildebrand and Roach would perhaps suggest that it helps to be a good Catholic; Hildebrand, for example, claims that the Catholic liturgy has just such an effect, to help us develop reverence for all creatures, including our neighbors (Hildebrand 2016, 42).[18] Here, we should be reminded of the fact that Hildebrand was an enthusiastic member of the Third Order of Franciscans; he described St. Francis as someone who was "full of sweet regard for all creation, even for non-living things . . . [his] heart was flooded with inexpressible joy as he beheld the sun, the moon, and the stars" (Hildebrand 1963, 33–34). He quotes Thomas of Celano: "he called all creatures brothers and with secret art penetrated to the inner nature of the

[18] A concept that may be relevant to this is that of divinization or deification (*theosis*). Gregory the Great understands the human fall as the loss of the ability to contemplate and the recovery from it as (a foretaste of) salvation: "this restored power enables us to contemplate and to be transformed by the divine light that renews and strengthens us, widening our hearts so that we can perceive others, ourselves, and indeed the whole creation as refulgent with God's glory" (Dysinger 2019, 264). Hildebrand also connects reverence toward and the dignity of being with religious contemplation and salvation: "In this right and appropriate attitude toward being as such [reverence], this affirmation free from obtrusiveness, this silent, contemplative disposition toward being as being, the world begins to disclose itself in its entire depth, differentiation, and plenitude of value" (Hildebrand 2016, 42).

very creature with the sharp look of his heart, as if he had entered already into the freedom of the glory of the children of God"[19] (Hildebrand 1963, 33).

However, I suggest that there are also other possible ways to develop our sense of reverence for human dignity. To begin with, we can try to be more contemplative than active, so that we are not overwhelmed by pragmatic (e.g., practical, technical, financial, etc.) perspectives. Another way is to *trust* the general personal beauty of the cared-for person in various ways. For example, we can attempt to "grasp" that human dignity inheres in every person, as many people apparently do (otherwise, it would not have been included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights);[20] clearly it helps to believe in its existence, although it may be hidden from our hearts, since if we think that it is there, it is easier for us to find it. As another example, perhaps we can try to see human dignity in people through empathy, by taking the perspective of those who love them. It seems reasonable to assume that such beauty tends to appear more clearly in the eyes of those who are close to them, such as their family and friends. As Hildebrand points out, love empowers us "to see value more clearly": "turning lovingly to someone opens our eyes and lets us grasp all the values that one would never see as long as one lived in an indifferent attitude" (Hildebrand 1971, 41; Hildebrand 2009, 23).

Conclusion

In this paper, I have proposed an approach to care based on the theory of love of Dietrich von Hildebrand and the theory of care of Sister Marie Simone Roach in order to explore a modern Catholic philosophical theory of care as an affective value response. In the first section, I briefly introduced two key concepts in Hildebrand's theory of love, *intentio benevolentiae* and *intentio unionis*. In the second section, I discussed his idea of transcendence and dedication, hinted at by Roach's comment about care as an affective value response, and explored its possibility further using the framework of thought suggested by Hildebrand's later work. In the third and final section, I explored the concept of human dignity as the general individual beauty of all human persons, based on Hildebrand's analyses of beauty, dignity, and reverence.

[19] Hildebrand (1963, 33). Note that the piece from which this passage is quoted is a translation of a work that had been written about forty years earlier in Germany, as a commemoration of 700 years of the Franciscan Orders there, in 1921, although this is not noted in the new book (Hildebrand 1921).

[20] Cf. Hollenbach (2014, 256).

In light of the discussions above, I would like to conclude my paper with two suggestions for further research. First, I would like to emphasize the importance of the practitioner's perspective in learning about human dignity. Human dignity, which seems to be so fundamental to the experience of caregivers, is not simply dogmatically *believed*, but richly *felt*, given that love, even love of neighbor, is an affective value response. Philosophers tend to analyze the normativity of human dignity as an abstract concept, and theologians are eager to ground it from a dogmatic or exegetical standpoint; both of these approaches, however, seem to leave "human dignity" an open question in the face of skepticism, especially in the pluralistic world of today.[21] However, as Roach points out, there seems to be something fundamentally human about our reverence for human dignity. Thus, I suggest that a phenomenology of the dignity of the person can be a promising line of research, and for this, it is crucial to refer to accounts by a practitioner such as Roach, someone who can *see* such dignity in her patients, in the form of the beauty of their humanity, even in challenging circumstances, in her daily confrontation with difficult patients, despair due to misfortune, or the mechanistic worldview of modern medicine.

Second, I suggest that phenomenologists can also learn from the Catholic intellectual tradition.[22] What is the common characteristic among human beings that underlies our experience of human dignity? Integral to a phenomenology of dignity is a phenomenology of personhood, and there is a rich tradition of phenomenology of personhood among Catholic philosophers, from Augustine to Edith Stein, who have seen in our *imago dei* our dignity.[23] Perhaps our ability to love—to care—proves to be crucial, if, as Roach believes, we human beings have been "created by love, for love, and to love" (Roach, 3).[24]

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[21] Cf. Hollenbach (2014).

[22] The close connection between early phenomenology and modern Catholic thought is another topic that is currently receiving much attention (cf. Baring 2019).

[23] Cf. Spencer (2018). Levinas is perhaps the most important figure in what I call "phenomenology of dignity". Cf. Atterton 2014. Levinas claims that already in the recognition of the Other—in the experience of the face of the Other—there is the felt need to help the person (Atterton 2014, 278). Levinas' view seems "radically other centered" in comparison to that of Hildebrand, and comparison between the two thinkers is "a project waiting to be carried out" (Crosby 2009, xxxi).

[24] According to the "functional interpretation" of the *imago dei*, human beings are "in God's image by being delegated by God to exercise the kind of care for creation that God's love for all creatures leads to (Hollenbach 2014, 254–255).

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The Relational Self in an Ethic of Care
—Another possibility of the self as distinct from the autonomous self—

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Abstract*: In modern normative ethics, we assume that a moral agent is an individual with autonomous and independent rational judgment. On that basis, there are many arguments centered on the subject of examining universal ethical standards such as the duties and consequences of such agents and the search for justification. Certainly, given the role of normative ethics in exploring universal and impartial principles, it is not surprising that this attitude is generally adopted in constructing a normative ethical theory. However, on the other hand, it is also a fact that there are some people who are not covered by this definition of an agent. In recent years, there has been a growing tendency to question the fact that such people are not given consideration as agents in theories other than an ethic of care. But at least in Japan, despite this growing debate, compared to the rise in practical research on care, the foundational arguments in ethics that should ground such discussions, in other words, the theoretical examination of an ethic of care are still inadequate and far from advanced. However, it is feared that continuing to disregard such theoretical research may ultimately prove to be a fatal flaw for the advancement of practical research.*

Therefore, in this paper, as a starting point for increasing the amount of theoretical research on an ethic of care in Japan, I will elucidate the ideal form of an agent called "care relations", which is the smallest unit of a moral agent. In particular, I will focus on Noddings' concept of the 'relational self' and clarify it by comparing the idea of agents in virtue ethics and in an ethic of care. For our discussion of virtue ethics, I will focus on Hursthouse's arguments. Through these arguments, it becomes clear that the human view of the relational self in an ethic of care can adopt a relational self image that focuses not only on the caring subject but also on the cared for.

1. Introduction

In modern normative ethics, we assume a moral agent who is an individual with autonomous and independent rationality, and on that basis, there are many arguments

centered on the subject of examining universal ethical standards such as the duties and consequences of such agents and the search for justification. Certainly, given the role of normative ethics in exploring universal and impartial principles,[1] it is not surprising that this attitude is generally adopted in constructing a normative ethical theory. However, on the other hand, it is also a fact that there are some people who are not covered by this definition of an agent, in other words, people who fall outside of the ethical considerations of these theories. In recent years, even other theories aside from an ethic of care have begun to question the fact that such people are not given consideration as moral agents. Okin, Nussbaum and Kittay are sensitive to these points, and based on the awareness of the above-mentioned problem, their arguments focus on 'cared-for people,' that is, people who necessarily have difficulty living in society.[2] But at least in Japan, despite this growing debate, compared to the rise in practical research on care, the foundational arguments in ethics that should ground such discussions, in other words, the theoretical examination of the ethic of care is still inadequate and far from advanced. However, if we intend to defend the adherence to an ethic of care, there is a risk that continuing to disregard such theoretical research may ultimately prove to be a fatal flaw for the advancement of practical research.

Therefore, in this paper, as a starting point for increasing the amount of theoretical research on an ethic of care in Japan, I will elucidate the ideal form of an agent called the 'relational self', which is the smallest unit of an agent in an ethic of care. In particular, I will focus on Noddings' concept of the "relational self" and clarify it by comparing the idea of agents in virtue ethics and in an ethic of care. For our discussion of virtue ethics, I will focus on Hursthouse's argument. I think Hursthouse's argument is a good reference when comparing an ethic of care and virtue ethics, because Hursthouse attempts to comprehensively distinguish the elusive characteristics of virtue ethics. Through these arguments, it becomes clear that the human view of the relational self in an ethic of care can adopt a relational self-image that focuses not only on the subject of the one caring but also on the one cared-for.

2. Background of the problem: Limitations of the agent image presented by traditional ethical theories

[1] Kuhse (1997), chap.4.
[2] Okin (1989), Nussbaum (2006), Kittay (1999).

"Care" is a word that is heard in various situations in daily life, and its meaning also differs depending on the context. Among the various meanings of "care", even if we take up only the usage in medical, nursing, and long-term care contexts, care does not only refer to the physical contact involved in certain kinds of caring, nursing, and assistance, but also to mental caring and compassion. The implications of such a concept of care are hidden in the words that are often heard in everyday life, such as "mental care", "being close to the feelings of the other person", and "compassion for others". Similar trends can be seen not only in such daily usage, but also in the definition of care by care theorists. For example, nursing scholar Benner focuses on the "taking care" or "cherishing" involved in many aspects of the concept of care; Frankfurt emphasizes "interest"; and Noddings, influenced by care research pioneer Mayeroff, puts emphasis on "relationships". Thus, it is clear that the concept of care is ambiguous, whether used on a daily basis or in academic discourse. Therefore, it is hard to say that even among care theorists, a definition based on a certain common understanding of the concept of care has been established. Attempting to find a set definition is almost impossible due to the ambiguity of care. In any case, the ambiguity and individuality of these concepts of care can be pointed out as one of the main reasons why the theoretical examination of an ethic of care is difficult. This is because appropriate care may vary depending on the area in which the concept of care is being argued, the subject to be cared for, and the situation in which the care is taken.[3] And these characteristics that make it difficult to define care strictly are related not only to the above-mentioned range of everyday terminology but also to the difficulty of theoretical examination. In this way, when discussing an ethic of care and the theory of care, it is necessary to be sensitive to the context in which the concept of care is treated. So, in this section, as a call to argue for ethics based on care, which is an ambiguous concept, I shall proceed by presenting a certain distinction concerning the academic context for the discussion of care. So what exactly does the concept of care mean and in what context is it argued? Due to space limitations, I will mainly focus on the latter issue, which is directly related to the discussion in this article.

[3] At this time, not only the meaning of the concept of care differs depending on the fields such as medical field and education field, but also the area where care is provided, such as whether the care is public or private. The meaning of the concept of care changes not only depending on these differences, but also on the individual objects and situations such as who the care relationship is established with. For example, is the care for patients on the verge of unavoidable death, is it aimed at elderly people with dementia who cannot escape from memory decline, or is it for a child who is expected to grow and develop in the future. There are a wide variety of individual considerations, such as whether the care is for children whose growth and development are different because of a disability.

2.1 Defining the context in which the concept of care is argued

Frankfurt presents philosophical questions in three areas: the epistemology of what to believe, the ethics of how to behave, and the area of care that asks "what to care for".[4] Each of these areas is considered independent. And while ethics focuses on self-other relationships and addresses their rightness or wrongness as well as the attendant moral responsibilities, the subject of the area of care is "what I am": it is regarded as an area related to the question of "is it important for us?".[5] In other words, "we distinguish between moral demands and what is most important to us".[6] For example, according to Frankfurt's explanation, those who always prioritize moral ethic of care are those who care most about moral considerations.[7] Similarly, the areas of epistemology and care are independent. Because what is true and whether that true fact is important enough for someone to care about it are separate issues. In this way, Frankfurt explains that matters related to the area of care, i.e. what to care for, are independent areas because they can be determined independently of the truth of things and the ethical norms of right and wrong.

But who will be cared for depends on our particular, contingent circumstances, so who will be cared for is also non-selective; it is determined by chance. Moreover, what motivates care at any times is not the value of the object to be cared for. For "care makes itself important to the person",[8] when you happen to meet them and start care, a unique connection arises in that relationship. For the relationship has irreplaceable value. Frankfurt calls this volitional necessity. Feeling that "the person must actually do what he or she does",[9] he is "forced not to betray"[10] what he cares for, that is, what he identifies with himself. And it's why the person's life is coherent and integrated. This is because we place the care that we cherish at the center of life and organize the priorities of life based on that.[11] In this way, the caregiver wants the healthy growth of what he or she cares for and envisions his or her life plan accordingly. Since it is not assumed that the object of care has an intrinsic value, the

[4] Frankfurt 1982, p.257.
[5] ibid.
[6] Shinagawa 2007, pp.151–152.
[7] Frankfurt 1982, p.259.
[8] ibid., p.269.
[9] ibid., p.264.
[10] ibid., p.268.
[11] ibid., p.260.

significance of care must be found not in the value of the object but in the "importance of the activity itself of caring".[12] In this way, when discussing care, there is not only the level of care that is practiced in our daily lives, but also the level of discussion that is directly related to the action guidelines of the caregiver, in other words, their ethical standards. In addition, there may be a meta-level discussion that critically examines such care theory and asks more basic questions, however in this paper, I will proceed within the scope of care theory at the above-mentioned level.

2.2 Agents in virtue ethics

In this section, before clarifying the image of the agent as depicted by an ethic of care, I will briefly point out the reason why an ethic of care and virtue ethics are said to be similar. Utilitarianism and Kantian ethics are called justice ethics, and the rightness of actions is determined according to impartial and universal principles. Care ethicists have continued to criticize this attitude of judging and justifying. On the other hand, virtue ethics, which has been attracting attention as another option of normative ethical theory since the latter half of the 20th century, also criticized the conventional act-centered ethical theory and argued that instead of asking "What kind of action should be taken?", we should ask "what kind of person should I be?". However, it is not the purpose of this paper to fully consider this issue, so we will proceed on the premise that both are separate ethical positions with a certain degree of independence. In addition, by comparing both theories, I can show a concrete image of the moral agent of ethic of care.

Now I will attempt to clarify the basic characteristics of virtue ethics according to Hursthouse's explanation. According to Hursthouse, virtue ethics is characterized by four main points[13]: Virtue ethics is (1) agent-centric, not act-centric. (2) It emphasizes the question of what kind of person someone should be, not what kind of action should be taken. (3) It is based on the concept of *arete* (good, virtuousness), not the concept of duty (rightness, duty, responsibility). (4) It rejects the codifiability of ethics, the principles that lead to individual course of action. In the following, I will briefly discuss the details of each of these points. Here, when introducing the characteristics of virtue ethics, for the sake of convenience, my explanation will start from the characteristic (2) without following the above order.

[12] ibid., p.271.
[13] Hursthouse 1999, p.17.

First, I will focus on the second feature that Hursthouse mentions. In virtue ethics, it is the virtue that the agent possesses that guides the moral act, that is, "the character trait of a person, the state of the character. A moral agent in virtue ethics is evaluated for their character by the character traits formed by the accumulation of virtuous acts performed throughout life. Moreover, these virtues and vices are considered to be firmly acquired by daily habits and cannot be easily changed. The virtue referred to here is also the excellence of the character traits, which includes phronesis as the ability to reason about practical problems, which implies a correct grasp of things, and the concept of virtue makes the possessor good, so it does not lead the person to perform wrong actions.[14] Therefore, I can say that while deontological ethics emphasizes acts that obey duties and utilitarianism emphasizes the consequences of acts, virtue ethics emphasizes the virtue and moral character of moral agent.

Next, I will discuss the first feature of virtue ethics, namely that virtue ethics is not act-centered but agent-centered. Virtue ethics focuses on "virtuous agents" rather than "right acts". For example, consider the "remainder"[15] in moral dilemmas. Unlike virtue ethics, act-centered ethical theory tends to undervalue the importance of the remainder. That is, these theories focus only on the question of whether x or y is the right thing to do in a particular case and do not refer to the "remainder" on specific moral issues. This tendency to overlook "remainders" is encouraged in response to the demand for action guidelines that normative ethics should provide explanations for right action. However, virtue ethics is a theory that focuses on the agent, not the act. Therefore, because utilitarianism and deontology are act-centric theories, it is not possible to make decisions that are not acts that make us feel regret or recognize an apology, and as a result, the thoughts that produce remainder are excluded. On the other hand, the meaning of "what to do" in virtue ethics is a broader concept, so I can focus on "who does what and how" rather than "what we do".

The third feature is that virtue ethics is based on the concept of *arete* rather than the concept of obligation. This can be easily understood by focusing on a tragic and irresolvable dilemma while keeping in mind the right course of action. Suppose two truly virtuous agents face the same moral choice of x or y in the same situation, and in a virtuous way one does x and the other does y. Here, the "right act" is what

[14] ibid., p12ff.

[15] ibid., p.44. The "remainder" is one that a moral agent, faced with a moral dilemma, embraces primarily when making moral decisions against moral imperatives. Specific examples include the recognition of "distress and regret, remorse and guilt" and "need apology, compensation and compensation" (ibid.).

the "a virtuous agent" does, not the "the virtuous agent" (generally a virtuous agent). For example, suppose two virtuous agents are bothered by a situation where they can only give one gift, either a or b, on their daughters' birthday. And suppose that there is no moral basis for preferring one over the other and, in the end, both choose a and b respectively as their daughters' gifts. In such case, there is no code of conduct and neither option is considered to be the only morally right decision, so according to virtue ethics, both agents are right at this time.[16] Both of them "behave generously and therefore act well".[17] In this way, virtue ethics, unlike the theory based on obligatory concepts, has the characteristic of being able to describe everyday trivial moral decisions and moral acts. Some may think that such a trivial daily experience is not a moral decision. However, not all morally important things exist in extreme situations. In the case of the above gift, for example, if the daughter is fighting illness and seeing the flowers is very encouraging, I think that the choice of choosing flowers as a gift is morally important.

Fourth, virtue ethics rejects the idea that "ethics is encoded by the rules and principles that make it possible to give specific guidelines of action". So what is the "codeability" that virtue ethics criticizes? According to Hursthouse, virtue ethics criticizes a "strong codeability thesis" with two characteristics[18]: That is, (a) those rules / principles are, in essence, a decision procedure for deciding what is the right action to do in every individual case. (b) Those rules and principles are expressed in terms that even non-virtuous people can understand and use them correctly.[19] Therefore, a certain degree of virtue-consistent phronesis is needed both in interpreting the rules and in deciding which rule is most appropriate to apply to the individual case. In this way, virtue ethics, which recognizes the need for phronesis, is criticized for giving inadequate guidelines of conduct because it does not indicate the

[16] ibid., pp.68–69.

[17] Ibid., pp.67–68.

[18] ibid., pp.39–40.

[19] The "strong codeability thesis" with the above two characteristics is criticized for at least the following two reasons. First, the attempt to find a set of rules and principles seems to continue to fail. Especially in applied ethics, it is increasingly required to draw different and diverse conclusions while using the same abstract principle. As a result, the gap between the abstract principle and the complex individuality of the concrete moral situation becomes more apparent, and the idea that the rule must have both of the above characteristics begins to lose its appeal. Second, phronesis as moral and practical wisdom is necessary to properly interpret the rules and principles and determine in what circumstances they apply. For example, simply asking them to act according to certain rules cannot guarantee that an arrogant, uncaring, dishonest and self-centered doctor will do what they should do.

priority of virtue. In order for virtue ethics to provide a guideline for such criticism, it needs to be complemented by the principle that "honesty takes precedence over kindness"[20]. As I will see later, an ethic of care basically agrees with this attitude of virtue ethics. However, while virtue ethics provides the reason for the act and explains the reason for the act, an ethic of care believes that the act need not be justified. This is due to the fact that an ethic of care is not "ethics" that appeals to universal principles to evaluate or make decisions on ethical action, but "ethic" that relies on individual experience. And Noddings explains the difference between the two as a distinction between "professional ethics" and "personal ethic" as follows: while "professional ethics" deals with the derivation of moral judgment based on principles, and is a "study of justified action" centered on moral judgment and moral reasoning, [21] "personal ethic" is a "study on how to treat others morally" that deals with ethical action in a particular person's specific situation. Here we can confirm that an ethic of care does not aim to justify the act, so therefore does not call it "ethics".[22]

3. Relational agent image in an ethic of care

In the previous section, we briefly explained the main features of traditional mainstream normative ethical theories and the image of the agents they present. I would like to emphasize here that the assertion of this paper holds that Kantian ethics, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics all define an individual as the smallest unit of a moral agent, but the assertion of this paper does not necessarily take such an individualistic agents negatively. What I would like to show in this paper is that in traditional ethics, as Baier points out, only some people with privileged qualifications are worthy of having justice applied to them[23]: that is, "a wealthy, at least professional white adult man".[24] So I argue that if such a problem is treated as out of range of justice and justice remains unapplied, an ethic of care is certainly more "decent"[25] than ethical theories that continue to present such unjust versions of justice. In this way, not only is the image of an individualist agent dominant in conventional ethical theory, but it is also excluded from the application of justice because it does not fully assume human

[20] ibid., p.57.
[21] Noddings 1984, p.94.
[22] ibid., pp.26–27.
[23] Baier1994, pp.25–26.
[24] Benhabib 1992, p.153.
[25] Baier 1994, p.25.

relationships with asymmetrical power relationships. Here, one of the important issues criticized by an ethic of care is that there are people who will be excluded in conventional ethical theory, namely that there are people who stand outside of justice. Therefore, I am concerned that no matter how good the idea of justice is, when it is actually applied, if its original meaning is distorted and applied, then only some privileged people will be considered.

In addition, traditional ethical theories assume symmetry of ability, not only because individualistic agents dominate, but also because relationships with asymmetrical human beings are not fully envisioned. Thus, one of the important issues criticized by the ethics of care is that each ethical position makes insufficient assumptions about relationships, especially those with asymmetrical power relationships. After emphasizing the above points, I will elucidate the theoretical content of an ethic of care, using arguments of several ethic theorists as starting points.

3.1 Ethical self and relational self

Noddings is an advocate of ethic of care, aiming to theorize ethic of care, and continues to make proposals that contribute to the development of an ethic of care. Among Noddings's claims, her discussion of the "ethical self" and "relational self" are important concepts in understanding agency in an ethic of care. Therefore, in this section, I will briefly discuss these concepts as described by Noddings.

In an ethic of care, "ethical self" is attributed to the role of controlling the ethical aspect of the agent in the care relationship. An ethic of care considers self-generation in the relationship between the carer and the cared-for. Therefore, ethical self is described as the active relationship of the vision between the real self and the ideal self as one-caring and the cared-for that arises from a basic understanding of self-other relationships.[26] So, in an ethic of care, both self of the one-caring and the cared-for can only be established in a relationship with each other, and never exist in a completely independent form separated from others. Thus, in an ethic of care, the ethical self is the reciprocal relationship between the one-caring and the cared-for from the perspective of maintaining a balance between reality and the ethical ideal.

So how does Noddings describe the self? Noddings sees the self as an inconsistent entity that can change in the context of the moment, and points out that in this sense there is no firm "true self".[27] Furthermore, Noddings stipulates that the

[26] Noddings 1984, p.49.
[27] Noddings 2002, p.107.

self occurs only in the interrelationship between the one caring and the cared-for, and presents this relational self through the following two aspects: the ethical self, which controls the ethical aspect of the self; and the "habitual self", which occurs when we follow the habits we always practice. The former has been mentioned above and will not be discussed here. The latter is "a subset of the various encounters that one has, which seems to be a product of everyday culture",[28] such as greeting a neighbor in the morning. Here, the habitual self is established by being loosely bound by social norms, but its binding force is not absolute. This is because people deal with accidental events with "creative improvisation" and live their daily lives while overcoming sudden troubles that occur every day. Therefore, the one caring and the cared-for cultivate their own selves while maintaining a care relationship by influencing each other, helping each other, and thinking things out when unexpected events and troubles occur. The ethical self and habitual self are self-images of "relational self" that occur and develop in the relationship of care and through the practice of care at the daily level, and are important elements that constitute the human view of an ethic of care.

The view of "relational self" posits that the self occurs only in the care relationship, and it rejects the individualistic agent image that independent individuals exist separately. The self depicted by an ethic of care is formed by chance encounters, events, and, in some cases, accidents. Therefore, unlike the self of virtue ethics, which is strongly characterized by daily habits, the self in an ethic of care has the flexibility of always responding to changes in the situation as well as the individuality of each other. The notion of an ethic of care is characterized by particularism, transformable flexibility, and relationalism, and this concept is considered to be an objection to the individualism underlying traditional ethical theory.

3.2 Differences between the relational self in an ethic of care and the agent in virtue ethics

In this section, based on the discussions so far, I will highlight some of the differences between virtue ethics and an ethic of care, and then show the characteristics of the agent in an ethic of care. As shown in the previous section, virtue ethics is characterized as agent-centered rather than act-centered. Regarding this attitude, the view of an ethic of care is in line with that of virtue ethics. However, there are

[28] ibid., p.103.

differences between the two theories about the norms that agents should follow and the well-being that they bring. Let us consider the case of monks living alone in the mountains and living ascetic lives.[29] From the perspective of Hursthouse-style virtue ethics, these monks' practices are positively evaluated if they strive to cultivate virtue and contribute to their own flourishing. In contrast, when evaluated from the perspective of an ethic of care, a monk's ascetic practice is basically evaluated as a way of life that does not deserve praise. This is because in an ethic of care, the self is formed only in the relationship with others, and this is because it means that the self cannot be established as a self in the first place if one don't have a relationship with others.[30] In virtue ethics, the agent is regarded as an individual, whereas in an ethic of care, the agent is regarded as a relational existence. An ethic of care emphasizes not only the one-caring (i.e. the one that acts) but also the cared-for, who is the target of the act. Furthermore, an ethic of care tends to consider the interests of the cared-for over the one-caring more than in virtue ethics.

The second notable feature of virtue ethics is that it deals more with "how we should live" than "what we should do". Let us now refer to Hursthouse's account of the "tragic dilemma" to show how virtue ethics relates to the issues surrounding the way of life of agents. A tragic dilemma is a kind of dilemma that cannot be solved because it is a situation in which you will inevitably get your hands dirty no matter what you do to get out of it. For example, how should a virtuous agent act in the face of a moral dilemma where if one person out of 20 is not killed, then all will be killed? According to Hursthouse, in this case, one kind of virtuous agent must commit suicide when the time comes, no matter which option he chooses, because a decent person could not live after such a dire situation. On the other hand, Hursthouse says that another virtuous agent must live in sadness because committing suicide is cowardly. In other words, the former virtuous agent can never get over not saving 20 people (or killing one) because he is truly compassionate, while the latter as a virtuous agent cannot commit suicide because he is truly courageous. Neither agent, after doing what they should, can get over their actions, and their lives will be forever impaired. Thus, there is a dilemma that even a virtuous agent cannot navigate well.[31] This is not because the agent has done anything wrong or right, but simply because of the fact that the agent's life has forced her to make a decision

[29] Hursthouse 1999, chap.8.
[30] Noddings 1984, p.97; Noddings 2002, chap.5.
[31] Ibid., p.72.

after which she will not be able to live an intact life.[32] Therefore, moral decisions in virtue ethics are guided by the virtues cultivated in the agent's life and have a great influence on the agent's subsequent life.

In an ethic of care, as in virtue ethics, moral decisions are regarded as being related to one's whole life. In the above cases, in an ethic of care, as in virtue ethics, no matter what decision is made, the decision itself cannot be evaluated positively.[33] However, since the image of the agent to be aimed at is different for an ethic of care and virtue ethics, it seems that the two have different ways of living with some kind of hurt. In Hursthouse's ethics of virtue, virtues and happiness are so closely related that, once you do something wrong, you cannot reach eudaimonia. On the other hand, even in an ethic of care, it is certain that the occurrence of pathological caring[34] itself is not positively evaluated, but even in life after being hurt by pathological caring, in some cases, the care relationship can be repaired, and this leaves the possibility of fostering an ethical self in the future. Because, according to Noddings, care itself is good and happy.[35] Thus, while virtue ethics aims at the search for goodness, an ethic of care affirms life itself full of care relationships as good. Therefore, even if an agent does an act that is not virtuous at that time or if care fails, it is possible to recover oneself, repair the relationship, and in some cases even strengthen it in the subsequent care relationships.

Third, virtue ethics is based on the concept of *arete* rather than the concept of duty. Therefore, virtue ethics, unlike theories based on obligatory concepts, can sufficiently account for trivial, everyday moral decisions and moral acts. This kind of description is also shared by an ethic of care. However, while virtue ethics has the underlying notions of virtue and goodness, an ethic of care theoretically defines the non-arete concepts of care itself and the relationships that are the one-caring and the cared-for, and there may be situations where the views of the two are somewhat different. For example, according to Hursthouse, agents who satisfy the "unity of virtues"[36] that is, that a person with one virtue has all virtues are the perfect virtuous person. In addition, a virtuous agent "acts for some reason", so it is thought that he or she can have an impartial perspective to some extent compared to the agent in an ethic

[32] ibid., p.75.
[33] Noddings 1984, p.104.
[34] Pathrogical caring is paternalism between the one-caring and the cared-for based on an overwhelming power relationship, or excessive dependence such as codependence. Noddings considers these relationships to be inappropriate (Noddings 2002).
[35] Noddings 2003, pp.31–32.
[36] Hursthouse 1999, chap.4.

of care.[37] On the other hand, in an ethic of care, it is believed that the one caring and the cared-for as moral agents are both finite and vulnerable beings, and whether or not care is exerted changes depending on the situation and circumstances. And Noddings states that human beings ultimately "stand on my side" and that in extreme situations, humans can only judge things from a subjective standpoint.[38] The above idea comes from the ethical claim of care that puts personality formation based on human relationships, and because the two-way relationship of the one caring and the cared-for is set as the smallest unit of the agent.

The fourth feature is that virtue ethics rejects the strong codeability thesis. An ethic of care also criticizes the ethical theory of the codeability thesis in line with these virtue ethical claims. This is because one of the most important criticisms from an ethic of care against conventional ethical theories is the denial of universal principles and rules, as well as their distorted interpretations.[39]

4. Conclusion

Based on the discussions so far, in order to identify the differences between agents in an ethic of care and virtue ethics, I have discussed the characteristics of both theories and their differences. The following three characteristics are common to both an ethic of care and virtue ethics concerning their attitudes toward action-centered ethical theories. First, both ethic of care and virtue ethics share the characteristic of being able to effectively deal with the "remainder" inherent in moral dilemmas and the trivial moral situations of everyday life. Second, both theories agree that they deal with the problem of life. However, an ethic of care is more particularistic than virtue ethics in approaching moral issues. Third, both reject ethical theories that favor a strong codeability thesis. Whereas traditional act-centered ethical theories justify morality only by moral reasoning and rationality, an ethic of care and virtue ethics do not approach morality in that way.

Next, an ethic of care has three main differences from virtue ethics. First, both ethical theories focus on agents rather than actions, however their "agent" implications are different. That is, while the agent in virtue ethics is a virtuous individual, the "agent" in an ethic of care is a relationship that includes both the one

[37] ibid., p.69.
[38] Noddings 2010, pp.135–136.
[39] Noddings, 1984, pp.5–6; pp.100–102.

caring and the cared-for. Therefore, as mentioned above, in virtue ethics, arguments are conducted assuming a virtuous individual, whereas in an ethic of care, oneself is only in the care relationship with the one caring and the cared-for, adopting the image of "relational self". Second, the perspectives that agents take when making moral decisions or doing moral acts are different. In other words, in virtue ethics, the interests and concerns of individual agents are a problem, whereas in an ethic of care, the one caring and the cared-for are evaluated and make decisions from the perspective of their respective interests and concerns. Thus, an ethic of care can focus on the voice of those who for some reason cannot express their needs and desires, which traditional ethical theories have overlooked, or who do not have such abilities. Third, there are differences in both theories as to what an agent should be. In virtue ethics, the purpose is for the agent to be an individual with outstanding virtues, whereas in an ethic of care, the moral agents—the one caring and the cared-for—are finite and vulnerable. We admit that we are, so we are not necessarily aiming to be a morally respectable and virtuous agent. Thus, the image of human beings depicted in an ethic of care is neither one of an outstanding being as suggested in virtue ethics, nor that of a perfect being with virtues that cannot be achieved in reality. The relational self in an ethic of care is the self formed by influencing each other in the relationship between the one caring and the cared-for, and it is the smallest unit of the agent in an ethic of care. And, in the face of unexpected events in daily life, we often make mistakes and use our imagination and creativity to deal with the situations and to overcome our daily troubles. This kind of self is both finite and fragile, as well as flexible and indomitable. Therefore, the self in an ethic of care has the characteristic that it occurs in the relationship, it can be transformed according to individual situations, and it is based on the human view assuming a finite human being who makes mistakes and failures. It is a theory that has the potential to scoop out the voices of those who cannot fulfill their obligations or follow the universal principles represented by Kant's moral law and the principles of utilitarianism, either because of their plight or because they have been deprived of the opportunity to know ethical norms.

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II Other Refereed Articles

Compossibility, Harmony, and God's Wisdom in Leibniz

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***Abstract**: Compossibility is one of the most important concepts in the philosophy of Leibniz (1646–1716). It enabled him to avoid Spinoza's (1632–1677) necessitarianism: whatever exists necessarily exists and there are no alternatives to what actually happens. Briefly, compossibility refers to the possibility of objects existing together. This concept causes a plurality of worlds. Since all possibles are not compossible in one and the same world, there are many possible worlds.*

While the importance of compossibility is evident, it has not been clarified thus far as to whether this concept is really strong enough. Why can we assert that God never creates multiple worlds? This paper will answer this question by discussing Griffin's interpretation. Griffin doubted precisely whether God ever created multiple worlds and proposed a necessitarian reading of Leibniz. On the contrary, this paper will conclude that we can interpret Leibniz without implying necessitarianism. Joráti's response to Griffin is to be considered. Consulting Messina and Rutherford's "cosmological interpretation" will improve this paper's suggestion.

This paper comprises four sections. The first section shows present interpretations of compossibility, including the cosmological interpretation. The second section refers to Griffin's interpretation. He claimed that God created all possible worlds as the best creation because God desired to the maximum reality. We examine whether his textual evidence can be interpreted otherwise. The third section considers Joráti's response to Griffin. She designated an important role for God's wisdom: it rules out what is unharmonious. Since multiple worlds are unharmonious, God does not create them. The fourth section concludes that we should adopt Messina and Rutherford's cosmological interpretation in addition to Joráti's. The best creation in Leibniz has a facet that is difficult to be described as the maximum reality. The cosmological interpretation details this facet as united spatiotemporal system.

1. Introduction

1.1. Can Compossibility Repel Necessitarianism?

Compossibility is one of the most important concepts in the philosophy of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716). It enabled him to avoid Baruch de Spinoza's (1632–

1677) necessitarianism:[1] whatever exists necessarily exists[2] and there are no alternatives to what actually happened, happens, and will happen.[3] Leibniz criticized Spinoza by name,[4] and refuting Spinoza's necessitarianism was his task.

Briefly, compossibility refers to the possibility of objects existing together. It is a relationship among possible substances and not possible worlds. This description is significant because, as we see later, when we admit compossibility among possible worlds, necessitarianism would be the end result. The concept of compossibility causes a plurality of worlds.[5] Since all possibles are not compossible in one and the same world, there are many possible worlds.[6] To belong to the same world, possible things have to be compossible with one another. Being individually possible does not necessarily mean being compossible with any other individual. Leibniz criticizes the actualization of all possible worlds for the reason that it threatens God's free will.[7] In the process of creation, God desires to maximize the existing substances insofar as they are compossible.

In *Theodicy* (1710), it is showed that the concept of compossibility excludes the creation of all possibles:

> [A]s all the possibles are not compatible together in one and the same world-sequence, *for that very reason* (*c'est pour cela même*) all the possibles cannot be produced. . . .[8]

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[1] This role of compossibility has already been pointed out. Fred D'Agostino. "Leibniz on Compossibility and Relational Predicates", in *Leibniz: Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science*, ed. R.S. Woolhouse (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 90. Margaret Wilson, "Compossibility and Law", in *Causation in Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. Steven Nadler (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 122. Renée Bouveresse, *Leibniz (Que sais-je?)*. (Paris: PUF, 1994), 64. James Messina, and Donald Rutherford, "Leibniz on Compossibility", *Philosophy Compass* 4, no. 6 (2009): 962.

[2] Proposition 16 in Part 1 of *Ethics*.

[3] Proposition 33 in Part 1 of *Ethics*.

[4] For example, in *Theodicy*, Sections 173, and 372–373.

[5] James Messina, "The Fate of the World (and Compossibility) After Leibniz: The Development of Cosmology in German Philosophy from Leibniz to Kant", in *Leibniz on Compossibility and Possible Worlds*, ed. G. Brown and Y. Chiek (Switzerland: Springer, 2016), 230.

[6] Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Die Philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz*, ed. C. I. Gerhardt (Hildesheim: Olms, 1965), VI, 236 (Leibniz uses the adjective "compatible" there, and not "compossible"). Leibniz, *Die Philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz*, II,573.

[7] Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Opuscules et fragments inédits*, ed. Louis Couturat (Hildesheim: Olms, 1966), 530.

[8] *Theodicy*, section 201 (Leibniz, *Die Philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz*, VI, 236). Italics mine. Translation of Theodicy is from the following. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil*, trans. E.M. Huggard (Charleston: s. n., 2015).

In "A Résumé of Metaphysics" (1697), Leibniz asserted that "since some things are incompatible with others, it follows that *certain possibles do not arrive at existence*. . .".[9]

While the importance of compossibility is evident, it has not been clarified thus far as to whether this concept is really strong enough. Why can we assert that God never creates multiple worlds? This paper will answer this question by analyzing Griffin's interpretation and Joráti's response to it. By "strong enough", I mean that compossibility can be interpreted not to allow necessitarianism. As we see later, many interpreters do not consider compossibility as so. *Leibniz, God and Necessity* by Griffin is a notable exception. Griffin claimed a kind of compossibility among worlds and his interpretation doubts precisely if God ever created multiple worlds. Multiple existent worlds are definitely different from plural possible worlds. While the latter are ideas in God's intellect,[10] the former are actual existents. To interpret compossibility as a strong enough concept, Griffin's reading should be discussed. Joráti's "Divine Faculties and the Puzzle on Incompossibility" is a strong response to Griffin. Consulting Messina and Rutherford's "cosmological interpretation" will improve this paper's suggestion.

Whether Leibniz's philosophy can exclude Spinoza's necessitarianism depends on whether compossibility can be interpreted as a strong concept. Therefore, discussing interpretations of compossibility would help to understand a part of the history of early-modern philosophy.[11]

1.2. Interpretations of Compossibility[12]

Before embarking on a discussion, let us examine three interpretations of compossibility. Griffin's interpretation proceeds as a criticism of the third cosmological interpretation. In "Leibniz on Compossibility", Messina and Rutherford divided the current interpretations into two groups—logical and lawful,[13] and then proposed their cosmological interpretation.

According to logical interpretation, two substances are compossible if and only if the supposition of their joint existence does not include logical contradiction.

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[9] "A Résumé of Metaphysics", Leibniz, *Opuscules et fragments inédits*, 535. Italics mine. Translation for "A Résumé of Metaphysics" is from the following source. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Leibniz, Philosophical Writings*, trans. Mary Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson, (New York: Dutton, 1973), 145.

[10] Section 53 of *Monadology* (1714). Section 7 and 42 of *Theodicy*.

[11] Yakira compared Spinoza and Leibniz, regarding necessitarianism and liberty. Elhanan Yakira, *Contrainte, nécessité, choix : la métaphysique de la liberté chez Spinoza et chez Leibniz* (Zurich: Éditions du Grand Midi, 1989).

[12] This subsection is entirely based on Messina and Rutherford, "Leibniz on Compossibility", 962–977.

[13] The terms "logical interpretation" and "lawful interpretation" were originally proposed by Wilson, "Compossibility and Law", 120–121.

God does not create a world that contains all possible substances because they conclude logical impossibility. Logical relations among possible substances are represented by their complete concepts. While this interpretation provides a simple and cogent response to Spinoza's necessitarianism, it does not have textual evidence as much as necessary. Leibniz treats compossibility mostly not as relations among concepts but as expressions among substances.

According to lawful interpretation, two substances are compossible if and only if they are connected and expressed under certain general laws of nature. Possible substances are incompossible when God does not organize them into a world because they do not instantiate the law that he would like. This interpretation does not present further explanation on why God does not create a world that contains all possible substances. In this interpretation, any substances can make a world because any substances instantiate a certain law and, therefore, are compossible. Hence we have to admit a possible world that contains all possible substances. To avoid this difficulty, one can say that God would not like a law that connects all possible substances. Yet, without further explanation on why he does not like such a law, lawful interpretation cannot be a strong response to necessitarianism.

Against these two interpretations, Messina and Rutherford proposed cosmological interpretation. According to this, two substances are compossible if and only if God conceives of them as belonging to the same world. "The same world" refers to the same relations of time and space. God does not create a world that contains all possible substances because they cannot be conceived in one and the same spatiotemporal sequence.

This interpretation is supported by the text as follows:

> I call *a world* the entire series and entire collection of all existing things, lest it be said that several worlds could have existed at different times and different places. For they must be reckoned all together as one world or, if you will, as one *universe*. And even though one should fill all times and all places, it still remains true that one could have filled them in infinite ways, and that there is an infinity of possible worlds, from among which God must have chosen the best, since he does nothing without acting in accordance with supreme reason.[14]

Messina and Rutherford explained this text that Leibniz affirmed: "there is an infinity of possible worlds, which are distinguished (in part) by the ways in which things are spatially and temporally ordered within them".[15] They inferred a plurality of worlds from the fact that time and space can be filled in plural ways. In other words, there is an infinity of combinations of possible things to make a spatiotemporal relation.

[14] Section 8 of *Theodicy*. (Leibniz, *Die Philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz*, VI, 107. Leibniz, *Theodicy*, 128.)

[15] Messina and Rutherford, "Leibniz on Compossibility", 970.

Belonging to the same time and space is a more detailed condition than general law under lawful interpretation.

2. Griffin's Interpretation: God Creates All Possible Worlds

2.1. Griffin's Argument

Griffin criticized the cosmological interpretation after criticizing the lawful one and the logical one.[16] He claimed that it cannot explain why God does not create all possible worlds:

> However, their view [Messina and Rutherford's view] does not seem to have the consequence they intend, that God cannot create all possible substances. The most that follows from the fact that God cannot conceive substances which are incompossible *as a world*—in their understanding of "incompossible" and "world"—is that God cannot create them as a world. It does not follow that God cannot create them.[17]

Griffin's claim is clear: the fact that all possibles are not compossible as *a* world does not necessarily deny that God may create them as different worlds. We can say that Griffin draws attention to an implicit hypothesis of the cosmological interpretation: God creates only one world.[18] Without this hypothesis, the cosmological interpretation would lose some of its strength.

Of course, Griffin did not ignore Leibniz's "anti-necessitarianism" argument.[19] His interpretation seems to show that there is a conceptual problem in Leibniz's philosophy that makes him committed to necessitarianism. By "necessitarianism" Griffin meant that whatever is metaphysically possible is actual.[20] There is no pure possibility that does not become an actual being.

Now, let us see how Griffin develops a necessitarian reading. It can be reconstructed as follows. Leibniz's God desires to produce the greatest quantity of reality or essence[21] as the best creation.[22] The maximization of reality requires that

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[16] Michael Griffin, *Leibniz, God and Necessity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 95–99.

[17] Griffin, *Leibniz, God and Necessity*, 103.

[18] In the conclusion of their paper, Messina and Rutherford stated "Thus, on the assumption that God aims to create a unique world, he is limited to create some but not all possible substances". For them, this assumption is not to be formally demonstrated. (Messina and Rutherford, "Leibniz on Compossibility,"974.)

[19] Griffin, *Leibniz, God and Necessity*, 83.

[20] Griffin, *Leibniz, God and Necessity*, 83.

[21] For Leibniz, reality and essence are not what only an existent thing has. A possible substance has some reality, even if it will not be created forever. (Section 44 of *Monadology*.)

[22] Griffin, *Leibniz, God and Necessity*, 106–107.

all possibles exist if such a creation is possible.[23] The more possible substances are created, the more reality is actualized. Most interpreters would agree that God desires to create substances as much as possible. But they would conclude that, while God's antecedent will desires to create all the possibles, his consequent will desires only the best collection of substances.[24] On the contrary, Griffin argued that God actually created all the possibles as he desired firstly. [25]

According to Griffin, the existence of a world does not disturb the existence of another world because they are disconnected.[26] For Leibniz, a world has "universal harmony" by which a substance expresses all other substances in that world.[27] Griffin does not deny this. What he claims is that, because the substances of different worlds do not communicate, the existence of a world does not detract from other existent worlds' harmony. It should be noted that Griffin did not state that all possible worlds are harmonious. Although what he thought about it is not clear, he did not demonstrate it at least. The focus of his argument seems to be on showing that all possible worlds can be compossible, even if it is not shown that there is harmony among them.

Griffin's main claim can be condensed into the following two points: (1) All possible worlds are compossible; there is no intrinsic incompossibility among them, and (2) God has a decisive reason to create all possible worlds: the maximization of reality as the best creation. As we will see later, we can interpret Leibniz without allowing (2) even if we admit (1).

Let us pay attention to the fact that Griffin considered the best creation as the maximization of reality. It is indispensable to his interpretation. As Griffin claimed, the set of all possible worlds would be the creation with the greatest reality because it contains all possible substances. Would it also be the most harmonious creation, then? If not, there is the possibility that God does not choose to create all possible worlds, preferring harmony to the greatest reality. Thus, Griffin's objection would be not as strong as it seems.

2. 2. Griffin's Textual Evidence and Reading It Otherwise

[23] Griffin, *Leibniz, God and Necessity*, 107.

[24] The difference between God's antecedent will and consequent will is stated in *Theodicy*, Sections 22–23.

[25] Griffin, *Leibniz, God and Necessity*, 108.

[26] Griffin, *Leibniz, God and Necessity*, 108. See also Rescher, who is considered as a proponent of logical interpretation. Rescher pointed out a similar conceptual difficulty in Leibniz: If incompossible substances are unrelated to one another, why do they hold incompossibility, which is a kind of relationship? Nicholas Rescher, "Logical difficulties in Leibniz's Metaphysics", in G*ottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Critical Assessments II*, ed. R.S. Woolhouse (London: Routledge, 1994), 176–178.

[27] Section 59 of *Monadology*.

In developing his interpretation, Griffin presented textual evidence that God can create multiple worlds. Citing it here, we can see how he read it and then determine whether it can be interpreted otherwise.

The following extract is sourced from the text in 1676 that Griffin mainly depended on:

> [I]t follows that infinitely many other spaces and other worlds can exist, in such a way that between these and ours there will be no distance, if there exist certain minds to which other things appear which are in no respect consistent with ours.[28]

> [I]t does not follow that there is not another world, or other minds which cohere among themselves in a way which is different from that which holds in our case.[29]

Here, Leibniz seemed to admit that there can be multiple worlds. Minds that are separated into different worlds do not communicate with each other. Griffin inferred from this that God's power can admit to the existence of multiple worlds.[30]

However, we do not have to interpret the above texts as strongly as Griffin did when we consider their contexts. Around the citation, Leibniz discussed God in relation to the human mind and argued for a relationship between space and our sensations. He claimed that we separate dreams from our own actual place by space as a criterion.[31] As far as we have consistent sensations, there should be corresponding space that is not just a dream. The texts below also show that the context does not concern the best creation:

> Further, just as the world and space of dreams differ from ours, so there could be different laws of motion in that other world. From this it is evident that so far is it from being the case that material things are more real than others, ...[32]

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[28] Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe*, ed. Deutche Akademie Wissenschaften (Berlin:Akademie Verlag, 1923–), VI, iii, 511.Translation for this "De Summa Rerum" is from the following source. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *De Summa Rerum: Metaphysical Papers, 1675–1676*, trans. G. H. R. Parkinson. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 65.

[29] Leibniz, *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe*, VI, iii, 512. (Leibniz, *De Summa Rerum*, 67.)

[30] Griffin, *Leibniz, God and Necessity*, 104. One can respond to this saying that the referenced text is sourced from the Paris period (1672–1676) and does not represent Leibniz's mature philosophy. However, Griffin also cited a similar text from the later years. A comment on Bayle's article "Rorarius" in the *Historical and Critical Dictionary* (1702). Leibniz, *Die Philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz*, IV, 519.

[31] Leibniz, *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe*, VI, iii, 511.

[32] Leibniz, *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe*, VI, iii, 511. (Leibniz, *De Summa Rerum*, 65.)

> However, it is clear enough from this [there could be another world which is disconnected from ours] that space differs from God, since there could be several spaces, but there is one God, and the immeasurability of God in all things is the same.[33]

These indicate that Leibniz described what another world would be like if it were to exist, rather than claiming that it should exist. I suppose that Griffin's textual evidence is not entirely a positive claim that God creates multiple worlds.

One may argue that Griffin's reading is excessive. Even granted, his interpretation is still notable because it revealed a critical but implicit hypothesis in Leibniz: Compossibility does not occur among possible worlds. Of course, Leibniz would not admit compossibility among worlds because it concludes necessitarianism. Yet it is not obvious what the conceptual basis for justifying such an attitude would be.

3. Joráti's Interpretation: God's Wisdom Excludes What is Unharmonious

Next let us consult Joráti's response to Griffin's interpretation. The distinction between God's wisdom and his intellect, which is a key of her interpretation, is precedingly acknowledged by Griffin.[34] Joráti also agreed with Griffin in that the cosmological interpretation cannot explain why God does not create all possible worlds.[35] Still, her interpretation is contrary to Griffin's necessitarianism reading.

3. 1. Joráti's Response to Griffin

Firstly, while recognizing that there are many texts where Leibniz uses "intellect" and "wisdom" interchangeably, Joráti claimed that they nonetheless contain different types of knowledge. For example, Leibniz states, "Ideas or essences are all founded on a necessity independent of wisdom [sagesse], fittingness and choice; but existences are dependent on them".[36] As this citation indicates, wisdom's function is not to hold all kinds of knowledge. Whereas God's intellect concerns all knowledge that is logically possible, his wisdom concerns knowledge of the good or of happiness. [37]

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[33] Leibniz, *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe*, VI, iii, 512. (Leibniz, *De Summa Rerum*, 67.)

[34] Julia Joráti, "Divine Faculties and the Puzzle of Incompossibility", in *Leibniz on Compossibility and Possible Worlds*, ed. G. Brown and Y. Chiek (Switzerland: Springer, 2016), 185.

[35] Joráti, "Divine Faculties and the Puzzle of Incompossibility", 182.

[36] A letter to Bourget in 1716. Leibniz, *Die Philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz*, III, 592. Translation is from the following source. Gottfried Wilhelm, *The Shorter Leibniz Texts: A Collection of New Translations*, trans. Lloyd Strickland (New York: Continuum, 2006), 199.

[37] Joráti, "Divine Faculties and the Puzzle of Incompossibility", 188.

Secondly, Joráti qualified God's wisdom as knowledge of harmony. As textual evidence, she refers to the following:

> [W]e must resort. . . to the treasures of supreme wisdom [Summae Sapientiae divitias], which absolutely has not allowed God to do violence to the order and nature of the universe, disregarding law and measure, nor to disturb the universal harmony, nor to select another but the best series of events.[38]

This citation shows that the function of wisdom is to constrain God to worlds with harmony or order.[39] Joráti concluded that God does not create all the possible worlds because his wisdom prevents him from making any unharmonious creation.

Let us assume a case in which multiple possible worlds are compossible despite being unharmonious, as Griffin did. According to Joráti, even if such a case is possible, God does not actualize them because his wisdom prevents him from making any unharmonious creation. Here is the advantage of Joráti's interpretation. It can deal with a situation that logical, lawful, and cosmological interpretations do not suppose: compossibility among possible worlds.

In sum, Joráti's interpretation consists in two specific claims: (1) God's wisdom is a different faculty from his intellect, and (2) God's wisdom is knowledge of harmony. The process of creation can be reconstructed as follows. God's intellect rules out logically and metaphysically impossible worlds. God's wisdom rules out a world that does not have harmony and constrains him from creating multiple worlds that do not share harmony.[40] Finally, God's will, with the principle of the best, chooses the best among the possible worlds.[41]

3. 2. More Requirements

Joráti's interpretation seems to contain potential weak points. To respond to Griffin sufficiently, we need to deal with two problems mentioned below.

The first is Section 6 of *Discourse on Metaphysics* (1686). Sometimes, it is referred to as a potential threat to lawful interpretation.[42] As we saw already, this interpretation claimed that two things are compossible if and only if they are related

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[38] *Causa Dei* (1710), Section 126 (Leibniz, *Die Philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz,* VI, 457). Translation is from the following source. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. *Monadology and other Philosophical Essays*, trans. Paul and Ann Martin Schrecker (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 141.

[39] Joráti, "Divine Faculties and the Puzzle of Incompossibility", 189.

[40] Joráti did not explicitly say that a set of all possible worlds does not have harmony, but she seemed to assume it (Joráti, "Divine Faculties and the Puzzle of Incompossibility", 185).

[41] Joráti, "Divine Faculties and the Puzzle of Incompossibility", 185.

[42] Wilson, "Compossibility and Law", 129–130. Messina and Rutherford, "Leibniz on Compossibility", 966. Jeffrey K McDonough, "Leibniz and the Puzzle of Incompossibility: The Packing Strategy", *The Philosophical Review* 119, no. 2 (2010):141, footnote 11.

under certain law. According to Section 6, however, it seems that law can be found for any set of substances:

> God does nothing which is not orderly and it is not even possible to imagine events that are not regular.
>
> Thus let us assume, for example, that someone jots down a number of points at random on a piece of paper, as do those who practice the ridiculous art of geomancy. I maintain that it is possible to find a geometric line whose notion is constant and uniform, following a certain rule, such that this line passes through all the points in the same order in which the hand jotted them down.[43]

There is no interpretative problem with the claim that God always acts with order. What matters is that order or law seems to be everywhere.

Joráti is not a proponent of lawful interpretation, but the problem concerns her interpretation, too. In her interpretation, God's wisdom rules out any creation which lacks harmony, order, or lawfulness. Thus, if any set of substances can have order and harmony, God's wisdom would accept a set of possible worlds because it has certain order and harmony. Joráti paid attention to this problem while referring to the very text.[44] In another part of her paper, she claimed that only substances with a spatiotemporal system comprise a possible world if we take into consideration God's wisdom.[45] With this condition, creation of multiple worlds will not be an option for God. Even if they share a certain law, they do not share a spatiotemporal system and, therefore, do not make creation with harmony.

This solution makes Joráti's interpretation similar to the cosmological one. She admitted the possibility that the cosmological interpretation would overcome its weak point by considering God's wisdom, although this route was not taken.[46] According to her, while "God chooses to constrain himself to spatiotemporally connected worlds" in the cosmological interpretation, "his wisdom constrains him thus" in her interpretation.[47] While the cosmological interpretation has the merit that it details "order" and "law" as spatiotemporal systems, Joráti's interpretation has the merit that it indicates the role of God's wisdom to constrain himself.

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[43] Leibniz, *Die Philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz*, IV, 431 (Leibniz, *Leibniz: Philosophical Essays*, 39). In section 7, Leibniz admits a miracle which seems to be inconsistent with order. However, he explains that a miracle follows the most general laws that God settled, even when it contradicts lower laws. Hence, a miracle does not deny that God always acts with order.

[44] Joráti, "Divine Faculties and the Puzzle of Incompossibility", 183, footnote 18.

[45] Joráti, "Divine Faculties and the Puzzle of Incompossibility", 185. It was based on Griffin, *Leibniz, God and Necessity*, 106.

[46] Joráti, "Divine Faculties and the Puzzle of Incompossibility", 181, footnote 16.

[47] Joráti, "Divine Faculties and the Puzzle of Incompossibility", 181, footnote 16.

The second problem concerns God's reason for creation. According to Griffin, God has a decisive reason to create all possible worlds: the maximization of reality. Of course, God's wisdom would not admit such an option. Still creation of all possible worlds would attain the maximum reality. Hence, to respond to Griffin effectively, we have to show that the best creation in Leibniz is not determined solely by the quantity of reality. Otherwise we cannot deny a case that God's other faculty than his wisdom may decide to create a set of all possible worlds despite their being unharmonious because trying to maximize the reality is one of God's principles for creation.[48]

4. Which is the Best Creation, the Maximum Reality or the Most Harmonious?

4. 1. Difference between the Maximum Reality and Harmony

Griffin provisionally considered harmony of a world as a possible "limiting condition on the quantity of essence God realizes in creation".[49] But, in conclusion, he argued that the degree of reality equals harmony and offered a citation from a letter to Wolff in 1715:

> *Perfection* is the harmony of things, or the state where everything is worthy of being observed, that is, the state of agreement [*consensus*] of identity in variety; you can even say that it is the degree of contemplatibility [*considerabilitas*]. Indeed, order, regularity, and harmony come to the same thing. You can even say that it is degree of essence, if essence is calculated from harmonizing properties, which give weight and momentum to essence, so to speak.[50]

In this citation, "degree of essence" is not a simple sum of essences or reality but one of "harmonizing properties". "Perfection" seems to refer to both the quantity and variety of reality. "Elementa Verae Pietatis" (1677–1678) also offers the following: "***Perfection*** *is degree or quantity of reality*" and "***Harmony*** *is unity in variety*",[51] and as its corollary "Harmony is perfection of cogitable things as far as they are cogitable".[52] It is seemingly evident that harmony equals the quantity of reality.

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[48] In order to avoid necessitarianism, Harmer qualified harmony as a higher level of determinateness (Adam Harmer, "Leibniz on Determinateness and Possible Worlds," *Philosophy Compass* 13, no. 1 (2018): 6–8). Yet his interpretation would have the same problem if harmony is not the first priority for creation.

[49] Griffin, *Leibniz, God and Necessity*, 107.

[50] Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Christian Wolff. *Briefwechsel zwischen Leibniz und Christian Wolff*, ed. C. I. Gerhardt (Hildesheim: Olms, 1963), 172 (Leibniz, *Leibniz: Philosophical Essays*, 233–234).

[51] Leibniz, *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe*, VI, iv, 1358. My translation.

[52] Leibniz, *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe*, VI, iv, 1359. My translation.

However, Leibniz's attitude toward harmony can be interpreted otherwise. In the beginning of *Philosopher's Confession* (1672–1673?), harmony is defined as "[s]imilarity in variety, that is, diversity compensated by identity".[53] It indicates that harmony is a relationship among things that are identical. Of course, Leibniz denied a doctrine that only a single substance exists and other beings are modifications of it, like Spinozism. Therefore, we should interpret "identity" here to mean unity. Substances in a world have to make a unity, while their expressions are various and diverse. This definition of harmony seems to already be a counterexample of the necessitarianism reading because different worlds cannot be considered as one. Harmony is expressed within *a* world.[54] This definition does not directly contradict citations from a letter to Wolff and "Elementa Verae Pietatis" because they state that harmony is accompanied by "identity" or "unity". The latter text also says "the more variety and variety in unity, the greater harmony".[55]

"Unity" in Leibniz does not always indicate unity of a world. It frequently indicates unity of a corporal substance or a constituent of a corporal substance.[56] Unity of a world must not be treated the same as unity of a substance; otherwise we would treat a world as if it is one substance. Feeney pays attention to unity of a world to discuss incompossibility in Leibniz.[57] According to him, unity of a world means the mutual expression of substances in that world.[58] This paper follows this interpretation. Since substances in different worlds do not express one another, multiple worlds do not have a common unity. They do not share what is needed to represent them together.

As a result, although Leibniz holds that harmony is the greatest reality in some texts, it is not clear that they are rigorously the same. Harmony in Leibniz has a facet that is difficult to be described as the maximum reality: unity of mutual expressions of substances. Certainly Leibniz's God chooses the best creation by calculation. In "On the Radical Origination of Things" (1697), Leibniz argued that there is a possible

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[53] Leibniz, *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe*, VI, iii, 116.

[54] A letter to Arnauld in 1687 (Leibniz, *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe* II, ii. 245).

[55] Leibniz, *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe*, VI, iv, 1359. My translation.

[56] According to Levey, a corporal substance in 1679–1690 has unity *per se* (Levey, "On Unity and Simple Substance in Leibniz", *The Leibniz Review* 17 (2007): 72–74). On the other hand, Arthur argues that an organic body does not have real unity although it contains unities (Arthur, "Presupposition, Aggregation, and Leibniz's Argument for a Plurality of Substances", *The Leibniz Review* 21 (2011): 101–103).

[57] Thomas Feeney, "Leibniz, Acosmism, and Incompossibility", in *Leibniz on Compossibility and Possible Worlds*, ed. G. Brown and Y. Chiek (Switzerland: Springer, 2016) 163–166.

[58] Feeney, "Leibniz, Acosmism, and Incompossibility",163. He mentioned Section 9 of *Discourse on Metaphysic*, a letter to De Volder (Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *The Leibniz- De Volder Correspondence: With Selections from the Correspondence between Leibniz and Johann Bernoulli*, trans. Paul Lodge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 266–267), and Sections 56–8 of *Monadology*.

series by which the maximum reality is provided with the minimum cost. [59] But, at the same time, the calculation is not strictly the same as the degree of reality. "On the Radical Origination of Things" continues that minimum cost means "time, place, or so to say receptivity or capacity of a world".[60] God desires to maximize the reality as far as it is expressed in *a* world.

4. 2. Conclusion: the Cosmological Interpretation with God's Wisdom

We can conclude that it is a sufficient response to Griffin's necessitarianism reading to adopt the cosmological interpretation by Messina and Rutherford in addition to Joráti's interpretation. Such an interpretation would be as follows. A set of all possible worlds has the maximum reality but is not the most harmonious because multiple worlds are disconnected and there is no united spatiotemporal system. According to Joráti, God's wisdom, that is knowledge of harmony, rules out what is unharmonious. Thus it rules out a set of all possible worlds and God would look for the most harmonious creation within a single world. Even if there is no function in Leibniz's philosophy to prevent all possible worlds from just being logically compossible, God does not have a decisive reason to realize all of them.[61]

In the process of creation, harmony is considered twice by different implications.[62] Firstly, as Joráti pointed out, absence of harmony is the reason why God did not create multiple worlds. In this meaning, harmony is "all-or-nothing" property [63] and every possible world has its own harmony, that is, a unified spatiotemporal system. Secondly, after ruling out multiple worlds as an option for creation, God chooses the most harmonious possible world as the best creation. In this meaning, harmony allows difference in degree. The best possible world should have the most beauty and the most goodness, when compared with other possible worlds.

The beginning of this paper proposed the question as to whether compossibility is strong enough as a concept, and why we can assert that God never creates multiple worlds. This paper responds to that question by saying that compossibility is strong enough when we interpret it as belonging to the same spatiotemporal system and take account of God's wisdom.

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[59] Leibniz, *Die Philosophischen Schriften von G.W. Leibniz*, VII, 303.
[60] Leibniz, *Die Philosophischen Schriften von G.W. Leibniz*, VII, 303. My translation.
[61] Deleuze simulated a case in which different possible worlds were incompossible but God created all of them, nevertheless. Gilles Deuleuze, *Le pli : Leibniz et le baroque* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1988), 84. Of course, such a God lacks wisdom and is not Leibniz's God anymore. This is where Deleuze left Leibniz and went to his own philosophy in *Le pli*.
[62] This distinction is based on Donald Rutherford, *Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 197–199.
[63] This expression is used in Joráti, "Divine Faculties and the Puzzle of Incompossibility", 193.

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Hegels Kunstbegriff in den Jenaer Jahren: Zur Differenzierung von Kunst und Religion

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***Abstrakt**: Der vorliegende Aufsatz befasst sich mit Hegels Begriff der Kunst in den Jenaer Jahren. Es wird dabei darauf abgezielt, die systematische Bedeutung der Kunst durch eine Differenzierung von Kunst und Religion zu erklären. Hierzu möchte ich betrachten, wie Hegel seine Kunstlehre und den Begriff der „Kunstreligion" in der Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807) entwickelt. Um das Konzept der (Religion der) Kunst zu erklären, rekonstruiere ich die Chronologie des hegelschen Denkens in seiner Jenaer Zeit. Auf der Ebene der Funktion unterscheiden sich die Bestimmungen der Kunst und der Religion voneinander in der Weise, wie sie als die ästhetische Anschauung des Absoluten konzipiert werden. Hegel definiert dabei auf der einen Seite die Kunst als „Kunst als Kunstwerk" und auf der anderen Seite Religion als „Kunst ohne Kunstwerk". Diese beiden Anschauungsweisen des Absoluten versteht Hegel wiederum als Formen der Kunst, die mit und zur Spekulation eine Polaritätsstruktur bilden. Zusammenfassend kann man sagen, dass die Kunst in Hegels späteren Jenaer Jahren nicht mehr die angemessene Form ist, um das Absolute in der modernen Gemeinschaft aufzufassen. Damit betont Hegel ihre Beschränkungen und den Vergangenheitscharakter der Kunst. Hingegen entwickelt Hegel den Begriff der Religion vor allem durch eine Auseinandersetzung mit Schleiermacher. Kunst und Religion werden also zwar jeweils in verschiedenen Schriften thematisiert, doch erst in der Phänomenologie des Geistes von Hegel in einen logischen und systematischen Zusammenhang gebracht.*

Entscheidend für den Übergang zur Religion ist, dass die Kunstreligion als Moment der Religion aufbewahrt wird. Hegel stellt dies durch den Begriff der „Erinnerung" heraus und erläutert den Übergang parallel anhand des tragischen Dramas. Diese Er-Innerung steht in einem Verhältnis zum Kunstwerk in der modernen Zeit. Obwohl Hegel Kunst von der Phänomenologie bis hin zur Enzyklopädie von 1817 als „Religion der Kunst" konzipiert, zeigt er doch auch die Möglichkeit auf, Kunst als solche nicht abhängig von der Religion zu thematisieren. Um seine Konzeptionen der „Kunst" und der „Religion" besser zu verstehen, ist es nötig, sie nicht nur aus Sicht des Systems zu betrachten, sondern zusätzlich auch durch weitere Perspektiven in seinen Darstellungen zu ergänzen.

Einleitung

„Kunst“ und „Religion“ — diese Begriffe werden im späteren hegelschen System der *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* (1827; 1830) dem absoluten Geist zugeordnet. Diese beiden Begriffe stehen in einem Zusammenhang und durchziehen Hegels Philosophie von seinen früheren Schriften bis zu den späten Vorlesungen. Bekanntlich konzipiert Hegel „Kunstreligion“ in der *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1807) als eine Stufe der Religion, auf der er die Welt der griechischen Kunst aus Sicht der Religion verortet. In der *Phänomenologie* ist Kunstreligion dann unmittelbar auf das klassische Griechenland bezogen. Auch in der *Enzyklopädie* von 1817 betrachtet Hegel Kunst noch als die „Religion der Kunst“.[1] Wir können jedoch diese starke Verbindung zwischen der Kunst und der Religion sicherlich nicht für einen speziellen, eigenen Gedanken Hegels halten. Eine Annäherung von Kunst und Religion findet sich Gunter Scholtz zufolge schon bei Herder.[2] Aus dieser Perspektive ist das späte 18. Jahrhundert das entscheidende Zeitalter, in dem Kunst aufhört, einfach *ars* (*techne*) zu sein.[3] Dabei beginnt die Grenze von Kunst und Religion zu verschwimmen. Hegels Diskussion, so scheint es zumindest, gehört ebenfalls diesem Zeitalter an. Dennoch sind in der Generation von Hegel nur „wenige auf den Gedanken gekommen, Kunst und Religion in einem Atemzug zu nennen“.[4]

Im Folgenden werde ich das Verhältnis zwischen „Kunst“ und „Religion“ im Hinblick auf seine Entwicklungsgeschichte in Hegels Jenaer Jahren (1801–1807) thematisieren. Mit dieser chronologischen Rekonstruktion beabsichtigt der Aufsatz, zu zeigen, in welchem Sinne Hegel Kunst und Religion miteinander *verbindet* und voneinander *unterscheidet*. Zuerst betrachte ich Hegels Analyse der Funktionen von Kunst und Religion in seiner früheren Jenaer Zeit. Beide Begriffe werden dort im

[1] GW:13, §§456–464.

[2] Herders Einstellung zur Kunst ist jedoch nicht eindeutig. „Herder führt zunächst eine strikte Trennung zwischen religiöser und poetischer Wahrheit durch: Das Christentum beruhe auf „factis“ — das Reich der Poesie aber sei das der „Fiktion“ (Scholtz 1990, 26). Andererseits bewertet Herder religiöse Kunstwerke positiv, solange sie etwa „Religionsgefühl“ ausdrücken (z. B. Kirchenlieder). In diesem Fall hebt sich die Trennung zwischen Kunst und Religion auf und gewisse Kunstwerke haben nicht nur einen schönen, sondern auch einen heiligen Charakter (ibid.).

[3] Ibid., 28.

[4] Jaeschke 2005, 97.

Zusammenhang mit dem „Absoluten“ behandelt. Daraus wird ersichtlich, dass Hegel die beiden Begriffe am Anfang noch nicht strikt *systematisch* behandelt (1). In den späteren Jenaer Jahren verändert sich vor allem die systematische Funktion der Kunst und aufgrund dieser Differenzierung lässt sich die „Kunst der Religion“ einer Stufe des Geistes zuordnen (2).

1. Grundriss der hegelschen Thematisierung von Kunst und Religion in den frühen Jenaer Jahren

1. 1 Kunst als „Kunstwerk“, Religion als „Kunst ohne Werk“

Hegel hat sich während seiner Frankfurter Jahre (1797–1800) nicht nur mit Religion, sondern auch allgemein mit Philosophie beschäftigt. Im November 1800 hat Hegel einen Brief an Schelling geschrieben, in dem er von der Ausarbeitung eines wissenschaftlichen Systems berichtet.[5] Zu dieser Zeit hat Hegel seinen Gedanken aber noch nicht die Form eines philosophischen Systems gegeben und der Schwerpunkt seines Denkens lag immer noch auf der Religion. Zugleich lässt sich fast keine kunsttheoretische Betrachtung als solche in Hegels Frankfurter Zeit finden. Das bedeutet jedoch nicht, dass Hegel damals kein Interesse an „Schönheit“ und „Kunst“ hatte. Ein Beleg dafür ist das sogenannte *Älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus* von 1797, das in Hegels Handschrift überliefert ist. Im *Systemprogramm* war Hegel mit Hölderlin und Schelling unter dem Einfluß des ästhetischen Platonismus gestanden.[6] Deswegen findet sich die ästhetische Idee im *Systemprogramm*, „daß *Wahrheit und Güte, nur in der Schönheit* verschwistert sind“ (GW2: 616). Dennoch nimmt der Begriff der Kunst in den frühen Schriften Hegels noch keine prominente Stellung ein.[7] Mit der Übersiedlung nach Jena ändert sich aber Hegels Beurteilung von Religion und Kunst. Und zwar ordnet Hegel die Religion der Philosophie nicht mehr über, und er schreibt der Kunst eine systematische Funktion zu.

In dem Aufsatz *Differenzschrift* (1801) vertritt Hegel in seiner Analyse die Ansicht, dass die Moderne durch die Bildung eine „Harmonie“ (GW4: 14) verloren hat. In vormoderner Zeit hatten Kunstwerke eine „Totalität in sich“ (GW4: 12). Hegel nennt diese Totalität Harmonie oder „Indifferenzpunkt der Schönheit“ (GW4: 60).

[5] Hegel 1969, 59.
[6] Vgl. Düsing 1981, 101–117.
[7] Vgl. Sans 2015, 277.

Hegel zufolge hatten die Kunst und „eine bestimmte Religion“ diese „höchste ästhetische Vollkommenheit“ (ibid.) besessen. Unter dem Begriff der „Schönheit“ versteht Hegel zunächst die Totalität, deren Entzweiung die Philosophie aufheben soll. In dem Bildungsprozess ist diese ästhetische Einheit verloren gegangen, und aus diesem modernen Zustand heraus entsteht laut Hegel das „Bedürfnis der Philosophie“ (GW4: 14). Daraus formuliert Hegel die Aufgabe der Philosophie, dass das Absolute für das Bewußtsein konstruiert werden soll.[8] In der *Differenzschrift* traut Hegel es der Religion nicht mehr zu, die notwendige Entzweiung der Kultur aufzuheben. Stattdessen versucht Hegel durch Philosophie die Gegensätze zu überwinden, die überall in den sozialen und politischen Verhältnissen herrschen.

Auch Schiller bezeichnet in seiner Schrift *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen* (1795) die Moderne als eine Zeit der Entzweiung, die er „Zeitcharakter“[9] nennt. Im Vergleich zu Hegel ist das Problem für Schiller kein philosophisches Problem, sondern eines der „Kunst“ und „Ästhetik“. Bei Schiller sind also Kunst und Ästhetik das Mittel der Überwindung der Entzweiung.[10] Hegel hat die Schrift von Schiller im April 1795 zwar hochgeschätzt[11] und im *Systemprogramm* finden sich Ähnlichkeiten zu Schillers Standpunkt. Aber die Überwindung der Entzweiung ist für Hegel die Aufgabe der Philosophie. Noch auffälliger ist es, dass Hegel im Zusammenhang mit dem Gedanken der Entzweiung Schleiermachers *Reden über die Religion* (1799)[12] affirmativ erwähnt. „Wenn Erscheinungen, wie die Reden über die Religion,— das spekulative Bedürfniß nicht unmittelbar angehen, so deuten sie und ihre Aufnahme, noch mehr aber die Würde, welche mit dunklerem oder bewußterem Gefühl, Poesie und Kunst überhaupt in ihrem wahren Umfange, zu erhalten anfängt, auf das Bedürfniß nach einer Philosophie hin“ (GW4: 8). Laut Dilthey müsse Hegel die *Reden über die Religion* spätestens in seiner späten Frankfurter Zeit gelesen haben, in der er begonnen hat, sich mit dem philosophischen System zu beschäftigen[13] (doch gibt es keinen schlüssigen Beweis für den Zeitpunkt).[14] Hegel stimmt Schleiermacher zu, dass das Ziel der Religion eigentlich die Überwindung der Entzweiung sein sollte. Hegel hat dennoch seine eigene philosophische Position im Hinblick auf Kunst und

[8] Vgl. GW4: 16.
[9] Schiller 1962, 321.
[10] Vgl. Beiser 1992, 245–263.
[11] Hegel 1969, 25.
[12] Auch Schleiermacher erwähnt in seiner Schrift *Reden über die Religion* die Entzweiung der Moderne. Vgl. KGA, I/2, 191.
[13] Vgl. Dilthey 1921, 148ff.
[14] Jaeschke 1988, 333f.

Religion. Wie denkt Hegel also über Kunst und Religion?

Hegel versteht das Absolute als das Ganze und insofern geht es ihm um das „System“.[15] Deswegen muss die Philosophie als die Darstellung des Absoluten für Hegel ein System sein. Aber die kurze Systemskizze der *Differenzschrift* unterscheidet sich von der späteren *Enzyklopädie*. Hegel stellt erst in der *Differenzschrift* die Kunst als Erscheinungsweise des Absoluten neben der Religion dar. In diesem Aufsatz gilt die Kunst als ein Gegenpol zur Spekulation, d. h. Kunst und Spekulation bilden gemeinsam eine Polaritätsstruktur.[16] Beide Begriffe bedeuten nach Hegel die Anschauung „des sich selbst gestaltenden, oder sich objektiv findenden Absoluten“ (GW4: 75). Hegel vergleicht die von Kunst und Spekulation komponierte Sphäre mit Religion oder einem religiösen Begriff: „Beides, Kunst und Spekulation sind in ihrem Wesen der Gottesdienst, ─ beides ein lebendiges Anschauen des absoluten Lebens und somit ein Einssein mit ihm“ (GW4: 76). Wie Hegel den absoluten Geist mit religiösen Vorstellungen in der *Enzyklopädie* in Verbindung bringt, bezeichnet Hegel auch hier die Sphäre der Kunst und der Spekulation als „Gottesdienst“.

Die hier im Vergleich mit Hegels späterem Systemaufbau sichtbar werdende Signifikanz der Seite der Kunst geht jedoch noch darüber hinaus: Innerhalb der Sphäre der Kunst treten noch die zwei Seiten der Anschauung des Absoluten ein, nämlich die objektive und die subjektive Seite. Auf der „objektiven Seite“ steht *Kunst* als „Kunstwerk“ und die „eigentlich sogenannte Kunst, als Werk“ (GW4: 75). „Kunst als Werk“ bedeutet für Hegel ein Produkt des genialischen Individuums, aber auch „der Menschheit angehörend“ (ibid.). Das heißt, das „Kunstwerk“ lässt Menschen in einer Gemeinschaft das Absolute zusammen repräsentieren. Dagegen ist die *Religion* die „subjektive Seite“ der Kunst, die der „Kunst als Werk“ gegenübersteht. Die Religion wird als „Produkt einer Menge“, als Produktion „einer allgemeinen Genialität, aber auch jedem einzelnen angehörend“ (ibid.) gedacht. Diese Einsicht in die Religion besteht darin, dass Anschauung des Absoluten dabei als bloß innere, subjektive Erfahrung jedes Individuums gilt. Kurz gesagt, unterscheidet Hegel innerhalb der

[15] „Ein System der Philosophie ist vielmehr so zu entwerfen, daß das Absolute als das in sich differenzierte »Ganze« oder der intern strukturierte Gesamtzusammenhang von Wirklichkeit im Denken erfaßt und nachkonstruiert wird. [...] es kann nur [...] als »System« konstruiert werden” (Jaeschke 2016, 103). Systematisch betrachtet ist aber das System der *Differenzschrift* noch nicht besonders klar. Der Plan eines zu konstruierenden Systems von Kunst, Religion und Philosophie (Wissenschaft) lässt sich jedoch schon finden.

[16] Hegel begreift „Polarität“ als die „Kategorie“ der „Bestimmung von einem Unterschiede, in welchem die Unterschiedenen untrennbar verbunden sind“ (GW21: 11).

Kunst im weiteren Sinne noch „Kunst als Werk“ (*Kunst* im engeren Sinne) und *Religion*. Auffallend ist jedoch, dass Hegel die Kunst hier nicht der Religion unterordnet, sondern vielmehr die Religion der Kunst. Aus dieser Perspektive konzipiert Hegel Kunst auch im weiteren Sinne. Es stellt sich dabei die Frage, wie *Kunst* (als Werk) und *Religion* innerhalb der Sphäre der „Kunst“ miteinander zusammenhängen oder wie die beiden Begriffe in der „Kunst“ vereinigt werden können. Das Verhältnis wird hier noch polar und nicht als systematische Hierarchie konzipiert. Die Einteilung des absoluten Geistes in Kunst, Religion und Wissenschaft vertritt Hegel zum ersten Mal in der Philosophie des Geistes des *Jenaer Systementwurfs* (1805/06).

Wichtig ist, dass die *Religion* dem Konzept der „Kunst ohne Werk“ (GW4: 386) entspricht[17], womit Hegel jedoch in seinem Aufsatz *Glauben und Wissen* (1802) Kritik an Schleiermacher zu üben versucht. Schleiermacher behandelt die Parallelisierung von Kunst und Religion bereits in seiner Schrift *Reden über die Religion*. Er vertritt die Auffassung, dass Kunst und Religion „beide Quelle der Anschauung des Unendlichen“ sind, aber beide trotzdem *nicht* synthetisiert werden können.[18] Hegel war früher stark von Schleiermacher beeinflusst und rezipierte dessen Ideen positiv.[19] Daher hatten Hegels und Schleiermachers allgemeine Definitionen von Religion ihre Bestimmung als subjektive oder innerliche Anschauung oder als Gefühl des Absoluten gemeinsam. In *Glauben und Wissen* dagegen tritt dieser affirmative Ton in den Hintergrund, stattdessen positioniert sich Hegel kritisch zum Begriff der Subjektivität in Schleiermachers Religionskonzept.[20] Diese Kritik ist ebenso als eine Selbstkorrektur Hegels bezüglich seiner eigenen Religionsbestimmung zu verstehen.[21] Schleiermachers *Reden über die Religion* sind für Hegel ein Initialpunkt der subjektiven Wende des Religionsbegriffs, an dem Hegel zufolge das Prinzip des Protestantismus, d. h. das der Subjektivität beginnt und nach dem die Subjektivität zum unverzichtbaren Moment wird. Der Protestantismus, „der im Diesseits Versöhnung sucht, hat sich auf das höchste getrieben, ohne aus seinem Charakter der Subjektivität herauszutreten“ (GW4: 391). Insofern verschwindet das Jenseits und das Individuum versöhnt sich mit dem Ewigen in der inneren, subjektiven

[17] Müller 2004, 178ff.
[18] „Religion und Kunst stehen nebeneinander wie zwei befreundete Seelen deren innere Verwandtschaft, ob sie sie gleich ahnden, ihnen doch noch unbekannt ist“ (KGA, I/2, 263).
[19] Vgl. Arndt 2002, 57f.
[20] Vgl. Arndt 2013, 215f.
[21] Vgl. Müller, op. cit., 186.

Gewissheit („das Sehnen“). [22] Hegel greift hier Schleiermachers Begriff der „Virtuosität“ oder des „religiösen Künstlers“ (GW4: 385) negativ auf. [23] Schleiermacher behauptet, dass „die Kunst ohne Werk perennieren“ soll. Aber „Kunst ohne Werk“ sei „ein schlechthin Inneres“ und habe also keine „wahrhafte Äußerung“ (GW4: 386). Hegel kritisiert an Schleiermacher, dass Religion, die Hegel eher im engeren Sinne darstellt, objektiv ausgedrückt werden soll. Hegels Darstellung des Religionsbegriffs konnotiert zwar etwas ästhetisches, aber in *Glauben und Wissen* geht es nicht hauptsächlich um Kunst oder eine ästhetische Theorie. Jedoch deutet Hegel in diesem Kontext interessanterweise an, dass die religiöse Gewissheit eine objektive Darstellung im Epos und der Tragödie habe. [24] Denn die ästhetische Darstellung muss für Hegel objektiv ausgedrückt werden und verbindet sich dabei mit dem sittlichen Leben. Das heißt, Hegel konzipiert ästhetische Darstellung im Verbund mit der Sittlichkeit. Diese „sittliche Schönheit“ (GW4: 382) ist im Kunstwerk, vor allem in der Tragödie zum Ausdruck gebracht. Aus diesem Grund betrachtet Hegel Kunst (tragische Kunstwerke) auch als Muster der Sittlichkeit. Er versteht also die Tragödie als das Modell sowohl der Kunst wie der schönen Sittlichkeit.

1. 2 Kunstlehre als Theorie der Sittlichkeit

Der *Naturrechtsaufsatz* (1802), der nur einige Monate nach *Glauben und Wissen* veröffentlicht wurde, enthält ebenso keine eigene ästhetische Theorie. Kunst und Religion scheinen hier aber zumindest keinen Gegenpol zur Spekulation (Philosophie) zu bilden, geht es Hegel doch nicht um Kunst als solche im *Naturrechtsaufsatz*. Aber in dem Aufsatz kommt auch Hegels Kunsttheorie zum Vorschein, nämlich seine Theorie des Dramas. Denn das Drama, d. h. Tragödie und Komödie, machen im Wesentlichen seine Kunstlehre aus. Diese Theorie des Dramas kann man als einen Prototyp der hegelschen „Kunstreligion“ ansehen, den er vollständig erst in der *Phänomenologie* entwickelt. Die schöne Kunst geht mit der griechischen Sittlichkeit einher und dies gilt Hegel bis zur *Enzyklopädie* von 1830. Deswegen müssen wir die

[22] Die Religion hat „als Empfindung, die ewig sehnsuchtsvolle Liebe ihre erhabene Seite darin, daß sie [sc. die Religion] [...] nach ewiger Schönheit und Seligkeit sich sehnt. Sie ist als Sehnen etwas Subjektives; aber was sie sucht und [was] ihr nicht im Schauen gegeben ist, ist das Absolute und Ewige; wenn aber das Sehnen seinen Gegenstand fände, so würde die zeitliche Schönheit eines Subjekts als eines Einzelnen seine Glückseligkeit“ (GW4: 317).
[23] Diese Kritik an Schleiermacher ist beeinflußt von Friedrich Schlegels *Athenäum*, in dem Schlegel Kritik an *Reden* als „unheilige Form von Virtuosität in der Religion“ übt. Vgl. Jamme 1990, 147.
[24] Vgl. GW4: 385f.

Darstellung im *Naturrechtsaufsatz* auch aus Sicht der Kunsttheorie betrachten, obwohl Hegels Argumentation im Aufsatz den Schwerpunkt auf Sittlichkeit und Gemeinschaft legt.

Hier beschäftigt Hegel sich eher mit der Sittlichkeits- und Gemeinschaftstheorie und stellt in diesem Zusammenhang seine Kunsttheorie der Kontext der griechischen Tragödie und der göttlichen Komödie dar. Es geht Hegel hier um Notwendigkeit und Schicksal und er legt die Tragödie als Modell der Sittlichkeit und der sittlichen Substanz aus. Deswegen möchte ich im Folgenden auf seine Theaterkunsttheorie eingehen. Für Hegel ist die sittliche Substanz ein Begriff dafür, dass die normativen Verhältnisse auf geteilten Werten beruhen und durch gemeinschaftliche Praktiken gestützt werden. Hegel zufolge kommt das „Schicksal" in der Sittlichkeit zur Erscheinung und er zeigt dies, indem er die griechische Tragödie der Gemeinschaftslehre zu Grunde legt. Hegel misst der griechischen Tragödie (z. B. *Antigone*) eine wichtige Rolle bei, weil hier ein Kampf um Superiorität zwischen der Familien- und der Polis-Sittlichkeit (Antigone und Kreon), der sich „als ein Schicksal von sich abtrennt und sich gegenüberstellt", jedoch „durch die Anerkennung desselben in dem Kampfe, mit dem göttlichen Wesen als der Einheit von beidem versöhnt ist", präsentiert wird (GW4: 459). Obwohl im *Naturrechtsaufsatz* die Polis-Sittlichkeit überwiegt, ist die Tragödie doch eine Darstellung des Schicksals. Im Gegensatz dazu ist die Komödie ein Drama ohne „Schicksal". Der Kernpunkt von Hegels Kritik an der Komödie besteht in dem Begriff des „Leichtsinns" (GW4: 460). „Die göttliche Komödie ist ohne Schicksal und ohne wahrhaften Kampf, [...] oder aber stelle sich der Gegensatz auch in einer selbstempfundenen und in sich bewußten Göttlichkeit dar, welche mit Bewußtsein sich Gegensätze und Spiele erzeugt, in denen sie mit absolutem Leichtsinn einzelne ihrer Glieder an das Erringen eines bestimmten Preises setzt und ihre mannigfaltigen Seiten und Momente sich zur vollkommenen Individualität ausgebären und zu eigenen Organisationen sich bilden läßt" (GW4: 459f.).[25] Die Komödie hat kein Schicksal als einen eigenen Gegensatz und Hegel hält sie für diejenige Kunstform, in der das Individuum gegenüber Schicksal und Notwendigkeit der Gemeinschaft als unabhängig auftritt und sich keine Versöhnung mit dem Schicksal einstellt. Trotz dieser Einschätzung spielt die Kunstform der Komödie aber im Übergang von der Kunst zur Religion in der *Phänomenologie* eine wichtige Rolle. An dem Übergang tritt der Geist aus der Form der Substanz in die des

[25] Hegel nimmt mit dem Begriff „göttliche Komödie" Bezug auf *La Divina Commedia* von Dante. Vgl. Jaeschke, op. cit., 137.

Subjekts über.[26]

2. Das Verhältnis der Kunst zur Religion in der *Phänomenologie des Geistes*

2. 1 Die Komödie als Kulminationspunkt der Kunstreligion

In der *Phänomenologie des Geistes* lässt sich das Verhältnis von Kunst und Religion nicht mehr parallelisieren, sondern muss vielmehr aus systematischer Sicht als eine geschichtliche Abfolge dargestellt werden. Folglich wird der systematische Stellenwert der Kunst herabgesetzt. Dies aber kommt deutlich erst in der Geistesphilosophie des dritten *Jenaer Systementwurfs* zum Ausdruck, die im letzten Abschnitt „Kunst, Religion und Wissenschaft" enthalten ist. Diese drei Teile werden nach den Formen des absoluten Geistes in „Anschauung", „Vorstellung" und „Begriff" gegliedert. [27] Der Unterschied zu den vorherigen Ausgaben des Systemabrisses ist auffällig, denn nun umfasst die Kunst nicht mehr die Religion, sondern die Religion ist umgekehrt der Kunst als höhere Stufe des Geistes übergeordnet. Aber die Ausführungen über die unterschiedlichen Formen der Kunst und ihr Verhältnis zur Religion werden hier nicht in einen internen geschichtlichen Zusammenhang gebracht.[28] Erst in der *Phänomenologie des Geistes* sind sie einander logisch und systematisch zugeordnet. *Kunst* ist entsprechend nicht mehr als „Kunst als Kunstwerk" bestimmt und *Religion* auch nicht als „Kunst ohne Kunstwerk".

Noch interessanter ist, dass die *Reden über die Religion* diejenige Schrift sind, in welcher zum ersten Mal der Begriff „Kunstreligion" auftaucht. [29] Für Schleiermacher bedeutet die Kunstreligion die Verbindung von Kunst und Religion, aber die „Kunstreligion [...] findet Schleiermacher nicht als gegeben, sondern er erhofft sie erst von der Zukunft".[30] Während Hegel die Religion Griechenlands bis 1803 als „Naturreligion" bezeichnet,[31] fasst er das klassische Griechenland in der *Phänomenologie*, anders als Schleiermacher, unter dem Begriff „Kunstreligion" und

[26] Bertram gibt der Tragödie zurecht einen großen Stellenwert, übersieht aber die systematische Rolle der Komödie in der *Phänomenologie*. Vgl. Bertram 2017, 272f.
[27] Vgl. GW8: 279ff.
[28] Jaeschke 1982, 169.
[29] Scholtz 2000, 515.
[30] Ibid., 522. Der Grund, warum Schleiermacher Kunstreligion fordert, lautet Scholtz zufolge so: „Die vollkommenste Form aber ergebe sich, wenn beide Richtungen verschmelzen, und dies zeichne die Kunst vor, die sinnliche Anschauung und inneres Gefühl auf vollkommene Weise verbinde. Kunst also wird gefordert, um die Religion zu vervollkommnen" (ibid.).
[31] Vgl. GW5: 461; Jaeschke 1986, 172.

„Religion der Kunst".

Im Religionskapitel der *Phänomenologie* wird beschrieben, wie der Geist zum „sich als Geist wissenden Geist" (GW9: 366) wird. Hegel bezeichnet Religion hier als „Selbstbewußtsein des Geistes" (GW9: 363), und der Geist findet sich reflexiv in der „sittlichen Substanz", in der die Individuen der Gemeinschaft einander Anerkennung zeigen. Durch diese gemeinschaftliche Reflexion können sogar Nichtphilosophen das Auffassen des Absoluten gemeinsam durchführen. [32] Anhand dieser Charakterisierung lässt sich verstehen, inwiefern Hegel die Religion in Verbindung mit der sittlichen Substanz bringt. Wenn die unterschiedlichen Formen der Religionen das Absolute auffassen, dann geht die Religion mit der Reflexion der sittlichen Substanz einher. In diesem Sinne ist die Kunstreligion für Hegel an die sittliche Substanz eines Volkes gebunden. Hegel parallelisiert deshalb die Darstellung der Kunstreligion mit der ersten Stufe des Geistkapitels, die die Welt der griechischen Sittlichkeit bis zum römischen Rechtszustand umfasst. Die Momente wiederholen und überschneiden sich. Hegel thematisiert die Kunst im Religionskapitel auf zwei Diskussionsebenen; zum einen als eine Geschichte, die sich von der ägyptischen bis hin zur griechischen Religion des Kunstwerks vollzieht. Die Kunstreligion hebt die Natürlichkeit oder Ummittelbarkeit der Naturreligion dadurch auf, dass Menschen von sich aus Kunstwerke gestalten und hervorbringen. Diese Formen der Werke unterscheiden sich voneinander je nachdem, ob sie abstrakt, lebendig oder geistig sind. Im Abschnitt „das geistige Kunstwerk" behandelt Hegel die sprachlichen Kunstformen der Poesie (Epos, Tragödie und Komödie). Zum anderen stellt die Entwicklung der Kunstreligion vom „geistigen Kunstwerk" zu der „offenbare[n] Religion" ebenso eine „Erfahrung des Bewußtseins" dar. Deshalb ist die Kunst als diejenige Gestalt des Geistes zu verstehen, die sich selbst zur Religion erhebt. Zudem ist für dieses Kapitel noch relevant, dass die Substanz ebenso als Subjekt zu begreifen ist.

In der Tragödie wird eine Interaktion zwischen Menschen in der Gemeinschaft beschrieben. Sie vertreten das Gesetz jeder eigenen Substanz als „Charakter" (GW9: 392), dem sie angehören. Indem Schauspieler (die Künstler) das Drama mit Masken spielen, stellt die Tragödie das Schicksal als Resultat der Handlungen und des daraus resultierenden Konflikts dar. Aber aus systematischer Sicht sei die Form des geistigen Kunstwerks unzureichend, weil „die Kunst das wahre eigentliche Selbst noch nicht in ihr enthält" (ibid.). Deswegen ist „die wahre [Vereinigung], die des Selbsts, des Schicksals und der Substanz noch nicht vorhanden" (GW9: 397).

[32] Vgl. Pinkard 1994, 219ff.; Sticker 2015, 101–122; Bertram, op. cit., 253ff.

> Diese Notwendigkeit hat gegen das Selbstbewußtsein die Bestimmung, die negative Macht aller auftretenden Gestalten zu sein, in ihr sich selbst nicht zu erkennen, sondern darin vielmehr unterzugehen. Das Selbst tritt nur den *Charakteren* zugeteilt auf, nicht als die Mitte der Bewegung. Aber das Selbstbewußtsein, die einfache *Gewißheit* seiner, ist in der Tat die negative Macht, die Einheit des Zeus, des *substantiellen* Wesens und der *abstrakten* Notwendigkeit [...]. (ibid.)

Im Gegensatz zur Tragödie treten die Künstler in der Komödie so auf, dass „das wirkliche Selbstbewußtsein sich als das Schicksal der Götter darstellt“ (ibid.). Indem das Selbstbewußtsein sich im Drama demaskiert und sich damit ebenso selbstbezüglich als ein Protagonist zeigt, bemächtigt es sich der göttlichen Notwendigkeit des Schicksals. In dieser Kunstform findet die Kunstreligion in ihrem Ausdruck eine neue Überordnung dafür, dass der Mensch sich mit dem Schicksal vereint. Umgekehrt sieht Hegel in der Komödie den positiven Aspekt eines entscheidenden Wendepunkts, an dem die göttliche Substanzialität sich zur Subjektivität entwickelt. Die vorher mit dem Schicksal unversöhnten Menschen gewinnen in der Komödie den „Leichtsinn“ (GW9: 377, 401), der „vollkommen seiner sicher zur schrankenlosen Freudigkeit und zum freisten Genüsse seiner selbst gelangt ist“ (GW9: 377). Das komische Bewußtsein erkennt kein fremdes Schicksal mehr an, sondern gewinnt die Gewissheit seiner selbst und des Selbst als absolute Macht. Die Kunstreligion kulminiert aus diesem Grund in dem Satz: „*das Selbst ist das absolute Wesen*“ (GW9: 400). Damit tritt der Geist aus der Form der Substanz in die des Subjekts. Hegel fasst die Komödie unter dem Begriff der „Subjektivität“, wie in seiner späteren Kunsttheorie in der *Vorlesung über die Philosophie der Kunst* von 1823.[33]

2. 2 *Er-Innerung* der Kunstwerke — Übergang von der Kunst zur Religion

Der Sieg des komödischen Bewußtsseins über die Tragödie ist aber, weil dieser nun zweiseitig ist, nur ein vorläufiger, und diese Doppeldeutigkeit des Bewusstseins macht den Grund für den Übergang zur Religion aus. Die komische Heiterkeit der sich

[33] Vgl. GW 28.1: 509ff.; Siehe auch Siep 2000, 234. Diese Diskussion von der Komödie als der höchsten Stufe der Kunstreligion vertritt nicht die These von der ästhetischen, kunsttheoretischen Überlegenheit der Komödie im allgemeinen Sinne.

erfüllenden Kunstreligion ist in ein Unglücklichsein umgeschlagen, und das Bewusstsein der Komödie wandelt sich zum unglücklichen Bewusstsein. Die Erfahrung des Bewusstseins kommt erst dadurch zum Zuge, dass es in Wahrheit das unglückliche Bewusstsein ist und dieses damit eine höhere Gestalt des Geistes darstellt. Diese zeigt ebenso den Übergang von der Kunst in die offenbare Religion. Dem komödischen Bewusstsein gilt einerseits die Macht der sittlichen Substanz nicht mehr als absolute, und es nimmt sie nunmehr ins Selbst zurück. Dieses Bewusstsein ist der „Leichtsinn", der „die gänzliche Befreiung der Zwecke der unmittelbaren Einzelheit von der allgemeinen Ordnung und der Spott jener über diese" (GW9: 398) ist. Dies bedeutet aber anderseits das Vergehen der Sittlichkeit,[34] denn nur das einzelnes Selbst ist absolut allgemeingültig. Dieser Untergang der Sittlichkeit ist bereits im Geist-Kapitel geschehen und deswegen nimmt Hegel dort Bezug auf den Übergang, den wir in der sittlichen Welt gesehen haben.

> Die Religion der Kunst gehört dem sittlichen Geiste an, den wir früher in dem *Rechtszustande* untergehen sahen, d. h. in dem Satze: *das Selbst als solches*, die *abstrakte Person ist absolutes Wesen*. [...] ihr Leichtsinn reinigt sie zur Person, zur abstrakten Allgemeinheit des Rechts. In dieser ist die *Realität* des sittlichen Geistes verloren, die inhaltsleeren Geister der Völkerindividuen sind in Ein Pantheon versammelt [...] in das Pantheon der abstrakten Allgemeinheit, des reinen Gedankens, der sie entleibt und dem geistlosen Selbst, der einzelnen Person, das An- und Fürsichsein erteilt. (GW9: 401)

Hegel erläutert im Zusammenhang mit dem „wirklichen Geist" die Kunstreligion. Dem Untergang der griechischen Sittlichkeit folgt der Rechtszustand, dessen Kernsatz ist: „*das Selbst als solches, die abstrakte Person ist absolutes Wesen*". Im Rechtszustand finden die Individuen zwar Anerkennung, das An- und Fürsichsein (GW9: 261, 401). Aber solche formale Anerkennung als Person ist nur rechtlich und diese Anerkennungsform ist an keine sittliche Substanz gebunden. Deshalb sagt Hegel, dass die Person ein geistloses und leeres Selbst ist. Der Zustand ist für Hegel nicht mehr schön und freudig wie das verlorene sittliche Leben. In diesem Leben verliert man „das Vertrauen" (GW9: 254, 402) in die eigene Substanz. Der römische Bund löst die Völkerindividuen auf und nur die atomischen Einzelpersonen anerkennen sich einander. Dieser Verlust aller Wesenheit ist ebenso „das tragische Schicksal" des komischen Bewusstseins, des Leichtsinns wie der sittlichen Welt. Er ist „das tragische

[34] Vgl. GW9: 377.

Schicksal der an und für sich sein sollenden *Gewißheit seiner selbst*. Das Schicksal ist das Bewußtsein des Verlustes aller *Wesenheit* in *dieser Gewißheit* seiner und des Verlustes eben dieses Wissens von sich－ der Substanz wie des Selbsts“ (GW9: 401).

Die Kunst repräsentiert nur ein Vergangenes in der Religion, jedoch wird sie hochgeschätzt. Welche Bedeutung hat das alte, schöne Kunstwerk noch in der nachgriechischen Welt? Für das unglückliche Bewusstsein der Religion, das das Reich der Kunstreligion schon verlässt, ist die schöne Wahrheit der Kunst ebenso verloren wie die ursprüngliche Einheit mit der sittlichen Substanz. Hegel behauptet, dass die Kunst als Religion in ihrer Funktion für die Moderne zu Ende geht. Dies ist kein zufälliges Geschehen, sondern hat eine historische Notwendigkeit. Diese innere Tendenz des Schicksals kennt das Bewusstsein nicht, die Kunstwerke sind nur „für uns“ (GW9: 402) bedeutsam, die wir die Entwicklung des Geistes sehen. Wenn wir den Rückblick auf das Kunstwerk aus der vergangenen Welt werfen und sie als „Erinnerung“ (ibid.) aufbewahren, dann gewinnen wir daraus unser eigenes Selbstverständnis. Hegel umschreibt dies durch seine Anspielung auf Schillers Dichtung *Das Mädchen aus der Fremde* (1797).[35]

> Aber wie das Mädchen, das die gepflückten Früchte darreicht, mehr ist, als die in ihre Bedingungen und Elemente, den Baum, Luft, Licht u.s.f. ausgebreitete Natur derselben, welche sie unmittelbar darbot, indem es auf eine höhere Weise diß alles in den Strahl des selbstbewußten Auges und der darreichenden Gebehrde zusammenfaßt, so ist der Geist des Schicksals, der uns jene Kunstwerke darbietet, mehr als das sittliche Leben und Wirklichkeit jenes Volkes, denn er ist die *Er-Innerung* des in ihnen noch *veräusserten* Geistes, － er ist der Geist des tragischen Schicksals, das alle jene individuelle Götter und Attribute der Substanz in das Eine Pantheon versammelt, in den seiner als Geist selbstbewußten Geist. (GW9: 402)

Wie das Mädchen die vom Baum gepflückten schönen Früchte darreicht, so erscheint, Hegel zufolge, der Geist des Schicksals, der jene Kunstwerke darbietet, nicht als ein fremdes, sondern eher als „ein freundliches Schicksal“ (ibid.). Aus dieser Rückschau erfasst und reflektiert der Geist sich selbst und dadurch kommt es zum Selbstbewusstsein des Geistes, d.h. der Geist *stellt* sich *vor*. Das Wesen der Offenbarungsreligion ist laut Hegel eine Selbstbezüglichkeit des Geistes. Hierbei wird die Religion der Kunst zur „offenbaren Religion“, in der das Absolute im Medium der

[35] Vgl. Schiller 1943, 275; Siehe auch Glockner 1968, 529.

Vorstellung aufzufassen ist. In der Religion sei „das göttliche Wesen *geoffenbart*“ (GW9: 405). Dieses bestimmt Hegel so: „Sein Offenbarsein besteht offenbar darin, daß gewußt wird, was es ist“ (GW9: 404).[36]

Die Kunst erreicht in der vormodernen Welt zwar ihren Scheitelpunkt. Hier jedoch versteht Hegel die Kunst ganz anders als er sie noch in der *Differenzschrift* aufgefasst hatte und sie ist deshalb nun nicht mehr „das *gottesdienstliche* [Tun], wodurch unserem Bewußtsein seine vollkommene, es ausfüllende Wahrheit würde, sondern es ist das äußerliche Tun“ (GW9: 402: Hervorhebung durch den Zitierenden). Zugleich stellt Hegel die Bedeutung der Kunst klar heraus, in der ebenso der Geist des Schicksals wie das Mädchen und seine Gebärde „mehr“ sind als das sittliche Leben jenes Volkes. Denn durch diese Erinnerung hat der Geist seine frühere Stufe (die Kunstreligion) in sich und schließt sich dadurch mit sich selbst zusammen. Dieses heißt also „*Er-Innerung*“ (Sich-innerlich-machen). Der geschichtliche Geist ist ebenso höhergradig als der noch an die unmittelbare Substanz gebundene, wie das Mädchen mehr ist als naturbelassene Früchte.

Was bedeutet aber die *Er-Innerung*? Wenn wir die alten Kunstwerke nicht mehr so genießen können, wie es dessen Zeitgenossen konnten, ist dann das Pantheon nun ein Überbleibsel der Vergangenheit? Hegel bestreitet gar nicht „das äußerliche Tun“, denn wir müssen uns *historisch* zu den alten Kunstwerken verhalten. Indem der Geist sich vielmehr „auf eine höhere Weise“ vorstellt, sieht er sich selbst im Kunstwerk dargestellt. Wir verhalten uns zum geschichtlichen Kunstwerk dabei nicht nur äußerlich, sondern auch innerlich. Wie Hans-Georg Gadamer in seinem Werk *Wahrheit und Methode* (1960) zurecht bemerkt, spricht Hegel „damit eine entschiedene Wahrheit aus, sofern das Wesen des geschichtlichen Geistes nicht in der Restitution des Vergangenen, sondern in der *denkenden Vermittlung mit dem gegenwärtigen Leben* besteht“[37]. Hegel selbst teilt der Offenbarungsreligion in der

[36] „Die Konflikte des Menschen mit den Göttern werden zurückgenommen in die Konfliktstruktur des Selbstbewußtseins selbst. In der kunstphilosophieschen Betrachtung werden die Götter zu Idealen, heute zu Bildungsidealen: Die ästhetische Betrachtungsweise erkennt, wie die Götter in das Pantheon unseres Selbstbewußtseins gehören, nämlich als eine Vorstellungsweise der Mächte, die in der Tat unser Leben beherrscht“ (Jamme, op. cit., 156.).

[37] Gadamer 1990, 174. Gadamer behandelt den Unterschied zwischen der Kunsttheorien Schleiermachers und Hegels in *Wahrheit und Methode* aus der Sicht seiner Hermeneutik. Gadamer bezeichnet die beiden Theorien mit den Begriffen der *Rekonstruktion* (Schleiermacher) und der *Integration* (Hegel, die Integration bedeutet *Er-Innerung*). Schleiermacher ist darauf gerichtet, „die ursprüngliche Bestimmung eines Werkes im Verständnis wiederherzustellen. Denn Kunst und Literatur, die uns aus der Vergangenheit überliefert sind, sind ihrer ursprünglichen Welt entrissen“ (ibid., 171). Für Schleiermacher

Phänomenologie die Aufgabe der Selbsterkenntnis des Geistes zu. Deshalb scheint es, als würde Kunstreligion nur als eine vergangene, abgelegte Geistesstufe thematisiert werden. Wir können uns zu der griechischen Kunst heute nicht mehr gottesdienstlich verhalten. Doch lässt sich die Bedeutung der Kunst erkennen, wenn wir uns durch *Er-Innerung* mit den Kunstwerken vermitteln. Wichtig ist dabei, so hebt Hegel hervor, dass die Reflexionsstufe der Moderne *höher* als die der Antike ist. In diesem Sinne wird hier der Weg zu einem besseren Verständnis antiker Kunstwerke erkennbar. Das Kunstwerk macht uns eine Idee nicht sinnlich und unmittelbar einsichtig. Stattdessen müssen wir das Werk begrifflich durch Reflexion auffassen. Laut dem Jenaer Hegel ist dies ein Angelpunkt der modernen Kunst.

In der *Phänomenologie* führt Hegel die Kunst zwar noch nicht als eigenständige Gestalt auf. Kunst ist „Religion der Kunst" und differenziert sich noch nicht von Religion an sich. Nachdem Hegel drei *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Kunst* (1820/21; 1823; 1826) gehalten hat, nimmt er dann Kunst eindeutig als selbstständige Stufe seines Systems auf. Es ist jedoch hervorzuheben, dass Hegel Kunst später nicht plötzlich als selbstständigen Teil konzipiert. Vielmehr wird Kunst in den Jenaer Jahren in einem religiösen Kontext thematisiert und ihre eigentümliche Bestimmung geht aus der Entwicklung im religiösen Kontext hervor.

Schluss

Auf der Ebene der Funktion unterscheiden sich die Bestimmungen der Kunst und der Religion voneinander in der Weise, wie sie als die ästhetische Anschauung des Absoluten konzipiert werden. Hegel bestimmt dabei *Kunst* als „Kunst als Kunstwerk", *Religion* hingegen als „Kunst ohne Kunstwerk". Diese beiden Anschauungsweisen des Absoluten stellen für Hegel wiederum Formen der Kunst dar, die zusammen mit der Spekulation eine Polaritätsstruktur bilden. Zusammenfassend lässt sich jedoch sagen, dass die Kunst in Hegels späteren Jenaer Jahren nicht mehr die angemessene Form ist, um das Absolute in der modernen Gemeinschaft aufzufassen. Damit betont Hegel ihre Beschränkungen und ihren Vergangenheitscharakter. Hingegen entwickelt Hegel den Begriff der Religion vor allem durch eine Auseinandersetzung mit

muss also das Kunstwerk in seinem eigenen Kontext interpretiert werden. Demgegenüber ist für Gadamer fragwürdig, ob solche Wiederherstellung des eigentlichen Zusammenhangs überhaupt möglich ist. Und wenn es möglich wäre, bleibt doch die schleiermachersche Rekonstruktion nur das äußerliche Tun (ibid., 173).

Schleiermacher und versteht den Wesenskern der Religion nicht als bloße innere Anschauung und Gefühl. Kunst und Religion werden zwar in jeweils verschiedenen Schriften thematisiert, doch erst in der *Phänomenologie des Geistes* bringt Hegel sie in einen logischen und systematischen Zusammenhang. Um seine Konzeptionen von „Kunst" und „Religion" besser zu verstehen, muss man sie nicht nur aus der Sicht des Systems, sondern auch durch weitere Perspektiven (aus der Sicht der Entwicklungsgeschichte der Jenaer Zeit) in seinen Darstellungen ergänzen.

In der *Phänomenologie des Geistes* folgt die Komödie aus der Tragödie, weil sie das Selbstbewusstsein mit dem Schicksal vereinigt. Damit übernimmt sie die Funktion, durch die die Substanz in die Form des Subjekts übertritt. Entscheidend für den Übergang der Kunst zur Religion ist, dass die Kunstreligion als Moment der offenbaren Religion aufbewahrt wird. Hegel bringt dies durch den Begriff der „Erinnerung" zum Ausdruck und erläutert den Übergang parallel anhand des tragischen Dramas. Diese *Er-Innerung* verweist auf die Möglichkeit eines spezifischen modernen Verhältnisses zum Kunstwerk. Obwohl Hegel von der *Phänomenologie* bis hin zur *Enzyklopädie* von 1817 Kunst als „Religion der Kunst" konzipiert, zeigt er damit doch die Möglichkeit auf, Kunst als solche unabhängig von der Religion zu thematisieren.

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The Distribution Problem in Kant's Doctrine of the Highest Good

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***Abstract**: A number of studies have been conducted on the distribution problem about the highest good in Kant's ethics. Kant defines the highest good as the perfect unity of morality and happiness and takes its attainment as a moral obligation, but in this context, Kant only shows the path to the perfection of morality. He does not provide any information about what man can do about the perfection of happiness. Instead he seems to bring up God as a convenient solution, that is, as a distributor of happiness in proportion to one's morality. Since such an eschatological idea of God has hardly been accepted, researchers seek another interpretation in which the distribution problem can be avoided. Some of them have tried to solve the problem without assuming the idea of God. Hence, firstly I shall examine this suggested solution and point out its reach and deficiencies (section 2). Against that, secondly, I shall examine the requisite for achieving the highest good and show that it is a necessary connection between morality and proportionate happiness (section 3). In section 4 and 5, I examine the possibility of the necessary connection, along the key words of cognitive faculty, hypothesis and Belief. Throughout this paper, I shall conclude that God as an arbitrarily assumed solution for distribution is not necessary. Rather a rationally justified Belief in God, in some sense, is necessary for human reason in order to hold the highest good attainable.*

1. What Is the Distribution Problem?

There is a common understanding that Kant's concept of the highest good consists of two elements, morality and happiness, and that the two elements are in a proportionate relationship, i.e. happiness proportionate to a virtuous state that deserves happiness.[1]

[1] Cf. CPrR 5:110. With the exception of *the Critique of Pure Reason,* I have followed the convention for quotations from Kant's texts: the abbreviations, the volume and page numbers of the academy edition i.e. *Immanuel Kant's gesammelte Schriften*. Hg. von der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften [und ihren Nachfolgern]. Berlin 1900–. With regard to the *Critique of Pure Reason,* I have also followed the convention and indicated the page of A and B; "A" stands for the first edition and "B" for the second edition.
A/B: *Critique of Pure Reason*.

From this a sort of dualism seems to follow: morality[2] and happiness appear to be entirely different and opposing goods. This allows the idea that Kant's practical philosophy is a narrow deontology focused solely on morality. Moreover, this apparent dualism leads to a problem about the proportionate relationship of the both elements. I call this the "distribution problem"[3]: since morality by itself does not result in proportionate happiness, a third element, e.g. God,[4] is theoretically required in order to distribute happiness in proportion to one's morality. This looks as if Kant left the fate of humans to a God whose existence is just an arbitrary imagination. Obviously, such an eschatological idea of God has hardly been accepted in contemporary Kant scholarship. Commentators are inclined to think that it is just *deus ex machina*, or at least involves some theoretical leap.

Some interpretation, however, arises, which says that one can hope for the attainment of the highest good without requiring the idea of God. This interpretation can be traced back to John Silber's distinction between the immanent and transcendent conceptions of the highest good in 1959. According to him, whereas the transcendent conception implies the regulative idea of achieving the highest good, the immanent conception boils down to the obligation that human beings can actually engage in within the world to promote the highest good.[5] Although Silber believed that the concept of the highest good had both conceptions, in 1988 Andrews Reath argued that since the transcendent conception involves an unsolvable problem of distribution, only the immanent conception, i.e. the highest good that can be hoped to get realized within this world, should be interpreted as Kant's highest good.[6] Even though this interpretation hardly seems to be a comprehensive understanding of Kant's moral system, such a tendency has become one of the current mainstream interpretations.[7]

G: *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*.
CPrR: *Critique of Practical Reason*.

[2] Kant counts into the good will not only virtue i.e. the state that one obtains through the proper control of one's inclinations, but also holiness i.e. a perfect state of being completely unaffected by sensible inclination. (CPrR 5:32) I would like to discuss the issue in the future.

[3] Generally, the key issue under consideration has been called "distribution", e.g. by Reath 1988, 602 and Engstrom 2016, 90.

[4] CPrR 5:125.

[5] Silber 1959, 492.

[6] Reath 1988, 594. Reath divides the concept of the highest good into theological and secular conceptions, but the implications of this classification can be considered almost synonymous with Silber's.

[7] Ertl points out that Reath's interpretation remains only an attractive reconstruction: "Reath's aim is therefore mainly a highly attractive reconstruction of Kant from a secular perspective, and not an interpretation of Kant's original intentions, as he nonetheless has

Recently, a number of commentators, e.g. Stephen Engstrom and Pauline Kleingeld, propose a solution for the distribution problem within the immanent conception. Although sustaining Kant's idea of the highest good without theological notions seems a distinct advantage for the contemporary audience, is it really possible in Kant's approach to hope for achieving the highest good, or even promoting it, without any aid of the idea of God? I would like to argue that it is not possible by virtue of the requirement of a necessary connection between morality and proportionate happiness. In the next section, I shall expand on the non-theological solution for the distribution problem and point out the reach and the limitations of it. After that, I shall reconsider the requisites for achieving the highest good.[8]

2. The Highest Good without the Idea of God

As mentioned above, some commentators think that one can attain the highest good without divine aid. In order to understand their solution, let us begin with what Kant explains about the highest good.

> So fern nun Tugend und Glückseligkeit zusammen den Besitz des höchsten Guts in einer Person, hiebei aber auch Glückseligkeit, ganz genau in Proportion der Sittlichkeit (als Wert der Person und deren Würdigkeit, glücklich zu sein) ausgeteilt, das höchste Gut einer möglichen Welt ausmachen: so bedeutet dieses das Ganze, das vollendete Gute . . . .

sometimes been understood to posit. Reath also tries to show that the numerous justified objections raised against Kant refer to the theological conception of the highest good. According to Reath, the secular conception not only fits better with Kant's overall position in moral philosophy, but is preferable on theoretical grounds because it omits the problematic principle of a proportional distribution of virtue and happiness. This principle, in his opinion, cannot be accounted for within Kant's own moral system" (Ertl 2021, section 2). Moreover, it has already been pointed out that even in order to realize the immanent conception, one must assume the transcendent conception. (Mariña 2000, 331)

[8] Although I shall consider mainly the Belief in God in this paper (in section 5), it should be noted that this element is only one of the necessary conditions for the realization of the highest good. In addition to this consideration, a discussion of the immortality of the soul is also necessary, but I cannot deal with it in this paper due to space limitations. I shall make it a subject of future study. Furthermore, it is necessary to consider *grace* and the *ethical commonwealth* as essential elements of achieving the highest good, which is shown in detail by Nakano 2019a; Nakano 2019b. In the latter, the relationship between the ethical commonwealth and the highest good is discussed in detail.

> Now, inasmuch as virtue and happiness together constitute possession of the highest good in a person, and happiness distributed in exact proportion to morality (as the worth of a person and his worthiness to be happy) constitutes the highest good of a possible world, the latter means the whole, the complete good. . . .[9]

Virtue consists of one's moral actions, hence one's morality, and therefore, the state of the highest good can be described as follows.

> **The Highest Good (HG)**: a person x acts morally, and this involves that x gets happiness in proportion to x's morality.

In contrast, the state of this everyday world can be described as follows.

> **Present State**: a person x acts morally, and x *does not*, at least not necessarily, get happiness in proportion to x's morality.[10]

From this Present State to the state of HG, one must strive to make progress. For the sake of it, Kant requires the postulates of the idea of immortality and God; the former is for endless moral striving, whereas the latter seems to be for the distribution of happiness to each virtuous person.

The interpreters who think that there is a possibility to attain the highest good without divine aid, however, suggest that the duty of benevolence allows one to attain HG without divine arrangement. That is, HG cannot be attained by anyone acting on one's own, but through *collective* cooperation there is a possibility for all to attain it.[11]

Before looking at their solution, we shall try to grasp what the duty of benevolence is. Let us see the context of the *Groundwork*. Kant divides all duties into four types, according to two criteria: the criterion of whether the duty is to others or to oneself, and the criterion of perfect duty, in which it is never permissible to give priority to inclination instead of a duty, and imperfect duty, with regard to which this

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[9] CPrR 5:110. Translated by Gregor.

[10] Indeed, there is another possibility:

Present state*: x does not act morally, and x gets happiness.

Although this version also raises important issues regarding justice, I omit this case in this paper for lack of space.

[11] See Reath 1988, Engstrom 2016 etc.

can be the case in exceptional circumstances. The duty of benevolence belongs to the imperfect duty to others. Suppose that I live my life without problems and I find out about others' suffering and consider whether or not to help them. Although the maxim of not helping them is certainly not morally problematic on the grounds that there are no contradictions within it, I still *cannot will* that maxim as a universal law and therefore it is duty to help others.[12] Thus, it is the happiness of others in general that is subject to this duty.

Now Engstrom tries to resolve the distribution problem in the following way.[13] That is, if I act in such a way that I set the happiness of others in general as my end, and promote the happiness of others as morally good acts, and if every other person acts in the same way as I do, considering the happiness of others as their ends, then in the ideal case every human being's happiness will be realized as the end of all the human acts involving this duty.[14] In other words, virtue and happiness would be proportionate in the way that the happiness of all agents is attributed to the result of morally good acts performed by all. According to this understanding, there would be no need for a divine aid of distributing happiness in proportion to morality.

Kleingeld holds the same position and summarizes her account as follows.

> If it is *a moral duty to promote the happiness of others*, then *the highest good,* conceived as an ideal moral world populated by virtuous agents, *does include the happiness of all*. In a moral world, I promote the happiness of others, and others promote mine. . . . . This means that *the virtuous agents in this world collectively aim at the happiness of all*. . . .
> In sum, the highest good, when conceived as a moral world, is the world that moral agents would bring into existence. . . *if all moral agents were fully virtuous and their actions would achieve their moral ends*. The highest good includes happiness because morality demands that we make the happiness of

[12] Cf. G 4:421–23.

[13] There will be disagreement as to whether Engstrom's account belongs to the interpretation of *Kant's ethics,* i.e. textual studies, or *Kantian ethics*. (About this distinction, see Wood 2008, 1.) Indeed, he appears to be engaged in Kantian ethics in that he attempts to understand practical philosophy by setting aside the idea of God for the moment which Kant himself is explicitly drawing on. However, Engstrom's analysis is an interpretation close to Kant's text, and thus it can be said that Engstrom is carrying out a study of Kant's ethics, even though Engstrom tries to "repair" or improve Kant's position by using other elements of Kant's system. In this paper, I will therefore consider his analysis as belonging to Kant's ethics.

[14] Engstrom 2016, 105f.

> others our end, while making it a duty on the part of others to promote ours (as part of their duty to promote the happiness of others).[15]

In this vein, their explanation can be formulated in two propositions. The first is the case of one who acts morally on their own, and his or her distribution cannot be done. The second is the collective case in which every distribution can be done.

> **HG by Oneself**: *for some x*, x acts morally, and this *does not* involve that x obtains happiness in proportion to x's morality.
> **HG in Collective Cooperation**: *for all x*, x acts morally, and this involves that *it is possible* that *for all x*, x obtains happiness in proportion to x's morality.

Through this solution even though the proportion between morality and happiness of each individual does not occur, viewed as a whole, it occurs. For each individual, still, the proportion remains contingent; the HG in collective cooperation does not guarantee the HG for each person.

3. Necessary Connection between Morality and Happiness

There is a further point which needs to be clarified. That is, it is quite possible that even though there is collective cooperation for the HG, the actions will *fail*; because there is no guarantee for success. Commentators who regard the transcendent conception of the highest good as theoretically indispensable are prone to focus on the possibility of this failure. For instance, Ertl states as follows.

> This point is complementary to the one Kant is making in a famous passage in the GMM in which he speaks of a possible "step-motherly nature" (GMM 4, 394) flouting the efforts of a good will. In this passage, he emphasizes that a will can be good *although* the consequences of its actions fail to emerge; plainly, such a scenario won't do for a self-rewarding morality. Free action needs to be successful at least with regard to the reward in terms of happiness to materialize.[16]

[15] Kleingeld 2016, 40–41, italicized by AN.
[16] Ertl 2021, section 2, italicized by the author. GMM in this quotation means *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*.

Engstrom acknowledges the possibility of failure, but he has just claimed that the cause of the failure cannot be sought in the will, but in *bad luck*. That is, he states that the good will cannot be responsible for the failure.[17] What matters, however, is not the possibility of imputation of each action, but the possibility of failure of all the actions. The problem is more radical than Engstrom admits; the failure here does not mean a failure of some of the actions, but of all the actions. In other words, central to this issue is the possibility that the world or nature does not harmonize with all the good actions.[18]

Kant clearly refers to this issue in the section of the existence of God as a postulate of pure practical reason.

> Also ist in dem moralischen Gesetze nicht der mindeste Grund zu einem notwendigen Zusammenhang zwischen Sittlichkeit und der ihr proportionierten Glückseligkeit eines zur Welt als Teil gehörigen, und daher von ihr abhängigen, Wesens, welches eben darum durch seinen Willen nicht Ursache dieser Natur sein, und sie, was seine Glückseligkeit betrifft, mit seinen praktischen Grundsätzen aus eigenen Kräften nicht durchgängig einstimmig machen kann. Gleichwohl wird in der praktischen Aufgabe der reinen Vernunft, d. i. der notwendigen Bearbeitung zum höchsten Gute, ein solcher Zusammenhang als notwendig postuliert: wir sollen das höchste Gut (welches also doch möglich sein muß) zu befördern suchen.

[17] Engstrom 2016, 96.

[18] A. W. Moore's approach is also helpful to understand this point. He calls Kant's conception of freedom the Basic Idea and describes it this way: "there is a nisus in all of us, more fundamental than any other, towards rationality" (Moore 2003, 128). To rephrase, this states that the categorical imperative has priority when we act according to the law of freedom, that is, the moral law. He points out that in exercising the Basic Idea, the world must have such a stability that it accepts the Basic Idea regularly, and the agent needs to believe in that stability. Furthermore, the agent not only needs to believe in stability, but the agent needs to hope that moral actions will be reflected in the world in the most vital way. This hope is neither groundless nor random, but derives from the ought that the highest good should be realized. It can be said: in order for the failure of a moral act to be considered as exceptional, I need to believe in advance that the world would ordinarily accept moral actions. According to Moore's approach, in order to regard the possibility of failure of actions as really exceptional, one must first acknowledge the presence of a good will and, in addition, one needs to have a hope; when one does a good action, one must simultaneously believe or hope that the realization of that action will have stability.

> Consequently, there is not the least ground in the moral law for a necessary connection between the morality and the proportionate happiness of a being belonging to the world as part of it and hence dependent upon it, who for that reason cannot by his will be a cause of this nature and, as far as his happiness is concerned, cannot by his own powers make it harmonize thoroughly with his practical principles. Nevertheless, in the practical task of pure reason, that is, in the necessary pursuit of the highest good, such a connection is postulated as necessary: we ought to strive to promote the highest good (which must therefore be possible).[19]

The long first sentence shows that there is no ground for a necessary connection between morality and proportionate happiness within the moral law. Nevertheless, the second sentence indicates that this connection is indispensable for attaining the highest good.

Then, the requisite Kant shows here can be described as follows.

> **Necessary Connection (NC)**: morality *necessarily connects* with proportionate happiness.

We can add this condition to HG.

> **HG with NC**: x acts morally, and this involves that *it necessarily connects* to x obtaining happiness in proportion to x's morality.

This clearly differs from the goal of the secular interpretation i.e. HG in collective cooperation, which supports only: *for all x*, x acts morally, and this involves that *it is possible* that *for all x*, x obtains happiness in proportion to x's morality. That is, a possibility of the connection between the morality and the proportionate happiness is not enough, rather a necessary connection is required.[20]

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[19] CPrR 5:124f. Translated by Gregor.

[20] Engstrom himself, in 1996, believed that there is no guarantee that morality and happiness will be in proportion when an individual does a good action, but that on a global scale, social and natural external conditions provide some assurance. Social conditions are those in which the realization of the good is aimed at on a communal scale. The natural conditions are that "nature is congenial to this ultimate end" (Engstrom 1996, 130). From this, Engstrom himself seems to believe that the highest good is only possible if nature allows the realization of the good will. However, there is not much intention to extend this point until 2016. The fact that

Why is such a strong condition required? The reason has already been shown in the above quotation. That is, human's "reason cannot by his will be a cause of this nature and, as far as his happiness is concerned, cannot by his own powers make it harmonize thoroughly with his practical principles". In other words, in order to certainly realize one's moral actions in this world, one must be a cause of nature or control the law of nature to be in harmony with the moral law; but one has no such a power i.e. human beings have no power to make the NC.

So far I have shown three points. First, for the sake of attaining the highest good the solution of secular interpretation came up short in virtue of the possibility of failure of all the actions. Second, according to Kant's text, it was necessary to insert NC into the formula of HG. This meant that a necessary connection between the morality and the proportionate happiness was needed rather than a possible connection of them. Finally, we human beings have not been able to provide such a strong connection. Then again, is it still an unwarranted move to resort to God as a distributor, as an additional aid to the highest good theory?

4. The Possibility of Necessary Connection

Perhaps there are other options. Let us consider how we might understand the possibility of NC.

First, let us briefly review the scope of our cognitive faculty. It can be considered from both speculative and practical standpoints. The former is discussed in the first *Critique,* which is concerned with spatial-temporal objects; intuition captures appearances in space and time, and understanding raises it to a concept through its categories; the use of categories that do not relate in any way to spatial-temporal objects is transcendent and does not generate knowledge.[21] Since NC—the thesis that morality necessarily connects with proportionate happiness—cannot be observed within space and time, nor does it relate to spatial-temporal objects, it can be concluded that in speculative cognition, there are no possible clues for humans to recognize the existence of NC or its possibility.

he resolved the distribution problem by the duty of benevolence in 2016 makes it clear that he does not regard the issue of natural conditions as significant.

[21] About the word 'transcendent,' see: A327/B383.

The other cognitive faculty is practical. Although rarely mentioned in comparison to speculative cognition, Kant explains this in the second *Critique* as follows.

> In der praktischen Erkenntnis, d. i. derjenigen, welche es bloß mit Bestimmungsgründen des Willens zu tun hat. . . [d]ie praktische Regel ist jederzeit ein Produkt der Vernunft, weil sie Handlung, als Mittel zur Wirkung, als Absicht vorschreibt. Diese Regel ist aber für ein Wesen, bei dem Vernunft nicht ganz allein Bestimmungsgrund des Willens ist, ein Imperativ. . . .
>
> In practical cognition—that is, cognition having to do only with determining grounds of the will. . . [a] practical rule is always a product of reason because it prescribes action as a means to an effect, which is its purpose. But for a being in whom reason quite alone is not the determining ground of the will, this rule is an imperative. . . .[22]

According to this quotation, our practical cognitive faculty concerns the determining grounds of the will; that is, it concerns a rule which prescribes action as a means to an effect, and for human beings as rational-sensitive beings it appears as an imperative. Although imperatives are either hypothetical or categorical, in this context, central to this issue is the latter. According to Wood's widely known reformulation of categorical imperatives, there are three formulas.

First formula

FUL *Formula of Universal Law*: "Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you at the same time can will that it become a universal law" (G 4:421),
with its more intuitive variant,
FLN *Formula of the Law of Nature*: "So act, as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature" (G 4:421).

Second formula

FH *Formula of Humanity as End in Itself*: "So act that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means" (G 4:429).

[22] CPrR 5:20. Translated by Gregor.

Third formula

FA *Formula of Autonomy*: "the idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law" (G 4:431; cf. 4:432), or "Not to choose otherwise than so that the maxims of one's choice are at the same time comprehended with it in the same volition as universal law" (G 4:440; cf. 4:432, 434, 438),

with its more intuitive variant,

FRE *Formula of the Realm of Ends*: "Act in accordance with maxims of a universally legislative member for a merely possible realm of ends" (G 4:439; cf. 4:433, 437–439).[23]

From the fact that there is no mention of NC in all the formulas of categorical imperatives, it can be concluded that even in practical cognition, at least in this narrow sense of establishing the basic normative principles, there are no possible clues for humans to recognize the existence of NC nor its possibility.

Thus, there is nothing I cognize, speculatively nor practically, that indicates that NC can exist. But still, there is also nothing I cognize that can refute the existence of NC or its possibility. It is, therefore, always possible to assume NC as a *hypothesis*. Then, I can assume a hypothesis of NC from neutral standpoint; there is not any basis for recommending or refuting this hypothesis.

5. Hypothesis and Belief

Now, let us return to the reason I came to assume the possibility of NC as a hypothesis. It was because I have a duty to achieve the highest good.[24] From this the following

[23] Wood 2017, 6.

[24] Engstrom argues how pure practical reason aims at the highest good as the final end, through his 'hylomorphic analysis' in Engstrom 2016. Since a discussion of this analysis as a whole is beyond the scope of a brief paper, I show only a rough outline of its direction below. To summarize Engstrom's "hylomorphic analysis", a good will uses the gifts— the gift of nature, to which belong the "talents of mind", such as cleverness and the goodness of temperament, namely courage and perseverance; the other is the gift of fortune, such as power, riches, honor, health, and satisfaction about the present condition (see. G 4:393) —based on practical knowledge that has the efficacy of actualizing the object itself. Only in that way is a good action possible. Through it, Engstrom understands the relationship between virtue and

points result. First, this hypothesis is not groundless, but is something that any rational being obliged to achieve the highest good would need to inevitably assume.[25] In this sense it is connected to an actually given duty. For Kant, if one thinks of a possibility of an object which is not yet given, its hypothesis must have such a feature.

> Wo nicht etwa Einbildungskraft schwärmen, sondern, unter der strengen Aufsicht der Vernunft, dichten soll, so muß immer vorher etwas völlig gewiß und nicht erdichtet, oder bloße Meinung sein, und das ist die Möglichkeit des Gegenstandes selbst. Alsdenn ist es wohl erlaubt, wegen der Wirklichkeit desselben, zur Meinung seine Zuflucht zu nehmen, *die aber, um nicht grundlos zu sein, mit dem, was wirklich gegeben und folglich gewiß ist, als Erklärungsgrund in Verknüpfung gebracht werden muß, und alsdenn Hypothese heißt.*
>
> If the imagination is not simply to enthuse but is, under the strict oversight of reason, to invent, something must always first be fully certain and not invented, or a mere opinion, and that is the possibility of the object itself. In that case it is permissible to take refuge in opinion concerning the actuality of the object, *which opinion, however, in order not to be groundless, must be connected as a ground of explanation with that which is actually given and consequently it is then called an hypothesis.*[26]

The hypothesis of NC is connected to the actually given duty of the highest good. Hence, it is bound up with pure practical reason.

For Kant, a matter that pure practical reason asserts is necessary.

> Was reine Vernunft assertorisch urteilt, muß (wie alles, was Vernunft erkennt,) notwendig sein, oder es ist gar nichts. Demnach enthält sie in der Tat gar keine Meinungen. Die gedachten Hypothesen aber sind nur problematische Urteile, die wenigstens nicht widerlegt, obgleich freilich durch nichts bewiesen werden können, und sind also reine Privatmeinungen, können aber doch nicht

happiness by means of a model in which a good will as a form determines desires for happiness as a matter in the broad sense.

[25] This is basically the approach taken by Willaschek 2018, 270–275.

[26] A770/B798. Translated by Guyer and Wood. Italicized by AN.

> füglich (selbst zur inneren Beruhigung) gegen sich regende Skrupel entbehrt werden.
>
> What pure reason judges assertorically must be necessary (like everything cognized by reason), or it is nothing at all. Thus in fact it contains no opinions at all. The hypotheses in question are, however, only problematic judgments, which at least cannot be refuted, though of course they cannot be proved by anything, and they are therefore not private opinions, though against reigning scruples they cannot be dispensed with (even for inner tranquility).[27]

Since the hypothesis of NC is grounded on pure practical reason, it is not just a private opinion, but "[t]he end here is inescapably fixed",[28] namely, it is fixed to the duty of attaining the highest good. On the basis that the moral law commands it, now I can hold the hypothesis as a *Believing*.

> Believing is a kind of subjective ground for taking something to be true.
>
> Das Fürwahrhalten, oder die subjektive Gültigkeit des Urteils, in Beziehung auf die Überzeugung (welche zugleich objektiv gilt), hat folgende drei Stufen: Meinen, Glauben und Wissen. . . . Ist das letztere[Fürwahrhalten] nur subjektiv zureichend und wird zugleich für objektiv unzureichend gehalten, so heißt es Glauben.
>
> Taking something to be true, or the subjective of judgment, has the following three stages in relation to conviction (which at the same time is objectively): having an opinion, [B]elieving, and knowing. . . . If taking something to be true is only subjectively sufficient and is at the same time held to be objectively insufficient, then it is called [B]elieving.[29]

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[27] A781/B809. Translated by Guyer and Wood.

[28] "Der Zweck ist hier unumgänglich festgestellt. . . ." A828/B856. Translated by Guyer and Wood.

[29] A822/B850. Translated by Guyer and Wood. Italicized by AN. I changed the translation of the word "Glauben" from "believing" to "Believing". For a comprehensive account of "Glaube" in Kant see Chignell 2007. Chignell 2007, 335n15 says that "Glaube" is a technical term in Kant (close to the contemporary notion of "acceptance") which cannot be rendered simply as "belief" or "faith" in all cases so that it should be translated as "Belief".

In this vein, Believing is taking something to be true as subjectively sufficient and objectively insufficient. What the subjective sufficiency means is that something can obtain an influence or show a direction to reason.

> Der Ausdruck des Glaubens ist in solchen Fällen ein Ausdruck der Bescheidenheit in objektiver Absicht, aber doch zugleich *der Festigkeit des Zutrauens in subjektiver*. . . . Das Wort Glauben aber geht nur auf *die Leitung, die mir eine Idee gibt, und den subjektiven Einfluß auf die Beförderung meiner Vernunfthandlungen, die mich an derselben festhält,* ob ich gleich von ihr nicht im Stande bin, in spekulativer Absicht Rechenschaft zu geben.
>
> The expression of [B]elief is in such cases an expression of modesty from an objective point of view, but at the same time of *the firmness of confidence in a subjective one.* . . . The word "[B]elief", however, concerns only *the direction that an idea gives me and the subjective influence on the advancement of my actions of reason that holds me fast to it*, even though I am not in a position to give an account of it from a speculative point of view.[30]

Thus, the subjective sufficiency of Belief is that it influences and confirms subjective actions and reinforces conviction. This is not a logical conviction, but it is a moral conviction.[31]

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[30] A827/B855. Translated by Guyer and Wood. Italicized by AN. I changed the translation of the word "Glaube" from "belief" to "Belief".

[31] "Zwar wird freilich sich niemand rühmen können: er wisse, daß ein Gott und daß ein künftig Leben sei. . . . Nein, die Überzeugung ist nicht logische, sondern moralische Gewißheit, und, da sie auf subjektiven Gründen (der moralischen Gesinnung) beruht, so muß ich nicht einmal sagen: es ist moralisch gewiß, daß ein Gott sei etc., sondern, ich bin moralisch gewiß etc. Das heißt: der Glaube an einen Gott und eine andere Welt ist mit meiner moralischen Gesinnung so verwebt, daß, so wenig ich Gefahr laufe, die erstere einzubüßen, eben so wenig besorge ich, daß mir der zweite jemals entrissen werden könne./ Of course, no one will be able to boast that he knows that there is a God and a future life. . . . No, the conviction is not logical but moral certainty, and, since it depends on subjective grounds (of moral disposition) I must not even say "It is morally certain that there is a God", etc., but rather "I am morally certain" etc. That is, the [B]elief in a God and another world is so interwoven with my moral disposition that I am in as little danger of ever surrendering the former as I am worried that the latter can ever be torn away from me". (A828f./B856f. Translated by Guyer and Wood. I changed the translation of the word "Glaube" from "belief" to "Belief".)

To sum up, regarding the NC, instead of simply holding a neutral hypothesis, I can hold it as a Belief, which in this case amounts to a kind of faith, from a universal standpoint as grounded on moral law. Hence, although I do not have any theoretical ground for proving the possibility of NC, I have a practical ground to *justify* its Belief.

As mentioned above, Kant refers NC in the section of the existence of God as a postulate of pure practical reason. It means that he regards NC, at least in practical sense, as requiring Belief in God. Of course, it is far different from simply assuming the existence of God as the distributer of happiness without any argument or justification.

What I have shown in this paper in one sense amounts to the same as the secular interpretation in that I conclude that God as an arbitrarily assumed distributor is not necessary. Meanwhile, in another sense, it rather amounts to something completely different in that I conclude that a Belief in God, by virtue of NC, is necessary for human reason in order to hold the highest good attainable. Kleingeld and Engstrom fail in their attempt to replace Kant's recourse to God by other means. Kant's recourse to God is not unwarranted nor ad hoc; but whether Kant's argument is a good argument is still a different question.

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Call for Papers for Tetsugaku Vol.6, 2022

Special Issue: “Philosophy of Catastrophe”

Tetsugaku: The International Journal (e-journal) of the Philosophical Association of Japan, calls for papers for the special issue, “Philosophy of Catastrophe” (Vol. 6, 2022).

“Catastrophe” has ceased to be an object of speculative concern about the end of the world, and instead concerns such events that we witness in our ordinary life and on a worldwide scale, from natural disasters such as earthquakes, drought or inundations, to industrial disasters or other types of crises like the pandemic, climate change, etc. What kind of philosophical reflections are possible for, or required by these events? How can we, warn, prevent, or at least understand such risks? Or should we start by asking “what is Catastrophe itself”?

On the other hand, we may say without exaggeration that the history of philosophy is not unrelated to these concerns. Modern western philosophy is said to have begun with the Lisbon Earthquake (1755). From then on, revolutions, exile, world war, extermination camps and nuclear disasters constantly appear throughout the books of philosophers, without even mentioning the “end” inevitable for every one — “death”.

We have already some reflections of a Philosophy of “Auschwitz”, or of “Hiroshima” or of “Fukushima”, but now, with COVID-19, it might be no longer be necessary to specify a location and a time, since catastrophe can come anywhere and anytime, Furthermore, it is probable that technological innovation, especially AI and tele-technology, adds some new aspects to what we used to call Catastrophe.

Based on this recognition, our special issue seeks to bring forward new understandings and new approaches to the topic of catastrophe. How can we evaluate the concept of catastrophe and other related notions, such as disaster, accident, risk? What can we learn from philosophers on these topics? What is the role of human beings in the age of catastrophes? What kind of philosophical reflections is to be made on concrete catastrophic events?

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