

タイトル Hume on Liberty and Necessity

副題 From Clarke–Collins Controversy

氏名 小畑敦嗣 (ICU キリスト教と文化研究所 研究員)

Traditionally, commentators argued that David Hume took the position of determinist and attacked the libertarian incompatibilism. Then, Hume have been regarded as a compatibilist between liberty and necessity in the Hobbesian style. Hume's position is often identified with that of Hobbes.

However, Hume, in his anonymously published abstract of Book I and II of his *Treatise*, claims that his manner of treating free-will problem 'puts the whole controversy in a new light, by giving a new definition of necessity.' Some commentators argues that Hume's 'reconciling project' between liberty and necessity might be situated in the context of the libertarian Samuel Clarke and the necessitarian Anthony Collins debate. Hume claims in the abstract that 'the most zealous advocates for free-will must allow' his revision of the 'universally allowed' meaning of cause or necessity. According to Hume, it is universally allowed that physical objects in all their operations are actuated by a 'necessary force' or determined by the 'energy' of their cause. In addition, human actions are subject to the same kind of necessity as that which is universally allowed with respect to physical objects. On the contrary, Hume changed this 'universally allowed' meaning by his analysis of causation that is reduced to constant conjunction and the inference from the one to the other. According to traditional view, Hume subscribes to the Hobbesian style necessitarian Collins and criticizes the Clarkean libertarian view, but in fact Hume thinks he can persuade Clarke because he weakens the concept of necessity and reduces it to the predictability about the future behaviours of bodies and human actions. Thus, he thinks he succeeds in reconciling both libertarian and necessitarian on the free-will problem. Nevertheless, some commentators proposed their worries that Hume's persuasion to Clarkean libertarian incompatibilism may fail.

Clarke holds Newtonian view in natural philosophy and so he distinguishes the concept of necessity into natural(physical) necessity and moral necessity. Clarke claims that moral necessity may be compatible with natural liberty and then he defends his libertarian side. Hume's strategy is thought to redefine the meaning of necessity weaker than determinists had supposed, and so Clarke may acknowledge Hume's revised meaning of necessity. However, it is possible that Clarke and Collins share with the received meaning of necessity, and Clarkean moral necessity provide as much certainty as physical necessity. Clarke's rejection to identification of moral necessity with physical necessity has only something with its mechanism. Therefore, Hume's revised concept of necessity is in fact too weak to Clarke.

Physical objects are merely *passive* or *inert*, while moral agents are *active*, beginning actions of their own grounded on rational motives. Furthermore, in connection with this, Clarke attacks the Hobbesian necessitarian such as Collins in that necessitarians regard as motives the last judgment of understanding. According to Clarke, the judgment of understanding is only passive

but on the other hand the will to action is active, thus the judgment of understanding cannot be identified as the motive or beginning of the action.

How can Hume say about it? In his speculative philosophy, Hume starts his argument by examining the received thesis that 'whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of existence'. Hobbes, Clarke, and Collins acknowledge this thesis, as Hume thinks so in the *Treatise* Book 1. Hume attempts to show that this thesis cannot be confirmed neither by intuition nor by demonstration in his sense, but he concludes this thesis is the one nothing but derived from experience and observation. As a result, Hume claims that causal inference is nothing but customary transition by human being. Some commentators claim Hume seems not to be committed to the thesis that whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of existence. However, there are much evidence that Hume subscribes to this thesis but from a different reason than Clarke's. Thus, Hume holds that his concept of causal necessity is strong enough both to Clarke and Collins, but on the different basis.

Rather, it is more important that Hume argues this customary transition is the same with power and necessity in his *Treatise* Book 1, but the story does not complete here. Furthermore, custom plays an additional role to the actions of men when Hume argues about it in his *Treatise* Book 2. Custom decreases passive habits, but it increases active habits by its giving facility to any action and inclination or tendency to it. Accordingly, it is possible that the judgment of understanding as a causal inference may become active by the force of custom in Hume's line of thinking. For this reason, Hume can respond to Clarke in the way his argument is consistent with Clarkean meaning of necessity as well as with Collins's Hobbesian necessitarian.