Kant on the Justification of Testimonial Belief

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Abstract: *This study aims to explore the debated question of whether Kant's theory of testimony is reductionist or non-reductionist. While the former position considers testimony to be a basic source of knowledge without any rational inference (on par with perceptions), the latter requires additional inductive support concerning the qualities of testifiers through which we can rely on their testimony. As Kant emphasized rigorous objective validity as a key criterium of true knowledge in its narrow sense, most Kant scholars assumed his stance on testimony to be an orthodox reductionist one. A reductionist position questions testimonies as a reliable epistemic source of knowledge because not every testimonial belief demonstrates universal objective validity. However, recent research shows that Kant does acknowledge testimony as a source of human knowledge and that his works reflect the non-reductionist theory of testimony. This surprising conclusion is endorsed by an emphasis on Kant's "presumptive principle" as the bona fide condition of testimony acceptance. That is, by virtue of moral obligations of humanity, we must, by default, accept all testimonies as true until proven otherwise. I argue that this moral-based approach may minimize Kant's multiple allusions to the reductionist position of testimony acceptance and the role of epistemic justification of testimonial belief. To address this conundrum, I explore the structure of the truth-oriented, evidence-based approach to the acceptance of testimony and show its epistemic conditions through a modified reductionist position. Finally, I show that acceptance of testimony must rely on both moral basics and theoretical grounds. That is, we need to respect each other due to our shared humanity while simultaneously validating the epistemic grounds of testimonial information. Understanding Kantian epistemology of testimony provides important insights into our urgent problems, such as fake news, within the fields of social ethics and epistemology.*

1. Introduction

Immanuel Kant's most widely known work, the *Critique of Pure Reason*,[1] aimed at answering the theoretical question "What can I know?" and is regarded as a noteworthy text even for contemporary epistemologists. Until recently, many scholars understood Kant as an exponent of epistemic individualism—a position that did not admit testimony [Zeugnis][2] as a reliable source of knowledge and claimed epistemic self-sufficiency. This perspective has explanatory merit as it separates Kant from Hume and others who accept social justification as a reliable source of knowledge.[3] Admittedly, Kant's motto of the enlightenment, "Think for yourself", seems connected to the argument that we should avoid the state of immaturity, namely, being influenced by others' opinions, and compels us to be autonomous cognitive subjects. However, against these preconceptions,[4] scholarship on Kant from the past 20 years shows that others' testimony can also constitute a reliable source of proper knowledge in the Kantian schema.

As previous studies have shown, Kant was fully aware that we, as human beings, are subject to epistemic interdependence.[5] Kant scholars have further argued that his position concerning testimony is what is presently referred to as "non-reductionism" which admits epistemic license of testimonial belief as granted by itself,

[1] I refer to passages from the *Critique of Pure Reason* by the page numbers of the first (A) and second (B) edition. All other works by Kant are cited according to the volume and page numbers in *Akademie-Ausgabe* (1900–). I refer to Kant's text in the following order: Abbreviation, AA. Volume: Page. For all abbreviations, see the list of abbreviations at the end of this manuscript. The translation is based on The *Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant* (1996–), from which I occasionally diverge slightly. All translations of the cited articles are mine.

[2] In this paper, I use the word "testimony" as counterpart of German *Zeugnis,* in accordance with the previous research. See Gelfert (2015).

[3] It is true that Humean epistemology also has an individualistic element, such as in impression and perceptions. However, unlike Kant, Hume acknowledged that our knowledge of causality depends on our collective customs and habits of thought.

[4] For example, although Coady (1992) provides an excellent overview, he does not mention Kant's testimonial knowledge (Coady 1992, 179–82, 186–88). As a notable exception, see Gelfert (2014). Although I find that there is room to argue against his moral-based interpretation of Kant's epistemology of testimony, this excellent work should be highly appreciated for its comprehensiveness.

[5] The term "epistemic dependence" has several connotations but generally refers to a situation that does not admit epistemic self-sufficiency. For example, we know our place of birth regardless of whether we can remember it. This kind of knowledge is based on others' testimony, and this way of acquiring knowledge is called "epistemic dependence". For a discussion of cognitive self-sufficiency in Kant, see O'Neill (2002, 258).

on par with perceptual information (cf. Scholz 2001, Gelfert 2006, Shieber 2010).[6] Notably, most researchers suggest that, in Kant, we are motivated to accept others' testimony based not on the existing evidence but on moral obligation (Gelfert 2006, 633–6 and 649; Mikalsen 2010, 37; Longworth 2017, 251–2 and 264). Accordingly, doubting what others say by default is a morally objectionable state of mind, which according to Kant indicates a "lack of moral interest" (Refl, AA. 16: 509). I discuss this point in section 2 and identify in what sense the rejection of testimony is considered to be morally objectionable.

In contrast, Shieber emphasizes Kant's allusion to reductionism, in which the acceptance of testimony requires additional inductive support (Coady 1992, 22), while also acknowledging the difficulty of deciding whether Kant's stance regarding testimony's credibility is reductionist or non-reductionist (Shieber 2010, 334–336). For example, Kant says, "here [testimony based on the divine oracles] grounds cannot be believed subjective, then, but instead, all grounds must be examined exactly" (V-Lo/Wiener, AA. 24: 896–7) and "historical belief rests in important cases on such a doubtful basis that it has to be examined closely" (V-Lo/Wiener, AA. 24: 899). This view can be understood as reductionist because it requires scrutinizing testimony on epistemic grounds. Kant's text also supports a non-reductionist interpretation that deserves particular emphasis because this perspective is intimately connected with some core concepts of Kant's moral philosophy. Nevertheless, considering new interpretations of Kant's texts, his apparent reductionist stance regarding testimony acceptance calls for a theoretical exploration. Therefore, examining the theoretical, truth-oriented criteria concerning the acceptance of testimony is indispensable to further develop this line of research.

This paper proceeds as follows.[7] First, I show that Gelfert (2006) and Longworth (2017) identify the plausibility of the "presumptive principle"—a

[6] We could formalize this position in different ways. Non-reductionists in the weaker sense would claim that testimonial belief need not to be justified or grounded by other fundamental beliefs; whereas in the stronger sense, they may claim that testimonial belief is irreducible to other type of beliefs by its nature. The majority of the current Kant studies incline to hold a strong non-reductionist position.

[7] The current studies on Kant's concept of testimonial belief frequently mention unpublished lecture notes taken by students, not only Kant's published works. Although this method has become widely accepted to date, specifically within the community of anglophone interpreters, there are remaining worries about the reliability of unpublished texts. However, given the aim of this paper, it does not matter, because I am just trying to show an underestimated "reductionist" aspect of Kantian epistemology of testimonial belief. It is irrelevant to the question *how* Kant developed his thought historically. Therefore, it does not undermine my

condition that requires accepting testimonies on a moral basis—primarily in the context of practical rather than theoretical philosophy. I call this the "moral-based approach" and argue that this approach is insufficient to fully expound Kant's epistemology of testimony. Second, I explore two conditions that allow people to adopt the moral-based approach without succumbing to naive obedience to others: the principle of exclusion of lies discussed by Shieber (2010) and the reliance on the epistemic authority of experts introduced by Mikalsen (2010). Third, I discuss the reductionist aspect of Kant's stance on testimony's acceptance indicated by Shieber (2010) by proposing an "evidence-based approach", which confirms that Kant's emphasis on the empirical justification of knowledge relies on the universalization of the first-order *grounds* of testimony in others' understanding. Finally, I show that Kant's epistemology of testimony includes both non-reductionist and reductionist aspects that are not antithetical but serve the same goal of "enlightenment" in human society. Understanding the Kantian enlightenment epistemology of testimony may provide important insights into the urgent task of dealing with the profusion of unfaithful belief reports, such as fake news, to which we are increasingly exposed.

2. Moral basis of the presumptive principle

Before discussing testimony-based knowledge, we should determine the extent to which beliefs and knowledge are interchangeable. In the tradition that defines knowledge as justified true belief, this issue would seem irrelevant. However, Kant's idea of a priori synthetic "knowledge", which he painstakingly endorses, is distinct from "belief". For example, mathematical knowledge is independent of our empirical knowledge and valid for all subjects, albeit with slight differences in notation. In contrast, as with the historical or geographical knowledge, an increase in our spatiotemporal distance from the source can make us less confident in the validity of the knowledge. Then, empirical knowledge can be called belief according to its "degree" of certainty. Thus, knowledge has both a narrow and a broader sense in Kant's text. The former is distinct from belief, whereas the latter is continuous with

theoretical argument, although it is possible that the reliability of texts may change as historical research progresses. As we will see, what is indicated in lecture notes can be well fixed in the corpus of Kant's theory of empirical knowledge.

it. In either case, belief can be defined as the "subjectively sufficient but at the same time objectively insufficient holdings-to-be-true [Fürwahrhalten]" (A822/B850).[8]

A well-known dictum of the Kantian distinction of knowledge from belief is as follows: "I therefore had to annul knowledge [Wissen] in order to make room for belief [Glaube]" (B xxx). Kant also maintains that "pure rational belief can never be transformed into knowledge by any natural data of reason and experience" (WDO, AA. 8: 141). This narrow sense of knowledge can help identify a narrow sense of belief. It is "rational belief [Vernunftglaube]" that makes human morality and religion possible. The main examples are "the immortality of the soul" and "the existence of God," which are shown in KrV's Dialectic as theoretically unknowable but still required by practical reason as objects of moral interest (A829/B857). In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, pure practical reason provides justification for the object of belief, which is referred to as the "primacy" of practical over theoretical reason (KpV, AA. 5: 121). However, the primacy of practical reason is valid solely for the finite rational existence of humankind, not for God. Thus, although rational belief has a certain credibility, it must be considered as distinct from knowledge.

Kant also discusses the notions of knowledge and belief in a broad and empirical sense. Belief becomes empirical knowledge when its degree of certainty increases. Similar to belief, such empirical knowledge can be proven false and is, therefore, provisional, and not eternally true.[9] Beliefs related to empirical knowledge rely solely on containing empirical facts while holding them as propositional content. As emphasized in previous studies, this frangibility is an earmark of testimony-based

[8] For research on holding-to-be-true [Fürwahrhalten], see Stevenson (2003), Chignell (2007a, 2007b), Pasternack (2011, 2014), Höwing (2015, 2016, 2017), Stang (2016), and Shigeta (2020). These studies focus on the so-called "SOIS-distinction" problems and whether Kant's theory of belief is continuous or discontinuous with his conception of knowledge. Since I already showed a comprehensive picture of Kant's theory of holding-to-be-true, I do not argue it here. For detailed discussion on the section "On having an opinion, knowing, and believing" in KrV, see my previous paper Shigeta (2020, in Japanese).

[9] Willaschek and Watkins (2020) argued that we should differentiate cognition [Erkenntnis] from knowledge [Wissen] in Kant. One of the main distinctions lies in the fact that the latter necessarily requires truthiness, whereas the former does not (Willaschek and Watkins 2020, 3209). Thus, it seems implausible to say that knowledge can be faulty. However, the frangibility of empirical knowledge is not in contrast with their main arguments for two reasons. First, *S* believes that their empirical knowledge is *true* at any rate. Second, testimonial knowledge acquisition requires epistemic justification or the compiling of information, which coincides with Willaschek and Watkins (2020, 3208–9). For instance, Kant says "*opining* can gradually be supplemented by the same kind of grounds and finally become a *knowing*" (WDO, AA. 8: 141).

knowledge. Focusing on this broad sense of knowledge, I consider that Kant positions it under the umbrella term of "historical" cognition, which is similar to "empirical" cognition and opposed to "rational" cognition (A836/B864).[10] In addition to historical events, knowledge of geography and doctor's diagnoses (which Kant calls "pragmatic" beliefs) also constitute examples of historical cognition. Pragmatic beliefs generally involve making tentative judgments about the execution of an action based on finite empirical evidence; thus, they are not limited to medical practices, and also include other action-directed beliefs such as "practical precepts" about executing moral actions.[11] Hence, the breadth of testimonial knowledge covers various disciplines across theoretical and practical fields.

A question then arises regarding the meaning of "presumptive principle" and its motivating factors according to previous research. Although first discussed by Scholz (2001), Gelfert (2006) was the first to use this principle as a foundation of the moral-based approach to testimony acceptance.[12] The presumptive principle stems from Kant's rule of fairness: "everyone is presumed good until the opposite is proved. [Quilibet prosumitur (read: praesumitur) bonus. Donec probetur contrarium.]" (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA. 24: 246). This principle does not determine what we can believe but functions negatively, namely, we should not doubt others without sufficient reason (Gelfert 2006, 633–4). Although Gelfert is aware that this principle "does call for a specification of the social and institutional conditions that circumscribe its applicability" (2006, 634) and that these conditions are identified as the three Kantian maxims of *sensus communis* (cf. Gelfert 2006, 642, 644), according to Gelfert, this principle does not require epistemic justifications regarding the validity of the testimony. "Kant. . . does not attempt to justify testimony by accumulating empirical

[10] Some might argue that we were taught mathematics by someone's telling. However, this is not the case in Kant because mathematics is knowledge based on proof, not an accumulation of beliefs (KU, AA. 5: 468; V-Lo/Pölitz, AA. 24: 542). Whereas it is possible to talk about mathematical truth in ordinary conversation, it has nothing to do with mathematical knowledge (V-Lo/Wiener, AA. XXIV 895). If one believes it blindly without critical examination, it is only a "prejudice to authority" (V-Lo/Bauch 139).

[11] The practical precept is a judgement such that if you want to be wise, safe, or happy, you have better to do x instead of y, given the empirical circumstances (cf. KpV, AA. 5: 20, 31, 33).

[12] Gelfert also maintains this moral-based approach in his other work (2010, 84–5, 87). This study aims to suggest a historical background and *possibility* of "Kantian social epistemology", which are noteworthy in contexts of contemporary both epistemology and Kant scholarship. In my opinion, when my evidence-based approach is squared with his moral-based approach, we could reconstruct Kantian social epistemology systematically, which Gelfert (2010) hinted at as something unlikely to be achieved.

evidence of its reliability" (Gelfert 2006, 632). I call this line of reasoning the moral-based approach to testimony acceptance.

Notably, Kant uses two different types of incredulity: *ungläubisch* and *ungläubig* (Refl, AA. 16: 508f.). The former is an attitude of not trusting anything other than oneself, whereas the latter is more modest because it just requires us to not believe what others say *without sufficient evidence*. In this paper, I refer to the first as "Incredulous$_1$ [ungläubisch]" and the latter as "Incredulous$_2$ [ungläubig]" following Gelfert's notation. Incredulous$_1$ is akin to rigorous skepticism and is objectionable because it leads to "logical egoism", which will be expounded in the next section.[13] providing grounds for its rejection. However, Gelfert also rejects Incredulous$_2$, which implies not believing others' testimony *without theoretical evidence*, by the same charge as the former. He concludes that "whereas incredulity with respect to testimony is morally objectionable because it generates an attitude of suspicion and undermines the practice of promises and social life. . . the second, more general form of incredulity is *equally* objectionable, not least because it ignores that theoretical certainty is not always required for *moral certainty*" (Gelfert 2006, 635, emphasis mine).

Although there is room to question whether Incredulous$_2$ should also be "equally" discarded, his argument is based on the following rationale. First, considering the absence of a method to calculate the *probability* of certainty of an interlocutor's testimony in Kant's works, a tenable communication requires, at a pragmatic level, certainty that our interlocutors are rational human beings (Gelfert 2006, 631–2, 635–6). Second, Kant maintains that perception and testimony are *equally* reliable (V-Lo/Wiener, AA. 24: 896). These arguments seem to suggest that we have to accept testimony with as much certainty as perception without expecting to be able to ascertain the reliability of the testimony depends on theoretical evidence. We are thus "obliged" to believe others' testimony because of the *de facto* moral certainty that is independent of theoretical evidence.[14] According to Gelfert,

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[13] Hinske (1993: 64-5) had shown Kant's historical inheritance of the idea, "logical egoism" from Meier's *Auszug* (1752). The logical egoism is an art of thinking in which one regard their judgements as true/false without any inquiry for others. This is opposed to logical pluralism in Kant (V-Lo/Philippi, AA. 24: 427-8; V-Lo/Wiener, AA. 24: 874).

[14] Although his rationale has textual support, his argumentation is based on a logically implausible inference. Namely, it holds only when we take the numerical calculation of credibility as a *necessary condition* of testimony acceptance in Kant. However, given that Kant stipulates scrutiny of epistemic grounds of testimony acceptance in several passages, the calculation of probability in itself is not a necessary but a mere *sufficient condition* of this acceptance. Therefore, even if there is no formula to reckon the testimony's credibility, it does not follow that it is futile to consider the given evidence. The theoretical necessary condition

incredulity in general indicates a "lack of moral interest" (Refl, AA. 16: 509) and amounts to a self-violation of human dignity, because for Kant "true dignity of man rests on morality" (V-Lo/Wiener, AA. 24: 903).

However, given that testimonial knowledge concerns empirical facts, if the goal is to acquire empirical knowledge about the truth, it seems unsettling to suppose that moral certainty solely motivates the presumptive principle. This raises questions as to whether a theoretical basis of empirical knowledge could be formed in terms of the truth-directedness of testimonial belief.

There is textual evidence in support of Incredulous_2 that is in tension with Gelfert's moral-based approach and guides us to the evidence-based approach to accepting testimony (which is discussed in section 4):

> If the term unbeliever, which also occurs in theology, is to mean a censure, it cannot consist in the difficulty of ascribing belief to a testimony, for that is no difficulty, but, inasmuch as it is a censure, the reason must be moral. The former can do him honor if he is ponderous or unbelieving. For example, in the case of a widespread rumor, this cannot be a moral disadvantage to him. In all narratives, it is good and praiseworthy to be unbelieving, and one must proceed critically in this when it is possible. (V-Lo/Wiener, AA. 24: 900; translation mine)

Given this passage, Incredulous_2 can be understood in a positive sense.[15] Thus, for now, I suggest restricting Gelfert's claim to Incredulous_1, a rigorous logical egoism, and consider that the presumptive principle works to refute it. Nonetheless, there is ample room to discuss whether the acceptance of testimony requires any sort of justification. For this, we must accept the presumptive principle as a rudimental state of mind, which is a prerequisite to communicating with others.

Longworth is another proponent of this moral-based approach. He argues that trusting others "can be reasonable despite our lacking evidence because we can

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of testimony acceptance, which must be presupposed as equal to the practical necessary condition (i.e., presumptive principle), should confirm whether testimony is based on the objective field of our possible experience in general.

[15] Gelfert also refers to V-Lo/Wiener, but never mentions the quoted passage. Provided that a similar argument is found in V-Lo/Blomberg, AA. 24: 249, this is likely Kant's legitimate opinion. Gelfert also refuses Incredulous_2 by arguing "practical-necessity" in Refl, AA. 16: 509. However, given Kant's terminology of "practical-necessity" in the context of the necessity of postulating the transcendental ideas, it is plausible that what is practically necessary is not the acceptance of others' testimony but pure moral beliefs.

possess practical reasons for holding that others will be reliable" (Longworth 2017, 251). Key to his understanding is Kant's asymmetrical argument that the certainty of "moral faith" can be warranted solely by practical reason, generally known as the "primacy of practical reason" (Longworth 2017, 264).[16] According to Longworth, "In particular, faith is grounded in the moral demands. Thus, faith is grounded in practical rather than theoretical reason" (Longworth 2017, 251–2).

Longworth is correct regarding "rational beliefs [Vernunftglaube]", because we only need pure reason to be certain of rational beliefs. In this case, practical reason can be expected to hold supremacy over theoretical reason. However, it leaves room for debate regarding the relationship between purely rational beliefs and empirical testimonial beliefs. In his closing section, Longworth rightly acknowledges that it is still possible to argue that in believing testimony, "we have sufficient evidence to hold that people will be reliable" (Longworth 2017, 251, 268–70). Kant indeed mentions a trade-off between trusting others generously and withholding trust on a theoretical basis. For instance, we should trust our friends and disclose details about ourselves believing that it is morally wrong to lie to them. However, it is wise not to overexpose one's weaknesses, considering that our friends can also become our enemies (V-Mo/Collins, AA. 27: 429–30). Kant expresses his skepticism about placing de facto trust in others without sufficient theoretical basis.

The presumptive principle that prohibits doubting *all* testimony of others by default seems to confirm as Kant's legitimate claim. However, the validity and the argumentative stance of this principle seem to vacillate between theoretical and practical motivation. The former involves the enlargement of our true knowledge, whereas the latter comprises the accomplishment of morality and humanity. Although previous studies have stressed the latter aspect, and taken the moral-based strategy, I explore another possibility suggested by Longworth (section 4), which argues that, we trust others by drawing on sufficient evidence ("the evidence-based approach"). The point is worth arguing because it helps explain Kant's positive assessment of Incredulous$_2$, as quoted above. Squaring evidence-based approach with the moral-based interpretation can potentially improve the current understanding of the theory of testimonial belief in Kant. Before exploring the evidence-based approach, I discuss

[16] In my view, Longworth makes this claim possible by combining *belief* with *faith*. In German, both are expressed by the word "Glaube". However, in light of the twofold meaning of *Glaube*—the narrow meaning *rational faith* [Vernunftglaube] and the broader sense of *mere belief*—it seems better not to mingle faith with testimonial belief.

how the presumptive principle can be employed without ensuing a slavish epistemic dependence on others, even with the moral-based approach.

3. Two critical conditions

According to the "presumptive principle", testimonial belief reports are accepted in the absence of apparent counterexamples. Similarly, the systematic rejection of testimony is a path to the "logical egoism".[17] A logical egoist "considers it unnecessary to test his judgment also by the understanding of others" (Anth, AA. 7: 128). In KrV, gauging the validity of one's experiences through others is an essential criterion to confirm that conviction is more than mere persuasion (A820/B848). Logical egoists attempt to get away without testing the generalization of their perceptions with others, considering their views accurate without testing them. This egoism can be further explained as a form of insanity because, for example, egoists are even certain of auditory hallucinations (Kant gives the example of a voice or a bell ringing). As Kant says, "persuasion [Überredung] cannot be distinguished from conviction [Überzeugung] subjectively when the subject has taken something to be true merely as an appearance of his own mind" (A821/B849). To reach the truth, the egoistic state must be abandoned. In contrast, the extreme opposite of this egoism is the absolute lack of personal opinion and treating something as true based on whatever the majority says. This extreme "banality [Alltägliche]" is another object of Kant's criticism since it leads our understanding to a comfortable "sleep" (Anth, AA. 7: 129; WA, 8: 35). Thus, while accepting others' opinions according to the "presumptive principle" we must consider the "critical" conditions that prevent us from becoming enslaved by those opinions. Prior studies have shown that such criteria lie in Kant's three maxims of common human understanding or *sensus communis*, presented in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (KU, AA. 5: 294–5): "1. To think for oneself; 2. To think from the position of everyone else; 3. To always think in accordance with oneself". The first is called the maxim of "enlightenment", the second "broad-mindedness", and the third "consistence".

[17] There are other tokens of egoism, namely, the egoism concerning taste and morality (Anth, AA. 7: 130). The latter is exhibited by eudaemonists who limit all ends of action to their happiness. Eudaemonists would show lack of moral interest in Kant's sense because all their seemingly good conducts can be hypocritical and is, after all, not based on a universally valid moral principle. This reinforces my suspicion that there was some discrepancy in Gelfert's argument that logical egoism by itself shows a lack of practical interest.

First, the maxim of broad-mindedness proposes that one cannot be indifferent about whose words constitute correct and reliable testimony. As Kant admitted:

> One judges most books by their covers. If I hear that the author is a well-respected man, I have more confidence in it. And if the subject matter is new, I have even more right to make a favorable judgment. Such judgments are necessary when I meditate while making a plan, although often much must be eliminated afterward. (V-Lo/Pölitz, AA. 24: 546–7; translation mine)

Thus, the criteria for recognizing a trustworthy testifier, intuitively speaking, are based on the speaker's "authority". Mikalsen (2010, 30) emphasizes that the reliability of the testifier only depends on their "epistemic authority", not "social authority".[18] The latter determines the reliability of a given testimony through the testifier's social status, whereas the former does it through the testifier's epistemic ability.[19] I is difficult to determine whether Kant was entirely hostile toward social authority because it is possible for someone with social authority to simultaneously possess epistemic authority. However, Mikalsen is justified in stating that social authority alone is not sufficient for a reliable testimony. As Mikalsen (2010, 29) notes, the motto of the enlightenment: "To think for oneself" does call for the other two maxims of *sensus communis*. The maxim of enlightenment is introduced by Kant as a "merely negative element" to rule out prejudgment (KU, AA. 5: 294).

Similarly, Fleischacker (2013, 23) notes that we should take Kant's enlightenment to be egalitarian, not elitist. That is, the question is not about who believes what, but how the belief is obtained. We do not take a particular belief to be true because of the social status of the testifier but by examining whether the testimony was valid based on the public use of reason. He states, "enlightenment demands just that one always pull one's private thoughts toward a publicly shareable touchstone, not that one has any particular set of such thoughts or endorses any particular public

[18] The concept of epistemic authority is closely related to a problem of the "testimonial injustice". For a thought-provoking examination of this topic, see Fricker (2007). Whereas she focuses on racism and sexism, her argumentation is adaptable to the wrong epistemic dependence in general. As an example, see Gelfert (2014, 193–214).

[19] Mikalsen emphasizes the knowledge of "experts". In the absence of relevant defeaters, "we ought to take at face value what experts tell us as long as their claims relate to their own field of expertise" (Mikalsen 2010, 39). However, for some reason, I do not see it that way. Among others, it seems an extremely narrow definition to take expertise as a knowledge solely held by academic experts. As for interesting sociological research on the layperson's expertise, see Collins and Evans (2007).

standard" (Fleischacker 2013, 25). In this respect, Kant's enlightenment is not achieved by becoming epistemic individualists but is achieved through a community of sincere and autonomous rational subjects.[20] Therefore, in terms of the presumptive principle, we are not compelled to merely accept all testimony uncritically but to start with the presumption of mutual trust because both the testifier and hearer are on par as rational beings.

In addition, we may question whether the testimony we encounter is truthful. For example, in our daily lives, experts may often lie by saying things counter to the truth as they know it or not disclosing all the information they have, owing to the restrictions placed on them by certain groups to which they belong. In my view, the key to solving this problem is closely linked to the consistency maxim in Kant. Considering Kant's general critiques of lying, Shieber's (2010) argument rightly indicates that one can accept testimonies without worrying about the liar problem. For instance, one of Kant's most substantial claims is that all lies inevitably lead to self-contradiction (cf. GMS, AA. 4: 422; KpV, 5: 44; MS, 6: 429; VRML, 8: 430). A lie can be defined as a claim that the claimant does not agree with. Suppose there is a computer in front of me. If I say that *p*: "There is a computer", I am stating a true judgment of the facts; if I deny it, while nevertheless *believing that p is true*, it is self-contradiction because I simultaneously imply *p* and ~*p*.[21] Saying what one believes as true is sincere, whereas saying what one does not believe is insincere. Crucially, every belief report is held to be "true" by the subject, as far as they believe it (Shieber 2010, 340).[22] A testimonial belief report, thus, cannot be a lie without being a self-contradiction. In light of the consistency maxim, lying is the self-destruction of reason and is inimical to all human reason. At any rate, when testimony is understandable by others, they presume the testifier is testifying reasonably. Therefore, given that fake testimony is irrational by itself, and understandable belief reports imply that the

[20] What we ordinally refer to *autonomous cognitive subject* is not strictly the "autonomy" in Kant because the latter means the self-legislation of the *moral law*. Rather, the autonomous subject here is much akin to "autocrat" in Kant. Although the word "autocracy" is associated with a monarchic way of reign, "autocrat" means one "who rules by himself" (MS, AA. 6: 339, 479). For a close examination, see Baxley (2003 and 2010).

[21] Lie is different from a simple misconception in that the latter asserts non-p, which is the predicate negation of *p* when the predicate should be *p*. This is not a contradiction.

[22] The famous "pure white lie [pia fraus]" is also unacceptable to Kant because it is a latent contradiction (cf. Refl, AA. 17: 25). On this point, see Schwarz (1970).

testifier is a reasonable speaker, it is sufficient to take such understandable reports prima facie as reliable sources of truth-directed information (Shieber 2010, 341).[23]

Combining these two conditions with the presumptive principle, we can hold that testimonial belief reports are well-warranted cognitive sources when they are issued by rational, free agents.[24] This qualified presumptive principle would be sufficient to argue that testimonial beliefs in Kant are non-reductionist.[25] However, as I noted in section 2, there is also textual evidence that hinders us from denying Incredulous_2, and Kant distinguishes between logical egoism and practical egoism. Therefore, one can still argue that the evidence-based approach—another layer of the critical condition concerning the presumptive principle—is solely truth-oriented, a kind of justification of testimonial beliefs based on evidence. It is fully compatible with the moral-based approach in that it also draws on the three maxims of Kant's *sensus communis*. I now delve into the theoretical side of the broad-mindedness principle.

4. Evidence-based approach to testimonial beliefs

As per Shieber's (2010) observation, Kant presented non-reductionist and reductionist arguments about testimonial knowledge almost in parallel. However, these terms are not found in Kant and are introduced by today's epistemologists somewhat anachronistically; thus, Kant's indication of both standpoints is not necessarily a deficiency in his thinking.[26] Although the presumptive principle, combined with the

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[23] Although all faithful reports must be truth-oriented, this does not entail that to speak truth we must necessarily disclose our private thoughts. The condition of sincerity inhibits our telling a lie from the first-person perspective.

[24] It would be impossible to assess the rationality of others from the outside. However, this fact does not undermine our argument, as it is enough for us to accept the testimony of others with a *relatively high degree of certainty* (cf. Chignell 2007a, 326). The fallibility of truthiness is an earmark of empirical knowledge based on testimony. Thus, it is sufficient to ask whether they testify in a normatively required manner, that is, the public use of reason and the condition of sincerity in speaker.

[25] There could be another condition, namely, the historical periodization condition; we must consider testimony's historical background before accepting it. For example, Kant mentions that, unlike modern historians, ancient historians (e.g., Herodotus, even Livy) valued a rhetorically beautiful narration over accuracy (V-Lo/Wiener, AA. 24: 898–9). However, this condition is outside the scope of this paper.

[26] As Scholz (2001, 838) claims, based on Coady (1992, 79ff.), Humean optimistic reductionism faces the problem of ambiguity in its epistemic justification, and Kant does not

three principles of *sensus communis* (i.e., autonomous, objectively valid, and consistent thinking), can render testimony credible, it does not logically entail that all testimony must be believed true solely on moral grounds without theoretical justification. After all, presumptive principles are established under the conditional phrase: "Until the opposite is proved". The pre-consideration of the absence of defeaters is needed to validate the presumptive principle. Gelfert suggests, "we must be ready to revise our (testimonial) beliefs, for example, when a comparison of our own judgments with those of others gives us reason to suspect that we are in error. This is what justifies an attitude of presumptive acceptance in the first place" (Gelfert 2006, 641–2).[27] The presumptive principle does not stand independently before other principles of *sensus communis* but is in a reciprocal relationship with these principles. As Kant put it, our possession of *sensus communis* is "not an advantage or an honor" but rather the minimum condition of healthy understanding in general (KU, AA. 5: 293), which suggests that the presumptive principle, in support of *sensus communis*, does not endorse a solely moral-based acceptance of testimony. Thus, it is necessary to clarify the hidden theoretical aspects of the pre-conditions concerning the presumptive principle.

One of the most critical defeaters in contemporary epistemology is the liar's testimony; the notion of a lie is publicly denounced by the principle of consistent thinking. Accordingly, the pre-conditions of the presumptive principle should exclude not only the liar's testimony but also belief without sufficient objective evidence. Scholz (2001, 388) suggests that "another presumption" regulates "the burden of the proof condition [Beweislastverhältnisse]". I argue that the broad-mindedness condition, in conjunction with the enlightenment condition, compels testifiers to explain the basis of their testimony. The moral-based approach claims that the moral interest of practical reason mandates us to respect the "humanity" of others, supposedly to motivate the presumptive principle. However, this view cannot provide theoretical criteria concerning evidence. In my opinion, Incredulity$_2$—not believing p until and unless there is sufficient theoretical ground, refers to this theoretical insight

succumb to Humean reductionism. Thus, he seems to prefer non-reductionism in Kant. However, this objection only stands when we presume that Kant's epistemology is similar to Hume's. Although I cannot compare Kant and Hume in this article, I am inclined to deny this extravagant presumption and preserve the possibility of reductionism in Kant.

27 Gelfert (2006, 638) also acknowledges that the adoption of testimony works by connecting others' experiences with one's own and spotting any inconsistencies with the universal truths of reason or violations of them, such as mathematical facts. Although his understanding seems closely connected to the reductionist approach, he explicitly denies that this comparison constitutes inferential reasoning.

and is indispensable. Similarly, according to Fleischacker (2013, 20), "Kant's point, I believe, is that even as regards empirical facts, we must at some point think hard about which authorities we can reasonably rely on and which we should suspect or reject." Moreover, Kant says that to "accept what appears worthy of belief after careful and sincere examination of facts or rational grounds" is necessary (WDO, AA. 8: 146). Fleischacker (2013, 25) calls this justification based on the grounds of "Kant's cognitive universalization test".

First, it seems appropriate to quote Kant's reductionist allusion to testimony, as discussed by Shieber (2010, 335).

> An open-eyed belief is one that is bound up with an examination of the witness and is grounded in the same. A blind belief, however, is one that accepts a testimony without examination and exploration of the reliability of the same. The former leads to truth, the other, however, is the way to error, and thus harmful, whereas the former is helpful. (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA. 24: 249)

Truth-oriented testimonial beliefs require "examination", and this examination depends on whether the testifier has a trustworthy nature [Glaubwürdigkeit]. Trustworthiness is divided into two categories: competence [Tüchtigkeit] and sincerity [Aufrichtigkeit].[28]

Even if Shieber's argument is applied for sincerity, it does not sufficiently address the "competence" of the testifier, which depends on three specific factors:[29] their ability to experience things as they really are, the absence of defeaters such as drowsiness or distraction, and the ability to narrate facts as they really are (V-Lo/Wiener, AA. 24: 898). We can take others' testimonies as reliable sources of information only after finding sufficient indicators that the testifier has satisfied the following criteria: (1) the ability to observe a particular fact sufficiently, (2) the ability to observe without disturbance, and (3) the ability to precisely report the observations.

[28] These two elements of trustworthiness are in common with Meier's *Auszug* (1752) §. 207. There are debates on how much Kant was sympathetic to this tradition. For instance, Gelfert (2006: 631) takes Kant's repeated reference to Meier as nothing but superficial. Instead, Scholz (2001: 837) says "Kant essentially agrees with these considerations, although he tries to systematize them and to elaborate their consequences".

[29] There is a profound problem of *mistaken memory* in the present discussion. The truthiness of memory played an essential role in Meier's *Auszug* §. 209: "He must have a good and true memory [Gedächtniss]". However, it is difficult to find an established theory of memory in Kant. Hence, I do not address this issue at the moment. For a succinct explanation of this issue, see Bernecker (2011: 326–34).

Satisfying the third condition—given the grammatical, logical, and rhetorical competence required—takes "practice", which alone limits the number of testimonies worth trusting. Thus, Mikalsen's restriction of reliable sources to "experts" seems plausible. However, the testimony of an eyewitness to an incident is also within the scope of the discussion; thus, the observer need not be an expert, as Kant describes:

> For example, there are many testimonies before a defendant. 1) The crime happened when he was not at home. He really was not at home. This is res facti. 2) Another person saw him at that time. Here the credibility [Glaubwürdigkeit] of the other is the reason. (V-Lo/Wiener, AA. 24: 880)

In this case, when a person testifies about the defendant, the witness need not be a legal expert. Instead, the testifier is often a layperson who is examined by the court for trustworthiness. For example, the eyewitnesses must have been able to see the defendant clearly, not be intoxicated, have the verbal ability to testify to what they have witnessed, and be sincere.[30] Thus, it is better to define trustworthiness in terms of the cognitive capabilities of the testifier, rather than their expertise. This aspect underlies Mikalsen's emphasis on the argument that true propositions are *impersonal*. Impersonality of truth implies universality; true propositions must be equally valid and attestable in others' understanding. It is not necessary fulfill what Fleischacker calls the "cognitive universalization test" in each case personally, given that we are subject to diverse epistemic conditions; however, we should accept the *in-principle possibility* of it, which can thus be renamed as Kant's "universalizability test". Testimony cab be accepted as a reliable source of empirical truth when there are convincing grounds for it, which is accessible by at least one or more hearers who have appropriate cognitive skills.

Since there is some unique epistemic dependency between experts and laypeople, and between primary and secondary cognitive agents, it is pertinent to discuss information transfers between subjects under both equivalent epistemic

[30] The last condition, sincerity, can be met, when the testifier is Kantian, because lying considered to be self-distraction of one's reason. However, even non-Kantian testifiers face the condition of sincerity by the oath in court, when they say, "I do solemnly and sincerely and truly declare and affirm that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" (The UK Legislation). Kant was aware of this point: "One has to make them [the testifier] attentive by *threats with the oath*. Then they begin to hesitate and become quite doubtful" (V-Lo/Wiener, AA. 24: 898, emphasis mine).

conditions and under different conditions.[31] In the first condition, suppose experts *A* and *B* are debating on *B*'s discovery, by their public use of reason. If they agree, *A* would have no qualms about taking *B*'s testimony regarding the results of their experiment as true. However, if *B*'s outcome is hard to believe from *A*'s previous experiment or other extant scientific knowledge, *A* would reconstruct *B*'s original experiment, since A too is an expert, operating under the same conditions. *A* would then decide whether to accept *B*'s opinion as true. Furthermore, if *C*, who had the same doubts as *A*, sees that A's retest results are consistent with *B*, *C* would believe *B* and *A* equally. The early entrance of groundbreaking scientific discovery such as Copernican theory and Darwinism provides a good example. These well-known theories were once considered to be highly controversial and unbelievable within religious contexts, but eventually became convincing and widely accepted by natural scientists to date.

Second, suppose a layperson *D* is looking at them. Where all experts are unanimous, *D* would immediately trust the subject without requiring proof.[32] What must *D* do when experts sharply disagree, especially when the testimony of the experts is unbelievable for *D*, or when they are equally contradictory and persuasive, as in the case of antinomies? In such situations, Kant asks, "If, however, the credibility of the witness simply cannot be shaken, but the story or the testimony that he gives contradicts reason and experience in the highest degree, then the question arises, do we have to give approval to his assertion in this case and, as it were, deny our reason, or not?" (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA. 24: 247–8). Requiring proof or evidence is one answer, as suggested by Scholz's "the burden of the proof condition". Similarly, according to Mikalsen (2010, 33), *D* can choose a single opinion as true through the public use of reason. However, in this case, ideally, the first reaction that layperson D should have is to withhold judgment. This is consistent with Kant's answer in the following:

[31] Some argued that the epistemic immediacy is not essential in Kant (cf. Gelfert 2006: 636–7). Kant does admit that someone's testimony and our direct perceptions have equal certainty (V-Lo/Wiener, AA. 24: 891, 896). Moreover, it is still possible that the testifier is much more thoughtful than us concerning the matters in question. Gelfert calls it "Kant's 'symmetry thesis'" (2006: 628, 633). However, Kant notably distinguishes "eyewitness" and "earwitness" and prioritizes the former (V-Lo/Wiener, AA. 24: 900).

[32] There is also an opposite case, testimony that can be denied without any proof. According to Kant, the oracle or the assertion about the divining rod is a good example (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA. 24: 247, V-Lo/Wiener, AA. 24: 896–7).

> The best thing is neither to reject the cognition nor to accept it as true but instead to postpone one's approval until one has more grounds for or against it. (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA. 24: 248)

This passage is related to the fact that holding a proposition to be true amounts to approving it (cf. Meier 1752 §. 168 and 206). In the case of testimony, especially when there is a large gap in epistemic conditions, we must approve the testifier, not only the propositional contents of testimony. This fact has led to the idea that the presumptive principle is founded solely on the moral basis of the trust in others as equals. However, Kant's distinction[33] between believing *something* and believing *someone* does not coincide with the distinction between believing testifiers as reliable *based on their humanity* and believing testimony as true *based on the grounds*. Thus, we need to investigate not the *who and what* of the testimony but *how* that testimonial belief is formed. As Fleischacker (2013, 23) puts it, "Kant's basic rule [the categorical imperative: accept only claims whose grounds you could use universally as a basis of belief] is not aimed at the content of what we believe, but at its form, the grounds on which we believe it". This reflection on *form* alongside withholding judgment underpins egalitarian enlightenment.

Withholding of judgment here means "suspension of judgment for the sake of inquiry, [suspensio judicii indagatoria]" and not merely "renunciation of judgment [renunciatio judicii]." The former is also called "critical suspension", an attitude that critically distances oneself from prejudices, from the tendency to immediately assume something to be true, and is distinct from the mere renunciation of judgment called "skeptical suspension" (V-Lo/Pölitz, AA. 24: 545-6). The subject does care about the proposition *p* but dares to withhold approval in the search for greater certainty. As Kant puts it: "suspension should only serve the purpose of not accepting anything until one has sufficient grounds, but that does not mean that one should reject any and all hope of attaining complete certainty of a thing or a cognition altogether". (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA. 24: 161 and 163; V-Lo/Dohna, 24: 737; V-Lo/Wiener, 24: 885;

[33] Cf. V-Lo/Hechsel 381, V-Lo/Wiener, AA. 24: 893. This distinction is a definition of the historical belief. However, it is important to notice that this is about the difference between rational belief and historical belief. Thus, it does not follow that testimonial belief solely comprises believing someone as rational beings. We can differentiate believing testifiers as reliable on the basis of their *personality* from believing testimony as true on the basis of its *contents and grounds*. Given that Kant says, "I rely (1.) on the statement of others, and (2.) on the experience itself that the third party had" (V-Lo/Wiener AA. 24: 897), it is fair to admit that the "material" belief (V-Lo/Bauch 59) has both connotations.

Log, 9: 73). The suspension of judgment does not have the effect of turning the communicated knowledge into nothing. Rather, it is the profitable attitude of a critical and autonomous cognitive subject who seeks sufficient grounds to reconsider it independently in light of the laws of understanding. Therefore, layperson *D* should pass judgement only when the appropriate evidence is available. *D* would choose one side in principle—that is, based on the universal accessibility of a particular position that can be proven by additional experiments by several experts—even if they do not have the skills to verify the expert's opinion themselves. In this sense, there is no contradiction between accepting others' testimony as a source of possible truth and withholding one's judgment about it.[34]

As for the nature of the grounds of testimony in Kant, we need to distinguish between the grounding of testimony on the principle of universalizability and the grounding of testimony on the principle of an autonomous subject. This twofold grounding schema enable us to establish which testimony is worth accepting, with a relatively high degree of confidence. In the former, it is crucial to decide whether the testimony is valid to others' understanding, that is, when others testify approvingly on proposition *p*, we should ask if *p* causes the same approbation in our understanding. This is in line with what recent studies called the Kantian "communicability condition"[35] or the "betting test"[36] (A820/B848, A824/B852). For instance, Kant strongly believed that other planets are inhabited, and he was willing to bet his entire fortune on the truth of this proposition (A825/B853). However, such a proposition about a possible fact does not always trigger the same affirmative response. Even for Kant, whether there are inhabitants on the moon or not is to be determined by future empirical, perceptual evidence (A492-3/B521).

Thus, those struggling with whether to agree or disagree with p will have to consider whether there is a primary empirical ground *g* for p. Withholding judgment may be prolonged when one's epistemic condition is far different from that of others. It is still possible to choose an object of approval based on whether ground *g* is "in principle" attainable, namely, whether it is accepted by others' understanding.

[34] Kant suggests that learning how to critically *withhold judgments* is age-relative skill acquisition. We are prone to prejudice at young ages and only when we become mature can we suspend judgment critically. Although it is beyond my scope to discuss such psychological development, it is essential to emphasize that the critical suspension is necessary for our mature, enlightened way of thinking.

[35] See Gelfert 2006: 643ff.

[36] See Stang 2016: 280-1. He puts this test into a question "what would one be willing to wager that *p*?" or "how much would you bet that *p*?" (modification mine).

Drawing on the previous discussion, I formalize the grounding condition for testimony as follows.[37] S's testimony that p counts as a case of reliable empirical information only if ($\exists g$), such that:

(i) g is a sufficient subjective ground that S has
(ii) *S*'s assent is directly based on that g, and
(iii) If someone else takes *S*'s position, they can also attain the same g.

This condition need not be accomplished by individuals; rather, it calls for the *in-principle* universalizability of grounding proof. This condition is supported by the maxims of broad-mindedness and enlightenment, mentioned above. We can trust testimony based on a ground g supported by empirical facts attainable by others' understandings. Conversely, the presumptive principle taken by itself does not allow for doubts about others' testimony when it meets the grounding conditions in principle.

These conditions must be considered; nevertheless, we should respect and trust others as being sincere. "Trusting others [vertrauen]" is indeed equivalent to "moral friendship" (MS, AA. 6: 471).[38] However, this does not mean uncritical trust as sometimes it is necessary to point out our friends' mistakes. Thus, we should always consider whether some grounds exist for accepting what they say.[39] The evidence-based approach to testimony can be considered a reductionist interpretation because it examines testimony referring to the empirical and objective facts on which it is grounded.

In contrast, Gelfert (2006, 641) claims, "being 'critical' does neither require nor demand that we be able to construct, by rational argument, a 'positive case' each

[37] One might find it is akin to Dretske and Nozick's "tracking theory of knowledge" (cf. Dretske (1970, 1971, 2003) and Nozick (1981)). Their theory can be summarized as follows. A subject S knows that p is true, just when S tracks *p*'s truth. And S tracks *p*'s truth just when S has an experience *E* such that (1) S's belief *p* is based on S's having *E*, and (2) $\sim P \rightarrow \sim$(S has *E*). Our grounding condition similarly requires that S is traceable to a basic experience which compels him to believe that *p* is true. An important difference is that it does not necessarily require S's accomplishment of the source tracing. Rather, our condition solely calls for the *in-principle accessibility* to that evidence.
[38] The word "trust" certainly has a central importance in Kant's moral philosophy. Namely, having trust in the rational belief makes a moral way of thinking, obedience to moral law, and the attainability of the highest good possible (KU, AA. 5: 471 Anm.). Again, this is all about purely rational beliefs, which is different from trusting others in the empirical realm.
[39] Kant describes this ambivalent relationship quoting Aristotle's aphorism "My friend, no one is my friend!" (MS, AA. 6: 470; Anth, AA. 7: 152).

time we accept someone's testimony".[40] Although there could be several meanings of the term "positive case", I would argue that Kant's demand for grounds means that we do need fair grounds to make approval possible. Finally, it is worth stressing that the evidence-based approach is compatible with the moral-based approach. The presumptive principle works in harmony with the three principles of *sensus communis*. The evidence-based approach can explain more adequately the nature of the process of empirical knowledge acquisition based on testimonial belief in Kant. In accepting testimony, both theory and practice operate; therefore, Kant's work reflects both reductionism and non-reductionism. This duality is not a theoretical weakness of Kant's epistemology, but rather indicates a possible middle path in this field of research.

5. Conclusions

This study reconsidered the debate on knowledge acquisition from testimonial belief reports, a topic in Kant's epistemology that has attracted much interest in recent years. Specifically, the article outlined how the presumptive principle operates in accepting testimony. I concluded that both the evidence-based and moral-based approaches should be considered to obtain the most plausible and comprehensive account of Kant's argument. Further, we must escape from logical egoism and accept the testimony of others as a reliable source of information. However, we must simultaneously distance ourselves from a slavish epistemic dependence through Kant's three principles of *sensus communis*. Finally, I provided a tentative answer to the question about why the acceptance of testimony relates to the domains of both theory and practice.

The key is the status of testimonial knowledge. As it has been repeatedly highlighted, testimonial knowledge solely concerns empirical matters of fact. Thus, empirical knowledge is not discussed at the level of critical philosophy or metaphysics,

[40] Gelfert draws on the following passages from WDO: "To make use of one's own reason means no more than to ask oneself, whenever one is supposed to assume something: whether one would find it expedient [tunlich] to make the ground on which one assumes something, or the rule that follows from what one assumes, into a universal principle for one's use of reason". (WDO, AA. 8: 146-7Anm.; quoted after Gelfert 2006: 641). However, this quotation seems to indicate an opposite conclusion, namely, requiring "evidence" so that we can reasonably trust someone's testimony. Fleischacker (2013, 22–23) offers a more natural explanation of this point.

but at the anthropological level. This is the reason for the simultaneity of theory and practice. In the real world, the subject of cognition is neither a mere subject of logical judgment nor of action based on the pure practical reason. Instead, human subjects interact in the real world, in which truthfulness and moral good are, in a sense, identical, and we perform various actions based on our tacit knowledge of empirical facts and moral standards. These actions produce not only other empirical facts in its causal chain but also moral consequences. For instance, lying during testimony is not only a logical self-contradiction and a distraction from empirical facts but also a moral violation of sincerity and humanity and it is subject to ethical condemnation.

A detailed discussion of how Kant's theory of testimonial knowledge influences our actions and moral practices lies beyond the scope of this article. However, it is interesting that the extant research has considerably allowed us to discuss the theory of actual communication within the schema of Kant's "enlightenment". Although Kant's enlightenment is considered epistemic individualism, the genuine Kantian enlightenment epistemology has a further implication for the philosophical consideration of the ongoing crisis of trust in this digital age. In today's world, characterized by the increasing specialization of knowledge, manipulation of information, and prevailing fake news, the idea of an epistemology based on Kant's enlightenment may be, perhaps surprisingly, more important than ever before.

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List of Abbreviations

AA		*Akademie-Ausgabe*/Academy-Edition
Anth	1798	*Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*/Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (AA. 7)
KpV	1788	*Kritik der praktische Vernunft*/Critique of Practical Reason (AA. 5)
KrV	1781/ 1787	*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*/Critique of Pure Reason (Ph.B)
KU	1790	*Kritik der Urteilskraft*/Critique of the Power of Judgment (AA. 5)
Log	1798	*Jäsche Logik*/*Jäsche* Logic (AA. 9)
MS	1797	*Die Metaphysik der Sitten*/Metaphysics of Morals (AA. 7)
Refl		Reflexion/Kant's Notes and Fragments (AA. 14–19)
V-Mo/Collins		Vorlesungen Moralphilosophie Collins/The Collins Lecture Notes on Moral Philosophy (AA. 27)
V-Lo/ Blomberg		*Logik* Blomberg/The Blomberg Lecture Notes on Logic (AA. 24)
V-Lo/Bauch		*Bauch Logik*/The Bauch Lecture Notes on Logic (Kant 1998a)
V-Lo/Dohna		*Logik Dohna-Wundlacken*/The Dohna-Wundlacken Lecture Notes on Logic (AA. 24)
V-Lo/Hechsel		*Hechserl Logik*/The Hechsel Lecture Notes on Logic (Kant 1998b)
V-Lo/Philippi		*Logik Pilippi*/The Philipii Lecture Notes on Logic (AA. 24)

V-Lo/Pölitz		*Logik Pölitz*/The Pölitz Lecture Notes on Logic (AA. 24)
V-Lo/ Warschauer		*Warschauer Logik*/The Warschauer Lecture Notes on Logic (Kant 1998b)
V-Lo/Wiener		*Vienner Logik*/The Vienna Lecture Notes on Logic (AA. 24)
VRML	1797	*Über ein vermeintes Recht, aus Menschenliebe zu lügen*/On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives (AA. 8)
WA	1784	*Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? /*An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment? (AA. 8)
WDO	1786	*Was heißt sich im Denken orientiren? /*What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking? (AA. 8)

