

Roots of *philosophical hermeneutics* in Gadamer's reading of the *Philebus*: ethics, practical knowledge and understanding

Leonardo Marques Kussler
State University of Rio Grande do Sul

Abstract: *There are many studies highlighting Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics is deeply rooted in a larger and less explicit ethical project. However, few of them address the young Gadamer's interpretation of Plato's Philebus dialogue and how the dialectical ethics outlined there is essential to the way the author later defends hermeneutics as a way of being to understand and live better in the world. For this reason, my main objective in the present text is (1) to approach the context of writing Gadamer's habilitation thesis in the late 1920's, (2) to make a brief overflight on the main concepts highlighted when we read the Philebus to, later, (3) show how much of the practical philosophy usually attributed to the Aristotelian philosophy in Gadamerian hermeneutics is heir to Plato's existential dialectics.*

1. Gadamer and the context of his *Habilitationsschrift*

When we start studying about the history behind Hans-Georg Gadamer's main ideas, it is easy to find and confirm the influence Martin Heidegger had in his early formative years. But we should not underestimate the influence of Nicolai Hartmann in Gadamer's studies, especially regarding the indication for the young Gadamer to the completion of his doctoral thesis under Paul Natorp's supervision. Back then, Natorp was a well-known Neo-Kantian already aware of a young Husserl's prominent assistant in Freiburg. This young assistant was Heidegger, that Natorp eventually nominated to a professorship at the University of Marburg upon a report on his studies on Aristotle—the well-known *Natorp-Bericht* [Natorp Report], from 1921–22 (Di Cesare 2013). Around the same time, Gadamer's doctoral thesis, from 1922, is entitled *Das Wesen der Lust nach den Platonischen Dialogen* [The essence of pleasure according to Plato's dialogues], which is thematically very much alike what we can see discussed over his later work on the *Philebus*.

Regarding the Heidegger-Gadamer relationship, we usually learn Gadamer used to work as Heidegger's assistant around 1923–24, but we hardly hear of the consequences on Gadamer's end—"the Heideggerian shadow always looking over his shoulder" (Grondin 2003). At the beginning, the Heideggerian figure, new in Marburg, had friction with Hartmann's presence, and Gadamer even tried to pacify the situation, but, eventually, ended up choosing Heidegger's philosophical views over Hartmann's. But that choice came at a price: Heidegger's criticism toward Gadamer's philosophical discussions were so harsh that Gadamer gave up on philosophy, focusing his efforts in classical philology (Malpas 2018).

Only a few years later, in 1927, he started regaining some philosophical recognition when he began studying classical philology under the guidance of Paul Friedländer in order to form a solid ground in classic philosophy, especially in Plato's interpretation. After passing the state examination in philology, Gadamer wanted to keep studying under Friedländer's, but Heidegger sends him a peremptory letter of invitation, and he could not refuse it. Thus, full of Heidegger's post-Husserlian phenomenology and the encouragement of years to explore further Aristotle's philosophy, Gadamer's *Habilitationsschrift* [habilitation thesis] emerges in 1928–29. This habilitation thesis was then published, in 1931, under the title *Platos dialektische Ethik* [Plato's dialectical ethics], which is, as I want to show, one of the most important works in order to better understand Gadamer's *philosophical hermeneutics* in *Wahrheit und Methode* [Truth and Method] (Gadamer 1990).

Next, I will make a brief thematic and conceptual summary of the *Philebus* dialogue to introduce aspects that may have caught Gadamer's interest in his habilitation thesis.

2. *Philebus*' general structure and interpretation: quick overview

As we already know, *Philebus* is a late Plato dialogue, and a very atypical one in many aspects. For starters, Socrates still has a leading role in it, which is very odd, because the tendency of late Platonic dialogues is to have a reduced presence of Socrates and more of the characters participation. Another interesting point is that *Philebus* has way less humor and is more contemplative and speculative, way different from dialogues such as *Symposium* or *Alcibiades*, for instance. A third point is that it starts presupposing an earlier conversation, an earlier dialogue that is never explicitly presented to the public. Sure, we can assume discussions from the *Republic*, *Sophist*,

Statesman, *Parmenides* and *Timaeus*, for example, but the problem of the *reading order* or *the place* of the *Philebus* is still open to discussion (Altman 2016, Waterfield 1980).

Now, it is curious that, despite the subtitle indication stating περί ηδονής [*on pleasure*], this is not really the main teaching of this dialogue, but rather a means to explain something larger and more complex. Some editions also bring the word ἠθικός, which could help us think of the main dimension of this dialogue and why Gadamer was so interested in reading it, as I will present in the next section. As for the main characters, we can list: 1) Philebus, that hardly participates of the dialogue, but initially supports the hedonistic idea that the good is in the physical pleasure; 2) Protarchus, that, having learnt the argumentation with sophists, takes place in the discussion in favor of Philebus' point of view; and 3) Socrates, which defends the idea of higher kinds of pleasure and the rational aspect of human life, indicating the good human life is in a *middle path*.

If we were to summarize the main opposing concepts in this dialogue—pleasure and knowledge—, we should take Socrates' hint, right in the beginning, when he indicates that there are two sides trying to find *what the good in human life consists of*. On the one hand, there is Philebus' point of view, whose defense is delegated to Protarchus, characterized by the initial concepts of χαίρειν (be glad, be joyful), ἠδονὴν (pleasure, enjoyment) and τέρψιν (delight); on the other hand, there are the concepts advocated by Socrates' position, which are φρονεῖν (to be wise, to think), νοεῖν (to perceive, to have an insight) and μεμνησθαι (to remind, put something in mind) (*Phil.*, 11 b–c). Nevertheless, if we look closely to the structure of the *Philebus*, there are maybe more discussions about *dialectics*—the superior art capable of division, combination and simplification of ideas and things when properly used by *true philosophers*—and *ontology*—especially when dealing with the four genera: ἄπειρον (limitless/unlimited), πέρασ (limited), συμμειχθέντων / μεικτών (mixed), and αἰτίαν (cause of mixture, reason of nature, i.e., κόσμος) (*Phil.*, 26b, 26e)—than regarding ethics and its relation to the dyad of *knowledge-pleasure*.

To end this section and prepare ourselves for the next one, I would like to remind that the discussion about an ascetic and a hedonistic life was a tradition among Ancient Greek philosophers, and Plato himself had dealt with this theme in other dialogues—*Gorgias*, *Republic*, *Phaedo* etc. In the *Philebus*, a very short and odd dialogue, as I have mentioned above, Socrates already anticipates the conclusion in the opening of the dialogue, which is: the good human life is not only trapped in pleasures or deprived from all of them, but rather, a *measured and rational mixture of*

the two. This is very intriguing, because, in the end, we, the readers, after all the reading course, find out the same thing, with the small difference of having more richness of details. The truly good, then, is beyond human understanding, but with *dialectics*—the gift from the gods that allows us to divide, organize, measure and rationalize things—, good reasoning and *φρόνησις*, we can be closer to it and be able to somehow apply it in our daily lives.

Perhaps this was reason enough for Gadamer to have pored over this text, since it really converges with the ideas later structured in *Truth and Method*. This is what I will briefly discuss in the next section: how does Gadamer's reading of the *Philebus* impact his later *philosophical hermeneutics*?

3. Gadamer's unique reading of *Philebus*: from dialectical ethics to philosophical hermeneutics

Almost 30 years separate the publication of Gadamer's *Platos dialektische Ethik und Wahrheit und Methode*, but the interesting part is that, in my opinion, some of the main ethical issues were already being developed back then. According to the English edition, which has a generous introduction by Robert M. Wall, the work published in the 1930s had two main chapters: 1) one dealing with the Socratic-Platonic *dialectical ethics* and the way Gadamer relates it to his own view of *shared understanding through conversation*—which will accompany Gadamer henceforth on the themes related to *language*; and 2) another one committed to a phenomenological and thorough interpretation of the *Philebus* with, but not reduced to, Aristotelian concepts especially developed in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Metaphysics* (in Gadamer 1991).¹

As I have mentioned in the first section, Gadamer's interpretation of the *Philebus* marks some sort of rupture with Neo-Kantianism—for which the ideas were more important—, as he posed greater emphasis on Plato's *dialectical-dialogical element*, in which *truth occurs/happens* among human beings.² This is precisely one of the main ideas that will permeate *Wahrheit und Methode*, decades later: the idea

¹ Gadamer insists on confronting the Heideggerian view presented in works such as *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle* and *Being and Time*, which propose a different view from that operated by Gadamer (see Dostal 2021).

² Despite his background with Natorp and Hartmann, Gadamer's interpretation differs from the traditional reading of Neo-Kantian studies, as can be seen in texts by Grondin (2009) and Crowell (1999).

that human understanding necessarily passes through the conversational interaction of human beings—and not through the deduction of a subject by a given object—, in which the participants can recognize their own limits, historical situation, *Tradition*, ignorance and allow themselves to be wrong and guided by *the other* (Gadamer 1990).³

As it is a phenomenological reading, one of the first interesting points of this interpretation is that it does not stick exclusively to a traditional Platonic metaphysics. Connecting the idea of a *dialectical ethics* to the ‘Aristotelian concept’ of φρόνησις, Gadamer wants to expose how can we, as human beings, make the truth *happen* through a *committed dialogue*. This takes place by expanding the meaning of λόγος as something beyond *word*, but also *reason* and *giving an account of something* that is only possible by a *shared willingness to question* and build knowledge dialogically—perhaps it reminds us of the concept of *fusion of horizons* [*Horizontverschmelzung*] (?). Coming to an understanding, according to Gadamer’s view, is being able to converse especially with the ones who disagree the most with us, but not in the hopes of simple refutation. In a broader view, as I have supported in other studies, Gadamer’s preoccupation to the sorts of ἐπιστήμη involved in the pursuit of knowledge and wisdom in the *Philebus* could be related to the idea of someone trying to *agree with himself* and *agreeing with others* as implicitly expressed in *Wahrheit und Methode*—perhaps in the way Plato would use the Delphic maxims of γνῶθι σεαυτόν, ἐπιμέλεια εαυτού and μηδὲν ἄγαν (?). No wonder that Gadamer himself affirmed “. . . the order of the individual’s own self (the Ψυχή) is not something commanded by others, in the form of a customary ethic; rather, it produces itself through the unity of *Dasein*’s *self-understanding*” (Gadamer 1985, 59, emphasis added).

One of the many curiosities of Gadamer’s interpretation of the *Philebus* is his attempt of evading historical approaches and pursuing a more personal, immanent and phenomenological view, largely due to the close orientation of Heidegger—including the hermeneutic technique of reading the posterior to understand the anterior, i.e., reading Aristotle to understand Plato. Despite being very influenced by Heidegger’s thoughts at that time, Gadamer was aware his interests were not exactly aligned, as he mentioned in his 90s, in a conversation with Dottori. In this interview, Gadamer claims that Heidegger’s interpretations of Aristotle [*Natorp-Bericht*] were not really

³ In recent decades, some authors have begun to focus on the topic of *ethics* and *otherness* in Gadamer’s works, but usually without mentioning Gadamer’s habilitation thesis (George, 2020; Risser, 2019; Schmidt, 2012, 2019).

concerned with practical knowledge or φρόνησις—which he claims being a Platonic concept, as we can notice through *Philebus*'s reading—, but rather *being*. Gadamer says Heidegger was not really preoccupied with Aristotle, for what matters: “I even became initially aware of phronesis, the reasonableness of practical knowing, through Heidegger. But I subsequently found a better basis for *phronesis*, which I developed, not in terms of a virtue, but rather in terms of the dialogue” (Gadamer 2006, 20).

Speaking of φρόνησις, I would like to mention a few studies considering Gadamer's interpretation of the *Philebus*, as well as the relevance of these early studies for the later conception of his *philosophical hermeneutics*. Kristin Gjesdal (2010), for instance, has a very nice book chapter trying to highlight the fact that Gadamer's inspiration is more Heideggerian than Socratic-Platonic, as argued by Davidson. Carlo DaVia (2021), by his turn, wrote a very interesting article arguing that Gadamer had a kind of a *phenomenological ethics* which is not only *practical reasoning*, but, foremost, *philosophical ethics*, a *practical philosophy*. There is also the work by Cleary (2013), who tried to show the importance of understanding the Gadamerian model of conversation as a hermeneutical tool for reading the *Philebus*, in the sense that the dialogues should not be read only as a *medium* of specific doctrines, but *exemplifications of philosophical activity* for interlocutors, but for us, who are invited to take part in the same conversation.

Now, back to the *Philebus*, it is important to notice the agonistic tension between ἡδονή (pleasure) and ἐπιστήμη (science, knowledge) is only a prolegomenon to develop the discussion on the *human balanced life* and the way this *good life* participates in the *four genera*, as it is a condition of *being-good*, which is not a concept, but a materialized way of existing in real life *conditioned by existential dialectics*, which also *has the good in it only insofar as the good is concretized in the actual doing of it*, through προαίρεσις, the *proper choice* (Gadamer 1986). The main point, for Gadamer, is to show that Plato was aware of the Socratic pursuit of eternally trying to be a better human being, but also being aware that we would never be *the good* ourselves, but only *participate in goodness* through *beautiful and worthy ways of inspiring others*. Perhaps, here, we can remember the first part of *Wahrheit und Methode*, in which Gadamer elucidates the relation of the *work of art* and our experience of truth and contemplation in the process of understanding, since art is not only representation of something, but *the very truth of something playfully and symbolically expressed* by a painting, a sculpture or a poetry, which promotes a *growth in being* [Zuwachs an Sein] in the person experiencing it (Gadamer 1990, Davey 2016).

So, the whole point of speaking of the sorts of pleasure and the ways φρόνησις and σωφροσύνη could help the humans being better for themselves and for others is to propose us both a) an *ontology* to give people a kind of a basis to part of, and b) a *metaphor* to understand there is no perfect life for limited beings like us. What *Philebus* is trying to show us, and Gadamer had stressed it hard, is that we are not capable of being *the good* [ἀγαθὸν], because we are beings conditioned to time, not gods. That is why the *art of measurement*—μετρητικὴ τέχνη (*Prot.*, 356d) or Meßkunst—is so important, for *measure/rule for measuring something* (μέτρον) (*Phil.*, 57d), which help us finding the *middle* (μεσότης) [ground] of a well-balanced life. And this life is only achieved through the art of διαλέγεσθαι, which contains, in itself, at least the meanings of 1) talking to, 2) choosing between different options and 3) discussing with someone about something. And this art is only reachable, in the *Philebus*, through φιλοσοφία, which would be able to help us mixing pleasure and rationality in a proper way and allow us *contemplating the true being*, τὸ ὄν ὄντως ἐννοίαις (*Phil.*, 59d).

In the *Philebus*' logic, after dealing with different types of pleasure, a) practical and b) theoretical forms of knowledge/science—a) productive ones, like architecture; b) pure forms, geometry and calculation—, assuming that the purest science is that related to the *numbers* and *measures* and the dialectical art to use it can be learned via philosophy, it is not surprising that the main goal of philosophy is to help us, as human beings, to find the good in our lives through the capacity of choosing and measuring to find the best *mixture of wisdom and pleasure* [φρονήσεώς τε καὶ ἡδονῆς ... μεῖζιν] (*Phil.*, 59 d–e). The main difference of this *art of measurement*, in productive and theoretical forms, is that the first one is more akin to *exactness*, and the second is drawn by *truth*. That is why the *dialectical art* is the only art capable of enabling us to get to the ἀρχαί of things, especially the *idea of the Good*.

That is why Gadamer stresses the Socratic-Platonic passage of the *power/potential of good* [τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δύναμις] *taking refuge* [καταπέφυγεν] in the *nature of the beautiful* [τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν], for *measure and proportion* [μετριότης καὶ συμμετρία] *identify themselves* or *coexist* [συμβαίνει] with *beauty and virtue* [κάλλος καὶ ἀρετή] (*Phil.*, 64e). For both Plato and Gadamer, the beauty is one of the modes of *giving shape to the good in reality*, within the idea of hiding the ugly and showing what is beautiful from an existential point of view—letting the truth shine and be shown, expressing the ideal of καλοκαγαθία, i.e., the goodness/nobleness of body and soul when combining the *beauty* and the *good* expressed in a *virtuous way of being*.

So, for it to make sense in an ethical approach, the point is to explore the idea of someone who can control himself that can be related to the practice of being able to *make himself a work of art*—from which we can trace the notion of *existential aesthetics*.

The final idea is that to live in harmony, in balance with the universe and the others, is not *to be* a perfect being, an Olympian god, but *becoming* [γίγνεσθαι] a more balanced one, mixing feelings and rationality as well, given our condition of human beings, always *trying to become something [better]*—especially when we think of the never-ending task Gadamer speaks of recognizing our prejudices, preconceptions [Vorurteile]. In the end of the *Philebus*, after discussing about the impossibility of an *ascetic life*—the *unmixed life* [ἀμείκτω βίῳ]—in contrast to a *hedonistic life*, the conclusion is looking for the capacity of human beings prone to philosophy in dealing with ethical issues by means of the *dialectical art*, combining *measure and proportion* [μετριότης καὶ συμμετρία] to compose a more realistic, possible and conscious life, a *mixed life* [μεικτῷ βίῳ].⁴

It seems what Gadamer wants to stress in his arguments on the *Philebus* is that the *Platonic dialectics* in his late dialogues is somehow intertwined with the *Socratic ethics*—and we might add: the dialectics becomes ethics, for, in Gadamer's view, it is about a *conversation about shared understanding*. That is why, for Gadamer, in the end of his interpretation, is so important to bring the concepts of νοῦς and φρόνησις, for the discussion is not only concerned about the mind exercises—a refutational practice, as in ἔλεγχος—, but also the *spiritual meditation* that help us making better choices in our daily lives and being better persons. As Gadamer (1985) points out, pleasure and knowledge (practical and theoretical) have to be *compatible* with one another, which means taking care of one[self] but also *letting the other coexist*. It is not about a normative rule to be followed, but a way of learning how to *conduct* one's life, combining pleasure and reasoning, since we are not divine beings, but human finite ones—is not that one of the main aspects Gadamer highlights when writing his main book on *philosophical hermeneutics*? We have the *divine spark* brought by Prometheus, but we are mere *beings capable of language* and its limitations, which is

⁴ It would be nice to check other Greek synonyms related to the idea of [un]mixing, such as: μίγνυμι and μειγνύμενα (mixture, mingle, mix up liquids, brought in contact to), μεΐζις and μίξις (mixing, combining), ἀμείκτους (unmixed) and μεικτών (mixed). Given the time, it would be interesting to connect these words to the idea of *participation* as in μέθεξις (participate, participation), κοινωνέω (to have in common, share, take part), κοινωνός (companion, partner in something) and κοινός (common [to all], shared in common).

the main core of Gadamer's *philosophical hermeneutics*, that deals with the notion of understanding from the condition of being human.⁵

As I have mentioned before, it turns out that by reading the *Philebus* discussion we can find important aspects of later Gadamer's *philosophical hermeneutics*, which, as we are aware, is not only related to the epistemological element, but also to the ethical one; it is a stance, an attitude, a disposition or a habit—in the modes of ἔξις or ἦθος—a way of [*Dasein*] *being-in-the-world [with others]*, not a mere technique used to better understand texts. We can think that the main characteristics of Platonic dialectics, διαίρεσις and συναγωγή, as expressed in the *Philebus*, are not only related to, respectively, the *division* and *combination* of arguments, themes discussed or elements analyzed. Rather, they also cover the need of exposing one's thoughts without a *heavy heart*, but with a *sound soul*, certain of the *openness for understanding coming from the other*. Knowing how to combine the rational and emotional aspects of one's life is, perhaps, one of the main tasks *hermeneutical ethics* can pose to us in the decision-making moment—in the sense of προαίρεσις—and maybe that is why dealing with this thesis on *the good in human life that is in a well-mixed way of life* is still so fresh and invigorating to this day.

Final considerations

In this brief text, I tried to expose how the context of Gadamer's formation, with philological studies of Plato and Aristotle under the guidance of Hartmann, Friedländer, Natorp and Heidegger were decisive for the philosophical hermeneutics composed by Gadamer decades later.

To this end, I presented a succinct thematic analysis of some essential passages from *Philebus* so that it was possible to highlight the discussion of what is good in human life, an ethical aspect of the Platonic dialogue that suggests an *existential dialectics* that takes into account the *good mixture* of pleasure and knowledge for the good human life, which I believe profoundly influenced the roots of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics.

⁵ One very particular article about one of the main important Gadamerian sentences in *Wahrheit und Methode—Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache*—is the one Vattimo (2000) published with the title *The story of a comma: Gadamer and the sense of being*, in which the author highlights the emphasis of a) *being that is language* and b) *being that can be understood*, depending on the position of the comma.

Subsequently, I tried to show how the phenomenological interpretation carried out by Gadamer in his habilitation thesis, which relates Platonic concepts with Aristotelian categories—highlighting, respectively, the relationship between dialectical ethics and practical philosophy—sheds light on the Gadamerian proposal of the understanding process as an *attitude towards the world and other human beings*, and not just a set of rules to better understand texts. Therefore, the effort to show the relationship between Platonic dialectical ethics and φρόνησις, as Gadamer explores the kind of *experience of understanding that lets the truth happen* via a *committed dialogue*, which unfolds in a *fusion of horizons* that complements different worldviews.

In a way, when discussing pleasure and knowledge in the Platonic perspective, Gadamer tries to point out the aspect that human life is not a divine, perfect life, but full of limitations in the way of understanding oneself and others and, consequently, in the way of *making decisions*. Hence the attempt to understand how to *measure* and *blend the good mix for a good life*—metaphor presented by Plato, in the *Philebus*, to explain that the good human life, the *virtuous way of being*, is composed of a mixture of pleasure and knowledge, of body and spirit—, which means a life more open to differences, capable of listening to arguments and welcoming different forms of life from the self. And isn't this precisely one of the main aspects of Gadamerian hermeneutics, namely, *understanding things better in order to have a more open attitude towards the world?*

Finally, I would like to point out that this is why the idea of *measurement* is so appealing in Gadamer's interpretation, because good measure emphasizes a *beautiful life*, a way of being in the world that is beautiful, showable, from the perspective of an *aesthetics of existence*. The *good mixed life* is one which relates conversation, dialogue and a *shared understanding*, in a way that understanding is not only related to the idea of mind exercises, but also *spiritual meditation* that helps us choose better in our everyday life, in a case that *dialectics becomes also ethics*.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the following institutions and their members for encouraging the debate and publication of this study:

Hans-Georg Gadamer Research Society of Japan [ガダマー研究会]

State University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil
Hermeneutics, Philosophy and Literature Research Group, University of Vale
do Rio dos Sinos, Brazil

References

- Altman, William H. F. (2016) *The Guardians in Action: Plato the Teacher and the Post-Republic Dialogues from Timaeus to Theaetetus*. (Lanham: Lexington Books).
- Cleary, John J. (2013) Plato's Philebus as a Gadamerian Conversation? In *Studies on Plato, Aristotle and Proclus*, edited by John Dillon, Brendan O'Byrne, and Fran O'Rourke, (Leiden; Boston: Brill), 565–83. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004247840_026.
- Crowell, Steven Galt. (1999) Neo-Kantianism, In *A Companion to Continental Philosophy*, edited by Simon Critchley and William R. Schroeder, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd), 185–97. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781405164542.ch14>.
- Davey, Nicholas. (2016) Gadamer's Aesthetics, In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/gadamer-aesthetics>.
- DaVia, Carlo. (2021) Gadamer's Phenomenological Ethics. *European Journal of Philosophy* 29 (4): 746–57. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12602>.
- Di Cesare, Donatella. (2013) *Gadamer: A Philosophical Portrait*. (Bloomington; Indianapolis: Indiana University Press).
- Dostal, Robert J. (2021) Gadamer's Relation to Heidegger and to Phenomenology, In *The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer*, edited by Robert J. Dostal, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 334–54. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108907385.014>.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg. (1985) *Gesammelte Werke 5: Griechische Philosophie I*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg. (1986) *The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy*. (New Haven; London: Yale University Press).
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg. (1990) *Gesammelte Werke 1: Hermeneutik I*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

- Gadamer, Hans-Georg. (1991) *Plato's Dialectical Ethics: Phenomenological Interpretations Relating to the Philebus*. (New Haven; London: Yale University Press).
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg. (2006) *A Century of Philosophy: Hans-Georg Gadamer in Conversation with Riccardo Dottori*. (New York; London: Continuum).
- George, Theodore. (2020) Hermeneutic Responsibility: Vattimo, Gadamer, and the Impetus of Interpretive Engagement, *Duquesne Studies in Phenomenology* 1 (1): 1–15. <https://dsc.duq.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=dsp>.
- Gjesdal, Kristin. (2010) Davidson and Gadamer on Plato's Dialectical Ethics, In *Interpretation: Ways of Thinking about the Sciences and the Arts*, edited by Peter Machamer and Gereon Wolters, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press), 66–90.
- Grondin, Jean. (2003) *The Philosophy of Gadamer*. Chesham: Acumen.
- Grondin, Jean. (2009) The Neo-Kantian Heritage in Gadamer, In *Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy*, edited by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Sebastian Luft, (Bloomington; Indianapolis: Indiana University Press), 92–110.
- Malpas, Jeff. (2018) Hans-Georg Gadamer, In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/gadamer>.
- Risser, James. (2019) Hearing the Other: Communication as Shared Life. *Journal of Applied Hermeneutics*, 1–17. <https://journalhosting.ucalgary.ca/index.php/jah/article/view/68707/53233>.
- Schmidt, Dennis J. (2012) On the Sources of Ethical Life. *Research in Phenomenology* 42 (1): 35–48. <https://doi.org/10.1163/156916412X628739>.
- Schmidt, Dennis J. (2019) Philosophical Life and Moral Responsibility: Wozu Philosophie? In *International Yearbook for Hermeneutics*, edited by Günter Figal and Bernhard Zimmermann. Vol. 18. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck).
- Vattimo, Gianni. (2000) Histoire d'une Virgule: Gadamer et Le Sens de l'être. *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 54 (213 (3)): 499–513. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23955761>.
- Waterfield, R. A. H. (1980) The Place of the 'Philebus' in Plato's 'Dialogues'. *Phronesis* 25 (3): 270–305. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182099>.