

What makes us P4C teachers?¹

MURASE Tomoyuki

National Institute of Technology, Tokyo College

Abstract: *What makes us P4C teachers? P4C teachers, endeavoring to build a Community of Inquiry (CoI), are different from normal teachers. P4C teachers should have a special ‘something’ which makes a classroom transform into a CoI, and especially a Community of Philosophical Inquiry. This paper focuses on the special ‘something’ P4C teachers should have. Our inquiry begins with two questions regarding this ‘something’: a ‘Category Question’ and a ‘Core Question’. Our answer to the Category Question is that this ‘something’ belongs to the category of knowing-how or intelligent skills, not the propositional knowledge of academic philosophy and not simple skills. Next, we point out the close relationship between philosophy and questions. A question is necessary for doing philosophy. Therefore, this special ‘something’ can be understood as QKH (questioning know-how). QKH has many interesting characteristics, and we briefly discuss some of these, including its paradoxical nature: it can be characterized as simultaneously intelligent and ignorant. The intelligent aspect of QKH concerns asking the right questions, as well as clarifying questions; the ignorant aspect of QKH involves a certain attitude toward the unknown, much like Socrates’. This ambivalence is what makes QKH such an interesting and unique intelligent skill. Focusing on the QKH allows us to become more aware of the flow of questions within the CoI and the significance of each child’s unique questions.*

Ch.1 Purpose and methods

What should a teacher have in order to be a better practitioner of Philosophy for Children (hereafter referred to as P4C)? Teachers engaged in P4C do many different things in their classes. Some of them may be done in non-P4C classes, and some may be done only in P4C classes. In this article, we will be focusing on ‘P4C teachers’ and a special ‘something’ they have. Through focusing on these, we will discuss what is important in a P4C class and what is most important to a teacher engaged in P4C.

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1.1 Who are ‘P4C teachers’?

P4C is an educational program initiated by M. Lipman that has been adapted and refined to suit different regions, schools, and children. Basic structures of P4C include children asking their own questions about a given topic, and children engaging in inquiry on a question chosen together with teachers. Lipman describes these activities as building a “Community of Inquiry (hereafter referred to as CoI)”. The idea of a CoI is explained by the five-stage process that Lipman outlines: “the offering of the text”, “the construction of the agenda”, “solidifying the community”, “using exercises and discussion plans”, and “encouraging further responses” (Lipman 2003:100–3). For many practitioners, the creation of a CoI is both the means and the goal of all P4C practice. As Gregory says, “the central practice of Philosophy for Children is the community of inquiry” (Gregory 2013:73).

Teachers engaging in P4C can be understood as “converting the classroom into a community of inquiry” (Lipman 2003:21). They try to explore the question motivating the inquiry together with the children.

Remember, the commitment you are encouraging on the child’s part is commitment to *the process of inquiry itself*, whether this be logical, aesthetic, scientific, or moral inquiry. The child should eventually be able to distinguish between your idiosyncratic values and the process that you try to embody. While there will be times when you will stray, it is that process to which you will most repeatedly return. (Lipman et al. 1980:84–5 emphasis in original)

The center of the CoI is the children’s philosophical inquiry, which is based on one or more questions. So in this article, we will use the term ‘P4C teachers’ for teachers who engage in any practices involving a CoI, including: Philosophy in Schools, p4c, philosophical dialogue, and Philosophy with Children.² And similarly, “P4C” will be used as an umbrella term to include all of these practices, especially classroom dialogue based on the idea of a CoI.

While discussing P4C teachers’ relation to their students, Lipman argues that the P4C teacher’s main goal is to facilitate the discussion. He illustrates the skills required to facilitate during a P4C session by comparing it to an art:

² The term ‘Philosophy in Schools’ is “often used to capture these divergent approaches, to include P4C, also referred to as ‘philosophy with children’, ‘philosophy with children and adolescents’, and ‘philosophy for young people’” (Burgh and Thornton 2019:2). In the same book, the acronym ‘p4c’ is not used as a proper noun, thereby distinguishing it from “P4C”, which specifically refers to the program created by Lipman (Splitter and Glaser 2019:10). Jackson, on the other hand, uses the term “p4c” in another sense (Jackson 2013). In Japan, this kind of class is often referred to by terms such as “philosophy dialogue” or “children’s philosophy”.

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Getting students to engage in philosophical dialogue is an art. As with any art, some knowledge is a prerequisite, in this case, the teacher should possess an understanding of when it is appropriate to intervene in the discussion and when not to. There are times when the best thing one can do to guide a discussion is to say nothing and let things happen. The goal towards which a philosophical discussion should move is one in which there is maximum student-student interchange, as opposed to the start of such a discussion, in which teacher-student interchange is at a maximum. (Lipman et al. 1980:113)

P4C teachers need to be able to facilitate the CoI, and therefore should have facilitation skills. These facilitation skills, however, are not only applicable to philosophical inquiries, but are necessary for establishing any kind of CoI: as Lipman points out, the idea of a CoI “was originally restricted to the practitioners of scientific inquiry” (Lipman 2003: 20). In this sense, facilitation skills that can be used to convert the classroom into a CoI are not only the concern of P4C teachers. Facilitation skills can benefit a variety of learning goals, and do not necessarily make an inquiry more philosophical. But what P4C teachers need is a special ‘something’ that makes a community of inquiry “philosophical”. Therefore, our initial question has to be changed to the question “what is the special ‘something’ which P4C teachers should have, and which makes their inquiry philosophical?” (we will discuss what “philosophical” means in Ch. 3).

1.2 The difference between the Category and Core Questions

Presumably, to improve our practice, we as P4C teachers should strive to acquire this ‘something’. But what is this special ‘something’? We will take two approaches to this problem, in the form of two clarifying questions: a question about the *Category* of this something and the *Core* of this something. The first approach, which we will call the “Category Question” asks: what category of knowledge does this ‘something’ belong to? Is it a form of propositional knowledge? A technique? Or something else? We know that P4C teachers have to study a lot of things. Therefore, answers to Category Question need not be mutually exclusive. The Category Question has not often been raised concerning P4C teachers. But exploring these possible categories will help us to understand the features of this ‘something’.

The second approach, which we will call the “Core Question”, asks: what is the core of this ‘something’ that P4C teachers should have? In other words, this question asks “what is the center of this special something”? Teachers generally try to facilitate students’ learning. In this regard, P4C teachers are no different from ordinary (i.e., not P4C) teachers. But they try to create a community of *philosophical* inquiry. This is more than what ordinary teachers try to do. So the ‘something’ P4C teachers should have is different from what ordinary teachers are expected to have. This ‘something’ would need to be an addition to whatever skills, knowledge and

other abilities ordinary teachers are expected to possess. Such an additional ‘something’ is what makes us P4C teachers. Because a P4C teacher might have many additional skills or abilities that an ordinary teacher does not have, it could be possible to list many things as candidates for this additional ‘something’. But whatever abilities, knowledge, and skills a P4C teacher might have, it can be assumed that they all share a common core because each of P4C teachers engage in the same activities and have the same aim, which is to build a community of philosophical inquiry. What is this common core? This is the *Core Question* regarding our ‘something’.

Lipman has said that “a good teacher of philosophy never reaches a point where there seems no further need for wondering. . . . It is this wondering behavior that is so difficult to explain or convey by means of techniques, strategies, or recipes. Wondering cannot be feigned; it has to grow out of one’s own experience”, (Lipman 1980:126). In this quote, Lipman illustrates the ideal image of the P4C teacher, who has an attitude of fascination towards philosophy and philosophical questions. How does such an attitude relate to the ‘something’ P4C teachers should have? This last question is such that it crosses over the division between the Category Question and the Core Question.

We have defined our terms and clarified our research questions. As is evident from the literature in this chapter, answering the Category Question and the Core Question are not independent tasks. Nevertheless, it is my contention that our inquiry into the nature of this special ‘something’ will benefit by clearly differentiating these two questions and pursuing answers to each in turn. In the following section, we will discuss one potential answer to the Category Question

Ch.2 The role and limitations of propositional knowledge

Academic philosophy might seem to guarantee the philosophical qualifications of P4C teachers (as per the quote from Lipman et al. in 1.1). The first candidate for that ‘something’, therefore, might be knowledge of academic philosophy. Knowledge of academic philosophy has always been an important component of P4C practice. Lipman said that “Throughout the writing of *Harry*, I tried to see to it that virtually every event in the story reverberated with ideas or fragments of ideas from the history of philosophy” (Lipman 2009:25). The reason why the practice based on Lipman’s novel is a community of philosophical inquiry is clear: its novels include ideas traditionally thought to be the ‘property’ of academic philosophy. The materials used in P4C sessions (i.e., Lipman’s novels) include ideas from academic philosophy, and these ideas in turn generate the philosophical inquiry. Children’s inquiries are able to inherit some of this philosophical ‘property’ from these novels. Gregory sees P4C as not only a “process approach”, in which argumentation and the exercise of critical thinking are emphasized, but also a “content approach”, in which the acquisition of traditional philosophical ideas is important.

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In that regard, P4C is also a content approach, though it eschews the traditional content approach to a teaching philosophy that emphasizes canonical philosophical problems, concepts, arguments, and key figures within established subdisciplines. Instead, P4C draws students' attention to philosophical concepts like justice, person, mind, beauty, cause, time, number, truth, citizen, good, and right. (Gregory 2013:76)

The meaning of the phrase 'content approach' in this context, therefore, differs from its sense in traditional philosophical education. However, P4C emphasizes the same concepts that academic philosophy does, and in that sense it does share the same contents. The "content" of P4C, to the extent that we see it as a content approach, includes the concepts legitimated by academic philosophy, the standard knowledge of how arguments are structured, and some of the standard positions and conflicts surrounding well-known philosophical problems.

Academic philosophy, therefore, can strongly support the special 'something' of P4C teachers which makes their practice philosophical. Knowledge of academic philosophy is a useful resource for P4C teachers, as it helps bestow the name of philosophy on their inquiries. Haynes recognizes ". . . the value of knowledge, experience, insight and training offered by 'educated' or 'academic' philosophers" (Haynes 2017:139).

Academic philosophy is one of the possible candidates for the 'something' that makes us P4C teachers. We can therefore ask our two clarifying questions regarding the status of academic philosophy. What category is it in? Basically, it belongs to the category of propositional knowledge, or "knowing-that". Propositional knowledge is one possible answer to the Category Question.

What about the Core Question? Is it possible to think of the propositional knowledge of academic philosophy as an answer to the Core Question? We propose to answer "No" to this question. No one (presumably including Lipman) would think that propositional knowledge of academic philosophy alone can capture every aspect of P4C teachers' 'something' that guarantees the philosophical nature of the CoI. One of the reasons to reject knowledge of academic philosophy as a candidate for this 'something' is that we know many knowledgeable academic philosophers can't be effective P4C teachers in schools. Academic philosophical knowledge alone is not enough to become a P4C teacher. A second reason is that P4C teachers should promote a community of philosophical inquiry by facilitating students' discussion, and propositional knowledge has little power to help guide this kind of facilitation. Propositional knowledge describes a true state of affairs. Thus, propositional knowledge can help us understand what is occurring, but it cannot tell us how to change the situation. If it appears to have such a power, it is because it implicitly draws on the power of another kind of knowledge.

Propositional knowledge only provides a tiny amount of help in transforming the classroom inquiry into a community of philosophical inquiry. Since propositional knowledge cannot complete this task on its own, an additional 'something' (which

has some efficacy to change the current situation for the better) is needed to make the classroom inquiry a community of philosophical inquiry.

Ch. 3 Interventions, Skills, and Knowing-how

If the arguments thus far are valid and the propositional knowledge (knowing-that) of academic philosophy is not an appropriate answer to both the Category Question and the Core Question, what is the next possibility to consider? Facilitation of student discussion is one of the key elements of the CoI and can be seen as an ‘intervention’ by the P4C teachers; P4C teachers need to be able to intervene in discussions to foster participants’ thinking, and they need to use their skills well. This chapter focuses on the intervention skills of P4C teachers. What interventions do P4C teachers make in philosophical discussions?

3.1 Arguments of Murriss and Gardner

Murriss describes several instances of P4C teachers encouraging discussions to become more philosophical by trying to connect children’s thinking to philosophical concepts. According to Murriss, this encouragement is evidence of a “hidden agenda” on the part of the teacher: “. . . it is worth bearing in mind that this is the philosopher’s ‘hidden agenda’, i.e., to focus on classical philosophical topics. Knowledge and awareness of the history of philosophical ideas and the attitude and skills to ask the relevant questions is crucial here” (Murriss 2000:42). According to Murriss, it is important that the interventions of P4C teachers, which include setting an agenda, determining the direction of the philosophical inquiry, and formulating the question, are decisive factors in making sure that a P4C inquiry becomes *philosophy*: “I conclude that the facilitator’s interventions have been crucial in determining the direction of the inquiry—a direction very much informed by traditional philosophical distinctions (e.g. appearance/ reality), problems (e.g. personal identity), and questions (e.g. Is a robot a person?)—important when one is claiming to teach *philosophy*” (Murriss 2000:43 emphasis in original). Murriss thinks that P4C teachers’ intervention is an essential part of making children’s discussion philosophical. In other words, sufficient facilitation skills, meaning skills that can guide an inquiry towards the direction of philosophically relevant topics, are necessary for P4C teachers.

Gardner thinks that truth-seeking is one of the most important roles of P4C teachers. According to Gardner, a philosophically directed inquiry is an inquiry directed towards the truth. P4C teachers acting as facilitators are necessary to promote a truth-seeking attitude in the CoI. Truth is the center of a CoI and produces the form of inquiry. Based on these assumptions, Gardner proposes the idea that a CoI is best understood as a “truth-centered” approach.

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A Community of Inquiry is neither teacher-centered and controlled nor student-centered and controlled, but centered on and controlled by the demands of truth. Truth is absolutely essential to this method; it is only because of progress toward truth that participants are ultimately convinced of the fruitfulness of the process. Truth, however, is a hard taskmaster; it places severe restrictions on participants and puts exacting demands on the facilitator (Gardner 1995:38).

Truth-seeking is demanding work, which requires teachers to train professionally. Truth-seeking facilitation is different from mere facilitation, which lacks a direction and a goal. Mere facilitation can't reach the same level of progress as truth-seeking philosophical facilitation.

Facilitation alone, when the participants are all or mostly seasoned philosophers, may be sufficient to ensure progress toward truth. Philosophers, after all, have been professionally trained to track the truth. Non-philosophers, however, have no such training and there is little reason to believe that the mere kiss of facilitation will bring them up to scratch (Gardner 1995:41).

For Gardner, the truth-seeking abilities that it grants its students guarantee that philosophy is the P4C teacher's special 'something'. For P4C teachers, mere facilitation abilities are not enough. This also puts the onus on the P4C teacher to do "the hard work" that Gardner refers to in the title of her article, because philosophical tendencies, intuitions, and insights are precious and hard to find.

Facilitation alone is not sufficient. Simply letting a discussion follow 'its course' will not create a Community of Inquiry for the very reason that without explicit intervention by the facilitator, the discussion will rarely follow 'a course'. And without 'philosophical direction', the discussion will almost certainly not follow 'a philosophical course' (Gardner 1995:42).

Both arguments show that there must be some quality held by P4C teachers (a 'something') that makes an inquiry philosophical. (They are not focusing on simply encouraging discussion, but rather creating a Community of *Philosophical Inquiry*). And Murrin and Gardner recognize the important role of intervention by P4C teachers in the CoI. The emphasis of both thinkers is on how philosophy emerges in the CoI. And by following the course of both thinkers' arguments, it has become clear that the special 'something' that P4C teachers have was identified in relation to the philosophical component of the inquiry of the CoI. Furthermore, both pieces have proposed their own answers to the Core Question about this 'something': they have variously identified it as being agenda setting, directing the discussion towards philosophically relevant topics, questioning, or the seeking of truth. Agenda setting, the philosophical direction of a discussion, questioning, and the pursuit of truth

(whatever that means) are emphasized because they transform the CoI into a community of *philosophical* inquiry. These are all possible candidates for answers to the Core Question.

3.2 The category of knowing-how

What category does the ‘something’ that was the focus of 3.1 belong to? Murriss thinks that all her proposed answers fall into the categories of skills and attitude. “I argue that the philosophical dimension of an inquiry depends to a large extent on the facilitating skills and attitude of the teacher (Murriss 2000:40)”. Evidently, these skills and attitudes are the kind of dispositions that P4C teachers possess, abilities that enable them to successfully intervene in children’s discussions.

These abilities are not simple and single-minded skills. They must be flexible, sophisticated and intelligent skills (or dispositions). Such skills are acquired only after having been trained for many years, and maintaining them requires constant practice. While the concept of a ‘skill’ has many meanings, we can divide skills into two types: simple skills, which are inflexible, and intelligent skills, which are flexible. The ‘something’ we are searching for is flexible, meaning that it can be exercised in a variety of different ways. Therefore, we cannot regard this ‘something’ as a kind of simple skill, because the exercise of this ‘something’ must be adaptable to various occasions.

In Ryle’s famous arguments concerning the idea of ‘knowing-how’, he distinguishes between two kinds of disposition: single-track dispositions and non single-track dispositions (Ryle 1949:31). If the ‘something’ we are searching for is a non single-track disposition, that is to say, if the ‘something’ has flexibility, then this ‘something’ must belong to the “knowing-how” category, as any knowing-how must have a certain degree of flexibility when it is exercised, and can only be acquired through much practice. Knowing-how or intelligent skills are prime candidates for answers to the Category Question. In what follows, I would like to further clarify the meaning of ‘flexible’ and ‘intelligent’ by discussing two dimensions of the concept of ‘knowing-how’: a practical dimension and an epistemic dimension.

What is “knowing-how”? According to Cath, researchers have long struggled to reconcile two features of knowing-how: a practical dimension and an epistemic dimension (Cath 2019). The practical dimension means that knowing-how ascriptions entail ability ascriptions. When focusing on the practical dimension of knowing-how, the close relationship between ability and knowing-how is emphasized. For example, if S knows how to ride a bicycle, then S is able to ride a bicycle. If S is not able to ride a bicycle, then even if S is able to explain how to ride a bicycle in mechanical terms, S doesn’t know how to ride a bicycle. This kind of claim is the core idea of a position called “Anti-Intellectualism”. Anti-Intellectualism stems from Rylean arguments and is a standard view of knowing-how (Snowdon 2004). The anti-

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intellectualist thinks that knowing-how ascriptions entail the possession of ability. Thus, focusing on the practical dimension leads to anti-intellectualist views.

Elizinga regards knowing-how as a successful performance resulting from self-regulated abilities: “To regulate one’s ability is to be disposed to (a) vary performances in a wide variety of circumstances, (b) differentially respond to feedback on performances, and (c) consolidate what’s learned through practice or rehearsal” (Elizinga 2021:1743). The core idea of self-regulation is encapsulated in point (b): the ability to differentially respond to feedback on any given performance, which means that one of the conditions of knowing-how requires adequate responses and an ability to control the form of the knower’s performance. It entails that one precondition of knowing-how ascription is that the knower has second-order abilities that can regulate the exercise of the first-order abilities. Thus, the one who knows how to *F* requires two kinds of abilities: first order and second order abilities (c.f. Murase 2021). For the first order ability to *F*, the knower should have an additional (i.e., second order) ability to formulate and alter the exercise of the ability to *F*. This means that we have various abilities that can be understood as forming a cluster. This cluster consists of many single-track dispositions (or first-order abilities) that manifest in any given event or circumstance, as well as second-order abilities which choose to exercise, as well as intelligently adjust, one or more of those first-order abilities in response to a present situation. These many abilities are integrated into a knowing-how. If someone only has the former ability, this person is not a knower, not skillful, and can only be said to have a simple skill.

These characteristics of know-how are consistent with the characteristics of the special ‘something’ described in the previous section: the interventions of the P4C teachers involve subtle adjustments to the flow of discussions in the CoI. And their actions, far from being manual-based and awkward, are clever actions. It is the ‘something’ that bestows such abilities on P4C teachers.

Intellectualism, as contrasted with Anti-Intellectualism, emphasizes the cognitive or epistemic aspect of knowing-how, in which knowing-how is grasped as a kind of knowledge first and foremost, and not simply an ability or skill.³

The epistemic requirement for proving the possession of a knowing-how is what we will call the condition of cognitive alteration. That is to say, every piece of knowledge allows the possessor to perceive the world differently from before the knowledge was obtained. Once we know how to *F*, our cognitive state will be changed and the world as we perceive it will change. In other words, if the possessor’s perceptual states cannot be changed, then even if they can be said to have acquired some ability, it does not deserve the name of knowledge. Noë describes this change through the example of a pianist.

³ For example, according to Stanley et al., who proposes one of the most influential arguments for intellectualism, knowing-how is one kind of knowing-that under the “practical mode of presentation” (Stanley et al. 2001).

A piano tickles the fancy of a pianist, soliciting him or her to play. And the piano player can see in the piano, in the arrangement of its keys, possibilities that are not available to the non-player. . . . Possession of abilities enables us to detect significance where there would otherwise be none. In this way, the body, the world and our practical knowledge open up a meaningful realm of experience to us. (Noë 2005:285).

The perception of someone changes in conjunction with the possession of knowing-how. The possessor of knowing-how is embedded in a particular situation and can perceive properties in this situation that are imperceptible to those who do not possess the knowing-how.

Can the special ‘something’ satisfy such a condition? If the ‘something’ satisfies this epistemic condition, that is to say, if the ‘something’ is a kind of knowing-how, then P4C teachers as possessors of knowing-how could perceive features or possibilities in the CoI that are imperceptible to normal (non-P4C) teachers. Do P4C teachers experience this kind of perceptual alteration?

Gregory mentions the term “philosophical ear” in his discussion of P4C teacher training. “Teachers new to philosophy may also take some time to develop a ‘philosophical ear’, during which time they may miss the philosophical meaning of their students’ talk” (Gregory 2013:76). By cultivating a philosophical ear, the P4C teachers will be able to hear new philosophical voices that were previously unheard. This is precisely the epistemic change that P4C teachers experience by acquiring and fostering this ‘something’.

The two characteristics regarding know-how (a practical dimension and an epistemic dimension) indicate that the ‘something’ P4C teachers should have is a type of knowing-how rather than just a set of skills.

We have proposed two conditions regarding knowing-how. It should be clear that the P4C teacher satisfies the first condition and possesses second-order abilities, because the P4C teacher intervenes flexibly in children’s discussions and decides what she should do with complex feedback, including feedback regarding her own actions. The second condition, i.e., perceptual change, also occurs in P4C teachers. This is because the P4C teacher “perceives” the flow of philosophical discussion within the CoI. They find philosophical elements that are invisible to the normal teacher. P4C teachers are constantly receiving and giving feedback on their own interventions and questions, they are controlling their actions and abilities in a philosophical direction, and they can find the flow of philosophical arguments and concepts embedded in the children’s discussions and reflect them in their performances.

The special ‘something’, therefore, is a kind of knowing-how. This is our proposed answer to the Category Question. If one would prefer, however, we could think of this ‘something’ as a kind of “intelligent skill” which can satisfy both the practical and epistemic conditions outlined above. The term ‘intelligent skill’ might appeal to some who find the concept of ‘knowing-how’ untenable (With regard to

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knowing-how, we take a mixed position here between the Intellectualism and the Anti-Intellectualism). But regardless of which term is preferred, we should be focusing on matters of fact, and not simply matters of terminology.

3.3 Questioning know-how as the core

We have already seen many forms of knowing-how being proposed (especially in 3.1) as the ‘something’ which makes P4C practice philosophical. Of course, all of these forms of knowing-how have the potential to be useful, and it would no doubt be beneficial for P4C teachers to acquire as many of them as possible. But which is the core idea of this special ‘something’? Which is the most important form of knowing-how? We will begin to answer this by focusing on the notion of a question and its relationship with philosophy.

Questions are undoubtedly a very important feature of philosophy. Several philosophers have pointed out the close relationship between philosophy and questions.

One such philosopher is Bertrand Russell. In his famous book, he wrote, “Philosophy, if it cannot *answer* so many questions as we could wish, has at least the power of *asking* questions which increase the interest of the world. . . .” (Russell 1921/2019:13) (emphasis in original). Russell claims that the question is a more important component of philosophy than any single proposed answer to that question. “Thus, to sum up, our discussion of the value of philosophy; Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions, since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves. . . .” (Russell 1921/2019:110).

Furthermore, a philosopher is one who questions the question itself. That is to say, the philosopher tries to more accurately clarify and express the mystery that the question is asking. In the process, the question is refined and reveals its essence. This is an important aspect of the relationship between philosophy and the question. Ryle praises Hume for precisely this ability to clarify and alter questions, referring to the idea that “a philosopher’s genius lies not in his giving one new answer to one old question, but in his transforming all the questions” (Ryle 2009:167).

The answer to a philosophical question is a kind of knowledge. Therefore, in a view of philosophy that emphasizes questions over answers, questions can also be contrasted with knowledge. According to Singer, “Philosophy is often thought of as a body of knowledge; but this idea makes little sense, . . . It is better to consider philosophy as a method of enquiring into very fundamental questions that do not yield to the methods of science. In the Western tradition, since the time of Plato, this method can be characterized by a form of relentless questioning, in which the answer to one question only leads to a further question, and so on, and on and on” (Singer, 1995:1).

Enough quotations from great philosophers showing how important questions are in philosophy. What all these references show is that many philosophers have regarded questions as essential to the enterprise of philosophy.⁴

What about P4C researchers and practitioners? Of course, they also emphasize the fundamental importance of the question. Lipman, echoing Ryle, argues that “Children, unlike adults, do not look insistently for answers or conclusions. They look rather for the kind of transformation that philosophy provides—not giving a new answer to an old question, but transforming all the questions” (Lipman, 2003:86–7).

In the context of P4C, children’s questions are also emphasized; Lipman describes children’s own questioning as “pivotal” and stresses its importance: “In any event, this recognition of the elevated status of the question (and the reduced status of the answer) will help the students remember that questioning is the leading edge of inquiry: it opens the door to dialogue, to self-criticism, and to self-correction” (Lipman 2003:99).

We should recall here that Murriss stressed the importance of questions when she described the role of P4C teachers. “If the facilitator aims to bring about *philosophy*, then she needs to gently move the inquiry forward by asking the ‘right’ kind of questions, informed by (but not determined by) the discipline of philosophy, with an attitude that is the result of practice with philosophizing in communities of inquiry” (Murriss 2000:46, emphasis in original). Murriss argues for the P4C teacher’s superiority when it comes to asking questions. This, Murriss thinks, is also related to their knowledge of academic philosophy as discussed in Ch.2, where the P4C teacher builds on such knowledge to determine how to intervene in the CoI.

There is, however, a possible objection to this idea. Someone might argue that even if questions are important to philosophy, the aim of the philosophical enterprise is knowledge, and questions are *merely a tool* to reach that aim.

At first glance, such a claim appears to be a valid argument. However, this objection rests on a mistaken assumption about knowledge. Specifically, it assumes that the meaning of knowledge in this context must be restricted to ‘propositional knowledge’.

Hetherington argues that philosophical knowledge is knowledge of the questioning kind. According to Hetherington, any propositional knowledge of proposition *p* requires the various abilities regarding its proposition *p*. These abilities include the ability to ask questions regarding proposition *p* and using proposition *p* to ask questions about other propositions. He refers to these abilities as an ‘epistemic diaspora’. Hetherington argues that based on this theory of knowledge, philosophical knowledge is best described as a kind of knowing-how. He states that “. . . philosophical knowledge would be a *questioning* kind of knowing”. “And an essential

⁴ Of course, the view presented here is just one view of philosophy. As we have seen, however, this view is widely popular among philosophers. It is sufficient here to show that, in one view, philosophy is essentially linked to questions.

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part of such know-how is one's knowing how to ask the right questions" (Hetherington 2008:319, emphasis in original).

If philosophical knowledge is a kind of knowing-how, and if it is a questioning knowing-how, is it possible to arrive at a final, completed body of philosophical knowledge? Hetherington states that philosophical knowledge essentially consists of "... questions, more questions, all bearing upon a particular *p*. Without them, there is no philosophy of *p* (so to speak) at that moment in that place. Wherever they disappear, so does any philosophy of *p*" (Hetherington 2008:318, emphasis in original). In other words, if questions are the essence of philosophical knowledge, then one cannot do philosophy when all questions have been answered.

Hetherington's argument further solidifies the possibility that one of the aims of philosophy is to question. In other words, philosophical knowledge may be a kind of knowing-how, and not only a kind of knowing-that. Of course, the aims of philosophy might be plural. It could be argued that one aim of philosophy is to discover truth in the form of propositional knowledge, and that this knowing-how-to-question is another, separate aim. In any case, if the argument so far is correct, the view that questioning-know-how is merely a tool for philosophy would be false. It could be an aim. At the very least, it is reasonable to think that many philosophers consider questioning to be one of the essences of philosophy and that questioning know-how is one of the core features of philosophical knowledge.

We have already suggested several possible answers to the Core Question, including the ideas of agenda-setting and truth-seeking; focusing on the role of the question can help clarify some implications of these ideas. What Murriss refers to as 'agenda setting' is the clarification and formulation of questions by the facilitator-teacher in the CoI. This is evident from a passage in her paper describing a situation wherein the teacher fails to interpret the students' questions. It is the questions, rather than any sort of propositional content, that are being misinterpreted in that scene (Murriss 2000:43). The same can be said about directing the inquiry towards philosophy.⁵ Furthermore, it would be justifiable to assert that questioning know-how is necessary and essential to truth-seeking, no matter what "truth" means in this context. Moreover, philosophical truth-seeking includes the clarification of questions. Questioning and truth-seeking are distinct objectives, but they are reciprocal and work hand in hand (this point is discussed in more detail in Ch. 4.2). Therefore, by focusing on the role of the question, all possible answers to the Core Question previously discussed can be interpreted as a kind of knowing-how to question. We are now able to answer the Core Question: the 'something' that P4C teachers should have is a "questioning know-how".

⁵ Murriss emphasizes the very important point that academic knowledge of philosophy can actually *prevents* right agenda-setting and guiding the inquiry towards the direction of philosophical inquiry (Murriss 2000:43).

4. Questioning know-how and its implications.

4.1 What is a “questioning know-how”?

What is a “questioning know-how (hereafter referred to as QKH)”? According to Anti-Intellectualism, QKH possession must entail the ability to ask a question, or more broadly to engage in questioning, in appropriate conditions. QKH is not a single-track disposition, and therefore manifestations of QKH are multiple and varied. This is no different from the fact that manifestations of a person’s exercising their knowing-how to ride a bicycle include both going slowly on a rough road without falling down and stably riding at high speed. Typical manifestations of QKH are asking the right question (Murriss 2000), and questioning the question itself, which is to say clarification of the question (Murase and Tsuchiya 2019) in the CoI. This represents the intelligent aspect of QKH.⁶

On the other hand, QKH has what might be called an ignorant aspect. P4C teachers have a connection to ignorance, insofar as ignorance is a necessary condition for questioning.⁷ The person who can continue to question is an ignorant person. In the same way that Socrates thought of himself as knowing nothing, questioning people should think of themselves as ignorant, because if they were knowledgeable and not ignorant of the answer, there would be no reason to question. Teachers often ask questions they already know the answers to in order to evaluate their students’ knowledge of a subject. Such “teacher questions” are not true questions. Or, at the very least, we can claim that the teacher’s expertise in asking these kinds of questions does not qualify as QKH. It is certainly a kind of know-how, but it is very different from QKH.

Therefore, QKH has two aspects: an intelligent aspect and an ignorant one. There is a reciprocity between these two aspects: someone who continues to question is in possession of the ignorant aspect of QKH because they are compelled by their ignorance, and yet to the extent that this person continues to reformulate and clarify their questions, they are in possession of the intelligent aspect of QKH. And,

⁶ The latter, “questioning the question itself”, is particularly important, because this is one criterion that separates philosophical questions from scientific and other questions. One image of philosophy is “philosophy as the starting point of thinking” (Murase and Tsuchiya 2019 :96). This represents philosophy as thinking from a starting point, without assuming anything. A question for which the answer is already known, or for which one knows how to arrive at the correct answer, is a scientific question and not a philosophical question. A question that needs to be clarified from the meaning of the question itself, or a question that requires questioning the question itself, is a philosophical question. This is why philosophy and questions are inseparably linked. Everything is subject to questioning, including the question itself. This kind of thinking is philosophical thinking.

⁷ Kohan et al. discuss the relationship between the P4C teacher and ignorance (Kohan et al. 2016)

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conversely, questioning the question itself (viz. the intelligent aspect of QKH) is a result of the continued recognition of one's own ignorance regarding the matter at hand. This allows us to claim that those who possess QKH (that is, P4C teachers) are the "intelligent ignorant". The paradoxical nature of QKH is interesting in itself, but it will also help us understand what it is to be a philosopher in general.

4.2 Implications

What does possession of QKH entail for the teacher?

Earlier, we pointed out that the possession of knowing-how entails a change in perception. QKH must, therefore, also change the perceptions of its possessor. Specifically, the ascription of QKH to a person entails that the possessor's perceptions of questions have been altered. This can be related to Gregory's idea concerning the development of a "philosophical ear". By cultivating a philosophical ear, which I claim is equivalent to acquiring QKH, P4C teachers will understand the flow of philosophical questions in ways that were previously unrecognizable. QKH makes this 'current' of questions in CoI salient for P4C teachers, allowing them to intervene in it so as to encourage better thinking in the CoI.

This means that there are two currents of thinking present in the CoI. Firstly, there is the flow of arguments, reasonings, or inferences, which are rooted in propositions. This includes initial claims, examples given to substantiate or object to those claims, and final conclusions made regarding them. This kind of flow is constituted entirely of propositions. Secondly, there is the flow of questions, wondering, or problems, which are rooted in mysteries (or questions). This includes initial questions that began the inquiry, subsequent questions that were formed in response to the initial questions, and those things that remain unknown after the inquiry has concluded. This kind of flow consists entirely of questions. The CoI begins with asking a question, which provides impetus to our inquiry, and because of this, the role of questioning may appear to be restricted to the first step of inquiry. However, the role of questioning cannot be limited to the first step.⁸ The CoI has a constant flow of questions as well as a flow of reasonings and arguments. Therefore, the question itself could be one of the aims of philosophical inquiry. These two currents are in a reciprocal relationship with each other. CoI is a truth-centered approach (c.f. Gardner 1995), but also a question-centered approach. P4C teachers are those who find the flow of ignorance intelligible.

QKH entails changing one's perception of the participants' questions. The QKH makes P4C teachers sensitive to the participants' questions. Children often have authentic questions of their own. But some children can express these questions only in an awkward way. P4C teachers, as possessors of QKH, try to find these questions, and facilitate expressing them in a better way. This is one of the manifestations of

⁸ This point was pointed out by Y. Koga.

QKH: listening to the voices of the children, P4C teachers try to clarify them. When P4C teachers create a safe space for the community, it makes it easier for children to express their questions. For this to be possible, teachers have to be sensitive to children's questions. QKH shapes the way in which such facilitations are conducted.⁹

QKH ascription requires a sensitivity to the participants' questions. This means that P4C teachers should care about the children, and all participants in general. This can make a world of difference for the participants, because to be sensitive to participants' questions and to treat them with respect is to care for their world. As Lipman argues, "To ask the question compels people to think differently about the world" (Lipman 2003:87). Children's questions express their unique perspective about the world. That is to say, their questions express their own world. This is especially true of questions without any underlying assumptions, or questions that can only be answered by the person who asked the question. These questions express their own unique perspective, and they are created by questioning the questions themselves. By questioning the question themselves, i.e., by asking more philosophical questions, the P4C teacher is protecting the children's own world and caring for the children themselves. I think this is one of the centers of what Lippman calls 'caring thinking'. P4C teachers can care for children by trying to find out and get close to children's questions.

5. Summary

What makes us P4C teachers? We began the article with this question. P4C teachers, endeavoring to build the CoI, should have a special 'something' which transforms a classroom into a CoI, and especially a Community of *Philosophical Inquiry*. We set out to determine the nature of this special 'something' that P4C teachers should have. Our inquiry began with two clarifying questions: a Category Question and a Core Question. Our answer to the Category Question was that this 'something' belongs to the category of knowing-how or intelligent skills, not the propositional knowledge of academic philosophy and not simple skills. Next, we pointed out the close relationship between philosophy and questions. A question is necessary for doing philosophy. This is only one view of philosophy, but it is a widely held view and depicts one aspect of the nature of philosophy. Therefore, the special 'something' can be understood as QKH (questioning know-how). QKH has many interesting characteristics, one of which is its paradoxical nature: it is both intelligent and ignorant. The intelligent aspect of QKH is a way of asking the right questions, a way of clarifying questions; the ignorant aspect of QKH is a certain attitude toward the unknown, much like

⁹ In this sense, facilitation in order to better express a participant's own question does not solely come from P4C teachers, but also from the climate of the community (c.f. "Intellectual Safety" Jackson 2013). This is to say, QKH is a kind of knowing-how that a community can have.

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Socrates' attitude. This ambivalence is what makes the intelligent skill of QKH so interesting. Focusing on the QKH allows us to better understand that there is a flow of questions within the CoI, and also appreciate the significance of the questions that each child has.

Here the argument relies on one view of philosophy, namely, the view that questions are essential to philosophy. Therefore, the claim that QKH is the core of P4C teachers' practice also relies on a particular view of philosophy. There could be alternative views of what kind of enterprise philosophy is, and there is no easy way to conclude this. We can only hope to justify the views expressed above by continuing to question the nature of QKH.

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