Paolo Bonardi氏講演会「Dialetheism and Rational Belief」（1/27・大阪大学）
2019.01.23
Paolo Bonardi氏の講演会「Dialetheism and Rational Belief」が開催されます。奮ってご参加ください。
日時：１月２７日（日）１６：００－１７：３０
場所：大阪大学豊中キャンパス文法経本館演習室２５４
概要：
My talk aims to answer two closely related questions: 1) what does it mean for a dialetheist to be rational? 2) How do non-dialetheists explain the rationality of dialetheists?
In order to answer question 1), I will examine a characterization of rationality based on Graham Priest’s works “Pragmatics” (In Contradiction, ch. 7) and “Rational Belief” (Doubt Truth to be a Liar, ch. 7).
In order to answer question 2), I will first examine Frege’s Constraint: a rational subject cannot simultaneously believe and disbelieve (i.e. believe the negation of) a to be F under the same mode of presentation or under different modes of presentation which the subject realizes are modes of presentation of the same thing (Schiffer). After arguing against modes of presentation and introducing two in my opinion more convincing notions, belief subsystems (Davidson) and coordination (Fine and Salmon), I will examine the following alternative constraint: a rational subject cannot simultaneously believe a to be F and believe a not to be F from the same subsystem and by positively coordinating the two occurrences of a as well as the two occurrences of F.
（講演は英語でおこなわれます）
お問い合わせ：nayuta.miki<a>let.osaka-u.ac.jp （三木）
日時：１月２７日（日）１６：００－１７：３０
場所：大阪大学豊中キャンパス文法経本館演習室２５４
概要：
My talk aims to answer two closely related questions: 1) what does it mean for a dialetheist to be rational? 2) How do non-dialetheists explain the rationality of dialetheists?
In order to answer question 1), I will examine a characterization of rationality based on Graham Priest’s works “Pragmatics” (In Contradiction, ch. 7) and “Rational Belief” (Doubt Truth to be a Liar, ch. 7).
In order to answer question 2), I will first examine Frege’s Constraint: a rational subject cannot simultaneously believe and disbelieve (i.e. believe the negation of) a to be F under the same mode of presentation or under different modes of presentation which the subject realizes are modes of presentation of the same thing (Schiffer). After arguing against modes of presentation and introducing two in my opinion more convincing notions, belief subsystems (Davidson) and coordination (Fine and Salmon), I will examine the following alternative constraint: a rational subject cannot simultaneously believe a to be F and believe a not to be F from the same subsystem and by positively coordinating the two occurrences of a as well as the two occurrences of F.
（講演は英語でおこなわれます）
お問い合わせ：nayuta.miki<a>let.osaka-u.ac.jp （三木）
